(a) When a judgment of imprisonment is imposed, or the execution of a judgment of imprisonment is ordered suspended, the sentencing judge must, in their sound discretion, order imposition of a sentence not to exceed the middle term, except as otherwise provided in paragraph (b).
(Subd (a) amended effective March 14, 2022; previously amended effective July 28, 1977, January 1, 1991, January 1, 2007, and May 23, 2007.)
(b) The court may only choose an upper term when (1) there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition of an upper term, and (2) the facts underlying those circumstances have been (i) stipulated to by the defendant, (ii) found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by a jury, or (iii) found true beyond a reasonable doubt by the judge in a court trial.
(Subd (b) adopted effective March 14, 2022.)
(c) Notwithstanding paragraphs (a) and (b), the court may consider the fact of the defendant's prior convictions based on a certified record of conviction without it having been stipulated to by the defendant or found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by a jury or the judge in a court trial. This exception does not apply to the use of the record of a prior conviction in selecting the upper term of an enhancement.
(Subd (c) adopted effective March 14, 2022.)
(d) In selecting between the middle and lower terms of imprisonment, the sentencing judge may consider circumstances in aggravation or mitigation, and any other factor reasonably related to the sentencing decision. The court may consider factors in aggravation and mitigation, whether or not the factors have been stipulated to by the defendant or found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by a jury or the judge in a court trial. The relevant circumstances may be obtained from the case record, the probation officer's report, other reports and statements properly received, statements in aggravation or mitigation, and any evidence introduced at the sentencing hearing.
(Subd (d) relettered and amended effective March 14, 2022; adopted as Subd (b); previously amended effective July 28, 1977, January 1, 1991, January 1, 2007, May 23, 2007, January 1, 2008, and January 1, 2017.)
(e) Notwithstanding section 1170(b)(1), and unless the court finds that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances such that imposition of the lower term would be contrary to the interests of justice, the court must order imposition of the lower term if any of the following was a contributing factor in the commission of the offense:
(1) The defendant has experienced psychological, physical, or childhood trauma, including, but not limited to, abuse, neglect, exploitation, or sexual violence;
(2) The defendant is a youth, or was a youth as defined under section 1016.7(b) at the time of the commission of the offense; or
(3) Prior to the instant offense, or at the time of the commission of the offense, the defendant is or was a victim of intimate partner violence or human trafficking.
(Subd (e) adopted effective March 14, 2022.)
(f) Paragraph (e) does not preclude the court from imposing the lower term even if there is no evidence of the circumstances listed in paragraph (e).
(Subd (f) adopted effective March 14, 2022.)
(g) To comply with section 1170(b)(5), a fact charged and found as an enhancement may be used as a reason for imposing a particular term only if the court has discretion to strike the punishment for the enhancement and does so. The use of a fact of an enhancement to impose the upper term of imprisonment is an adequate reason for striking the additional term of imprisonment, regardless of the effect on the total term.
(Subd (g) relettered and amended effective March 14, 2022; adopted as Subd (c) effective January 1, 1991; previously amended effective January 1, 2018.
(h) A fact that is an element of the crime on which punishment is being imposed may not be used to impose a particular term.
(Subd (h) relettered effective March 14, 2022; adopted as Subd (d) effective January 1, 1991; previously amended effective January 1, 2007, May 23, 2007, and January 1, 2018.)
(i) The reasons for selecting one of the three authorized terms of imprisonment referred to in section 1170(b) must be stated orally on the record.
(Subd (i) relettered effective March 14, 2022; previously amended and relettered effective January 1, 1991; previously amended effective July 28, 1977, January 1, 2007, May 23, 2007, and January 1, 2017.)
Rule 4.420 amended effective March 14, 2022; adopted as rule 439 effective July 1, 1977; previously amended and renumbered as rule 420 effective January 1, 1991; previously renumbered effective January 1, 2001; previously amended effective July 28, 1977, January 1, 2007, May 23, 2007, January 1, 2008, January 1, 2017, and January 1, 2018.
Advisory Committee Comment
It is not clear whether the reasons stated by the judge for selecting a particular term qualify as "facts" for the purposes of the rule prohibition on dual use of facts. Until the issue is clarified, judges should avoid the use of reasons that may constitute an impermissible dual use of facts. For example, the court is not permitted to use a reason to impose a greater term if that reason also is either (1) the same as an enhancement that will be imposed, or (2) an element of the crime. The court should not use the same reason to impose a consecutive sentence as to impose an upper term of imprisonment. (People v. Avalos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 216, 233.) It is not improper to use the same reason to deny probation and to impose the upper term. (People v. Bowen (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 102, 106.)
The rule makes it clear that a fact charged and found as an enhancement may, in the alternative, be used as a factor in aggravation.
People v. Riolo (1983) 33 Cal.3d 223, 227 (and note 5 on 227) held that section 1170.1(a) does not require the judgment to state the base term (upper, middle, or lower) and enhancements, computed independently, on counts that are subject to automatic reduction under the one-third formula of section 1170.1(a).
Even when sentencing is under section 1170.1, however, it is essential to determine the base term and specific enhancements for each count independently, in order to know which is the principal term count. The principal term count must be determined before any calculation is made using the one-third formula for subordinate terms.
In addition, the base term (upper, middle, or lower) for each count must be determined to arrive at an informed decision whether to make terms consecutive or concurrent; and the base term for each count must be stated in the judgment when sentences are concurrent or are fully consecutive (i.e., not subject to the one-third rule of section 1170.1(a)).
Case law suggests that in determining the "interests of justice" the court should consider the constitutional rights of the defendant and the interests of society represented by the people; the defendant's background and prospects, including the presence or absence of a record; the nature and circumstances of the crime and the defendant's level of involvement; the factors in aggravation and mitigation including the specific factors in mitigation of Penal Code section 1170(b)(6); and the factors that would motivate a "reasonable judge" in the exercise of their discretion. The court should not consider whether the defendant has simply pled guilty, factors related to controlling the court's calendar, or antipathy toward the statutory scheme. (See People v. Romero (1996) 13 Cal.4th 947; People v. Dent (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1726; People v. Kessel (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 322; People v. Orin (1975) 13 Cal.3d 937.)