

# Judicial Council of California Criminal Jury Instructions

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## CALCRIM 2021

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Series 100–1800



**Judicial Council of California  
Advisory Committee on Criminal Jury Instructions**

Hon. Peter J. Siggins, *Chair*

LexisNexis Matthew Bender  
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Editorial Office  
230 Park Ave., 7th Floor, New York, NY 10169 (800) 543-6862  
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MATTHEW  BENDER

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March 2021

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# Preface

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These instructions represent the work of the Task Force on Jury Instructions, appointed by Chief Justice Ronald M. George in 1997. Our charge was to write instructions that are both legally accurate and understandable to the average juror. The eight-year effort addressed a need for instructions written in plain English and responded to the specific recommendation of the Blue Ribbon Commission on Jury System Improvement that observed: “jury instructions as presently given in California and elsewhere are, on occasion, simply impenetrable to the ordinary juror” (Blue Ribbon Commission on Jury System Improvement, Final Report (May 1996) p. 93).<sup>1</sup>

The reason instructions are so often impenetrable is that they are based on the language of case law and statutes written by and for a specialized legal audience and expressed in terms of art that have evolved through multiple languages, in many countries, over several centuries. We do not seek to lose either the majesty of the law or the rich language in which lawyers and judges have expressed it. However, our work reflects a belief that sound communication takes into account the audience to which it is addressed. Jurors perform an essential service in our democracy. We are absolutely dependent upon them to apply the law fairly and accurately. In order to do so, they must be able to understand the instructions they are asked to follow.

These instructions were prepared by a statewide committee of justices from the Court of Appeal, trial court judges, attorneys, academicians, and lay people. They are approved by the Judicial Council as the state’s official instructions pursuant to the California Rules of Court (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.1050(a)).<sup>2</sup> The Rules of Court strongly encourage their use (*Id.*, Rule 2.1050(e)).<sup>3</sup>

Each instruction began with the preparation of an initial draft, followed by subcommittee review and full committee consideration. The task force was assisted by a remarkable group of staff attorneys that included Robin Seeley, Natasha Minsker, Jeffrey Shea, Melissa Johnson, Elizabeth Givens, and Lisa Lockyer. Throughout our multi-year effort, drafts were repeatedly circulated for public comment. The task force reviewed thousands of observations, and this final product reflects the input of judges and lawyers throughout California. We are grateful for the willingness of prosecutors, defense counsel, appellate specialists, judges, and justices to share their insights and the benefit of their experience.

A list of people and organizations who have contributed to this undertaking follows this preface; we apologize to anyone who has been omitted through oversight.

The official publisher of this work is LexisNexis Matthew Bender. Its representatives have worked closely with us to prepare the instructions and to create a software platform for their usage. We have been greatly aided by their efficiency, professionalism, and commitment to excellence. We particularly recognize Bruce Greenlee for his tireless efforts in this regard.

We gratefully acknowledge our predecessor. The Committee on Standard Jury Instructions, Criminal, of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, published the first edition of California Jury Instructions, Criminal (CALJIC) in 1946. For six decades, their efforts have helped guide the deliberations of California jurors. While we have taken a very different approach to the

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<sup>1</sup> Blue Ribbon Commission on Jury System Improvement, Final Report (May 1996) p. 93.

<sup>2</sup> Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.1050(a).

<sup>3</sup> *Id.*, Rule 2.1050(e).

drafting of instructions, the tremendous contribution the CALJIC committee has made to the California justice system cannot be overestimated.

Like the law on which they are based, these instructions will continue to change. This evolution will come not only through appellate decisions and legislation but also through the observations and comments of the legal community. The Judicial Council's Advisory Committee on Criminal Jury Instructions, charged with maintaining these instructions, welcomes your comments and suggestions for modification.

Finally, I wish to express my personal appreciation for the leadership of Chief Justice George whose vision and commitment have infused this project from its inception and to the remarkable men and women who so tirelessly served on the task force.

May 2005

Carol A. Corrigan  
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal  
First Appellate District







# *Preface to CALCRIM Updates*

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This edition of CALCRIM includes a number of additions and changes to the instructions that were first published in 2005. In providing these updates, the Judicial Council Advisory Committee on Criminal Jury Instructions is fulfilling its charge to ensure that CALCRIM reflects all changes in the law.

In addition to maintaining the legal accuracy of CALCRIM, the committee carefully considered and implemented suggestions from CALCRIM users. Responding to feedback from users is consistent with the Advisory Committee's goal to maintain CALCRIM as the work product of the legal community. We hope that our many contributors view our role in the same way and will continue to support us.

September 2018

Hon. Peter J. Siggins, Presiding Justice  
Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three  
Chair, Advisory Committee on Criminal Jury Instructions

**The Advisory Committee on Criminal Jury Instructions welcomes comments.**

**Send print comments to:**

Advisory Committee on Criminal Jury Instructions  
c/o Judicial Council of California  
Criminal Justice Services  
455 Golden Gate Avenue  
San Francisco, CA 94102-3588

Or you may send comments by e-mail to [criminaljuryinstructions@jud.ca.gov](mailto:criminaljuryinstructions@jud.ca.gov).



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# Guide for Using Judicial Council of California Criminal Jury Instructions (CALCRIM)

The Judicial Council jury instructions are accurate, designed to be easy to understand, and easy to use. This guide provides an introduction to the instructions and explains conventions and features that will assist in their use.

In order to fulfill its mandate pursuant to Rule 10.59 of the California Rules of Court<sup>1</sup> to maintain the criminal jury instructions, members of the advisory committee meet several times a year to consider changes in statutes, appellate opinions, and suggestions from practitioners. *It bears emphasis that when the committee proposes changing a jury instruction, that does not necessarily mean the previous version of the instruction was incorrect.* Often the committee proposes changes for reasons of style, consistency among similar instructions, and to improve clarity.

## Judicial Council Instructions Endorsed by Rule of Court

Rule 2.1050 of the California Rules of Court provides:

The California jury instructions approved by the Judicial Council are the official instructions for use in the state of California . . .

The Judicial Council endorses these instructions for use and makes every effort to ensure that they accurately state existing law . . .

Use of the Judicial Council instructions is strongly encouraged.

## Using the Instructions

### Bench Notes

The text of each instruction is followed by a section in the Bench Notes titled “Instructional Duty,” which alerts the user to any *sua sponte* duties to instruct and special circumstances raised by the instruction. It may also include references to other instructions that should or should not be used. In some instances, the directions include suggestions for modification. In the “Authority” section, all of the pertinent sources for the instruction are listed. Some of the instructions also have sections containing “Related Issues” and “Commentary.” The Bench Notes also refer to any relevant lesser included offenses. Secondary sources appear at the end of instructions. The official publisher, and not the Judicial Council, is responsible for updating the citations for secondary sources. Users should consult the Bench Notes before using an instruction. Italicized notes between angle brackets in the language of the instruction itself signal important issues or choices. For example, in instruction 1750, Receiving Stolen Property, optional element 3 is introduced thus: *<Give element 3 when instructing on knowledge of presence of property; see Bench Notes>*.

### Multiple-Defendant and Multiple-Count Cases

These instructions were drafted for the common case in which a single defendant is on trial. The document-assembly program from the Judicial Council’s official publisher, LexisNexis, will modify the instructions for use in multi-defendant cases. It will also allow the user to name the defendants charged in a particular instruction if the instruction applies only to some of the defendants on trial in the case.

It is impossible to predict the possible fact combinations that may be present when a crime is

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<sup>1</sup> Rule 10.59(a) states: “The committee regularly reviews case law and statutes affecting jury instructions and makes recommendations to the Judicial Council for updating, amending, and adding topics to the council’s criminal jury instructions.”

charged multiple times or committed by different defendants against different victims involving different facts. Thus, when an instruction is being used for more than one count and the factual basis for the instruction is different for the different counts, the user will need to modify the instruction as appropriate.

### **Related California Jury Instructions, Criminal (CALJIC)**

The CALJIC and CALCRIM instructions should *never* be used together. While the legal principles are obviously the same, the organization of concepts is approached differently. Mixing the two sets of instructions into a unified whole cannot be done and may result in omissions or confusion that could severely compromise clarity and accuracy. Nevertheless, for convenient reference this publication includes a table of related CALJIC instructions.

### **Titles and Definitions**

The titles of the instructions are directed to lawyers and sometimes use words and phrases not used in the instructions themselves. The title is not a part of the instruction. The titles may be removed before presentation to the jury.

The instructions avoid separate definitions of legal terms whenever possible. Instead, definitions have been incorporated into the language of the instructions in which the terms appear. When a definition is lengthy, a cross-reference to that definition is provided.

Defined terms are printed in italics in the text of the definition.

### **Alternatives vs. Options**

When the user must choose one of two or more options in order to complete the instruction, the choice of necessary alternatives is presented in parentheses thus: *When the defendant acted, George Jones was performing (his/her) duties as a school employee.*

The instructions use brackets to provide optional choices that may be necessary or appropriate, depending on the individual circumstances of the case: *[If you find that George Jones threatened or harmed the defendant [or others] in the past, you may consider that information in evaluating the defendant's beliefs.]*

Finally, both parentheses and brackets may appear in the same sentence to indicate options that arise depending on which necessary alternatives are selected: *[It is not required that the person killed be the (victim/intended victim) of the (felony/ [or] felonies).]*

### **General and Specific Intent**

The instructions do not use the terms general and specific intent because while these terms are very familiar to judges and lawyers, they are novel and often confusing to many jurors. Instead, if the defendant must specifically intend to commit an act, the particular intent required is expressed without using the term of art “specific intent.” Instructions 250–254 provide jurors with additional guidance on specific vs. general intent crimes and the union of act and intent.

### **Organization of the Instructions**

The instructions are organized into 24 series, which reflect broad categories of crime (e.g., Homicide) and other components of the trial (e.g., Evidence). The series, and the instructions within each series, are presented in the order in which they are likely to be given in an actual trial. As a result, greater offenses (like DUI with injury) come before lesser offenses (DUI). All of the defenses are grouped together at the end of the instructions, rather than dispersed throughout. The misdemeanors are placed within the category of instructions to which they belong, so simple battery is found with the other battery instructions rather than in a stand-alone misdemeanor section.

### **Lesser Included Offenses**

Users may wish to modify instructions used to explain lesser included offenses by replacing the standard introductory sentence, “**The defendant is charged with È! .**” with “**The crime of \_\_\_\_\_ (e.g., false imprisonment) is a lesser offense than the crime of \_\_\_\_\_ (e.g., kidnapping)**” to amplify the explanation provided in instructions 3517–3519: “**\_\_\_\_\_ <insert crime> is a lesser crime of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert crime> [charged in Count \_\_\_\_\_].**”

When giving the lesser included offense instructions 640 and 641 (homicide) or instructions 3517–3519 (non-homicide), no further modification of the corresponding instructions on lesser crimes is necessary to comply with the requirements of *People v. Dewberry* (1959) 51 Cal.2d 548.

### **Burden of Production/Burden of Proof**

The instructions never refer to the “burden of producing evidence.” The drafters concluded that it is the court’s decision whether the party has met the burden of production. If the burden is not met, no further instruction is necessary. The question for the jury is whether a party has met its properly allocated burden based on the evidence received.

Instruction 103 on Reasonable Doubt states, “Whenever I tell you the People must prove something, I mean they must prove it beyond a reasonable doubt [unless I specifically tell you otherwise].” Thus, when the concept of reasonable doubt is explained and defined, the jury is told that it is the standard that applies to every issue the People must prove, unless the court specifically informs the jury otherwise.

### **Sentencing Factors and Enhancements**

Because the law is rapidly evolving regarding when sentencing factors and enhancements must be submitted to the jury, we have provided “template” instructions 3250 and 3251 so that the court may tailor an appropriate instruction that corresponds to this emerging body of law.

### **Personal pronouns**

Many instructions include an option to insert the personal pronouns “he/she,” “his/her,” or “him/her.” The committee does not intend these options to be limiting. It is the policy of the State of California that nonbinary people are entitled to full legal recognition and equal treatment under the law. In accordance with this policy, attorneys and courts should ensure that they are using preferred personal pronouns.



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2365–2369. Reserved for Future Use

### **(iii) Planting**

2370. Planting, etc., Cannabis (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11358(c)–(d))

2371–2374. Reserved for Future Use

### **(iv) Simple Possession**

2375. Simple Possession of Cannabis or Concentrated Cannabis: Misdemeanor (Health & Saf. Code, § 11357(b))

2376. Simple Possession of Cannabis or Concentrated Cannabis on School Grounds: Misdemeanor (Health & Saf. Code, § 11357(c))

2377. Simple Possession of Concentrated Cannabis (Health & Saf. Code, § 11357(a))

2378–2379. Reserved for Future Use

## **F. OFFENSES INVOLVING MINORS**

### **(i) Controlled Substances**

2380. Sale, Furnishing, etc., of Controlled Substance to Minor (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11353, 11354, 11380(a))

2381. Offering to Sell, Furnish, etc., Controlled Substance to Minor (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11353, 11354, 11380(a))

- 2382. Employment of Minor to Sell Controlled Substance (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11353, 11354)
- 2383. Use of Minor as Agent to Violate Controlled Substance Law (Health & Saf. Code, § 11380(a))
- 2384. Inducing Minor to Violate Controlled Substance Laws (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11353, 11354, 11380(a))
- 2385–2389. Reserved for Future Use

**(ii) Marijuana**

- 2390. Sale, Furnishing, etc., of Cannabis to Minor (Health & Saf. Code, § 11361)
- 2391. Offering to Sell, Furnish, etc., Cannabis to Minor (Health & Saf. Code, § 11361)
- 2392. Employment of Minor to Sell, etc., Cannabis (Health & Saf. Code, § 11361(a))
- 2393. Inducing Minor to Use Cannabis (Health & Saf. Code, § 11361(a))
- 2394–2399. Reserved for Future Use

**G. USE AND POSSESSION OF PARAPHERNALIA**

**(i) Use**

- 2400. Using or Being Under the Influence of Controlled Substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11550)
- 2401. Aiding and Abetting Unlawful Use of Controlled Substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11365)
- 2402–2409. Reserved for Future Use

**(ii) Possession of Paraphernalia**

- 2410. Possession of Controlled Substance Paraphernalia (Health & Saf. Code, § 11364)
- 2411. Possession of Hypodermic Needle or Syringe (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 4140) (revoked)
- 2412. Fraudulently Obtaining a Hypodermic Needle or Syringe (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 4326(a))
- 2413. Using or Permitting Improper Use of a Hypodermic Needle or Syringe (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 4326(b))
- 2414–2429. Reserved for Future Use

**H. MONEY FROM CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES**

- 2430. Possession of More Than \$100,000 Related to Transaction Involving Controlled Substance: Proceeds (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.6)
- 2431. Possession of More Than \$100,000 Related to Transaction Involving Controlled Substance: Money to Purchase (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.6)
- 2432. Attorney's Possession of More Than \$100,000 Related to Transaction Involving Controlled Substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.6(b))
- 2433–2439. Reserved for Future Use

**I. OTHER RELATED OFFENSES**

- 2440. Maintaining a Place for Controlled Substance Sale or Use (Health & Saf. Code, § 11366)
- 2441. Use of False Compartment to Conceal Controlled Substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11366.8)
- 2442–2499. Reserved for Future Use

**SERIES 2500        WEAPONS**

**A. POSSESSION OF ILLEGAL OR DEADLY WEAPON**

- 2500. Illegal Possession, etc., of Weapon
- 2501. Carrying Concealed Explosive or Dirk or Dagger (Pen. Code, §§ 21310, 16470)
- 2502. Possession, etc., of Switchblade Knife (Pen. Code, § 21510)
- 2503. Possession of Deadly Weapon With Intent to Assault (Pen. Code, § 17500)
- 2504–2509. Reserved for Future Use

**B. POSSESSION OF FIREARM BY PERSON PROHIBITED**

- 2510. Possession of Firearm by Person Prohibited Due to Conviction—No Stipulation to Conviction (Pen. Code, §§ 29800, 29805, 29820, 29900)
- 2511. Possession of Firearm by Person Prohibited Due to Conviction—Stipulation to Conviction (Pen. Code, §§ 29800, 29805, 29820, 29900)
- 2512. Possession of Firearm by Person Prohibited by Court Order (Pen. Code, §§ 29815, 29825)
- 2513. Possession of Firearm by Person Addicted to a Narcotic Drug (Pen. Code, § 29800)
- 2514. Possession of Firearm by Person Prohibited by Statute: Self-Defense
- 2515–2519. Reserved for Future Use

**C. CARRYING A FIREARM**

**(i) Concealed**

- 2520. Carrying Concealed Firearm on Person (Pen. Code, § 25400(a)(2))
- 2521. Carrying Concealed Firearm Within Vehicle (Pen. Code, § 25400(a)(1))
- 2522. Carrying Concealed Firearm: Caused to Be Carried Within Vehicle (Pen. Code, § 25400(a)(3))
- 2523–2529. Reserved for Future Use

**(ii) Loaded**

- 2530. Carrying Loaded Firearm (Pen. Code, § 25850(a))
- 2531–2539. Reserved for Future Use

**(iii) Sentencing Factors**

- 2540. Carrying Firearm: Specified Convictions (Pen. Code, §§ 25400(a), 25850(c))
- 2541. Carrying Firearm: Stolen Firearm (Pen. Code, §§ 25400(c)(2), 25850(c)(2))

- 2542. Carrying Firearm: Active Participant in Criminal Street Gang (Pen. Code, §§ 25400(c)(3), 25850(c)(3))
- 2543. Carrying Firearm: Not in Lawful Possession (Pen. Code, §§ 25400(c)(4), 25850(c)(4))
- 2544. Carrying Firearm: Possession of Firearm Prohibited Due to Conviction, Court Order, or Mental Illness (Pen. Code, §§ 25400(c)(4), 25850(c)(4))
- 2545. Carrying Loaded Firearm: Not Registered Owner (Pen. Code, § 25850(c)(6))
- 2546. Carrying Concealed Firearm: Not Registered Owner and Weapon Loaded (Pen. Code, § 25400(c)(6))
- 2547–2559. Reserved for Future Use

#### **D. ASSAULT WEAPONS**

- 2560. Possession, etc., of Assault Weapon or .50 BMG Rifle (Pen. Code, §§ 30605, 30600)
- 2561. Possession, etc., of Assault Weapon or .50 BMG Rifle While Committing Other Offense—Charged as Separate Count and as Enhancement (Pen. Code, § 30615)
- 2562. Possession, etc., of Assault Weapon or .50 BMG Rifle While Committing Other Offense—Charged Only as Enhancement (Pen. Code, § 30615)
- 2563–2569. Reserved for Future Use

#### **E. EXPLOSIVES AND DESTRUCTIVE DEVICES**

- 2570. Possession of Destructive Device (Pen. Code, § 18710)
- 2571. Carrying or Placing Explosive or Destructive Device on Common Carrier (Pen. Code, § 18725)
- 2572. Possession of Explosive or Destructive Device in Specified Place (Pen. Code, § 18715)
- 2573. Possession, Explosion, etc., of Explosive or Destructive Device With Intent to Injure or Damage (Pen. Code, § 18740)
- 2574. Sale or Transportation of Destructive Device (Pen. Code, § 18730)
- 2575. Offer to Sell Destructive Device (Pen. Code, § 18730)
- 2576. Explosion of Explosive or Destructive Device With Intent to Murder (Pen. Code, § 18745)
- 2577. Explosion of Explosive or Destructive Device Causing Bodily Injury (Pen. Code, § 18750)
- 2578. Explosion of Explosive or Destructive Device Causing Death, Mayhem, or Great Bodily Injury (Pen. Code, § 18755)
- 2579. Possession of Materials to Make Destructive Device or Explosive (Pen. Code, § 18720)
- 2580–2589. Reserved for Future Use

#### **F. OTHER WEAPONS OFFENSES**

- 2590. Armed Criminal Action (Pen. Code, § 25800)
- 2591. Possession of Ammunition by Person Prohibited From Possessing Firearm Due to Conviction or Mental Illness (Pen. Code, § 30305(a))

2592. Possession of Ammunition by Person Prohibited From Possessing Firearm Due to Court Order (Pen. Code, § 30305(a))

2593–2599. Reserved for Future Use

## **SERIES 2600        CRIMES AGAINST GOVERNMENT**

### **A. BRIBERY OF OFFICIAL**

2600. Giving or Offering a Bribe to an Executive Officer (Pen. Code, § 67)

2601. Giving or Offering a Bribe to a Ministerial Officer (Pen. Code, § 67.5)

2602. Giving or Offering a Bribe to a Ministerial Officer: Value of Thing Offered (Pen. Code, § 67.5(b))

2603. Requesting or Taking a Bribe (Pen. Code, §§ 68, 86, 93)

2604–2609. Reserved for Future Use

### **B. BRIBERY OR INTIMIDATION OF WITNESS**

#### **(i) Bribery**

2610. Giving or Offering a Bribe to a Witness (Pen. Code, § 137(a))

2611. Giving or Offering a Bribe to a Witness Not to Testify (Pen. Code, § 138(a))

2612. Witness Receiving a Bribe (Pen. Code, § 138(b))

2613–2619. Reserved for Future Use

#### **(ii) Threatening or Intimidating**

2620. Using Force or Threatening a Witness Before Testimony or Information Given (Pen. Code, § 137(b))

2621. Influencing a Witness by Fraud (Pen. Code, § 137(b))

2622. Intimidating a Witness (Pen. Code, § 136.1(a) & (b))

2623. Intimidating a Witness: Sentencing Factors (Pen. Code, § 136.1(c))

2624. Threatening a Witness After Testimony or Information Given (Pen. Code, § 140(a))

2625–2629. Reserved for Future Use

### **C. EVIDENCE TAMPERING**

2630. Evidence Tampering by Peace Officer or Other Person (Pen. Code, § 141)

2631–2639. Reserved for Future Use

### **D. PERJURY**

2640. Perjury (Pen. Code, § 118)

2641. Perjury by False Affidavit (Pen. Code, § 118a)

2642–2649. Reserved for Future Use

### **E. THREATENING OR RESISTING OFFICER**

2650. Threatening a Public Official (Pen. Code, § 76)



- 2651. Trying to Prevent an Executive Officer From Performing Duty (Pen. Code, § 69)
- 2652. Resisting an Executive Officer in Performance of Duty (Pen. Code, § 69)
- 2653. Taking Firearm or Weapon While Resisting Peace Officer or Public Officer (Pen. Code, § 148(b) & (c))
- 2654. Intentionally Taking or Attempting to Take Firearm From Peace Officer or Public Officer (Pen. Code, § 148(d))
- 2655. Causing Death or Serious Bodily Injury While Resisting Peace Officer (Pen. Code, § 148.10(a) & (b))
- 2656. Resisting Peace Officer, Public Officer, or EMT (Pen. Code, § 148(a))
- 2657–2669. Reserved for Future Use

#### **F. LAWFUL PERFORMANCE**

- 2670. Lawful Performance: Peace Officer
- 2671. Lawful Performance: Custodial Officer
- 2672. Lawful Performance: Resisting Unlawful Arrest With Force
- 2673. Pat-Down Search
- 2674–2679. Reserved for Future Use

#### **G. UNLAWFUL ASSEMBLY AND DISTURBING THE PEACE**

- 2680. Courthouse Picketing (Pen. Code, § 169)
- 2681. Disturbance of Public Meeting (Pen. Code, § 403)
- 2682. Inciting a Riot (Pen. Code, § 404.6(a))
- 2683. Participating in a Riot (Pen. Code, §§ 404, 405)
- 2684. Participating in a Rout (Pen. Code, §§ 406, 408)
- 2685. Participating in an Unlawful Assembly (Pen. Code, §§ 407, 408)
- 2686. Refusal to Disperse: Riot, Rout, or Unlawful Assembly (Pen. Code, §§ 407, 409)
- 2687. Refusal to Disperse: Intent to Commit Unlawful Act (Pen. Code, § 416(a))
- 2688. Disturbing the Peace: Fighting or Challenging Someone to Fight (Pen. Code, §§ 415(1), 415.5(a)(1))
- 2689. Disturbing the Peace: Loud and Unreasonable Noise (Pen. Code, §§ 415(2), 415.5(a)(2))
- 2690. Disturbing the Peace: Offensive Words (Pen. Code, §§ 415(3), 415.5(a)(3))
- 2691–2699. Reserved for Future Use

#### **H. VIOLATION OF COURT ORDER**

- 2700. Violation of Court Order (Pen. Code, § 166(a)(4) & (b)(1))
- 2701. Violation of Court Order: Protective Order or Stay Away (Pen. Code, §§ 166(c)(1), 273.6)
- 2702. Violation of Court Order: Protective Order or Stay Away—Physical Injury (Pen. Code, §§ 166(c)(2), 273.6(b))

2703. Violation of Court Order: Protective Order or Stay Away—Act of Violence (Pen. Code, §§ 166(c)(4), 273.6(d))

2704–2719. Reserved for Future Use

## **I. CRIMES INVOLVING PRISONERS**

### **(i) Assault and Battery**

2720. Assault by Prisoner Serving Life Sentence (Pen. Code, § 4500)

2721. Assault by Prisoner (Pen. Code, § 4501)

2722. Battery by Gassing (Pen. Code, §§ 243.9, 4501.1)

2723. Battery by Prisoner on Nonprisoner (Pen. Code, § 4501.5)

2724–2734. Reserved for Future Use

### **(ii) Hostage Taking and Rioting**

2735. Holding a Hostage (Pen. Code, § 4503)

2736. Inciting a Riot in a Prison or Jail (Pen. Code, § 404.6(c))

2737–2744. Reserved for Future Use

### **(iii) Possession of Contraband**

2745. Possession or Manufacture of Weapon in Penal Institution (Pen. Code, § 4502)

2746. Possession of Firearm, Deadly Weapon, or Explosive in a Jail or County Road Camp (Pen. Code, § 4574(a))

2747. Bringing or Sending Firearm, Deadly Weapon, or Explosive Into Penal Institution (Pen. Code, § 4574(a)–(c))

2748. Possession of Controlled Substance or Paraphernalia in Penal Institution (Pen. Code, § 4573.6)

2749–2759. Reserved for Future Use

### **(iv) Escape**

2760. Escape (Pen. Code, § 4532(a)(1) & (b)(1))

2761. Escape by Force or Violence (Pen. Code, § 4532(a)(2) & (b)(2))

2762. Escape After Remand or Arrest (Pen. Code, § 836.6)

2763. Escape After Remand or Arrest: Force or Violence (Pen. Code, § 836.6)

2764. Escape: Necessity Defense

## **J. MISAPPROPRIATION OF PUBLIC MONEY**

2765. Misappropriation of Public Money (Pen. Code § 424(a)(1–7))

2766–2799. Reserved for Future Use

## **SERIES 2800 TAX CRIMES**

### **A. FAILURE TO FILE**

2800. Failure to File Tax Return (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19701(a))

2801. Willful Failure to File Tax Return (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19706)

2802–2809. Reserved for Future Use

#### **B. FALSE RETURN**

2810. False Tax Return (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19701(a))

2811. Willfully Filing False Tax Return: Statement Made Under Penalty of Perjury (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19705(a)(1))

2812. Willfully Filing False Tax Return: Intent to Evade Tax (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19706)

2813–2824. Reserved for Future Use

#### **C. OTHER TAX OFFENSES**

2825. Aiding in Preparation of False Tax Return (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19705(a)(2))

2826. Willful Failure to Pay Tax (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19701(c))

2827. Concealing Property With Intent to Evade Tax (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19705(a)(4))

2828. Failure to Withhold Tax (Rev. & Tax. Code, §§ 19708, 19709)

2829–2839. Reserved for Future Use

#### **D. EVIDENCE**

2840. Evidence of Uncharged Tax Offense: Failed to File Previous Returns

2841. No Deductions on Gross Income From Illegal Conduct (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 17282(a))

2842. Determining Income: Net Worth Method

2843. Determining Income: Bank Deposits Method

2844. Determining Income: Cash Expenditures Method

2845. Determining Income: Specific Items Method

2846. Proof of Unreported Taxable Income: Must Still Prove Elements of Offense

2847–2859. Reserved for Future Use

#### **E. DEFENSES**

2860. Defense: Good Faith Belief Conduct Legal

2861. Defense: Reliance on Professional Advice

2862–2899. Reserved for Future Use

### **SERIES 2900 VANDALISM, LOITERING, TRESPASS, AND OTHER MISCELLANEOUS OFFENSES**

#### **A. VANDALISM**

2900. Vandalism (Pen. Code, § 594)

2901. Vandalism: Amount of Damage (Pen. Code, § 594(b)(1))

2902. Damaging Phone or Electrical Line (Pen. Code, § 591)

2903–2914. Reserved for Future Use

## **B. LOITERING**

- 2915. Loitering (Pen. Code, § 647(h))
- 2916. Loitering: Peeking (Pen. Code, § 647(i))
- 2917. Loitering: About School (Pen. Code, § 653b)
- 2918–2928. Reserved for Future Use

## **C. TRESPASS**

- 2929. Trespass After Making Credible Threat (Pen. Code, § 601(a))
- 2930. Trespass: To Interfere With Business (Pen. Code, § 602(k))
- 2931. Trespass: Unlawfully Occupying Property (Pen. Code, § 602(m))
- 2932. Trespass: Entry Into Dwelling (Pen. Code, § 602.5(a) & (b))
- 2933. Trespass: Person Present (Pen. Code, § 602.5(b))
- 2934–2949. Reserved for Future Use

## **D. ANIMALS**

- 2950. Failing to Maintain Control of a Dangerous Animal (Pen. Code, § 399)
- 2951. Negligent Control of Attack Dog (Pen. Code, § 399.5)
- 2952. Defenses: Negligent Control of Attack Dog (Pen. Code, § 399.5(c))
- 2953. Cruelty to Animals (Pen. Code, § 597(a))
- 2954–2959. Reserved for Future Use

## **E. ALCOHOL RELATED OFFENSES (NON-DRIVING)**

- 2960. Possession of Alcoholic Beverage by Person Under 21 (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 25662(a))
- 2961. Purchase of Alcoholic Beverage by Person Under 21 (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 25658(b))
- 2962. Selling or Furnishing Alcoholic Beverage to Person Under 21 (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 25658(a))
- 2963. Permitting Person Under 21 to Consume Alcoholic Beverage (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 25658(d))
- 2964. Purchasing Alcoholic Beverage for Person Under 21: Resulting in Death or Great Bodily Injury (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 25658(a) & (c))
- 2965. Parent Permitting Child to Consume Alcoholic Beverage: Causing Traffic Collision (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 25658.2)
- 2966. Disorderly Conduct: Under the Influence in Public (Pen. Code, § 647(f))
- 2967–2979. Reserved for Future Use

## **F. OFFENSES INVOLVING CARE OF MINOR**

- 2980. Contributing to Delinquency of Minor (Pen. Code, § 272)
- 2981. Failure to Provide (Pen. Code, § 270)
- 2982. Persuading, Luring, or Transporting a Minor Under 14 Years of Age (Pen. Code, § 272(b)(1))

2983–2989. Reserved for Future Use

### **G. BETTING**

- 2990. Bookmaking (Pen. Code, § 337a(a)(1))
- 2991. Pool Selling (Pen. Code, § 337a(a)(1))
- 2992. Keeping a Place for Recording Bets (Pen. Code, § 337a(a)(2))
- 2993. Receiving or Holding Bets (Pen. Code, § 337a(a)(3))
- 2994. Recording Bets (Pen. Code, § 337a(a)(4))
- 2995. Permitting Place to Be Used for Betting Activities (Pen. Code, § 337a(a)(5))
- 2996. Betting or Wagering (Pen. Code, § 337a(a)(6))

### **H. MONEY LAUNDERING**

- 2997. Money Laundering (Pen. Code, § 186.10)
- 2998–3000. Reserved for Future Use

### **I. FAILURE TO APPEAR**

- 3001. Failure to Appear While on Bail (Pen. Code, § 1320.5)
- 3002. Failure to Appear While on Own Recognizance Release (Pen. Code, § 1320)
- 3003–3099. Reserved for Future Use

## **SERIES 3100      ENHANCEMENTS AND SENTENCING FACTORS**

### **A. PRIOR CONVICTION**

- 3100. Prior Conviction: Nonbifurcated Trial (Pen. Code, §§ 1025, 1158)
- 3101. Prior Conviction: Bifurcated Trial (Pen. Code, §§ 1025, 1158)
- 3102. Prior Conviction: Prison Prior
- 3103. Prior Conviction: Factual Issue for Jury (Pen. Code, §§ 1025, 1158)
- 3104–3114. Reserved for Future Use

### **B. ARMED WITH FIREARM**

- 3115. Armed With Firearm (Pen. Code, § 12022(a)(1))
- 3116. Armed With Firearm: Assault Weapon, Machine Gun, or .50 BMG Rifle (Pen. Code, § 12022(a)(2))
- 3117. Armed With Firearm: Knowledge That Coparticipant Armed (Pen. Code, § 12022(d))
- 3118–3129. Reserved for Future Use

### **C. PERSONALLY ARMED WITH DEADLY WEAPON OR FIREARM**

- 3130. Personally Armed With Deadly Weapon (Pen. Code, § 12022.3)
- 3131. Personally Armed With Firearm (Pen. Code, §§ 1203.06(b)(3), 12022(c), 12022.3(b))
- 3132. Personally Armed With Firearm: Unlawfully Armed When Arrested (Pen. Code, § 1203.06(a)(3))

3133–3144. Reserved for Future Use

**D. PERSONALLY USED DEADLY WEAPON OR FIREARM**

- 3145. Personally Used Deadly Weapon (Pen. Code, §§ 667.61(e)(3), 1192.7(c)(23), 12022(b)(1) & (2), 12022.3)
- 3146. Personally Used Firearm (Pen. Code, §§ 667.5(c)(8), 667.61(e)(4), 1203.06, 1192.7(c)(8), 12022.3, 12022.5, 12022.53(b))
- 3147. Personally Used Firearm: Assault Weapon, Machine Gun, or .50 BMG Rifle (Pen. Code, § 12022.5(b))
- 3148. Personally Used Firearm: Intentional Discharge (Pen. Code, § 12022.53(c))
- 3149. Personally Used Firearm: Intentional Discharge Causing Injury or Death (Pen. Code, §§ 667.61(e)(3), 12022.53(d))
- 3150. Personally Used Firearm: Intentional Discharge and Discharge Causing Injury or Death—Both Charged (Pen. Code, §§ 667.61(e)(3), 12022.53(d))
- 3151–3159. Reserved for Future Use

**E. GREAT BODILY INJURY**

- 3160. Great Bodily Injury (Pen. Code, §§ 667.5(c)(8), 667.61(d)(6), 1192.7(c)(8), 12022.7, 12022.8)
- 3161. Great Bodily Injury: Causing Victim to Become Comatose or Paralyzed (Pen. Code, § 12022.7(b))
- 3162. Great Bodily Injury: Age of Victim (Pen. Code, § 12022.7(c) & (d))
- 3163. Great Bodily Injury: Domestic Violence (Pen. Code, § 12022.7(e))
- 3164–3174. Reserved for Future Use

**F. SEX OFFENSES**

- 3175. Sex Offenses: Sentencing Factors—Aggravated Kidnapping (Pen. Code, § 667.61(d)(2))
- 3176. Sex Offenses: Sentencing Factors—Aggravated Mayhem (Pen. Code, § 667.61(d)(3))
- 3177. Sex Offenses: Sentencing Factors—Torture (Pen. Code, § 667.61(d)(3))
- 3178. Sex Offenses: Sentencing Factors—Burglary With Intent to Commit Sex Offense (Pen. Code, § 667.61(d)(4))
- 3179. Sex Offenses: Sentencing Factors—Kidnapping (Pen. Code, § 667.61(e)(1))
- 3180. Sex Offenses: Sentencing Factors—Burglary (Pen. Code, § 667.61(e)(2))
- 3181. Sex Offenses: Sentencing Factors—Multiple Victims (Pen. Code, § 667.61(e)(4))
- 3182. Sex Offenses: Sentencing Factors—Tying or Binding (Pen. Code, § 667.61(e)(5))
- 3183. Sex Offenses: Sentencing Factors—Administered Controlled Substance (Pen. Code, § 667.61(e)(6))
- 3184. Sex Offenses: Sentencing Factors—Using Force or Fear to Cause Minor to Engage in Commercial Sex Act (Pen. Code, § 236.1(c)(2))
- 3185–3199. Reserved for Future Use

## **G. CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES**

- 3200. Controlled Substance: Quantity (Pen. Code, §§ 1203.07(a)(1), (2) & (4); Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11352.5, 11370.4)
- 3201. Controlled Substance: Quantity—Manufacture of Controlled Substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379.8)
- 3202–3220. Reserved for Future Use

## **H. OTHER ENHANCEMENTS**

- 3221. Aggravated White Collar Crime (Pen. Code, § 186.11(a)(1))
- 3222. Characteristics of Victim (Pen. Code, §§ 667.9(a) & (b), 667.10(a))
- 3223. Reckless Driving With Specified Injury (Veh. Code, § 23105(a))
- 3224–3249. Reserved for Future Use

## **I. TEMPLATES**

- 3250. Enhancement, Sentencing Factor, or Specific Factual Issue: Template
- 3251. Enhancement, Sentencing Factor, or Specific Factual Issue: Template—Bifurcated Trial
- 3252–3259. Reserved for Future Use

## **J. RELATED INSTRUCTIONS**

- 3260. Duty of Jury: Verdict Form for Enhancement, Sentencing Factor, or Prior Conviction
- 3261. While Committing a Felony: Defined—Escape Rule
- 3262–3399. Reserved for Future Use

## **SERIES 3400 DEFENSES AND INSANITY**

### **A. GENERAL DEFENSES**

- 3400. Alibi
- 3401. Reserved for Future Use
- 3402. Duress or Threats
- 3403. Necessity
- 3404. Accident (Pen. Code, § 195)
- 3405. Parental Right to Punish a Child
- 3406. Mistake of Fact
- 3407. Defenses: Mistake of Law
- 3408. Entrapment
- 3409. When Conduct of Officer May Not Be Attributed to Defendant
- 3410. Statute of Limitations
- 3411. Mistake of Law As a Defense
- 3412. Compassionate Use (Health & Saf. Code, § 11362.5)

- 3413. Collective or Cooperative Cultivation Defense (Health & Saf. Code, § 11362.775)
- 3414. Coercion (Pen. Code, § 236.23)
- 3415. Lawful Use Defense (Health & Saf. Code, § 11362.1)
- 3416–3424. Reserved for Future Use

**B. IMPAIRMENT DEFENSES**

- 3425. Unconsciousness
- 3426. Voluntary Intoxication (Pen. Code, § 29.4)
- 3427. Involuntary Intoxication
- 3428. Mental Impairment: Defense to Specific Intent or Mental State (Pen. Code, § 28)
- 3429. Reasonable Person Standard for Physically Disabled Person
- 3430–3449. Reserved for Future Use

**C. INSANITY AND CIVIL COMMITMENTS**

- 3450. Insanity: Determination, Effect of Verdict (Pen. Code, §§ 25, 29.8)
- 3451. Present Mental Competence of Defendant
- 3452. Determining Restoration to Sanity (Pen. Code, § 1026.2)
- 3453. Extension of Commitment (Pen. Code, § 1026.5(b)(1))
- 3454. Initial Commitment as Sexually Violent Predator (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 6600, 6600.1)
- 3454A. Hearing to Determine Current Status Under Sexually Violent Predator Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6605)
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# **PRETRIAL**

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## **A. GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS**

### **100. Trial Process (Before or After Voir Dire)**

---

[Jury service is very important and I would like to welcome you and thank you for your service.] Before we begin, I am going to describe for you how the trial will be conducted, and explain what you and the lawyers and I will be doing. When I refer to “the People,” I mean the attorney[s] from the (district attorney’s office/city attorney’s office/office of the attorney general) who (is/are) trying this case on behalf of the People of the State of California. When I refer to defense counsel, I mean the attorney[s] who (is/are) representing the defendant[s], \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] of defendant[s]>.

[The first step in this trial is jury selection.

During jury selection, the attorneys and I will ask you questions. These questions are not meant to embarrass you, but rather to determine whether you would be suitable to sit as a juror in this case.]

The trial will (then/now) proceed as follows: The People may present an opening statement. The defense is not required to present an opening statement, but if it chooses to do so, it may give it either after the People’s opening statement or at the beginning of the defense case. The purpose of an opening statement is to give you an overview of what the attorneys expect the evidence will show.

Next, the People will offer their evidence. Evidence usually includes witness testimony and exhibits. After the People present their evidence, the defense may also present evidence but is not required to do so. Because (he/she/they) (is/are) presumed innocent, the defendant[s] (does/do) not have to prove that (he/she/they) (is/are) not guilty.

After you have heard all the evidence and [before] the attorneys (give/have given) their final arguments, I will instruct you on the law that applies to the case.

After you have heard the arguments and instructions, you will go to the jury room to deliberate.

---

*New January 2006; Revised June 2007*

### **BENCH NOTES**

#### ***Instructional Duty***

There is no sua sponte duty to give an instruction outlining how the trial will proceed. This instruction has been provided for the convenience of the trial judge

who may wish to explain the trial process to jurors. See California Rules of Court, Rule 2.1035.

The court may give the optional bracketed language if using this instruction before jury selection begins.

**AUTHORITY**

- This Instruction Upheld. *People v. Ibarra* (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1179–1181 [67 Cal.Rptr.3d 871].

## **101. Cautionary Admonitions: Jury Conduct (Before, During, or After Jury Is Selected)**

---

**Our system of justice requires that trials be conducted in open court with the parties presenting evidence and the judge deciding the law that applies to the case. It is unfair to the parties if you receive additional information from any other source because that information may be unreliable or irrelevant and the parties will not have had the opportunity to examine and respond to it. Your verdict must be based only on the evidence presented during trial in this court and the law as I provide it to you.**

**During the trial, do not talk about the case or about any of the people or any subject involved in the case with anyone, not even your family, friends, spiritual advisors, or therapists. You may only say that you are on a jury and the anticipated length of the trial, and you may inform others of scheduling and emergency contact information. Do not share any information about the case by any means of communication, including in writing, by email, by telephone, on the Internet, social media, Internet chat rooms, and blogs. You must not talk about these things with other jurors either, until you begin deliberating.**

**As jurors, you may discuss the case together only after all of the evidence has been presented, the attorneys have completed their arguments, and I have instructed you on the law. After I tell you to begin your deliberations, you may discuss the case only in the jury room, and only when all jurors are present.**

**You must not allow anything that happens outside of the courtroom to affect your decision [unless I tell you otherwise]. During the trial, do not read, listen to, or watch any news report or commentary about the case from any source.**

**Do not use the Internet (, a dictionary/[, or \_\_\_\_\_ <insert other relevant source of information or means of communication>]) in any way in connection with this case, either on your own or as a group. Do not investigate the facts or the law or do any research regarding this case or any of its participants. Do not conduct any tests or experiments, or visit the scene of any event involved in this case. If you happen to pass by the scene, do not stop or investigate.**

**[If you have a cell phone or other electronic device, keep it turned off while you are in the courtroom and during jury deliberations. An electronic device includes any data storage device. If someone needs to contact you in an emergency, the court can receive messages that it will deliver to you without delay.]**

**During the trial, do not speak to a defendant, witness, lawyer, or anyone**

**associated with them. Do not listen to anyone who tries to talk to you about the case or about any of the people or subjects involved in it. If someone asks you about the case, tell him or her that you cannot discuss it. If that person keeps talking to you about the case, you must end the conversation.**

**If you receive any information about this case from any source outside of the trial, even unintentionally, do not share that information with any other juror. If you do receive such information, or if anyone tries to influence you or any juror, you must immediately tell the bailiff.**

**Keep an open mind throughout the trial. Do not make up your mind about the verdict or any issue until after you have discussed the case with the other jurors during deliberations. Do not take anything I say or do during the trial as an indication of what I think about the facts, the witnesses, or what your verdict should be.**

**You must not let bias, sympathy, prejudice, or public opinion influence your assessment of the evidence or your decision. Many people have assumptions and biases about or stereotypes of other people and may be unaware of them. You must not be biased in favor of or against any party, witness, attorney, defendant[s], or alleged victim because of his or her disability, gender, nationality, national origin, race or ethnicity, religion, gender identity, sexual orientation, [or] age (./) [or socioeconomic status] (./) [or \_\_\_\_\_ <insert any other impermissible form of bias>.]**

**You must reach your verdict without any consideration of punishment.**

**I want to emphasize that you may not use any form of research or communication, including electronic or wireless research or communication, to research, share, communicate, or allow someone else to communicate with you regarding any subject of the trial. [If you violate this rule, you may be subject to jail time, a fine, or other punishment.]**

**When the trial has ended and you have been released as jurors, you may discuss the case with anyone. [But under California law, you must wait at least 90 days before negotiating or agreeing to accept any payment for information about the case.]**

---

*New January 2006; Revised June 2007, April 2008, December 2008, April 2010, October 2010, April 2011, February 2012, August 2012, August 2014, September 2019, April 2020*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct the jurors on how they must conduct themselves during trial. (Pen. Code, § 1122.) See also California Rules of Court Rule 2.1035.

When giving this instruction during the penalty phase of a capital case, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to delete the sentence which reads “Do not let bias, sympathy, prejudice, or public opinion influence your decision.” (*People v. Lanphear* (1984) 36 Cal.3d 163, 165 [203 Cal.Rptr. 122, 680 P.2d 1081]; *California v. Brown* (1987) 479 U.S. 538, 545 [107 S.Ct. 837, 93 L.Ed.2d 934].) The court should also delete the following sentence: “You must reach your verdict without any consideration of punishment.”

If there will be a jury view, give the bracketed phrase “unless I tell you otherwise” in the fourth paragraph. (Pen. Code, § 1119.)

## AUTHORITY

- Statutory Admonitions. Pen. Code, § 1122.
- Avoid Discussing the Case. *People v. Pierce* (1979) 24 Cal.3d 199 [155 Cal.Rptr. 657, 595 P.2d 91]; *In re Hitchings* (1993) 6 Cal.4th 97 [24 Cal.Rptr.2d 74, 860 P.2d 466]; *In re Carpenter* (1995) 9 Cal.4th 634, 646–658 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 665, 889 P.2d 985].
- Avoid News Reports. *People v. Holloway* (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1098, 1108–1111 [269 Cal.Rptr. 530, 790 P.2d 1327], disapproved on other grounds in *People v. Stansbury* (1995) 9 Cal.4th 824, 830 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d. 394, 889 P.2d 588].
- Judge’s Conduct as Indication of Verdict. *People v. Hunt* (1915) 26 Cal.App. 514, 517 [147 P. 476].
- No Bias, Sympathy, or Prejudice. *People v. Hawthorne* (1992) 4 Cal.4th 43, 73 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 133, 841 P.2d 118].
- No Independent Research. *People v. Karis* (1988) 46 Cal.3d 612, 642 [250 Cal.Rptr. 659, 758 P.2d 1189]; *People v. Castro* (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 849, 853 [229 Cal.Rptr. 280]; *People v. Sutter* (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 806, 820 [184 Cal.Rptr. 829].
- Prior Version of This Instruction Upheld. *People v. Ibarra* (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1182–1183 [67 Cal.Rptr.3d 871].
- Court’s Contempt Power for Violations of Admonitions. Pen. Code, § 1122(a)(1); Code Civ. Proc. § 1209(a)(6) (effective 1/1/12).

## RELATED ISSUES

### *Admonition Not to Discuss Case With Anyone*

In *People v. Danks* (2004) 32 Cal.4th 269, 298–300 [8 Cal.Rptr.3d 767, 82 P.3d 1249], a capital case, two jurors violated the court’s admonition not to discuss the

case with anyone by consulting with their pastors regarding the death penalty. The Supreme Court stated:

It is troubling that during deliberations not one but two jurors had conversations with their pastors that ultimately addressed the issue being resolved at the penalty phase in this case. Because jurors instructed not to speak to anyone about the case except a fellow juror during deliberations . . . may assume such an instruction does not apply to confidential relationships, we recommend the jury be expressly instructed that they may not speak to anyone about the case, except a fellow juror during deliberations, and that this includes, but is not limited to, spouses, spiritual leaders or advisers, or therapists. Moreover, the jury should also be instructed that if anyone, other than a fellow juror during deliberations, tells a juror his or her view of the evidence in the case, the juror should report that conversation immediately to the court.

(*Id.* at p. 306, fn. 11.)

The court may, at its discretion, add the suggested language to the second paragraph of this instruction.

### ***Jury Misconduct***

It is error to instruct the jury to immediately advise the court if a juror refuses to deliberate or expresses an intention to disregard the law or to decide the case based on penalty, punishment, or any other improper basis. (*People v. Engelman* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 436, 449 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d 862, 49 P.3d 209].)

## **SECONDARY SOURCES**

5 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial § 726.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 81, *Jury Selection and Opening Statement*, § 81.06[1], Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.05[1], [4] (Matthew Bender).

## 102. Note-Taking

---

**You have been given notebooks and may take notes during the trial. Do not remove them from the courtroom. You may take your notes into the jury room during deliberations. I do not mean to discourage you from taking notes, but here are some points to consider if you take notes:**

- 1. Note-taking may tend to distract you. It may affect your ability to listen carefully to all the testimony and to watch the witnesses as they testify;**

**AND**

- 2. The notes are for your own individual use to help you remember what happened during the trial. Please keep in mind that your notes may be inaccurate or incomplete.**

**At the end of the trial, your notes will be (collected and destroyed/collected and retained by the court but not as a part of the case record/\_\_\_\_\_ <specify other disposition>).**

---

*New January 2006; Revised June 2007, April 2008*

### **BENCH NOTES**

#### ***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct the members of the jury that they may take notes. California Rules of Court, Rule 2.1031.

The court may specify its preferred disposition of the notes after trial. No statute or rule of court requires any particular disposition.

### **AUTHORITY**

- Resolving Jurors' Questions. Pen. Code, § 1137.
- Jurors' Use of Notes. California Rules of Court, Rule 2.1031.
- This Instruction Upheld. *People v. Ibarra* (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1183 [67 Cal.Rptr.3d 871].

### **SECONDARY SOURCES**

5 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, § 726.

6 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Judgment, § 21.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.05[2] (Matthew Bender).

## 103. Reasonable Doubt

---

I will now explain the presumption of innocence and the People's burden of proof. The defendant[s] (has/have) pleaded not guilty to the charge[s]. The fact that a criminal charge has been filed against the defendant[s] is not evidence that the charge is true. You must not be biased against the defendant[s] just because (he/she/they) (has/have) been arrested, charged with a crime, or brought to trial.

A defendant in a criminal case is presumed to be innocent. This presumption requires that the People prove a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Whenever I tell you the People must prove something, I mean they must prove it beyond a reasonable doubt [unless I specifically tell you otherwise].

Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you with an abiding conviction that the charge is true. The evidence need not eliminate all possible doubt because everything in life is open to some possible or imaginary doubt.

In deciding whether the People have proved their case beyond a reasonable doubt, you must impartially compare and consider all the evidence that was received throughout the entire trial. Unless the evidence proves the defendant[s] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, (he/she/they) (is/are) entitled to an acquittal and you must find (him/her/them) not guilty.

---

*New January 2006; Revised June 2007*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the presumption of innocence and the state's burden of proof before deliberations. (*People v. Vann* (1974) 12 Cal.3d 220, 225–227 [115 Cal.Rptr. 352, 524 P.2d 824]; *People v. Soldavini* (1941) 45 Cal.App.2d 460, 463 [114 P.2d 415]; *People v. Phillips* (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 952, 956–958 [69 Cal.Rptr.2d 532].) This instruction is included in this section for the convenience of judges who wish to instruct on this point during voir dire or before testimony begins.

If the court will be instructing that the prosecution must prove something by a preponderance of the evidence, give the bracketed phrase “unless I specifically tell you otherwise.”

### AUTHORITY

- Instructional Requirements. Pen. Code, §§ 1096, 1096a; *People v. Freeman* (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 503–504 [34 Cal.Rptr.2d 558, 882 P.2d 249]; *Victor v.*



*Nebraska* (1994) 511 U.S. 1, 16–17 [114 S.Ct. 1239, 127 L.Ed.2d 583]; *Lisenbee v. Henry* (9th Cir. 1999) 166 F.3d 997.

- Previous Version of CALCRIM 103 Upheld. *People v. Reyes* (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1491, 1496 [60 Cal.Rptr.3d 777].
- Reference to Elements Not Required. *People v. Ramos* (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1082, 1088–1089 [78 Cal.Rptr.3d 186].

### COMMENTARY

This instruction is based directly on Penal Code section 1096. The primary changes are a reordering of concepts and a definition of reasonable doubt stated in the affirmative rather than in the negative. The instruction also refers to the jury’s duty to impartially compare and consider all the evidence. (See *Victor v. Nebraska* (1994) 511 U.S. 1, 16–17 [114 S.Ct. 1239, 127 L.Ed.2d 583].) The appellate courts have urged the trial courts to exercise caution in modifying the language of section 1096 to avoid error in defining reasonable doubt. (See *People v. Freeman* (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 503–504 [34 Cal.Rptr.2d 558, 882 P.2d 249]; *People v. Garcia* (1975) 54 Cal.App.3d 61 [126 Cal.Rptr. 275].) The instruction includes all the concepts contained in section 1096 and substantially tracks the statutory language.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

5 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, §§ 624, 716–717, 720–722.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 83, *Evidence*, § 83.03[1], Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, §§ 85.02[2][a][i], 85.04[2][a] (Matthew Bender).

## 104. Evidence

---

You must decide what the facts are in this case. You must use only the evidence that is presented in the courtroom [or during a jury view]. “Evidence” is the sworn testimony of witnesses, the exhibits admitted into evidence, and anything else I tell you to consider as evidence. The fact that the defendant was arrested, charged with a crime, or brought to trial is not evidence of guilt.

Nothing that the attorneys say is evidence. In their opening statements and closing arguments, the attorneys will discuss the case, but their remarks are not evidence. Their questions are not evidence. Only the witnesses’ answers are evidence. The attorneys’ questions are significant only if they help you understand the witnesses’ answers. Do not assume that something is true just because one of the attorneys asks a question that suggests it is true.

During the trial, the attorneys may object to questions asked of a witness. I will rule on the objections according to the law. If I sustain an objection, the witness will not be permitted to answer, and you must ignore the question. If the witness does not answer, do not guess what the answer might have been or why I ruled as I did. If I order testimony stricken from the record, you must disregard it and must not consider that testimony for any purpose.

You must disregard anything you see or hear when the court is not in session, even if it is done or said by one of the parties or witnesses.

The court [reporter] has made a (record/recording) of everything that was said during the trial. If you decide that it is necessary, you may ask that the (court reporter’s record be read to/court’s recording be played for) you. You must accept the (court reporter’s record/court’s recording) as accurate.

---

*New January 2006; Revised April 2008, August 2009, March 2019*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

There is no sua sponte duty to instruct on these evidentiary topics; however, instruction on these principles has been approved. (See *People v. Barajas* (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 804, 809 [193 Cal.Rptr. 750]; *People v. Samayoa* (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 843–844 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, 938 P.2d 2]; *People v. Horton* (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1068, 1121 [47 Cal.Rptr.2d 516, 906 P.2d 478].)

### AUTHORITY

- Evidence Defined. Evid. Code, § 140.

- Arguments Not Evidence. *People v. Barajas* (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 804, 809 [193 Cal.Rptr. 750].
- Questions Not Evidence. *People v. Samayoa* (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 843–844 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, 938 P.2d 2].
- Striking Testimony. *People v. Horton* (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1068, 1121 [47 Cal.Rptr.2d 516, 906 P.2d 478].
- This Instruction Upheld. *People v. Ibarra* (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1183 [67 Cal.Rptr.3d 871].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

5 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, § 715.  
4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 83,  
*Evidence*, §§ 83.01[1], 83.02[2] (Matthew Bender).

## 105. Witnesses

---

**You alone must judge the credibility or believability of the witnesses. In deciding whether testimony is true and accurate, use your common sense and experience. You must judge the testimony of each witness by the same standards, setting aside any bias or prejudice you may have. You may believe all, part, or none of any witness's testimony. Consider the testimony of each witness and decide how much of it you believe.**

**In evaluating a witness's testimony, you may consider anything that reasonably tends to prove or disprove the truth or accuracy of that testimony. Among the factors that you may consider are:**

- **How well could the witness see, hear, or otherwise perceive the things about which the witness testified?**
- **How well was the witness able to remember and describe what happened?**
- **What was the witness's behavior while testifying?**
- **Did the witness understand the questions and answer them directly?**
- **Was the witness's testimony influenced by a factor such as bias or prejudice, a personal relationship with someone involved in the case, or a personal interest in how the case is decided?**
- **What was the witness's attitude about the case or about testifying?**
- **Did the witness make a statement in the past that is consistent or inconsistent with his or her testimony?**
- **How reasonable is the testimony when you consider all the other evidence in the case?**
- **[Did other evidence prove or disprove any fact about which the witness testified?]**
- **[Did the witness admit to being untruthful?]**
- **[What is the witness's character for truthfulness?]**
- **[Has the witness been convicted of a felony?]**
- **[Has the witness engaged in [other] conduct that reflects on his or her believability?]**
- **[Was the witness promised immunity or leniency in exchange for his or her testimony?]**

**Do not automatically reject testimony just because of inconsistencies or**

**conflicts. Consider whether the differences are important or not. People sometimes honestly forget things or make mistakes about what they remember. Also, two people may witness the same event yet see or hear it differently.**

**[If the evidence establishes that a witness’s character for truthfulness has not been discussed among the people who know him or her, you may conclude from the lack of discussion that the witness’s character for truthfulness is good.]**

**[If you do not believe a witness’s testimony that he or she no longer remembers something, that testimony is inconsistent with the witness’s earlier statement on that subject.]**

**[If you decide that a witness deliberately lied about something significant in this case, you should consider not believing anything that witness says. Or, if you think the witness lied about some things, but told the truth about others, you may simply accept the part that you think is true and ignore the rest.]**

---

*New January 2006; Revised June 2007, April 2008, September 2020*

## **BENCH NOTES**

### ***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on factors relevant to a witness’s credibility. (*People v. Rincon-Pineda* (1975) 14 Cal.3d 864, 883–884 [123 Cal.Rptr. 119, 538 P.2d 247].) Although there is no sua sponte duty to instruct on inconsistencies in testimony or a witness who lies, there is authority approving instruction on both topics. (*Dodds v. Stellar* (1946) 77 Cal.App.2d 411, 426 [175 P.2d 607]; *People v. Murillo* (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1104, 1107 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 21].)

The court may strike any of the enumerated impermissible bases for bias that are clearly inapplicable in a given case.

Give all of the bracketed factors that are relevant based on the evidence. (Evid. Code, § 780(e), (i), and (k).)

Give any of the final three bracketed paragraphs if relevant based on the evidence.

## **AUTHORITY**

- Factors. Evid. Code, § 780; *People v. Rincon-Pineda* (1975) 14 Cal.3d 864, 883–884 [123 Cal.Rptr. 119, 538 P.2d 247].
- Proof of Character For Truthfulness From Evidence of Lack of Discussion. *People v. Jimenez* (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 726, 732 [201 Cal.Rptr.3d 76]; *People v. Adams* (1902) 137 Cal. 580, 582 [70 P. 662].
- Inconsistencies. *Dodds v. Stellar* (1946) 77 Cal.App.2d 411, 426 [175 P.2d 607].

- Witness Who Lies. *People v. Murillo* (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1104, 1107 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 21]; *People v. Reyes* (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 957, 965 [240 Cal.Rptr. 752]; *People v. Johnson* (1986) 190 Cal.App.3d 187, 192–194 [237 Cal.Rptr. 479].

### **SECONDARY SOURCES**

- 5 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, § 725.
- 4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, §§ 85.02[2][b], [c], 85.03[2][b] (Matthew Bender).

## 106. Jurors Asking Questions

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**If, during the trial, you have a question that you believe should be asked of a witness, you may write out the question and send it to me through the bailiff. I will discuss the question with the attorneys and decide whether it may be asked. Do not feel slighted or disappointed if your question is not asked. Your question may not be asked for a variety of reasons, including the reason that the question may call for an answer that is inadmissible for legal reasons. Also, do not guess the reason your question was not asked or speculate about what the answer might have been. Always remember that you are not advocates for one side or the other in this case. You are impartial judges of the facts.**

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2006*

### **BENCH NOTES**

#### ***Instructional Duty***

This instruction may be given on request.

### **AUTHORITY**

- Statutory Admonitions. See generally Pen. Code, § 1122.
- Juror Questions. California Rules of Court, Rule 2.1033.

### **SECONDARY SOURCES**

5 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, § 726.  
4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 82, *Witnesses*, § 82.02[2] (Matthew Bender).

## 107. Pro Per Defendant

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(The defendant[s]/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] of self-represented defendant[s]>) (has/have) the right to be represented by an attorney in this trial, as do all criminal defendants in this country. (He/She/They) (has/have) decided instead to exercise (his/her/their) constitutional right to act as (his/her/their) own attorney in this case. Do not allow that decision to affect your verdict.

The court applies the rules of evidence and procedure to a (self-represented defendant/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] of self-represented defendant[s]>).

---

*New August 2009*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

This instruction may be given on request.

#### AUTHORITY

- Basis for Right of Self-Representation. Sixth Amendment, Constitution of the United States; *Faretta v. California* (1975) 422 U.S. 806 [95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562].

#### SECONDARY SOURCES

5 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, § 291.

1 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 1, *The California Defense Advocate*, § 1.73 (Matthew Bender).

**108–119. Reserved for Future Use**



## B. ADMONITIONS

### 120. Service Provider for Juror With Disability: Beginning of Trial

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**During trial, \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name or number of juror> will be assisted by (a/an) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of service provider, e.g., sign language interpreter>. The \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of service provider> is not a member of the jury and is not to participate in the deliberations in any way other than as necessary to provide the service to \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name or number of juror>.**

---

*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction if a juror will be using the assistance of a service provider. (Code Civ. Proc., § 224(b).)

### AUTHORITY

- Juror Not Incompetent Due to Disability. Code Civ. Proc., § 203(a)(6).
- Juror May Use Service Provider. Code Civ. Proc., § 224.
- Court Must Instruct on Use of Service Provider. Code Civ. Proc., § 224(b).

### SECONDARY SOURCES

7 Witkin, California Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Trial, §§ 320, 330.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 81, *Jury Selection and Opening Statement*, §§ 81.02[2], 81.04[4][a] (Matthew Bender).

## 121. Duty to Abide by Translation Provided in Court

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<Alternative A—foreign language testimony>

**Some testimony may be given in \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name or description of language other than English>. An interpreter will provide a translation for you at the time that the testimony is given. You must rely on the translation provided by the interpreter, even if you understand the language spoken by the witness. Do not retranslate any testimony for other jurors. If you believe the court interpreter translated testimony incorrectly, let me know immediately by writing a note and giving it to the (clerk/bailiff).**

<Alternative B—foreign language recording>

**You (may/are about to) hear a recording [that is partially] in a foreign language. You will receive a transcript with an English language translation of that recording.**

**You must rely on the transcript, even if you understand the language in the recording. Do not retranslate the recording for other jurors. If you believe the transcript is incorrect, let me know immediately by writing a note and giving it to the (clerk/bailiff). [If the recording is partially in English, the English parts of the recording are the evidence.]**

---

*New January 2006; Revised February 2014, August 2016*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The committee recommends giving Alternative A of this instruction whenever testimony will be received with the assistance of an interpreter, though no case has held that the court has a sua sponte duty to give the instruction. The instruction may be given at the beginning of the case, when the person requiring translation testifies, or both, at the court's discretion. If the jury may hear a recording that is at least partially in a foreign language, the court may give Alternative B with the appropriate bracketed language, as needed.

If the court chooses, the instruction may also be modified and given again at the end of the case, with all other instructions.

It is misconduct for a juror to retranslate for other jurors testimony that has been translated by the court-appointed interpreter. (*People v. Cabrera* (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 300, 303 [281 Cal.Rptr. 238].) “If [the juror] believed the court interpreter was translating incorrectly, the proper action would have been to call the matter to the trial court's attention, not take it upon herself to provide her fellow jurors with the ‘correct’ translation.” (*Id.* at p. 304.)

**AUTHORITY**

- Juror May Not Retranslate. *People v. Cabrera* (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 300, 303–304 [281 Cal.Rptr. 238].

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

3 Witkin, *California Evidence* (5th ed. 2012) Presentation, § 55

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.05[4][a][i] (Matthew Bender).

## 122. Corporation Is a Person

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(A/The) defendant[s] in this case, \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] of corporate defendant[s]>, (is a corporation/are corporations). Under the law, a corporation must be treated in the same way as a natural person. When I use words like person or he or she in these instructions to refer to the defendant[s], those instructions [also] apply to \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] of corporate defendant[s]>.

---

*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction if the defendant is a corporation.

### AUTHORITY

- Corporation Is a Person. Pen. Code, § 7.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Defenses, §§ 40–43.

2 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 42, *Arrestment, Pleas, and Plea Bargaining*, § 42.21[2][e] (Matthew Bender).

## 123. Witness Identified as John or Jane Doe

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**In this case, a person is called ((John/Jane) Doe/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert other name used>). This name is used only to protect (his/her) privacy, as required by law. [The fact that the person is identified in this way is not evidence. Do not consider this fact for any purpose.]**

---

*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

If an alleged victim will be identified as John or Jane Doe, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction at the beginning and at the end of the trial. (Pen. Code, § 293.5(b); *People v. Ramirez* (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 47, 58 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 9].)

Penal Code section 293.5 provides that the alleged victim of certain offenses may be identified as John or Jane Doe if the court finds it is “reasonably necessary to protect the privacy of the person and will not unduly prejudice the prosecution or the defense.” (*Id.*, § 293.5(a).) This applies only to alleged victims of offenses under the following Penal Code sections: 261 (rape), 261.5 (unlawful sexual intercourse), 262 (rape of spouse), 264.1 (aiding and abetting rape), 286 (sodomy), 288 (lewd or lascivious act), 287 (oral copulation), and 289 (penetration by force). Note that the full name must still be provided in discovery. (*Id.*, § 293.5(a); *People v. Bohannon* (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 798, 803, fn. 7 [98 Cal.Rptr.2d 488]; *Reid v. Superior Court* (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1326, 1338 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 714].)

Give the last two bracketed sentences on request. (*People v. Ramirez, supra*, 55 Cal.App.4th at p. 58.)

### AUTHORITY

- Identification as John or Jane Doe. Pen. Code, § 293.5(a).
- Instructional Requirements. Pen. Code, § 293.5(b); *People v. Ramirez* (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 47, 58 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 9].
- Statute Constitutional. *People v. Ramirez* (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 47, 54–59 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 9].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

5 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, § 661.

3 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 70, *Discovery and Investigation*, § 70.05 (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.24[3] (Matthew Bender).

## 124. Separation Admonition

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[You may be permitted to separate during recesses and at the end of the day. I will tell you when to return. Please remember, we cannot begin the trial until all of you are in place, so it is important to be on time.]

Remember, do not talk about the case or about any of the people or any subject involved in it with anyone, including the other jurors. Do not do research, share information, or talk to each other or to anyone else about the facts of the case or anything else connected with the trial, and do not use any form of electronic or wireless communication to do any of those things, either.

Do not make up your mind or express any opinion about the case or any issue connected with the trial until after you have discussed the case with the other jurors during deliberations.

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2012*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to admonish the jury “at each adjournment of the court before the submission of the cause to the jury.” Pen. Code, § 1122(b).

Adjournment means continuing proceedings to another court day, not every time the court calls a recess. *People v. Heishman* (1988) 45 Cal.3d 147, 174 [246 Cal.Rptr. 673, 691, 753 P.2d 629], citing *People v. Moore* (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 851, 852–853 [93 Cal.Rptr. 447].

### AUTHORITY

- Statutory Authority. Pen. Code, § 1122(b).

### SECONDARY SOURCES

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 81, *Jury Selection and Opening Statement*, § 81.06[1], Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.05[1] (Matthew Bender).

**125–199. Reserved for Future Use**

## **POST-TRIAL: INTRODUCTORY**

### **A. INTRODUCTORY INSTRUCTIONS AND ADMONITIONS**

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- 240. Causation
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- 250. Union of Act and Intent: General Intent
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- 253. Union of Act and Intent: Criminal Negligence
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- 255–299. Reserved for Future Use





## **A. INTRODUCTORY INSTRUCTIONS AND ADMONITIONS**

### **200. Duties of Judge and Jury**

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**Members of the jury, I will now instruct you on the law that applies to this case. [I will give you a copy of the instructions to use in the jury room.] [Each of you has a copy of these instructions to use in the jury room.] [The instructions that you receive may be printed, typed, or written by hand. Certain sections may have been crossed-out or added. Disregard any deleted sections and do not try to guess what they might have been. Only consider the final version of the instructions in your deliberations.]**

**You must decide what the facts are. It is up to all of you, and you alone, to decide what happened, based only on the evidence that has been presented to you in this trial.**

**You must not let bias, sympathy, prejudice, or public opinion influence your assessment of the evidence or your decision. Many people have assumptions and biases about or stereotypes of other people and may be unaware of them. You must not be biased in favor of or against any party, witness, attorney, defendant[s], or alleged victim because of his or her disability, gender, nationality, national origin, race or ethnicity, religion, gender identity, sexual orientation, [or] age (./) [or socioeconomic status] (./) [or \_\_\_\_\_ <insert any other impermissible form of bias>.]**

**You must follow the law as I explain it to you, even if you disagree with it. If you believe that the attorneys' comments on the law conflict with my instructions, you must follow my instructions.**

**Pay careful attention to all of these instructions and consider them together. If I repeat any instruction or idea, do not conclude that it is more important than any other instruction or idea just because I repeated it.**

**Some words or phrases used during this trial have legal meanings that are different from their meanings in everyday use. These words and phrases will be specifically defined in these instructions. Please be sure to listen carefully and follow the definitions that I give you. Words and phrases not specifically defined in these instructions are to be applied using their ordinary, everyday meanings.**

**Some of these instructions may not apply, depending on your findings about the facts of the case. [Do not assume just because I give a**

**particular instruction that I am suggesting anything about the facts.]  
After you have decided what the facts are, follow the instructions that do  
apply to the facts as you find them.**

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*New January 2006; Revised June 2007, April 2008, December 2008, September  
2019, April 2020*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct that the jurors are the exclusive judges of the facts and that they are entitled to a copy of the written instructions when they deliberate. (Pen. Code, §§ 1093(f), 1137.) Although there is no sua sponte duty to instruct on the other topics described in this instruction, there is authority approving instruction on these topics.

In the first paragraph, select the appropriate bracketed alternative on written instructions. Penal Code section 1093(f) requires the court to give the jury a written copy of the instructions on request. The committee believes that the better practice is to always provide the jury with written instructions. If the court, in the absence of a jury request, elects not to provide jurors with written instructions, the court must modify the first paragraph to inform the jurors that they may request a written copy of the instructions.

Do not instruct a jury in the penalty phase of a capital case that they cannot consider sympathy. (*People v. Easley* (1982) 34 Cal.3d 858, 875–880 [196 Cal.Rptr. 309, 671 P.2d 813].) Instead of this instruction, CALCRIM 761 is the proper introductory instruction for the penalty phase of a capital case.

Do not give the bracketed sentence in the final paragraph if the court will be commenting on the evidence pursuant to Penal Code section 1127.

## AUTHORITY

- Copies of Instructions. Pen. Code, §§ 1093(f), 1137.
- Judge Determines Law. Pen. Code, §§ 1124, 1126; *People v. Como* (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1088, 1091 [115 Cal.Rptr.2d 922]; see *People v. Williams* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 441, 455 [106 Cal.Rptr.2d 295, 21 P.3d 1209].
- Jury to Decide the Facts. Pen. Code, § 1127.
- Attorney’s Comments Are Not Evidence. *People v. Stuart* (1959) 168 Cal.App.2d 57, 60–61 [335 P.2d 189].
- Consider All Instructions Together. *People v. Osband* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 679 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 26, 919 P.2d 640]; *People v. Rivers* (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1040, 1046 [25 Cal.Rptr.2d 602]; *People v. Shaw* (1965) 237 Cal.App.2d 606, 623 [47 Cal.Rptr. 96].
- Follow Applicable Instructions. *People v. Palmer* (1946) 76 Cal.App.2d 679, 686–687 [173 P.2d 680].

- No Bias, Sympathy, or Prejudice. Pen. Code, § 1127h; *People v. Hawthorne* (1992) 4 Cal.4th 43, 73 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 133, 841 P.2d 118].
- This Instruction Upheld. *People v. Ibarra* (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1185 [67 Cal.Rptr.3d 871].

## RELATED ISSUES

### *Jury Misconduct*

It is error to instruct the jury to immediately advise the court if a juror refuses to deliberate or expresses an intention to disregard the law or to decide the case based on penalty, punishment, or any other improper basis. (*People v. Engelman* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 436, 449 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d 862, 49 P.3d 209].)

## SECONDARY SOURCES

5 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, §§ 726, 727.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 80, *Defendant's Trial Rights*, § 80.05[1], Ch. 83, *Evidence*, § 83.02, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, §§ 85.02[1], [2][c], 85.03[1], 85.05[2], [4] (Matthew Bender).

## 201. Do Not Investigate

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**Do not use the Internet (, a dictionary/[, or \_\_\_\_\_ <insert other relevant source of information or means of communication>]) in any way in connection with this case, either on your own or as a group. Do not investigate the facts or the law or do any research regarding this case, either on your own, or as a group. Do not conduct any tests or experiments, or visit the scene of any event involved in this case. If you happen to pass by the scene, do not stop or investigate.**

---

*New January 2006; Revised June 2007, April 2010, February 2012*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a  **sua sponte**  duty to instruct the jurors on how they must conduct themselves during trial. (Pen. Code, § 1122.)

### AUTHORITY

- No Independent Research. Pen. Code, § 1122; *People v. Karis* (1988) 46 Cal.3d 612, 642 [250 Cal.Rptr. 659, 758 P.2d 1189]; *People v. Castro* (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 849, 853 [229 Cal.Rptr. 280]; *People v. Sutter* (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 806, 820 [184 Cal.Rptr. 829].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

6 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Judgment, § 24.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 81, *Jury Selection and Opening Statement*, § 81.06[1], Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.05[4][a][i] (Matthew Bender).

## 202. Note-Taking and Reading Back of Testimony

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**[You have been given notebooks and may have taken notes during the trial. You may use your notes during deliberations.] Your notes are for your own individual use to help you remember what happened during the trial. Please keep in mind that your notes may be inaccurate or incomplete.**

**If there is a disagreement about the testimony [and stipulations] at trial, you may ask that the (court reporter’s record be read to/court’s recording be played for) you. It is the record that must guide your deliberations, not your notes. You must accept the (court reporter’s record /court’s recording) as accurate. Do not ask the court reporter questions during the readback and do not discuss the case in the presence of the court reporter.**

**Please do not remove your notes from the jury room.**

**At the end of the trial, your notes will be (collected and destroyed/collected and retained by the court but not as a part of the case record/\_\_\_\_\_ <specify other disposition>).**

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*New January 2006; Revised June 2007, April 2008, August 2009, February 2012, March 2019, September 2020, March 2021*

### **BENCH NOTES**

#### ***Instructional Duty***

The court has a  **sua sponte**  duty to instruct the members of the jury that they may take notes. California Rules of Court, Rule 2.1031.

The court may specify its preferred disposition of the notes after trial. No statute or rule of court requires any particular disposition.

If the jury requests transcripts, the court should remind the jury of the right to request readback and to advise the court whether there is any testimony they want read. (See *People v. Triplett* (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 655, 662 [267 Cal.Rptr.3d 675].)

### **AUTHORITY**

- Jurors’ Use of Notes. California Rules of Court, Rule 2.1031.
- Juror Deliberations Must Be Private and Confidential. *People v. Oliver* (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 423, 429 [241 Cal.Rptr. 804].

### **SECONDARY SOURCES**

6 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Judgment, § 21.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 83,

*Evidence*, § 83.05[1], Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.05[2], [3], Ch. 87, *Death Penalty*, §§ 87.20, 87.24 (Matthew Bender).

## 203. Multiple Defendants

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<Alternative A—different charges for different defendants>

**[Because more than one defendant is on trial here, I am going to remind you which individuals are charged with which crimes.**

\_\_\_\_\_ is charged with \_\_\_\_\_.

\_\_\_\_\_ is charged with \_\_\_\_\_.]

<Alternative B—charges the same for all defendants>

**[(Both/All) defendants in this case are charged with the same crimes.]**

**You must separately consider the evidence as it applies to each defendant. You must decide each charge for each defendant separately. If you cannot reach a verdict on (all/both) of the defendants, or on any of the charges against any defendant, you must report your disagreement to the court and you must return your verdict on any defendant or charge on which you have unanimously agreed.**

**Unless I tell you otherwise, all instructions apply to each defendant.**

---

*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a  **sua sponte**  duty to give this instruction if multiple defendants are on trial. (*People v. Mask* (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 450, 457 [233 Cal.Rptr. 181]; *People v. Fulton* (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 91, 101 [201 Cal.Rptr. 879].)

Give alternative A if any of the charges against the defendants are different. Give alternative B if all of the charges against all defendants are the same.

### AUTHORITY

- Separate Verdicts When Multiple Defendants. Pen. Code, §§ 970, 1160.
- Instructional Duty. *People v. Mask* (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 450, 457 [233 Cal.Rptr. 181]; *People v. Fulton* (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 91, 101 [201 Cal.Rptr. 879].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

5 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, § 727.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.02[2][a][ii] (Matthew Bender).

## 204. Defendant Physically Restrained

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**The fact that physical restraints have been placed on [the] defendant[s] [\_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] of defendant[s] if multiple defendants in case but not all are restrained>] is not evidence. Do not speculate about the reason. You must completely disregard this circumstance in deciding the issues in this case. Do not consider it for any purpose or discuss it during your deliberations.**

---

New January 2006

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a  **sua sponte**  duty to give this instruction if a defendant has been restrained in a manner that is visible to the jury. (*People v. Duran* (1976) 16 Cal.3d 282, 291–292 [127 Cal.Rptr. 618, 545 P.2d 1322].) If the restraints are not visible, **do not** give this instruction unless requested by the defense.

The court must find a “manifest need for such restraints” and the record must clearly disclose the reasons the restraints were used. (*People v. Duran, supra*, 16 Cal.3d at pp. 290–291.) “The imposition of physical restraints in the absence of a record showing . . . violence or a threat of violence or other nonconforming conduct will be deemed to constitute an abuse of discretion.” (*Id.* at p. 291.) The court must make the determination based on facts, not rumor, and may not delegate the decision to law enforcement personnel. (*People v. Mar* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1201, 1218 [124 Cal.Rptr.2d 161, 52 P.3d 95].) The reasons supporting physical restraints must relate to the individual defendant. The court cannot rely on the nature of the charges, the courtroom design, or the lack of sufficient staff. (*People v. Slaughter* (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1187, 1213 [120 Cal.Rptr.2d 477, 47 P.3d 262]; *People v. Cunningham* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 986–987 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 291, 25 P.3d 519]; *People v. Seaton* (2001) 26 Cal.4th 598, 652 [110 Cal.Rptr.2d 441, 28 P.3d 175].)

The use of stun belts is subject to the same requirements. (*People v. Mar, supra*, 28 Cal.4th at pp. 1205–1206.) In addition, the Supreme Court has urged “great caution” in using stun belts at all, stating that, prior to using such devices, courts must consider the psychological impact, risk of accidental activation, physical dangers, and limited ability to control the level of shock delivered. (*Ibid.*)

### AUTHORITY

- Instructional Duty. *People v. Duran* (1976) 16 Cal.3d 282, 291–292 [127 Cal.Rptr. 618, 545 P.2d 1322].
- Requirements Before Use. *People v. Duran* (1976) 16 Cal.3d 282, 290–292 [127 Cal.Rptr. 618, 545 P.2d 1322]; *People v. Mar* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1201, 1218 [124 Cal.Rptr.2d 161, 52 P.3d 95].



- Use of Stun Belts. *People v. Mar* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1201, 1205–1206 [124 Cal.Rptr.2d 161, 52 P.3d 95].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

5 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, §§ 13–21.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 80, *Defendant's Trial Rights*, § 80.09[6][b], [c], [d] (Matthew Bender).

## 205. Charge Removed From Jury Consideration

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Count[s] \_\_\_\_\_ charging the defendant with \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name[s] of offense[s]>* no longer need[s] to be decided in this case.

**Do not speculate about or consider in any way why you no longer need to decide (this/these) count[s].**

---

*New January 2006*

### **BENCH NOTES**

#### ***Instructional Duty***

The court may give this instruction if one or more of the original counts has been removed from the case, whether through plea or dismissal.

## 206. One or More Defendants Removed From Case

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**The charge[s] against defendant[s] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert names[s] of defendant[s]> no longer need[s] to be decided in this case.**

**Do not speculate about or consider in any way why the charge[s] against defendant[s] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert names[s] of defendant[s]> (do/does) not need to be decided.**

---

*New January 2006*

### **BENCH NOTES**

#### ***Instructional Duty***

The court may give this instruction if one or more of the original defendants has been removed from the case, whether through plea, dismissal, or flight.

## 207. Proof Need Not Show Actual Date

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**It is alleged that the crime occurred on [or about] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert alleged date>. The People are not required to prove that the crime took place exactly on that day but only that it happened reasonably close to that day.**

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2014, February 2016*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has no sua sponte duty to give this instruction. This instruction should not be given: (1) when the evidence demonstrates that the offense was committed at a specific time and place and the defendant has presented a defense of alibi or lack of opportunity; or (2) when two similar offenses are charged in separate counts.

*(People v. Jennings* (1991) 53 Cal.3d 334, 358–359 [279 Cal.Rptr. 780, 807 P.2d 1009]; *People v. Jones* (1973) 9 Cal.3d 546, 557 [108 Cal.Rptr. 345, 510 P.2d 705], overruled on other grounds in *Hernandez v. Municipal Court* (1989) 49 Cal.3d 713 [263 Cal.Rptr. 513, 781 P.2d 547]; *People v. Barney* (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 490, 497–498 [192 Cal.Rptr. 172]; *People v. Gavin* (1971) 21 Cal.App.3d 408, 415–416 [98 Cal.Rptr. 518]; *People v. Deletto* (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 458, 474–475 [195 Cal.Rptr. 233].)

### AUTHORITY

- Instructional Requirements. Pen. Code, § 955; *People v. Jennings* (1991) 53 Cal.3d 334, 358–359 [279 Cal.Rptr. 780, 807 P.2d 1009]; *People v. Jones* (1973) 9 Cal.3d 546, 557 [108 Cal.Rptr. 345, 510 P.2d 705]; *People v. Barney* (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 490, 497–498 [192 Cal.Rptr. 172]; *People v. Gavin* (1971) 21 Cal.App.3d 408, 415–416 [98 Cal.Rptr. 518]; *People v. Deletto* (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 458, 474–475 [195 Cal.Rptr. 233].
- This Instruction Correctly States the Law. *People v. Rojas* (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1298, 1304 [188 Cal.Rptr.3d 811].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 40, *Accusatory Pleadings*, § 40.07[2] (Matthew Bender).

## 208. Witness Identified as John or Jane Doe

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**In this case, a person is called ((John/Jane) Doe/\_\_\_\_\_ <insert other name used>). This name is used only to protect (his/her) privacy, as required by law. [The fact that the person is identified in this way is not evidence. Do not consider this fact for any purpose.]**

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*New August 2009*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

If an alleged victim will be identified as John or Jane Doe, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction at the beginning and at the end of the trial. (Pen. Code, § 293.5(b); *People v. Ramirez* (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 47, 58 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 9].)

Penal Code section 293.5 provides that the alleged victim of certain offenses may be identified as John or Jane Doe if the court finds it is “reasonably necessary to protect the privacy of the person and will not unduly prejudice the prosecution or the defense.” (*Id.*, § 293.5(a).) This applies only to alleged victims of offenses under the following Penal Code sections: 261 (rape), 261.5 (unlawful sexual intercourse), 262 (rape of spouse), 264.1 (aiding and abetting rape), 286 (sodomy), 288 (lewd or lascivious act), 287 (oral copulation), and 289 (penetration by force). Note that the full name must still be provided in discovery. (*Id.*, § 293.5(a); *Reid v. Superior Court* (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1326, 1338 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 714].)

Give the last two bracketed sentences on request. (*People v. Ramirez, supra*, 55 Cal.App.4th at p. 58.)

### AUTHORITY

- Identification as John or Jane Doe. Pen. Code, § 293.5(a).
- Instructional Requirements. Pen. Code, § 293.5(b); *People v. Ramirez* (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 47, 58 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 9].
- Statute Constitutional. *People v. Ramirez* (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 47, 54–59 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 9].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

5 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, § 661.

3 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 70, *Discovery and Investigation*, § 70.05 (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.24[3] (Matthew Bender).

**209–218. Reserved for Future Use**

## B. GENERAL LEGAL CONCEPTS

### 219. Reasonable Doubt in Civil Commitment Proceedings

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**The fact that a petition to (declare respondent a sexually violent predator/declare respondent a mentally disordered offender/extend respondent’s commitment) has been filed is not evidence that the petition is true. You must not be biased against the respondent just because the petition has been filed and this matter has been brought to trial. The Petitioner is required to prove the allegations of the petition are true beyond a reasonable doubt.**

**Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you with an abiding conviction that the allegations of the petition are true. The evidence need not eliminate all possible doubt because everything in life is open to some possible or imaginary doubt.**

**In deciding whether the Petitioner has proved the allegations of the petition are true beyond a reasonable doubt, you must impartially compare and consider all the evidence that was received throughout the entire trial. Unless the evidence proves the Respondent \_\_\_\_\_ <insert what must be proved in this proceeding, e.g., “is a sexually violent predator”> beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the petition is not true.**

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*New August 2009; Revised August 2015*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct jurors on the reasonable doubt standard in civil commitment proceedings relating to sexually violent predators (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 6604, 6605) and mentally disordered offenders (Pen. Code, §§ 2966, 2972) as well as extended commitment proceedings for persons found not guilty by reason of insanity (Pen. Code, § 1026.5(b)) and juveniles committed to the Division of Juvenile Facilities (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 1800 et seq.).

*In People v. Beeson* (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1393, 1411 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 384], the Court concluded that neither the federal nor the state Constitution compelled an instruction on a presumption that the allegations of a mentally disordered offender (MDO) extension petition are not true. However, no court has addressed whether the respondents in extended insanity commitment and extended juvenile commitment proceedings are entitled to an instruction on the presumption. (Pen. Code, § 1026.5(b)(7); Welf. & Inst. Code, § 1801.5; see also *Hudec v. Superior Court* (2015) 60 Cal.4th 815, 826 [339 P.3d 998, 1004] [“section 1026.5(b)(7) provides

respondents in commitment extension hearings the rights constitutionally enjoyed by criminal defendants”] and *In re Luis C.* (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1397, 1402–1403 [11 Cal.Rptr.3d 429] [same for Welfare and Institutions Code section 1801.5 juvenile proceedings].)

### AUTHORITY

- Instructional Requirements. *People v. Beeson* (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1393, 1401 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 384]; Pen. Code, § 1026.5(b)(7); Welf. & Inst. Code, § 1801.5.

### *Related Instructions*

CALCRIM No. 220, *Reasonable Doubt*.

CALCRIM No. 3453, *Extension of Commitment*.

CALCRIM No. 3454, *Commitment as Sexually Violent Predator*.

CALCRIM No. 3454A, *Hearing to Determine Current Status Under Sexually Violent Predator Act*.

CALCRIM No. 3456, *Initial Commitment of Mentally Disordered Offender As Condition of Parole*.

CALCRIM No. 3457, *Extension of Commitment as Mentally Disordered Offender*.

CALCRIM No. 3458, *Extension of Commitment to Division of Juvenile Facilities*.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

3 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, § 774.

5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 104, *Parole*, § 104.06 (Matthew Bender).



## 220. Reasonable Doubt

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The fact that a criminal charge has been filed against the defendant[s] is not evidence that the charge is true. You must not be biased against the defendant[s] just because (he/she/they) (has/have) been arrested, charged with a crime, or brought to trial.

A defendant in a criminal case is presumed to be innocent. This presumption requires that the People prove a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Whenever I tell you the People must prove something, I mean they must prove it beyond a reasonable doubt [unless I specifically tell you otherwise].

Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you with an abiding conviction that the charge is true. The evidence need not eliminate all possible doubt because everything in life is open to some possible or imaginary doubt.

In deciding whether the People have proved their case beyond a reasonable doubt, you must impartially compare and consider all the evidence that was received throughout the entire trial. Unless the evidence proves the defendant[s] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, (he/she/they) (is/are) entitled to an acquittal and you must find (him/her/them) not guilty.

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2006, February 2013*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the presumption of innocence and the state's burden of proof. (*People v. Vann* (1974) 12 Cal.3d 220, 225–227 [115 Cal.Rptr. 352, 524 P.2d 824]; *People v. Soldavini* (1941) 45 Cal.App.2d 460, 463 [114 P.2d 415]; *People v. Phillips* (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 952, 956–958 [69 Cal.Rptr.2d 532].)

If the court will be instructing that the prosecution has a different burden of proof, give the bracketed phrase “unless I specifically tell you otherwise.”

### AUTHORITY

- Instructional Requirements. Pen. Code, §§ 1096, 1096a; *People v. Freeman* (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 503–504 [34 Cal.Rptr.2d 558, 882 P.2d 249]; *Victor v. Nebraska* (1994) 511 U.S. 1, 16–17 [114 S.Ct. 1239, 127 L.Ed.2d 583]; *Lisenbee v. Henry* (9th Cir. 1999) 166 F.3d 997, 999.
- This Instruction Upheld. *People v. Ramos* (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1082, 1088–1089 [78 Cal.Rptr.3d 186].

- This Instruction Does Not Suggest That Bias Against Defendant Is Permissible. *People v. Ibarra* (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1185–1186 [67 Cal.Rptr.3d 871].
- Cited With Approval. *People v. Aranda* (2012) 55 Cal.4th 342, 353 [145 Cal.Rptr.3d 855].

### COMMENTARY

This instruction is based directly on Penal Code section 1096. The primary changes are a reordering of concepts and a definition of reasonable doubt stated in the affirmative rather than in the negative. The instruction also refers to the jury’s duty to impartially compare and consider all the evidence. (See *Victor v. Nebraska* (1994) 511 U.S. 1, 16–17 [114 S.Ct. 1239, 127 L.Ed.2d 583].) The appellate courts have urged the trial courts to exercise caution in modifying the language of section 1096 to avoid error in defining reasonable doubt. (See *People v. Freeman* (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 503–504 [34 Cal.Rptr.2d 558, 882 P.2d 249]; *People v. Garcia* (1975) 54 Cal.App.3d 61, 63 [126 Cal.Rptr. 275].) The instruction includes all the concepts contained in section 1096 and substantially tracks the statutory language. For an alternate view of instructing on reasonable doubt, see Committee on Standard Jury Instructions—Criminal, Minority Report to CALJIC “Reasonable Doubt” Report, in *Alternative Definitions of Reasonable Doubt: A Report to the California Legislature* (May 22, 1987; repr., San Francisco: Daily Journal, 1987) pp. 51–53.

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Pinpoint Instruction on Reasonable Doubt*

A defendant is entitled, on request, to a nonargumentative instruction that directs attention to the defense’s theory of the case and relates it to the state’s burden of proof. (*People v. Sears* (1970) 2 Cal.3d 180, 190 [84 Cal.Rptr. 711, 465 P.2d 847] [error to deny requested instruction relating defense evidence to the element of premeditation and deliberation].) Such an instruction is sometimes called a pinpoint instruction. “What is pinpointed is not specific evidence as such, but the theory of the defendant’s case. It is the specific evidence on which the theory of the defense ‘focuses’ which is related to reasonable doubt.” (*People v. Adrian* (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 335, 338 [185 Cal.Rptr. 506] [court erred in refusing to give requested instruction relating self-defense to burden of proof]; see also *People v. Granados* (1957) 49 Cal.2d 490, 496 [319 P.2d 346] [error to refuse instruction relating reasonable doubt to commission of felony in felony-murder case]; *People v. Brown* (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 674, 677–678 [199 Cal.Rptr. 680] [error to refuse instruction relating reasonable doubt to identification].)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

5 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, §§ 624, 716–717, 720–722.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 83, *Evidence*, § 83.03[1], Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, §§ 85.02[1A][a], [2][a][i], 85.04[2][a] (Matthew Bender).

## 221. Reasonable Doubt: Bifurcated Trial

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The People are required to prove the allegations beyond a reasonable doubt.

Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you with an abiding conviction that the allegation is true. The evidence does not need to eliminate all possible doubt because everything in life is open to some possible or imaginary doubt.

In deciding whether the People have proved (an/the) allegation beyond a reasonable doubt, you must impartially compare and consider all the evidence that was received during this [phase of the] trial. Unless the evidence proves (an/the) allegation beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find that the allegation has not been proved [and disregard it completely].

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2015*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on reasonable doubt in any proceeding in which that standard of proof applies.

This instruction is provided for the court to use **only** in bifurcated trials or special proceedings where the court is required to instruct on reasonable doubt but neither CALCRIM No. 219, *Reasonable Doubt in Civil Commitment Proceedings*, nor CALCRIM No. 220, *Reasonable Doubt*, would apply. **Do not** use this instruction in place of CALCRIM No. 220 in a trial on the substantive crimes charged.

Use this instruction **only** if: (1) the court has granted a bifurcated trial on a prior conviction or a sentencing factor (see CALCRIM No. 3101, *Prior Conviction: Bifurcated Trial* and CALCRIM No. 3251, *Enhancement, Sentencing Factor, or Specific Factual Issue: Template—Bifurcated Trial*); or (2) in the penalty phase of a capital trial when the court is instructing on other violent criminal activity or prior felony convictions offered as aggravation (see CALCRIM No. 764, *Death Penalty: Evidence of Other Violent Crimes* and CALCRIM No. 765, *Death Penalty: Conviction for Other Felony Crimes*).

In the first sentence, the court, at its discretion, may wish to insert a description of the specific allegations that the People must prove.

In the final paragraph, give the bracketed phrase “and disregard it completely” when using this instruction in the penalty phase of a capital trial.

### AUTHORITY

- Instructional Requirements. Pen. Code, §§ 1096, 1096a; *People v. Freeman*

(1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 503–504 [34 Cal.Rptr.2d 558, 882 P.2d 249].

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012), Defenses, § 2.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 83, *Evidence*, § 83.03[1], Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.02[1A][a], [2][a][i] (Matthew Bender).

## 222. Evidence

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**“Evidence” is the sworn testimony of witnesses, the exhibits admitted into evidence, and anything else I told you to consider as evidence.**

**Nothing that the attorneys say is evidence. In their opening statements and closing arguments, the attorneys discuss the case, but their remarks are not evidence. Their questions are not evidence. Only the witnesses’ answers are evidence. The attorneys’ questions are significant only if they helped you to understand the witnesses’ answers. Do not assume that something is true just because one of the attorneys asked a question that suggested it was true.**

**During the trial, the attorneys may have objected to questions or moved to strike answers given by the witnesses. I ruled on the objections according to the law. If I sustained an objection, you must ignore the question. If the witness was not permitted to answer, do not guess what the answer might have been or why I ruled as I did. If I ordered testimony stricken from the record you must disregard it and must not consider that testimony for any purpose.**

**You must disregard anything you saw or heard when the court was not in session, even if it was done or said by one of the parties or witnesses.**

**[During the trial, you were told that the People and the defense agreed, or stipulated, to certain facts. This means that they both accept those facts as true. Because there is no dispute about those facts you must also accept them as true.]**

**The court (reporter has made a record of/has recorded) everything that was said during the trial. If you decide that it is necessary, you may ask that the (court reporter’s record be read to/court’s recording be played for) you. You must accept the (court reporter’s record/court’s recording) as accurate.**

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*New January 2006; Revised June 2007, August 2009, February 2012, March 2019, March 2021*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

There is no sua sponte duty to instruct on these evidentiary topics; however, instruction on these topics has been approved. (*People v. Barajas* (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 804, 809 [193 Cal.Rptr. 750]; *People v. Samayoa* (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 843–844 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, 938 P.2d 2]; *People v. Horton* (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1068, 1121 [47 Cal.Rptr.2d 516, 906 P.2d 478].)

If the parties stipulated to one or more facts, give the bracketed paragraph that

begins with “During the trial, you were told.”

If the jury requests transcripts, the court should remind the jury of the right to request readback and to advise the court whether there is any testimony they want read. (See *People v. Triplett* (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 655, 662 [267 Cal.Rptr.3d 675].)

### AUTHORITY

- Evidence Defined. Evid. Code, § 140.
- Arguments Not Evidence. *People v. Barajas* (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 804, 809 [193 Cal.Rptr. 750].
- Questions Not Evidence. *People v. Samayoa* (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 843–844 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 400].
- Stipulations. *Palmer v. City of Long Beach* (1948) 33 Cal.2d 134, 141–142 [199 P.2d 952].
- Striking Testimony. *People v. Horton* (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1068, 1121 [47 Cal.Rptr.2d 516, 906 P.2d 478].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Non-Testifying Courtroom Conduct*

There is authority for an instruction informing the jury to disregard defendant’s in-court, but non-testifying behavior. (*People v. Garcia* (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 82, 90 [206 Cal.Rptr. 468] [defendant was disruptive in court; court instructed jurors they should not consider this behavior in deciding guilt or innocence].) However, if the defendant has put his or her character in issue or another basis for relevance exists, such an instruction should not be given. (*People v. Garcia, supra*, 160 Cal.App.3d at p. 91, fn. 7; *People v. Foster* (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 20, 25 [246 Cal.Rptr. 855].)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

5 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012), Criminal Trial, §§ 715, 726.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 83, Evidence, §§ 83.01[1], 83.02[2] (Matthew Bender).

## 223. Direct and Circumstantial Evidence: Defined

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Facts may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence or by a combination of both. *Direct evidence* can prove a fact by itself. For example, if a witness testifies he saw it raining outside before he came into the courthouse, that testimony is direct evidence that it was raining. *Circumstantial evidence* also may be called indirect evidence. Circumstantial evidence does not directly prove the fact to be decided, but is evidence of another fact or group of facts from which you may logically and reasonably conclude the truth of the fact in question. For example, if a witness testifies that he saw someone come inside wearing a raincoat covered with drops of water, that testimony is circumstantial evidence because it may support a conclusion that it was raining outside. Both direct and circumstantial evidence are acceptable types of evidence to prove or disprove the elements of a charge, including intent and mental state and acts necessary to a conviction, and neither is necessarily more reliable than the other. Neither is entitled to any greater weight than the other. You must decide whether a fact in issue has been proved based on all the evidence.

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*New January 2006; Revised June 2007, February 2013*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction explaining direct and circumstantial evidence if the prosecution substantially relies on circumstantial evidence to establish any element of the case. (*People v. Yrigoyen* (1955) 45 Cal.2d 46, 49 [286 P.2d 1] [duty exists where circumstantial evidence relied on to prove any element, including intent]; see *People v. Bloyd* (1987) 43 Cal.3d 333, 351–352 [233 Cal.Rptr. 368, 729 P.2d 802]; *People v. Heishman* (1988) 45 Cal.3d 147, 167 [246 Cal.Rptr. 673, 753 P.2d 629].) The court must give this instruction if the court will be giving either CALCRIM No. 224, *Circumstantial Evidence: Sufficiency of Evidence* or CALCRIM No. 225, *Circumstantial Evidence: Intent or Mental State*.

The court, at its discretion, may give this instruction in any case in which circumstantial evidence has been presented.

### AUTHORITY

- Direct Evidence Defined. Evid. Code, § 410.
- Logical and Reasonable Inference Defined. Evid. Code, § 600(b).
- Difference Between Direct and Circumstantial Evidence. *People v. Lim Foon* (1915) 29 Cal.App. 270, 274 [155 P. 477] [no sua sponte duty to instruct, but court approves definition]; *People v. Goldstein* (1956) 139 Cal.App.2d 146,

152–153 [293 P.2d 495] [sua sponte duty to instruct].

- This Instruction Upheld. *People v. Ibarra* (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1186 [67 Cal.Rptr.3d 871].
- This Instruction Cited With Approval. *People v. Livingston* (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1145, 1166 [140 Cal.Rptr.3d 139, 274 P.3d 1132].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

- 1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Elements, § 3.
- 5 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, § 737.
- 1 Witkin, *California Evidence* (5th ed. 2012) Circumstantial Evidence, § 121.
- 4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 83, *Evidence*, § 83.01[2], Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.03[2][a] (Matthew Bender).



## 224. Circumstantial Evidence: Sufficiency of Evidence

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**Before you may rely on circumstantial evidence to conclude that a fact necessary to find the defendant guilty has been proved, you must be convinced that the People have proved each fact essential to that conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt.**

**Also, before you may rely on circumstantial evidence to find the defendant guilty, you must be convinced that the only reasonable conclusion supported by the circumstantial evidence is that the defendant is guilty. If you can draw two or more reasonable conclusions from the circumstantial evidence, and one of those reasonable conclusions points to innocence and another to guilt, you must accept the one that points to innocence. However, when considering circumstantial evidence, you must accept only reasonable conclusions and reject any that are unreasonable.**

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2013*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on how to evaluate circumstantial evidence if the prosecution substantially relies on circumstantial evidence to establish any element of the case. (*People v. Yrigoyen* (1955) 45 Cal.2d 46, 49 [286 P.2d 1] [duty exists where circumstantial evidence relied on to prove any element, including intent]; see *People v. Bloyd* (1987) 43 Cal.3d 333, 351–352 [233 Cal.Rptr. 368, 729 P.2d 802]; *People v. Heishman* (1988) 45 Cal.3d 147, 167 [246 Cal.Rptr. 673, 753 P.2d 629].)

There is no sua sponte duty to give this instruction when the circumstantial evidence is incidental to and corroborative of direct evidence. (*People v. Malbrough* (1961) 55 Cal.2d 249, 250–251 [10 Cal.Rptr. 632, 359 P.2d 30]; *People v. Watson* (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 831 [299 P.2d 243]; *People v. Shea* (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1257, 1270–1271 [46 Cal.Rptr.2d 388].) This is so even when the corroborative circumstantial evidence is essential to the prosecution’s case, e.g., when corroboration of an accomplice’s testimony is required under Penal Code section 1111. (*People v. Williams* (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 869, 874 [208 Cal.Rptr. 790].)

If intent is the only element proved by circumstantial evidence, do not give this instruction. Give CALCRIM No. 225, *Circumstantial Evidence: Intent or Mental State*. (*People v. Marshall* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 849 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 347, 919 P.2d 1280].)

### AUTHORITY

- Direct Evidence Defined. Evid. Code, § 410.

- Inference Defined. Evid. Code, § 600(b).
- Between Two Reasonable Interpretations of Circumstantial Evidence, Accept the One That Points to Innocence. *People v. Merkouris* (1956) 46 Cal.2d 540, 560–562 [297 P.2d 999] [error to refuse requested instruction on this point]; *People v. Johnson* (1958) 163 Cal.App.2d 58, 62 [328 P.2d 809] [sua sponte duty to instruct]; see *People v. Wade* (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1487, 1492 [46 Cal.Rptr.2d 645].
- Circumstantial Evidence Must Be Entirely Consistent With a Theory of Guilt and Inconsistent With Any Other Rational Conclusion. *People v. Bender* (1945) 27 Cal.2d 164, 175 [163 P.2d 8] [sua sponte duty to instruct]; *People v. Yrigoyen* (1955) 45 Cal.2d 46, 49 [286 P.2d 1] [same].
- Difference Between Direct and Circumstantial Evidence. *People v. Lim Foon* (1915) 29 Cal.App. 270, 274 [155 P. 477] [no sua sponte duty to instruct, but court approves definition]; *People v. Goldstein* (1956) 139 Cal.App.2d 146, 152–153 [293 P.2d 495] [sua sponte duty to instruct].
- Each Fact in Chain of Circumstantial Evidence Must Be Proved. *People v. Watson* (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 831 [299 P.2d 243] [error to refuse requested instruction on this point].
- Sua Sponte Duty When Prosecutor’s Case Rests Substantially on Circumstantial Evidence. *People v. Bloyd* (1987) 43 Cal.3d 333, 351–352 [233 Cal.Rptr. 368, 729 P.2d 802].
- This Instruction Upheld. *People v. Ibarra* (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1186–1187 [67 Cal.Rptr.3d 871].
- This Instruction Cited With Approval. *People v. Livingston* (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1145, 1166 [140 Cal.Rptr.3d 139, 274 P.3d 1132].

## RELATED ISSUES

### *Extrajudicial Admissions*

Extrajudicial admissions are not the type of indirect evidence requiring instruction on circumstantial evidence. (*People v. Wiley* (1976) 18 Cal.3d 162, 174–175 [133 Cal.Rptr. 135, 554 P.2d 881].)

## SECONDARY SOURCES

- 1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Elements, § 3.
- 5 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, § 737.
- 1 Witkin, California Evidence (5th ed. 2012) Circumstantial Evidence, § 121.
- 4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 83, Evidence, § 83.01[2], Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.03[2][a] (Matthew Bender).

## 225. Circumstantial Evidence: Intent or Mental State

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The People must prove not only that the defendant did the act[s] charged, but also that (he/she) acted with a particular (intent/ [and/or] mental state). The instruction for (the/each) crime [and allegation] explains the (intent/ [and/or] mental state) required.

A[n] (intent/ [and/or] mental state) may be proved by circumstantial evidence.

Before you may rely on circumstantial evidence to conclude that a fact necessary to find the defendant guilty has been proved, you must be convinced that the People have proved each fact essential to that conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt.

Also, before you may rely on circumstantial evidence to conclude that the defendant had the required (intent/ [and/or] mental state), you must be convinced that the only reasonable conclusion supported by the circumstantial evidence is that the defendant had the required (intent/ [and/or] mental state). If you can draw two or more reasonable conclusions from the circumstantial evidence, and one of those reasonable conclusions supports a finding that the defendant did have the required (intent/ [and/or] mental state) and another reasonable conclusion supports a finding that the defendant did not, you must conclude that the required (intent/ [and/or] mental state) was not proved by the circumstantial evidence. However, when considering circumstantial evidence, you must accept only reasonable conclusions and reject any that are unreasonable.

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2006, June 2007, April 2011*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a  **sua sponte**  duty to instruct on how to evaluate circumstantial evidence if the prosecution substantially relies on circumstantial evidence to establish the element of a specific intent or a mental state. (*People v. Yrigoyen* (1955) 45 Cal.2d 46, 49 [286 P.2d 1].)

Give this instruction when the defendant's intent or mental state is the only element of the offense that rests substantially or entirely on circumstantial evidence. If other elements of the offense also rest substantially or entirely on circumstantial evidence, do not give this instruction. Give CALCRIM No. 224, *Circumstantial Evidence: Sufficiency of Evidence*. (See *People v. Marshall* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 849 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 347, 919 P.2d 1280]; *People v. Hughes* (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 347 [116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401, 39 P.3d 432].)

If the court is also instructing on a strict-liability offense, the court may wish to modify this instruction to clarify the charges to which it applies.

### AUTHORITY

- Instructional Requirements. *People v. Lizarraga* (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 476, 481–482 [268 Cal.Rptr. 262] [when both specific intent and mental state are elements].
- Intent Manifested by Circumstances. Pen. Code, § 29.2(a).
- Accept Reasonable Interpretation of Circumstantial Evidence That Points Against Specific Intent. *People v. Yokum* (1956) 145 Cal.App.2d 245, 253–254 [302 P.2d 406], disapproved on other grounds in *People v. Cook* (1983) 33 Cal.3d 400, 413 [189 Cal.Rptr. 159, 658 P.2d 86].
- Circumstantial Evidence Must Be Entirely Consistent With Existence of Specific Intent. *People v. Yokum* (1956) 145 Cal.App.2d 245, 253–254 [302 P.2d 406], disapproved on other grounds in *People v. Cook* (1983) 33 Cal.3d 400, 413 [189 Cal.Rptr. 159, 658 P.2d 86].
- Reject Unreasonable Interpretations. *People v. Hines* (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1049–1050 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 594, 938 P.2d 388].
- This Instruction Upheld. *People v. Golde* (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 101, 118 [77 Cal.Rptr.3d 120].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *General or Specific Intent Explained*

A crime is a general-intent offense when the statutory definition of the crime consists of only the description of a particular act, without reference to intent to do a further act or achieve a future consequence. A crime is a specific-intent offense when the statutory definition refers to the defendant's intent to do some further act or achieve some additional consequence. (*People v. McDaniel* (1979) 24 Cal.3d 661, 669 [156 Cal.Rptr. 865, 597 P.2d 124]; *People v. Hood* (1969) 1 Cal.3d 444, 456–457 [82 Cal.Rptr. 618, 462 P.2d 370]; *People v. Swanson* (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 104, 109 [190 Cal.Rptr. 768]; see, e.g., *People v. Whitfield* (1994) 7 Cal.4th 437, 449–450 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 858, 868 P.2d 272] [second degree murder based on implied malice is a specific-intent crime].)

#### *Only One Possible Inference*

The fact that elements of a charged offense include mental elements that must necessarily be proved by inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence does not alone require an instruction on the effect to be given to such evidence. (*People v. Heishman* (1988) 45 Cal.3d 147, 167 [246 Cal.Rptr. 673, 753 P.2d 629]; *People v. Wiley* (1976) 18 Cal.3d 162, 174–176 [133 Cal.Rptr. 135, 554 P.2d 881].) When the only inference to be drawn from circumstantial evidence points to the existence of a required specific intent or mental state, a circumstantial evidence instruction need not be given sua sponte, but should be given on request. (*People v. Gordon* (1982)

136 Cal.App.3d 519, 531 [186 Cal.Rptr. 373]; *People v. Morrisson* (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 787, 793–794 [155 Cal.Rptr. 152].)

***Direct Evidence, Extrajudicial Admission, or No Substantial Reliance***

This instruction should not be given if direct evidence of the mental elements exists (*People v. Wiley* (1976) 18 Cal.3d 162, 175 [133 Cal.Rptr. 135, 554 P.2d 881]), if the only circumstantial evidence is an extrajudicial admission (*People v. Gould* (1960) 54 Cal.2d 621, 629 [7 Cal.Rptr. 273, 354 P.2d 865], overruled on other grounds in *People v. Cuevas* (1995) 12 Cal.4th 252, 271–272 [48 Cal.Rptr.2d 135, 906 P.2d 1290]), or if the prosecution does not substantially rely on circumstantial evidence (*People v. DeLeon* (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 602, 607–608 [188 Cal.Rptr. 63]).

See the Related Issues section of CALCRIM No. 224, *Circumstantial Evidence: Sufficiency of Evidence*.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

- 1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Elements, §§ 3, 6.
- 5 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, § 737.
- 1 Witkin, California Evidence (5th ed. 2012) Circumstantial Evidence, § 121.
- 4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.03[2][a] (Matthew Bender).

## 226. Witnesses

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**You alone must judge the credibility or believability of the witnesses. In deciding whether testimony is true and accurate, use your common sense and experience. You must judge the testimony of each witness by the same standards, setting aside any bias or prejudice you may have.**

**You may believe all, part, or none of any witness's testimony. Consider the testimony of each witness and decide how much of it you believe.**

**In evaluating a witness's testimony, you may consider anything that reasonably tends to prove or disprove the truth or accuracy of that testimony. Among the factors that you may consider are:**

- **How well could the witness see, hear, or otherwise perceive the things about which the witness testified?**
- **How well was the witness able to remember and describe what happened?**
- **What was the witness's behavior while testifying?**
- **Did the witness understand the questions and answer them directly?**
- **Was the witness's testimony influenced by a factor such as bias or prejudice, a personal relationship with someone involved in the case, or a personal interest in how the case is decided?**
- **What was the witness's attitude about the case or about testifying?**
- **Did the witness make a statement in the past that is consistent or inconsistent with his or her testimony?**
- **How reasonable is the testimony when you consider all the other evidence in the case?**
- **[Did other evidence prove or disprove any fact about which the witness testified?]**
- **[Did the witness admit to being untruthful?]**
- **[What is the witness's character for truthfulness?]**
- **[Has the witness been convicted of a felony?]**
- **[Has the witness engaged in [other] conduct that reflects on his or her believability?]**
- **[Was the witness promised immunity or leniency in exchange for his or her testimony?]**

**Do not automatically reject testimony just because of inconsistencies or**

**conflicts. Consider whether the differences are important or not. People sometimes honestly forget things or make mistakes about what they remember. Also, two people may witness the same event yet see or hear it differently.**

**[If the evidence establishes that a witness’s character for truthfulness has not been discussed among the people who know him or her, you may conclude from the lack of discussion that the witness’s character for truthfulness is good.]**

**[If you do not believe a witness’s testimony that he or she no longer remembers something, that testimony is inconsistent with the witness’s earlier statement on that subject.]**

**[If you decide that a witness deliberately lied about something significant in this case, you should consider not believing anything that witness says. Or, if you think the witness lied about some things, but told the truth about others, you may simply accept the part that you think is true and ignore the rest.]**

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*New January 2006; Revised June 2007, April 2008, September 2020*

## **BENCH NOTES**

### ***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on factors relevant to a witness’s credibility. (*People v. Rincon-Pineda* (1975) 14 Cal.3d 864, 883–884 [123 Cal.Rptr. 119, 538 P.2d 247].) Although there is no sua sponte duty to instruct on inconsistencies in testimony or a witness who lies, there is authority approving instruction on both topics. (*Dodds v. Stellar* (1946) 77 Cal.App.2d 411, 426 [175 P.2d 607]; *People v. Murillo* (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1104, 1107 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 21].)

The court may strike any of the enumerated impermissible bases for bias that are clearly inapplicable in a given case.

Give all of the bracketed factors that are relevant based on the evidence. (Evid. Code, § 780(e), (i), and (k).)

Give any of the final three bracketed paragraphs if relevant based on the evidence.

If the court instructs on a prior felony conviction or prior misconduct admitted pursuant to *People v. Wheeler* (1992) 4 Cal.4th 284 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 418, 841 P.2d 938], the court should consider whether to give CALCRIM No. 316, *Additional Instructions on Witness Credibility—Other Conduct*. (See Bench Notes to that instruction.)

## **AUTHORITY**

- Factors. Evid. Code, § 780; *People v. Rincon-Pineda* (1975) 14 Cal.3d 864, 883–884 [123 Cal.Rptr. 119, 538 P.2d 247].

- Inconsistencies. *Dodds v. Stellar* (1946) 77 Cal.App.2d 411, 426 [175 P.2d 607].
- Witness Who Lies. *People v. Murillo* (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1104, 1107 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 21].
- Proof of Character For Truthfulness From Evidence of Lack of Discussion. *People v. Jimenez* (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 726, 732 [201 Cal.Rptr.3d 76]; *People v. Adams* (1902) 137 Cal. 580, 582 [70 P. 662].
- This Instruction Upheld. *People v. Ibarra* (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1187–1188 [67 Cal.Rptr.3d 871].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

5 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, § 725.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, §§ 85.02[1A][b], [2][b], [c], 85.03[2][b] (Matthew Bender).

**227–239. Reserved for Future Use**



## C. CAUSATION

### 240. Causation

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**An act [or omission] causes (injury/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert other description>) if the (injury/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert other description>) is the direct, natural, and probable consequence of the act [or omission] and the (injury/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert other description>) would not have happened without the act [or omission]. A natural and probable consequence is one that a reasonable person would know is likely to happen if nothing unusual intervenes. In deciding whether a consequence is natural and probable, consider all the circumstances established by the evidence.**

*<Give if multiple potential causes.>*

**[There may be more than one cause of (injury/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert other description>). An act [or omission] causes (injury/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert other description>), only if it is a substantial factor in causing the (injury/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert other description>). A substantial factor is more than a trivial or remote factor. However, it does not have to be the only factor that causes the (injury/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert other description>).]**

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2012*

### BENCH NOTES

#### ***Instructional Duty***

If causation is at issue, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on proximate cause. (*People v. Bernhardt* (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 567, 590–591 [35 Cal.Rptr. 401]; *People v. Cervantes* (2001) 26 Cal.4th 860, 866–874 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 148, 29 P.3d 225].) The committee has addressed causation in those instructions where the issue is most likely to arise. If the particular facts of the case raise a causation issue and other instructions do not adequately cover the point, give this instruction.

If there is evidence of multiple potential causes, the court should also give the bracketed paragraph. (*People v. Sanchez* (2001) 26 Cal.4th 834, 845–849 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 129, 29 P.3d 209]; *People v. Autry* (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 363 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 135].)

### AUTHORITY

- Proximate Cause. *People v. Cervantes* (2001) 26 Cal.4th 860, 866–874 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 148, 29 P.3d 225]; *People v. Roberts* (1992) 2 Cal.4th 271, 315–322 [6 Cal.Rptr.2d 276, 826 P.2d 274].

- Substantial Factor. *People v. Sanchez* (2001) 26 Cal.4th 834, 845–849 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 129, 29 P.3d 209]; *People v. Autry* (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 363 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 135].
- Independent Intervening Cause. *People v. Cervantes* (2001) 26 Cal.4th 860, 866–874 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 148, 29 P.3d 225].
- Causation Instructions. *People v. Sanchez* (2001) 26 Cal.4th 834, 845–849 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 129, 29 P.3d 209]; *People v. Roberts* (1992) 2 Cal.4th 271, 311–322 [6 Cal.Rptr.2d 276, 826 P.2d 274]; *People v. Autry* (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 363 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 135].
- Instructional Duty. *People v. Bernhardt* (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 567, 590–591 [35 Cal.Rptr. 401].
- Natural and Probable Consequences Defined. See *People v. Prettyman* (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 291 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 827, 926 P.2d 1013] (conc. & dis. opn. of Brown, J.).
- Act or Omission. *People v. Cervantes* (2001) 26 Cal.4th 860, 866 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 148, 29 P.3d 225].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Elements, §§ 37–46.

1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, § 99.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.02[1A][a] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 140, *Challenges to Crimes*, § 140.04 (Matthew Bender).

### 241–249. Reserved for Future Use

## D. UNION OF ACT AND INTENT

### 250. Union of Act and Intent: General Intent

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**The crime[s] [or other allegation[s]] charged in this case require[s] proof of the union, or joint operation, of act and wrongful intent.**

**For you to find a person guilty of the crime[s] (in this case/ of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] of alleged offense[s] and count[s], e.g., battery, as charged in Count 1> [or to find the allegation[s] of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] of enhancement[s]> true), that person must not only commit the prohibited act [or fail to do the required act], but must do so with wrongful intent. A person acts with wrongful intent when he or she intentionally does a prohibited act [or fails to do a required act]; however, it is not required that he or she intend to break the law. The act required is explained in the instruction for that crime [or allegation].**

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*New January 2006; Revised June 2007, April 2008, April 2011*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the union of act and general criminal intent. (*People v. Jeffers* (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 917, 920–923 [49 Cal.Rptr.2d 86].) However, this instruction **must not** be used if the crime requires a specific mental state, such as knowledge or malice, even if the crime is classified as a general intent offense. In such cases, the court must give CALCRIM No. 251, *Union of Act and Intent: Specific Intent or Mental State*.

If the case involves both offenses requiring a specific intent or mental state and offenses that do not, the court may give CALCRIM No. 252, *Union of Act and Intent: General and Specific Intent Together*, in place of this instruction.

The court should specify for the jury which offenses require only a general criminal intent by inserting the names of the offenses and count numbers where indicated in the second paragraph of the instruction. (*People v. Hill* (1967) 67 Cal.2d 105, 118 [60 Cal.Rptr. 234, 429 P.2d 586].) If all the charged crimes and allegations involve general intent, the court need not provide a list in the blank provided in this instruction.

If the defendant is charged with aiding and abetting or conspiracy to commit a general-intent offense, the court must instruct on the specific intent required for aiding and abetting or conspiracy. (See *People v. McCoy* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1117–1118 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 188, 24 P.3d 1210]; *People v. Bernhardt*, *supra*, 222 Cal.App.2d at pp. 586–587.)

If the defendant is also charged with a criminal negligence or strict liability offense, insert the name of the offense where indicated in the first sentence. The court may also give CALCRIM No. 253, *Union of Act and Intent: Criminal Negligence*, or CALCRIM No. 254, *Union of Act and Intent: Strict-Liability Crime*.

### ***Defenses—Instructional Duty***

“A person who commits a prohibited act ‘through misfortune or by accident, when it appears that there was no evil design, intention or culpable negligence’ has not committed a crime.” (*People v. Jeffers* (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 917, 922 [49 Cal.Rptr.2d 86] [quoting Pen. Code, § 26].) Similarly, an honest and reasonable mistake of fact may negate general criminal intent. (*People v. Hernandez* (1964) 61 Cal.2d 529, 535–536 [39 Cal.Rptr. 361, 393 P.2d 673].) If there is sufficient evidence of these or other defenses, such as unconsciousness, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give the appropriate defense instructions. (See Defenses and Insanity, CALCRIM No. 3400 et seq.)

### **AUTHORITY**

- Statutory Authority. Pen. Code, § 20; see also Evid. Code, §§ 665, 668.
- Instructional Requirements. *People v. Hill* (1967) 67 Cal.2d 105, 117 [60 Cal.Rptr. 234, 429 P.2d 586]; *People v. Bernhardt* (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 567, 586–587 [35 Cal.Rptr. 401]; *People v. Jeffers* (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 917, 920–923 [49 Cal.Rptr.2d 86].
- History of General-Intent Requirement. *Morissette v. United States* (1952) 342 U.S. 246 [72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed.2d 288]; see also *People v. Garcia* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 744, 754 [107 Cal.Rptr.2d 355, 23 P.3d 590].
- This Instruction Upheld. *People v. Ibarra* (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1189 [67 Cal.Rptr.3d 871].

### **RELATED ISSUES**

#### ***Sex Registration and Knowledge of Legal Duty***

The offense of failure to register as a sex offender requires proof that the defendant actually knew of his or her duty to register. (*People v. Garcia* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 744, 754 [107 Cal.Rptr.2d 355, 23 P.3d 590].) For the charge of failure to register, it is error to give an instruction on general criminal intent that informs the jury that a person is “acting with general criminal intent, even though he may not know that his act or conduct is unlawful.” (*People v. Barker* (2004) 34 Cal.4th 345, 360 [18 Cal.Rptr.3d 260]; *People v. Edgar* (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 210, 219 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 662].) In such cases, the court should give CALCRIM No. 251, *Union of Act and Intent: Specific Intent or Mental State*, instead of this instruction.

### **SECONDARY SOURCES**

- 1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Elements, §§ 1–5.
- 4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.03[2][e] (Matthew Bender).
- 6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 140,

*Challenges to Crimes*, § 140.02[1], [2] (Matthew Bender).

## 251. Union of Act and Intent: Specific Intent or Mental State

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The crime[s] [(and/or) other allegation[s]] charged in this case require[s] proof of the union, or joint operation, of act and wrongful intent.

For you to find a person guilty of the crime[s] (in this case/ of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] of alleged offense[s] and count[s], e.g., burglary, as charged in Count 1> [or to find the allegation[s] of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] of enhancement[s]> true), that person must not only intentionally commit the prohibited act [or intentionally fail to do the required act], but must do so with a specific (intent/ [and/or] mental state). The act and the specific (intent/ [and/or] mental state) required are explained in the instruction for that crime [or allegation].

<Repeat next paragraph as needed>

[The specific (intent/ [and/or] mental state) required for the crime of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] of alleged offense[s] e.g., burglary> is \_\_\_\_\_ <insert specific intent>.]

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New January 2006; Revised August 2006, June 2007, April 2008

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the union of act and specific intent or mental state. (*People v. Alvarez* (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 220 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 385, 926 P.2d 365].) This instruction **must** be given if the crime requires a specific mental state, such as knowledge or malice, even if the crime is classified as a general intent offense.

**Do not** give this instruction if the case involves only general-intent offenses that do not require any specific mental state. (See CALCRIM No. 250, *Union of Act and Intent: General Intent*.) If the case involves both offenses requiring a specific intent or mental state and offenses that do not, the court may give CALCRIM No. 252, *Union of Act and Intent: General and Specific Intent Together*, in place of this instruction.

The court should specify for the jury which offenses are specific-intent offenses by inserting the names of the offenses and count numbers where indicated in the second paragraph of the instruction. (See *People v. Hill* (1967) 67 Cal.2d 105, 118 [60 Cal.Rptr. 234, 429 P.2d 586].) The court may use the final optional paragraph if it deems it helpful, particularly in cases with multiple counts.

If the defendant is charged with aiding and abetting or conspiracy to commit a general-intent offense, the court must instruct on the specific intent required for aiding and abetting or conspiracy. (See *People v. McCoy* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1117–1118 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 188, 24 P.3d 1210]; *People v. Bernhardt* (1963) 222

Cal.App.2d 567, 586–587 [35 Cal.Rptr. 401].)

This instruction does not apply to criminal negligence or strict liability. If the defendant is also charged with a criminal negligence or strict liability offense, the court should give the appropriate Union of Act and Intent instruction: CALCRIM No. 253, *Union of Act and Intent: Criminal Negligence*, or CALCRIM No. 254, *Union of Act and Intent: Strict-Liability Crime*.

### ***Defenses—Instructional Duty***

Evidence of voluntary intoxication or mental impairment may be admitted to show that the defendant did not form the required mental state. (See *People v. Ricardi* (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1427, 1432 [12 Cal.Rptr.2d 364].) The court has no sua sponte duty to instruct on these defenses; however, the trial court must give these instructions on request if supported by the evidence. (*People v. Saille* (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1103, 1119 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 364, 820 P.2d 588]; see Defenses and Insanity, CALCRIM No. 3400 et seq.)

## **AUTHORITY**

- Statutory Authority. Pen. Code, § 20; see also Evid. Code, §§ 665, 668.
- Instructional Requirements. *People v. Alvarez* (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 220 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 385, 926 P.2d 365]; *People v. Ford* (1964) 60 Cal.2d 772, 792–793 [36 Cal.Rptr. 620, 388 P.2d 892]; *People v. Turner* (1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 174, 184 [99 Cal.Rptr. 186]; *People v. Hill* (1967) 67 Cal.2d 105, 117 [60 Cal.Rptr. 234, 429 P.2d 586].

## **SECONDARY SOURCES**

- 1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Elements, §§ 1–6.
- 3 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 73, *Defenses and Justifications*, § 73.03 (Matthew Bender).
- 4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.03[2][e] (Matthew Bender).
- 6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 140, *Challenges to Crimes*, § 140.02[1], [3] (Matthew Bender).

## 252. Union of Act and Intent: General and Specific Intent Together

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The crime[s] [(and/or) other allegation[s]] charged in Count[s] \_\_\_\_\_ require[s] proof of the union, or joint operation, of act and wrongful intent.

The following crime[s] [and allegation[s]] require[s] general criminal intent: \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] of alleged offense[s] and enhancement[s] and count[s], e.g., battery, as charged in Count 1>. For you to find a person guilty of (this/these) crime[s] [or to find the allegation[s] true], that person must not only commit the prohibited act [or fail to do the required act], but must do so with wrongful intent. A person acts with wrongful intent when he or she intentionally does a prohibited act [or fails to do a required act]; however, it is not required that he or she intend to break the law. The act required is explained in the instruction for that crime [or allegation].

The following crime[s] [and allegation[s]] require[s] a specific intent or mental state: \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] of alleged offense[s] and count[s], e.g., burglary, as charged in Count 1> \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] of enhancement[s]>. For you to find a person guilty of (this/these) crimes [or to find the allegation[s] true], that person must not only intentionally commit the prohibited act [or intentionally fail to do the required act], but must do so with a specific (intent/ [and/or] mental state). The act and the specific (intent/ [and/or] mental state) required are explained in the instruction for that crime [or allegation].

<Repeat next paragraph as needed>

[The specific (intent/ [and/or] mental state) required for the crime of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] of alleged offense[s] e.g., burglary> is \_\_\_\_\_ <insert specific intent>.]

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New January 2006; Revised June 2007, April 2010, April 2011, March 2017

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the joint union of act and intent. (*People v. Alvarez* (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 220 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 385, 926 P.2d 365]; *People v. Ford* (1964) 60 Cal.2d 772, 792–793 [36 Cal.Rptr. 620, 388 P.2d 892]; *People v. Jeffers* (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 917, 920–923 [49 Cal.Rptr.2d 86].) The court may give this instruction in cases involving both offenses requiring a specific intent or mental state and offenses that do not, rather than giving both CALCRIM No. 250 and CALCRIM No. 251.

**Do not** give this instruction if the case involves only offenses requiring a specific



intent or mental state or involves only offenses that do not. (See CALCRIM No. 250, *Union of Act and Intent: General Intent*, and CALCRIM No. 251, *Union of Act and Intent: Specific Intent or Mental State*.)

The court should specify for the jury which offenses require general criminal intent and which require a specific intent or mental state by inserting the names of the offenses where indicated in the instruction. (See *People v. Hill* (1967) 67 Cal.2d 105, 118 [60 Cal.Rptr. 234, 429 P.2d 586].) If the crime requires a specific mental state, such as knowledge or malice, the court **must** insert the name of the offense in the third paragraph, explaining the mental state requirement, even if the crime is classified as a general intent offense.

If the defendant is charged with aiding and abetting or conspiracy to commit a general-intent offense, the court **must** instruct on the specific intent required for aiding and abetting or conspiracy. (See *People v. McCoy* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1117–1118 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 188, 24 P.3d 1210]; *People v. Bernhardt* (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 567, 586–587 [35 Cal.Rptr. 401].)

If the defendant is also charged with a criminal negligence or strict-liability offense, insert the name of the offense where indicated in the first sentence. The court may also give CALCRIM No. 253, *Union of Act and Intent: Criminal Negligence*, or CALCRIM No. 254, *Union of Act and Intent: Strict-Liability Crime*.

### ***Defenses—Instructional Duty***

Evidence of voluntary intoxication or mental impairment may be admitted to show that the defendant did not form the required mental state. (See *People v. Ricardi* (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1427, 1432 [12 Cal.Rptr.2d 364].) The court has no sua sponte duty to instruct on these defenses; however, the trial court must give these instructions on request if supported by the evidence. (*People v. Saille* (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1103, 1119 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 364, 820 P.2d 588]; see Defenses and Insanity, CALCRIM No. 3400 et seq.)

## **AUTHORITY**

- Statutory Authority. Pen. Code, § 20; see also Evid. Code, §§ 665, 668.
- Instructional Requirements. *People v. Hill* (1967) 67 Cal.2d 105, 117 [60 Cal.Rptr. 234, 429 P.2d 586]; *People v. Ford* (1964) 60 Cal.2d 772, 792–793 [36 Cal.Rptr. 620, 388 P.2d 892]; *People v. Jeffers* (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 917, 920–923 [49 Cal.Rptr.2d 86].
- History of General-Intent Requirement. *Morissette v. United States* (1952) 342 U.S. 246 [72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288]; see also *People v. Garcia* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 744, 754 [107 Cal.Rptr.2d 355, 23 P.3d 590].
- This Instruction Upheld. *People v. Ibarra* (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1189 [67 Cal.Rptr.3d 871].
- Instruction on Both General and Specific Intent May Be Necessary for Voluntary Manslaughter. *People v. Martinez* (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 314, 334–336 [64 Cal.Rptr.3d 580].

**RELATED ISSUES**

See the Bench Notes and Related Issues sections of CALCRIM No. 250, *Union of Act and Intent: General Intent*, and CALCRIM No. 251, *Union of Act and Intent: Specific Intent or Mental State*.

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

- 1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Elements, §§ 1–6.
- 4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.03[2][e] (Matthew Bender).
- 6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 140, *Challenges to Crimes*, § 140.02[1]–[3] (Matthew Bender).

## 253. Union of Act and Intent: Criminal Negligence

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**For you to find a person guilty of the crime[s] of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] of alleged offense[s]> [or to find the allegation[s] of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] of enhancement[s]> true], a person must do an act [or fail to do an act] with (criminal/gross) negligence. (Criminal/Gross) negligence is defined in the instructions on that crime.**

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*New January 2006; Revised June 2007*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

This instruction is provided for the court to use when instructing on an offense for which criminal or gross negligence is an element. **Do not** give this instruction if only general or specific-intent offenses are presented to the jury. (*People v. Lara* (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 102, 110 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].) Although no case has held that the court has a sua sponte duty to give this instruction, the committee recommends that the instruction be given, if applicable, as a matter of caution.

The court must specify for the jury which offenses require criminal negligence by inserting the names of the offenses where indicated in the instruction. (See *People v. Hill* (1967) 67 Cal.2d 105, 118 [60 Cal.Rptr. 234, 429 P.2d 586].)

The court should select either “criminal” or “gross” based on the words used in the instruction on the elements of the underlying offense.

### AUTHORITY

- Statutory Authority. Pen. Code, § 20; see also Evid. Code, §§ 665, 668.
- Criminal or Gross Negligence Defined. *People v. Penny* (1955) 44 Cal.2d 861, 879 [285 P.2d 926]; *People v. Rodriguez* (1960) 186 Cal.App.2d 433, 440 [8 Cal.Rptr. 863].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Elements, § 21.  
6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 140, *Challenges to Crimes*, § 140.02[1], [4] (Matthew Bender).

## 254. Union of Act and Intent: Strict-Liability Crime

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**For you to find a person guilty of the crime[s] of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] of alleged offense[s]> [or to find the allegation[s] of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] of enhancement[s]> true], a person only needs to do the prohibited act [or to fail to do the required act]. The People do not need to prove any intent or other mental state.**

---

*New January 2006; Revised June 2007*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

This instruction is provided for the court to use when instructing on a strict-liability offense. The committee does not believe that the instruction is required. However, the instruction may be useful when the case also involves general-intent, specific-intent, or criminal negligence offenses. **Do not** give this instruction unless the court is completely certain that the offense is a strict-liability offense. For a discussion of the rarity of strict-liability offenses in modern criminal law, see *People v. Garcia* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 744, 754 [107 Cal.Rptr.2d 355, 23 P.3d 590], and *People v. Simon* (1995) 9 Cal.4th 493, 519–522 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d 278, 886 P.2d 1271].

The court must specify for the jury which offenses are strict-liability offenses by inserting the names of the offenses where indicated in the instruction. (See *People v. Hill* (1967) 67 Cal.2d 105, 118 [60 Cal.Rptr. 234, 429 P.2d 586].)

### AUTHORITY

- Strict-Liability Offenses Discussed. *People v. Garcia* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 744, 754 [107 Cal.Rptr.2d 355, 23 P.3d 590]; *People v. Simon* (1995) 9 Cal.4th 493, 519–522 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d 278, 886 P.2d 1271].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Elements, §§ 18–20.  
6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 140, *Challenges to Crimes*, § 140.02[5] (Matthew Bender).

**255–299. Reserved for Future Use**

# EVIDENCE

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- 378–399. Reserved for Future Use

## A. GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

### 300. All Available Evidence

---

**Neither side is required to call all witnesses who may have information about the case or to produce all physical evidence that might be relevant.**

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*New January 2006*

#### BENCH NOTES

##### *Instructional Duty*

The court is not required to give this instruction sua sponte; however, it should be given on request. (See generally Pen. Code, §§ 1093(f), 1127; *People v. Pitts* (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 606, 880, 881 [273 Cal.Rptr. 757].)

#### AUTHORITY

- Instructional Requirements. *People v. Simms* (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 299, 313 [89 Cal.Rptr. 1].
- This Instruction Upheld. *People v. Ibarra* (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1189–1190 [67 Cal.Rptr.3d 871].

#### RELATED ISSUES

##### *Willful Suppression of or Failure to Obtain Evidence*

Willful suppression of evidence by the government constitutes a denial of a fair trial and of due process. (*People v. Noisy* (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 543, 549–550 [71 Cal.Rptr. 339].) Likewise, willful failure by investigating officers to obtain evidence that would clear a defendant would amount to a denial of due process of law. (*Ibid.*) However, failure to look for evidence is different from suppressing known evidence and “the mere fact that investigating officers did not pursue every possible means of investigation of crime does not, standing alone, constitute denial of due process or suppression of evidence.” (*Ibid.*; see also *People v. Tuthill* (1947) 31 Cal.2d 92, 97–98 [187 P.2d 16], overruled on other grounds as noted by *People v. Balderas* (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 182 [222 Cal.Rptr. 184, 711 P.2d 480] [“[t]here is no compulsion on the prosecution to call any particular witness or to make any particular tests so long as there is fairly presented to the court the material evidence bearing upon the charge for which the defendant is on trial.”].)

#### SECONDARY SOURCES

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 82, *Witnesses*, Ch. 83, *Evidence* (Matthew Bender).

## 301. Single Witness's Testimony

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**[Unless I instruct you otherwise,] (T/the) testimony of only one witness can prove any fact. Before you conclude that the testimony of one witness proves a fact, you should carefully review all the evidence.**

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*New January 2006; Revised April 2010, February 2012, February 2014, September 2017, March 2019*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a  **sua sponte**  duty to give an instruction on this issue in every case. (*People v. Rincon-Pineda* (1975) 14 Cal.3d 864, 884–885 [123 Cal.Rptr. 119, 538 P.2d 247].)

Give the bracketed phrase if any testimony requires corroboration. See Cal. Const., art. I, § 18 [treason]; Pen. Code, §§ 1111 [accomplice testimony]; 1111.5 [in-custody informant]; 653f [solicitation of felony]; 118 [perjury]; 1108 [abortion and seduction of minor]; 532 [obtaining property by false pretenses].

### AUTHORITY

- Instructional Requirements. Evid. Code, § 411; *People v. Rincon-Pineda* (1975) 14 Cal.3d 864, 885 [123 Cal.Rptr. 119, 538 P.2d 247].
- Corroboration Required. *People v. Chavez* (1985) 39 Cal.3d 823, 831–832 [218 Cal.Rptr. 49, 705 P.2d 372].
- No Corroboration Requirement for Exculpatory Accomplice Testimony. *People v. Smith* (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 766, 778–780 [218 Cal.Rptr.3d 892].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Uncorroborated Testimony of Defendant*

The cautionary admonition regarding a single witness's testimony applies with equal force to uncorroborated testimony by a defendant. (*People v. Turner* (1990) 50 Cal.3d 668, 696, fn. 14 [268 Cal.Rptr. 706, 789 P.2d 887].)

#### *Uncorroborated Testimony in Sex Offense Cases*

In a prosecution for forcible rape, an instruction that the testimony of a single witness is sufficient may be given in conjunction with an instruction that there is no legal corroboration requirement in a sex offense case. Both instructions correctly state the law and because each focuses on a different legal point, there is no implication that the victim's testimony is more credible than the defendant's testimony. (*People v. Gammage* (1992) 2 Cal.4th 693, 700–702 [7 Cal.Rptr.2d 541, 828 P.2d 682] [resolving split of authority on whether the two instructions can be given together].)



**SECONDARY SOURCES**

3 Witkin, California Evidence (5th ed. 2012) Presentation at Trial, § 125.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.03[2][b] (Matthew Bender).

## 302. Evaluating Conflicting Evidence

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If you determine there is a conflict in the evidence, you must decide what evidence, if any, to believe. Do not simply count the number of witnesses who agree or disagree on a point and accept the testimony of the greater number of witnesses. On the other hand, do not disregard the testimony of any witness without a reason or because of prejudice or a desire to favor one side or the other. What is important is whether the testimony or any other evidence convinces you, not just the number of witnesses who testify about a certain point.

---

*New January 2006; Revised June 2007*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on weighing contradictory evidence unless corroborating evidence is required. (*People v. Rincon-Pineda* (1975) 14 Cal.3d 864, 884 [123 Cal.Rptr. 119, 538 P.2d 247].)

### AUTHORITY

- Instructional Requirements. *People v. Rincon-Pineda* (1975) 14 Cal.3d 864, 884 [123 Cal.Rptr. 119, 538 P.2d 247].
- This Instruction Upheld. *People v. Reyes* (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1491, 1497 [60 Cal.Rptr.3d 777]; *People v. Ibarra* (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1190 [67 Cal.Rptr.3d 871].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

3 Witkin, California Evidence (5th ed. 2012) Presentation at Trial, § 100.

5 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, §§ 732, 734.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.03[2][b] (Matthew Bender).

### 303. Limited Purpose Evidence in General

---

**During the trial, certain evidence was admitted for a limited purpose. You may consider that evidence only for that purpose and for no other.**

---

*New January 2006*

#### **BENCH NOTES**

##### ***Instructional Duty***

The court has no sua sponte duty to give an admonition limiting consideration of evidence; however, it must be given on request. (Evid. Code, § 355; *People v. Simms* (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 299, 311 [89 Cal.Rptr. 1].)

#### **AUTHORITY**

- Instructional Requirements. Evid. Code, § 355; *People v. Simms* (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 299, 311 [89 Cal.Rptr. 1].

#### **RELATED ISSUES**

##### ***Timing of Instruction***

The court has discretion to give limiting instructions at the time the evidence is admitted or at the close of evidence. (*People v. Dennis* (1998) 17 Cal.4th 468, 533–534 [71 Cal.Rptr.2d 680, 950 P.2d 1035] [giving limiting instruction regarding use of defendant’s statements to psychiatrist at close of all evidence did not result in error].)

#### **SECONDARY SOURCES**

1 Witkin, *California Evidence* (5th ed. 2012) Circumstantial Evidence, §§ 32, 33, 35.  
4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 83, *Evidence*, § 83.04[3], Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.02[2][b] (Matthew Bender).

## 304. Multiple Defendants: Limited Admissibility of Evidence

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**I instructed you during the trial that certain evidence was admitted only against [a] certain defendant[s]. You must not consider that evidence against any other defendant.**

---

*New January 2006*

### **BENCH NOTES**

#### ***Instructional Duty***

The court has no sua sponte duty to give an instruction limiting evidence to one defendant; however, it must be given on request. (Evid. Code, § 355; *People v. Miranda* (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 83 [241 Cal.Rptr. 594, 744 P.2d 1127], disapproved of on other grounds in *People v. Marshall* (1990) 50 Cal.3d 907 [269 Cal.Rptr. 269, 790 P.2d 676].)

### **AUTHORITY**

- Instructional Requirements. Evid. Code, § 355.

### **RELATED ISSUES**

See the Related Issues section to CALCRIM No. 303, *Limited Purpose Evidence in General*.

### **SECONDARY SOURCES**

- 1 Witkin, *California Evidence* (5th ed. 2012) Circumstantial Evidence, §§ 32, 33, 35.
- 4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 83, *Evidence*, § 83.04[3] (Matthew Bender).

## 305. Multiple Defendants: Limited Admissibility of Defendant's Statement

---

**You have heard evidence that defendant \_\_\_\_\_ <insert defendant's name> made a statement (out of court/before trial). You may consider that evidence only against (him/her), not against any other defendant.**

---

*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has no sua sponte duty to give an instruction on defendant's statements; however, it must be given on request. (Evid. Code, § 355; *People v. Simms* (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 299, 311 [89 Cal.Rptr. 1].)

If the defendant made the statement out of court, give that phrase in the parenthetical. If the statement was made in a previous proceeding, give the phrase "before trial." (See *People v. Perry* (1972) 7 Cal.3d 756, 787–788 [103 Cal.Rptr. 161, 499 P.2d 129].)

### AUTHORITY

- Instructional Requirements. Evid. Code, § 355.

### RELATED ISSUES

See the Related Issues section to CALCRIM No. 303, *Limited Purpose Evidence in General*.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin, *California Evidence* (5th ed. 2012) Circumstantial Evidence, §§ 32, 33, 35.  
4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.02[2][b] (Matthew Bender).

## 306. Untimely Disclosure of Evidence

---

**Both the People and the defense must disclose their evidence to the other side before trial, within the time limits set by law. Failure to follow this rule may deny the other side the chance to produce all relevant evidence, to counter opposing evidence, or to receive a fair trial.**

**An attorney for the (People/defense) failed to disclose: \_\_\_\_\_**  
<describe evidence that was not disclosed> [within the legal time period].

**In evaluating the weight and significance of that evidence, you may consider the effect, if any, of that late disclosure.**

**[However, the fact that the defendant’s attorney failed to disclose evidence [within the legal time period] is not evidence that the defendant committed a crime.]**

<Consider for multiple defendant cases>

**[You must not consider the fact that an attorney for defendant \_\_\_\_\_ <insert defendant’s name> failed to disclose evidence when you decide the charges against defendant[s] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert names of other defendant[s]>.]**

---

*New January 2006; Revised February 2014*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

While the court has discretion to give an instruction on untimely disclosure of evidence (Pen. Code, § 1054.5(b)), the court should not give this instruction unless there is evidence of a prejudicial violation of the discovery statute. (See *People v. Bell* (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 249, 254–257 [12 Cal.Rptr.3d 808]; *People v. Cabral* (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 748, 752–753 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 456]; *People v. Saucedo* (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 937, 942–943 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 692].) The court should consider whether giving this instruction could jeopardize the defendant’s right to a fair trial if the jury were to attribute a defense attorney’s malfeasance to the defendant.

This instruction addresses a failure to comply with Penal Code requirements. If the court imposes additional sanctions, it may choose to instruct the jury accordingly. (See *People v. Zamora* (1980) 28 Cal.3d 88, 103 [167 Cal.Rptr. 573, 615 P.2d 1361]; *People v. Edwards* (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 1248, 1265 [22 Cal.Rptr.2d 3].) A court may make any order necessary to enforce the disclosure provisions, including, but not limited to, orders for immediate disclosure, contempt proceedings, delaying or prohibiting the testimony of a witness or the presentation of real evidence, continuance of the matter, or any other lawful order. (Pen. Code, § 1054.5(b).)

If the court concludes that one defendant in a multidefendant case failed to comply with the statute, the last bracketed paragraph should be given.

If the court determines that the defendant is personally responsible for discovery abuse, see CALCRIM No. 371, *Consciousness of Guilt: Suppression and Fabrication of Evidence*.

### AUTHORITY

- Instructional Requirements. Pen. Code, § 1054.5(b); *People v. Bell* (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 249, 254–257 [12 Cal.Rptr.3d 808]; *People v. Cabral* (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 748, 752–753 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 456]; *People v. Saucedo* (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 937, 942–943 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 692].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

5 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, § 93–95 et seq.

3 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 70, *Discovery and Investigation*, § 70.09[1] (Matthew Bender).

**307–314. Reserved for Future Use**





## B. WITNESSES

### (i) Regarding Specific Testimony

#### 315. Eyewitness Identification

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You have heard eyewitness testimony identifying the defendant. As with any other witness, you must decide whether an eyewitness gave truthful and accurate testimony.

In evaluating identification testimony, consider the following questions:

- Did the witness know or have contact with the defendant before the event?
- How well could the witness see the perpetrator?
- What were the circumstances affecting the witness's ability to observe, such as lighting, weather conditions, obstructions, distance, [and] duration of observation[, and \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert any other relevant circumstances>*]?
- How closely was the witness paying attention?
- Was the witness under stress when he or she made the observation?
- Did the witness give a description and how does that description compare to the defendant?
- How much time passed between the event and the time when the witness identified the defendant?
- Was the witness asked to pick the perpetrator out of a group?
- Did the witness ever fail to identify the defendant?
- Did the witness ever change his or her mind about the identification?
- How certain was the witness when he or she made an identification?
- Are the witness and the defendant of different races?
- [Was the witness able to identify other participants in the crime?]
- [Was the witness able to identify the defendant in a photographic or physical lineup?]
- [\_\_\_\_\_ *<insert other relevant factors raised by the evidence>*.]

- Were there any other circumstances affecting the witness’s ability to make an accurate identification?

**The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that it was the defendant who committed the crime. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty.**

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*New January 2006; Revised June 2007*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has no sua sponte duty to give an instruction on eyewitness testimony. (*People v. Richardson* (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 853, 863 [148 Cal.Rptr. 120], disapproved on other grounds by *People v. Saddler* (1979) 24 Cal.3d 671, 682 [156 Cal.Rptr. 871, 597 P.2d 130].) An instruction relating eyewitness identification to reasonable doubt, including any relevant “pinpoint” factors, must be given by the trial court on request “[w]hen an eyewitness identification of the defendant is a key element of the prosecution’s case but is not substantially corroborated by evidence giving it independent reliability.” (*People v. Wright* (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1126, 1143–1144 [248 Cal.Rptr. 600, 755 P.2d 1049], quoting *People v. McDonald* (1984) 37 Cal.3d 351, 377 [208 Cal.Rptr. 236, 690 P.2d 709], overruled on other grounds in *People v. Mendoza* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 896, 914 [98 Cal.Rptr.2d 431, 4 P.3d 265]; *People v. Fudge* (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1075, 1110 [31 Cal.Rptr.2d 321, 875 P.2d 36]; *People v. Palmer* (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 79, 89 [203 Cal.Rptr. 474] [error to refuse defendant’s requested instruction on eyewitness testimony].)

## AUTHORITY

- Factors. *People v. Wright* (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1126, 1139, fn. 9, 1141 [248 Cal.Rptr. 600, 755 P.2d 1049]; *People v. West* (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 606, 609 [189 Cal.Rptr. 36].
- Reasonable Doubt. *People v. Hall* (1980) 28 Cal.3d 143, 159–160 [167 Cal.Rptr. 844, 616 P.2d 826], overruled on other grounds in *People v. Newman* (1999) 21 Cal.4th 413, 422, fn. 6 [87 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 981 P.2d 98].
- This Instruction Upheld. *People v. Golde* (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 101, 119 [77 Cal.Rptr.3d 120].

## COMMENTARY

The court should give the unbracketed factors, if requested, in every case in which identity is disputed. The bracketed factors should be given if requested and factually appropriate. A blank space has also been provided for the court to include any factual circumstances relevant to eyewitness identification that have not been addressed in the preceding list of factors.

In *People v. Wright* (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1126, 1139 [248 Cal.Rptr. 600, 755 P.2d 1049], the court suggested that the trial court select factors from an approved list of

eyewitness identification factors and then give counsel the opportunity to supplement with any additional relevant factors. (*Id.* at pp. 1126, 1143.) Additional “pinpoint” factors should be neutrally written, brief, and nonargumentative. (*Ibid.*; see also *People v. Gaglione* (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1291, 1302–1303 [32 Cal.Rptr.2d 169], overruled on other grounds in *People v. Martinez* (1995) 11 Cal.4th 434, 452 [45 Cal.Rptr.2d 903, 908 P.2d 1037].)

## RELATED ISSUES

### *Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification*

An instruction to view eyewitness testimony with caution and that “mistaken identification is not uncommon” should not be given because it improperly singles out this testimony as suspect. (*People v. Wright* (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1126, 1153 [248 Cal.Rptr. 600, 755 P.2d 1049] [special cautionary instruction unnecessary as duplicative of required eyewitness “factors” instruction]; see also *People v. Benson* (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 805, fn. 12 [276 Cal.Rptr. 827, 802 P.2d 330].) If a defendant wants to present information on the unreliability of eyewitness identifications under a particular set of circumstances, he or she must use means other than a jury instruction, such as expert testimony. (*People v. Wright, supra*, 45 Cal.3d at pp. 1153–1154.)

## SECONDARY SOURCES

5 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, §§ 720–722.

2 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 31, *Eyewitness Identification*, §§ 31.01–31.07 (Matthew Bender).

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.03[2][b] (Matthew Bender).

## 316. Additional Instructions on Witness Credibility—Other Conduct

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<Alternative A—felony conviction>

**[If you find that a witness has been convicted of a felony, you may consider that fact [only] in evaluating the credibility of the witness’s testimony. The fact of a conviction does not necessarily destroy or impair a witness’s credibility. It is up to you to decide the weight of that fact and whether that fact makes the witness less believable.]**

<Alternative B—prior criminal conduct with or without conviction>

**[If you find that a witness has committed a crime or other misconduct, you may consider that fact [only] in evaluating the credibility of the witness’s testimony. The fact that a witness may have committed a crime or other misconduct does not necessarily destroy or impair a witness’s credibility. It is up to you to decide the weight of that fact and whether that fact makes the witness less believable.]**

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*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

There is no sua sponte duty to give this instruction; however, the instruction must be given on request. (*People v. Kendrick* (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1273, 1278 [260 Cal.Rptr. 27]; *People v. Hernandez* (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1040, 1051–1052 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 880, 94 P.3d 1080] [overruling *People v. Mayfield* (1972) 23 Cal.App.3d 236 [100 Cal.Rptr. 104], which had found a sua sponte duty to give limiting instruction on felony conviction admitted for impeachment].)

If a felony conviction or other misconduct has been admitted only on the issue of credibility, give the bracketed word “only.”

Do not give this instruction if a conviction also has been admitted to prove an element of a charged offense. (*People v. Dewberry* (1959) 51 Cal.2d 548, 553–554 [334 P.2d 852].)

It is unclear whether this instruction is appropriate if the evidence also has been admitted for a purpose other than to prove an element of the offense (as discussed above). For example, the evidence may have been admitted under Evidence Code section 1108. In such cases, if the court does give this instruction, the court may omit the bracketed “only.”

### AUTHORITY

- Limiting Instruction Must Be Given on Request. *People v. Kendrick* (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1273, 1278 [260 Cal.Rptr. 27]; *People v. Hernandez* (2004) 33

Cal.4th 1040, 1051–1052 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 880, 94 P.3d 1080].

- Felony Conviction Admissible for Impeachment. Evid. Code, § 788.
- Standard for Admitting Felony Conviction. *People v. Castro* (1985) 38 Cal.3d 301, 306–319 [211 Cal.Rptr. 719, 696 P.2d 111]; *People v. Beagle* (1972) 6 Cal.3d 441, 451–452 [99 Cal.Rptr. 313, 492 P.2d 1].
- Misdemeanor Conduct Admissible for Impeachment. *People v. Wheeler* (1992) 4 Cal.4th 284, 295–296 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 418, 841 P.2d 938].
- Record Must Demonstrate Court Conducted Evid. Code, § 352 Weighing. *People v. Navarez* (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 936, 950 [215 Cal.Rptr. 519].
- Modifications to this Instruction Created Error. *People v. Gray* (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 635, 640–641 [69 Cal.Rptr.3d 876].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin, California Evidence (5th ed. 2012) Presentation at Trial, §§ 304–326.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 82, *Witnesses*, § 82.22[3][e], Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, §§ 85.02[2][b], 85.03[2][b] (Matthew Bender).

5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 105, *Executive Clemency*, § 105.04[3] (Matthew Bender).

## 317. Former Testimony of Unavailable Witness

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**The testimony that \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of witness> has given under oath (was/will be) (read to/played for) you because (he/she) is not available. You must evaluate this testimony by the same standards that you apply to a witness who testified here in court.**

---

*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has discretion to give an instruction on the weight a jury should give to former testimony of an unavailable witness. (*People v. Wharton* (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 598–599 [280 Cal.Rptr. 631, 809 P.2d 290].) No case holds that a trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the use of former testimony of an unavailable witness.

### AUTHORITY

- Instructional Requirements. *People v. Wharton* (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 598–599 [280 Cal.Rptr. 631, 809 P.2d 290].
- Admissibility of Former Testimony. Evid. Code, § 1291.
- Admissibility of Hearsay Evidence or Deposition Testimony Generally. Pen. Code, § 686(3).
- Former Testimony Defined. Evid. Code, § 1290.
- Unavailable Witness Defined. Evid. Code, § 240.
- Admissibility of Former Testimony as Substitute for Live Testimony. *People v. Reed* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 217, 225–226 [52 Cal.Rptr.2d 106, 914 P.2d 184].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

- 5 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, § 644.
- 1 Witkin, California Evidence (5th ed. 2012) Hearsay, §§ 18 et seq., 265 et seq.
- 4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 83, *Evidence*, § 83.13[2], [3][o] (Matthew Bender).

## 318. Prior Statements as Evidence

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**You have heard evidence of [a] statement[s] that a witness made before the trial. If you decide that the witness made (that/those) statement[s], you may use (that/those) statement[s] in two ways:**

- 1. To evaluate whether the witness’s testimony in court is believable;**

**AND**

- 2. As evidence that the information in (that/those) earlier statement[s] is true.**
- 

*New January 2006; Revised August 2012*

### BENCH NOTES

#### ***Instructional Duty***

The court has no sua sponte duty to give this instruction. (*People v. Griffin* (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1011, 1026 [251 Cal.Rptr. 643, 761 P.2d 103].) Use this instruction when a testifying witness has been confronted with a prior inconsistent statement.

If prior testimony of an unavailable witness was impeached with a prior inconsistent statement, use CALCRIM No. 319, *Prior Statements of Unavailable Witness*. (*People v. Williams* (1976) 16 Cal.3d 663, 668–669 [128 Cal.Rptr. 888, 547 P.2d 1000].) If the prior statements were obtained by a peace officer in violation of *Miranda*, give CALCRIM No. 356, *Miranda-Defective Statements*.

### AUTHORITY

- Instructional Requirements. *California v. Green* (1970) 399 U.S. 149, 158 [90 S.Ct. 1930, 26 L.Ed.2d 489]; *People v. Cannady* (1972) 8 Cal.3d 379, 385–386 [105 Cal.Rptr. 129, 503 P.2d 585]; see Evid. Code, §§ 770, 791, 1235, 1236.
- This Instruction Upheld. *People v. Tuggles* (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 339, 363–367 [100 Cal.Rptr.3d 820]; *People v. Golde* (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 101, 120 [77 Cal.Rptr.3d 120].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin, *California Evidence* (5th ed. 2012) Hearsay, § 158.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 82, *Witnesses*, § 82.22[3][b], Ch. 83, *Evidence*, § 83.13[3][e], [f], Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.03[2][b] (Matthew Bender).

### 319. Prior Statements of Unavailable Witness

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\_\_\_\_\_ <Insert name of unavailable witness> **did not testify in this trial, but (his/her) testimony, taken at another time, was (read/played) for you. In addition to this testimony, you have heard evidence that \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of unavailable witness> made (another/other) statement[s]. [I am referring to the statement[s] about which \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s]> testified.]**

**If you conclude that \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of unavailable witness> made (that/those) other statement[s], you may only consider (it/them) in a limited way. You may only use (it/them) in deciding whether to believe the testimony of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of unavailable witness> that was (read/played) here at trial. You may not use (that/those) other statement[s] as proof that the information contained in (it/them) is true, nor may you use (it/them) for any other reason.**

---

*New January 2006*

#### BENCH NOTES

##### *Instructional Duty*

The court has no sua sponte duty to give this instruction. (*People v. Griffin* (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1011, 1026 [251 Cal.Rptr. 643, 761 P.2d 103].)

Give this instruction when prior inconsistent statements of an unavailable witness were admitted for impeachment purposes. (*People v. Williams* (1976) 16 Cal.3d 663, 668–669 [128 Cal.Rptr. 888, 547 P.2d 1000].) If a testifying witness was confronted with prior inconsistent statements, give CALCRIM No. 318, *Prior Statements as Evidence*. If the prior statements were obtained by a peace officer in violation of *Miranda*, give CALCRIM No. 356, *Miranda-Defective Statements*.

Evidence Code section 1294 creates an exception to the impeachment-only rule in *Williams* for the use of prior inconsistent statements given as testimony in a preliminary hearing or prior proceeding in the same criminal matter.

#### AUTHORITY

- Instructional Requirements. *People v. Williams* (1976) 16 Cal.3d 663, 668–669 [128 Cal.Rptr. 888, 547 P.2d 1000]; see Evid. Code, §§ 145, 240, 770, 791, 1235, 1236, 1291.

#### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin, *California Evidence* (5th ed. 2012) Hearsay, § 158.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 83, *Evidence*, § 83.13[3][e] (Matthew Bender).



## 320. Exercise of Privilege by Witness

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*<Alternative A—Valid Exercise of Privilege>*

**[A witness may refuse to answer questions that call for privileged information. Under the law, \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of witness>* was justified in refusing to answer certain questions. Do not consider (his/her) refusal to answer for any reason at all and do not guess what (his/her) answer would have been.]**

*<Alternative B—Invalid Exercise of Privilege>*

**[\_\_\_\_\_ *<Insert name of witness>* did not have the right to refuse to answer questions in this case. You may consider that refusal during your deliberations.]**

---

*New January 2006; Revised August 2014*

### BENCH NOTES

#### ***Instructional Duty***

The court has no sua sponte duty to give an instruction on the exercise of privilege by witnesses; however, it must be given on request. (Evid. Code, § 913(b); see also *People v. Mincey* (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 440–441 [6 Cal.Rptr.2d 822, 827 P.2d 388].)

Give Alternative A when the court has sustained the exercise of privilege. Give Alternative B when the witness's exercise of privilege is invalid. If the witness was not justified in refusing to answer a question, the jury may draw reasonable inferences regarding why the witness refused to testify. (*People v. Morgain* (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 454, 468 [99 Cal.Rptr.3d 301]; *People v. Lopez* (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1550, 1554 [84 Cal.Rptr.2d 655].)

#### ***Related Instructions***

See CALCRIM No. 355, *Defendant's Right Not to Testify*.

### AUTHORITY

- Instructional Requirements. Evid. Code, § 913(b); *People v. Mincey* (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 440–441 [6 Cal.Rptr.2d 822, 827 P.2d 388].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 80, *Defendant's Trial Rights*, § 80.06, Ch. 83, *Evidence*, § 83.09[2], [17], Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.03[2][b] (Matthew Bender).

### **321–329. Reserved for Future Use**

## (ii) Particular Types of Witnesses

### 330. Testimony of Child 10 Years of Age or Younger

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**You have heard testimony from a child who is age 10 or younger. As with any other witness, you must decide whether the child gave truthful and accurate testimony.**

**In evaluating the child’s testimony, you should consider all of the factors surrounding that testimony, including the child’s age and level of cognitive development.**

**When you evaluate the child’s cognitive development, consider the child’s ability to perceive, understand, remember, and communicate.**

**While a child and an adult witness may behave differently, that difference does not mean that one is any more or less believable than the other. You should not discount or distrust the testimony of a witness just because he or she is a child.**

---

*New January 2006; Revised February 2014*

#### **BENCH NOTES**

##### ***Instructional Duty***

The court has no sua sponte duty to give an instruction on child witnesses; however, it must be given on request. (Pen. Code, § 1127f.)

#### **AUTHORITY**

- Instructional Requirements. Pen. Code, § 1127f.
- This Instruction Upheld. *People v. Fernandez* (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 540, 558–560 [157 Cal.Rptr.3d 43].

#### **RELATED ISSUES**

##### ***Due Process/Equal Protection Challenges***

“The instruction provides sound and rational guidance to the jury in assessing the credibility of a class of witnesses as to whom ‘traditional assumptions’ may previously have biased the fact-finding process.” (*People v. Gilbert* (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1372, 1392–1394 [7 Cal.Rptr.2d 660] [instructing jury to make credibility determinations based on child’s age, level of cognitive development, and other factors surrounding child’s testimony does not inflate testimony of child witness and thereby lessen prosecutor’s burden of proof and deny defendant due process and equal protection].)

#### **SECONDARY SOURCES**

3 Witkin, California Evidence (5th ed. 2012) Presentation at Trial, § 100.

5 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, § 725.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 82, *Witnesses*, §§ 82.05[1], [2][a], [b], 82.07, 82.22[3][c], Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.03[2][b] (Matthew Bender).

### 331. Testimony of Person With Developmental, Cognitive, or Mental Disability

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**In evaluating the testimony of a person with a (developmental disability[,]/ [or] [a] (cognitive[,]/ [or] mental[,]/ [or] communication) impairment), consider all of the factors surrounding that person’s testimony, including his or her level of cognitive development.**

**Even though a person with a (developmental disability[,]/ [or] [a] (cognitive[,]/ [or] mental[,]/ [or] communication) impairment)[,] may perform differently as a witness because of his or her level of cognitive development, that does not mean he or she is any more or less credible than another witness.**

**You should not discount or distrust the testimony of a person with a (developmental disability[,]/ [or] [a] (cognitive[,]/ [or] mental[,]/ [or] communication) impairment)[,] solely because he or she has such a (disability/ [or] impairment).**

---

*New January 2006*

#### **BENCH NOTES**

##### ***Instructional Duty***

This instruction must be given on request in any case “in which a person with a developmental disability, or cognitive, mental, or communication impairment testifies as a witness . . . .” (Pen. Code, § 1127g.)

The court should consider whether this instruction is appropriate if the witness has a communication impairment that is not related to a deficiency in cognitive functioning.

#### **AUTHORITY**

- Statutory Authority. Pen. Code, § 1127g.

#### **SECONDARY SOURCES**

5 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, § 725.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 82, *Witnesses*, §§ 82.05[2][a], 82.07, 82.22[3][c] (Matthew Bender).

## 332. Expert Witness Testimony

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(A witness was/Witnesses were) allowed to testify as [an] expert[s] and to give [an] opinion[s]. You must consider the opinion[s], but you are not required to accept (it/them) as true or correct. The meaning and importance of any opinion are for you to decide. In evaluating the believability of an expert witness, follow the instructions about the believability of witnesses generally. In addition, consider the expert’s knowledge, skill, experience, training, and education, the reasons the expert gave for any opinion, and the facts or information on which the expert relied in reaching that opinion. You must decide whether information on which the expert relied was true and accurate.

You may disregard any opinion that you find unbelievable, unreasonable, or unsupported by the evidence.

[An expert witness may be asked a hypothetical question. A *hypothetical question* asks the witness to assume certain facts are true and to give an opinion based on the assumed facts. It is up to you to decide whether an assumed fact has been proved. If you conclude that an assumed fact is not true, consider the effect of the expert’s reliance on that fact in evaluating the expert’s opinion.]

[If the expert witnesses disagreed with one another, you should weigh each opinion against the others. You should examine the reasons given for each opinion and the facts or other matters on which each witness relied. You may also compare the experts’ qualifications.]

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*New January 2006; Revised March 2018*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

When expert testimony is received at trial, the court must  **sua sponte** instruct the jury on evaluating the expert’s testimony. (Pen. Code, § 1127b.)

Give the bracketed paragraph beginning, “An expert witness may be asked a hypothetical question,” if an expert witness responded to a hypothetical question.

Give the bracketed paragraph beginning, “If the expert witnesses disagreed with one another,” if there is conflicting expert testimony.

### AUTHORITY

- Instructional Requirements. Pen. Code, § 1127b.
- Inadmissible Case-Specific Hearsay Not Basis for Expert Testimony. *People v. Sanchez* (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665, 684–686 [204 Cal.Rptr.3d 102, 374 P.3d 320]; *People v. Vega-Robles* (2017) 9 Cal. App. 5th 382, 416 [215 Cal.Rptr.3d 284].

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

4 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, § 725.

1 Witkin, *California Evidence* (5th ed. 2012) Opinion Evidence, § 86.

3 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 71, *Scientific and Expert Evidence*, § 71.04 (Matthew Bender).

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, §§ 85.02[2][a][ii], 85.03[2][b], Ch. 86, *Insanity Trial*, § 86.04[3][a] (Matthew Bender).

### 333. Opinion Testimony of Lay Witness

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(A witness/Witnesses)[, who (was/were) not testifying as [an] expert[s],] gave (his/her/their) opinion[s] during the trial. You may but are not required to accept (that/those) opinion[s] as true or correct. You may give the opinion[s] whatever weight you think appropriate. Consider the extent of the witness’s opportunity to perceive the matters on which his or her opinion is based, the reasons the witness gave for any opinion, and the facts or information on which the witness relied in forming that opinion. You must decide whether information on which the witness relied was true and accurate. You may disregard all or any part of an opinion that you find unbelievable, unreasonable, or unsupported by the evidence.

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*New January 2006*

#### BENCH NOTES

##### *Instructional Duty*

Give this instruction on request when a lay witness gives opinion testimony.

Give the bracketed phrase “who was not testifying as an expert” if an expert witness also testified in the case.

##### *Related Instructions*

CALCRIM No. 332, *Expert Witness Testimony*.

CALCRIM No. 1860, *Owner’s Opinion of Value*.

#### AUTHORITY

- Opinion Testimony. Evid. Code, §§ 800, 802.
- Opinion Testimony to Prove Character. Evid. Code, § 1100.
- Jury Must Decide What Weight to Give Lay Opinion. See *People v. Pena* (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 100, 102–103 [135 Cal.Rptr. 602].
- This Instruction Upheld. *People v. Golde* (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 101, 120 [77 Cal.Rptr.3d 120].

#### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin, *California Evidence* (5th ed. 2012) Opinion Evidence, §§ 3–25.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 82, *Witnesses*, § 82.22[3][d], Ch. 83, *Evidence*, § 83.11 (Matthew Bender).

### 334. Accomplice Testimony Must Be Corroborated: Dispute Whether Witness Is Accomplice

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Before you may consider the (statement/ [or] testimony) of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] of witness[es]> as evidence against (the defendant/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert names of defendants>) [regarding the crime[s] of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] of crime[s] if corroboration only required for some crime[s]>], you must decide whether \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] of witness[es]> (was/were) [an] accomplice[s] [to (that/those) crime[s]]. A person is an *accomplice* if he or she is subject to prosecution for the identical crime charged against the defendant. Someone is subject to prosecution if:

1. He or she personally committed the crime;

OR

2. He or she knew of the criminal purpose of the person who committed the crime;

AND

3. He or she intended to, and did in fact, (aid, facilitate, promote, encourage, or instigate the commission of the crime[;]/ [or] participate in a criminal conspiracy to commit the crime).

[The burden is on the defendant to prove that it is more likely than not that \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] of witness[es]> (was/were) [an] accomplice[s].]

[An accomplice does not need to be present when the crime is committed. On the other hand, a person is not an accomplice just because he or she is present at the scene of a crime, even if he or she knows that a crime will be committed or is being committed and does nothing to stop it.]

[A person who lacks criminal intent but who pretends to join in a crime only to detect or prosecute those who commit that crime is not an accomplice.]

[A person may be an accomplice even if he or she is not actually prosecuted for the crime.]

[You may not conclude that a child under 14 years old was an accomplice unless you also decide that when the child acted, (he/she) understood:

1. The nature and effect of the criminal conduct;
2. That the conduct was wrongful and forbidden;



**AND**

3. That (he/she) could be punished for participating in the conduct.] If you decide that a (declarant/ [or] witness) was not an accomplice, then supporting evidence is not required and you should evaluate his or her (statement/ [or] testimony) as you would that of any other witness.

If you decide that a (declarant/ [or] witness) was an accomplice, then you may not convict the defendant of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert charged crime[s]> based on his or her (statement/ [or] testimony) alone. You may use (a statement/ [or] testimony) of an accomplice that tends to incriminate the defendant to convict the defendant only if:

1. The accomplice's (statement/ [or] testimony) is supported by other evidence that you believe;
2. That supporting evidence is independent of the accomplice's (statement/ [or] testimony);

**AND**

3. That supporting evidence tends to connect the defendant to the commission of the crime[s].

Supporting evidence, however, may be slight. It does not need to be enough, by itself, to prove that the defendant is guilty of the charged crime[s], and it does not need to support every fact (mentioned by the accomplice in the statement/ [or] about which the accomplice testified). On the other hand, it is not enough if the supporting evidence merely shows that a crime was committed or the circumstances of its commission. The supporting evidence must tend to connect the defendant to the commission of the crime.

[The evidence needed to support the (statement/ [or] testimony) of one accomplice cannot be provided by the (statement/ [or] testimony) of another accomplice.]

Any (statement/ [or] testimony) of an accomplice that tends to incriminate the defendant should be viewed with caution. You may not, however, arbitrarily disregard it. You should give that (statement/ [or] testimony) the weight you think it deserves after examining it with care and caution and in the light of all the other evidence.

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*New January 2006; Revised June 2007, April 2010, April 2011, February 2016, March 2019, April 2020*

**BENCH NOTES*****Instructional Duty***

There is a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the principles governing the law of accomplices, including the need for corroboration, if the evidence at trial suggests

that a witness could be an accomplice. (*People v. Tobias* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 327, 331 [106 Cal.Rptr.2d 80, 21 P.3d 758]; *People v. Guiuan* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 558, 569 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 239, 957 P.2d 928].)

“Whether a person is an accomplice is a question of fact for the jury unless the facts and the inferences to be drawn therefrom are undisputed.” (*People v. Coffman and Marlow* (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 104 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 710, 96 P.3d 30].) When the court concludes that the witness is an accomplice as a matter of law or the parties agree about the witness’s status as an accomplice, do not give this instruction. Give CALCRIM No. 335, *Accomplice Testimony: No Dispute Whether Witness Is Accomplice*.

If a codefendant’s testimony tends to incriminate another defendant, the court **must give** an appropriate instruction on accomplice testimony. (*People v. Avila* (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 562 [43 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 133 P.3d 1076]; *citing People v. Box* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1209 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 69, 5 P.3d 130]; *People v. Alvarez* (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 218 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 385, 926 P.2d 365].) The court **must** also instruct on accomplice testimony when two codefendants testify against each other and blame each other for the crime. (*Id.* at 218–219).

When the witness is a codefendant whose testimony includes incriminating statements, the court **should not** instruct that the witness is an accomplice as a matter of law. (*People v. Hill* (1967) 66 Cal.2d 536, 555 [58 Cal.Rptr. 340, 426 P.2d 908].) Instead, the court should give this instruction, informing the jury that it must decide whether the testifying codefendant is an accomplice. In addition, the court should instruct that when the jury considers this testimony as it relates to the testifying codefendant’s defense, the jury should evaluate the testimony using the general rules of credibility, but if the jury considers testimony as incriminating evidence against the non-testifying codefendant, the testimony must be corroborated and should be viewed with caution. (See *People v. Coffman and Marlow* (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 105 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 710, 96 P.3d 30].)

Do not give this instruction if accomplice testimony is solely exculpatory or neutral. (*People v. Smith* (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 766, 778–780 [218 Cal.Rptr.3d 892] [telling jurors that corroboration is required to support neutral or exonerating accomplice testimony was prejudicial error].)

If the court concludes that the corroboration requirement applies to an out-of-court statement, use the word “statement” throughout the instruction. (See discussion in Related Issues section below.)

In a multiple codefendant case, if the corroboration requirement does not apply to all defendants, insert the names of the defendants for whom corroboration is required where indicated in the first sentence.

If the witness was an accomplice to only one or some of the crimes he or she testified about, the corroboration requirement only applies to those crimes and not to other crimes he or she may have testified about. (*People v. Wynkoop* (1958) 165 Cal.App.2d 540, 546 [331 P.2d 1040].) In such cases, the court may insert the

specific crime or crimes requiring corroboration in the first sentence.

Give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “A person who lacks criminal intent” when the evidence suggests that the witness did not share the defendant’s specific criminal intent, e.g., witness was an undercover police officer or an unwitting assistant.

Give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “You may not conclude that a child under 14 years old” on request if the defendant claims that a child witness’s testimony must be corroborated because the child acted as an accomplice. (Pen. Code, § 26; *People v. Williams* (1936) 12 Cal.App.2d 207, 209 [55 P.2d 223].)

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “The burden is on the defendant” unless acting with an accomplice is an element of the charged crime. (*People v. Martinez* (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 721, 723 [246 Cal.Rptr.3d 442].) *Martinez* only involved charges where acting as an accomplice was an element.

### AUTHORITY

- Instructional Requirements. Pen. Code, § 1111; *People v. Guiuan* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 558, 569 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 239, 957 P.2d 928].
- Accomplice May Not Provide Sole Basis for Admission of Other Evidence. *People v. Bowley* (1963) 59 Cal.2d 855, 863 [31 Cal.Rptr. 471, 382 P.2d 591].
- Consideration of Incriminating Testimony. *People v. Guiuan* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 558, 569 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 239, 957 P.2d 928].
- Defendant’s Burden of Proof. *People v. Belton* (1979) 23 Cal.3d 516, 523 [153 Cal.Rptr. 195, 591 P.2d 485].
- Defense Admissions May Provide Necessary Corroboration. *People v. Williams* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 680 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573, 941 P.2d 752].
- Accomplice Includes Co-perpetrator. *People v. Felton* (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 260, 268 [18 Cal.Rptr.3d 626].
- Definition of Accomplice as Aider and Abettor. *People v. Stankewitz* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 72, 90–91 [270 Cal.Rptr. 817, 793 P.2d 23].
- Extent of Corroboration Required. *People v. Szeto* (1981) 29 Cal.3d 20, 27 [171 Cal.Rptr. 652, 623 P.2d 213].
- One Accomplice May Not Corroborate Another. *People v. Montgomery* (1941) 47 Cal.App.2d 1, 15 [117 P.2d 437], disapproved on other grounds in *Murgia v. Municipal Court* (1975) 15 Cal.3d 286, 301, fn. 11 [124 Cal.Rptr. 204, 540 P.2d 44] and *People v. Dillon* (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 454, fn. 2 [194 Cal.Rptr. 390, 668 P.2d 697].
- Presence or Knowledge Insufficient. *People v. Boyd* (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 541, 557, fn. 14 [271 Cal.Rptr. 738]; *In re Michael T.* (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 907, 911 [149 Cal.Rptr. 87].
- Testimony of Feigned Accomplice Need Not Be Corroborated. *People v.*

*Salazar* (1962) 201 Cal.App.2d 284, 287 [20 Cal.Rptr. 25]; but see *People v. Brocklehurst* (1971) 14 Cal.App.3d 473, 476 [92 Cal.Rptr. 340]; *People v. Bohmer* (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 185, 191–193 [120 Cal.Rptr. 136].

- Uncorroborated Accomplice Testimony May Establish Corpus Delicti. *People v. Williams* (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1268, 1317 [248 Cal.Rptr. 834, 756 P.2d 221].
- Witness an Accomplice as a Matter of Law. *People v. Williams* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 679 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573, 941 P.2d 752].
- In-Custody Informant Testimony and Accomplice Testimony May Corroborate Each Other. *People v. Huggins* (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 715, 719–720 [185 Cal.Rptr.3d 672].
- No Corroboration Requirement for Exculpatory Accomplice Testimony. *People v. Smith* (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 766, 778–780 [218 Cal.Rptr.3d 892].

## RELATED ISSUES

### *Out-of-Court Statements*

The out-of court statement of a witness *may* constitute “testimony” within the meaning of Penal Code section 1111, and may require corroboration. (*People v. Williams* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 245 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 123, 940 P.2d 710]; *People v. Belton* (1979) 23 Cal.3d 516, 526 [153 Cal.Rptr. 195, 591 P.2d 485].) The Supreme Court has quoted with approval the following summary of the corroboration requirement for out-of-court statements:

‘[T]estimony’ within the meaning of . . . section 1111 includes . . . all out-of-court statements of accomplices and conspirators used as substantive evidence of guilt which are made under suspect circumstances. The most obvious suspect circumstances occur when the accomplice has been arrested or is questioned by the police. [Citation.] On the other hand, when the out-of-court statements are not given under suspect circumstances, those statements do not qualify as ‘testimony’ and hence need not be corroborated under . . . section 1111.

(*People v. Williams, supra*, 16 Cal.4th at p. 245 [quoting *People v. Jeffery* (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 209, 218 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 526] [quotation marks, citations, and italics removed]; see also *People v. Sully* (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1195, 1230 [283 Cal.Rptr. 144, 812 P.2d 163] [out-of-court statement admitted as excited utterance did not require corroboration].) The court must determine whether the out-of-court statement requires corroboration and, accordingly, whether this instruction is appropriate. The court should also determine whether the statement is testimonial, as defined in *Crawford v. Washington* (2004) 541 U.S. 36 [124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177], and

whether the *Crawford* holding effects the corroboration requirement of Penal Code section 1111.

***Incest With a Minor***

Accomplice instructions are not appropriate in a trial for incest with a minor. A minor is a victim, not an accomplice, to incest. (*People v. Tobias* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 327, 334 [106 Cal.Rptr.2d 80, 21 P.3d 758]; see CALCRIM No. 1180, *Incest*.)

***Liable to Prosecution When Crime Committed***

The test for determining if a witness is an accomplice is not whether that person is subject to trial when he or she testifies, but whether he or she was liable to prosecution for the same offense at the time the acts were committed. (*People v. Gordon* (1973) 10 Cal.3d 460, 469 [110 Cal.Rptr. 906, 516 P.2d 298].) However, the fact that a witness was charged for the same crime and then granted immunity does not necessarily establish that he or she is an accomplice. (*People v. Stankewitz* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 72, 90 [270 Cal.Rptr. 817, 793 P.2d 23].)

***Threats and Fear of Bodily Harm***

A person who is induced by threats and fear of bodily harm to participate in a crime, other than murder, is not an accomplice. (*People v. Brown* (1970) 6 Cal.App.3d 619, 624 [86 Cal.Rptr. 149]; *People v. Perez* (1973) 9 Cal.3d 651, 659–660 [108 Cal.Rptr. 474, 510 P.2d 1026].)

***Defense Witness***

“[A]lthough an accomplice witness instruction must be properly formulated . . . , there is no error in giving such an instruction when the accomplice’s testimony favors the defendant.” (*United States v. Tirouda* (9th Cir. 2005) 394 F.3d 683, 688.)

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

3 Witkin, *California Evidence* (5th ed. 2012) Presentation at Trial, §§ 110, 111, 118, 122.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 82, *Witnesses*, § 82.03, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, §§ 85.02[2][b], 85.03[2][b], [d], Ch. 87, *Death Penalty*, § 87.23[4][b] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 141, *Conspiracy, Solicitation, and Attempt*, § 141.02[5][b] (Matthew Bender).

### 335. Accomplice Testimony: No Dispute Whether Witness Is Accomplice

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If the crime[s] of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert charged crime[s]> (was/were) committed, then \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] of witness[es]> (was/were) [an] accomplice[s] to (that/those) crime[s].

You may not convict the defendant of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert crime[s]> based on the (statement/ [or] testimony) of an accomplice alone. You may use (a statement/ [or] testimony) of an accomplice that tends to incriminate the defendant to convict the defendant only if:

1. The accomplice's (statement/ [or] testimony) is supported by other evidence that you believe;
2. That supporting evidence is independent of the accomplice's (statement/ [or] testimony);

AND

3. That supporting evidence tends to connect the defendant to the commission of the crime[s].

Supporting evidence, however, may be slight. It does not need to be enough, by itself, to prove that the defendant is guilty of the charged crime, and it does not need to support every fact (mentioned by the accomplice in the statement/ [or] about which the witness testified). On the other hand, it is not enough if the supporting evidence merely shows that a crime was committed or the circumstances of its commission. The supporting evidence must tend to connect the defendant to the commission of the crime.

[The evidence needed to support the (statement/ [or] testimony) of one accomplice cannot be provided by the (statement/ [or] testimony) of another accomplice.]

Any (statement/ [or] testimony) of an accomplice that tends to incriminate the defendant should be viewed with caution. You may not, however, arbitrarily disregard it. You should give that (statement/ [or] testimony) the weight you think it deserves after examining it with care and caution and in the light of all the other evidence.

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*New January 2006; Revised June 2007, April 2010, August 2012, February 2016, March 2019*



**BENCH NOTES*****Instructional Duty***

There is a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the principles governing the law of accomplices, including the need for corroboration, if the evidence at trial suggests that a witness could be an accomplice. (*People v. Tobias* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 327, 331 [106 Cal.Rptr.2d 80, 21 P.3d 758].)

“Whether a person is an accomplice is a question of fact for the jury unless the facts and the inferences to be drawn therefrom are undisputed.” (*People v. Coffman and Marlow* (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 104 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 710, 96 P.3d 30].) Give this instruction only if the court concludes that the witness is an accomplice as a matter of law or the parties agree about the witness’s status as an accomplice. (*People v. Verlinde* (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1161 [123 Cal.Rptr.2d 322] [only give instruction “ ‘if undisputed evidence established the complicity’ ”].) If there is a dispute about whether the witness is an accomplice, give CALCRIM No. 334, *Accomplice Testimony Must Be Corroborated: Dispute Whether Witness Is Accomplice*.

If a codefendant’s testimony tends to incriminate another defendant, the court **must give** an appropriate instruction on accomplice testimony. (*People v. Avila* (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 562 [43 Cal. Rptr.3d 1, 133 P.3d 1076]; citing *People v. Box* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1209 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 69, 5 P.3d 130]; *People v. Alvarez* (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 218 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 385, 926 P.2d 365].) The court **must** also instruct on accomplice testimony when two co-defendants testify against each other and blame each other for the crime. (*Id.* at 218–219).

When the witness is a codefendant whose testimony includes incriminating statements, the court **should not** instruct that the witness is an accomplice as a matter of law. (*People v. Hill* (1967) 66 Cal.2d 536, 555 [58 Cal.Rptr. 340, 426 P.2d 908].) Instead, the court should give CALCRIM No. 334, *Accomplice Testimony Must Be Corroborated: Dispute Whether Witness Is Accomplice*, informing the jury that it must decide whether the testifying codefendant is an accomplice. In addition, the court should instruct that when the jury considers this testimony as it relates to the testifying codefendant’s defense, the jury should evaluate the testimony using the general rules of credibility, but if the jury considers testimony as incriminating evidence against the non-testifying codefendant, the testimony must be corroborated and should be viewed with caution. (See *People v. Coffman and Marlow* (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 105 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 710, 96 P.3d 30].)

Do not give this instruction if accomplice testimony is solely exculpatory or neutral. (*People v. Smith* (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 766, 778–780 [218 Cal.Rptr.3d 892] [telling jurors that corroboration is required to support neutral or exonerating accomplice testimony was prejudicial error].)

If the court concludes that the corroboration requirement applies to an out-of-court statement, use the word “statement” throughout the instruction. (See discussion in Related Issues section to CALCRIM No. 334, *Accomplice Testimony Must Be Corroborated: Dispute Whether Witness Is Accomplice*.)

**AUTHORITY**

- Instructional Requirements. Pen. Code, § 1111; *People v. Guiuan* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 558, 569 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 239, 957 P.2d 928].
- Accomplice May Not Provide Sole Basis for Admission of Other Evidence. *People v. Bowley* (1963) 59 Cal.2d 855, 863 [31 Cal.Rptr. 471, 382 P.2d 591].
- Consideration of Incriminating Testimony. *People v. Guiuan* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 558, 569 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 239, 957 P.2d 928].
- Defense Admissions May Provide Necessary Corroboration. *People v. Williams* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 680 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573, 941 P.2d 752].
- Definition of Accomplice as Aider and Abettor. *People v. Stankewitz* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 72, 90–91 [270 Cal.Rptr. 817, 793 P.2d 23].
- Extent of Corroboration Required. *People v. Szeto* (1981) 29 Cal.3d 20, 27 [171 Cal.Rptr. 652, 623 P.2d 213].
- One Accomplice May Not Corroborate Another. *People v. Montgomery* (1941) 47 Cal.App.2d 1, 15 [117 P.2d 437], disapproved on other grounds in *Murgia v. Municipal Court* (1975) 15 Cal.3d 286, 301, fn. 11 [124 Cal.Rptr. 204, 540 P.2d 44] and *People v. Dillon* (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 454, fn. 2 [194 Cal.Rptr. 390, 668 P.2d 697].
- Presence or Knowledge Insufficient. *People v. Boyd* (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 541, 557, fn. 14 [271 Cal.Rptr. 738]; *In re Michael T.* (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 907, 911 [149 Cal.Rptr. 87].
- Testimony of Feigned Accomplice Need Not Be Corroborated. *People v. Salazar* (1962) 201 Cal.App.2d 284, 287 [20 Cal.Rptr. 25]; but see *People v. Brocklehurst* (1971) 14 Cal.App.3d 473, 476 [92 Cal.Rptr. 340]; *People v. Bohmer* (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 185, 191–193 [120 Cal.Rptr. 136].
- Uncorroborated Accomplice Testimony May Establish Corpus Delicti. *People v. Williams* (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1268, 1317 [248 Cal.Rptr. 834, 756 P.2d 221].
- Witness an Accomplice as a Matter of Law. *People v. Williams* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 679 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573, 941 P.2d 752].
- This Instruction Upheld. *People v. Tuggles* (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 339, 363–367 [100 Cal.Rptr.3d 820].
- In-Custody Informant Testimony and Accomplice Testimony May Corroborate Each Other. *People v. Huggins* (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 715, 719–720 [185 Cal.Rptr.3d 672].
- No Corroboration Requirement for Exculpatory Accomplice Testimony. *People v. Smith* (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 766, 778–780 [218 Cal.Rptr.3d 892].



**SECONDARY SOURCES**

3 Witkin, *California Evidence* (5th ed. 2012) Presentation at Trial, §§ 108, 109, 118, 122.

5 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, §§ 686, 738, 739.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 82, *Witnesses*, § 82.03, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, §§ 85.02[2][b], 85.03[2][b], [d], Ch. 87, *Death Penalty*, § 87.23[4][b] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 141, *Conspiracy, Solicitation, and Attempt*, § 141.02[5][b] (Matthew Bender).

### 336. In-Custody Informant

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View the (statement/ [or] testimony) of an in-custody informant against the defendant with caution and close scrutiny. In evaluating such (a statement/ [or] testimony), you should consider the extent to which it may have been influenced by the receipt of, or expectation of, any benefits. This does not mean that you may arbitrarily disregard such (statement/ [or] testimony), but you should give it the weight to which you find it to be entitled in the light of all the evidence in the case.

*<Give the following paragraph if the issue of whether a witness was an in-custody informant is in dispute>*

**[An *in-custody informant* is someone [, other than (a/an) (codefendant[,/ [or] percipient witness[,/ [or] accomplice[,/ [or] coconspirator,)] whose (statement/ [or] testimony) is based on [a] statement[s] the defendant allegedly made while both the defendant and the informant were held within a correctional institution. If you decide that a (declarant/ [or] witness) was not an in-custody informant, then you should evaluate his or her (statement/ [or] testimony) as you would that of any other witness.]**

*<Give the first bracketed phrase if the issue of whether a witness was an in-custody informant is in dispute>*

**[If you decide that a (declarant/ [or] witness) was an in-custody informant, then] (Y/)you may not convict the defendant of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert charged crime[s]>* based on the (statement/ [or] testimony) of that in-custody informant alone. [Nor may you find a special circumstance true/ [or] use evidence in aggravation based on the (statement/ [or] testimony) of that in-custody informant alone.]**

**You may use the (statement/ [or] testimony) of an in-custody informant only if:**

- 1. The (statement/ [or] testimony) is supported by other evidence that you believe;**
- 2. That supporting evidence is independent of the (statement/ [or] testimony);**

**AND**

- 3. That supporting evidence connects the defendant to the commission of the crime[s] [or to the special circumstance/ [or] to evidence in aggravation]. The supporting evidence is not sufficient if it merely shows that the charged crime was committed [or proves the existence of a special circumstance/ [or] evidence in aggravation].**

[*Supporting evidence*, however, may be slight. It does not need to be enough, by itself, to prove that the defendant is guilty of the charged crime, and it does not need to support every fact (mentioned by the accomplice in the statement/ [or] about which the witness testified). On the other hand, it is not enough if the supporting evidence merely shows that a crime was committed or the circumstances of its commission. The supporting evidence must tend to connect the defendant to the commission of the crime.]

[Do not use the (statement/ [or] testimony) of an in-custody informant to support the (statement/ [or] testimony) of another in-custody informant unless you are convinced that \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of party calling in-custody informant as witness> has proven it is more likely than not that the in-custody informant has not communicated with another in-custody informant on the subject of the testimony.]

[A *percipient witness* is someone who personally perceived the matter that he or she testified about.]

<Insert the name of the in-custody informant if his or her statue is not in dispute>

[\_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of witness> is an in-custody informant.]

[\_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of institution> is a correctional institution.]

*New January 2006; Revised August 2012, February 2016*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court must give this instruction on request. (Pen. Code, § 1127a.)

The court should also be aware of the following statutory provisions relating to in-custody informants: Penal Code sections 1127a(c) [prosecution must disclose consideration given to witness]; 1191.25 [prosecution must notify victim of in-custody informant]; and 4001.1 [limitation on payments to in-custody informants and action that may be taken by in-custody informant].

If there is no issue over whether the witness is an in-custody informant and the parties agree, the court may instruct the jury that the witness “is an in-custody informant.” If there is an issue over whether the witness is an in-custody informant, give the bracketed definition of the term.

The committee awaits guidance from courts of review on the issue of whether this instruction applies to witnesses other than those called by the People. Until the issue is resolved, the committee provides this version consistent with the language of the new statute.

If the court concludes that the corroboration requirement applies to an out-of-court statement, use the word “statement” throughout the instruction. (See discussion in

Related Issues section to CALCRIM No. 334, *Accomplice Testimony Must Be Corroborated: Dispute Whether Witness Is Accomplice.*)

***Related Instruction***

CALCRIM No. 337, *Witness in Custody or Physically Restrained.*

**AUTHORITY**

- Instructional Duty. Pen. Code, §§ 1111.5, 1127a.
- In-Custody Informant Testimony and Accomplice Testimony May Corroborate Each Other. *People v. Huggins* (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 715, 719–720 [185 Cal.Rptr.3d 672].

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

- 2 Witkin, *California Evidence* (5th ed. 2012) *Witnesses*, § 20.
- 3 Witkin, *California Evidence* (5th ed. 2012) *Presentation at Trial*, §§ 120, 123.
- 2 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 30, *Confessions and Admissions*, § 30.32[2] (Matthew Bender).
- 4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 82, *Witnesses*, § 82.03A, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, §§ 85.02[2][b], 85.03[2][b] (Matthew Bender).

### 337. Witness in Custody or Physically Restrained

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<Alternative A—physically restrained>

[When \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] of witness[es]> testified, (he/she/they) (was/were) physically restrained. Do not speculate about the reason. You must completely disregard this circumstance in deciding the issues in this case. Do not consider it for any purpose or discuss it during your deliberations. Evaluate the witness’s testimony according to the instructions I have given you.]

<Alternative B—in custody>

[When \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] of witness[es]> testified, (he/she/they) (was/were) in custody. [Do not speculate about the reason.] The fact that a witness is in custody does not by itself make a witness more or less believable. Evaluate the witness’s testimony according to the instructions I have given you.]

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New January 2006

#### BENCH NOTES

##### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a *sua sponte* duty to give this instruction if the witness has been physically restrained in a manner that is visible to the jury. (See *People v. Duran* (1976) 16 Cal.3d 282, 291–292 [127 Cal.Rptr. 618, 545 P.2d 1322]; *Wilson v. McCarthy* (9th Cir. 1985) 770 F.2d 1482, 1485; *People v. Metzger* (1904) 143 Cal. 447, 448 [77 P. 155].) If the restraints are not visible, do not give this instruction unless requested. For an in-custody witness, give this instruction on request.

**Do not** give this instruction for an in-custody informant unless the witness is also physically restrained. When an in-custody informant testifies, the court must give CALCRIM No. 336, *In-Custody Informant*. For an in-custody informant, the court may only give this instruction if it is limited to the issue of physical restraints.

In alternative B, always give the bracketed sentence that begins with “Do not speculate” unless the jury has been informed of the reason the witness is in custody.

The rules articulated in *People v. Duran* (1976) 16 Cal.3d 282, 290–292 [127 Cal.Rptr. 618, 545 P.2d 1322] regarding physical restraints of a defendant at trial also apply to physical restraint of a defense witness. (*Id.* at p. 288, fn. 4.)

#### AUTHORITY

- Instructional Duty. *People v. Duran* (1976) 16 Cal.3d 282, 291–292 [127 Cal.Rptr. 618, 545 P.2d 1322]; *Wilson v. McCarthy* (9th Cir. 1985) 770 F.2d 1482, 1485; *People v. Metzger* (1904) 143 Cal. 447, 448 [77 P. 155].
- Requirements Before Restraints Used. *People v. Duran* (1976) 16 Cal.3d 282,

290–292 [127 Cal.Rptr. 618, 545 P.2d 1322]; *People v. Mar* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1201, 1218 [124 Cal.Rptr.2d 161, 52 P.3d 95].

- Use of Stun Belts. *People v. Mar* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1201, 1205–1206 [124 Cal.Rptr.2d 161, 52 P.3d 95].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

5 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, §§ 13–21.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 80, *Defendant's Trial Rights*, § 80.09[6][b][v] (Matthew Bender).

**338–349. Reserved for Future Use**

## C. CHARACTER EVIDENCE

### 350. Character of Defendant

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You have heard character testimony that the defendant (is a \_\_\_\_\_ <insert character trait relevant to crime[s] committed> person/ [or] has a good reputation for \_\_\_\_\_ <insert character trait relevant to crime[s] committed> in the community where (he/she) lives or works).

Evidence of the defendant's character for \_\_\_\_\_ <insert character trait relevant to crime[s] committed> can by itself create a reasonable doubt [whether the defendant committed \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] of alleged offenses[s] and count[s], e.g., battery, as charged in Count 1>]. However, evidence of the defendant's good character may be countered by evidence of (his/her) bad character for the same trait. You must decide the meaning and importance of the character evidence.

[If the defendant's character for certain traits has not been discussed among those who know (him/her), you may assume that (his/her) character for those traits is good.]

You may take that testimony into consideration along with all the other evidence in deciding whether the People have proved that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2012*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has no sua sponte duty to give an instruction on defendant's character; however, it must be given on request. (*People v. Bell* (1875) 49 Cal. 485, 489–490 [jury should be instructed that evidence of good reputation should be weighed as any other fact established and may be sufficient to create reasonable doubt of guilt]; *People v. Jones* (1954) 42 Cal.2d 219, 222 [266 P.2d 38] [character evidence may be sufficient to create reasonable doubt of guilt]; *People v. Wilson* (1913) 23 Cal.App. 513, 523–524 [138 P. 971] [court erred in failing to give requested instruction or any instruction on character evidence].)

### AUTHORITY

- Instructional Requirements. *People v. Bell* (1875) 49 Cal. 485, 489–490; *People v. Wilson* (1913) 23 Cal.App. 513, 523–524 [138 P. 971]; *People v. Jones* (1954) 42 Cal.2d 219, 222 [266 P.2d 38].
- Character Evidence Must Be Relevant to Offense Charged. *People v. Taylor*

(1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 622, 629 [225 Cal.Rptr. 733].

- Admissibility. Evid. Code, §§ 1100–1102.

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *No Discussion of Character Is Evidence of Good Character*

The fact that the defendant's character or reputation has not been discussed or questioned among those who know him or her is evidence of the defendant's good character and reputation. (*People v. Castillo* (1935) 5 Cal.App.2d 194, 198 [42 P.2d 682].) However, the defendant must have resided in the community for a sufficient period of time and become acquainted with the community in order for his or her character to have become known and for some sort of reputation to have been established. (See Evid. Code, § 1324 [reputation may be shown in the community where defendant resides and in a group with which he or she habitually associates]; see also *People v. Pauli* (1922) 58 Cal.App. 594, 596 [209 P. 88] [witness's testimony about defendant's good reputation in community was inappropriate where defendant was a stranger in the community, working for a single employer for a few months, going about little, and forming no associations].)

#### *Business Community*

The community for purposes of reputation evidence may also be the defendant's business community and associates. (*People v. Cobb* (1955) 45 Cal.2d 158, 163 [287 P.2d 752].)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin, California Evidence (5th ed. 2012) Circumstantial Evidence, § 55.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 82, *Witnesses*, § 82.22[3][d], [e][ii], Ch. 83, *Evidence*, § 83.12[1] (Matthew Bender).



## 351. Cross-Examination of Character Witness

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**The attorney for the People was allowed to ask defendant’s character witness[es] if (he/she/they) had heard that the defendant had engaged in certain conduct. These “have you heard” questions and their answers are not evidence that the defendant engaged in any such conduct. You may consider these questions and answers only to evaluate the meaning and importance of (the/a) character witness’s testimony.**

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*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has no sua sponte duty to give an instruction on cross-examination of character witnesses; however it must be given on request. (*People v. Hempstead* (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 949, 954 [196 Cal.Rptr. 412] [when cross-examination of character witness is permitted, a limiting admonition should be given]; Evid. Code, § 355.)

### AUTHORITY

- Instructional Requirements. *People v. Hempstead* (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 949, 954 [196 Cal.Rptr. 412]; *People v. Eli* (1967) 66 Cal.2d 63, 79 [56 Cal.Rptr. 916, 424 P.2d 356].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

3 Witkin, California Evidence (5th ed. 2012) Presentation at Trial, § 255.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 82, *Witnesses*, § 82.22[3][d], Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.02[2][b], Ch. 87, *Death Penalty*, § 87.23[5] (Matthew Bender).

**352–354. Reserved for Future Use**



## D. DEFENDANT’S TESTIMONY AND STATEMENTS

### 355. Defendant’s Right Not to Testify

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**A defendant has an absolute constitutional right not to testify. He or she may rely on the state of the evidence and argue that the People have failed to prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt. Do not consider, for any reason at all, the fact that the defendant did not testify. Do not discuss that fact during your deliberations or let it influence your decision in any way.**

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*New January 2006*

#### BENCH NOTES

##### *Instructional Duty*

This instruction should only be given on request. (*Carter v. Kentucky* (1981) 450 U.S. 288, 300 [101 S.Ct. 1112, 67 L.Ed.2d 241]; *People v. Evans* (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 186, 191 [72 Cal.Rptr.2d 543].)

The court has no sua sponte duty to seek a personal waiver of the instruction from the defendant. (*People v. Towey* (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 880, 884 [112 Cal.Rptr.2d 326].)

The United States Supreme Court has held that the court may give this instruction over the defendant’s objection (*Lakeside v. Oregon* (1978) 435 U.S. 333, 340–341 [98 S.Ct. 1091, 55 L.Ed.2d 319]), but as a matter of state judicial policy, the California Supreme Court has found otherwise. (*People v. Roberts* (1992) 2 Cal.4th 271, 314 [6 Cal.Rptr.2d 276, 826 P.2d 274] [“[T]he purpose of the instruction is to protect the defendant, and if the defendant does not want it given the trial court should accede to that request, notwithstanding the lack of a constitutional requirement to do so.”].)

#### AUTHORITY

- Instructional Requirements. *People v. Lewis* (1990) 50 Cal.3d 262, 282 [266 Cal.Rptr. 834, 786 P.2d 892] [no sua sponte duty to instruct].
- This Instruction Upheld. *People v. Ibarra* (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1191–1192 [67 Cal.Rptr.3d 871].

#### SECONDARY SOURCES

5 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, §§ 725, 742.

2 Witkin, California Evidence (5th ed. 2012) Witnesses, § 458.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 80,

*Defendant's Trial Rights*, § 80.08, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, §§ 85.02[1A][a], 85.04[2][b] (Matthew Bender).

## 356. *Miranda*-Defective Statements

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**You have heard evidence that the defendant made a statement to a peace officer. [I am referring to the statement (about which Officer[s] \_\_\_\_\_ testified/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert other description to identify statement, e.g., time and place statement was taken>).]**

**If you conclude that the defendant made this statement, you may consider it only to help you decide whether to believe the defendant's testimony. You may not consider it as proof that the statement is true or for any other purpose.**

**[You should view an unrecorded oral statement cautiously.]**

---

*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

There is no sua sponte duty to give a limiting instruction on the use of statements taken in violation of the *Miranda* rule. (*People v. Coffman and Marlow* (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 63 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 710, 96 P.3d 30].) The court must give the instruction on request.

If the defendant made more than one statement, but not all of the statements are subject to the limiting admonition, specify the relevant statement or statements using the bracketed text in the first paragraph.

### AUTHORITY

- Instructional Requirements. *People v. Coffman and Marlow* (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 63 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 710, 96 P.3d 30]; *People v. May* (1988) 44 Cal.3d 309 [243 Cal.Rptr. 369, 748 P.2d 307]; *Harris v. New York* (1971) 401 U.S. 222 [91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

3 Witkin, *California Evidence* (5th ed. 2012) Presentation at Trial, §§ 330–332.

5 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, §§ 111–112.

2 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 30, *Confessions and Admissions*, §§ 30.02[2], 30.10[3], 30.30[1], 30.57 (Matthew Bender).

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.03[2][c] (Matthew Bender).

## 357. Adoptive Admissions

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If you conclude that someone made a statement outside of court that (accused the defendant of the crime/ [or] tended to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime) and the defendant did not deny it, you must decide whether each of the following is true:

1. The statement was made to the defendant or made in (his/her) presence;
2. The defendant heard and understood the statement;
3. The defendant would, under all the circumstances, naturally have denied the statement if (he/she) thought it was not true;

AND

4. The defendant could have denied it but did not.

If you decide that all of these requirements have been met, you may conclude that the defendant admitted the statement was true.

If you decide that any of these requirements has not been met, you must not consider either the statement or the defendant's response for any purpose.

[You must not consider this evidence in determining the guilt of (the/any) other defendant[s].]

---

*New January 2006; Revised February 2014*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has no sua sponte duty to give an instruction on adoptive admissions; however, it must be given if requested by the defendant. (*People v. Carter* (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1166, 1198 [135 Cal.Rptr.2d 553, 70 P.3d 981].)

If the court instructs on adoptive admissions, the court also has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on corpus delicti. (See CALCRIM No. 359, *Corpus Delicti: Independent Evidence of a Charged Crime*; see also *People v. Jennings* (1991) 53 Cal.3d 334, 364 [279 Cal.Rptr. 780, 807 P.2d 1009] [discussing corpus delicti rule in the case of an affirmative admission; by analogy the rule also should apply to adoptive admissions].)

The limiting admonition in the last sentence of the instruction must be given on request when other codefendants are on trial. (*People v. Richards* (1976) 17 Cal.3d 614, 618–619 [131 Cal.Rptr. 537, 552 P.2d 97], disapproved on other grounds in *People v. Carbajal* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1126 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 681, 899 P.2d 67]; see generally Evid. Code, § 355.)

Do not give this instruction if the defendant’s failure to reply was based on his or her invocation of the right to remain silent. (See *Griffin v. California* (1965) 380 U.S. 609 [85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106]; *People v. Cockrell* (1965) 63 Cal.2d 659 [47 Cal.Rptr. 788, 408 P.2d 116].)

### AUTHORITY

- Instructional Requirements. *People v. Atwood* (1963) 223 Cal.App.2d 316, 332–333 [35 Cal.Rptr. 831]; *People v. Vindiola* (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 370 [158 Cal.Rptr. 6]; *People v. Humphries* (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 1315, 1336 [230 Cal.Rptr. 536]; see *People v. Riel* (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1189 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 998 P.2d 969].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Defendant Intoxicated When Admission Made*

“Declarations of a prisoner under the influence of intoxicants are not rendered inadmissible by reason of his drunkenness. That condition would go only to the weight of the evidence.” (*People v. MacCagnan* (1954) 129 Cal.App.2d 100, 112 [276 P.2d 679].)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

8 Witkin, *California Procedure* (5th ed. 2008) Trial, § 303.

1 Witkin, *California Evidence* (5th ed. 2012) Hearsay, §§ 103–106.

2 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 30, *Confessions and Admissions*, §§ 30.04[4], 30.57 (Matthew Bender).

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 83, *Evidence*, § 83.13[3][b] (Matthew Bender).

## 358. Evidence of Defendant's Statements

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**You have heard evidence that the defendant made [an] [oral] [and] [a] [written] statement[s] (before the trial/while the court was not in session). You must decide whether the defendant made any (such/of these) statement[s], in whole or in part. If you decide that the defendant made such [a] statement[s], consider the statement[s], along with all the other evidence, in reaching your verdict. It is up to you to decide how much importance to give to the statement[s].**

**[Consider with caution any statement made by (the/a) defendant tending to show (his/her) guilt unless the statement was written or otherwise recorded.]**

---

*New January 2006; Revised June 2007, December 2008, February 2014, August 2015, September 2017, September 2020*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

There is no sua sponte duty to give this instruction. *People v. Diaz* (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1176, 1190 [185 Cal.Rptr.3d 431, 345 P.3d 62].

Give the bracketed cautionary instruction on request if there is evidence of an incriminating out-of-court oral statement made by the defendant. (*People v. Diaz* (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1176 [185 Cal.Rptr.3d 431, 345 P.3d 62].) In the penalty phase of a capital trial, the bracketed paragraph should be given only if the defense requests it. (*People v. Livaditis* (1992) 2 Cal.4th 759, 784 [9 Cal.Rptr.2d 72, 831 P.2d 297].)

The bracketed cautionary instruction is not required when the defendant's incriminating statements are written or tape-recorded. (*People v. Gardner* (1961) 195 Cal.App.2d 829, 833 [16 Cal.Rptr. 256]; *People v. Hines* (1964) 61 Cal.2d 164, 173 [37 Cal.Rptr. 622, 390 P.2d 398], disapproved on other grounds in *People v. Murtishaw* (1981) 29 Cal.3d 733, 774, fn. 40 [175 Cal.Rptr. 738, 631 P.2d 446]; *People v. Scherr* (1969) 272 Cal.App.2d 165, 172 [77 Cal.Rptr. 35]; *People v. Slaughter* (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1187, 1200 [120 Cal.Rptr.2d 477, 47 P.3d 262] [admonition to view non-recorded statements with caution applies only to a defendant's incriminating statements].) If the jury heard both inculpatory and exculpatory, or only inculpatory, statements attributed to the defendant, give the bracketed paragraph. If the jury heard only exculpatory statements by the defendant, do not give the bracketed paragraph.

If the defendant was a minor suspected of murder who made a statement in a custodial interview that did not comply with Penal Code section 859.5, give the following additional instruction:

**Consider with caution any statement tending to show defendant's guilt made by**



**(him/her) during** \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of interview, e.g., interview with Officer Smith of October 15, 2013>.

When a defendant's statement is a verbal act, as in conspiracy cases, this instruction applies. (*People v. Bunyard* (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1189, 1224 [249 Cal.Rptr. 71, 756 P.2d 795]; *People v. Ramirez* (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 347, 352 [114 Cal.Rptr. 916]; see also, e.g., *Peabody v. Phelps* (1858) 9 Cal. 213, 229 [similar, in civil cases.

When a defendant's statement is an element of the crime, as in conspiracy or criminal threats (Pen. Code, § 422), this instruction still applies. (*People v. Diaz* (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1176 [185 Cal.Rptr.3d 431, 345 P.3d 62], overruling *People v. Zichko* (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1055, 1057 [13 Cal.Rptr.3d 509].)

### **Related Instructions**

If out-of-court oral statements made by the defendant are prominent pieces of evidence in the trial, then CALCRIM No. 359, *Corpus Delicti: Independent Evidence of a Charged Crime*, may also have to be given together with the bracketed cautionary instruction.

## **AUTHORITY**

- Instructional Requirements. *People v. Diaz* (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1176 [185 Cal.Rptr.3d 431, 345 P.3d 62]; *People v. Livaditis* (1992) 2 Cal.4th 759, 784 [9 Cal.Rptr.2d 72, 831 P.2d 297].
- Custodial Statements by Minors Suspected of Murder. Pen. Code, § 859.5, effective 1/1/2014.

## **SECONDARY SOURCES**

5 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial §§ 683–686, 723, 724, 733.

1 Witkin, California Evidence (5th ed. 2012) Hearsay § 52.

3 Witkin, California Evidence (5th ed. 2012) Presentation at Trial § 127.

2 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 30, *Confessions and Admissions*, § 30.57 (Matthew Bender).

## 359. Corpus Delicti: Independent Evidence of a Charged Crime

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The defendant may not be convicted of any crime based on (his/her) out-of-court statement[s] alone. You may rely on the defendant's out-of-court statements to convict (him/her) only if you first conclude that other evidence shows that the charged crime [or a lesser included offense] was committed.

That other evidence may be slight and need only be enough to support a reasonable inference that a crime was committed.

This requirement of other evidence does not apply to proving the identity of the person who committed the crime [and the degree of the crime]. If other evidence shows that the charged crime [or a lesser included offense] was committed, the identity of the person who committed it [and the degree of the crime] may be proved by the defendant's statement[s] alone.

You may not convict the defendant unless the People have proved (his/her) guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2006, February 2014, February 2015, September 2017, March 2018*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on corpus delicti whenever an accused's extrajudicial statements form part of the prosecution's evidence. (*People v. Howk* (1961) 56 Cal.2d 687, 707 [16 Cal.Rptr. 370, 365 P.2d 426], unless the statement was made during the commission of the crime. (*People v. Carpenter* (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 394 [63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708].)

Give the bracketed language in the first paragraph if the court will be instructing on lesser included offenses.

An earlier version of this instruction was upheld in *People v. Reyes* (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1491, 1496 [60 Cal.Rptr.3d 777]. A later case, *People v. Rivas* (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1410, 1427–1429 [155 Cal.Rptr.3d 403], found fault with the same earlier version of the instruction without referring to *Reyes*. The instruction has been modified in light of the discussion in *Rivas*.

### AUTHORITY

- Instructional Requirements. *People v. Ray* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 313, 342 [52 Cal.Rptr.2d 296, 914 P.2d 846]; *People v. Jennings* (1991) 53 Cal.3d 334, 368 [279 Cal.Rptr. 780, 807 P.2d 1009]; *People v. Howk* (1961) 56 Cal.2d 687, 707 [16 Cal.Rptr. 370, 365 P.2d 426].

- Burden of Proof. *People v. Lara* (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 658, 676 [35 Cal.Rptr.2d 886].
- Earlier Version of This Instruction Correctly States the Law. *People v. Rosales* (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1254, 1260–1261 [166 Cal.Rptr.3d 620]; *People v. Reyes* (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1491, 1496 [60 Cal.Rptr.3d 777].
- Proof of Identity Independent of “Elements.” *People v. Rivas* (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1410, 1427–1429 [155 Cal.Rptr.3d 403].
- Corpus Delicti Rule Does Not Apply Generally to All Uncharged Acts. *People v. Davis* (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 617, 636 [86 Cal.Rptr.3d 55].

## COMMENTARY

### *Harm Caused by Criminal Conduct*

The instruction states that the other evidence need only “be enough to support a reasonable inference that someone’s criminal conduct caused an injury, loss, or harm.” This is based in part on *People v. Alvarez* (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1161, 1171 [119 Cal.Rptr.2d 903, 46 P.3d 372], in which the court stated that “[t]here is no requirement of independent evidence ‘of every physical act constituting an element of an offense,’ so long as there is some slight or prima facie showing of injury, loss, or harm by a criminal agency.” (Citing *People v. Jones* (1998) 17 Cal.4th 279, 303 [70 Cal.Rptr.2d 793, 949 P.2d 890].)

### *Scope of Corpus Delicti*

The following are not elements of a crime and need not be proved by independent evidence: the degree of the crime charged (*People v. Cooper* (1960) 53 Cal.2d 755, 765 [3 Cal.Rptr. 148, 349 P.2d 964]), the identity of the perpetrator (*People v. Westfall* (1961) 198 Cal.App.2d 598, 601 [18 Cal.Rptr. 356]), elements of the underlying felony when the defendant is charged with felony murder (*People v. Cantrell* (1973) 8 Cal.3d 672, 680–681 [105 Cal.Rptr. 792, 504 P.2d 1256], disapproved on other grounds in *People v. Wetmore* (1978) 22 Cal.3d 318, 324 [149 Cal.Rptr. 265, 583 P.2d 1308] and *People v. Flannel* (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 684–685, fn. 12 [160 Cal.Rptr. 84, 603 P.2d 1]), special circumstances when the defendant is charged with a felony-based special circumstance murder as listed in Penal Code section 190.2(a)(17) (Pen. Code, § 190.41; see *People v. Ray* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 313, 341, fn. 13 [52 Cal.Rptr.2d 296, 914 P.2d 846]), the knowledge and intent required for aider-abettor liability (*People v. Gutierrez* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083, 1128–1129 [124 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 52 P.3d 572]; *People v. Ott* (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 118, 131 [148 Cal.Rptr. 479]), or facts necessary for a sentencing enhancement (see *People v. Shoemake* (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 243, 252–256 [20 Cal.Rptr.2d 36]).

## RELATED ISSUES

### *Truth-in-Evidence Initiative*

The “truth-in-evidence” provision of the California Constitution abrogates the corpus delicti rule insofar as it restricts the admissibility of incriminatory extrajudicial

statements by an accused. (*People v. Alvarez* (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1161, 1173–1174 [119 Cal.Rptr.2d 903, 46 P.3d 372]; see Cal. Const., art. I, § 28(d) [Proposition 8 of the June 8, 1982 General Election].) The constitutional provision, however, does not eliminate the rule insofar as it prohibits *conviction* when the only evidence that the crime was committed is the defendant’s own statements outside of court. Thus, the provision does not affect the rule to the extent it requires a jury instruction that no person may be convicted absent evidence of the crime independent of his or her out-of-court statements. (*People v. Alvarez, supra*, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1180.)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

- 1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Elements, §§ 47–54.
- 2 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 30, *Confessions and Admissions*, §§ 30.04[2], 30.57 (Matthew Bender).
- 4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.04[2][c]; Ch. 87, *Death Penalty*, § 87.13[17][e] (Matthew Bender).
- 6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 140, *Challenges to Crimes*, § 140.01 (Matthew Bender).

## 360. Statements to an Expert

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\_\_\_\_\_ <Insert name> testified that in reaching (his/her) conclusions as an expert witness, (he/she) considered [a] statement[s] made by \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name>. [I am referring only to the statement[s] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert or describe statements admitted for this limited purpose>.] You may consider (that/those) statement[s] only to evaluate the expert's opinion. Do not consider (that/those) statement[s] as proof that the information contained in the statement[s] is true.

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*New January 2006; Revised March 2018*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

Although the court has no sua sponte duty to give this instruction, it should be given if appropriate under the circumstances. (*People v. Cantrell* (1973) 8 Cal.3d 672, 683 [105 Cal.Rptr. 792, 504 P.2d 1256], disapproved on other grounds in *People v. Wetmore* (1978) 22 Cal.3d 318, 324 [149 Cal.Rptr. 265, 583 P.2d 1308] and *People v. Flannel* (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 684–685, fn. 12 [160 Cal.Rptr. 84, 603 P.2d 1].)

This instruction should not be given if all of the statements relied on by the expert were admitted under applicable hearsay exceptions. If some but not all of the defendant's statements were admitted for the limited purpose of evaluating the expert's testimony, specify those statements in the bracketed sentence.

### AUTHORITY

- Instructional Requirements. *In re Spencer* (1965) 63 Cal.2d 400, 412 [46 Cal.Rptr. 753, 406 P.2d 33].
- Inadmissible Case-Specific Hearsay Not Basis for Expert Testimony. *People v. Sanchez* (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665, 684–686 [204 Cal.Rptr.3d 102, 374 P.3d 320]; *People v. Vega-Robles* (2017) 9 Cal. App. 5th 382, 416 [215 Cal.Rptr 3d 284].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

4 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, § 136.

3 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 71, *Scientific and Expert Evidence*, § 71.04 (Matthew Bender).

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.02[2][b] (Matthew Bender).

## 361. Failure to Explain or Deny Adverse Evidence

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**If the defendant failed in (his/her) testimony to explain or deny evidence against (him/her), and if (he/she) could reasonably be expected to have done so based on what (he/she) knew, you may consider (his/her) failure to explain or deny in evaluating that evidence. Any such failure is not enough by itself to prove guilt. The People must still prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.**

**If the defendant failed to explain or deny, it is up to you to decide the meaning and importance of that failure.**

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*New January 2006; Revised April 2010, February 2016, March 2017, April 2020*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

No authority imposes a duty to give this instruction sua sponte. This instruction should only be given when the defendant testifies and the privilege against self-incrimination has not been successfully invoked. (*People v. Mask* (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 450, 455 [233 Cal.Rptr. 181]; *People v. Haynes* (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 1117, 1118 [196 Cal.Rptr. 450].)

There is a split in authority over the application of *People v. Saddler* (1979) 24 Cal.3d 671, 682–683 [156 Cal.Rptr. 871, 597 P.2d 130] [instruction erroneously given because there was no evidence that defendant failed to deny or explain incriminating evidence] and whether this instruction should be given when a testifying defendant fails to explain or deny incriminating evidence in the absence of a question. (Compare *People v. Grandberry* (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 599, 609 [247 Cal.Rptr.3d 258] [approving use of the instruction “when a testifying defendant has failed to explain or deny matters within the scope of relevant cross-examination, not simply those matters that were asked of the defendant on cross-examination”] with *People v. Roehler* (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 353, 392 [213 Cal.Rptr. 353] [“If a defendant has not been asked an appropriate question calling for either an explanation or denial, the instruction cannot be given, as a matter of law”] and *People v. Vega* (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 484, 497 [186 Cal.Rptr.3d 671] [noting restrictions for when the instruction may be given and quoting *Roehler*].)

If the court follows *Grandberry*, the trial court **must** ascertain as a matter of law: (1) if the matter was within the scope of relevant cross-examination; (2) if the defendant knew the facts necessary to explain or deny incriminating evidence or if some circumstance precluded the defendant from knowing such facts; and (3) if the defendant failed to explain or deny the incriminating evidence.

If the court follows *Roehler*, the trial court **must** ascertain as a matter of law: (1) if a question was asked that called for an explanation or denial of incriminating evidence; (2) if the defendant knew the facts necessary to answer the question or if

some circumstance precluded the defendant from knowing such facts; and (3) if the defendant failed to deny or explain the incriminating evidence when answering the question.

Contradiction of the state's evidence is not by itself a failure to deny or explain. (*People v. Marks* (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1335, 1346 [248 Cal.Rptr. 874, 756 P.2d 260]; *People v. Peters* (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 75, 86 [180 Cal.Rptr. 76].) Failure to recall is not an appropriate basis for this instruction. (*People v. De Larco* (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 294, 309 [190 Cal.Rptr. 757].)

Give this instruction only when a testifying defendant completely fails to explain or deny incriminating evidence, or claims to lack knowledge although it appears from the evidence that defendant could reasonably be expected to have that knowledge. (*People v. Cortez* (2016) 63 Cal.4th 101, 117–118 [201 Cal.Rptr.3d 846, 369 P.3d 521].)

### AUTHORITY

- Instructional Requirements. Evid. Code, § 413.
- Cautionary Language. *People v. Saddler* (1979) 24 Cal.3d 671, 683 [156 Cal.Rptr. 871, 597 P.2d 130].
- This Instruction Upheld. *People v. Vega* (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 484, 494–500 [186 Cal.Rptr.3d 671]; *People v. Rodriguez* (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1062, 1068 [88 Cal.Rptr.3d 749].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Bizarre or Implausible Answers*

If the defendant's denial or explanation is bizarre or implausible, several courts have held that the question whether his or her response is reasonable should be given to the jury with an instruction regarding adverse inferences. (*People v. Mask* (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 450, 455 [233 Cal.Rptr. 181]; *People v. Roehler* (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 353, 392–393 [213 Cal.Rptr. 353].) However, in *People v. Kondor* (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 52, 57 [245 Cal.Rptr. 750], the court stated, “the test for giving the instruction [on failure to deny or explain] is not whether the defendant's testimony is believable. [The instruction] is unwarranted when a defendant explains or denies matters within his or her knowledge, no matter how improbable that explanation may appear.”

#### *Facts Beyond the Scope of Examination*

If the defendant has limited his or her testimony to a specific factual issue, it is error for the prosecutor to comment, or the trial court to instruct, on his or her failure to explain or deny other evidence against him or her that is beyond the scope of this testimony. (*People v. Tealer* (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 598, 604–607 [122 Cal.Rptr. 144].)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

3 Witkin, California Evidence (5th ed. 2012) Presentation at Trial, § 102.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 80,

*Defendant's Trial Rights*, § 80.08[6][a][i], Ch. 83, *Evidence*, § 83.01[2][b], Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, §§ 85.01[5], 85.04[2][b] (Matthew Bender).



## 362. Consciousness of Guilt: False Statements

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If [the] defendant [\_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of defendant when multiple defendants on trial>] made a false or misleading statement before this trial relating to the charged crime, knowing the statement was false or intending to mislead, that conduct may show (he/she) was aware of (his/her) guilt of the crime and you may consider it in determining (his/her) guilt. [You may not consider the statement in deciding any other defendant’s guilt.]

If you conclude that the defendant made the statement, it is up to you to decide its meaning and importance. However, evidence that the defendant made such a statement cannot prove guilt by itself.

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2009, April 2010, September 2019*

### BENCH NOTES

#### ***Instructional Duty***

This instruction should not be given unless it can be inferred that the defendant made the false statement for self-protection rather than to protect someone else. (*People v. Rankin* (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 430, 436 [11 Cal.Rptr.2d 735] [error to instruct on false statements and consciousness of guilt where defendant lied to protect an accomplice]; see also *People v. Blakeslee* (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 831, 839 [82 Cal.Rptr. 839].)

Consider modifying this instruction when the evidence supports an inference that the defendant was aware of his or her guilt generally, but not of the charged crime. *People v. Burton* (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 917, 926, fn.2 [241 Cal.Rptr.3d 35].

### AUTHORITY

- Instructional Requirements. *People v. Najera* (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1132, 1139 [77 Cal.Rptr.3d 605, 184 P.3d 732] [in context of adoptive admissions]; *People v. Atwood* (1963) 223 Cal.App.2d 316, 333 [35 Cal.Rptr. 831]; but see *People v. Carter* (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1166, 1197–1198 [135 Cal.Rptr.2d 553, 70 P.3d 981]; see also *People v. Coffman and Marlow* (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 102–103 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 710, 96 P.3d 30].
- This Instruction Upheld. *People v. McGowan* (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1099, 1104 [74 Cal.Rptr.3d 57].

### COMMENTARY

The word “willfully” was not included in the description of the making of the false statement. Although one court suggested that the jury be explicitly instructed that the defendant must “willfully” make the false statement (*People v. Louis* (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 156, 161–162 [205 Cal.Rptr. 306]), the California Supreme Court

subsequently held that such language is not required. (*People v. Mickey* (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 672, fn. 9 [286 Cal.Rptr. 801, 818 P.2d 84].)

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Evidence*

The false nature of the defendant's statement may be shown by inconsistencies in the defendant's own testimony, his or her pretrial statements, or by any other prosecution evidence. (*People v. Kimble* (1988) 44 Cal.3d 480, 498 [244 Cal.Rptr. 148, 749 P.2d 803] [overruling line of cases that required falsity to be demonstrated only by defendant's own testimony or statements]; accord *People v. Edwards* (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1092, 1103 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 821]; *People v. Williams* (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 467, 478–479 [39 Cal.Rptr.2d 358].)

#### *Un-Mirandized Voluntary Statement*

The *Miranda* rule (*Miranda v. Arizona* (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 444, 479 [86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694]) does not prohibit instructing the jury that it may draw an inference of guilt from a willfully false or deliberately misleading un-Mirandized statement that the defendant voluntarily introduces into evidence on direct examination. (*People v. Williams* (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1157, 1166–1169 [94 Cal.Rptr.2d 727].)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin, California Evidence (5th ed. 2012) Hearsay, § 111.

5 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Criminal Trial, § 641.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 83, Evidence, § 83.13[1], Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.03[2][c] (Matthew Bender).

**363–369. Reserved for Future Use**

## E. PARTICULAR TYPES OF EVIDENCE

### 370. Motive

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**The People are not required to prove that the defendant had a motive to (commit (any of the crimes/the crime) charged/ [or] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert conduct alleged in support of sentencing enhancement or special circumstance>). In reaching your verdict you may, however, consider whether the defendant had a motive.**

**Having a motive may be a factor tending to show (that the defendant is guilty/ [or] that an (allegation/ [or] special circumstance) is true). Not having a motive may be a factor tending to show (the defendant is not guilty/ [or] that an (allegation/ [or] special circumstance) is not true).**

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2016, March 2017*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court does not have a sua sponte duty to instruct on motive. (*People v. Romo* (1975) 14 Cal.3d 189, 196 [121 Cal.Rptr. 111, 534 P.2d 1015] [not error to refuse instruction on motive].)

**Do not** give this instruction if motive is an element of all of the crimes charged. (See, e.g., CALCRIM No. 1122, *Annoying or Molesting a Child.*) *People v. Valenti* (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1140, 1165 [197 Cal.Rptr.3d 317].)

Modify this instruction as needed if motive is an element of some, but not all, of the crimes or special circumstances charged or enhancements alleged. (See *People v. Valenti* (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1140, 1165 [197 Cal.Rptr.3d 317].)

### AUTHORITY

- Instructional Requirements. *People v. Romo* (1975) 14 Cal.3d 189, 195–196 [121 Cal.Rptr. 111, 534 P.2d 1015]; *People v. Young* (1970) 9 Cal.App.3d 106, 110 [87 Cal.Rptr. 767].
- Jury May Consider Motive. *People v. Brown* (1900) 130 Cal. 591, 594 [62 P. 1072]; *People v. Gonzales* (1948) 87 Cal.App.2d 867, 877–878 [198 P.2d 81].
- Proof of Presence or Absence of Motive Not Required. *People v. Daly* (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 47, 59 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 21]; *People v. Scheer* (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1009, 1017–1018 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 676].
- This Instruction Upheld. *People v. Ibarra* (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1192–1193 [67 Cal.Rptr.3d 871].

## RELATED ISSUES

### *Entrapment Defense*

The court should not instruct on motive if the defendant admits his guilt for the substantive crime and presents an entrapment defense, because in that instance his or her commission of the crime would not be an issue and motive would be irrelevant. (See *People v. Martinez* (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 660, 669 [203 Cal.Rptr. 833]; *People v. Lee* (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 829, 841 [268 Cal.Rptr. 595].)

### *No Conflict With Other Instructions*

Motive, intent, and malice are separate and distinct mental states. Giving a motive instruction does not conflict with intent and malice instructions. (*People v. Hillhouse* (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 503–504 [117 Cal.Rptr.2d 45, 40 P.3d 754] [motive describes the reason a person chooses to commit a crime]; *People v. Snead* (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1088, 1098 [24 Cal.Rptr.2d 922].) Similarly, a motive instruction that focuses on guilt does not conflict with a special circumstance instruction, which the jury is directed to find true or not true. (*People v. Heishman* (1988) 45 Cal.3d 147, 178 [246 Cal.Rptr. 673, 753 P.2d 629] [defendant argued motive to prevent victim from testifying was at core of special circumstance].) A torture murder instruction that requires an intent to cause cruel pain or suffering for the purpose of revenge, extortion, or any sadistic purpose also does not conflict with the motive instruction. The torture murder instruction does not elevate motive to the status of an element of the crime. It simply makes explicit the treatment of motive as an element of proof in torture murder cases. (*People v. Lynn* (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 715, 727–728 [206 Cal.Rptr. 181].)

## SECONDARY SOURCES

- 1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Elements, § 4.
- 1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Defenses, § 281.
- 1 Witkin, California Evidence (5th ed. 2012) Circumstantial Evidence, § 123.
- 4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.03[2][c] (Matthew Bender).

## 371. Consciousness of Guilt: Suppression and Fabrication of Evidence

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<Alternative A—suppression>

[If the defendant tried to hide evidence or discourage someone from testifying against (him/her), that conduct may show that (he/she) was aware of (his/her) guilt. If you conclude that the defendant made such an attempt, it is up to you to decide its meaning and importance. However, evidence of such an attempt cannot prove guilt by itself.]

<Alternative B—fabrication>

[If the defendant tried to create false evidence or obtain false testimony, that conduct may show that (he/she) was aware of (his/her) guilt. If you conclude that the defendant made such an attempt, it is up to you to decide its meaning and importance. However, evidence of such an attempt cannot prove guilt by itself.]

<Alternative C—fabrication or suppression by a third party>

[If someone other than the defendant tried to create false evidence, provide false testimony, or conceal or destroy evidence, that conduct may show the defendant was aware of (his/her) guilt, but only if the defendant was present and knew about that conduct, or, if not present, authorized the other person's actions. It is up to you to decide the meaning and importance of this evidence. However, evidence of such conduct cannot prove guilt by itself.]

<Give final paragraph if multiple defendants on trial>

[If you conclude that a defendant (tried to hide evidence[,]/ discouraged someone from testifying[,]/ [or] authorized another person to (hide evidence/ [or] discourage a witness)), you may consider that conduct only against that defendant. You may not consider that conduct in deciding whether any other defendant is guilty or not guilty.]

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*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

No authority imposes a duty to give this instruction sua sponte. However, *People v. Atwood* (1963) 223 Cal.App.2d 316 [35 Cal.Rptr. 831] held that the court had a **sua sponte** duty, under the circumstances of that case, to instruct on consciousness of guilt based on defendant's false statements because they pertained to the vital question of whether defendant admitted his guilt. (*Id.* at pp. 333–334.)

### AUTHORITY

- Instructional Requirements. *People v. Atwood* (1963) 223 Cal.App.2d 316 [35

Cal.Rptr. 831]; see also *People v. Coffman and Marlow* (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 102–103 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 710, 96 P.3d 30].

- Fabrication or Suppression of Evidence. Evid. Code, § 413; *People v. Jackson* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1224–1225 [56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49, 920 P.2d 1254]; *People v. Rodrigues* (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1138–1140 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235, 885 P.2d 1].
- Suppression of Evidence. Evid. Code, § 413; see *People v. Farnam* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 165 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d 106, 47 P.3d 988] [instruction referring to defendant’s refusal to provide blood or hair sample was not an erroneous pinpoint instruction].
- Defendant Present or Authorized Suppression by Third Party. *People v. Hannon* (1977) 19 Cal.3d 588, 597–600 [138 Cal.Rptr. 885, 564 P.2d 1203]; *People v. Weiss* (1958) 50 Cal.2d 535, 554 [327 P.2d 527]; *People v. Kendall* (1952) 111 Cal.App.2d 204, 213–214 [244 P.2d 418].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin, California Evidence (5th ed. 2012) Hearsay, §§ 112, 113.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.03[2][c] (Matthew Bender).

## 372. Defendant's Flight

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**If the defendant fled [or tried to flee] (immediately after the crime was committed/ [or] after (he/she) was accused of committing the crime), that conduct may show that (he/she) was aware of (his/her) guilt. If you conclude that the defendant fled [or tried to flee], it is up to you to decide the meaning and importance of that conduct. However, evidence that the defendant fled [or tried to flee] cannot prove guilt by itself.**

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*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on flight whenever the prosecution relies on evidence of flight to show consciousness of guilt. (*People v. Williams* (1960) 179 Cal.App.2d 487, 491 [3 Cal.Rptr. 782].) There is, however, no reciprocal duty to instruct on the significance of the absence of flight, even on request. (*People v. Staten* (2000) 24 Cal.4th 434, 459 [101 Cal.Rptr.2d 213, 11 P.3d 968]; *People v. Williams* (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 648, 651 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 203].)

If the defendant's flight did not occur immediately after the crime was committed, the trial court should give the second option in the parenthetical. (*People v. Carrera* (1989) 49 Cal.3d 291, 313 [261 Cal.Rptr. 348, 777 P.2d 121] [flight from county jail]; *People v. Farley* (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1697, 1712 [53 Cal.Rptr.2d 702] [when flight was from custody, the instructional language "immediately after the commission of a crime" was irrelevant but harmless].)

### AUTHORITY

- Instructional Requirements. Pen. Code, § 1127c; *People v. Williams* (1960) 179 Cal.App.2d 487, 491 [3 Cal.Rptr. 782]; *People v. Bradford* (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1054–1055 [60 Cal.Rptr.2d 225, 929 P.2d 544]; see *People v. Mendoza* (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 179–180 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 485, 6 P.3d 150].
- This Instruction Upheld. *People v. Paysinger* (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 26, 29–32 [93 Cal.Rptr.3d 901]; *People v. Rios* (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1159–1160 [60 Cal.Rptr.3d 591].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Flight, Meaning*

Flight does not require a person to physically run from the scene or make an escape. What is required is acting with the purpose of avoiding observation or arrest. (*People v. Bradford* (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1055 [60 Cal.Rptr.2d 225, 929 P.2d 544] [defendant fled when he left victim's apartment after killing her, told the assistant manager, "I really got to get the hell out of here," returned to his apartment, packed his belongings, asked a former girlfriend who lived out of the

area if he could stay with her, and repeatedly pleaded with his roommate to drive him out of town].)

***Identity at Issue***

If evidence identifies the defendant as the person who fled, and this evidence is relied on as tending to show guilt, then it is not error to instruct the jury on flight. (*People v. Mason* (1991) 52 Cal.3d 909, 943 [277 Cal.Rptr. 166, 802 P.2d 950].)

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

5 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, §§ 723–724.

1 Witkin, *California Evidence* (5th ed. 2012) Hearsay, §§ 107–110.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, §§ 85.02[2][a][ii], 85.03[2][c] (Matthew Bender).



### 373. Other Perpetrator

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**The evidence shows that (another person/other persons) may have been involved in the commission of the crime[s] charged against the defendant. There may be many reasons why someone who appears to have been involved might not be a codefendant in this particular trial. You must not speculate about whether (that other person has/those other persons have) been or will be prosecuted. Your duty is to decide whether the defendant on trial here committed the crime[s] charged.**

**[This instruction does not apply to the testimony of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert names of testifying coparticipants>.]**

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*New January 2006*

#### BENCH NOTES

##### *Instructional Duty*

The court has no sua sponte duty to give an instruction on unjoined co-participants; however, it must be given on request. (See *People v. Sanders* (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 350, 359 [271 Cal.Rptr. 534].)

If other alleged participants in the crime are testifying, this instruction should not be given or the bracketed portion should be given exempting the testimony of those witnesses. (*People v. Carrera* (1989) 49 Cal.3d 291, 312 [261 Cal.Rptr. 348, 777 P.2d 121]; *People v. Sully* (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1195, 1218 [283 Cal.Rptr. 144, 812 P.2d 163]; *People v. Williams* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 226–227 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 123, 940 P.2d 710].) It is not error to give the first paragraph of this instruction if a reasonable juror would understand from all the instructions that evidence of criminal activity by a witness not being prosecuted in the current trial should be considered in assessing the witness’s credibility. (*People v. Fonseca* (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 543, 549–550 [129 Cal.Rptr.2d 513].)

#### AUTHORITY

- Instructional Requirements. *People v. Farmer* (1989) 47 Cal.3d 888, 918–919 [254 Cal.Rptr. 508, 765 P.2d 940], disapproved on other grounds in *People v. Waidla* (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 724, fn. 6 [94 Cal.Rptr.2d 396, 996 P.2d 46]; *People v. Sanders* (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 350, 359 [271 Cal.Rptr. 534].

#### RELATED ISSUES

##### *Jury Can Still Consider Evidence That Someone Else Was the Perpetrator*

“The instruction does not tell the jury it cannot consider evidence that someone else was the perpetrator. It merely says the jury is not to speculate on whether someone else might or might not be prosecuted.” (*People v. Farmer* (1989) 47 Cal.3d 888, 918–919 [254 Cal.Rptr. 508, 765 P.2d 940], disapproved on other grounds in *People*

v. *Waidla* (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 724, fn. 6 [94 Cal.Rptr.2d 396, 996 P.2d 46].)

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 82, *Witnesses*, § 82.03[2], Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.03[2][d] (Matthew Bender).

## 374. Dog Tracking Evidence

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**You have received evidence about the use of a tracking dog. You may not conclude that the defendant is the person who committed the crime based only on the fact that a dog indicated the defendant [or a location]. Before you may rely on dog tracking evidence, there must be:**

- 1. Evidence of the dog’s general reliability as a tracker;**

**AND**

- 2. Other evidence that the dog accurately followed a trail that led to the person who committed the crime. This other evidence does not need to independently link the defendant to the crime.**

**In deciding the meaning and importance of the dog tracking evidence, consider the training, skill, and experience, if any, of the dog, its trainer, and its handler, together with everything else that you learned about the dog’s work in this case.**

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*New January 2006*

### **BENCH NOTES**

#### ***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on tracking dogs whenever they are used to prove the identity of a defendant. (*People v. Malgren* (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 234, 241 [188 Cal.Rptr. 569], disapproved on other grounds in *People v. Jones* (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1115, 1144 [282 Cal.Rptr. 465, 811 P.2d 757].)

### **AUTHORITY**

- Instructional Requirements. *People v. Craig* (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 905, 917–918 [150 Cal.Rptr. 676].
- Dog Tracking Evidence Need Not Be Viewed With Caution. *People v. Malgren* (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 234, 241 [188 Cal.Rptr. 569], disapproved on other grounds in *People v. Jones* (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1115, 1144 [282 Cal.Rptr. 465, 811 P.2d 757].
- Corroboration Requirement. *People v. Gonzales* (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 403, 410 [267 Cal.Rptr. 138].

### **SECONDARY SOURCES**

1 Witkin California Evidence (5th ed. 2012) Opinion Evidence, § 78.

3 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 71, *Scientific and Expert Evidence*, § 71.04[1][d][ii] (Matthew Bender).

### 375. Evidence of Uncharged Offense to Prove Identity, Intent, Common Plan, etc.

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*<Introductory Sentence Alternative A—evidence of other offense admitted>*

**[The People presented evidence that the defendant committed ((another/ other) offense[s]/the offense[s] of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert description of alleged offense[s]>*) that (was/were) not charged in this case.]**

*<Introductory Sentence Alternative B—evidence of other act admitted>*

**[The People presented evidence (of other behavior by the defendant that was not charged in this case/that the defendant \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert description of alleged conduct admitted under Evid. Code, § 1101(b)>*.)]**

**You may consider this evidence only if the People have proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant in fact committed the (uncharged offense[s]/act[s]). Proof by a preponderance of the evidence is a different burden of proof than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. A fact is proved by a preponderance of the evidence if you conclude that it is more likely than not that the fact is true.**

**If the People have not met this burden, you must disregard this evidence entirely.**

**If you decide that the defendant committed the (uncharged offense[s]/ act[s]), you may, but are not required to, consider that evidence for the limited purpose of deciding whether:**

*<Select specific grounds of relevance and delete all other options.>*

*<A. Identity>*

**[The defendant was the person who committed the offense[s] alleged in this case](./; or)**

*<B. Intent>*

**[The defendant acted with the intent to \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert specific intent required to prove the offense[s] alleged>* in this case](./; or)**

*<C. Motive>*

**[The defendant had a motive to commit the offense[s] alleged in this case](./; or)**

*<D. Knowledge>*

**[The defendant knew \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert knowledge required to prove the offense[s] alleged>* when (he/she) allegedly acted in this case](./; or)**

<E. Accident>

**[The defendant’s alleged actions were not the result of mistake or accident](./; or)**

<F. Common Plan>

**[The defendant had a plan [or scheme] to commit the offense[s] alleged in this case](./; or)**

<G. Consent>

**[The defendant reasonably and in good faith believed that \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name or description of complaining witness> consented](./; or)**

<H. Other Purpose>

**[The defendant \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of other permissible purpose; see Evid. Code, § 1101(b)>.]**

**[In evaluating this evidence, consider the similarity or lack of similarity between the uncharged (offense[s]/ [and] act[s]) and the charged offense[s].]**

**Do not consider this evidence for any other purpose [except for the limited purpose of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert other permitted purpose, e.g., determining the defendant’s credibility>].**

**[Do not conclude from this evidence that the defendant has a bad character or is disposed to commit crime.]**

**If you conclude that the defendant committed the (uncharged offense[s]/ act[s]), that conclusion is only one factor to consider along with all the other evidence. It is not sufficient by itself to prove that the defendant is guilty of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert charge[s]> [or that the \_\_\_\_\_ <insert allegation[s]> has been proved]. The People must still prove (the/ each) (charge/ [and] allegation) beyond a reasonable doubt.**

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*New January 2006; Revised April 2008, February 2016, August 2016*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court must give this instruction on request when evidence of other offenses has been introduced. (Evid. Code, § 1101(b); *People v. Carpenter* (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 382 [63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708]; *People v. Collie* (1981) 30 Cal.3d 43, 63–64 [177 Cal.Rptr. 458, 634 P.2d 534].) The court is only required to give this instruction **sua sponte** in the “occasional extraordinary case in which unprotested evidence of past offenses is a dominant part of the evidence against the accused, and is both highly prejudicial and minimally relevant to any legitimate purpose.” (*People v. Collie, supra*, 30 Cal.3d at pp. 63–64.)

**Do not** give this instruction in the penalty phase of a capital case. (See CALCRIM No. 764, *Death Penalty: Evidence of Other Violent Crimes*.)

If evidence of uncharged conduct is admitted *only* under Evidence Code section 1108 or 1109, **do not** give this instruction. (See CALCRIM No. 1191, *Evidence of Uncharged Sex Offense*; CALCRIM No. 852, *Evidence of Uncharged Domestic Violence*; and CALCRIM No. 853, *Evidence of Uncharged Abuse of Elder or Dependent Person*.)

If the court admits evidence of uncharged conduct amounting to a criminal offense, give introductory sentence alternative A and select the words “uncharged offense[s]” where indicated. If the court admits evidence under Evidence Code section 1101(b) that does not constitute a criminal offense, give introductory sentence alternative B and select the word “act[s]” where indicated. (*People v. Enos* (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 25, 42 [109 Cal.Rptr. 876] [evidence tending to show defendant was “casing” a home admitted to prove intent where burglary of another home charged and defendant asserted he was in the second home by accident].) The court is not required to identify the specific acts to which this instruction applies. (*People v. Nicolas* (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614, 668 [21 Cal.Rptr.3d 612, 101 P.3d 509].)

If the court has admitted evidence that the defendant was convicted of a felony or committed a misdemeanor for the purpose of impeachment in addition to evidence admitted under Evidence Code section 1101(b), then the court must specify for the jury what evidence it may consider under section 1101(b). (*People v. Rollo* (1977) 20 Cal.3d 109, 123, fn. 6 [141 Cal.Rptr. 177, 569 P.2d 771], superseded in part on other grounds as recognized in *People v. Olmedo* (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 1085, 1096 [213 Cal.Rptr. 742].) In alternative A, insert a description of the uncharged offense allegedly shown by the 1101(b) evidence. If the court has not admitted any felony convictions or misdemeanor conduct for impeachment, then the court may give the alternative “another offense” or “other offenses” without specifying the uncharged offenses.

The court must instruct the jury on what issue the evidence has been admitted to prove and delete reference to all other potential theories of relevance. (*People v. Swearington* (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 935, 949 [140 Cal.Rptr. 5]; *People v. Simon* (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 125, 131 [228 Cal.Rptr. 855].) Select the appropriate grounds from options A through H and delete all grounds that do not apply.

When giving option F, the court may give the bracketed “or scheme” at its discretion, if relevant.

The court may give the bracketed sentence that begins with “In evaluating this evidence” at its discretion when instructing on evidence of uncharged offenses that has been admitted based on similarity to the current offense. (See *People v. Ewoldt* (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 402–404 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 646, 867 P.2d 757]; *People v. Balcom* (1994) 7 Cal.4th 414, 424 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 666, 867 P.2d 777].) For example, when the evidence of similar offenses is admitted to prove common plan, intent, or identity, this bracketed sentence would be appropriate.

Give the bracketed sentence beginning with “Do not conclude from this evidence that” on request if the evidence is admitted only under Evidence Code section 1101(b). Do not give this sentence if the court is also instructing under Evidence Code section 1108 or 1109.

The paragraph that begins with “If you conclude that the defendant committed” has been included to prevent jury confusion regarding the standard of proof. (See *People v. Reliford* (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1007, 1012–1013 [130 Cal.Rptr.2d 254, 62 P.3d 601] [instruction on section 1108 evidence sufficient where it advised jury that prior offense alone not sufficient to convict; prosecution still required to prove all elements beyond a reasonable doubt].)

### AUTHORITY

- Evidence Admissible for Limited Purposes. Evid. Code, § 1101(b); *People v. Ewoldt* (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 393–394 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 646, 867 P.2d 757]; *People v. Balcom* (1994) 7 Cal.4th 414, 422 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 666, 867 P.2d 777].
- Degree of Similarity Required. *People v. Ewoldt* (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 402–404 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 646, 867 P.2d 757]; *People v. Balcom* (1994) 7 Cal.4th 414, 424 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 666, 867 P.2d 777].
- Analysis Under Evidence Code Section 352 Required. *People v. Ewoldt* (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 404 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 646, 867 P.2d 757]; *People v. Balcom* (1994) 7 Cal.4th 414, 426–427 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 666, 867 P.2d 777].
- Instructional Requirements. *People v. Collie* (1981) 30 Cal.3d 43, 63–64 [177 Cal.Rptr. 458, 634 P.2d 534]; *People v. Morrisson* (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 787, 790 [155 Cal.Rptr. 152].
- Other Crimes Proved by Preponderance of Evidence. *People v. Carpenter* (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 382 [63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708].
- Two Burdens of Proof Pose No Problem For Properly Instructed Jury. *People v. Virgil* (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1210, 1258–1259 [126 Cal.Rptr.3d 465, 253 P.3d 553].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Circumstantial Evidence—Burden of Proof*

The California Supreme Court has upheld CALJIC Nos. 2.50, 2.50.1, and 2.50.2 on the burden of proof for uncharged crimes and CALJIC No. 2.01 on sufficiency of circumstantial evidence. (*People v. Virgil* (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1210, 1258–1259 [126 Cal.Rptr.3d 465, 253 P.3d 553].) *Virgil* explained it was not error to permit consideration of evidence by two different evidentiary standards: “If the jury finds the facts sufficiently proven [by a preponderance of the evidence] for consideration, it must still decide whether the facts are sufficient, taken with all the other evidence, to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” *Id.* at 1259–1260. Jury instructions on the People’s burden of proof and circumstantial evidence eliminate any danger that the jury might use the preponderance of evidence standard to decide



elemental facts or issues because together those instructions make clear that ultimate facts must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. *Ibid.*

### ***Issue in Dispute***

The “defendant’s plea of not guilty does put the elements of the crime in issue for the purpose of deciding the admissibility of evidence of uncharged misconduct, unless the defendant has taken some action to narrow the prosecution’s burden of proof.” (*People v. Ewoldt* (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 400, fn. 4 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 646, 867 P.2d 757]; *People v. Rowland* (1992) 4 Cal.4th 238, 260 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 841 P.2d 897].) The defense may seek to “narrow the prosecution’s burden of proof” by stipulating to an issue. (*People v. Bruce* (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 1099, 1103–1106 [256 Cal.Rptr. 647].) “[T]he prosecution in a criminal case cannot be compelled to accept a stipulation if the effect would be to deprive the state’s case of its persuasiveness and forcefulness.” (*People v. Scheid* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1, 16–17 [65 Cal.Rptr.2d 348, 939 P.2d 748].) However, an offer to stipulate may make the evidence less probative and more cumulative, weighing in favor of exclusion under Evidence Code section 352. (*People v. Thornton* (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 44, 49 [101 Cal.Rptr.2d 825] [observing that offer “not to argue” the issue is insufficient].) The court must also consider whether there could be a “reasonable dispute” about the issue. (See *People v. Balcom* (1994) 7 Cal.4th 414, 422–423 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 666, 867 P.2d 777] [evidence of other offense not admissible to show intent to rape because if jury believed witness’s account, intent could not reasonably be disputed]; *People v. Bruce*, *supra*, 208 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1103–1106 [same].)

### ***Subsequent Offenses Admissible***

Evidence of a subsequent as well as a prior offense is admissible. (*People v. Balcom* (1994) 7 Cal.4th 414, 422–423, 425 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 666, 867 P.2d 777].)

### ***Offenses Not Connected to Defendant***

Evidence of other offenses committed in the same manner as the alleged offense is not admissible unless there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed the uncharged offenses. (*People v. Martinez* (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1006–1007 [12 Cal.Rptr.2d 838] [evidence of how auto-theft rings operate inadmissible]; *People v. Hernandez* (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 225, 242 [63 Cal.Rptr.2d 769] [evidence from police database of similar sexual offenses committed by unknown assailant inadmissible].)

## **SECONDARY SOURCES**

1 Witkin, California Evidence (5th ed. 2012) Circumstantial Evidence, §§ 76–97.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 83, Evidence, § 83.12[1][c] (Matthew Bender).



## 376. Possession of Recently Stolen Property as Evidence of a Crime

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If you conclude that the defendant knew (he/she) possessed property and you conclude that the property had in fact been recently (stolen/extorted), you may not convict the defendant of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert crime> based on those facts alone. However, if you also find that supporting evidence tends to prove (his/her) guilt, then you may conclude that the evidence is sufficient to prove (he/she) committed \_\_\_\_\_ <insert crime>.

The supporting evidence need only be slight and need not be enough by itself to prove guilt. You may consider how, where, and when the defendant possessed the property, along with any other relevant circumstances tending to prove (his/her) guilt of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert crime>.

[You may also consider whether \_\_\_\_\_ <insert other appropriate factors for consideration>.]

**Remember that you may not convict the defendant of any crime unless you are convinced that each fact essential to the conclusion that the defendant is guilty of that crime has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.**

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*New January 2006, September 2019*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

In *People v. Najera* (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1132, 1141 [77 Cal.Rptr.3d 605, 184 P.3d 732], the Supreme Court abrogated *People v. Clark* (1953) 122 Cal.App.2d 342, 346 [265 P.2d 43] [failure to instruct that unexplained possession alone does not support finding of guilt was error]. Accordingly, there is no longer a sua sponte duty to give this instruction.

The instruction may be given when the charged crime is robbery, burglary, theft, or receiving stolen property. (See *People v. McFarland* (1962) 58 Cal.2d 748, 755 [26 Cal.Rptr. 473, 376 P.2d 449] [burglary and theft]; *People v. Johnson* (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1, 36–37 [23 Cal.Rptr.2d 593, 859 P.2d 673] [burglary]; *People v. Gamble* (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 446, 453 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 451] [robbery]; *People v. Anderson* (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 414, 424 [258 Cal.Rptr. 482] [receiving stolen property].) The crime of receiving stolen property includes receiving property that was obtained by extortion (Pen. Code, § 496). Thus, the instruction also includes optional language for recently extorted property.

Use of this instruction should be limited to theft and theft-related crimes. (*People v.*

*Prieto* (2003) 30 Cal.4th 226, 248–249 [133 Cal.Rptr.2d 18, 66 P.3d 1123] [trial court’s failure to do so was error]; *People v. Barker* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1166, 1176 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 403] [disapproving use of instruction to infer guilt of murder]; but see *People v. Harden* (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 848, 856 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 105] [court did not err in giving modified instruction on possession of recently stolen property in relation to special circumstance of murder committed during robbery]; *People v. Smithey* (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 975–978 [86 Cal.Rptr.2d 243, 978 P.2d 1171] [in a case involving both premeditated and felony murder, no error in instructing on underlying crimes of robbery and burglary]; *People v. Mendoza* (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 176–177 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 485, 6 P.3d 150].)

### ***Corroborating Evidence***

The bracketed paragraph that begins with “You may also consider” may be used if the court grants a request for instruction on specific examples of corroboration supported by the evidence. (See *People v. Russell* (1932) 120 Cal.App. 622, 625–626 [8 P.2d 209] [list of examples]; see also *People v. Peters* (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 75, 85–86 [180 Cal.Rptr. 76] [reference to false or contradictory statement improper when no such evidence was introduced]). Examples include the following:

- a. False, contradictory, or inconsistent statements. (*People v. Anderson* (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 414, 424 [258 Cal.Rptr. 482]; see, e.g., *People v. Peete* (1921) 54 Cal.App. 333, 345–346 [202 P. 51] [false statement showing consciousness of guilt]; *People v. Lang* (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1024–1025 [264 Cal.Rptr. 386, 782 P.2d 627] [false explanation for possession of property]; *People v. Farrell* (1924) 67 Cal.App. 128, 133–134 [227 P. 210] [same].)
- b. The attributes of possession, e.g., the time, place, and manner of possession that tend to show guilt. (*People v. Anderson, supra*, 210 Cal.App.3d at p. 424; *People v. Hallman* (1973) 35 Cal.App.3d 638, 641 [110 Cal.Rptr. 891]; see, e.g., *People v. Gamble* (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 446, 453–454 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 451].)
- c. The opportunity to commit the crime. (*People v. Anderson, supra*, 210 Cal.App.3d at p. 425; *People v. Mosqueira* (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 1173, 1176 [91 Cal.Rptr. 370].)
- d. The defendant’s conduct or statements tending to show guilt, or the failure to explain possession of the property under circumstances that indicate a “consciousness of guilt.” (*People v. Citrino* (1956) 46 Cal.2d 284, 288–289 [294 P.2d 32]; *People v. Wells* (1960) 187 Cal.App.2d 324, 328–329, 331–332 [9 Cal.Rptr. 384]; *People v. Mendoza* (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 175–176 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 485, 6 P.3d 150]; *People v. Champion* (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 29, 32 [71 Cal.Rptr. 113].)
- e. Flight after arrest. (*People v. Scott* (1924) 66 Cal.App. 200, 203 [225 P. 767]; *People v. Wells, supra*, 187 Cal.App.2d at p.329.)
- f. Assuming a false name and being unable to find the person from whom the

- defendant claimed to have received the property. (*People v. Cox* (1916) 29 Cal.App. 419, 422 [155 P. 1010].)
- g. Sale of property under a false name and at an inadequate price. (*People v. Majors* (1920) 47 Cal.App. 374, 375 [190 P. 636].)
- h. Sale of property with identity marks removed (*People v. Miller* (1920) 45 Cal.App. 494, 496–497 [188 P. 52]) or removal of serial numbers (*People v. Esquivel* (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1386, 1401 [34 Cal.Rptr.2d 324]).
- i. Modification of the property. (*People v. Esquivel, supra*, 28 Cal.App.4th at p. 1401 [shortening barrels of shotguns].)
- j. Attempting to throw away the property. (*People v. Crotty* (1925) 70 Cal.App. 515, 518–519 [233 P. 395].)

### AUTHORITY

- Instructional Requirements. *People v. Williams* (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1157, 1172 [94 Cal.Rptr.2d 727]; see *People v. McFarland* (1962) 58 Cal.2d 748, 755 [26 Cal.Rptr. 473, 376 P.2d 449].
- This Instruction Upheld. *People v. O'Dell* (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1569, 1577 [64 Cal.Rptr.3d 116]; *People v. Solorzano* (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1026, 1036 [63 Cal.Rptr.3d 659].
- Corroboration Defined. See Pen. Code, § 1111; *People v. McFarland* (1962) 58 Cal.2d 748, 754–755 [26 Cal.Rptr. 473, 376 P.2d 449].
- Due Process Requirements for Permissive Inferences. *Ulster County Court v. Allen* (1979) 442 U.S. 140, 157, 165 [99 S.Ct. 2213, 60 L.Ed.2d 777]; *People v. Williams* (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1157, 1172; *People v. Gamble* (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 446, 454–455 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 451].
- Examples of Corroborative Evidence. *People v. Russell* (1932) 120 Cal.App. 622, 625–626 [8 P.2d 209].
- Recently Stolen. *People v. Anderson* (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 414, 421–422 [258 Cal.Rptr. 482]; *People v. Lopez* (1954) 126 Cal.App.2d 274, 278 [271 P.2d 874].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property, § 14 [in context of larceny]; § 82 [in context of receiving stolen property]; § 85 [in context of robbery]; § 157 [in context of burglary].

5 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, § 629 [presumptions].

1 Witkin, California Evidence (5th ed. 2012) Burden of Proof and Presumptions, § 63.

1 Witkin, California Evidence (5th ed. 2012) Circumstantial Evidence, § 134.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.03[2][c] (Matthew Bender).

**377. Presence of Support Person/Dog/Dog Handler (Pen. Code, §§ 868.4, 868.5)**

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\_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of witness> (will have/has/had) a (person/dog) present during (his/her) testimony. Do not consider the presence of the (person/dog [and dog handler]) who (is/was) with the witness for any purpose or allow it to distract you.

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*New March 2018; Revised April 2020*

**BENCH NOTES**

***Instructional Duty***

The court may give this instruction on request. If instructing on support persons, this instruction only applies to prosecution witnesses.

**AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 868.4, 868.5.

**378–399. Reserved for Future Use**

# **AIDING AND ABETTING, INCHOATE, AND ACCESSORIAL CRIMES**

## **A. AIDING AND ABETTING AND RELATED DOCTRINES**

- 400. Aiding and Abetting: General Principles
- 401. Aiding and Abetting: Intended Crimes
- 402. Natural and Probable Consequences Doctrine (Target and Non-Target Offenses Charged)
- 403. Natural and Probable Consequences (Only Non-Target Offense Charged)
- 404. Intoxication
- 405–414. Reserved for Future Use

## **B. CONSPIRACY**

- 415. Conspiracy (Pen. Code, § 182)
- 416. Evidence of Uncharged Conspiracy
- 417. Liability for Coconspirators' Acts
- 418. Coconspirator's Statements
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## **C. ACCESSORY AND SOLICITATION**

- 440. Accessories (Pen. Code, § 32)
- 441. Solicitation: Elements (Pen. Code, § 653f)
- 442. Solicitation of a Minor (Pen. Code, § 653j)
- 443. Compelling Another to Commit Crime
- 444–449. Reserved for Future Use

## **D. CORPORATE OFFICERS**

- 450. Liability of Corporate Officers and Agents: Single Theory of Liability
- 451. Liability of Corporate Officers and Agents: Two Theories of Liability
- 452–459. Reserved for Future Use

## **E. ATTEMPT**

- 460. Attempt Other Than Attempted Murder (Pen. Code, § 21a)
- 461–499. Reserved for Future Use



## A. AIDING AND ABETTING AND RELATED DOCTRINES

### 400. Aiding and Abetting: General Principles

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**A person may be guilty of a crime in two ways. One, he or she may have directly committed the crime. I will call that person the perpetrator. Two, he or she may have aided and abetted a perpetrator, who directly committed the crime.**

**A person is guilty of a crime whether he or she committed it personally or aided and abetted the perpetrator.**

**[Under some specific circumstances, if the evidence establishes aiding and abetting of one crime, a person may also be found guilty of other crimes that occurred during the commission of the first crime.]**

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*New January 2006; Revised June 2007, August 2009, April 2010*

### BENCH NOTES

#### ***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on aiding and abetting when the prosecutor relies on it as a theory of culpability. (*People v. Beeman* (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 560–561 [199 Cal.Rptr. 60, 674 P.2d 1318].)

When the prosecution is relying on aiding and abetting, give this instruction before other instructions on aiding and abetting to introduce this theory of culpability to the jury.

An aider and abettor may be found guilty of a different crime or degree of crime than the perpetrator if the aider and abettor and the perpetrator do not have the same mental state. (*People v. Samaniego* (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1148, 1166 [91 Cal.Rptr.3d 874]; *People v. Woods* (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1570, 1577–1578 [11 Cal.Rptr.2d 231]; *People v. McCoy* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1115–1116 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 188, 24 P.3d 1210].)

If the prosecution is also relying on the natural and probable consequences doctrine, the court should also instruct with the last bracketed paragraph. Depending on which theories are relied on by the prosecution, the court should then instruct as follows.

#### ***Intended Crimes (Target Crimes)***

If the prosecution's theory is that the defendant intended to aid and abet the crime or crimes charged (target crimes), give CALCRIM No. 401, *Aiding and Abetting: Intended Crimes*.

#### ***Natural & Probable Consequences Doctrine (Non-Target Crimes)***

If the prosecution's theory is that any of the crimes charged were committed as a natural and probable consequence of the target crime, CALCRIM No. 402 or 403

should also be given. If both the target and non-target crimes are charged, give CALCRIM No. 402, *Natural and Probable Consequences Doctrine (Target and Non-Target Offenses Charged)*. In some cases, the prosecution may not charge the target crime but only the non-target crime. In that case, give CALCRIM No. 403, *Natural and Probable Consequences (Only Non-Target Offense Charged)*.

### AUTHORITY

- Aiding and Abetting Defined. *People v. Beeman* (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 560–561 [199 Cal.Rptr. 60, 674 P.2d 1318].
- Murder Not Complete Until Victim Dies. *People v. Celis* (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 466, 471–474 [46 Cal.Rptr.3d 139].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Introduction to Crimes, §§ 94–97.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.03[2][d] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 140, *Challenges to Crimes*, § 140.10 (Matthew Bender).



## 401. Aiding and Abetting: Intended Crimes

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To prove that the defendant is guilty of a crime based on aiding and abetting that crime, the People must prove that:

1. The perpetrator committed the crime;
2. The defendant knew that the perpetrator intended to commit the crime;
3. Before or during the commission of the crime, the defendant intended to aid and abet the perpetrator in committing the crime;

AND

4. The defendant's words or conduct did in fact aid and abet the perpetrator's commission of the crime.

Someone *aids and abets* a crime if he or she knows of the perpetrator's unlawful purpose and he or she specifically intends to, and does in fact, aid, facilitate, promote, encourage, or instigate the perpetrator's commission of that crime.

If all of these requirements are proved, the defendant does not need to actually have been present when the crime was committed to be guilty as an aider and abettor.

[If you conclude that defendant was present at the scene of the crime or failed to prevent the crime, you may consider that fact in determining whether the defendant was an aider and abettor. However, the fact that a person is present at the scene of a crime or fails to prevent the crime does not, by itself, make him or her an aider and abettor.]

[A person who aids and abets a crime is not guilty of that crime if he or she withdraws before the crime is committed. To withdraw, a person must do two things:

1. He or she must notify everyone else he or she knows is involved in the commission of the crime that he or she is no longer participating. The notification must be made early enough to prevent the commission of the crime.

AND

2. He or she must do everything reasonably within his or her power to prevent the crime from being committed. He or she does not have to actually prevent the crime.

The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not withdraw. If the People have not met this burden, you may not find the defendant guilty under an aiding and abetting

theory.]

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2012*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on aiding and abetting when the prosecution relies on it as a theory of culpability. (*People v. Beeman* (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 560–561 [199 Cal.Rptr. 60, 674 P.2d 1318].)

If there is evidence that the defendant was merely present at the scene or only had knowledge that a crime was being committed, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “If you conclude that defendant was present.” (*People v. Boyd* (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 541, 557 fn.14 [271 Cal.Rptr. 738]; *In re Michael T.* (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 907, 911 [149 Cal.Rptr. 87].)

If there is evidence that the defendant withdrew from participation in the crime, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give the bracketed portion regarding withdrawal. (*People v. Norton* (1958) 161 Cal.App.2d 399, 403 [327 P.2d 87]; *People v. Ross* (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 391, 404–405 [154 Cal.Rptr. 783].)

### *Related Instructions*

Give CALCRIM No. 400, *Aiding and Abetting: General Principles*, before this instruction. Note that Penal Code section 30 uses “principal” but that CALCRIM Nos. 400 and 401 substitute “perpetrator” for clarity.

If the prosecution charges non-target crimes under the Natural and Probable Consequences Doctrine, give CALCRIM No. 402, *Natural and Probable Consequences Doctrine (Target and Non-Target Offenses Charged)*, if both non-target and target crimes have been charged. Give CALCRIM No. 403, *Natural and Probable Consequences (Only Non-Target Offense Charged)*, if only the non-target crimes have been charged.

If the defendant is charged with aiding and abetting robbery and there is an issue as to when intent to aid and abet was formed, give CALCRIM No. 1603, *Robbery: Intent of Aider and Abettor*.

If the defendant is charged with aiding and abetting burglary and there is an issue as to when intent to aid and abet was formed, give CALCRIM No. 1702, *Burglary: Intent of Aider and Abettor*.

## AUTHORITY

- Definition of Principals. Pen. Code, § 31.
- Parties to Crime. Pen. Code, § 30.
- Presence or Knowledge Insufficient. *People v. Boyd* (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 541, 557 fn.14 [271 Cal.Rptr. 738]; *In re Michael T.* (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 907, 911 [149 Cal.Rptr. 87].
- Requirements for Aiding and Abetting. *People v. Beeman* (1984) 35 Cal.3d

547, 560–561 [199 Cal.Rptr. 60, 674 P.2d 1318].

- Withdrawal. *People v. Norton* (1958) 161 Cal.App.2d 399, 403 [327 P.2d 87]; *People v. Ross* (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 391, 404–405 [154 Cal.Rptr. 783].
- This Instruction Correct re Withdrawal Defense. *People v. Battle* (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 50, 67 [129 Cal.Rptr.3d 828].

## RELATED ISSUES

### ***Perpetrator versus Aider and Abettor***

For purposes of culpability the law does not distinguish between perpetrators and aiders and abettors; however, the required mental states that must be proved for each are different. One who engages in conduct that is an element of the charged crime is a perpetrator, not an aider and abettor of the crime. (*People v. Cook* (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1364, 1371 [72 Cal.Rptr.2d 183].)

### ***Accessory After the Fact***

The prosecution must show that an aider and abettor intended to facilitate or encourage the target offense before or during its commission. If the defendant formed an intent to aid after the crime was completed, then he or she may be liable as an accessory after the fact. (*People v. Cooper* (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1158, 1160–1161 [282 Cal.Rptr. 450, 811 P.2d 742] [get-away driver, whose intent to aid was formed after asportation of property, was an accessory after the fact, not an aider and abettor]; *People v. Rutkowsky* (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 1069, 1072–1073 [126 Cal.Rptr. 104]; *People v. Rodriguez* (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 760–761 [230 Cal.Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113].)

### ***Factors Relevant to Aiding and Abetting***

Factors relevant to determining whether a person is an aider and abettor include: presence at the scene of the crime, companionship, and conduct before or after the offense. (*People v. Singleton* (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 488, 492 [241 Cal.Rptr. 842] [citing *People v. Chagolla* (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 422, 429 [193 Cal.Rptr. 711]]; *People v. Campbell* (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 402, 409 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 525].)

### ***Presence Not Required***

A person may aid and abet a crime without being physically present. (*People v. Bohmer* (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 185, 199 [120 Cal.Rptr. 136]; see also *People v. Sarkis* (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 23, 27 [272 Cal.Rptr. 34].) Nor does a person have to physically assist in the commission of the crime; a person may be guilty of aiding and abetting if he or she intends the crime to be committed and instigates or encourages the perpetrator to commit it. (*People v. Booth* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1247, 1256 [56 Cal.Rptr.2d 202].)

### ***Principal Acquitted or Convicted of Lesser Offense***

Although the jury must find that the principal committed the crime aided and abetted, the fact that a principal has been acquitted of a crime or convicted of a lesser offense in a separate proceeding does not bar conviction of an aider and abettor. (*People v. Wilkins* (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1089, 1092–1094 [31 Cal.Rptr.2d

764]; *People v. Summersville* (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1062, 1066–1069 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 683]; *People v. Rose* (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 990 [65 Cal.Rptr.2d 887].) A single Supreme Court case has created an exception to this principle and held that non-mutual collateral estoppel bars conviction of an aider and abettor when the principal was acquitted in a separate proceeding. (*People v. Taylor* (1974) 12 Cal.3d 686, 696–698 [117 Cal.Rptr.70, 527 P.2d 622].) In *Taylor*, the defendant was the “get-away driver” in a liquor store robbery in which one of the perpetrators inadvertently killed another during a gun battle inside the store. In a separate trial, the gunman was acquitted of the murder of his co-perpetrator because the jury did not find malice. The court held that collateral estoppel barred conviction of the aiding and abetting driver, reasoning that the policy considerations favoring application of collateral estoppel were served in the case. The court specifically limited its holding to the facts, emphasizing the clear identity of issues involved and the need to prevent inconsistent verdicts. (See also *People v. Howard* (1988) 44 Cal.3d 375, 411–414 [243 Cal.Rptr. 842, 749 P.2d 279] [court rejected collateral estoppel argument and reiterated the limited nature of its holding in *Taylor*].)

### ***Specific Intent Crimes***

If a specific intent crime is aided and abetted, the aider and abettor must share the requisite specific intent with the perpetrator. “[A]n aider and abettor will ‘share’ the perpetrator’s specific intent when he or she knows the full extent of the perpetrator’s criminal purpose and gives aid or encouragement with the intent or purpose of facilitating the perpetrator’s commission of the crime.” (*People v. Beeman* (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 560 [199 Cal.Rptr. 60, 674 P.2d 1318] [citations omitted].) The perpetrator must have the requisite specific intent and the jury must be so instructed. (*People v. Patterson* (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 610 [257 Cal.Rptr. 407] [trial court erred in failing to instruct jury that perpetrator must have specific intent to kill]; *People v. Torres* (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 763, 768–769 [274 Cal.Rptr. 117].) And the jury must find that the aider and abettor shared the perpetrator’s specific intent. (*People v. Acero* (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 217, 224 [208 Cal.Rptr. 565] [to convict defendant of aiding and abetting and attempted murder, jury must find that he shared perpetrator’s specific intent to kill].)

### ***Greater Guilt Than Actual Killer***

An aider and abettor may be guilty of greater homicide-related crimes than the actual killer. When a person, with the mental state necessary for an aider and abettor, helps or induces another to kill, that person’s guilt is determined by the combined acts of all the participants as well as that person’s own mens rea. If that person’s mens rea is more culpable than another’s, that person’s guilt may be greater even if the other is deemed the actual killer. (*People v. McCoy* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1121 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 188, 24 P.3d 1210].)

## **SECONDARY SOURCES**

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Introduction to Crimes, §§ 94–97.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 85,

*Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.03[2][d] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 140, *Challenges to Crimes*, § 140.10[3] (Matthew Bender).

## 402. Natural and Probable Consequences Doctrine (Target and Non-Target Offenses Charged)

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The defendant is charged in Count[s] \_\_\_\_\_ with \_\_\_\_\_ <insert target offense> and in Counts[s] \_\_\_\_\_ with \_\_\_\_\_ <insert non-target offense>.

You must first decide whether the defendant is guilty of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert target offense>. If you find the defendant is guilty of this crime, you must then decide whether (he/she) is guilty of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert non-target offense>.

Under certain circumstances, a person who is guilty of one crime may also be guilty of other crimes that were committed at the same time.

To prove that the defendant is guilty of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert non-target offense>, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant is guilty of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert target offense>;
2. During the commission of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert target offense> a coparticipant in that \_\_\_\_\_ <insert target offense> committed the crime of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert non-target offense>;

AND

3. Under all of the circumstances, a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have known that the commission of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert non-target offense> was a natural and probable consequence of the commission of the \_\_\_\_\_ <insert target offense>.

A *coparticipant* in a crime is the perpetrator or anyone who aided and abetted the perpetrator. It does not include a victim or innocent bystander.

A *natural and probable consequence* is one that a reasonable person would know is likely to happen if nothing unusual intervenes. In deciding whether a consequence is natural and probable, consider all of the circumstances established by the evidence.

[Do not consider evidence of defendant's intoxication in deciding whether \_\_\_\_\_ <insert non-target offense> was a natural and probable consequence of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert target offense>.]

To decide whether the crime of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert non-target offense> was committed, please refer to the separate instructions that I (will give/ have given) you on that crime.

[The People allege that the defendant originally intended to aid and abet

**the commission of either \_\_\_\_\_ <insert target offense> or \_\_\_\_\_ <insert other target offense>. The defendant is guilty of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert non-target offense> if the People have proved that the defendant aided and abetted either \_\_\_\_\_ <insert target offense> or \_\_\_\_\_ <insert other target offense> and that \_\_\_\_\_ <insert non-target offense> was the natural and probable consequence of either \_\_\_\_\_ <insert target offense> or \_\_\_\_\_ <insert other target offense>. However, you do not need to agree on which of these two crimes the defendant aided and abetted.]**

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*New January 2006; Revised June 2007, April 2010, February 2013, August 2014, February 2015, September 2019*

## BENCH NOTES

### ***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on aiding and abetting when the prosecution relies on that theory of culpability. (*People v. Beeman* (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 560–561 [199 Cal.Rptr. 60, 674 P.2d 1318].)

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to identify and instruct on any target offense relied on by the prosecution as a predicate offense when substantial evidence supports the theory. Give all relevant instructions on the alleged target offense or offenses. The court, however, does not have to instruct on all potential target offenses supported by the evidence if the prosecution does not rely on those offenses. (*People v. Prettyman* (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 267–268 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 827, 926 P.2d 1013]; see *People v. Huynh* (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 662, 677–678 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d 340] [no sua sponte duty to instruct on simple assault when prosecutor never asked court to consider it as target offense].)

The target offense is the crime that the accused parties intended to commit. The non-target is an additional unintended crime that occurs during the commission of the target.

Give the bracketed paragraph beginning, “Do not consider evidence of defendant’s intoxication” when instructing on aiding and abetting liability for a non-target offense. (*People v. Mendoza* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1114, 1134 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 428, 959 P.2d 735].)

### ***Related Instructions***

Give CALCRIM No. 400, *Aiding and Abetting: General Principles*, and CALCRIM No. 401, *Aiding and Abetting: Intended Crimes*, before this instruction.

This instruction should be used when the prosecution relies on the natural and probable consequences doctrine and charges both target and non-target crimes. If only non-target crimes are charged, give CALCRIM No. 403, *Natural and Probable Consequences Doctrine (Only Non-Target Offense Charged)*.



## AUTHORITY

- Aiding and Abetting Defined. *People v. Beeman* (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 560–561 [199 Cal.Rptr. 60, 674 P.2d 1318].
- Natural and Probable Consequences, Reasonable Person Standard. *People v. Nguyen* (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 518, 531 [26 Cal.Rptr.2d 323].
- Reasonably Foreseeable Crime Need Not Be Committed for Reason Within Common Plan. *People v. Smith* (2014) 60 Cal.4th 603, 616–617 [180 Cal.Rptr.3d 100, 337 P.3d 1159].

## COMMENTARY

In *People v. Prettyman* (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 268 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 827, 926 P.2d 1013], the court concluded that the trial court must sua sponte identify and describe for the jury any target offenses allegedly aided and abetted by the defendant.

Although no published case to date gives a clear definition of the terms “natural” and “probable,” nor holds that there is a sua sponte duty to define them, we have included a suggested definition. (See *People v. Prettyman*, *supra*, 14 Cal.4th at p. 291 (conc. & dis. opn. of Brown, J.); see also *People v. Coffman and Marlow* (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 107–109 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 710, 96 P.3d 30] [court did not err in failing to define “natural and probable”].)

## RELATED ISSUES

### *Murder*

A verdict of murder may not be based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine. Pen. Code, § 188(a)(3). (Penal Code section 188, as amended by Statutes 2018, ch. 1015 (S.B. 1437), became effective January 1, 2019.) The amendment added “malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.” The question whether this amendment abolished the natural and probable consequences doctrine as to attempted murder is unresolved.

### *Lesser Included Offenses*

The court has a duty to instruct on lesser included offenses that could be the natural and probable consequence of the intended offense when the evidence raises a question whether the greater offense is a natural and probable consequence of the original, intended criminal act. (*People v. Woods* (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1570, 1586–1588 [11 Cal.Rptr.2d 231] [aider and abettor may be found guilty of second degree murder under doctrine of natural and probable consequences although the principal was convicted of first degree murder].)

### *Specific Intent—Non-Target Crimes*

Before an aider and abettor may be found guilty of a specific intent crime under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, the jury must first find that the perpetrator possessed the required specific intent. (*People v. Patterson* (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 610, 614 [257 Cal.Rptr. 407] [trial court erroneously failed to instruct the jury that they must find that the perpetrator had the specific intent to kill necessary for attempted murder before they could find the defendant guilty as an



aider and abettor under the “natural and probable” consequences doctrine], disagreeing with *People v. Hammond* (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 463 [226 Cal.Rptr. 475] to the extent it held otherwise.) However, it is not necessary that the jury find that the aider and abettor had the specific intent; the jury must only determine that the specific intent crime was a natural and probable consequence of the original crime aided and abetted. (*People v. Woods* (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1570, 1586–1587 [11 Cal.Rptr. 2d 231].)

***Target and Non-Target Offense May Consist of Same Act***

Although generally, non-target offenses charged under the natural and probable consequences doctrine will be different and typically more serious criminal acts than the target offense alleged, they may consist of the same act with differing mental states. (*People v. Laster* (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1450, 1463–1466 [61 Cal.Rptr.2d 680] [defendants were properly convicted of attempted murder as natural and probable consequence of aiding and abetting discharge of firearm from vehicle. Although both crimes consist of same act, attempted murder requires more culpable mental state].)

***Target Offense Not Committed***

The Supreme Court has left open the question whether a person may be liable under the natural and probable consequences doctrine for a non-target offense, if the target offense was not committed. (*People v. Prettyman* (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 262, fn. 4 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 827, 926 P.2d 1013], but see *People v. Ayala* (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1440, 1452 [105 Cal.Rptr.3d 575]; *People v. Laster* (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1450, 1464–1465 [61 Cal.Rptr.2d 680].)

See generally, the related issues under CALCRIM No. 401, *Aiding and Abetting: Intended Crimes*.

## SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Introduction to Crimes, §§ 102, 104–106, 110.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, §§ 85.02[1A][a], 85.03[2][d] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 140, *Challenges to Crimes*, § 140.10[3] (Matthew Bender).

### 403. Natural and Probable Consequences (Only Non-Target Offense Charged)

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[Before you may decide whether the defendant is guilty of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert non-target offense>, you must decide whether (he/she) is guilty of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert target offense>.]

To prove that the defendant is guilty of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert non-target offense>, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant is guilty of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert target offense>;
2. During the commission of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert target offense> a coparticipant in that \_\_\_\_\_ <insert target offense> committed the crime of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert non-target offense>;

AND

3. Under all of the circumstances, a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have known that the commission of the \_\_\_\_\_ <insert non-target offense> was a natural and probable consequence of the commission of the \_\_\_\_\_ <insert target offense>.

A *coparticipant* in a crime is the perpetrator or anyone who aided and abetted the perpetrator. It does not include a victim or innocent bystander.

A *natural and probable consequence* is one that a reasonable person would know is likely to happen if nothing unusual intervenes. In deciding whether a consequence is natural and probable, consider all of the circumstances established by the evidence.

[Do not consider evidence of defendant's intoxication in deciding whether \_\_\_\_\_ <insert non-target offense> was a natural and probable consequence of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert target offense>.]

To decide whether crime of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert non-target offense> was committed, please refer to the separate instructions that I (will give/have given) you on (that/those) crime[s].

[The People are alleging that the defendant originally intended to aid and abet \_\_\_\_\_ <insert target offenses>.

If you decide that the defendant aided and abetted one of these crimes and that \_\_\_\_\_ <insert non-target offense> was a natural and probable consequence of that crime, the defendant is guilty of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert non-target offense>. You do not need to agree about which of these crimes the defendant aided and abetted.]

*New January 2006; Revised June 2007, April 2010, February 2015, September 2019*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on aiding and abetting when the prosecution relies on it as a theory of culpability. (*People v. Beeman* (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 560–561 [199 Cal.Rptr. 60, 674 P.2d 1318].)

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to identify and instruct on any target offense relied on by the prosecution as a predicate offense when substantial evidence supports the theory. Give all relevant instructions on the alleged target offense or offenses. The court, however, does not have to instruct on all potential target offenses supported by the evidence if the prosecution does not rely on those offenses. (*People v. Prettyman* (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 267–268 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 827, 926 P.2d 1013]; see *People v. Huynh* (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 662, 677–678 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d 340] [no sua sponte duty to instruct on simple assault when prosecutor never asked court to consider it as target offense].)

The target offense is the crime that the accused parties intended to commit. The non-target is an additional unintended crime that occurs during the commission of the target.

**Do not** give the first bracketed paragraph in cases in which the prosecution is also pursuing a conspiracy theory.

Give the bracketed paragraph beginning, “Do not consider evidence of defendant’s intoxication” when instructing on aiding and abetting liability for a non-target offense. (*People v. Mendoza* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1114, 1134 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 428, 959 P.2d 735].)

### *Related Instructions*

Give CALCRIM No. 400, *Aiding and Abetting: General Principles*, and CALCRIM No. 401, *Aiding and Abetting: Intended Crimes*, before this instruction.

This instruction should be used when the prosecution relies on the natural and probable consequences doctrine and charges only non-target crimes. If both target and non-target crimes are charged, give CALCRIM No. 402, *Natural and Probable Consequences Doctrine (Target and Non-Target Offenses Charged)*.

## AUTHORITY

- Aiding and Abetting Defined. *People v. Beeman* (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 560–561 [199 Cal.Rptr. 60, 674 P.2d 1318].
- Natural and Probable Consequences, Reasonable Person Standard. *People v. Nguyen* (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 518, 531 [26 Cal.Rptr.2d 323].
- No Unanimity Required. *People v. Prettyman* (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 267–268 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 827, 926 P.2d 1013].
- Presence or Knowledge Insufficient. *People v. Boyd* (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 541, 557 fn. 14 [271 Cal.Rptr. 738]; *In re Michael T.* (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 907, 911 [149 Cal.Rptr. 87, 926 P.2d 1013].

- Withdrawal. *People v. Norton* (1958) 161 Cal.App.2d 399, 403 [327 P.2d 87]; *People v. Ross* (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 391, 404–405 [154 Cal.Rptr. 783].
- Reasonably Foreseeable Crime Need Not Be Committed for Reason Within Common Plan. *People v. Smith* (2014) 60 Cal.4th 603, 616–617 [180 Cal.Rptr.3d 100, 337 P.3d 1159].

### COMMENTARY

In *People v. Prettyman* (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 268 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 827, 926 P.2d 1013], the court concluded that the trial court must sua sponte identify and describe for the jury any target offenses allegedly aided and abetted by the defendant.

Although no published case to date gives a clear definition of the terms “natural” and “probable,” nor holds that there is a sua sponte duty to define them, we have included a suggested definition. (See *People v. Prettyman, supra*, 14 Cal.4th at p. 291 (conc. & dis. opn. of Brown, J.); see also *People v. Coffman and Marlow* (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 107–109 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 710, 96 P.3d 30] [court did not err in failing to define “natural and probable.”])

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Murder*

A verdict of murder may not be based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine. (Pen. Code, § 188(a)(3). Penal Code section 188, as amended by Statutes 2018, ch. 1015 (S.B. 1437), became effective January 1, 2019.) This amendment added “malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.” The question whether this legislation abolished the natural and probable consequences doctrine as to attempted murder is unresolved.

See the Related Issues section under CALCRIM No. 401, *Aiding and Abetting*, and CALCRIM No. 402, *Natural and Probable Consequences Doctrine (Target and Non-Target Offenses Charged)*.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Introduction to Crimes, §§ 102, 104–106, 110.

6 Mil/man, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 140, Challenges to Crimes, § 140.10[3] (Matthew Bender).

## 404. Intoxication

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If you conclude that the defendant was intoxicated at the time of the alleged crime, you may consider this evidence in deciding whether the defendant:

A. Knew that \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of perpetrator> intended to commit \_\_\_\_\_ <insert target offense>;

AND

B. Intended to aid and abet \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of perpetrator> in committing \_\_\_\_\_ <insert target offense>.

Someone is *intoxicated* if he or she (took[,]/ [or] used[,]/[or] was given) any drug, drink, or other substance that caused an intoxicating effect.

[Do not consider evidence of intoxication in deciding whether \_\_\_\_\_ <insert charged nontarget offense> is a natural and probable consequence of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert target offense>.]

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New January 2006

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has no sua sponte duty to instruct on voluntary intoxication; however, the trial court must give this instruction on request. (See *People v. Ricardi* (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1427, 1432 [12 Cal.Rptr.2d 364]; *People v. Castillo* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1009, 1014 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 648, 945 P.2d 1197]; *People v. Saille* (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1103, 1119 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 364, 820 P.2d 588] [in context not involving aiding and abetting].) Although voluntary intoxication is not an affirmative defense to a crime, the jury may consider evidence of voluntary or involuntary intoxication and its effect on a defendant's ability to form specific mental states. (Pen. Code, §§ 22, 26; *People v. Mendoza* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1114, 1131–1134 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 428, 959 P.2d 735]; *People v. Scott* (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 823, 832 [194 Cal.Rptr. 633].)

Give the last bracketed paragraph on request if the defendant was charged with both target and nontarget crimes. (*People v. Mendoza* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1114, 1134 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 428, 959 P.2d 735].)

#### *Related Instructions*

See CALCRIM No. 3426, *Voluntary Intoxication*, and CALCRIM No. 3427, *Involuntary Intoxication*.

### AUTHORITY

- Instructional Requirements. Pen. Code, § 29.4; *People v. Mendoza* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1114, 1131–1134 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 428, 959 P.2d 735]; see *People v.*

*Castillo* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1009, 1014 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 648, 945 P.2d 1197];  
*People v. Saille* (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1103, 1119 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 364, 820 P.2d 588]  
[in context other than aiding and abetting].

- Burden of Proof. See *People v. Saille* (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1103, 1118–1119 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 364, 820 P.2d 588] [in context other than aiding and abetting].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Intoxication Based on Mistake of Fact Is Involuntary*

Intoxication resulting from trickery is not “voluntary.” (*People v. Scott* (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 823, 831–833 [194 Cal.Rptr. 633] [defendant drank punch not knowing it contained hallucinogens; court held his intoxication was result of trickery and mistake and involuntary].)

#### *Unconsciousness Based on Voluntary Intoxication Is Not a Complete Defense*

Unconsciousness is typically a complete defense to a crime except when it is caused by voluntary intoxication. (*People v. Heffington* (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 1, 8 [107 Cal.Rptr. 859].) Unconsciousness caused by voluntary intoxication is governed by former Penal Code section 22 [now Penal Code section 29.4], rather than by section 26, and is only a partial defense to a crime. (*People v. Walker* (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1615, 1621 [18 Cal.Rptr.2d 431] [no error in refusing to instruct on unconsciousness when defendant was voluntarily under the influence of drugs at the time of the crime].)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Defenses, §§ 30–34.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 140, *Challenges to Crimes*, § 140.10[3][c] (Matthew Bender).

**405–414. Reserved for Future Use**

## B. CONSPIRACY

### 415. Conspiracy (Pen. Code, § 182)

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[I have explained that (the/a) defendant may be guilty of a crime if (he/she) either commits the crime or aids and abets the crime. (He/She) may also be guilty if (he/she) is a member of a conspiracy.]

(The defendant[s]/Defendant[s] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s]>) (is/are) charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with conspiracy to commit \_\_\_\_\_ <insert alleged crime[s]> [in violation of Penal Code section 182].

To prove that (the/a) defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant intended to agree and did agree with [one or more of] (the other defendant[s]/ [or] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] or description[s] of coparticipant[s]>) to commit \_\_\_\_\_ <insert alleged crime[s]>;
2. At the time of the agreement, the defendant and [one or more of] the other alleged member[s] of the conspiracy intended that one or more of them would commit \_\_\_\_\_ <insert alleged crime[s]>;
3. (The/One of the) defendant[s][,] [or \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] or description[s] of coparticipant[s]>][,] [or (both/all) of them] committed [at least one of] the following alleged overt act[s] to accomplish \_\_\_\_\_ <insert alleged crime[s]>: \_\_\_\_\_ <insert the alleged overt acts>;

AND

4. [At least one of these/This] overt act[s] was committed in California.

To decide whether (the/a) defendant committed (this/these) overt act[s], consider all of the evidence presented about the act[s].

To decide whether (the/a) defendant and [one or more of] the other alleged member[s] of the conspiracy intended to commit \_\_\_\_\_ <insert alleged crime[s]>, please refer to the separate instructions that I (will give/have given) you on (that/those) crime[s].

The People must prove that the members of the alleged conspiracy had an agreement and intent to commit \_\_\_\_\_ <insert alleged crime[s]>. The People do not have to prove that any of the members of the alleged conspiracy actually met or came to a detailed or formal agreement to commit (that/one or more of those) crime[s]. An agreement



may be inferred from conduct if you conclude that members of the alleged conspiracy acted with a common purpose to commit the crime[s].

An *overt act* is an act by one or more of the members of the conspiracy that is done to help accomplish the agreed upon crime. The overt act must happen after the defendant has agreed to commit the crime. The overt act must be more than the act of agreeing or planning to commit the crime, but it does not have to be a criminal act itself.

[You must all agree that at least one alleged overt act was committed in California by at least one alleged member of the conspiracy, but you do not have to all agree on which specific overt act or acts were committed or who committed the overt act or acts.]

[You must make a separate decision as to whether each defendant was a member of the alleged conspiracy.]

[The People allege that the defendant[s] conspired to commit the following crimes: \_\_\_\_\_ <insert alleged crime[s]>. You may not find (the/a) defendant guilty of conspiracy unless all of you agree that the People have proved that the defendant conspired to commit at least one of these crimes, and you all agree which crime (he/she) conspired to commit.] [You must also all agree on the degree of the crime.]

[A member of a conspiracy does not have to personally know the identity or roles of all the other members.]

[Someone who merely accompanies or associates with members of a conspiracy but who does not intend to commit the crime is not a member of the conspiracy.]

[Evidence that a person did an act or made a statement that helped accomplish the goal of the conspiracy is not enough, by itself, to prove that the person was a member of the conspiracy.]

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2006, February 2014*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime when the defendant is charged with conspiracy. (See *People v. Morante* (1999) 20 Cal.4th 403, 416 [84 Cal.Rptr.2d 665, 975 P.2d 1071].) If the defendant is charged with conspiracy to commit murder, do not give this instruction. Give CALCRIM No. 563, *Conspiracy to Commit Murder*. If the defendant is not charged with conspiracy but evidence of a conspiracy has been admitted for another purpose, do not give this instruction. Give CALCRIM No. 416, *Evidence of Uncharged Conspiracy*.

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the elements of the offense alleged to



be the target of the conspiracy. (*People v. Cortez* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1223, 1238–1239 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 733, 960 P.2d 537]; *People v. Fenenbock* (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1688, 1706 [54 Cal.Rptr.2d 608].) Give all appropriate instructions defining the elements of the offense or offenses alleged as targets of the conspiracy.

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give a unanimity instruction if “the evidence suggested two discrete crimes, i.e., two discrete conspiracies . . .” (*People v. Russo* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1124, 1135 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 436, 25 P.3d 641]; see also *People v. Diedrich* (1982) 31 Cal.3d 263, 285–286 [182 Cal.Rptr. 354, 643 P.2d 971].) A unanimity instruction is not required if there is “merely possible uncertainty on how the defendant is guilty of a particular conspiracy.” (*People v. Russo, supra*, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1135.) Thus, the jury need not unanimously agree as to what overt act was committed or who was part of the conspiracy. (*People v. Russo, supra*, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 1135–1136.) However, it appears that a unanimity instruction is required when the prosecution alleges multiple crimes that may have been the target of the conspiracy. (See *People v. Diedrich, supra*, 31 Cal.3d at pp. 285–286 [approving of unanimity instruction as to crime that was target of conspiracy]; but see *People v. Vargas* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 506, 560–561, 564 [110 Cal.Rptr.2d 210] [not error to decline to give unanimity instruction; if was error, harmless].) Give the bracketed paragraph that begins, “The People alleged that the defendant[s] conspired to commit the following crimes,” if multiple crimes are alleged as target offenses of the conspiracy. Give the bracketed sentence regarding the degree of the crime if any target felony has different punishments for different degrees. (See Pen. Code, § 182(a).) The court must also give the jury a verdict form on which it can state the specific crime or crimes that the jury unanimously agrees the defendant conspired to commit.

In addition, if a conspiracy case involves an issue regarding the statute of limitations or evidence of withdrawal by the defendant, a unanimity instruction may be required. (*People v. Russo, supra*, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1136, fn. 2; see also Related Issues section below on statute of limitations.)

In elements 1 and 3, insert the names or descriptions of alleged coconspirators if they are not defendants in the trial. (See *People v. Liu* (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1131 [54 Cal.Rptr.2d 578].) See also the Commentary section below.

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “You must make a separate decision,” if more than one defendant is charged with conspiracy. (See *People v. Fulton* (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 91, 101 [201 Cal.Rptr. 879]; *People v. Crain* (1951) 102 Cal.App.2d 566, 581–582 [228 P.2d 307].)

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “A member of a conspiracy does not have to personally know,” on request if there is evidence that the defendant did not personally know all the alleged coconspirators. (See *People v. Van Eyk* (1961) 56 Cal.2d 471, 479 [15 Cal.Rptr. 150, 364 P.2d 326].)

Give the two final bracketed sentences on request. (See *People v. Toledo-Corro* (1959) 174 Cal.App.2d 812, 820 [345 P.2d 529].)

### **Defenses—Instructional Duty**

If there is sufficient evidence that the defendant withdrew from the alleged conspiracy, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give CALCRIM No. 420, *Withdrawal From Conspiracy*.

### **AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 182(a), 183; *People v. Morante* (1999) 20 Cal.4th 403, 416 [84 Cal.Rptr.2d 665, 975 P.2d 1071]; *People v. Swain* (1996) 12 Cal.4th 593, 600 [49 Cal.Rptr.2d 390, 909 P.2d 994]; *People v. Liu* (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1128 [54 Cal.Rptr.2d 578].
- Overt Act Defined. Pen. Code, § 184; *People v. Saugstad* (1962) 203 Cal.App.2d 536, 549–550 [21 Cal.Rptr. 740]; *People v. Zamora* (1976) 18 Cal.3d 538, 549, fn. 8 [134 Cal.Rptr. 784, 557 P.2d 75]; see *People v. Brown* (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1361, 1368 [277 Cal.Rptr. 309]; *People v. Tatman* (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1, 10–11 [24 Cal.Rptr.2d 480].
- Association Alone Not a Conspiracy. *People v. Drolet* (1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 207, 218 [105 Cal.Rptr. 824]; *People v. Toledo-Corro* (1959) 174 Cal.App.2d 812, 820 [345 P.2d 529].
- Elements of Underlying Offense. *People v. Cortez* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1223, 1238–1239 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 733, 960 P.2d 537]; *People v. Fenenbock* (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1688, 1706 [54 Cal.Rptr.2d 608].
- Two Specific Intent. *People v. Miller* (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 412, 423–426 [53 Cal.Rptr.2d 773], disapproved on other ground in *People v. Cortez* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1223, 1239 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 733, 960 P.2d 537].
- Unanimity on Specific Overt Act Not Required. *People v. Russo* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1124, 1133–1135 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 436, 25 P.3d 641].
- Unanimity on Target Offenses of Single Conspiracy. *People v. Diedrich* (1982) 31 Cal.3d 263, 285–286 [182 Cal.Rptr. 354, 643 P.2d 971]; *People v. Vargas* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 506, 560–561, 564 [110 Cal.Rptr.2d 210].
- Penal Code Section 182 Refers to Crimes Under California Law Only. *People v. Zacarias* (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 652, 660 [69 Cal.Rptr.3d 81].

### **COMMENTARY**

It is sufficient to refer to coconspirators in the accusatory pleading as “persons unknown.” (*People v. Sacramento Butchers’ Protective Ass’n* (1910) 12 Cal.App. 471, 483 [107 P. 712]; *People v. Roy* (1967) 251 Cal.App.2d 459, 463 [59 Cal.Rptr. 636]; see 1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (3d ed. 2000) Elements, § 82.) Nevertheless, this instruction assumes the prosecution has named at least two members of the alleged conspiracy, whether charged or not.

### **LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES**

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct the jury on a lesser included target

offense if there is substantial evidence from which the jury could find a conspiracy to commit that offense. (*People v. Horn* (1974) 12 Cal.3d 290, 297 [115 Cal.Rptr. 516, 524 P.2d 1300], disapproved on other ground in *People v. Cortez* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1223, 1237–1238 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 733, 960 P.2d 537]; *People v. Cook* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 910, 918 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 204]; *People v. Kelley* (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 1358, 1365–1366, 1370 [269 Cal.Rptr. 900].

There is a split of authority whether a court may look to the overt acts in the accusatory pleadings to determine if it has a duty to instruct on any lesser included offenses to the charged conspiracy. (*People v. Cook, supra*, 91 Cal.App.4th at pp. 919–920, 922 [court may look to overt acts to determine whether charged offense includes a lesser included offense]; contra, *People v. Fenenbock* (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1688, 1708–1709 [54 Cal.Rptr.2d 608] [court should examine description of agreement in pleading, not description of overt acts, to decide whether lesser offense was necessarily the target of the conspiracy].)

## RELATED ISSUES

### ***Acquittal of Coconspirators***

The “rule of consistency” has been abandoned in conspiracy cases. The acquittal of all alleged conspirators but one does not require the acquittal of the remaining alleged conspirator. (*People v. Palmer* (2001) 24 Cal.4th 856, 858, 864–865 [103 Cal.Rptr.2d 13, 15 P.3d 234].)

### ***Conspiracy to Collect Insurance Proceeds***

A conspiracy to commit a particular offense does not necessarily include a conspiracy to collect insurance proceeds. (*People v. Leach* (1975) 15 Cal.3d 419, 435 [124 Cal.Rptr. 752, 541 P.2d 296].)

### ***Death of Coconspirator***

A surviving conspirator is liable for proceeding with an overt act after the death of his or her coconspirator. (*People v. Alleyne* (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1256, 1262 [98 Cal.Rptr.2d 737].)

### ***Factual Impossibility***

Factual impossibility of accomplishing a substantive crime is not a defense to conspiracy to commit that crime. (*People v. Liu* (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1130–1131 [54 Cal.Rptr.2d 578]; see also *United States v. Jimenez Recio* (2003) 537 U.S. 270, 274–275 [123 S.Ct. 819, 154 L.Ed.2d 744] [rejecting the rule that a conspiracy ends when the object of the conspiracy is defeated].)

### ***Statute of Limitations***

The defendant may assert the statute of limitations defense for any felony that is the primary object of the conspiracy. The limitations period begins to run with the last overt act committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. (*Parnell v. Superior Court* (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 392, 410 [173 Cal.Rptr. 906]; *People v. Crosby* (1962) 58 Cal.2d 713, 728 [25 Cal.Rptr. 847, 375 P.2d 839]; see Pen. Code, §§ 800, 801.) If the substantive offense that is the primary object of the conspiracy is successfully attained, the statute begins to run at the same time as for the substantive offense.

(*People v. Zamora* (1976) 18 Cal.3d 538, 560 [134 Cal.Rptr. 784, 557 P.2d 75].) “[I]f there is a question regarding the statute of limitations, the court may have to require the jury to agree an overt act was committed within the limitations period.” (*People v. Russo* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1124, 1136, fn. 2 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 436, 25 P.3d 641] [dicta].) See generally CALCRIM No. 3410, *Statute of Limitations* and CALCRIM No. 3500, *Unanimity*.

### ***Supplier of Goods or Services***

A supplier of lawful goods or services put to an unlawful use is not liable for criminal conspiracy unless he or she both knows of the illegal use of the goods or services and intends to further that use. The latter intent may be established by direct evidence of the supplier’s intent to participate, or by inference based on the supplier’s special interest in the activity or the aggravated nature of the crime itself. (*People v. Lauria* (1967) 251 Cal.App.2d 471, 476–477, 482 [59 Cal.Rptr. 628].)

### ***Wharton’s Rule***

If the cooperation of two or more persons is necessary to commit a substantive crime, and there is no element of an alleged conspiracy that is not present in the substantive crime, then the persons involved cannot be charged with both the substantive crime and conspiracy to commit the substantive crime. (*People v. Mayers* (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 809, 815 [168 Cal.Rptr. 252] [known as Wharton’s Rule or “concert of action” rule].)

## **SECONDARY SOURCES**

- 1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Elements, §§ 72–102.
- 4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, §§ 85.02[2][a][i], 85.03[2][d] (Matthew Bender).
- 6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 141, *Conspiracy, Solicitation, and Attempt*, §§ 141.01, 141.02, 141.10 (Matthew Bender).

## 416. Evidence of Uncharged Conspiracy

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The People have presented evidence of a conspiracy. A member of a conspiracy is criminally responsible for the acts or statements of any other member of the conspiracy done to help accomplish the goal of the conspiracy.

To prove that (the/a) defendant was a member of a conspiracy in this case, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant intended to agree and did agree with [one or more of] (the other defendant[s]/ [or] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] or description[s] of coparticipant[s]>) to commit \_\_\_\_\_ <insert alleged crime[s]>;
2. At the time of the agreement, the defendant and [one or more of] the other alleged member[s] of the conspiracy intended that one or more of them would commit \_\_\_\_\_ <insert alleged crime[s]>;
3. (The/One of the) defendant[s][,] [or \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] or description[s] of coparticipant[s]>][,] [or (both/all) of them] committed [at least one of] the following overt act[s] to accomplish \_\_\_\_\_ <insert alleged crime[s]>: \_\_\_\_\_ <insert the alleged overt acts>;

**AND**

4. [At least one of these/This] overt act[s] was committed in California.

To decide whether (the/a) defendant or another member of the conspiracy committed (this/these) overt act[s], consider all of the evidence presented about the act[s].

To decide whether (the/a) defendant and [one or more of] the other alleged member[s] of the conspiracy intended to commit \_\_\_\_\_ <insert alleged crime[s]>, please refer to the separate instructions that I (will give/have given) you on (that/those) crime[s].

The People must prove that the members of the alleged conspiracy had an agreement and intent to commit \_\_\_\_\_ <insert alleged crime[s]>. The People do not have to prove that any of the members of the alleged conspiracy actually met or came to a detailed or formal agreement to commit (that/one or more of those) crime[s]. An agreement may be inferred from conduct if you conclude that members of the alleged conspiracy acted with a common purpose to commit the crime.

An *overt act* is an act by one or more of the members of the conspiracy

that is done to help accomplish the agreed upon crime. The overt act must happen after the defendant has agreed to commit the crime. The overt act must be more than the act of agreeing or planning to commit the crime, but it does not have to be a criminal act itself.

[You must all agree that at least one overt act was committed in California by at least one alleged member of the conspiracy, but you do not have to all agree on which specific overt act or acts were committed or who committed the overt act or acts.]

[You must decide as to each defendant whether he or she was a member of the alleged conspiracy.]

[The People contend that the defendant[s] conspired to commit one of the following crimes: \_\_\_\_\_ <insert alleged crime[s]>. You may not find (the/a) defendant guilty under a conspiracy theory unless all of you agree that the People have proved that the defendant conspired to commit at least one of these crimes, and you all agree which crime (he/she) conspired to commit.] [You must also all agree on the degree of the crime.]

[A member of a conspiracy does not have to personally know the identity or roles of all the other members.]

[Someone who merely accompanies or associates with members of a conspiracy but who does not intend to commit the crime is not a member of the conspiracy.]

[Evidence that a person did an act or made a statement that helped accomplish the goal of the conspiracy is not enough, by itself, to prove that the person was a member of the conspiracy.]

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2006, August 2016*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction when the prosecution has not charged the crime of conspiracy but has introduced evidence of a conspiracy to prove liability for other offenses or to introduce hearsay statements of coconspirators. (See, e.g., *People v. Pike* (1962) 58 Cal.2d 70, 88 [22 Cal.Rptr. 664, 372 P.2d 656]; *People v. Ditson* (1962) 57 Cal.2d 415, 447 [20 Cal.Rptr. 165, 369 P.2d 714].)

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the elements of the offense alleged to be the target of the conspiracy. (*People v. Cortez* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1223, 1238–1239 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 733, 960 P.2d 537]; *People v. Fenenbock* (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1688, 1706 [54 Cal.Rptr.2d 608].) Give all appropriate instructions defining the elements of the offense or offenses alleged as targets of the conspiracy.



The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give a unanimity instruction if “the evidence suggested two discrete crimes, i.e., two discrete conspiracies . . .” (*People v. Russo* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1124, 1135 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 436, 25 P.3d 641]; see also *People v. Diedrich* (1982) 31 Cal.3d 263, 285–286 [182 Cal.Rptr. 354, 643 P.2d 971].) See the Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 415, *Conspiracy*, on when the court is required to give a unanimity instruction.

In elements 1 and 3, insert the names or descriptions of alleged coconspirators if they are not defendants in the trial. (See *People v. Liu* (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1131 [54 Cal.Rptr.2d 578].) See also the Commentary section to CALCRIM No. 415, *Conspiracy*.

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “You must make a separate decision,” if the prosecution alleges that more than one defendant was a member of the conspiracy. (See *People v. Fulton* (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 91, 101 [201 Cal.Rptr. 879]; *People v. Crain* (1951) 102 Cal.App.2d 566, 581–582 [228 P.2d 307].)

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “A member of a conspiracy does not have to personally know,” on request if there is evidence that the defendant did not personally know all the alleged coconspirators. (See *People v. Van Eyk* (1961) 56 Cal.2d 471, 479 [15 Cal.Rptr. 150, 364 P.2d 326].)

Give the two final bracketed sentences on request. (See *People v. Toledo-Corro* (1959) 174 Cal.App.2d 812, 820 [345 P.2d 529].)

### ***Defenses—Instructional Duty***

If there is sufficient evidence that the defendant withdrew from the alleged conspiracy, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give CALCRIM No. 420, *Withdrawal from Conspiracy*.

### ***Related Instructions***

CALCRIM No. 417, *Liability for Coconspirators’ Acts*.

CALCRIM No. 418, *Coconspirator’s Statements*.

CALCRIM No. 419, *Acts Committed or Statements Made Before Joining Conspiracy*.

## **AUTHORITY**

- Overt Act Defined. Pen. Code, § 184; *People v. Saugstad* (1962) 203 Cal.App.2d 536, 549–550 [21 Cal.Rptr. 740]; *People v. Zamora* (1976) 18 Cal.3d 538, 549, fn. 8 [134 Cal.Rptr. 784, 557 P.2d 75]; see *People v. Brown* (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1361, 1368 [277 Cal.Rptr. 309]; *People v. Tatman* (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1, 10–11 [24 Cal.Rptr.2d 480].
- Association Alone Not a Conspiracy. *People v. Drolet* (1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 207, 218 [105 Cal.Rptr. 824]; *People v. Toledo-Corro* (1959) 174 Cal.App.2d 812, 820 [345 P.2d 529].
- Elements of Underlying Offense. *People v. Fenenbock* (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1688, 1706 [54 Cal.Rptr.2d 608]; *People v. Cortez* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1223, 1238–1239 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 733, 960 P.2d 537].

- Two Specific Intent. *People v. Miller* (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 412, 423–426 [53 Cal.Rptr.2d 773], disapproved on other grounds in *People v. Cortez* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1223, 1240 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 733, 960 P.2d 537].

### RELATED ISSUES

See the Related Issues section to CALCRIM No. 415, *Conspiracy*.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

- 1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Elements, §§ 72–102.
- 4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.03[2][d] (Matthew Bender).
- 6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 141, *Conspiracy, Solicitation, and Attempt*, §§ 141.01, 141.02 (Matthew Bender).



## 417. Liability for Coconspirators' Acts

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**A member of a conspiracy is criminally responsible for the crimes that he or she conspires to commit, no matter which member of the conspiracy commits the crime.**

**A member of a conspiracy is also criminally responsible for any act of any member of the conspiracy if that act is done to further the conspiracy and that act is a natural and probable consequence of the common plan or design of the conspiracy. This rule applies even if the act was not intended as part of the original plan. [Under this rule, a defendant who is a member of the conspiracy does not need to be present at the time of the act.]**

**A *natural and probable consequence* is one that a reasonable person would know is likely to happen if nothing unusual intervenes. In deciding whether a consequence is natural and probable, consider all of the circumstances established by the evidence.**

**A member of a conspiracy is not criminally responsible for the act of another member if that act does not further the common plan or is not a natural and probable consequence of the common plan.**

**To prove that the defendant is guilty of the crime[s] charged in Count[s] \_\_\_\_\_, the People must prove that:**

- 1. The defendant conspired to commit one of the following crimes:  
\_\_\_\_\_ <insert target crime[s]>;**
- 2. A member of the conspiracy committed \_\_\_\_\_ <insert nontarget offense[s]> to further the conspiracy;**

**AND**

- 3. \_\_\_\_\_ <insert nontarget offense[s]> (was/were) [a] natural and probable consequence[s] of the common plan or design of the crime that the defendant conspired to commit.**

**[The defendant is not responsible for the acts of another person who was not a member of the conspiracy even if the acts of the other person helped accomplish the goal of the conspiracy.]**

**[A conspiracy member is not responsible for the acts of other conspiracy members that are done after the goal of the conspiracy had been accomplished.]**

**BENCH NOTES*****Instructional Duty***

Give this instruction when there is an issue whether the defendant is liable for the acts of coconspirators. (See *People v. Flores* (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1363 [9 Cal.Rptr.2d 754] [no sua sponte duty when no issue of independent criminal act by coconspirator].)

The court **must** also give either CALCRIM No. 415, *Conspiracy*, or CALCRIM No. 416, *Evidence of Uncharged Conspiracy*, with this instruction. The court **must** also give all appropriate instructions on the offense or offenses alleged to be the target of the conspiracy. (*People v. Prettyman* (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 254 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 827, 926 P.2d 1013].)

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “Under this rule,” if there is evidence that the defendant was not present at the time of the act. (See *People v. Benenato* (1946) 77 Cal.App.2d 350, 356 [175 P.2d 296]; *People v. King* (1938) 30 Cal.App.2d 185, 203 [85 P.2d 928].)

Although no published case to date gives a clear definition of the terms “natural” and “probable,” nor holds that there is a sua sponte duty to define them, a suggested definition is included. (See *People v. Prettyman* (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 291 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 827, 926 P.2d 1013] (conc. & dis. opn. of Brown, J.).)

Give either of the last two bracketed paragraphs on request, when supported by the evidence.

***Related Instructions***

CALCRIM No. 418, *Coconspirator’s Statements*.

**AUTHORITY**

- Natural and Probable Consequences; Reasonable Person Standard. *People v. Superior Court (Shamis)* (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 833, 842–843 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 388]; see *People v. Nguyen* (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 518, 531 [26 Cal.Rptr.2d 323] [in context of aiding and abetting].
- Vicarious Liability of Conspirators. *People v. Hardy* (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 188 [5 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 825 P.2d 781].
- Must Identify and Describe Target Offense. *People v. Prettyman* (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 254 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 827, 926 P.2d 1013].

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Elements, §§ 98–99.  
6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 141, *Conspiracy, Solicitation, and Attempt*, §§ 141.01[6], 141.02 (Matthew Bender).

## 418. Coconspirator's Statements

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**In deciding whether the People have proved that (the defendant[s]/Defendant[s] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] of defendant[s] if codefendant trial and this instruction does not apply to all defendants; see Bench Notes>) committed [any of] the crime[s] charged, you may not consider any statement made out of court by \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] of coconspirator[s]> unless the People have proved by a preponderance of the evidence that:**

- 1. Some evidence other than the statement itself establishes that a conspiracy to commit a crime existed when the statement was made;**
- 2. \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] of coconspirator[s]> (was/were) [a] member[s] of and participating in the conspiracy when (he/she/they) made the statement;**
- 3. \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] of coconspirator[s]> made the statement in order to further the goal of the conspiracy;**

**AND**

- 4. The statement was made before or during the time that (the defendant[s]/Defendant[s] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] of defendant[s] if codefendant trial and this instruction does not apply to all defendants>) (was/were) participating in the conspiracy.**

**A statement means an oral or written expression, or nonverbal conduct intended to be a substitute for an oral or written expression.**

**Proof by a preponderance of the evidence is a different standard of proof than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. A fact is proved by a preponderance of the evidence if you conclude that it is more likely than not that the fact is true.**

**[You may not consider statements made by a person who was not a member of the conspiracy even if the statements helped accomplish the goal of the conspiracy.]**

**[You may not consider statements made after the goal of the conspiracy had been accomplished.]**

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2016*

### **BENCH NOTES**

#### ***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the use of a coconspirator's statement to incriminate a defendant if the statement has been admitted under

Evidence Code section 1223. (See *People v. Jeffery* (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 209, 215 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 526]; *People v. Herrera* (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 46, 63 [98 Cal.Rptr.2d 911].)

The court **must also** give either CALCRIM No. 415, *Conspiracy*, or CALCRIM No. 416, *Evidence of Uncharged Conspiracy*, with this instruction.

If the coconspirator statement has been admitted against all defendants on trial, then use “the defendant[s]” in the first sentence and in element 4. If the coconspirator statement has been admitted under Evidence Code section 1223 against only one or some of the defendants on trial, insert the names of the defendants to whom this instruction applies where indicated. For example, if the prosecution is relying on a statement made by a defendant in the trial, the statement may be used against that defendant as an admission. However, as to the other defendants, the statement may be used only if it qualifies under Evidence Code section 1223 or another hearsay exception. In such cases, insert the names of the other codefendants where indicated in the first sentence and in element 4.

Give either of the last two bracketed paragraphs on request, when supported by the evidence.

### AUTHORITY

- Hearsay Exception for Coconspirator’s Statements. Evid. Code, § 1223; *People v. Jeffery* (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 209, 215 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 526]; *People v. Lipinski* (1976) 65 Cal.App.3d 566, 575 [135 Cal.Rptr. 451].
- Statement Defined. Evid. Code, § 225.
- Burden of Proof. *People v. Herrera* (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 46, 63 [98 Cal.Rptr.2d 911].
- Independent Evidence Conspiracy Existed at Time of Statement. *People v. Leach* (1975) 15 Cal.3d 419, 430, fn. 10, 436 [124 Cal.Rptr. 752, 541 P.2d 296].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin, *California Evidence* (5th ed. 2012) Hearsay, § 135.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 141, *Conspiracy, Solicitation, and Attempt*, §§ 141.01[5], 141.02 (Matthew Bender).

## 419. Acts Committed or Statements Made Before Joining Conspiracy

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**(The/A) defendant is not responsible for any acts that were done before (he/ [or] she) joined the conspiracy.**

**You may consider evidence of acts or statements made before the defendant joined the conspiracy only to show the nature and goals of the conspiracy. You may not consider any such evidence to prove that the defendant is guilty of any crimes committed before (he/ [or] she) joined the conspiracy.**

---

*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction if there is evidence suggesting that the defendant joined an alleged conspiracy after the crime was committed or after an act or statement was made to further the object of the conspiracy.

### AUTHORITY

- Joining Conspiracy After Commission of Crime. *People v. Marks* (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1335, 1345 [248 Cal.Rptr. 874, 756 P.2d 260]; *People v. Feldman* (1959) 171 Cal.App.2d 15, 21–22 [339 P.2d 888].
- Use of Prior Acts or Statements. *People v. Weiss* (1958) 50 Cal.2d 535, 564–566 [327 P.2d 527].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Elements, §§ 100–101.  
6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 141, *Conspiracy, Solicitation, and Attempt*, § 141.02[6] (Matthew Bender).

## 420. Withdrawal From Conspiracy

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The defendant is not guilty of conspiracy to commit \_\_\_\_\_ <insert target offense> if (he/she) withdrew from the alleged conspiracy before any overt act was committed. To withdraw from a conspiracy, the defendant must truly and affirmatively reject the conspiracy and communicate that rejection, by word or by deed, to the other members of the conspiracy known to the defendant.

[A failure to act is not sufficient alone to withdraw from a conspiracy.]

[If you decide that the defendant withdrew from a conspiracy after an overt act was committed, the defendant is not guilty of any acts committed by remaining members of the conspiracy after (he/she) withdrew.]

The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not withdraw from the conspiracy [before an overt act was committed]. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of conspiracy. [If the People have not met this burden, you must also find the defendant not guilty of the additional acts committed after (he/she) withdrew.]

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*New January 2006; Revised December 2008*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction if there is evidence that the defendant attempted to withdraw from the conspiracy.

### AUTHORITY

- Withdrawal From Conspiracy as Defense. *People v. Crosby* (1962) 58 Cal.2d 713, 731 [25 Cal.Rptr. 847, 375 P.2d 839].
- Ineffective Withdrawal. *People v. Sconce* (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 693, 701 [279 Cal.Rptr. 59]; *People v. Beaumaster* (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 996, 1003 [95 Cal.Rptr. 360].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Elements, § 97.  
6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 141, *Conspiracy, Solicitation, and Attempt*, § 141.02[6], [7] (Matthew Bender).

**421–439. Reserved for Future Use**

## C. ACCESSORY AND SOLICITATION

### 440. Accessories (Pen. Code, § 32)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with being an accessory to a felony [in violation of Penal Code section 32].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. Another person, whom I will call the perpetrator, committed a felony;
2. The defendant knew that the perpetrator had committed a felony or that the perpetrator had been charged with or convicted of a felony;
3. After the felony had been committed, the defendant either harbored, concealed, or aided the perpetrator;

AND

4. When the defendant acted, (he/she) intended that the perpetrator avoid or escape arrest, trial, conviction, or punishment.

[To decide whether the perpetrator committed the (felony/felonies) of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert offense[s]>, please refer to the separate instructions that I (will give/have given) you on (that/those) crime[s].]

---

*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

There is no sua sponte duty to instruct on the underlying felony unless it is unclear that a felony occurred. However, the defendant is entitled to such an instruction on request. (*People v. Shields* (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1, 4–5 [271 Cal.Rptr. 228].)

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 32; *People v. Duty* (1969) 269 Cal.App.2d 97, 100–101 [74 Cal.Rptr. 606].

### COMMENTARY

There is no authority defining “harbor.” The committee therefore kept “harbor” in the instruction. *Black’s Law Dictionary* defines harbor as “[t]he act of affording

lodging, shelter, or refuge to a person, esp. a criminal or illegal alien.” (7th ed., 1999, at p. 721.) The court may wish to give an additional definition depending on the facts of the case.

## RELATED ISSUES

### *Accessory and Principal to the Same Crime*

There is a split of authority on whether a person may ever be guilty as an accessory and a principal to the same crime. Early case law held that it was not possible to be convicted of both because either logic or policy prohibited it. (*People v. Prado* (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 267, 271–273 [136 Cal.Rptr. 521]; *People v. Francis* (1982) 129 Cal.App.3d 241, 246–253 [180 Cal.Rptr. 873].) However, a later case disagreed with both of these cases and held “that there is no bar to conviction as both principal and accessory where the evidence shows distinct and independent actions supporting each crime.” (*People v. Mouton* (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1313, 1324 [19 Cal.Rptr.2d 423], disapproved on other grounds in *People v. Prettyman* (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 827, 926 P.2d 1013]; *People v. Riley* (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1808, 1816 [25 Cal.Rptr.2d 676]; but see *People v. Nguyen* (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 518, 536 [26 Cal.Rptr.2d 323] [suggesting in dicta that a person guilty as a principal can never be guilty as an accessory].)

### *Awareness of the Commission of Other Crimes Insufficient to Establish Guilt as an Accessory*

Awareness that a co-perpetrator has committed other crimes is not enough to find a person guilty as an accessory to those crimes unless there is evidence that the person intentionally did something to help the co-perpetrator avoid or escape arrest, trial, conviction or punishment for those offenses. (*People v. Nguyen* (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 518, 537 [26 Cal.Rptr.2d 323] [defendants’ convictions as accessories to sexual assaults committed by co-perpetrators in the course of a robbery reversed; no evidence existed that defendants did anything to help co-perpetrators escape detection].)

### *Passive Nondisclosure*

Although a person is not guilty of being an accessory if he or she fails or refuses to give incriminating information about a third party to the police, providing a false alibi for that person violates the accessory statute. (*People v. Duty* (1969) 269 Cal.App.2d 97, 103–104 [74 Cal.Rptr. 606].)

## SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Introduction to Crimes, §§ 112–113.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 140, *Challenges to Crimes*, § 140.11 (Matthew Bender).



## 441. Solicitation: Elements (Pen. Code, § 653f)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with soliciting another person to commit a crime [in violation of Penal Code section 653f].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant requested [or \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert other synonyms for solicit as appropriate>*] another person to commit [or join in the commission of] the crime of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert target offense>*;

[AND]

2. The defendant intended that the crime of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert target offense>* be committed(;/.)

*<Give element 3 when instructing that person solicited must receive message; see Bench Notes.>*

[AND]

3. The other person received the communication containing the request.]

To decide whether the defendant intended that the person commit \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert target offense>*, please refer to the separate instructions that I (will give/have given) you on that crime.

*<Alternative A—Corroboration by One Witness>*

[The crime of solicitation must be proved by the testimony of at least one witness and corroborating evidence.]

*<Alternative B—Corroboration by Two Witnesses>*

[The crime of solicitation must be proved by the testimony of at least two witnesses or by the testimony of one witness and corroborating evidence.]

*Corroborating evidence* is evidence that (1) tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime and (2) is independent of the evidence given by the witness who testified about the solicitation or independent of the facts testified to by that witness. Corroborating evidence need not be strong or even enough to establish each element by itself. Corroborating evidence may include the defendant's acts, statements, or conduct, or any other circumstance that tends to connect (him/her) to the crime.

[A person is guilty of solicitation even if the crime solicited is not

completed or even started. The person solicited does not have to agree to commit the crime.]

[If you find the defendant guilty of solicitation, you must decide how many crimes (he/she) solicited. When deciding this question, consider the following factors:

1. Were the crimes solicited part of a plan with a single objective or motive or did each crime solicited have a different objective or motive?
2. Were the crimes solicited to be committed at the same time?
3. Were the crimes solicited to be committed in the same place?
4. Were the crimes solicited to be committed in the same way?
5. Was the payment, if any, for the crimes solicited one amount or were different amounts solicited for each crime?

Consider all of these factors when deciding whether the defendant's alleged acts were a single crime or \_\_\_\_\_ <insert number of solicitations alleged by the People> separate crimes of solicitation.]

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New January 2006

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the elements of the target offense. (See *People v. Baskins* (1946) 72 Cal.App.2d 728, 732 [165 P.2d 510].) Give all relevant instructions on the target crime alleged. If the crime is solicitation to commit murder, do not instruct on implied malice murder. (*People v. Bottger* (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 974, 980–981 [191 Cal.Rptr. 408].)

One court has held that the person solicited must actually receive the solicitous communication. (*People v. Saephanh* (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 451, 458–459 [94 Cal.Rptr.2d 910].) In *Saephanh*, the defendant mailed a letter from prison containing a solicitation to harm the fetus of his girlfriend. (*Id.* at p. 453.) The letter was intercepted by prison authorities and, thus, never received by the intended person. (*Ibid.*) If there is an issue over whether the intended person actually received the communication, give bracketed element 3.

A blank has also been provided in element one to permit substituting other words for “solicit.” Other approved language includes: to ask, entreat, implore, importune, to make petition to, to plead for, to try to obtain, or to offer or invite another to commit a crime. (*People v. Gordon* (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 465, 472 [120 Cal.Rptr. 840]; *People v. Phillips* (1945) 70 Cal.App.2d 449, 453 [160 P.2d 872]; *People v.*

*Sanchez* (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1490, 1494 [71 Cal.Rptr.2d 309]; *Laurel v. Superior Court for Los Angeles County* (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 292, 298 [63 Cal.Rptr. 114].)

Penal Code section 653f lists those crimes that may be the target of a solicitation. If the target crime is listed in subdivision (a) or (b) of that section, insert the bracketed portion “[or join in the commission of].” If the target crime is listed in subdivision (c), (d), or (e), of the section, omit that bracketed portion. (See *People v. Herman* (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1369, 1380 [119 Cal.Rptr.2d 199].)

When instructing on the corroboration requirements, if the target crime is listed in subdivision (d) or (e) of section 653f, give Alternative A. If the target crime is listed in subdivision (a), (b), or (c) of section 653f, give Alternative B.

Authority is divided on whether the judge or jury is to determine the number of solicitations if multiple crimes were solicited by the defendant. The bracketed portion at the end of the instruction should be given if multiple solicitations have been charged and the trial court determines that this is a question for the jury. (Compare *People v. Davis* (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 317, 322–323 [259 Cal.Rptr. 348] with *People v. Morocco* (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 1449, 1454 [237 Cal.Rptr. 113].) If the court decides to present this issue to the jury, multiple target offenses must be inserted in elements 1 and 2, and the paragraph immediately following the elements.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 653f.
- Corroboration. *People v. Phillips* (1985) 41 Cal.3d 29, 75–76 [222 Cal.Rptr. 127, 711 P.2d 423]; *People v. Baskins* (1946) 72 Cal.App.2d 728, 732 [165 P.2d 510].
- Solicitation Defined. *People v. Gordon* (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 465, 472 [120 Cal.Rptr. 840]; *People v. Sanchez* (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1490, 1494 [71 Cal.Rptr.2d 309]; see *People v. Herman* (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1369, 1380 [119 Cal.Rptr.2d 199] [since a minor cannot violate § 288 by engaging in lewd conduct with an adult, an adult who asks a minor to engage in such conduct does not violate § 653f(c)].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Crime Committed Outside of California*

The solicitation of a person in California to commit a felony outside the state constitutes solicitation. (*People v. Burt* (1955) 45 Cal.2d 311, 314 [288 P.2d 503].)

#### *Solicitation of Murder*

When defining the crime of murder, in the case of a solicitation of murder, the trial court must not instruct on implied malice as an element of murder. Because the “crime of solicitation to commit murder occurs when the solicitor purposely seeks to have someone killed and tries to engage someone to do the killing,” the person must have express malice to be guilty of the solicitation. (*People v. Bottger* (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 974, 981 [191 Cal.Rptr. 408].) An instruction on murder that includes implied malice as an element has the potential of confusing the jury. (*Ibid.*)

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Elements, §§ 32–35.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 141,  
*Conspiracy, Solicitation, and Attempt*, § 141.10 (Matthew Bender).

## 442. Solicitation of a Minor (Pen. Code, § 653j)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with soliciting a minor to commit a crime [in violation of Penal Code section 653j].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant voluntarily (asked/ [or] encouraged / [or] induced/ [or] intimidated) a minor to commit the crime of \_\_\_\_\_  
<insert target offense>;
2. (He/She) intended that the minor commit the crime of \_\_\_\_\_  
<insert target offense>;

[AND]

3. At the time of the offense, the defendant was at least 18 years old(;/.)

[AND]

<Alternative 4—defendant five years older>

4. At the time of the offense, the minor was 16 or 17 years old, and the defendant was at least 5 years older than the minor(;/.)

<Give element 5 when instructing that person solicited must receive message; see Bench Notes.>

[AND]

5. The minor received the communication containing the request.]

To decide whether the defendant intended that the minor commit \_\_\_\_\_ <insert target offense>, please refer to the separate instructions that I (will give/have given) you on that crime.

A *minor* is a person under the age of 18.

[If you find the defendant guilty of solicitation, you must decide how many crimes (he/she) solicited. When deciding this question, consider the following factors:

1. Were the crimes solicited part of a plan with a single objective or motive or did each crime solicited have a different objective or motive?
2. Were the crimes solicited to be committed at the same time?
3. Were the crimes solicited to be committed in the same place?
4. Were the crimes solicited to be committed in the same way?

**5. Was the payment, if any, for the crimes solicited one amount or were different amounts solicited for each crime?**

**Consider all of these factors when deciding whether the defendant's alleged acts were a single crime or \_\_\_\_\_ <insert number of solicitations alleged by the People> separate crimes of solicitation.]**

*New January 2006*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If the minor is 16 or 17 years old, the jury must find that the defendant is at least 5 years older and the court must instruct **sua sponte** on element 3A. (Pen. Code, § 653j(a).) Give element 3B if element 3A does not apply.

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the elements of the target offense. (See *People v. Baskins* (1946) 72 Cal.App.2d 728, 732 [165 P.2d 510].) Give all relevant instructions on the target crime alleged. Penal Code section 653j lists those offenses that may be the target of a solicitation of a minor. If the crime is solicitation to commit murder, do not instruct on implied malice murder. (*People v. Bottger* (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 974, 980–981 [191 Cal.Rptr. 408].)

One court has held that the person solicited must actually receive the solicitous communication. (*People v. Saephanh* (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 451, 458–459 [94 Cal.Rptr.2d 910].) In *Saephanh*, the defendant mailed a letter from prison containing a solicitation to harm the fetus of his girlfriend. (*Id.* at p. 453.) The letter was intercepted by prison authorities and, thus, never received by the intended person. (*Ibid.*) If there is an issue over whether the intended person actually received the communication, give bracketed element 4.

Authority is divided on whether the judge or jury is to determine the number of solicitations if multiple crimes were solicited by the defendant. The bracketed portion at the end of the instruction should be given if multiple solicitations have been charged and the trial court determines that this is a question for the jury. (Compare *People v. Davis* (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 317, 322–323 [259 Cal.Rptr. 348] with *People v. Morocco* (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 1449, 1454 [237 Cal.Rptr. 113].) If the court decides to present this issue to the jury, multiple target offenses must be inserted in elements 1 and 2, and the paragraph immediately following the elements.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 653j.

## RELATED ISSUES

See the Related Issues section to CALCRIM No. 441, *Solicitation: Elements*.

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Elements, § 36.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 141, *Conspiracy, Solicitation, and Attempt*, §§ 141.10, 141.11 (Matthew Bender).

## 443. Compelling Another to Commit Crime

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**If the defendant forced another person to commit a crime by threatening, menacing, commanding, or coercing that person, then the defendant is guilty of the crime that the defendant forced the other person to commit.**

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*New January 2006*

### **BENCH NOTES**

#### ***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the theory of liability advanced by the prosecution. (See *People v. Beeman* (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 560–561 [199 Cal.Rptr. 60, 674 P.2d 1318] [sua sponte duty to instruct on aiding and abetting].)

### **AUTHORITY**

- Principals Defined. Pen. Code, § 31.

### **SECONDARY SOURCES**

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 140, *Challenges to Crimes*, § 140.10 (Matthew Bender).

**444–449. Reserved for Future Use**



## D. CORPORATE OFFICERS

### 450. Liability of Corporate Officers and Agents: Single Theory of Liability

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**The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with \_\_\_\_\_ <insert offense charged> while acting as an (officer/ [or] agent) of a corporation.**

**The People must prove that the defendant (personally committed/was a direct participant in) the crime charged. The fact that the defendant is an (officer/ [or] agent) of the corporation is not sufficient by itself to support a finding of guilt.**

*<Alternative A—prosecution alleges only that defendant committed prohibited act personally>*

**[To prove that the defendant personally committed the crime charged, the People must prove that the defendant \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of conduct alleged in offense>.]**

*<Alternative B—prosecution alleges only that defendant had authority to control conduct of others>*

**[To prove that the defendant was a direct participant in the crime charged, the People must prove that:**

- 1. The defendant had the authority to control \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of conduct alleged in offense>;**

**[AND]**

- 2. The defendant (failed to/authorized/caused/permitted) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of conduct alleged in offense>(;/.)]**

*<Alternative 3A: Give if offense alleged requires only knowledge or general criminal intent.>*

**[AND]**

- 3. The defendant knew \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of knowledge about conduct alleged in offense>(;/.)]**

*<Alternative 3B: Give if offense alleged requires specific intent.>*

**[AND]**

- 3. When the defendant acted, (he/she) intended to \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of specific intent required>.]**
-

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction in any case where the defendant is charged as the officer or agent of a corporation. (See *Sea Horse Ranch, Inc. v. Superior Court* (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 446, 456–458 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 681]; *Otis v. Superior Court* (1905) 148 Cal. 129, 131 [82 P. 853].) Repeat this instruction for each offense, inserting the specific requirements for that offense.

If the prosecution alleges that the defendant personally committed some or all of the acts alleged in the offense, give alternative A. If the prosecution’s theory is solely that the defendant had control over the conduct alleged, give alternative B. If the prosecution is pursuing both theories of liability, do not give this instruction. Give CALCRIM No. 451, *Liability of Corporate Officers and Agents: Two Theories of Liability*.

Give element 3A if the alleged offense requires knowledge or general criminal intent by the defendant. (See *Sea Horse Ranch, supra*, 24 Cal.App.4th at pp. 456–458; *People v. Epstein* (1931) 118 Cal.App. 7, 10 [4 P.2d 555].) Give element 3B if specific intent is required. If a strict-liability offense is alleged, give only elements 1 and 2. (See *People v. Matthews* (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1052, 1062 [9 Cal.Rptr.2d 348].)

### *Example*

In *Sea Horse Ranch, Inc. v. Superior Court* (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 446 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 681], the defendant was charged as the president of a corporation with involuntary manslaughter based on a horse’s escape from the ranch that caused a fatal vehicle accident. The instruction in such a case could read:

To prove that the defendant was a direct participant in the crime charged, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant had the authority to control the maintenance of the fences.
2. The defendant failed to ensure that the fences were properly maintained.

AND

3. The defendant knew that horses had repeatedly escaped from the ranch due to poor maintenance of the fences.

## AUTHORITY

- Liability of Corporate Officer or Agent. *Sea Horse Ranch, Inc. v. Superior Court* (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 446, 456–458 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 681]; see *People v. Matthews* (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1052, 1062 [9 Cal.Rptr.2d 348]; *Otis v. Superior Court* (1905) 148 Cal. 129, 131 [82 P. 853].

## SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Introduction to Crimes, §§ 117–118.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 140,

*Challenges to Crimes*, § 140.12 (Matthew Bender).

## 451. Liability of Corporate Officers and Agents: Two Theories of Liability

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert offense charged>* while acting as an (officer/ [or] agent) of a corporation.

The People must prove that the defendant either personally committed or was a direct participant in the crime charged. The fact that the defendant is an (officer/ [or] agent) of the corporation is not sufficient by itself to support a finding of guilt.

To prove that the defendant personally committed the crime charged, the People must prove that the defendant \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert description of conduct alleged in offense>*.

To prove that the defendant was a direct participant in the crime charged, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant had the authority to control \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert description of conduct alleged in offense>*;

[AND]

2. The defendant (failed to/authorized/caused/permitted) \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert description of conduct alleged in offense>*(;/.)

*<Alternative 3A: Give if offense alleged requires only knowledge or general criminal intent.>*

[AND]

3. The defendant knew \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert description of knowledge about conduct alleged in offense>*(;/.)]

*<Alternative 3B: Give if offense alleged requires specific intent.>*

[AND]

3. When the defendant acted, (he/she) intended to \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert description of specific intent required>*.]

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*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction in any case where the defendant is charged as the officer or agent of a corporation. (See *Sea Horse Ranch, Inc. v. Superior Court* (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 446, 456–458 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 681]; *Otis v. Superior Court* (1905) 148 Cal. 129, 131 [82 P. 853].) Repeat this instruction

for each offense, inserting the specific requirements for that offense.

If the prosecution alleges only one theory of liability, do not give this instruction. Give CALCRIM No. 450, *Liability of Corporate Officers and Agents: Single Theory of Liability*.

Give element 3A if the alleged offense requires knowledge or general criminal intent by the defendant. (See *Sea Horse Ranch, supra*, 24 Cal.App.4th at pp. 456–458; *People v. Epstein* (1931) 118 Cal.App. 7, 10 [4 P.2d 555].) Give element 3B if specific intent is required. If a strict-liability offense is alleged, give only elements 1 and 2. (See *People v. Matthews* (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1052, 1062 [9 Cal.Rptr.2d 348].)

For an example of how to complete this instruction, see the Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 450, *Liability of Corporate Officers and Agents: Single Theory of Liability*.

It is unclear if the court is required to instruct on unanimity. For a discussion of instructional requirements on unanimity, see CALCRIM No. 3500, *Unanimity*.

### AUTHORITY

- Liability of Corporate Officer or Agent. *Sea Horse Ranch, Inc. v. Superior Court* (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 446, 456–458 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 681]; see *People v. Matthews* (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1052, 1062 [9 Cal.Rptr.2d 348]; *Otis v. Superior Court* (1905) 148 Cal. 129, 131 [82 P. 853].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Introduction to Crimes, §§ 117–118.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 140, *Challenges to Crimes*, § 140.12 (Matthew Bender).

**452–459. Reserved for Future Use**



## E. ATTEMPT

### 460. Attempt Other Than Attempted Murder (Pen. Code, § 21a)

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[The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with attempted \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert target offense>*.]

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant took a direct but ineffective step toward committing \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert target offense>*;

AND

2. The defendant intended to commit \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert target offense>*.

A *direct step* requires more than merely planning or preparing to commit \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert target offense>* or obtaining or arranging for something needed to commit \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert target offense>*. A direct step is one that goes beyond planning or preparation and shows that a person is putting his or her plan into action. A direct step indicates a definite and unambiguous intent to commit \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert target offense>*. It is a direct movement towards the commission of the crime after preparations are made. It is an immediate step that puts the plan in motion so that the plan would have been completed if some circumstance outside the plan had not interrupted the attempt.

[A person who attempts to commit \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert target offense>* is guilty of attempted \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert target offense>* even if, after taking a direct step towards committing the crime, he or she abandoned further efforts to complete the crime or if his or her attempt failed or was interrupted by someone or something beyond his or her control. On the other hand, if a person freely and voluntarily abandons his or her plans before taking a direct step toward committing \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert target offense>*, then that person is not guilty of attempted \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert target offense>*.]

To decide whether the defendant intended to commit \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert target offense>*, please refer to the separate instructions that I (will give/have given) you on that crime.

[The defendant may be guilty of attempt even if you conclude that \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert target offense>* was actually completed.]

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## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the elements of the crime of attempt when charged, or, if not charged, when the evidence raises a question whether all the elements of the charged offense are present. (*See People v. Breverman* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 154 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094].)

If the jury is instructed on attempted criminal threat, give the following third element, as required by *People v. Chandler* (2014) 60 Cal.4th 508, 525 [176 Cal.Rptr.3d 548, 332 P.3d 538], along with CALCRIM No. 1300, *Criminal Threat*.

### **3. The intended criminal threat was sufficient under the circumstances to cause a reasonable person to be in sustained fear.**

If an attempted crime is charged, give the first bracketed paragraph and choose the phrase “this crime” in the opening line of the second paragraph. If an attempted crime is not charged but is a lesser included offense, omit the first bracketed paragraph and insert the attempted target offense in the opening line of the second paragraph.

Give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “A person who attempts to commit” if abandonment is an issue.

If the attempted crime is murder, do not give this instruction; instead give the specific instruction on attempted murder. (*People v. Santascoy* (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 909, 918 [200 Cal.Rptr. 709]; see CALCRIM No. 600, *Attempted Murder*.)

Do not give this instruction if the crime charged is assault. There can be no attempt to commit assault, since an assault is by definition an attempted battery. (*In re James M.* (1973) 9 Cal.3d 517, 522 [108 Cal.Rptr. 89, 510 P.2d 33].)

If instructing on attempt to escape, see *People v. Bailey* (2012) 54 Cal.4th 740, 748–752 [143 Cal.Rptr.3d 647, 279 P.3d 1120] [specific intent to escape and intent to avoid further confinement required].

## AUTHORITY

- Attempt Defined. Pen. Code, §§ 21a, 664; *People v. Toledo* (2001) 26 Cal.4th 221, 229–230 [109 Cal.Rptr.2d 315, 26 P.3d 1051].
- Conviction for Charged Attempt Even If Crime Is Completed. Pen. Code, § 663.

## RELATED ISSUES

### *Insufficient Evidence of Attempt*

The court is not required to instruct on attempt as a lesser-included offense unless there is sufficient evidence that the crime charged was not completed. (*People v. Aguilar* (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 1434, 1436 [263 Cal.Rptr. 314]; *People v. Llamas*



(1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1729, 1743–1744 [60 Cal.Rptr.2d 357]; *People v. Strunk* (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 265, 271–272 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 868].)

***Legal or Factual Impossibility***

Although legal impossibility is a defense to attempt, factual impossibility is not. (*People v. Cecil* (1982) 127 Cal.App.3d 769, 775–777 [179 Cal.Rptr. 736]; *People v. Meyer* (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 496, 504–505 [215 Cal.Rptr. 352].)

***Solicitation***

Some courts have concluded that a mere solicitation is not an attempt. (*People v. Adami* (1973) 36 Cal.App.3d 452, 457 [111 Cal.Rptr. 544]; *People v. La Fontaine* (1978) 79 Cal.App.3d 176, 183 [144 Cal.Rptr. 729], overruled on other grounds in *People v. Lopez* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 282, 292–293 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 195, 965 P.2d 713].) At least one court disagrees, stating that simply because “an invitation to participate in the defendant’s commission of a crime consists only of words does not mean it cannot constitute an ‘act’ toward the completion of the crime, particularly where the offense by its nature consists of or requires the requested type of participation.” (*People v. Herman* (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1369, 1387 [119 Cal.Rptr.2d 199] [attempted lewd acts on a child under Pen. Code, § 288(c)(1)]; see *People v. Delvalle* (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 869, 877 [31 Cal.Rptr.2d 725].)

***Specific Intent Crime***

An attempted offense is a specific intent crime, even if the underlying crime requires only general intent. (See *People v. Martinez* (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 938, 942 [165 Cal.Rptr. 11].) However, an attempt is not possible if the underlying crime can only be committed unintentionally. (See *People v. Johnson* (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1329, 1332 [59 Cal.Rptr.2d 798] [no attempted involuntary manslaughter].)

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Elements, §§ 56–71.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 141, *Conspiracy, Solicitation, and Attempt*, § 141.20 (Matthew Bender).

**461–499. Reserved for Future Use**



# HOMICIDE

## A. GENERAL PRINCIPLES

- 500. Homicide: General Principles
- 501–504. Reserved for Future Use

## B. JUSTIFICATIONS AND EXCUSES

- 505. Justifiable Homicide: Self-Defense or Defense of Another
- 506. Justifiable Homicide: Defending Against Harm to Person Within Home or on Property
- 507. Justifiable Homicide: By Peace Officer
- 508. Justifiable Homicide: Citizen Arrest (Non-Peace Officer)
- 509. Justifiable Homicide: Non-Peace Officer Preserving the Peace
- 510. Excusable Homicide: Accident
- 511. Excusable Homicide: Accident in the Heat of Passion
- 512. Presumption That Killing Not Criminal (Pen. Code, § 194)
- 513–519. Reserved for Future Use

## C. MURDER: FIRST AND SECOND DEGREE

- 520. First or Second Degree Murder With Malice Aforethought (Pen. Code, § 187)
- 521. First Degree Murder (Pen. Code, § 189)
- 522. Provocation: Effect on Degree of Murder
- 523. First Degree Murder: Hate Crime (Pen. Code, § 190.03)
- 524. Second Degree Murder: Peace Officer (Pen. Code, § 190(b), (c))
- 525. Second Degree Murder: Discharge From Motor Vehicle (Pen. Code, § 190(d))
- 526–540. Reserved for Future Use

## D. FELONY MURDER

Introduction to Felony-Murder Series

- 540A. Felony Murder: First Degree—Defendant Allegedly Committed Fatal Act (Pen. Code, § 189)
- 540B. Felony Murder: First Degree—Coparticipant Allegedly Committed Fatal Act (Pen. Code, § 189)
- 540C. Felony Murder: First Degree—Other Acts Allegedly Caused Death (Pen. Code, § 189)
- 541A. Felony Murder: Second Degree—Defendant Allegedly Committed Fatal Act
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643. Deliberations and Completion of Verdict Forms: For Use When Defendant Is Charged With Second Degree Murder and Jury Is Given Only One Not Guilty Verdict Form for Each Count; Not to Be Used When Both Voluntary and Involuntary Manslaughter Are Lesser Included Offenses

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- 737. Special Circumstances: Murder of Transportation Worker (Pen. Code, § 190.25)
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## **HOMICIDE**

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752–759. Reserved for Future Use

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760. Death Penalty: Introduction to Penalty Phase

761. Death Penalty: Duty of Jury

762. Reserved for Future Use

763. Death Penalty: Factors to Consider—Not Identified as Aggravating or Mitigating (Pen. Code, § 190.3)

764. Death Penalty: Evidence of Other Violent Crimes

765. Death Penalty: Conviction for Other Felony Crimes

766. Death Penalty: Weighing Process

767. Jurors' Responsibility During Deliberation in Death Penalty Case

768. Penalty Trial: Pre-Deliberation Instructions

769–774. Reserved for Future Use

775. Death Penalty: Mental Retardation (Pen. Code, § 1376)

776–799. Reserved for Future Use





## A. GENERAL PRINCIPLES

### 500. Homicide: General Principles

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**Homicide is the killing of one human being by another. (Murder/ [and] (Manslaughter/manslaughter)) (is/are) [a] type[s] of homicide. The defendant is charged with (murder/ [and] manslaughter). [Manslaughter is a lesser offense to murder.]**

**[A homicide can be lawful or unlawful. If a person kills with a legally valid excuse or justification, the killing is lawful and he or she has not committed a crime. If there is no legally valid excuse or justification, the killing is unlawful and, depending on the circumstances, the person is guilty of either murder or manslaughter. You must decide whether the killing in this case was unlawful and, if so, what specific crime was committed. I will now instruct you in more detail on what is a legally permissible excuse or justification for homicide.] [I will [also] instruct you on the different types of (murder/ [and] manslaughter).]**

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*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

This instruction should be given if there are multiple theories of homicide or evidence supporting justification or excuse, as a way of introducing the jury to the law of homicide.

If no homicide defense instructions are given, do not give the bracketed language in the second paragraph beginning “A homicide can be lawful . . . .” If no instructions will be given on offenses other than first degree murder, do not give the last bracketed sentence.

### AUTHORITY

- Homicide Defined. *People v. Antick* (1975) 15 Cal.3d 79, 87 [123 Cal.Rptr. 475, 539 P.2d 43].
- Justification or Excuse. Pen. Code, § 189.5; *People v. Frye* (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1148, 1154–1155 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 217], disapproved on other grounds in *People v. McCoy* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1123 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 188, 24 P.3d 1210].
- This Instruction Upheld. *People v. Genovese* (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 817, 832 [85 Cal.Rptr.3d 664].

### COMMENTARY

The committee decided that a short introduction on the law of homicide would help

the jury understand basic principles governing a complicated body of law. By giving the jury a simple framework, this instruction will help the jurors understand the rest of the instructions. Although “homicide” is a classic legal term, the committee decided to use the word because it appears to now be a part of lay vocabulary and therefore easily recognizable by jurors.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, §§ 96, 102–103.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, §§ 142.01, 142.02 (Matthew Bender).

**501–504. Reserved for Future Use**

## B. JUSTIFICATIONS AND EXCUSES

### 505. Justifiable Homicide: Self-Defense or Defense of Another

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The defendant is not guilty of (murder/ [or] manslaughter/ attempted murder/ [or] attempted voluntary manslaughter) if (he/she) was justified in (killing/attempting to kill) someone in (self-defense/ [or] defense of another). The defendant acted in lawful (self-defense/ [or] defense of another) if:

1. The defendant reasonably believed that (he/she/ [or] someone else/ [or] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name or description of third party>) was in imminent danger of being killed or suffering great bodily injury [or was in imminent danger of being (raped/maimed/robbed/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert other forcible and atrocious crime>)];
2. The defendant reasonably believed that the immediate use of deadly force was necessary to defend against that danger;

**AND**

3. The defendant used no more force than was reasonably necessary to defend against that danger.

Belief in future harm is not sufficient, no matter how great or how likely the harm is believed to be. The defendant must have believed there was imminent danger of death or great bodily injury to (himself/herself/ [or] someone else). Defendant's belief must have been reasonable and (he/she) must have acted only because of that belief. The defendant is only entitled to use that amount of force that a reasonable person would believe is necessary in the same situation. If the defendant used more force than was reasonable, the [attempted] killing was not justified.

When deciding whether the defendant's beliefs were reasonable, consider all the circumstances as they were known to and appeared to the defendant and consider what a reasonable person in a similar situation with similar knowledge would have believed. If the defendant's beliefs were reasonable, the danger does not need to have actually existed.

[The defendant's belief that (he/she/ [or] someone else) was threatened may be reasonable even if (he/she) relied on information that was not true. However, the defendant must actually and reasonably have believed that the information was true.]

[If you find that \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of decedent/victim> threatened or harmed the defendant [or others] in the past, you may consider that information in deciding whether the defendant's conduct and beliefs were reasonable.]

[If you find that the defendant knew that \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of decedent/victim> had threatened or harmed others in the past, you may consider that information in deciding whether the defendant’s conduct and beliefs were reasonable.]

[Someone who has been threatened or harmed by a person in the past, is justified in acting more quickly or taking greater self-defense measures against that person.]

[If you find that the defendant received a threat from someone else that (he/she) reasonably associated with \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of decedent/victim>, you may consider that threat in deciding whether the defendant was justified in acting in (self-defense/ [or] defense of another).]

[A defendant is not required to retreat. He or she is entitled to stand his or her ground and defend himself or herself and, if reasonably necessary, to pursue an assailant until the danger of (death/great bodily injury/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert forcible and atrocious crime>) has passed. This is so even if safety could have been achieved by retreating.]

[*Great bodily injury* means significant or substantial physical injury. It is an injury that is greater than minor or moderate harm.]

The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the [attempted] killing was not justified. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of (murder/ [or] manslaughter/ attempted murder/ [or] attempted voluntary manslaughter).

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2012, August 2012, September 2020*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on self-defense when “it appears that the defendant is relying on such a defense, or if there is substantial evidence supportive of such a defense and the defense is not inconsistent with the defendant’s theory of the case.” (*People v. Breverman* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 157 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094] [addressing duty to instruct on voluntary manslaughter as lesser included offense, but also discussing duty to instruct on defenses generally]; see also *People v. Lemus* (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 470, 478 [249 Cal.Rptr. 897] [if substantial evidence of self-defense exists, court must instruct sua sponte and let jury decide credibility of witnesses].)

If there is substantial evidence of self-defense that is inconsistent with the defendant’s testimony, the court must ascertain whether the defendant wants an instruction on self-defense. (*People v. Breverman, supra*, 19 Cal.4th at p. 156.) The

court is then required to give the instruction if the defendant so requests. (*People v. Elize* (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 605, 611–615 [84 Cal.Rptr.2d 35].)

On defense request and when supported by sufficient evidence, the court must instruct that the jury may consider the effect of “antecedent threats and assaults against the defendant on the reasonableness of defendant’s conduct.” (*People v. Garvin* (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 484, 488 [1 Cal.Rptr.3d 774].) The court must also instruct that the jury may consider previous threats or assaults by the aggressor against someone else or threats received by the defendant from a third party that the defendant reasonably associated with the aggressor. (See *People v. Pena* (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 462, 475 [198 Cal.Rptr. 819]; *People v. Minifie* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1055, 1065, 1068 [56 Cal.Rptr.2d 133, 920 P.2d 1337].)

Forcible and atrocious crimes are generally those crimes whose character and manner reasonably create a fear of death or serious bodily harm. (*People v. Ceballos* (1974) 12 Cal.3d 470, 479 [116 Cal.Rptr. 233, 526 P.2d 241].) The following crimes have been deemed forcible and atrocious as a matter of law: murder, mayhem, rape, and robbery. (*Id.* at p. 478.) If the defendant is asserting that he or she was resisting the commission of one of these felonies or another specific felony, the court should include the bracketed language at the end of element 1 and select “raped,” “maimed,” or “robbed,” or insert another appropriate forcible and atrocious crime. In all other cases involving death or great bodily injury, the court should use element 1 without the bracketed language.

The second sentence of the great bodily injury definition could result in error if the prosecution improperly argues great bodily injury may be shown by greater than minor injury alone. (Compare *People v. Medellin* (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 519, 533–535 [258 Cal.Rptr.3d 867] [the definition was reasonably susceptible to prosecutor’s erroneous argument that the injury need only be greater than minor] with *People v. Quinonez* (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 457, 466 [260 Cal.Rptr.3d 86] [upholding instructions containing great bodily injury definition as written].)

### ***Related Instructions***

CALCRIM Nos. 506–511, Justifiable and Excusable Homicides.

CALCRIM Nos. 3470–3477, Defense Instructions: Defense of Self, Another, Property.

CALCRIM No. 571, *Voluntary Manslaughter: Imperfect Self-Defense or Imperfect Defense of Another—Lesser Included Offense.*

## **AUTHORITY**

- Justifiable Homicide. Pen. Code, §§ 197–199.
- Fear. Pen. Code, § 198.
- Lawful Resistance. Pen. Code, §§ 692–694.
- Burden of Proof. Pen. Code, § 189.5; *People v. Banks* (1976) 67 Cal.App.3d 379, 383–384 [137 Cal.Rptr. 652].

- Elements. *People v. Humphrey* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073, 1082 [56 Cal.Rptr.2d 142, 921 P.2d 1].
- Forcible and Atrocious Crimes. *People v. Ceballos* (1974) 12 Cal.3d 470, 478–479 [116 Cal.Rptr. 233, 526 P.2d 241].
- Imminence. *People v. Aris* (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1178, 1187 [264 Cal.Rptr. 167], overruled on other grounds in *People v. Humphrey* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073, 1089 [56 Cal.Rptr.2d 142].
- No Duty to Retreat. *People v. Hughes* (1951) 107 Cal.App.2d 487, 493 [237 P.2d 64]; *People v. Hatchett* (1942) 56 Cal.App.2d 20, 22 [132 P.2d 51].
- Reasonable Belief. *People v. Humphrey* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073, 1082 [56 Cal.Rptr.2d 142, 921 P.2d 1]; *People v. Clark* (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 371, 377 [181 Cal.Rptr. 682].
- Must Act Under Influence of Fear Alone. Pen. Code, § 198.
- This Instruction Upheld. *People v. Lopez* (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1297, 1306 [132 Cal.Rptr.3d 248]; *People v. Genovese* (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 817, 832 [85 Cal.Rptr.3d 664].

### COMMENTARY

Penal Code section 197, subdivision 1 provides that self-defense may be used in response to threats of death or great bodily injury, or to resist the commission of a felony. (Pen. Code, § 197, subd. 1.) However, in *People v. Ceballos* (1974) 12 Cal.3d 470, 477–479 [116 Cal.Rptr. 233, 526 P.2d 241], the court held that although the latter part of section 197 appears to apply when a person resists the commission of any felony, it should be read in light of common law principles that require the felony to be “some atrocious crime attempted to be committed by force.” (*Id.* at p. 478.) This instruction is therefore written to provide that self-defense may be used in response to threats of great bodily injury or death or to resist the commission of forcible and atrocious crimes.

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Imperfect Self-Defense*

Most courts hold that an instruction on imperfect self-defense is required in every case in which a court instructs on perfect self-defense. If there is substantial evidence of a defendant’s belief in the need for self-defense, there will *always* be substantial evidence to support an imperfect self-defense instruction because the reasonableness of that belief will always be at issue. (*People v. Ceja* (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 78, 85–86 [31 Cal.Rptr.2d 475], overruled on other grounds in *People v. Blakeley* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 82, 91 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 451, 999 P.2d 675]; *People v. De Leon* (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 815, 824 [12 Cal.Rptr.2d 825].) The court in *People v. Rodriguez* disagreed, however, and found that an imperfect self-defense instruction was not required sua sponte on the facts of the case where defendant’s version of the crime “could only lead to an acquittal based on justifiable homicide,” and when the prosecutor’s version could only lead to a conviction of first degree

murder. (*People v. Rodriguez* (1992) 53 Cal.App.4th 1250, 1275 [62 Cal.Rptr.2d 345]; see also *People v. Williams* (1997) 4 Cal.4th 354, 362 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 441, 841 P.2d 961] [in rape prosecution, no mistake-of-fact instruction was required when two sides gave wholly divergent accounts with no middle ground to support a mistake-of-fact instruction].)

### ***No Defense for Initial Aggressor***

An aggressor whose victim fights back in self-defense may not invoke the doctrine of self-defense against the victim's legally justified acts. (*In re Christian S.* (1994) 7 Cal.4th 768, 773, fn. 1 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 33, 872 P.2d 574].) If the aggressor attempts to break off the fight and communicates this to the victim, but the victim continues to attack, the aggressor may use self-defense against the victim to the same extent as if he or she had not been the initial aggressor. (Pen. Code, § 197, subd. 3; *People v. Trevino* (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 874, 879 [246 Cal.Rptr. 357]; see CALCRIM No. 3471, *Right to Self-Defense: Mutual Combat or Initial Aggressor*.) In addition, if the victim responds with a sudden escalation of force, the aggressor may legally defend against the use of force. (*People v. Quach* (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 294, 301–302 [10 Cal.Rptr.3d 196]; see CALCRIM No. 3471, *Right to Self-Defense: Mutual Combat or Initial Aggressor*.)

### ***Transferred Intent Applies***

“[T]he doctrine of self-defense is available to insulate one from criminal responsibility where his act, justifiably in self-defense, inadvertently results in the injury of an innocent bystander.” (*People v. Mathews* (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 1018, 1024 [154 Cal.Rptr. 628]; see also *People v. Curtis* (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1357 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d 304].) There is no sua sponte duty to instruct on this principle, although such an instruction must be given on request when substantial evidence supports it. (*People v. Mathews, supra*, 91 Cal.App.3d at p. 1025; see also CALCRIM No. 562, *Transferred Intent*.)

### ***Definition of “Imminent”***

In *People v. Aris* (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1178, 1187 [264 Cal.Rptr. 167], overruled on other grounds in *People v. Humphrey* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073, 1089 [56 Cal.Rptr.2d 142, 921 P.2d 1], the jury requested clarification of the term “imminent.” In response, the trial court instructed:

“Imminent peril,” as used in these instructions, means that the peril must have existed or appeared to the defendant to have existed at the very time the fatal shot was fired. In other words, the peril must appear to the defendant as immediate and present and not prospective or even in the near future. An imminent peril is one that, from appearances, must be instantly dealt with.

(*Ibid.*)

The Court of Appeal agreed with this definition of “imminent.” (*Id.* at pp. 1187–1190 [citing *People v. Scoggins* (1869) 37 Cal. 676, 683–684].)

***Reasonable Person Standard Not Modified by Evidence of Mental Impairment***

In *People v. Jefferson* (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 508, 519 [14 Cal.Rptr.3d 473], the court rejected the argument that the reasonable person standard for self-defense should be the standard of a mentally ill person like the defendant. “The common law does not take account of a person’s mental capacity when determining whether he has acted as the reasonable person would have acted. The law holds ‘the mentally deranged or insane defendant accountable for his negligence as if the person were a normal, prudent person.’ (Prosser & Keeton, *Torts* (5th ed. 1984) § 32, p. 177.)” (*Ibid.*; see also Rest.2d *Torts*, § 283B.)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Defenses, §§ 67–85.

3 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 73, *Defenses and Justifications*, §§ 73.11, 73.12 (Matthew Bender).

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.04[1][c] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.01[1][b] (Matthew Bender).



## 506. Justifiable Homicide: Defending Against Harm to Person Within Home or on Property

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The defendant is not guilty of (murder/ [or] manslaughter/ attempted murder/ [or] attempted voluntary manslaughter) if (he/she) (killed/attempted to kill) to defend (himself/herself) [or any other person] in the defendant's home. Such (a/an) [attempted] killing is justified, and therefore not unlawful, if:

1. The defendant reasonably believed that (he/she) was defending a home against \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of decedent>, who (intended to or tried to commit \_\_\_\_\_ <insert forcible and atrocious crime> / [or] violently[,], [or] riotously[,], [or] tumultuously) tried to enter that home intending to commit an act of violence against someone inside);
2. The defendant reasonably believed that the danger was imminent;
3. The defendant reasonably believed that the use of deadly force was necessary to defend against the danger;

AND

4. The defendant used no more force than was reasonably necessary to defend against the danger.

Belief in future harm is not sufficient, no matter how great or how likely the harm is believed to be. The defendant must have believed there was imminent danger of violence to (himself/herself/ [or] someone else). Defendant's belief must have been reasonable and (he/she) must have acted only because of that belief. The defendant is only entitled to use that amount of force that a reasonable person would believe is necessary in the same situation. If the defendant used more force than was reasonable, then the [attempted] killing was not justified.

When deciding whether the defendant's beliefs were reasonable, consider all the circumstances as they were known to and appeared to the defendant and consider what a reasonable person in a similar situation with similar knowledge would have believed. If the defendant's beliefs were reasonable, the danger does not need to have actually existed.

[A defendant is not required to retreat. He or she is entitled to stand his or her ground and defend himself or herself and, if reasonably necessary, to pursue an assailant until the danger of (death/bodily injury/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert forcible and atrocious crime>) has passed. This is so even if safety could have been achieved by retreating.]

The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the [attempted] killing was not justified. If the People have not met this

**burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of [attempted] (murder/ [or] manslaughter).**

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*New January 2006*

**BENCH NOTES*****Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give defense instructions supported by substantial evidence and not inconsistent with the defendant's theory of the case. (See *People v. Baker* (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 243, 252 [87 Cal.Rptr.2d 803]; *People v. Barton* (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 195 [47 Cal.Rptr.2d 569, 906 P.2d 531]; *People v. Slater* (1943) 60 Cal.App.2d 358, 367–368 [140 P.2d 846] [error to refuse instruction based on Pen. Code, § 197, subd. 2 when substantial evidence supported inference that victim intended to enter the habitation].)

Penal Code section 197, subdivision 2 provides that “defense of habitation” may be used to resist someone who “intends or endeavors, by violence or surprise, to commit a felony . . . .” (Pen. Code, § 197, subd. 2.) However, in *People v. Ceballos* (1974) 12 Cal.3d 470, 477–479 [116 Cal.Rptr. 233, 526 P.2d 241], the court held that the felony feared must be “some atrocious crime attempted to be committed by force.” (*Id.* at p. 478.) Forcible and atrocious crimes are those crimes whose character and manner reasonably create a fear of death or serious bodily harm. (*People v. Ceballos, supra*, 12 Cal.3d at p. 479.) The following crimes have been deemed forcible and atrocious as a matter of law: murder, mayhem, rape, and robbery. (*Id.* at p. 478.) *Ceballos* specifically held that burglaries which “do not reasonably create a fear of great bodily harm” are not sufficient “cause for exaction of human life.” (*Id.* at p. 479.) Thus, although the statute refers to “defense of habitation,” *Ceballos* requires that a person be at risk of great bodily harm or an atrocious felony in order to justify homicide. (*Ibid.*) The instruction has been drafted accordingly.

If the defendant is asserting that he or she was resisting the commission of a forcible and atrocious crime, give the first option in element 1 and insert the name of the crime. If there is substantial evidence that the defendant was resisting a violent entry into a residence for the general purpose of committing violence against someone inside, give the second option in element 1. (See Pen. Code, § 197, subd. 2.) The court may give the bracketed words “riotously” and “tumultuously” at its discretion.

***Related Instructions***

CALCRIM No. 3477, *Presumption That Resident Was Reasonably Afraid of Death or Great Bodily Injury*.

**AUTHORITY**

- Instructional Requirements. Pen. Code, § 197, subd. 2.
- Actual and Reasonable Fear. See Pen. Code, § 198; see *People v. Curtis* (1994)

30 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1361 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d 304].

- Burden of Proof. Pen. Code, § 189.5.
- Fear of Imminent Harm. *People v. Humphrey* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073, 1082 [56 Cal.Rptr.2d 146, 921 P.2d 1]; *People v. Lucas* (1958) 160 Cal.App.2d 305, 310 [324 P.2d 933].
- Forcible and Atrocious Crimes. *People v. Ceballos* (1974) 12 Cal.3d 470, 478–479 [116 Cal.Rptr. 233, 526 P.2d 241].
- No Duty to Retreat. *People v. Hughes* (1951) 107 Cal.App.2d 487, 493 [237 P.2d 64]; *People v. Hatchett* (1942) 56 Cal.App.2d 20, 22 [132 P.2d 51].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Defenses, § 88.

3 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 73, *Defenses and Justifications*, § 73.13 (Matthew Bender).

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.04[1][c] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.01[1][b] (Matthew Bender).

## 507. Justifiable Homicide: By Peace Officer

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The defendant is not guilty of (murder/ [or] manslaughter/attempted murder/ [or] attempted voluntary manslaughter) if (he/she) (killed/attempted to kill) someone while (acting as a peace officer/obeying a peace officer's command for aid and assistance). (A/An) [attempted] killing is justified, and therefore not unlawful, if:

1. The defendant was (a peace officer/obeying a peace officer's command for aid and assistance);

AND

2. The [attempted] killing was committed while the defendant either:
  - A. Reasonably believed, based on the totality of the circumstances, that the force was necessary to defend against an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury to the defendant or another person;

OR

- B. Reasonably believed, based on the totality of the circumstances, that:
  - B1. \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of fleeing felon> was fleeing;
  - B2. The force was necessary to arrest or detain \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of fleeing felon> for the crime of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of felony>;
  - B3. The commission of the crime of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of felony> created a risk of or resulted in death or serious bodily injury to another person;

AND

- B4. <insert name of fleeing felon> would cause death or serious bodily injury to another person unless immediately arrested or detained.

[A *serious bodily injury* means a serious impairment of physical condition. Such an injury may include[, but is not limited to]: (loss of consciousness/ concussion/ bone fracture/ protracted loss or impairment of function of any bodily member or organ/ a wound requiring extensive suturing/ [and] serious disfigurement).]

[A threat of death or serious bodily injury is *imminent* when, based on the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable officer in the same situation would believe that a person has the present ability, opportunity,

and apparent intent to immediately cause death or serious bodily injury to the peace officer or to another person. An imminent harm is not merely a fear of future harm, no matter how great the fear and no matter how great the likelihood of the harm, but is one that, from appearances, must be instantly confronted and addressed.]

[*Totality of the circumstances* means all facts known to the defendant at the time, including the conduct of the defendant and \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of decedent> leading up to the use of deadly force.]

[In considering the totality of circumstances, you may consider whether:

- [• Prior to the use of force, the defendant [identified] [or] [attempted to identify] him or herself as a peace officer and [warned] [or] [attempted to warn] that deadly force may be used(;/.)]
- [• Prior to the use of force, the defendant had objectively reasonable grounds to believe the person was aware that the defendant was a peace officer and that deadly force may be used(;/.)]
- [• The defendant was able, under the circumstances, [[to [identify] [or] [attempt to identify]] him or herself as a peace officer] [and] [to [warn] [or] [attempt to warn] that deadly force may be used].]

[A peace officer who makes or attempts to make an arrest need not retreat or stop because the person being arrested is resisting or threatening to resist. A peace officer does not lose (his/her) right to self-defense by using objectively reasonable force to arrest or to prevent escape or to overcome resistance.]

[A person who is employed as a police officer by \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of agency that employs police officer> is a *peace officer*.]

[A person employed by \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of agency that employs peace officer, e.g., “the Department of Fish and Wildlife”> is a *peace officer* if \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of facts necessary to make employee a peace officer, e.g., “designated by the director of the agency as a peace officer”>.]

The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the [attempted] killing was not justified. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of [attempted] (murder/ [or] manslaughter).

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*New January 2006; Revised April 2011, February 2012, August 2012, April 2020*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on justifiable homicide when “it appears that the defendant is relying on such a defense, or if there is substantial evidence supportive of such a defense and the defense is not inconsistent with the defendant’s theory of the case.” (See *People v. Breverman* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 156 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094] [addressing sua sponte duty to instruct on self-defense].)

Penal Code sections 196 and 835a, as amended by Statutes 2019, ch.170 (A.B. 392), became effective on January 1, 2020. If the defendant’s act occurred before this date, the court should give the prior version of this instruction.

The jury must determine whether the defendant was a peace officer. (*People v. Brown* (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 444–445 [250 Cal.Rptr. 604, 758 P.2d 1135].) The court may instruct the jury in the appropriate definition of “peace officer” from the statute (e.g., “a Garden Grove Regular Police Officer and a Garden Grove Reserve Police Officer are peace officers”). (*Ibid.*) However, the court may not instruct the jury that the defendant was a peace officer as a matter of law (e.g., “Officer Reed was a peace officer”). (*Ibid.*) If the defendant is a police officer, give the bracketed sentence that begins with “A person employed as a police officer.” If the defendant is another type of peace officer, give the bracketed sentence that begins with “A person employed by.”

### *Related Instructions*

CALCRIM No. 508, *Justifiable Homicide: Citizen Arrest (Non-Peace Officer)*.

CALCRIM No. 509, *Justifiable Homicide: Non-Peace Officer Preserving the Peace*.

## AUTHORITY

- Justifiable Homicide by Peace Officer. Pen. Code, §§ 196, 199, 835a.
- Burden of Proof. Pen. Code, § 189.5; *People v. Frye* (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1148, 1154–1155 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 217]; *People v. Banks* (1976) 67 Cal.App.3d 379, 383–384 [137 Cal.Rptr. 652].
- Peace Officer Defined. Pen. Code, § 830 et seq.
- Serious Bodily Injury Defined. Pen. Code, § 243(f)(4); *People v. Taylor* (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 11, 25, fn. 4 [12 Cal.Rptr.3d 693].

## SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Defenses, § 95.

3 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 73, *Defenses and Justifications*, § 73.15[1] (Matthew Bender).

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.04[1][c] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes*

*Against the Person*, § 142.01[1][b] (Matthew Bender).

## 508. Justifiable Homicide: Citizen Arrest (Non-Peace Officer)

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The defendant is not guilty of (murder/ [or] manslaughter/ attempted murder/ [or] attempted voluntary manslaughter) if (he/she) (killed/attempted to kill) someone while trying to arrest him or her for a violent felony. Such (a/an) [attempted] killing is justified, and therefore not unlawful, if:

1. The defendant committed the [attempted] killing while lawfully trying to arrest or detain \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of decedent> for committing (the crime of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert forcible and atrocious crime, i.e., felony that threatened death or great bodily injury>/\_\_\_\_\_ <insert crime decedent was suspected of committing, e.g., burglary>), and that crime threatened the defendant or others with death or great bodily injury);
2. \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of decedent> actually committed (the crime of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert forcible and atrocious crime, i.e., felony that threatened death or great bodily injury>/\_\_\_\_\_ <insert crime decedent was suspected of committing, e.g., burglary>), and that crime threatened the defendant or others with death or great bodily injury);
3. The defendant had reason to believe that \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of decedent> had committed (the crime of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert forcible and atrocious crime, i.e., felony that threatened death or great bodily injury>/\_\_\_\_\_ <insert crime decedent was suspected of committing, e.g., burglary>), and that crime threatened the defendant or others with death or great bodily injury);
4. The defendant had reason to believe that \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of decedent> posed a threat of death or great bodily injury, either to the defendant or to others];

AND

5. The [attempted] killing was necessary to prevent \_\_\_\_\_'s <insert name of decedent> escape.

A person has *reason to believe* that someone [poses a threat of death or great bodily injury or] committed (the crime of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert forcible and atrocious crime, i.e., felony that threatened death or great bodily injury> /\_\_\_\_\_ <insert crime decedent was suspected of committing, e.g., burglary>), and that crime threatened the defendant or others with death or great bodily injury) when facts known to the person would persuade someone of reasonable caution to have (that/those) belief[s].

*Great bodily injury* means significant or substantial physical injury. It is



**an injury that is greater than minor or moderate harm.**

**The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the [attempted] killing was not justified. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of [attempted] (murder/ [or] manslaughter).**

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*New January 2006; Revised April 2011, February 2012, September 2020*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on justifiable homicide when “it appears that the defendant is relying on such a defense, or if there is substantial evidence supportive of such a defense and the defense is not inconsistent with the defendant’s theory of the case.” (See *People v. Breverman* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 156 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094] [addressing sua sponte duty to instruct on self-defense].)

It is unclear whether the defendant must always have probable cause to believe that the victim poses a threat of future harm or if it is sufficient if the defendant knows that the victim committed a forcible and atrocious crime. In *Tennessee v. Garner* (1985) 471 U.S. 1, 3, 11 [105 S.Ct. 1694, 85 L.Ed.2d 1], the Supreme Court held that, under the Fourth Amendment, deadly force may not be used by a law enforcement officer to prevent the escape of an apparently unarmed suspected felon unless it is necessary to prevent the escape and the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others. “*Garner* necessarily limits the scope of justification for homicide under section 197, subdivision 4, and other similar statutes from the date of that decision.” (*People v. Martin* (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 1111, 1124 [214 Cal.Rptr. 873].) In a footnote, *Garner, supra*, 471 U.S. 1, 16, fn. 15, noted that California law permits a killing in either situation, that is either when the suspect has committed an atrocious crime or when the suspect poses a threat of future harm. (See also *Long Beach Police Officers Assn v. City of Long Beach* (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 364, 371–375 [132 Cal.Rptr. 348] [also stating the rule as “either” but quoting police regulations, which require that the officer always believe there is a risk of future harm].) The committee has provided both options. See *People v. Ceballos* (1974) 12 Cal.3d 470, 478–479 [116 Cal.Rptr. 233, 526 P.2d 241]. The court should review relevant case law before giving bracketed element 4.

The second sentence of the great bodily injury definition could result in error if the prosecution improperly argues great bodily injury may be shown by greater than minor injury alone. (Compare *People v. Medellin* (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 519, 533–535 [258 Cal.Rptr.3d 867] [the definition was reasonably susceptible to prosecutor’s erroneous argument that the injury need only be greater than minor]

with *People v. Quinonez* (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 457, 466 [260 Cal.Rptr.3d 86] [upholding instructions containing great bodily injury definition as written].)

***Related Instructions***

CALCRIM No. 507, *Justifiable Homicide: By Public Officer*.

CALCRIM No. 509, *Justifiable Homicide: Non-Peace Officer Preserving the Peace*.

**AUTHORITY**

- Justifiable Homicide to Preserve the Peace. Pen. Code, §§ 197, subd. 4, 199.
- Lawful Resistance to Commission of Offense. Pen. Code, §§ 692–694.
- Private Persons, Authority to Arrest. Pen. Code, § 837.
- Burden of Proof. Pen. Code, § 189.5; *People v. Frye* (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1148, 1154–1155 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 217].
- Felony Must Threaten Death or Great Bodily Injury. *People v. Piorkowski* (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 324, 328–329 [115 Cal.Rptr. 830].

**RELATED ISSUES**

***Felony Must Actually Be Committed***

A private citizen may use deadly force to apprehend a fleeing felon only if the suspect in fact committed the felony and the person using deadly force had reasonable cause to believe so. (*People v. Lillard* (1912) 18 Cal.App. 343, 345 [123 P. 221].)

***Felony Committed Must Threaten Death or Great Bodily Injury***

Deadly force is permissible to apprehend a felon if “the felony committed is one which threatens death or great bodily injury . . .” (*People v. Piorkowski* (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 324, 328–329 [115 Cal.Rptr. 830]).

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Defenses, §§ 90–96.

3 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 73, *Defenses and Justifications*, § 73.15[1], [3] (Matthew Bender).

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.04[1][c] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.01[1][b] (Matthew Bender).

## 509. Justifiable Homicide: Non-Peace Officer Preserving the Peace

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The defendant is not guilty of (murder/ [or] manslaughter/ attempted murder/ [or] attempted voluntary manslaughter) if (he/she) (killed/attempted to kill) someone while preserving the peace. Such (a/an) [attempted] killing is justified, and therefore not unlawful, if:

1. The defendant committed the [attempted] killing while lawfully (suppressing a riot/keeping and preserving the peace);
2. The defendant had probable cause to believe that \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of decedent> posed a threat of serious physical harm, either to the defendant or someone else;

AND

3. The [attempted] killing was necessary to lawfully (suppress a riot/ keep and preserve the peace).

A person has *probable cause* to believe that someone poses a threat of serious physical harm when facts known to the person would persuade someone of reasonable caution that the other person is going to cause serious physical harm to another.

[A *riot* occurs when two or more people, acting together and without legal authority, disturb the public peace by use of force or violence or by threat to use force or violence with the immediate ability to carry out those threats.]

[A disturbance of the public peace may happen in any place of confinement. \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of detention facility> is a place of confinement.]

The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the [attempted] killing was not justified. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of [attempted] (murder/ [or] manslaughter).

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*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on justifiable homicide when “it appears that the defendant is relying on such a defense, or if there is substantial evidence supportive of such a defense and the defense is not inconsistent with the defendant’s theory of the case.” (See *People v. Breverman* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 156 [77

Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094] [addressing sua sponte duty to instruct on self-defense].)

### ***Related Instructions***

CALCRIM No. 507, *Justifiable Homicide: By Public Officer*.

CALCRIM No. 508, *Justifiable Homicide: Citizen Arrest (Non-Peace Officer)*.

## **AUTHORITY**

- Justifiable Homicide to Preserve the Peace. Pen. Code, §§ 197, subd. 4, 199.
- Lawful Resistance to the Commission of an Offense. Pen. Code, §§ 692–694.
- Riot Defined. Pen. Code, § 404(a).
- Burden of Proof. Pen. Code, § 189.5; *People v. Frye* (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1148, 1154–1155 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 217].

## **RELATED ISSUES**

### ***Person Using Force Must Fear Imminent Death or Bodily Injury***

“Deadly force may not be used to prevent the escape of an apparently unarmed suspected felon unless it is necessary to prevent the escape and the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others.” (*Tennessee v. Garner* (1985) 471 U.S. 1, 3, 11 [105 S.Ct. 1694, 85 L.Ed.2d 1].) “*Garner* necessarily limits the scope of justification for homicide under section 197, subdivision 4, and other similar statutes from the date of that decision.” (*People v. Martin* (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 1111, 1124 [214 Cal.Rptr. 873].)

## **SECONDARY SOURCES**

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Defenses, §§ 90–66.

3 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 73, *Defenses and Justifications*, § 73.14 (Matthew Bender).

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.04[1][c] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.01[1][b] (Matthew Bender).

## 510. Excusable Homicide: Accident

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The defendant is not guilty of (murder/ [or] manslaughter) if (he/she) killed someone as a result of accident or misfortune. Such a killing is excused, and therefore not unlawful, if:

1. The defendant was doing a lawful act in a lawful way;
2. The defendant was acting with usual and ordinary caution;

AND

3. The defendant was acting without any unlawful intent.

A person acts with *usual and ordinary caution* if he or she acts in a way that a reasonably careful person would act in the same or similar situation.

The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was not excused. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of (murder/ [or] manslaughter).

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2012*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has no **sua sponte** duty to instruct on accident. (*People v. Anderson* (2011) 51 Cal.4th 989, 997–998 [125 Cal.Rptr.3d 408, 252 P.3d 968].)

When this instruction is given, it should always be given in conjunction with CALCRIM No. 581, *Involuntary Manslaughter: Murder Not Charged* or CALCRIM No. 580, *Involuntary Manslaughter: Lesser Included Offense*, unless vehicular manslaughter with ordinary negligence is charged. (*People v. Velez* (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 558, 566–568 [192 Cal.Rptr. 686].) A lawful act can be the basis of involuntary manslaughter, but only if that act is committed with *criminal* negligence (“in an unlawful manner or without due caution and circumspection”). (Pen. Code, § 192(b).) The level of negligence described in this instruction, 510, is *ordinary* negligence. While proof of ordinary negligence is sufficient to prevent a killing from being excused under Penal Code section 195, subd. 1, proof of ordinary negligence is not sufficient to find a defendant guilty of involuntary manslaughter under Penal Code section 192(b). (*People v. Penny* (1955) 44 Cal.2d 861, 879–880 [285 P.2d 926].)

#### *Related Instructions*

CALCRIM No. 3404, *Accident*.

### AUTHORITY

- Excusable Homicide If Committed by Lawful Act. Pen. Code, § 195, subd. 1.

- Burden of Proof. Pen. Code, § 189.5; *People v. Frye* (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1148, 1154–1155 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 217].
- Instructing With Involuntary Manslaughter. *People v. Velez* (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 558, 566–568 [192 Cal.Rptr. 686].
- Misfortune as Accident. *People v. Gorgol* (1953) 122 Cal.App.2d 281, 308 [265 P.2d 69].

## RELATED ISSUES

### *Traditional Self-Defense*

In *People v. Curtis* (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1358–1359 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d 304], the court held that the claim that a killing was accidental bars the defendant from relying on traditional self-defense not only as a defense, but also to negate implied malice. However, in *People v. Elize* (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 605, 610–616 [84 Cal.Rptr.2d 35], the court reached the opposite conclusion, holding that the trial court erred in refusing to give self-defense instructions where the defendant testified that the gun discharged accidentally. *Elize* relies on two Supreme Court opinions, *People v. Barton* (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186 [47 Cal.Rptr.2d 569, 906 P.2d 531], and *People v. Breverman* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094]. Because *Curtis* predates these opinions, *Elize* appears to be the more persuasive authority.

## SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Defenses, § 274.

3 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 73, *Defenses and Justifications*, §§ 73.01[5], 73.16 (Matthew Bender).

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.04[1][c] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.01[1][b] (Matthew Bender).

## 511. Excusable Homicide: Accident in the Heat of Passion

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The defendant is not guilty of (murder/ [or] manslaughter) if (he/she) killed someone by accident while acting in the heat of passion. Such a killing is excused, and therefore not unlawful, if, at the time of the killing:

1. The defendant acted in the heat of passion;
2. The defendant was (suddenly provoked by \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of decedent>/ [or] suddenly drawn into combat by \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of decedent>);
3. The defendant did not take undue advantage of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of decedent>;
4. The defendant did not use a dangerous weapon;
5. The defendant did not kill \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of decedent> in a cruel or unusual way;
6. The defendant did not intend to kill \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of decedent> and did not act with conscious disregard of the danger to human life;

**AND**

7. The defendant did not act with criminal negligence.

A person acts *in the heat of passion* when he or she is provoked into doing a rash act under the influence of intense emotion that obscures his or her reasoning or judgment. The provocation must be sufficient to have caused a person of average disposition to act rashly and without due deliberation, that is, from passion rather than from judgment.

Heat of passion does not require anger, rage, or any specific emotion. It can be any violent or intense emotion that causes a person to act without due deliberation and reflection.

In order for the killing to be excused on this basis, the defendant must have acted under the direct and immediate influence of provocation as I have defined it. While no specific type of provocation is required, slight or remote provocation is not sufficient. Sufficient provocation may occur over a short or long period of time.

It is not enough that the defendant simply was provoked. The defendant is not allowed to set up (his/her) own standard of conduct. You must decide whether the defendant was provoked and whether the provocation was sufficient. In deciding whether the provocation was sufficient, consider whether a person of average disposition, in the same situation

and knowing the same facts, would have reacted from passion rather than judgment.

[A *dangerous weapon* is any object, instrument, or weapon [that is inherently deadly or dangerous or one] that is used in such a way that it is capable of causing and likely to cause death or great bodily injury.]

[An object is *inherently deadly* if it is deadly or dangerous in the ordinary use for which it was designed.]

[*Great bodily injury* means significant or substantial physical injury. It is an injury that is greater than minor or moderate harm.]

*Criminal negligence* involves more than ordinary carelessness, inattention, or mistake in judgment. A person acts with *criminal negligence* when:

1. He or she acts in a way that creates a high risk of death or great bodily injury;

AND

2. A reasonable person would have known that acting in that way would create such a risk.

In other words, a person acts with criminal negligence when the way he or she acts is so different from how an ordinarily careful person would act in the same situation that his or her act amounts to disregard for human life or indifference to the consequences of that act.

The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was not excused. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of (murder/ [or] manslaughter).

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*New January 2006; Revised April 2011, September 2019, September 2020*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The trial court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on accident and heat of passion that excuses homicide when there is evidence supporting the defense. (*People v. Hampton* (1929) 96 Cal.App. 157, 159–160 [273 P. 854] [court erred in refusing defendant’s requested instruction].)

Give the bracketed phrase “that is inherently deadly or one” and give the bracketed definition of *inherently deadly* only if the object is a deadly weapon as a matter of law. (*People v. Stutelberg* (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 314, 317–318 [240 Cal.Rptr.3d 156].)

The second sentence of the great bodily injury definition could result in error if the prosecution improperly argues great bodily injury may be shown by greater than



minor injury alone. (Compare *People v. Medellin* (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 519, 533–535 [258 Cal.Rptr.3d 867] [the definition was reasonably susceptible to prosecutor’s erroneous argument that the injury need only be greater than minor] with *People v. Quinonez* (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 457, 466 [260 Cal.Rptr.3d 86] [upholding instructions containing great bodily injury definition as written].)

### ***Related Instructions***

CALCRIM No. 510, *Excusable Homicide: Accident*.

CALCRIM No. 3471, *Right to Self-Defense: Mutual Combat or Initial Aggressor*.

CALCRIM No. 570, *Voluntary Manslaughter: Heat of Passion—Lesser Included Offense*.

## **AUTHORITY**

- Excusable Homicide if Committed in Heat of Passion. Pen. Code, § 195, subd. 2.
- Burden of Proof. Pen. Code, § 189.5; *People v. Frye* (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1148, 1154–1155 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 217].
- Deadly Weapon Defined. See *People v. Aguilar* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1023, 1028–1029 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 655, 945 P.2d 1204].
- Inherently Deadly Defined. *People v. Perez* (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1055, 1065 [232 Cal.Rptr.3d 51, 416 P.3d 42]; *People v. Aguilar* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1023, 1028–1029 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 655, 945 P.2d 1204].

## **RELATED ISSUES**

### ***Distinguished From Voluntary Manslaughter***

Under Penal Code section 195, subd. 2, a homicide is “excusable,” “in the heat of passion” if done “by accident,” or on “sudden . . . provocation . . . or . . . combat.” (Pen. Code, § 195, subd. 2.) Thus, unlike voluntary manslaughter, the killing must have been committed without criminal intent, that is, accidentally. (See *People v. Cooley* (1962) 211 Cal.App.2d 173, 204 [27 Cal.Rptr. 543], disapproved on other grounds in *People v. Lew* (1968) 68 Cal.2d 774, 778, fn. 1 [69 Cal.Rptr. 102, 441 P.2d 942]; Pen. Code, § 195, subd. 1 [act must be without criminal intent]; Pen. Code, § 26, subd. 5 [accident requires absence of “evil design [or] intent”].) The killing must also be on “sudden” provocation, eliminating the possibility of provocation over time, which may be considered in cases of voluntary manslaughter. (See Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 570, *Voluntary Manslaughter: Heat of Passion—Lesser Included Offense*.)

### ***Distinguished From Involuntary Manslaughter***

Involuntary manslaughter requires a finding of gross or criminal negligence. (See Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 581, *Involuntary Manslaughter: Murder Not Charged*; Pen. Code, § 26, subd. 5 [accident requires no “culpable negligence”].)

## **SECONDARY SOURCES**

1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Defenses, § 274.

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, § 230.

3 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 73, *Defenses and Justifications*, § 73.16 (Matthew Bender).

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.04[1][c] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, §§ 142.01[1][b], [g], 142.02[2][a] (Matthew Bender).

## 512. Presumption That Killing Not Criminal (Pen. Code, § 194)

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The law presumes that a killing is not criminal if the person killed dies more than three years and one day from the day of the incident that caused the death.

The People must overcome this presumption by proving that the killing was criminal. If you have a reasonable doubt whether the killing was criminal, you must find the defendant not guilty.

[To count the three year and one day period, begin with the day on which the incident happened. Count that day as one whole day regardless of what time the incident happened.]

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*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on presumptions relevant to the issues of the case. (See *People v. Hood* (1969) 1 Cal.3d 444, 449 [82 Cal.Rptr. 618, 462 P.2d 370].)

### AUTHORITY

- Presumption of Lawful Killing. Pen. Code, § 194.
- Rebuttable Presumptions Affecting Burden of Proof. Evid. Code, §§ 601, 604, 606.

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *May Prosecute Defendant for Attempted Murder and Murder*

Double jeopardy does not preclude prosecution of the defendant for attempted murder and also for murder if the victim dies after the conviction for attempted murder. (*In re Saul S.* (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 1061, 1068 [213 Cal.Rptr. 541].)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, § 99.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.01[1][c] (Matthew Bender).

### **513–519. Reserved for Future Use**



## C. MURDER: FIRST AND SECOND DEGREE

### 520. First or Second Degree Murder With Malice Aforethought (Pen. Code, § 187)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with murder [in violation of Penal Code section 187].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

[1A. The defendant committed an act that caused the death of (another person/ [or] a fetus);]

[OR]

[1B. The defendant had a legal duty to (help/care for/rescue/warn/maintain the property of/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert other required action[s]>) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of decedent/person to whom duty is owed> and the defendant failed to perform that duty and that failure caused the death of (another person/ [or] a fetus);]

[AND]

2. When the defendant (acted/[or] failed to act), (he/she) had a state of mind called malice aforethought(;/.)

<Give element 3 when instructing on justifiable or excusable homicide.>

[AND]

3. (He/She) killed without lawful (excuse/[or] justification).]

There are two kinds of malice aforethought, express malice and implied malice. Proof of either is sufficient to establish the state of mind required for murder.

The defendant had *express malice* if (he/she) unlawfully intended to kill.

The defendant had *implied malice* if:

1. (He/She) intentionally (committed the act/[or] failed to act);
2. The natural and probable consequences of the (act/[or] failure to act) were dangerous to human life;
3. At the time (he/she) (acted/[or] failed to act), (he/she) knew (his/her) (act/[or] failure to act) was dangerous to human life;

AND

4. (He/She) deliberately (acted/[or] failed to act) with conscious

disregard for (human/ [or] fetal) life.

**Malice aforethought does not require hatred or ill will toward the victim. It is a mental state that must be formed before the act that causes death is committed. It does not require deliberation or the passage of any particular period of time.**

[It is not necessary that the defendant be aware of the existence of a fetus to be guilty of murdering that fetus.]

[A *fetus* is an unborn human being that has progressed beyond the embryonic stage after major structures have been outlined, which typically occurs at seven to eight weeks after fertilization.]

[(An act/[or] (A/a) failure to act) causes death if the death is the direct, natural, and probable consequence of the (act/[or] failure to act) and the death would not have happened without the (act/[or] failure to act). A *natural and probable consequence* is one that a reasonable person would know is likely to happen if nothing unusual intervenes. In deciding whether a consequence is natural and probable, consider all of the circumstances established by the evidence.]

[There may be more than one cause of death. (An act/[or] (A/a) failure to act) causes death only if it is a substantial factor in causing the death. A *substantial factor* is more than a trivial or remote factor. However, it does not need to be the only factor that causes the death.]

[(A/An) \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert description of person owing duty>* has a legal duty to (help/care for/rescue/warn/maintain the property of/ \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert other required action[s]>*) \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert description of decedent/person to whom duty is owed>*.]

*<Give the following bracketed paragraph if the second degree is the only possible degree of the crime for which the jury may return a verdict>*

**[If you find the defendant guilty of murder, it is murder of the second degree.]**

*<Give the following bracketed paragraph if there is substantial evidence of first degree murder>*

**[If you decide that the defendant committed murder, it is murder of the second degree, unless the People have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that it is murder of the first degree as defined in CALCRIM No. \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert number of appropriate first degree murder instruction>*.]**

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2009, October 2010, February 2013, August 2013, September 2017, March 2019, September 2019, March 2021*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the first two elements of the crime. If there is sufficient evidence of excuse or justification, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to include the third, bracketed element in the instruction. (*People v. Frye* (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1148, 1155–1156 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 217].) The court also has a **sua sponte** duty to give any other appropriate defense instructions. (See CALCRIM Nos. 505–627, and CALCRIM Nos. 3470–3477.)

If causation is at issue, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on proximate cause. (*People v. Bernhardt* (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 567, 590–591 [35 Cal.Rptr. 401].) If the evidence indicates that there was only one cause of death, the court should give the “direct, natural, and probable” language in the first bracketed paragraph on causation. If there is evidence of multiple causes of death, the court should also give the “substantial factor” instruction and definition in the second bracketed causation paragraph. (See *People v. Autry* (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 363 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 135]; *People v. Pike* (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 732, 746–747 [243 Cal.Rptr. 54].) If there is an issue regarding a superseding or intervening cause, give the appropriate portion of CALCRIM No. 620, *Causation: Special Issues*.

If the prosecution’s theory of the case is that the defendant committed murder based on his or her failure to perform a legal duty, the court may give element 1B. Review the Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 582, *Involuntary Manslaughter: Failure to Perform Legal Duty—Murder Not Charged*.

If the defendant is charged with first degree murder, give this instruction and CALCRIM No. 521, *First Degree Murder*. If the defendant is charged with second degree murder, no other instruction need be given.

If the defendant is also charged with first degree felony murder, instruct on that crime and give CALCRIM No. 548, *Murder: Alternative Theories*.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 187.
- Malice. Pen. Code, § 188; *People v. Dellinger* (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1212, 1217–1222 [264 Cal.Rptr. 841, 783 P.2d 200]; *People v. Nieto Benitez* (1992) 4 Cal.4th 91, 103–105 [13 Cal.Rptr.2d 864, 840 P.2d 969]; *People v. Blakeley* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 82, 87 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 451, 999 P.2d 675].
- Causation. *People v. Roberts* (1992) 2 Cal.4th 271, 315–321 [6 Cal.Rptr.2d 276, 826 P.2d 274].
- Fetus Defined. *People v. Davis* (1994) 7 Cal.4th 797, 814–815 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 50, 872 P.2d 591]; *People v. Taylor* (2004) 32 Cal.4th 863, 867 [11 Cal.Rptr.3d 510, 86 P.3d 881].
- Ill Will Not Required for Malice. *People v. Seden* (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703, 722 [112 Cal.Rptr. 1, 518 P.2d 913], overruled on other grounds in *People v. Flannel* (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 684, fn. 12 [160 Cal.Rptr. 84, 603 P.2d 1]; *People v.*

*Breverman* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 163 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094].

- Prior Version of This Instruction Upheld. *People v. Genovese* (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 817, 831 [85 Cal.Rptr.3d 664].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Voluntary Manslaughter. Pen. Code, § 192(a).
- Involuntary Manslaughter. Pen. Code, § 192(b).
- Attempted Murder. Pen. Code, §§ 663, 189.
- Sentence Enhancements and Special Circumstances Not Considered in Lesser Included Offense Analysis. *People v. Boswell* (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 55, 59–60 [208 Cal.Rptr.3d 244].

Gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated (Pen. Code, § 191.5(a)) and vehicular manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192(c)) are not lesser included offenses of murder. (*People v. Sanchez* (2001) 24 Cal.4th 983, 988–992 [103 Cal.Rptr.2d 698, 16 P.3d 118]; *People v. Bettasso* (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 1050, 1059 [263 Cal.Rptr.3d 563].) Similarly, child abuse homicide (Pen. Code, § 273ab) is not a necessarily included offense of murder. (*People v. Malfavon* (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 727, 744 [125 Cal.Rptr.2d 618].)

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Causation—Foreseeability*

Authority is divided on whether a causation instruction should include the concept of foreseeability. (See *People v. Autry* (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 362–363 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 135]; *People v. Temple* (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1750, 1756 [24 Cal.Rptr.2d 228] [refusing defense-requested instruction on foreseeability in favor of standard causation instruction]; but see *People v. Gardner* (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 473, 483 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 603] [suggesting the following language be used in a causation instruction: “[t]he death of another person must be foreseeable in order to be the natural and probable consequence of the defendant’s act”].) It is clear, however, that it is error to instruct a jury that foreseeability is immaterial to causation. (*People v. Roberts* (1992) 2 Cal.4th 271, 315 [6 Cal.Rptr.2d 276, 826 P.2d 274] [error to instruct a jury that when deciding causation it “[w]as immaterial that the defendant could not reasonably have foreseen the harmful result”].)

#### *Second Degree Murder of a Fetus*

The defendant does not need to know a woman is pregnant to be convicted of second degree murder of her fetus. (*People v. Taylor* (2004) 32 Cal.4th 863, 868 [11 Cal.Rptr.3d 510, 86 P.3d 881] [“[t]here is no requirement that the defendant specifically know of the existence of each victim.”]) “[B]y engaging in the conduct he did, the defendant demonstrated a conscious disregard for all life, fetal or otherwise, and hence is liable for all deaths caused by his conduct.” (*Id.* at p. 870.)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, §§ 96–101, 112–113.



6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 140, *Challenges to Crimes*, § 140.04, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.01 (Matthew Bender).

## 521. First Degree Murder (Pen. Code, § 189)

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<Select the appropriate section[s]. Give the final paragraph in every case.>

<Give if multiple theories alleged.>

[The defendant has been prosecuted for first degree murder under (two/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert number>) theories: (1) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert first theory, e.g., “the murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated”> [and] (2) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert second theory, e.g., “the murder was committed by lying in wait”> [\_\_\_\_\_ <insert additional theories>].

Each theory of first degree murder has different requirements, and I will instruct you on (both/all \_\_\_\_\_ <insert number>).

You may not find the defendant guilty of first degree murder unless all of you agree that the People have proved that the defendant committed murder. But all of you do not need to agree on the same theory.]

<A. Deliberation and Premeditation>

[The defendant is guilty of first degree murder if the People have proved that (he/she) acted willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation. The defendant acted *willfully* if (he/she) intended to kill. The defendant acted *deliberately* if (he/she) carefully weighed the considerations for and against (his/her) choice and, knowing the consequences, decided to kill. The defendant *acted with premeditation* if (he/she) decided to kill before completing the act[s] that caused death.

The length of time the person spends considering whether to kill does not alone determine whether the killing is deliberate and premeditated. The amount of time required for deliberation and premeditation may vary from person to person and according to the circumstances. A decision to kill made rashly, impulsively, or without careful consideration is not deliberate and premeditated. On the other hand, a cold, calculated decision to kill can be reached quickly. The test is the extent of the reflection, not the length of time.]

<B. Torture>

[The defendant is guilty of first degree murder if the People have proved that the defendant murdered by torture. The defendant murdered by torture if:

1. (He/She) willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation intended to inflict extreme and prolonged pain on the person killed while that person was still alive;
2. (He/She) intended to inflict such pain on the person killed for the calculated purpose of revenge, extortion, persuasion, or any other sadistic reason;

3. The acts causing death involved a high degree of probability of death;

AND

4. The torture was a cause of death.]

[A person commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose. A person *deliberates* if he or she carefully weighs the considerations for and against his or her choice and, knowing the consequences, decides to act.

The defendant *acted with premeditation* if (he/she) decided to kill before completing the act[s] that caused death.]

[There is no requirement that the person killed be aware of the pain.]

[A finding of torture does not require that the defendant intended to kill.]

<C. Lying in Wait>

[The defendant is guilty of first degree murder if the People have proved that the defendant murdered while lying in wait or immediately thereafter. The defendant murdered by lying in wait if:

1. (He/She) concealed (his/her) purpose from the person killed;
2. (He/She) waited and watched for an opportunity to act;

AND

3. Then, from a position of advantage, (he/she) intended to and did make a surprise attack on the person killed.

The lying in wait does not need to continue for any particular period of time, but its duration must be substantial enough to show a state of mind equivalent to deliberation or premeditation. [*Deliberation* means carefully weighing the considerations for and against a choice and, knowing the consequences, deciding to act. An act is done with *premeditation* if the decision to commit the act is made before the act is done.]

[A person can conceal his or her purpose even if the person killed is aware of the person's physical presence.]

[The concealment can be accomplished by ambush or some other secret plan.]]

<D. Destructive Device or Explosive>

[The defendant is guilty of first degree murder if the People have proved that the defendant murdered by using a destructive device or explosive.]

[An *explosive* is any substance, or combination of substances, (1) whose

main or common purpose is to detonate or rapidly combust and (2) which is capable of a relatively instantaneous or rapid release of gas and heat.]

[An *explosive* is [also] any substance whose main purpose is to be combined with other substances to create a new substance that can release gas and heat rapidly or relatively instantaneously.]

[\_\_\_\_\_ <insert type of explosive from Health & Saf. Code, § 12000> is an *explosive*.]

[A *destructive device* is \_\_\_\_\_ <insert definition supported by evidence from Pen. Code, § 16460>.]

[\_\_\_\_\_ <insert type of destructive device from Pen. Code, § 16460> is a *destructive device*.]

<E. *Weapon of Mass Destruction*>

[The defendant is guilty of first degree murder if the People have proved that the defendant murdered by using a weapon of mass destruction.

[\_\_\_\_\_ <insert type of weapon from Pen. Code, § 11417(a)(1)> is a *weapon of mass destruction*.]

[\_\_\_\_\_ <insert type of agent from Pen. Code, § 11417(a)(2)> is a *chemical warfare agent*.]

<F. *Penetrating Ammunition*>

[The defendant is guilty of first degree murder if the People have proved that when the defendant murdered, (he/she) used ammunition designed primarily to penetrate metal or armor to commit the murder and (he/she) knew that the ammunition was designed primarily to penetrate metal or armor.]

<G. *Discharge From Vehicle*>

[The defendant is guilty of first degree murder if the People have proved that the defendant murdered by shooting a firearm from a motor vehicle. The defendant committed this kind of murder if:

1. (He/She) shot a firearm from a motor vehicle;
2. (He/She) intentionally shot at a person who was outside the vehicle;

AND

3. (He/She) intended to kill that person.

A *firearm* is any device designed to be used as a weapon, from which a projectile is discharged or expelled through a barrel by the force of an explosion or other form of combustion.

**A motor vehicle includes (a/an) (passenger vehicle/motorcycle/motor scooter/bus/school bus/commercial vehicle/truck tractor and trailer/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert other type of motor vehicle>).**]

<H. Poison>

**[The defendant is guilty of first degree murder if the People have proved that the defendant murdered by using poison.**

**[Poison is a substance, applied externally to the body or introduced into the body, that can kill by its own inherent qualities.]]**

**[\_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of substance> is a poison.]**

**[The requirements for second degree murder based on express or implied malice are explained in CALCRIM No. 520, *First or Second Degree Murder With Malice Aforethought*.]**

**The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was first degree murder rather than a lesser crime. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of first degree murder and the murder is second degree murder.**

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2006, June 2007, April 2010, October 2010, February 2012, February 2013, February 2015, August 2015, September 2017*

## BENCH NOTES

### ***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime. Before giving this instruction, the court must give CALCRIM No. 520, *Murder With Malice Aforethought*. Depending on the theory of first degree murder relied on by the prosecution, give the appropriate alternatives A through H.

The court **must give** the final paragraph in every case.

If the prosecution alleges two or more theories for first degree murder, give the bracketed section that begins with “The defendant has been prosecuted for first degree murder under.” If the prosecution alleges felony murder in addition to one of the theories of first degree murder in this instruction, give CALCRIM No. 548, *Murder: Alternative Theories*, instead of the bracketed paragraph contained in this instruction.

When instructing on torture or lying in wait, give the bracketed sections explaining the meaning of “deliberate” and “premeditated” if those terms have not already been defined for the jury.

When instructing on murder by weapon of mass destruction, explosive, or destructive device, the court may use the bracketed sentence stating, “\_\_\_\_\_ is a weapon of mass destruction” or “is a chemical warfare agent,” only if the device used is listed in the code section noted in the instruction. For example,

“Sarin is a chemical warfare agent.” However, the court may not instruct the jury that the defendant used the prohibited weapon. For example, the court may not state, “the defendant used a chemical warfare agent, sarin,” or “the material used by the defendant, sarin, was a chemical warfare agent.” (*People v. Dimitrov* (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 18, 25–26 [39 Cal.Rptr.2d 257].)

Do **not** modify this instruction to include the factors set forth in *People v. Anderson* (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, 26–27 [73 Cal.Rptr. 550, 447 P.2d 942]. Although those factors may assist in appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support findings of premeditation and deliberation, they neither define the elements of first degree murder nor guide a jury’s determination of the degree of the offense. (*People v. Moon* (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 31 [32 Cal.Rptr.3d 894, 117 P.3d 591]; *People v. Steele* (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1230, 1254 [120 Cal.Rptr.2d 432, 47 P.3d 225]; *People v. Lucero* (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1006, 1020 [245 Cal.Rptr. 185, 750 P.2d 1342].)

### AUTHORITY

- Types of Statutory First Degree Murder. Pen. Code, § 189.
- Armor Piercing Ammunition Defined. Pen. Code, § 16660.
- Destructive Device Defined. Pen. Code, § 16460.
- For Torture, Act Causing Death Must Involve a High Degree of Probability of Death. *People v. Cook* (2006) 39 Cal.4th 566, 602 [47 Cal.Rptr.3d 22, 139 P.3d 492].
- Mental State Required for Implied Malice. *People v. Knoller* (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 143 [59 Cal.Rptr.3d 157, 158 P.3d 731].
- Explosive Defined. Health & Saf. Code, § 12000; *People v. Clark* (1990) 50 Cal.3d 583, 604 [268 Cal.Rptr. 399, 789 P.2d 127].
- Weapon of Mass Destruction Defined. Pen. Code, § 11417.
- Discharge From Vehicle. *People v. Chavez* (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 379, 386–387 [12 Cal.Rptr.3d 837] [drive-by shooting clause is not an enumerated felony for purposes of the felony murder rule].
- Lying in Wait Requirements. *People v. Stanley* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 794 [42 Cal.Rptr.2d 543, 897 P.2d 481]; *People v. Ceja* (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1134, 1139 [17 Cal.Rptr.2d 375, 847 P.2d 55]; *People v. Webster* (1991) 54 Cal.3d 411, 448 [285 Cal.Rptr. 31, 814 P.2d 1273]; *People v. Poindexter* (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 572, 582–585 [50 Cal.Rptr.3d 489]; *People v. Laws* (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 786, 794–795 [15 Cal.Rptr.2d 668].
- Poison Defined. *People v. Van Deleer* (1878) 53 Cal. 147, 149.
- Premeditation and Deliberation Defined. *People v. Pearson* (2013) 56 Cal.4th 393, 443–444 [154 Cal.Rptr.3d 541, 297 P.3d 793]; *People v. Anderson* (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, 26–27 [73 Cal.Rptr. 550, 447 P.2d 942]; *People v. Bender* (1945) 27 Cal.2d 164, 183–184 [163 P.2d 8]; *People v. Daugherty* (1953) 40 Cal.2d 876, 901–902 [256 P.2d 911].

- Torture Requirements. *People v. Pensinger* (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1210, 1239 [278 Cal.Rptr. 640, 805 P.2d 899]; *People v. Bittaker* (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1046, 1101 [259 Cal.Rptr. 630, 774 P.2d 659], habeas corpus granted in part on other grounds in *In re Bittaker* (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1004 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 679]; *People v. Wiley* (1976) 18 Cal.3d 162, 168–172 [133 Cal.Rptr. 135, 554 P.2d 881]; see also *People v. Pre* (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 413, 419–420 [11 Cal.Rptr.3d 739] [comparing torture murder with torture].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Murder. Pen. Code, § 187.
- Voluntary Manslaughter. Pen. Code, § 192(a).
- Involuntary Manslaughter. Pen. Code, § 192(b).
- Attempted First Degree Murder. Pen. Code, §§ 663, 189.
- Attempted Murder. Pen. Code, §§ 663, 187.
- Elements of Special Circumstances Not Considered in Lesser Included Offense Analysis. *People v. Boswell* (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 55, 59–60 [208 Cal.Rptr.3d 244].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### ***Premeditation and Deliberation—Heat of Passion Provocation***

Provocation may reduce murder from first to second degree. (*People v. Thomas* (1945) 25 Cal.2d 880, 903 [156 P.2d 7] [provocation raised reasonable doubt about premeditation or deliberation, “leaving the homicide as murder of the second degree; i.e., an unlawful killing perpetrated with malice aforethought but without premeditation and deliberation”]; see *People v. Padilla* (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 675, 679 [126 Cal.Rptr.2d 889] [evidence of hallucination is admissible at guilt phase to negate deliberation and premeditation and to reduce first degree murder to second degree murder].) There is, however, no sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on this issue. (*People v. Middleton* (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 19, 31–33 [60 Cal.Rptr.2d 366], disapproved on other grounds in *People v. Gonzalez* (2003) 31 Cal.4th 745, 752 [3 Cal.Rptr.3d 676, 74 P.3d 771].) On request, give CALCRIM No. 522, *Provocation: Effect on Degree of Murder*.

#### ***Torture—Causation***

The finding of murder by torture encompasses the totality of the brutal acts and circumstances that led to a victim’s death. “The acts of torture may not be segregated into their constituent elements in order to determine whether any single act by itself caused the death; rather, it is the continuum of sadistic violence that constitutes the torture [citation].” (*People v. Proctor* (1992) 4 Cal.4th 499, 530–531 [15 Cal.Rptr.2d 340, 842 P.2d 1100].)

#### ***Torture—Instruction on Voluntary Intoxication***

“[A] court should instruct a jury in a torture-murder case, when evidence of intoxication warrants it, that intoxication is relevant to the specific intent to inflict

cruel suffering.” (*People v. Pensinger* (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1210, 1242 [278 Cal.Rptr. 640, 805 P.2d 899]; see CALCRIM No. 625, *Voluntary Intoxication: Effects on Homicide Crimes*.)

***Torture—Pain Not an Element***

All that is required for first degree murder by torture is the calculated *intent to cause pain* for the purpose of revenge, extortion, persuasion, or any other sadistic purpose. There is no requirement that the victim actually suffer pain. (*People v. Pensinger* (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1210, 1239 [278 Cal.Rptr. 640, 805 P.2d 899].)

***Torture—Premeditated Intent to Inflict Pain***

Torture-murder, unlike the substantive crime of torture, requires that the defendant acted with deliberation and premeditation when inflicting the pain. (*People v. Pre* (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 413, 419–420 [11 Cal.Rptr.3d 739]; *People v. Mincey* (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 434–436 [6 Cal.Rptr.2d 822, 827 P.2d 388].)

***Lying in Wait—Length of Time Equivalent to Premeditation and Deliberation***

In *People v. Stanley* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 794 [42 Cal.Rptr.2d 543, 897 P.2d 481], the court approved this instruction regarding the length of time a person lies in wait: “[T]he lying in wait need not continue for any particular time, provided that its duration is such as to show a state of mind equivalent to premeditation or deliberation.”

***Discharge From a Vehicle—Vehicle Does Not Have to Be Moving***

Penal Code section 189 does not require the vehicle to be moving when the shots are fired. (Pen. Code, § 189; see also *People v. Bostick* (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 287, 291 [53 Cal.Rptr.2d 760] [finding vehicle movement is not required in context of enhancement for discharging firearm from motor vehicle under Pen. Code, § 12022.55].)

## SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, § 117.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.01 (Matthew Bender).



## 522. Provocation: Effect on Degree of Murder

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**Provocation may reduce a murder from first degree to second degree [and may reduce a murder to manslaughter]. The weight and significance of the provocation, if any, are for you to decide.**

**If you conclude that the defendant committed murder but was provoked, consider the provocation in deciding whether the crime was first or second degree murder. [Also, consider the provocation in deciding whether the defendant committed murder or manslaughter.]**

**[Provocation does not apply to a prosecution under a theory of felony murder.]**

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*New January 2006; Revised April 2011, March 2017*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

Provocation may reduce murder from first to second degree. (*People v. Thomas* (1945) 25 Cal.2d 880, 903 [156 P.2d 7] [provocation raised reasonable doubt about premeditation or deliberation, “leaving the homicide as murder of the second degree; i.e., an unlawful killing perpetrated with malice aforethought but without premeditation and deliberation”]; see also *People v. Cole* (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1211–1212 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 532, 95 P.3d 811] [court adequately instructed on relevance of provocation to whether defendant acted with intent to torture for torture murder].) There is, however, no sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on this issue. (*People v. Rogers* (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 877–880 [48 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 141 P.3d 135].) This is a pinpoint instruction, to be given on request.

This instruction may be given after CALCRIM No. 521, *First Degree Murder*.

If the court will be instructing on voluntary manslaughter, give both bracketed portions on manslaughter.

If the court will be instructing on felony murder, give the bracketed sentence stating that provocation does not apply to felony murder.

### AUTHORITY

- Provocation Reduces From First to Second Degree. *People v. Thomas* (1945) 25 Cal.2d 880, 903 [156 P.2d 7]; see also *People v. Cole* (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1211–1212 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 532, 95 P.3d 811].
- Pinpoint Instruction. *People v. Rogers* (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 877–878 [48 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 141 P.3d 135].
- This Instruction Upheld. *People v. Hernandez* (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1327, 1333–1335 [107 Cal.Rptr.3d 915].

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

3 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 73, *Defenses and Justifications*, § 73.16 (Matthew Bender).

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.04[1][c] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, §§ 142.01, 142.02 (Matthew Bender).

## 523. First Degree Murder: Hate Crime (Pen. Code, § 190.03)

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If you find the defendant guilty of first degree murder [as charged in Count \_\_\_\_\_], you must then decide whether the People have proved the additional allegation that the murder was a hate crime.

To prove this allegation the People must prove that the defendant committed the murder, in whole or in part, because of the deceased person's actual or perceived (disability[,]/[or] gender[,]/[or] nationality[,]/ [or] race or ethnicity[,]/[or] religion[,]/[or] sexual orientation[,]/ [or] association with a person or group with (this/one or more of these) actual or perceived characteristic[s]).

The defendant acted, *in whole or in part, because of* the actual or perceived characteristic[s] of the deceased person if:

1. The defendant was biased against the other person based on the other person's actual or perceived (disability[,]/ [or] gender[,]/ [or] nationality[,]/ [or] race or ethnicity[,]/ [or] religion[,]/ [or] sexual orientation[,]/ [or] association with a person or group having (this/one or more of these) actual or perceived characteristic[s]);

**AND**

2. The bias motivation caused the defendant to commit the alleged murder.

If you find that the defendant had more than one reason to commit the alleged murder, the bias described here must have been a substantial motivating factor. A *substantial factor* is more than a trivial or remote factor. However, it does not need to be the only factor that motivated the conduct.

[The term *disability* is explained in Instruction 1353, to which you should refer.]

[*Gender*, as used here, means sex and includes a person's gender identity and gender related appearance and behavior whether or not stereotypically associated with the person's assigned sex at birth.]

[*Nationality* includes citizenship, country of origin, and national origin.]

[*Race or ethnicity* includes ancestry, color, and ethnic background.]

[*Religion*, as used here, includes all aspects of religious belief, observance, and practice and includes agnosticism and atheism.]

[*Sexual orientation* means heterosexuality, homosexuality, or bisexuality.]

[*Association with a person or group with (this/one or more of these) actual*

*or perceived characteristic[s]* includes (advocacy for[,]/ identification with[,]/ [or] being on the ground owned or rented by[, or adjacent to,]) a (person[,]/ group[,]/ family[,]/ community center[,]/ educational facility[,]/ office[,]/ meeting hall[,]/ place of worship[,]/ private institution[,]/ public agency[,]/ library[,]/ [or] other entity) that has, or is identified with people who have, (that/one or more of those) characteristic[s].]

**The People have the burden of proving this allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you must find this allegation has not been proved.**

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*New January 2006; Revised March 2017*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the sentencing enhancement. (See *People v. Marshall* (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 186, 193–195 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 441]; *Apprendi v. New Jersey* (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 475–476, 490 [120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435].)

This statute was substantially revised, effective January 1, 2005. Prior to that time, the statute was limited to murder committed because of the decedent’s disability, gender, or sexual orientation.

**Do not** give CALCRIM No. 370, *Motive*, with this instruction because motive is an element of this enhancement. (See *People v. Valenti* (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1140, 1165 [197 Cal.Rptr.3d 317]; *People v. Maurer* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1121, 1126–1127 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 335].)

Give all relevant bracketed definitions. If the term “disability” is used, give CALCRIM No. 1353, *Hate Crime: Disability Defined*.

## AUTHORITY

- Murder That is a Hate Crime. Pen. Code, § 190.03(a).
- Hate Crime Defined. Pen. Code, § 422.55.
- “In Whole or in Part Because of” Defined. Pen. Code, § 422.56(d); *In re M.S.* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 698, 719–720 [42 Cal.Rptr.2d 355, 896 P.2d 1365]; *People v. Superior Court (Aishman)* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 735, 741 [42 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 896 P.2d 1387].
- Disability Defined. Pen. Code, § 422.56(b); Gov. Code, § 12926(i)–(l).
- Gender Defined. Pen. Code, §§ 422.56(c) & 422.57.
- Nationality Defined. Pen. Code, § 422.56(e).
- Race or Ethnicity Defined. Pen. Code, § 422.56(f).
- Religion Defined. Pen. Code, § 422.56(g).

- Sexual Orientation Defined. Pen. Code, § 422.56(h).
- Association With Defined. Pen. Code, § 422.56(a).

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

3 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, § 542.

5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 91, *Sentencing*, § 91.44 (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.01[4][a][ii] (Matthew Bender).

**524. Second Degree Murder: Peace Officer (Pen. Code, § 190(b),  
(c))**

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If you find the defendant guilty of second degree murder [as charged in Count \_\_\_\_\_], you must then decide whether the People have proved the additional allegation that (he/she) murdered a peace officer.

To prove this allegation the People must prove that:

1. \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert officer's name, excluding title>* was a peace officer lawfully performing (his/her) duties as a peace officer;

[AND]

2. When the defendant killed \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert officer's name, excluding title>*, the defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, that \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert officer's name, excluding title>* was a peace officer who was performing (his/her) duties(;/.)

*<Give element 3 when defendant charged with Pen. Code, § 190(c)>*

[AND]

3. The defendant (intended to kill the peace officer/ [or] intended to inflict great bodily injury on the peace officer/ [or] personally used a (deadly or dangerous weapon/ [or] firearm) in the commission of the offense.)

[*Great bodily injury* means significant or substantial physical injury. It is an injury that is greater than minor or moderate harm.]

[A *deadly or dangerous weapon* is any object, instrument, or weapon [that is inherently deadly or dangerous or one] that is used in such a way that it is capable of causing and likely to cause death or great bodily injury.]

[An object is *inherently deadly* if it is deadly or dangerous in the ordinary use for which it was designed.]

[A *firearm* is any device designed to be used as a weapon, from which a projectile is discharged or expelled through a barrel by the force of an explosion or other form of combustion.]

[Someone *personally uses* a (deadly weapon/ [or] firearm) if he or she intentionally does any of the following:

1. Displays the weapon in a menacing manner;
2. Hits someone with the weapon;

OR

3. Fires the weapon.]

[The People allege that the defendant \_\_\_\_\_ <insert all of the factors from element 3 when multiple factors are alleged>. **You may not find the defendant guilty unless you all agree that the People have proved at least one of these alleged facts and you all agree on which fact or facts were proved. You do not need to specify the fact or facts in your verdict.**]

[A person who is employed as a police officer by \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of agency that employs police officer> **is a peace officer.**]

[A person employed by \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of agency that employs peace officer, e.g., “the Department of Fish and Wildlife”> **is a peace officer if** \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of facts necessary to make employee a peace officer, e.g., “designated by the director of the agency as a peace officer”>.]

[The duties of (a/an) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert title of peace officer> **include** \_\_\_\_\_ <insert job duties>.]

<When lawful performance is an issue, give the following paragraph and Instruction 2670, Lawful Performance: Peace Officer.>

[A peace officer is not lawfully performing his or her duties if he or she is (unlawfully arresting or detaining someone/ [or] using unreasonable or excessive force in his or her duties). Instruction 2670 explains (when an arrest or detention is unlawful/ [and] when force is unreasonable or excessive).]

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2009, February 2013, September 2019, September 2020*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the sentencing enhancement. (See *People v. Marshall* (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 186, 193–195 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 441]; *Apprendi v. New Jersey* (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 475–476, 490 [120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435].)

If the defendant is charged under Penal Code section 190(b), give only elements 1 and 2. If the defendant is charged under Penal Code section 190(c), give all three elements, specifying the appropriate factors in element 3, and give the appropriate definitions, which follow in brackets. Give the bracketed unanimity instruction if the prosecution alleges more than one factor in element 3.

In order to be “engaged in the performance of his or her duties,” a peace officer must be acting lawfully. (*People v. Gonzalez* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1217 [275 Cal.Rptr. 729, 800 P.2d 1159].) “[D]isputed facts bearing on the issue of legal cause must be submitted to the jury considering an engaged-in-duty element.” (*Ibid.*) If

excessive force is an issue, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct the jury that the defendant is not guilty of the offense charged, or any lesser included offense in which lawful performance is an element, if the defendant used reasonable force in response to excessive force. (*People v. Olguin* (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 39, 46–47 [173 Cal.Rptr. 663].) On request, the court must instruct that the prosecution has the burden of proving the lawfulness of the arrest beyond a reasonable doubt. (*People v. Castain* (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 138, 145 [175 Cal.Rptr. 651].) If lawful performance is an issue, give the bracketed paragraph on lawful performance and the appropriate portions of CALCRIM No. 2670, *Lawful Performance: Peace Officer*.

The jury must determine whether the alleged victim is a peace officer. (*People v. Brown* (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 444–445 [250 Cal.Rptr. 604, 758 P.2d 1135].) The court may instruct the jury on the appropriate definition of “peace officer” from the statute (e.g., “a Garden Grove Regular Police Officer and a Garden Grove Reserve Police Officer are peace officers”). (*Ibid.*) However, the court may not instruct the jury that the alleged victim was a peace officer as a matter of law (e.g., “Officer Reed was a peace officer”). (*Ibid.*) If the alleged victim is a police officer, give the bracketed sentence that begins with “A person employed as a police officer.” If the alleged victim is another type of peace officer, give the bracketed sentence that begins with “A person employed by.”

“Peace officer,” as used in this statute, means “as defined in subdivision (a) of Section 830.1, subdivision (a), (b), or (c) of Section 830.2, subdivision (a) of Section 830.33, or Section 830.5.” (Pen. Code, § 190(b) & (c).)

The court may give the bracketed sentence that begins, “The duties of a \_\_\_\_\_ <insert title . . . > include,” on request. The court may insert a description of the officer’s duties such as “the correct service of a facially valid search warrant.” (*People v. Gonzalez* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1222 [275 Cal.Rptr. 729, 800 P.2d 1159].)

Give the bracketed phrase “that is inherently deadly or one” and give the bracketed definition of *inherently deadly* only if the object is a deadly weapon as a matter of law. (*People v. Stutelberg* (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 314, 317–318 [240 Cal.Rptr.3d 156].)

The second sentence of the great bodily injury definition could result in error if the prosecution improperly argues great bodily injury may be shown by greater than minor injury alone. (Compare *People v. Medellin* (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 519, 533–535 [258 Cal.Rptr.3d 867] [the definition was reasonably susceptible to prosecutor’s erroneous argument that the injury need only be greater than minor] with *People v. Quinonez* (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 457, 466 [260 Cal.Rptr.3d 86] [upholding instructions containing great bodily injury definition as written].)

### AUTHORITY

- Second Degree Murder of a Peace Officer. Pen. Code, § 190(b) & (c).
- Personally Used Deadly or Dangerous Weapon. Pen. Code, § 12022.



- Personally Used Firearm. Pen. Code, § 12022.5.
- Personal Use. Pen. Code, § 1203.06(b)(2).
- Inherently Deadly Defined. *People v. Perez* (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1055, 1065 [232 Cal.Rptr.3d 51, 416 P.3d 42]; *People v. Aguilar* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1023, 1028–1029 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 655, 945 P.2d 1204].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, § 186.

3 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 73, Defenses and Justifications, § 73.15[2] (Matthew Bender).

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 87, Death Penalty, § 87.13[7] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, Crimes Against the Person, § 142.01[4][c] (Matthew Bender).

**525. Second Degree Murder: Discharge From Motor Vehicle (Pen. Code, § 190(d))**

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If you find the defendant guilty of second degree murder [as charged in Count \_\_\_\_\_], you must then decide whether the People have proved the additional allegation that the murder was committed by shooting a firearm from a motor vehicle.

To prove this allegation, the People must prove that:

1. (The defendant/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name or description of principal if not defendant>) killed a person by shooting a firearm from a motor vehicle;
2. (The defendant/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name or description of principal if not defendant>) intentionally shot at a person who was outside the vehicle;

AND

3. When (the defendant/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name or description of principal if not defendant>) shot a firearm, (the defendant/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name or description of principal if not defendant>) intended to inflict great bodily injury on the person outside the vehicle.

[A *firearm* is any device designed to be used as a weapon, from which a projectile is discharged or expelled through a barrel by the force of an explosion or other form of combustion.]

[A *motor vehicle* includes (a/an) (passenger vehicle/motorcycle/motor scooter/bus/school bus/commercial vehicle/truck tractor and trailer/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert other type of motor vehicle>).]

[*Great bodily injury* means significant or substantial physical injury. It is an injury that is greater than minor or moderate harm.]

[The term[s] (*great bodily injury*[/] *firearm*[/] [and] *motor vehicle*) (is/are) defined in another instruction to which you should refer.]

[The People must prove that the defendant intended that the person shot at suffer great bodily injury when (he/she/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name or description of principal if not defendant>) shot from the vehicle. However, the People do not have to prove that the defendant intended to injure the specific person who was actually killed.]

The People have the burden of proving this allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you must find that this allegation has not been proved.

*New January 2006; Revised September 2020*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a  **sua sponte**  duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the sentencing enhancement. (See *People v. Marshall* (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 186, 193–195 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 441]; *Apprendi v. New Jersey* (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 475–476, 490 [120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435].)

The statute does not specify whether the defendant must personally intend to inflict great bodily injury or whether accomplice liability may be based on a principal who intended to inflict great bodily injury even if the defendant did not. The instruction has been drafted to provide the court with both alternatives in element 3.

Give the relevant bracketed definitions unless the court has already given the definition in other instructions. In such cases, the court may give the bracketed sentence stating that the term is defined elsewhere.

Give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “The People must prove that the defendant intended,” if the evidence shows that the person killed was not the person the defendant intended to harm when shooting from the vehicle. (*People v. Sanchez* (2001) 26 Cal.4th 834, 851, fn. 10 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 129, 29 P.3d 209].)

The second sentence of the great bodily injury definition could result in error if the prosecution improperly argues great bodily injury may be shown by greater than minor injury alone. (Compare *People v. Medellin* (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 519, 533–535 [258 Cal.Rptr.3d 867] [the definition was reasonably susceptible to prosecutor’s erroneous argument that the injury need only be greater than minor] with *People v. Quinonez* (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 457, 466 [260 Cal.Rptr.3d 86] [upholding instructions containing great bodily injury definition as written].)

## AUTHORITY

- Second Degree Murder, Discharge From Vehicle. Pen. Code, § 190(d).

## SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, § 186.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.01[1][a], [2][a][vii], [4][c] (Matthew Bender).

**526–540. Reserved for Future Use**



## D. FELONY MURDER

### Introduction to Felony-Murder Series

Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) substantially changed accomplice liability for felony murder. Malice may no longer be imputed simply from participation in a designated crime. (Pen. Code, § 188(a)(3).) If a defendant participated in the commission or attempted commission of a designated felony when a person was killed, the defendant is now liable under the felony-murder rule only if: (1) the defendant was the actual killer; (2) the defendant was not the actual killer but, *with intent to kill*, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the actual killer in committing murder in the first degree; or (3) the defendant was a major participant in the underlying designated felony *and* acted with reckless indifference to human life. (Pen. Code, § 189(e).) These restrictions do not apply when the victim was a peace officer and the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the victim was a peace officer acting within the performance of his or her duties. (Pen. Code, § 189(f).)

As a result of these changes, the committee has modified CALCRIM Nos. 540B and 540C to incorporate the additional statutory elements for accomplice liability. The committee has also removed CALCRIM Nos. 541A, 541B, and 541C which addressed second degree felony murder.

The three separate instructions for felony murder present the following options:

- A. Defendant Allegedly Committed Fatal Act
- B. Coparticipant Allegedly Committed Fatal Act
- C. Other Acts Allegedly Caused Death

For a simple case in which the defendant allegedly personally caused the death by committing a direct act of force or violence against the victim, the court may use CALCRIM No. 540A. This instruction contains the least amount of bracketed material and requires the least amount of modification by the court.

In a case where the prosecution alleges that a participant in the felony other than the defendant caused the death, the court must use CALCRIM No. 540B. This instruction allows the court to instruct that the defendant may have committed the underlying felony or may have aided and abetted or conspired to commit an underlying felony that actually was committed by a coparticipant.

If the evidence indicates that either the defendant or a coparticipant may have committed the fatal act, the court should give both CALCRIM No. 540A and CALCRIM No. 540B.

In addition, the committee has provided CALCRIM No. 540C to account for the unusual factual situations where a victim dies during the course of a felony as a result of a heart attack, a fire, or a similar cause, rather than as a result of some act of force or violence committed against the victim by one of the participants. (See *People v. Billa* (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1064, 1072.) This instruction is the most

complicated of the three instructions. Thus, although CALCRIM No. 540C is broad enough to cover most felony-murder scenarios, the committee recommends using CALCRIM Nos. 540A or 540B whenever appropriate to avoid providing the jury with unnecessarily complicated instructions.

In *People v. Wilkins* (2013) 56 Cal.4th 333, 344, the Supreme Court clarified the temporal component necessary for liability for a death under the felony-murder rule and noted the limited usefulness of former CALCRIM No. 549, *Felony Murder; One Continuous Transaction—Defined*. To avoid any potential confusion, the committee has deleted that instruction and replaced it with appropriate bench note references. If the defendant committed the homicidal act and fled, that killing did not occur in the commission of the felony if the fleeing felon has reached a place of temporary safety. (*People v. Wilkins, supra*, at p. 345.)

**540A. Felony Murder: First Degree—Defendant Allegedly  
Committed Fatal Act (Pen. Code, § 189)**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with murder, under a theory of first degree felony murder.

To prove that the defendant is guilty of first degree murder under this theory, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant committed [or attempted to commit] \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert felony or felonies from Pen. Code, § 189>*;
2. The defendant intended to commit \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert felony or felonies from Pen. Code, § 189>*;

**AND**

3. While committing [or attempting to commit] \_\_\_\_\_, *<insert felony or felonies from Pen. Code, § 189>* the defendant caused the death of another person.

A person [who was the actual killer] may be guilty of felony murder even if the killing was unintentional, accidental, or negligent.

To decide whether the defendant committed [or attempted to commit] \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert felony or felonies from Pen. Code, § 189>*, please refer to the separate instructions that I (will give/have given) you on (that/those) crime[s]. You must apply those instructions when you decide whether the People have proved first degree murder under a theory of felony murder.

*<Make certain that all appropriate instructions on all underlying felonies are given.>*

[The defendant must have intended to commit the (felony/felonies) of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert felony or felonies from Pen. Code, § 189>* before or at the time that (he/she) caused the death.]

*<If the facts raise an issue whether the commission of the felony continued while a defendant was fleeing the scene, give the following sentence instead of CALCRIM No. 3261, While Committing a Felony: Defined—Escape Rule.>*

[The crime of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert felony or felonies from Pen. Code, § 189>* continues until a defendant has reached a place of temporary safety.]

[It is not required that the person die immediately, as long as the act causing death occurred while the defendant was committing the (felony/felonies).]

**[It is not required that the person killed be the (victim/intended victim) of the (felony/felonies).]**

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*New January 2006; Revised April 2010, August 2013, September 2019*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime. The court also has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the elements of any underlying felonies. (*People v. Cain* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 36 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 481, 892 P.2d 1224].) Give all appropriate instructions on all underlying felonies with this instruction. The court may need to modify the first sentence of the instruction on an underlying felony if the defendant is not separately charged with that offense.

If the facts raise an issue whether the homicidal act caused the death, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give CALCRIM No. 240, *Causation*.

When giving this instruction with CALCRIM No. 540B or with CALCRIM No. 540C, give the bracketed phrase [who was the actual killer].

The felonies that support a charge of first degree felony murder are arson, rape, carjacking, robbery, burglary, kidnapping, mayhem, train wrecking, sodomy, lewd or lascivious acts on a child, oral copulation, and sexual penetration. (See Pen. Code, § 189(a).)

If there is evidence that the defendant did not form the intent to commit the felony until after the homicide, the defendant is entitled on request to an instruction pinpointing this issue. (*People v. Hudson* (1955) 45 Cal.2d 121, 124–127 [287 P.2d 497]; *People v. Silva* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 345, 371 [106 Cal.Rptr.2d 93, 21 P.3d 769].) Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “The defendant must have intended to commit the felony.” For an instruction specially tailored to robbery-murder cases, see *People v. Turner* (1990) 50 Cal.3d 668, 691 [268 Cal.Rptr. 706, 789 P.2d 887].

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “It is not required that the person die immediately” on request if relevant based on the evidence.

The felony-murder rule does not require that the person killed be the victim of the underlying felony. (*People v. Johnson* (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 653, 658 [104 Cal.Rptr. 807] [accomplice]; *People v. Welch* (1972) 8 Cal.3d 106, 117–119 [104 Cal.Rptr. 217, 501 P.2d 225] [innocent bystander]; *People v. Salas* (1972) 7 Cal.3d 812, 823 [103 Cal.Rptr. 431, 500 P.2d 7] [police officer].) Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “It is not required that the person killed be” on request.

There is **no** sua sponte duty to clarify the logical nexus between the felony and the homicidal act. If an issue about the logical nexus requirement arises, the court may give the following language:

**There must be a logical connection between the cause of death and the**  
\_\_\_\_\_ <insert felony or felonies from Pen. Code, § 189> **[or attempted**



\_\_\_\_\_ <insert felony or felonies from Pen. Code, § 189>]. **The connection between the cause of death and the \_\_\_\_\_ <insert felony or felonies from Pen. Code, § 189> [or attempted \_\_\_\_\_ <insert felony or felonies from Pen. Code, § 189>] must involve more than just their occurrence at the same time and place.]**

*People v. Cavitt* (2004) 33 Cal.4th 187, 203–204 [14 Cal.Rptr.3d 281, 91 P.3d 222]; *People v. Wilkins* (2013) 56 Cal.4th 333, 347 [153 Cal.Rptr.3d 519, 295 P.3d 903].

If the prosecutor is proceeding under both malice and felony-murder theories, also give CALCRIM No. 548, *Murder: Alternative Theories*. If the prosecutor is relying only on a theory of felony murder, no instruction on malice should be given. (See *People v. Cain* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 35–37 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 481, 892 P.2d 1224] [error to instruct on malice when felony murder only theory].)

### ***Drive-By Shooting***

The drive-by shooting clause in Penal Code section 189 is not an enumerated felony for purposes of the felony-murder rule. (*People v. Chavez* (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 379, 386–387 [12 Cal.Rptr.3d 837].) A finding of a specific intent to kill is required in order to find first degree murder under this clause. (*Ibid.*)

### ***Related Instructions—Other Causes of Death***

This instruction should be used only when the prosecution alleges that the defendant committed the act causing the death.

If the prosecution alleges that another coparticipant in the felony committed the fatal act, give CALCRIM No. 540B, *Felony Murder: First Degree—Coparticipant Allegedly Committed Fatal Act*. If the evidence indicates that either the defendant or a coparticipant may have committed the fatal act, give both instructions.

When the alleged victim dies during the course of the felony as a result of a heart attack, a fire, or a similar cause, rather than as a result of some act of force or violence committed against the victim by one of the participants, give CALCRIM No. 540C, *Felony Murder: First Degree—Other Acts Allegedly Caused Death*. (Cf. *People v. Billa* (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1064, 1072 [6 Cal.Rptr.3d 425, 79 P.3d 542]; *People v. Stamp* (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 203, 209–211 [82 Cal.Rptr. 598]; *People v. Hernandez* (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 282, 287 [215 Cal.Rptr. 166]; but see *People v. Gunnerson* (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 370, 378–381 [141 Cal.Rptr. 488] [a simultaneous or coincidental death is not a killing].)

If the evidence indicates that someone other than the defendant or a coparticipant committed the fatal act, then the crime is not felony murder. (*People v. Washington* (1965) 62 Cal.2d 777, 782–783 [44 Cal.Rptr. 442, 402 P.2d 130]; *People v. Caldwell* (1984) 36 Cal.3d 210, 216 [203 Cal.Rptr. 433, 681 P.2d 274]; see also *People v. Gardner* (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 473, 477 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 603].) Liability may be imposed, however, under the provocative act doctrine. (*Pizano v. Superior Court* (1978) 21 Cal.3d 128, 134 [145 Cal.Rptr. 524, 577 P.2d 659]; see CALCRIM No. 560, *Homicide: Provocative Act by Defendant*.)

### AUTHORITY

- Felony Murder: First Degree. Pen. Code, § 189.
- Specific Intent to Commit Felony Required. *People v. Gutierrez* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083, 1140 [124 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 52 P.3d 572].
- Infliction of Fatal Injury. *People v. Alvarez* (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 222–223 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 385, 926 P.2d 365].
- Merger Doctrine Does Not Apply to First Degree Felony Murder. *People v. Farley* (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1053, 1118–1120 [96 Cal.Rptr.3d 191, 210 P.3d 361].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### ***Does Not Apply Where Felony Committed Only to Facilitate Murder***

If a felony, such as robbery, is committed merely to facilitate an intentional murder, then the felony-murder rule does not apply. (*People v. Green* (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 61 [164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468], disapproved on other grounds in *People v. Hall* (1986) 41 Cal.3d 826, 834, fn. 3 [226 Cal.Rptr. 112, 718 P.2d 99] [robbery committed to facilitate murder did not satisfy felony-murder special circumstance].) If the defense requests a special instruction on this point, see CALCRIM No. 730, *Special Circumstances: Murder in Commission of Felony*.

#### ***No Duty to Instruct on Lesser Included Offenses of Uncharged Predicate Felony***

“Although a trial court on its own initiative must instruct the jury on lesser included offenses of *charged* offenses, this duty does not extend to *uncharged* offenses relevant only as predicate offenses under the felony-murder doctrine.” (*People v. Silva* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 345, 371 [106 Cal.Rptr.2d 93, 21 P.3d 769] [original italics]; see *People v. Cash* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 703, 736–737 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 545] [no duty to instruct on theft as lesser included offense of uncharged predicate offense of robbery].)

#### ***Auto Burglary***

Auto burglary may form the basis for a first degree felony-murder conviction. (*People v. Fuller* (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 618, 622–623, 628 [150 Cal.Rptr. 515] [noting problems of applying felony-murder rule to nondangerous daytime auto burglary].)

#### ***Duress***

“[D]uress can, in effect, provide a defense to murder on a felony-murder theory by negating the underlying felony.” (*People v. Anderson* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 767, 784 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 587, 50 P.3d 368] [dictum]; see also CALCRIM No. 3402, *Duress or Threats*.)

#### ***Imperfect Self-Defense***

Imperfect self-defense is not a defense to felony murder because malice aforethought, which imperfect self-defense negates, is not an element of felony murder. (See *People v. Tabios* (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1, 6–9 [78 Cal.Rptr.2d 753], disapproved on another ground in *People v. Chun* (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172,

1198–1199 [91 Cal.Rptr.3d 106, 203 P.3d 425].)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, §§ 151–168.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 87, *Death Penalty*, § 87.13[7] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.01[1][e], [2][b] (Matthew Bender).

**540B. Felony Murder: First Degree—Coparticipant Allegedly Committed Fatal Act (Pen. Code, § 189)**

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*<Give the following introductory sentence when not giving CALCRIM No. 540A.>*

**[The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with murder, under a theory of first degree felony murder.]**

**The defendant may [also] be guilty of murder, under a theory of felony murder, even if another person did the act that resulted in the death. I will call the other person the *perpetrator*.**

**To prove that the defendant is guilty of first degree murder under this theory, the People must prove that:**

- 1. The defendant (committed [or attempted to commit][,]/ [or] aided and abetted[,]/ [or] was a member of a conspiracy to commit) \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert felony or felonies from Pen. Code, § 189>*;**
- 2. The defendant (intended to commit[,]/ [or] intended to aid and abet the perpetrator in committing[,]/ [or] intended that one or more of the members of the conspiracy commit) \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert felony or felonies from Pen. Code, § 189>*;**
- 3. If the defendant did not personally commit [or attempt to commit] \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert felony or felonies from Pen. Code, § 189>*, then a perpetrator, (whom the defendant was aiding and abetting/ [or] with whom the defendant conspired), committed [or attempted to commit] \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert felony or felonies from Pen. Code, § 189>*;**
- 4. While committing [or attempting to commit] \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert felony or felonies from Pen. Code, § 189>*, the perpetrator caused the death of another person;**  
*<Alternative for Pen. Code § 189(e)(2) and (e)(3) liability>*

**[5A. The defendant intended to kill;**

**AND**

**5B. The defendant (aided and abetted[,])/ [or] counseled[,]/ [or] commanded[,]/ [or] induced[,]/ [or] solicited[,]/ [or] requested[,]/ [or] assisted) the perpetrator in the commission of first degree murder(./;)]**

**[OR]**

**[(5A/6A). The defendant was a major participant in the \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert felony or felonies from Pen. Code § 189>*;**

**AND**

**(5B/6B).** When the defendant participated in the <\_\_\_\_\_ *insert felony or felonies from Pen. Code § 189*>, **(he/she) acted with reckless indifference to human life(./;)]**

**[OR]**

*<Alternative for Pen. Code § 189(f) liability>*

**[(5A/6A/7A).** \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert officer's name, excluding title>* **was a peace officer lawfully performing (his/her) duties as a peace officer;**

**AND**

**(5B/6B/7B).** When the defendant acted, (he/she) knew, or reasonably should have known, that \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert officer's name, excluding title>* **was a peace officer performing (his/her) duties.]**

**[A person may be guilty of felony murder of a peace officer even if the killing was unintentional, accidental, or negligent.]**

**To decide whether (the defendant/ [and] the perpetrator) committed [or attempted to commit] \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert felony or felonies from Pen. Code, § 189>*, please refer to the separate instructions that I (will give/ have given) you on (that/those) crime[s]. [To decide whether the defendant aided and abetted a crime, please refer to the separate instructions that I (will give/have given) you on aiding and abetting.] [To decide whether the defendant was a member of a conspiracy to commit a crime, please refer to the separate instructions that I (will give/have given) you on conspiracy.] You must apply those instructions when you decide whether the People have proved first degree murder under a theory of felony murder.**

**[The defendant must have (intended to commit[,]/ [or] aid and abet[,]/ [or] been a member of a conspiracy to commit) the (felony/felonies) of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert felony or felonies from Pen. Code, § 189>* before or at the time of the death.]**

**[It is not required that the person die immediately, as long as the act causing death occurred while the defendant was committing the (felony/ felonies).]**

**[It is not required that the person killed be the (victim/intended victim) of the (felony/felonies).]**

**[It is not required that the defendant be present when the act causing the death occurs.]**

**[You may not find the defendant guilty of felony murder unless all of**

**you agree that the defendant or a perpetrator caused the death of another. You do not all need to agree, however, whether the defendant or a perpetrator caused that death.]**

*<The following instructions can be given when reckless indifference and major participant under Pen. Code § 189(e)(3) applies>*

**[A person acts with reckless indifference to human life when he or she knowingly engages in criminal activity that he or she knows involves a grave risk of death.]**

**[When you decide whether the defendant acted with *reckless indifference to human life*, consider all the evidence. No one of the following factors is necessary, nor is any one of them necessarily enough, to determine whether the defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life. Among the factors you may consider are:**

- [• Did the defendant know that [a] lethal weapon[s] would be present during the \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert underlying felony>?*]**
- [• Did the defendant know that [a] lethal weapon[s] (was/were) likely to be used?]**
- [• Did the defendant know that [a] lethal weapon[s] (was/were) used?]**
- [• Did the defendant know the number of weapons involved?]**
- [• Was the defendant near the person(s) killed when the killing occurred?]**
- [• Did the defendant have an opportunity to stop the killing or to help the victim(s)?]**
- [• How long did the crime last?]**
- [• Was the defendant aware of anything that would make a coparticipant likely to kill?]**
- [• Did the defendant try to minimize the possibility of violence?]**
- [• \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert any other relevant factors>*]**

**[When you decide whether the defendant was a *major participant*, consider all the evidence. No one of the following factors is necessary, nor is any one of them necessarily enough, to determine whether the defendant was a major participant. Among the factors you may consider are:**

- [• What was the defendant's role in planning the crime that led to the death[s]?]**
- [• What was the defendant's role in supplying or using lethal weapons?]**

- [• **What did the defendant know about dangers posed by the crime, any weapons used, or past experience or conduct of the other participant[s]?**]
- [• **Was the defendant in a position to facilitate or to prevent the death?**]
- [• **Did the defendant’s action or inaction play a role in the death?**]
- [• **What did the defendant do after lethal force was used?**]
- [• \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert any other relevant factors.>*]

*<Give the following instructions when Pen. Code § 189(f) applies>*

**[A person who is employed as a police officer by \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of agency that employs police officer>* is a peace officer.]**

**[A person employed by \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of agency that employs peace officer, e.g., “the Department of Fish and Wildlife”>* is a peace officer if \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert description of facts necessary to make employee a peace officer, e.g., “designated by the director of the agency as a peace officer”>*.]**

**[The duties of (a/an) \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert title of peace officer>* include \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert job duties>*.]**

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*New January 2006; Revised April 2010, August 2013, February 2015, September 2019, April 2020, September 2020*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime. The court also has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the elements of any underlying felonies. (*People v. Cain* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 36 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 481, 892 P.2d 1224].)

If the facts raise an issue whether the homicidal act caused the death, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give CALCRIM No. 240, *Causation*.

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on aiding and abetting when the prosecutor relies on it as a theory of culpability. (*People v. Beeman* (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 560–561 [199 Cal.Rptr.60, 674 P.2d 1318].) The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on conspiracy when the prosecution has introduced evidence of a conspiracy to prove liability for other offenses. (See, e.g., *People v. Pike* (1962) 58 Cal.2d 70, 88 [22 Cal.Rptr. 664, 372 P.2d 656]; *People v. Ditson* (1962) 57 Cal.2d 415, 447 [20 Cal.Rptr. 165, 369 P.2d 714].)

**Give all appropriate instructions on all underlying felonies, aiding and abetting, and conspiracy.**

If the prosecution’s theory is that the defendant, as well as the perpetrator,



committed or attempted to commit the underlying felony or felonies, then select “committed [or attempted to commit]” in element 1 and “intended to commit” in element 2. In addition, in the paragraph that begins with “To decide whether,” select both “the defendant and the perpetrator.” Give all appropriate instructions on any underlying felonies with this instruction. The court may need to modify the first sentence of the instruction on an underlying felony if the defendant is not separately charged with that offense. The court may also need to modify the instruction to state “the defendant and the perpetrator each committed [the crime] if . . . .”

If the prosecution’s theory is that the defendant aided and abetted or conspired to commit the felony, select one or both of these options in element 1 and the corresponding intent requirements in element 2. In addition, in the paragraph that begins with “To decide whether,” select “the perpetrator” in the first sentence. Give the second and/or third bracketed sentences. Give all appropriate instructions on any underlying felonies and on aiding and abetting and/or conspiracy with this instruction. The court may need to modify the first sentence of the instruction on an underlying felony if the defendant is not separately charged with that offense. The court may also need to modify the instruction to state “the perpetrator committed,” rather than “the defendant,” in the instructions on the underlying felony.

If the defendant was a nonkiller who fled, leaving behind an accomplice who killed, see *People v. Cavitt* (2004) 33 Cal.4th 187, 206, fn. 7 [14 Cal.Rptr.3d 281, 91 P.3d 222] [continuous transaction] and the discussion of *Cavitt* in *People v. Wilkins* (2013) 56 Cal.4th 333, 344 [153 Cal.Rptr.3d 519, 295 P.3d 903].

If there is evidence that the defendant did not form the intent to commit the felony until after the homicide, or did not join the conspiracy or aid and abet the felony until after the homicide, the defendant is entitled on request to an instruction pinpointing this issue. (*People v. Hudson* (1955) 45 Cal.2d 121, 124–127 [287 P.2d 497]; *People v. Silva* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 345, 371 [106 Cal.Rptr.2d 93, 21 P.3d 769].) Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “The defendant must have (intended to commit.” For an instruction specially tailored to robbery-murder cases, see *People v. Turner* (1990) 50 Cal.3d 668, 691 [268 Cal.Rptr. 706, 789 P.2d 887].

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “It is not required that the person die immediately” on request if relevant based on the evidence.

The felony-murder rule does not require that the person killed be the victim of the underlying felony. (*People v. Johnson* (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 653, 658 [104 Cal.Rptr. 807] [accomplice]; *People v. Welch* (1972) 8 Cal.3d 106, 117–119 [104 Cal.Rptr. 217, 501 P.2d 225] [innocent bystander]; *People v. Salas* (1972) 7 Cal.3d 812, 823 [103 Cal.Rptr. 431, 500 P.2d 7] [police officer].) Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “It is not required that the person killed be” on request.

Give the last bracketed sentence, stating that the defendant need not be present, on request.

If the prosecutor is proceeding under both malice and felony-murder theories, or is proceeding under multiple felony-murder theories, give CALCRIM No. 548,



*Murder: Alternative Theories.* If the prosecutor is relying only on a theory of felony murder, no instruction on malice should be given. (See *People v. Cain* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 35–37 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 481, 892 P.2d 1224] [error to instruct on malice when felony murder only theory].)

There is **no** sua sponte duty to clarify the logical nexus between the felony and the homicidal act. If an issue about the logical nexus requirement arises, the court may give the following language:

**There must be a logical connection between the cause of death and the \_\_\_\_\_ <insert felony or felonies from Pen. Code, § 189> [or attempted \_\_\_\_\_ <insert felony or felonies from Pen. Code, § 189>]. The connection between the cause of death and the \_\_\_\_\_ <insert felony or felonies from Pen. Code, § 189> [or attempted \_\_\_\_\_ <insert felony or felonies from Pen. Code, § 189>] must involve more than just their occurrence at the same time and place.]**

*People v. Cavitt* (2004) 33 Cal.4th 187, 203–204 [14 Cal.Rptr.3d 281, 91 P.3d 222]; *People v. Wilkins* (2013) 56 Cal.4th 333, 347 [153 Cal.Rptr.3d 519, 295 P.3d 903].

In *People v. Banks* (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788, 803–808 [189 Cal.Rptr.3d 208, 351 P.3d 330], the court identified certain factors to guide the jury in its determination of whether the defendant was a major participant but stopped short of holding that the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on those factors. The trial court should determine whether the *Banks* factors need be given.

The court does not have a sua sponte duty to define “reckless indifference to human life.” (*People v. Estrada* (1995) 11 Cal.4th 568, 578 [46 Cal.Rptr.2d 586, 904 P.2d 1197].) However, this “holding should not be understood to discourage trial courts from amplifying the statutory language for the jury.” (*Id.* at p. 579.) The court may give the bracketed definition of reckless indifference if requested.

In *People v. Clark* (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 614–620 [203 Cal.Rptr.3d 407, 372 P.3d 811], the court identified certain factors to guide the jury in its determination of whether the defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life but did not hold that the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on those factors. *Clark* noted that these factors had been applied by appellate courts “in cases involving nonshooter aiders and abettors to commercial armed robbery felony murders.” (*Id.* at p. 618.) The trial court should determine whether the *Clark* factors need be given.

### ***Related Instructions—Other Causes of Death***

This instruction should be used only when the prosecution alleges that a coparticipant in the felony committed the act causing the death.

When the alleged victim dies during the course of the felony as a result of a heart attack, a fire, or a similar cause, rather than as a result of some act of force or violence committed against the victim by one of the participants, give CALCRIM No. 540C, *Felony Murder: First Degree—Other Acts Allegedly Caused Death*. (Cf. *People v. Billa* (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1064, 1072 [6 Cal.Rptr.3d 425, 79 P.3d 542]; *People v. Stamp* (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 203, 209–211 [82 Cal.Rptr. 598]; *People v.*

*Hernandez* (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 282, 287 [215 Cal.Rptr. 166]; but see *People v. Gunnerson* (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 370, 378–381 [141 Cal.Rptr. 488] [simultaneous or coincidental death is not killing.]

If the evidence indicates that someone other than the defendant or a coparticipant committed the fatal act, then the crime is not felony murder. (*People v. Washington* (1965) 62 Cal.2d 777, 782–783 [44 Cal.Rptr. 442, 402 P.2d 130]; *People v. Caldwell* (1984) 36 Cal.3d 210, 216 [203 Cal.Rptr. 433, 681 P.2d 274]; see also *People v. Gardner* (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 473, 477 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 603].) Liability may be imposed, however, under the provocative act doctrine. (*Pizano v. Superior Court of Tulare County* (1978) 21 Cal.3d 128, 134 [145 Cal.Rptr. 524, 577 P.2d 659]; see CALCRIM No. 560, *Homicide: Provocative Act by Defendant*.)

### **Related Instructions**

CALCRIM No. 400 et seq., *Aiding and Abetting: General Principles*.

CALCRIM No. 415 et seq., *Conspiracy*.

## **AUTHORITY**

- Felony Murder: First Degree. Pen. Code, § 189.
- Specific Intent to Commit Felony Required. *People v. Gutierrez* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083, 1140 [124 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 52 P.3d 572].
- Infliction of Fatal Injury. *People v. Alvarez* (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 222–223 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 385, 926 P.2d 365].
- Defendant Must Join Felonious Enterprise Before or During Killing of Victim. *People v. Pulido* (1997) 15 Cal.4th 713, 726 [63 Cal.Rptr.2d 625, 936 P.2d 1235].
- Logical Nexus Between Felony and Killing. *People v. Dominguez* (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1141]; *People v. Cavitt* (2004) 33 Cal.4th 187, 197–206].
- Merger Doctrine Does Not Apply to First Degree Felony Murder. *People v. Farley* (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1053, 1118–1120 [96 Cal.Rptr.3d 191, 210 P.3d 361].
- Reckless Indifference to Human Life. *People v. Clark* (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 614–620 [203 Cal.Rptr.3d 407, 372 P.3d 811]; *People v. Banks* (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788, 807–811 [189 Cal.Rptr.3d 208, 351 P.3d 330]; *People v. Estrada* (1995) 11 Cal.4th 568, 578 [46 Cal.Rptr.2d 586, 904 P.2d 1197]; *Tison v. Arizona* (1987) 481 U.S. 137, 157–158 [107 S.Ct. 1676, 95 L.Ed.2d 127].
- Major Participant. *People v. Banks* (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788, 803–808 [189 Cal.Rptr.3d 208, 351 P.3d 330].

## **RELATED ISSUES**

See the Related Issues section of CALCRIM No. 540A, *Felony Murder: First Degree—Defendant Allegedly Committed Fatal Act*.

See the Related Issues section of CALCRIM No. 2670, *Lawful Performance: Peace Officer*.

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Introduction to Crimes, §§ 98, 109.

1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, §§ 151–168, 178.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 140, *Challenges to Crimes*, § 140.10[3][b], Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.01[1][e], [2][b] (Matthew Bender).

**540C. Felony Murder: First Degree—Other Acts Allegedly Caused Death (Pen. Code, § 189)**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with first degree murder, under a theory of felony murder.

The defendant may be guilty of murder, under a theory of felony murder, even if another person did the act that resulted in the death. I will call the other person the *perpetrator*.

To prove that the defendant is guilty of first degree murder under this theory, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant (committed [or attempted to commit][,]/ [or] aided and abetted[,]/ [or] was a member of a conspiracy to commit) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert felony or felonies from Pen. Code, § 189>;
2. The defendant (intended to commit[,]/ [or] intended to aid and abet the perpetrator in committing[,]/ [or] intended that one or more of the members of the conspiracy commit) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert felony or felonies from Pen. Code, § 189>;

<Give element 3 if defendant did not personally commit or attempt felony.>

- [3. A perpetrator, (whom the defendant was aiding and abetting/ [or] with whom the defendant conspired), personally committed [or attempted to commit] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert felony or felonies from Pen. Code, § 189>;]

(3/4). The commission [or attempted commission] of the \_\_\_\_\_ <insert felony or felonies from Pen. Code, § 189> was a substantial factor in causing the death of another person;

<Alternative for Pen. Code § 189(e)(2) and (e)(3) liability>

[(4A/5A). The defendant intended to kill;

AND

(4B/5B). The defendant (aided and abetted[,]/[or] counseled[,]/ [or] commanded[,]/ [or] induced[,]/ [or] solicited[,]/ [or] requested[,]/ [or] assisted) the perpetrator in the commission of murder(./;)]

[OR]

[(4A/5A/6A). The defendant was a major participant in the \_\_\_\_\_ <insert felony or felonies from Pen. Code § 189>;

AND

(4B/5B/6B). When the defendant participated in the \_\_\_\_\_

*<insert felony or felonies from Pen. Code § 189>*, (he/she) acted with reckless indifference to human life(./;)]

[OR]

*<Alternative for Pen. Code § 189(f) liability>*

[(4A/5A/6A/7A). \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert officer's name, excluding title>* was a peace officer lawfully performing (his/her) duties as a peace officer;

AND

(4B/5B/6B/7B). When the defendant acted, (he/she) knew, or reasonably should have known, that \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert officer's name, excluding title>* was a peace officer performing (his/her) duties.]

[A person may be guilty of felony murder of a peace officer even if the killing was unintentional, accidental, or negligent.]

To decide whether (the defendant/ [and] the perpetrator) committed [or attempted to commit] \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert felony or felonies from Pen. Code, § 189>*, please refer to the separate instructions that I (will give/ have given) you on (that/those) crime[s]. [To decide whether the defendant aided and abetted a crime, please refer to the separate instructions that I (will give/have given) you on aiding and abetting.] [To decide whether the defendant was a member of a conspiracy to commit a crime, please refer to the separate instructions that I (will give/have given) you on conspiracy.] You must apply those instructions when you decide whether the People have proved first degree murder under a theory of felony murder.

An act causes death if the death is the direct, natural, and probable consequence of the act and the death would not have happened without the act. A *natural and probable consequence* is one that a reasonable person would know is likely to happen if nothing unusual intervenes. In deciding whether a consequence is natural and probable, consider all the circumstances established by the evidence.

[There may be more than one cause of death. An act causes death only if it is a substantial factor in causing the death. A *substantial factor* is more than a trivial or remote factor. However, it does not need to be the only factor that causes the death.]

[The defendant must have (intended to commit[,]/ [or] aid and abet[,]/ [or] been a member of a conspiracy to commit) the (felony/felonies) of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert felony or felonies from Pen. Code, § 189>* before or at the time of the death.]

[It is not required that the person die immediately, as long as the act

causing death occurred while the defendant was committing the (felony/felonies).]

[It is not required that the person killed be the (victim/intended victim) of the (felony/felonies).]

[It is not required that the defendant be present when the act causing the death occurs.]

*<The following instructions can be given when reckless indifference and major participant under Pen. Code § 189(e)(3) applies>*

[A person *acts with reckless indifference to human life* when he or she knowingly engages in criminal activity that he or she knows involves a grave risk of death.]

[When you decide whether the defendant acted with *reckless indifference to human life*, consider all the evidence. No one of the following factors is necessary, nor is any one of them necessarily enough, to determine whether the defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life. Among the factors you may consider are:

- [• Did the defendant know that [a] lethal weapon[s] would be present during the \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert underlying felony>?*]
- [• Did the defendant know that [a] lethal weapon[s] (was/were) likely to be used?]
- [• Did the defendant know that [a] lethal weapon[s] (was/were) used?]
- [• Did the defendant know the number of weapons involved?]
- [• Was the defendant near the person(s) killed when the killing occurred?]
- [• Did the defendant have an opportunity to stop the killing or to help the victim(s)?]
- [• How long did the crime last?]
- [• Was the defendant aware of anything that would make a coparticipant likely to kill?]
- [• Did the defendant try to minimize the possibility of violence?]
- [• \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert any other relevant factors>*]]

[When you decide whether the defendant was a *major participant*, consider all the evidence. No one of the following factors is necessary, nor is any one of them necessarily enough, to determine whether the defendant was a major participant. Among the factors you may consider are:

- [• [What was the defendant’s role in planning the crime that led to the death[s]??]
- [• What was the defendant’s role in supplying or using lethal weapons?]
- [• What did the defendant know about dangers posed by the crime, any weapons used, or past experience or conduct of the other participant[s]??]
- [• Was the defendant in a position to facilitate or to prevent the death?]
- [• Did the defendant’s action or inaction play a role in the death?]
- [• What did the defendant do after lethal force was used?]
- [• \_\_\_\_\_ <insert any other relevant factors.>]]

<Give the following instructions when Pen. Code § 189(f) applies>

[A person who is employed as a police officer by \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of agency that employs police officer> is a peace officer.]

[A person employed by \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of agency that employs peace officer, e.g., “the Department of Fish and Wildlife”> is a peace officer if \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of facts necessary to make employee a peace officer, e.g., “designated by the director of the agency as a peace officer”>.]

[The duties of (a/an) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert title of peace officer> include \_\_\_\_\_ <insert job duties>.]

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*New January 2006; Revised April 2010, August 2013, September 2019, April 2020*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime. The court also has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the elements of any underlying felonies. (*People v. Cain* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 36 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 481, 892 P.2d 1224].)

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on aiding and abetting when the prosecutor relies on it as a theory of culpability. (*People v. Beeman* (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 560–561 [199 Cal.Rptr.60, 674 P.2d 1318].) The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on conspiracy when the prosecution has introduced evidence of a conspiracy to prove liability for other offenses. (See, e.g., *People v. Pike* (1962) 58 Cal.2d 70, 88 [22 Cal.Rptr. 664, 372 P.2d 656]; *People v. Ditson* (1962) 57 Cal.2d 415, 447 [20 Cal.Rptr. 165, 369 P.2d 714].)



**Give all appropriate instructions on all underlying felonies, aiding and abetting, and conspiracy.**

If causation is at issue, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on proximate cause. (*People v. Bernhardt* (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 567, 590–591 [35 Cal.Rptr. 401]; see generally, *People v. Cervantes* (2001) 26 Cal.4th 860, 866–874 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 148, 29 P.3d 225].) Because causation is likely to be an issue in any case in which this instruction is given, the committee has included the paragraph that begins with “An act causes death if.” If there is evidence of multiple potential causes, the court should also give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “There may be more than one cause of death.” (*People v. Sanchez* (2001) 26 Cal.4th 834, 845–849 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 129, 29 P.3d 209]; *People v. Autry* (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 363 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 135].)

If the prosecution’s theory is that the defendant committed or attempted to commit the underlying felony, then select “committed [or attempted to commit]” in element 1 and “intended to commit” in element 2. In addition, in the paragraph that begins with “To decide whether,” select “the defendant” in the first sentence. Give all appropriate instructions on any underlying felonies with this instruction. The court may need to modify the first sentence of the instruction on an underlying felony if the defendant is not separately charged with that offense.

If the prosecution’s theory is that the defendant aided and abetted or conspired to commit the felony, select one of these options in element 1 and the corresponding intent requirement in element 2. Give bracketed element 3. Give the bracketed sentence at the beginning of the instruction that begins with “The defendant may be guilty of murder.” In addition, in the paragraph that begins with “To decide whether,” select “the perpetrator” in the first sentence. Give the second and/or third bracketed sentences. Give all appropriate instructions on any underlying felonies and on aiding and abetting and/or conspiracy with this instruction. The court may need to modify the first sentence of the instruction on an underlying felony if the defendant is not separately charged with that offense. The court may also need to modify the instruction to state “the perpetrator committed,” rather than “the defendant,” in the instructions on the underlying felony.

If there is evidence that the defendant did not form the intent to commit the felony until after the homicide, or did not join the conspiracy or aid and abet the felony until after the homicide, the defendant is entitled on request to an instruction pinpointing this issue. (*People v. Hudson* (1955) 45 Cal.2d 121, 124–127 [287 P.2d 497]; *People v. Silva* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 345, 371 [106 Cal.Rptr.2d 93, 21 P.3d 769].) Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “The defendant must have (intended to commit).” For an instruction specially tailored to robbery-murder cases, see *People v. Turner* (1990) 50 Cal.3d 668, 691 [268 Cal.Rptr. 706, 789 P.2d 887].

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “It is not required that the person die immediately” on request if relevant based on the evidence.

The felony-murder rule does not require that the person killed be the victim of the underlying felony. (*People v. Johnson* (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 653, 658 [104 Cal.Rptr.



807] [accomplice]; *People v. Welch* (1972) 8 Cal.3d 106, 117–119 [104 Cal.Rptr. 217, 501 P.2d 225] [innocent bystander]; *People v. Salas* (1972) 7 Cal.3d 812, 823 [103 Cal.Rptr. 431, 500 P.2d 7] [police officer].) Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “It is not required that the person killed be” on request.

Give the last bracketed sentence, stating that the defendant need not be present, on request.

If the defendant was a nonkiller who fled, leaving behind an accomplice who killed, see *People v. Cavitt* (2004) 33 Cal.4th 187, 206, fn. 7 [14 Cal.Rptr.3d 281, 91 P.3d 222] [continuous transaction] and the discussion of *Cavitt* in *People v. Wilkins* (2013) 56 Cal.4th 333, 344 [153 Cal.Rptr.3d 519, 295 P.3d 903].

If the prosecutor is proceeding under both malice and felony-murder theories, or is proceeding under multiple felony-murder theories, give CALCRIM No. 548, *Murder: Alternative Theories*. If the prosecutor is relying only on a theory of felony murder, no instruction on malice should be given. (See *People v. Cain* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 35–37 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 481, 892 P.2d 1224] [error to instruct on malice when felony murder only theory].)

There is **no** sua sponte duty to clarify the logical nexus between the felony and the homicidal act. If an issue about the logical nexus requirement arises, the court may give the following language:

**There must be a logical connection between the cause of death and the \_\_\_\_\_ <insert felony or felonies from Pen. Code, § 189> [or attempted \_\_\_\_\_ <insert felony or felonies from Pen. Code, § 189>]. The connection between the cause of death and the \_\_\_\_\_ <insert felony or felonies from Pen. Code, § 189> [or attempted \_\_\_\_\_ <insert felony or felonies from Pen. Code, § 189>] must involve more than just their occurrence at the same time and place.]**

*People v. Cavitt* (2004) 33 Cal.4th 187, 203–204 [14 Cal.Rptr.3d 281, 91 P.3d 222]; *People v. Wilkins* (2013) 56 Cal.4th 333, 347 [153 Cal.Rptr.3d 519, 295 P.3d 903].

In *People v. Banks* (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788, 803–808 [189 Cal.Rptr.3d 208, 351 P.3d 330], the court identified certain factors to guide the jury in its determination of whether the defendant was a major participant but stopped short of holding that the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on those factors. The trial court should determine whether the *Banks* factors need be given.

The court does not have a sua sponte duty to define “reckless indifference to human life.” (*People v. Estrada* (1995) 11 Cal.4th 568, 578 [46 Cal.Rptr.2d 586, 904 P.2d 1197].) However, this “holding should not be understood to discourage trial courts from amplifying the statutory language for the jury.” (*Id.* at p. 579.) The court may give the bracketed definition of reckless indifference if requested.

In *People v. Clark* (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 614–620 [203 Cal.Rptr.3d 407, 372 P.3d 811], the court identified certain factors to guide the jury in its determination of whether the defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life but did not hold that the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on those factors. *Clark* noted

that these factors had been applied by appellate courts “in cases involving nonshooter aiders and abettors to commercial armed robbery felony murders.” (*Id.* at p. 618.) The trial court should determine whether the *Clark* factors need be given.

***Related Instructions—Other Causes of Death***

This instruction should be used only when the alleged victim dies during the course of the felony as a result of a heart attack, fire, or a similar cause rather than as a result of some act of force or violence committed against the victim by one of the participants in the felony. (Cf. *People v. Billa* (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1064, 1072 [6 Cal.Rptr.3d 425, 79 P.3d 542] [arson causing death of accomplice]; *People v. Stamp* (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 203, 209–211 [82 Cal.Rptr. 598] [heart attack caused by robbery]; *People v. Hernandez* (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 282, 287 [215 Cal.Rptr. 166] [same]; but see *People v. Gunnerson* (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 370, 378–381 [141 Cal.Rptr. 488] [simultaneous or coincidental death is not killing].)

See the Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 540A, *Felony Murder: First Degree—Defendant Allegedly Committed Fatal Act*, for a discussion of other instructions to use if the evidence indicates a person committed an act of force or violence causing the death.

**AUTHORITY**

- Felony Murder: First Degree. Pen. Code, § 189.
- Specific Intent to Commit Felony Required. *People v. Gutierrez* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083, 1140 [124 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 52 P.3d 572].
- Infliction of Fatal Injury. *People v. Alvarez* (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 222–223 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 385, 926 P.2d 365].
- Defendant Must Join Felonious Enterprise Before or During Killing of Victim. *People v. Pulido* (1997) 15 Cal.4th 713, 726 [63 Cal.Rptr.2d 625, 936 P.2d 1235].
- Death Caused by Felony but Not by Act of Force or Violence Against Victim. *People v. Billa* (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1064, 1072 [6 Cal.Rptr.3d 425, 79 P.3d 542] [arson causing death of accomplice]; *People v. Stamp* (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 203, 209–211 [82 Cal.Rptr. 598] [heart attack caused by robbery]; *People v. Hernandez* (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 282, 287 [215 Cal.Rptr. 166] [same]; but see *People v. Gunnerson* (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 370, 378–381 [141 Cal.Rptr. 488] [simultaneous or coincidental death is not killing].
- Logical Nexus Between Felony and Killing. *People v. Dominguez* (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1141 [47 Cal.Rptr.3d 575, 140 P.3d 866]; *People v. Cavitt* (2004) 33 Cal.4th 187, 197–206 [14 Cal.Rptr.3d 281, 91 P.3d 222].
- Merger Doctrine Does Not Apply to First Degree Felony Murder. *People v. Farley* (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1053, 1118–1120 [96 Cal.Rptr.3d 191, 210 P.3d 361].
- Reckless Indifference to Human Life. *People v. Clark* (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 614–620 [203 Cal.Rptr.3d 407, 372 P.3d 811]; *People v. Banks* (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788, 807–811 [189 Cal.Rptr.3d 208, 351 P.3d 330]; *People v. Estrada* (1995) 11

Cal.4th 568, 578 [46 Cal.Rptr.2d 586, 904 P.2d 1197]; *Tison v. Arizona* (1987) 481 U.S. 137, 157–158 [107 S.Ct. 1676, 95 L.Ed.2d 127].

- Major Participant. *People v. Banks* (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788, 803–808 [189 Cal.Rptr.3d 208, 351 P.3d 330].

### RELATED ISSUES

See the Related Issues section of CALCRIM No. 540A, *Felony Murder: First Degree—Defendant Allegedly Committed Fatal Act*, and CALCRIM No. 540B, *Felony Murder: First Degree—Coparticipant Allegedly Committed Fatal Act*.

See the Related Issues section of CALCRIM No. 2670, *Lawful Performance: Peace Officer*.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, §§ 118–168.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 140, *Challenges to Crimes*, §§ 140.04, 140.10[3][b], Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.01[1][e], [2][b] (Matthew Bender).

**541A. Felony Murder: Second Degree—Defendant Allegedly  
Committed Fatal Act**

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2009, February 2012, August 2013; Revoked  
September 2019*

**541B. Felony Murder: Second Degree—Coparticipant Allegedly  
Committed Fatal Act**

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2009, August 2013; Revoked September 2019*

**541C. Felony Murder: Second Degree—Other Acts Allegedly  
Caused Death**

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2009, August 2013; Revoked September 2019*

**542–547. Reserved for Future Use**

## 548. Murder: Alternative Theories

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**The defendant has been prosecuted for murder under multiple theories. Each theory of murder has different requirements, and I will instruct you on each.**

**You may not find the defendant guilty of murder unless all of you agree that the People have proved that the defendant committed murder. You need not all agree on the same theory but you must unanimously agree on the degree of murder.**

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2014, February 2016, September 2019, April 2020*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

This instruction should be given after the court has given any applicable instructions on defenses to homicide and **before** CALCRIM No. 520, *Murder With Malice Aforethought*.

If there is evidence of multiple acts from which the jury might conclude that the defendant killed the decedent, the court may be required to give CALCRIM No. 3500, *Unanimity*. (See *People v. Dellinger* (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 284, 300–302 [209 Cal.Rpt. 503] [error not to instruct on unanimity where evidence that the victim was killed either by blunt force or by injection of cocaine].) Review the Bench Notes for CALCRIM No. 3500 discussing when a unanimity instruction is required.

### AUTHORITY

- Unanimity on Degrees of Crime and Lesser Included Offenses. Pen. Code § 1157; *People v. Sanchez* (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1012, 1025 [164 Cal.Rptr.3d. 880]; *People v. Aikin* (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 685, 704 [97 Cal.Rptr. 251], disapproved on other grounds in *People v. Lines* (1975) 13 Cal.3d 500, 512 [119 Cal.Rptr. 225].
- Alternate Theories May Support Different Degrees of Murder. *People v. Sanchez* (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1012, 1025 [164 Cal.Rptr.3d. 880].

## **549. Felony Murder: One Continuous Transaction—Defined**

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*New January 2006; Revoked August 2013*

**550–559. Reserved for Future Use**



## E. ALTERNATE THEORIES OF LIABILITY

### 560. Homicide: Provocative Act by Defendant

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[The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with \_\_\_\_\_ <insert underlying crime>.] The defendant is [also] charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with murder. A person can be guilty of murder under the provocative act doctrine even if someone else did the actual killing.

To prove that the defendant is guilty of murder under the provocative act doctrine, the People must prove that:

1. In (committing/ [or] attempting to commit) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert underlying crime>, the defendant intentionally did a provocative act;
2. The defendant knew that the natural and probable consequences of the provocative act were dangerous to human life and then acted with conscious disregard for life;
3. In response to the defendant's provocative act, \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name or description of third party> killed \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of decedent>;

AND

4. \_\_\_\_\_'s <insert name of decedent> death was the natural and probable consequence of the defendant's provocative act.

A *provocative act* is an act:

1. [That goes beyond what is necessary to accomplish the \_\_\_\_\_ <insert underlying crime>;]

[AND

- 2.] Whose natural and probable consequences are dangerous to human life, because there is a high probability that the act will provoke a deadly response.

In order to prove that \_\_\_\_\_'s <insert name of decedent> death was the *natural and probable consequence* of the defendant's provocative act, the People must prove that:

1. A reasonable person in the defendant's position would have foreseen that there was a high probability that his or her act could begin a chain of events resulting in someone's death;
2. The defendant's act was a direct and substantial factor in causing \_\_\_\_\_'s <insert name of decedent> death;

AND

3. \_\_\_\_\_’s *<insert name of decedent>* death would not have happened if the defendant had not committed the provocative act.

A *substantial factor* is more than a trivial or remote factor. However, it does not need to be the only factor that caused the death.

*<Multiple Provocative Acts>*

[The People alleged that the defendant committed the following provocative acts: \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert acts alleged>*. You may not find the defendant guilty unless you all agree that the People have proved that the defendant committed at least one of these acts. However, you do not all need to agree on which act.]

*<Independent Criminal Act>*

[A defendant is not guilty of murder if the killing of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of decedent>* was caused solely by the independent criminal act of someone else. An *independent criminal act* is a free, deliberate, and informed criminal act by a person who is not acting with the defendant.]

*<Degree of Murder>*

[[If you decide that the defendant is guilty of murder, you must decide whether the murder is first or second degree.]

*<Give if multiple theories alleged.>*

[The defendant has been prosecuted for first degree murder under (two/ \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert number>*) theories: (1) \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert first theory, e.g., “the provocative act was willful, deliberate, and premeditated (murder/ attempted murder)”>* [and] (2) \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert second theory, e.g., “the provocative act was committed during the defendant’s perpetration of an enumerated felony>* [\_\_\_\_\_ *<insert additional theories>*”].

Each theory of first degree murder has different requirements, and I will instruct you on (both/all \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert number>*.)

You may not find the defendant guilty of first degree murder unless all of you agree that the People have proved that the defendant committed murder. But all of you do not need to agree on the same theory.]

*<A. Deliberation and Premeditation>*

[The defendant is guilty of first degree murder if the People have proved that (his/her) provocative act was a (murder/attempted murder) committed willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation. The defendant acted *willfully* in committing this provocative act if (he/she) intended to kill. The defendant acted *deliberately* if (he/she) carefully weighed the considerations for and against (his/her) choice and, knowing the

consequences, decided to kill. The defendant acted with *premeditation* if (he/she) decided to kill before committing the provocative act[s] that (caused/(was/were) intended to cause) death.

The length of time the person spends considering whether to kill does not alone determine whether the (killing/attempted killing) is deliberate and premeditated. The amount of time required for deliberation and premeditation may vary from person to person and according to the circumstances. A decision to kill made rashly, impulsively, or without careful consideration is not deliberate and premeditated. On the other hand, a cold, calculated decision to kill can be reached quickly. The test is the extent of the reflection, not the length of time.]

*<Give the following paragraph if more than one defendant was involved in the provocative act>*

**For a defendant to be found guilty of first degree murder, (he/she) personally must have acted willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation when the (murder/attempted murder) was committed.**

*<B. Enumerated Felony>*

**[To prove that the defendant is guilty of first degree murder, the People must prove that:**

- 1. As a result of the defendant's provocative act, \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of decedent>* was killed during the commission of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert Pen. Code, § 189 felony>*;**

**AND**

- 2. Defendant intended to commit \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert Pen. Code, § 189 felony>* when (he/she) did the provocative act.**

**In deciding whether the defendant intended to commit \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert Pen. Code, § 189 felony>* and whether the death occurred during the commission of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert Pen. Code, § 189 felony>*, you should refer to the instructions I have given you on \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert Pen. Code, § 189 felony>*.]**

*<C. If there is another theory, see Bench Note below and modify and use CALCRIM No. 521 in a manner consistent with the modifications in section A. Deliberation and Premeditation>*

**The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was first degree murder rather than a lesser crime. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of first degree murder.**

**Any murder that does not meet these requirements for first degree murder is second degree murder.**

**[If you decide that the defendant committed murder, that crime is murder in the second degree.]**

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*New January 2006; Revised April 2011, February 2013*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction if the provocative act doctrine is one of the general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence. (*People v. Hood* (1969) 1 Cal.3d 444, 449 [82 Cal.Rptr. 618, 462 P.2d 370].) If the prosecution relies on a first degree murder theory based on a Penal Code section 189 felony, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give instructions relating to the underlying felony, whether or not it is separately charged.

If the defendant is an accomplice, aider and abettor, or coconspirator of the person who did the provocative act, give CALCRIM No. 561, *Homicide: Provocative Act by Accomplice*, instead of this instruction.

The first bracketed sentence of this instruction should only be given if the underlying felony is separately charged.

In the definition of “provocative act,” the court should always give the bracketed phrase that begins, “that goes beyond what is necessary,” unless the court determines that this element is not required because the underlying felony includes malice as an element. (*In re Aurelio R.* (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 52, 59–60 [212 Cal.Rptr. 868]; see also *People v. Briscoe* (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 568, 582 [112 Cal.Rptr.2d 401]; *People v. Gonzalez* (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 968 [118 Cal.Rptr.3d 637].) See discussion in the Related Issues section below.

If the evidence suggests that there is more than one provocative act, give the bracketed paragraph on “multiple provocative acts,” which instructs the jury that they need not unanimously agree about which provocative act caused the killing. (*People v. Briscoe* (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 568, 591 [112 Cal.Rptr.2d 401].)

If there is evidence that the actual perpetrator may have committed an *independent criminal act*, give on request the bracketed paragraph that begins with “A defendant is not guilty of murder if . . .” (See *People v. Cervantes* (2001) 26 Cal.4th 860, 874 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 148, 29 P.3d 225].)

If the prosecution is not seeking a first degree murder conviction, omit those bracketed paragraphs relating to first degree murder and simply give the last bracketed sentence of the instruction. As an alternative, the court may omit all instructions relating to the degree and secure a stipulation that if a guilty verdict is returned, the degree of murder is set at second degree. If the prosecution is seeking a first degree murder conviction, give the bracketed section on “degree of murder.”

If there is a theory of first degree murder other than *A. Deliberation and Premeditation*, or *B. Enumerated Felony*, e.g., torture, insert relevant portions of CALCRIM No. 521. That instruction must be modified to reflect the circumstances

of the case. For example, if the defendant’s provocative act is the torture of A, which causes B to shoot and kill C, the defendant will not have inflicted the required pain on “the person killed,” C, but on “the person tortured,” *People v. Concha I* (2010) 47 Cal.4th 653, 666 [101 Cal.Rptr.3d 141, 218 P.3d 660].

### AUTHORITY

- Provocative Act Doctrine. *People v. Gallegos* (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 453, 461 [63 Cal.Rptr.2d 382].
- Felony-Murder Rule Invoked to Determine Degree. *People v. Gilbert* (1965) 63 Cal.2d 690, 705 [47 Cal.Rptr. 909, 408 P.2d 365]; *Pizano v. Superior Court* (1978) 21 Cal.3d 128, 139, fn. 4 [145 Cal.Rptr. 524, 577 P.2d 659]; see *People v. Caldwell* (1984) 36 Cal.3d 210, 216–217, fn. 2 [203 Cal.Rptr. 433, 681 P.2d 274].
- Independent Intervening Act by Third Person. *People v. Cervantes* (2001) 26 Cal.4th 860, 874 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 148, 29 P.3d 225].
- Natural and Probable Consequences Doctrine. *People v. Gardner* (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 473, 479 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 603].
- Response of Third Party Need Not Be Reasonable. *People v. Gardner* (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 473, 482 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 603].
- Unanimity on Which Act Constitutes Provocative Act is Not Required. *People v. Briscoe* (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 568, 591 [112 Cal.Rptr.2d 401] [multiple provocative acts].
- This Instruction Upheld. *People v. Baker-Riley* (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 631, 635–636 [143 Cal.Rptr.3d 737].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Act “Beyond What is Necessary”*

The general rule that has arisen in the context of robbery cases is that the provocative act must be one that goes beyond what is necessary to accomplish the underlying felony. However, more recent cases make clear that this requirement is not universal. In attempted murder or assault with a deadly weapon cases, the crime itself may be a provocative act because it demonstrates either express or implied malice. (*In re Aurelio R.* (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 52, 59–60 [212 Cal.Rptr. 868]; see *Pizano v. Superior Court* (1978) 21 Cal.3d 128, 134 [145 Cal.Rptr. 524, 577 P.2d 659].)

#### *Death of a Fetus*

The California Supreme Court has declined to decide whether the felony-murder doctrine could constitutionally apply to the death of a fetus that did not result from a direct attack on the mother. (*People v. Davis* (1994) 7 Cal.4th 797, 810, fn. 2 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 50, 872 P.2d 591].) That ambiguity could extend to the provocative act doctrine as well.

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, §§ 168–177.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.02[2][a][i] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 140, *Challenges to Crimes*, § 140.04, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.01[1][a], [2][c] (Matthew Bender).

## 561. Homicide: Provocative Act by Accomplice

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[The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert underlying crime>*.] The defendant is [also] charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with murder. A person can be guilty of murder under the provocative act doctrine even if someone else did the actual killing.

To prove that the defendant is guilty of murder under the provocative act doctrine, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant was an accomplice of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name[s] or description[s] of alleged provocateur[s]>* in (committing/ [or] attempting to commit) \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert underlying crime>*;
2. In (committing/ [or] attempting to commit) \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert underlying crime>*, \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name[s] or description[s] of alleged provocateur[s]>* intentionally did a provocative act;
3. \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name[s] or description[s] of alleged provocateur[s]>* knew that the natural and probable consequences of the provocative act were dangerous to human life and then acted with conscious disregard for life;
4. In response to \_\_\_\_\_'s *<insert name[s] or description[s] of alleged provocateur[s]>* provocative act, \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name or description of third party>* killed \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of decedent>*;

AND

5. \_\_\_\_\_'s *<insert name of decedent>* death was the natural and probable consequence of \_\_\_\_\_'s *<insert name[s] or description[s] of alleged provocateur[s]>* provocative act.

A *provocative act* is an act:

1. [That goes beyond what is necessary to accomplish the \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert underlying crime>*];

[AND

- 2.] Whose natural and probable consequences are dangerous to human life, because there is a high probability that the act will provoke a deadly response.

The defendant is an *accomplice* of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name[s] or description[s] of alleged provocateur[s]>* if the defendant is subject to prosecution for the identical offense that you conclude \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name[s] or description[s] of alleged provocateur[s]>* (committed/ [or] attempted to commit). The defendant is subject to prosecution if (he/



she) (committed/ [or] attempted to commit) the crime or if:

1. (He/She) knew of \_\_\_\_\_'s *<insert name[s] or description[s] of alleged provocateur[s]>* **criminal purpose to commit** \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert underlying crime>*;

**AND**

2. The defendant intended to, and did in fact, (aid, facilitate, promote, encourage, or instigate the commission of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert underlying crime>*/ [or] participate in a criminal conspiracy to commit \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert underlying crime>*).

[An accomplice does not need to be present when the crime is committed. On the other hand, a person is not an accomplice just because he or she is at the scene of a crime, even if he or she knows that a crime [will be committed or] is being committed and does nothing to stop it.]

In order to prove that \_\_\_\_\_'s *<insert name of decedent>* death was the *natural and probable consequence* of \_\_\_\_\_'s *<insert name[s] or description[s] of alleged provocateur[s]>* **provocative act**, the People must prove that:

1. A reasonable person in \_\_\_\_\_'s *<insert name[s] or description[s] of alleged provocateur[s]>* **position would have foreseen that there was a high probability that (his/her/their) act could begin a chain of events resulting in someone's death;**
2. \_\_\_\_\_'s *<insert name[s] or description[s] of alleged provocateur[s]>* **act was a direct and substantial factor in causing** \_\_\_\_\_'s *<insert name of decedent>* **death;**

**AND**

3. \_\_\_\_\_'s *<insert name or description of decedent>* **death would not have happened if** \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name[s] or description[s] of alleged provocateur[s]>* **had not committed the provocative act.**

A *substantial factor* is more than a trivial or remote factor. However, it does not need to be the only factor that caused the death.

*<Multiple Provocative Acts>*

[The People alleged the following provocative acts: \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert acts alleged>*. You may not find the defendant guilty unless you all agree that the People have proved that:

1. \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name[s] or description[s] of alleged provocateur[s]>* **committed at least one provocative act;**

**AND**



2. At least one of the provocative acts committed by \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] or description[s] of alleged provocateur[s]> was a direct and substantial factor that caused the killing.

However, you do not all need to agree on which provocative act has been proved.]

<Accomplice Deceased>

[If you decide that the only provocative act that caused \_\_\_\_\_'s <insert name of deceased accomplice> death was committed by \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of deceased accomplice>, then the defendant is not guilty of \_\_\_\_\_'s <insert name of deceased accomplice> murder.]

<Independent Criminal Act>

[A defendant is not guilty of murder if the killing of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name or description of decedent> was caused solely by the independent criminal act of someone other than the defendant or \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] or description[s] of all alleged accomplice[s]>. An independent criminal act is a free, deliberate, and informed criminal act by a person who is not acting with the defendant.]

<Degree of Murder>

[If you decide that the defendant is guilty of murder, you must decide whether the murder is first or second degree.

To prove that the defendant is guilty of first degree murder, the People must prove that:

1. As a result of \_\_\_\_\_'s <insert name[s] or description[s] of alleged provocateur[s]> provocative act, \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of decedent> was killed while \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] or description[s] of alleged provocateur[s]> (was/were) committing \_\_\_\_\_ <insert Pen. Code, § 189 felony>;

AND

2. \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] or description[s] of alleged provocateur[s]> specifically intended to commit \_\_\_\_\_ <insert Pen. Code, § 189 felony> when (he/she/they) did the provocative act.

In deciding whether \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] or description[s] of alleged provocateur[s]> intended to commit \_\_\_\_\_ <insert Pen. Code, § 189 felony> and whether the death occurred during the commission of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert Pen. Code, § 189 felony>, you should refer to the instructions I have given you on \_\_\_\_\_ <insert Pen. Code, § 189 felony>.

**Any murder that does not meet these requirements for first degree murder is second degree murder.]**

**[If you decide that the defendant committed murder, that crime is murder in the second degree.]**

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2014, September 2019*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction if the provocative act doctrine is one of the general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence. (*People v. Hood* (1969) 1 Cal.3d 444, 449 [82 Cal.Rptr. 618, 462 P.2d 370].) If the prosecution relies on a first degree murder theory based on a Penal Code section 189 felony, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give instructions relating to the underlying felony, whether or not it is separately charged.

Penal Code section 188, as amended by Statutes 2018, ch. 1015 (S.B. 1437), became effective January 1, 2019. The amendment added “malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.” The continued legality of provocative act murder liability when an accomplice committed the provocative act may be affected by this statutory change.

The first bracketed sentence of this instruction should only be given if the underlying felony is separately charged.

In the definition of “provocative act,” the court should always give the bracketed phrase that begins, “that goes beyond what is necessary,” unless the court determines that this element is not required because the underlying felony includes malice as an element. (*In re Aurelio R.* (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 52, 59–60 [212 Cal.Rptr. 868].) See discussion in the Related Issues section to CALCRIM No. 560, *Homicide: Provocative Act by Defendant*.

In the paragraph that begins with “An accomplice does not need to be present,” use the bracketed phrase “will be committed or” if appropriate under the facts of the case.

If a deceased accomplice participated in provocative acts leading to his or her own death, give the bracketed sentence that begins, “If you decide that the only provocative act that caused . . . .” (See *People v. Garcia* (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1324, 1330 [82 Cal.Rptr.2d 254]; *People v. Superior Court (Shamis)* (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 833, 846 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 388]; *Taylor v. Superior Court* (1970) 3 Cal.3d 578, 583–584 [91 Cal.Rptr. 275, 477 P.2d 131]; *People v. Antick* (1975) 15 Cal.3d 79, 90 [123 Cal.Rptr. 475, 539 P.2d 43], disapproved on other grounds in *People v. McCoy* (2010) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1123 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 188, 24 P.3d 1210].)

If there is evidence that the actual perpetrator may have committed an *independent criminal act*, give on request the bracketed paragraph that begins, “A defendant is

not guilty of murder if . . . .” (See *People v. Cervantes* (2001) 26 Cal.4th 860, 874 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 148, 29 P.3d 225].)

If the evidence suggests that there is more than one provocative act, give the bracketed section on “Multiple Provocative Acts.” (*People v. Briscoe* (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 568, 591 [112 Cal.Rptr.2d 401].)

If the prosecution is not seeking a first degree murder conviction, omit those bracketed paragraphs relating to first degree murder and simply give the last bracketed sentence of the instruction. As an alternative, the court may omit all instructions relating to the degree and secure a stipulation that if a murder verdict is returned, the degree of murder is set at second degree. If the prosecution is seeking a first degree murder conviction, give the bracketed section on “degree of murder.”

### AUTHORITY

- Provocative Act Doctrine. *People v. Gallegos* (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 453, 461 [63 Cal.Rptr.2d 382].
- Felony-Murder Rule Invoked to Determine Degree. *People v. Gilbert* (1965) 63 Cal.2d 690, 705 [47 Cal.Rptr. 909, 408 P.2d 365]; *Pizano v. Superior Court* (1978) 21 Cal.3d 128, 139, fn. 4 [145 Cal.Rptr. 524, 577 P.2d 659]; see *People v. Caldwell* (1984) 36 Cal.3d 210, 216–217, fn. 2 [203 Cal.Rptr. 433, 681 P.2d 274].
- Independent Intervening Act by Third Person. *People v. Cervantes* (2001) 26 Cal.4th 860, 874 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 148, 29 P.3d 225].
- Natural and Probable Consequences Doctrine. *People v. Gardner* (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 473, 479 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 603].
- Response of Third Party Need Not Be Reasonable. *People v. Gardner* (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 473, 482 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 603].
- Unanimity on Which Act Constitutes Provocative Act Is Not Required. *People v. Briscoe* (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 568, 591 [112 Cal.Rptr.2d 401] [multiple provocative acts].
- Implied Malice May Be Imputed to Absent Mastermind. *People v. Johnson* (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 623, 633 [164 Cal.Rptr.3d 505].

### RELATED ISSUES

See the Related Issues section to CALCRIM No. 560, *Homicide: Provocative Act by Defendant*.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, §§ 168–177.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.02[2][a][i] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 140,

*Challenges to Crimes*, §§ 140.04, 140.10, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.01[1][a], [2][c] (Matthew Bender).

## 562. Transferred Intent

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<A. Only unintended victim is killed.>

**[If the defendant intended to kill one person, but by mistake or accident killed someone else instead, then the crime, if any, is the same as if the intended person had been killed.]**

<B. Both intended and unintended victims are killed.>

**[If the defendant intended to kill one person, but by mistake or accident also killed someone else, then the crime, if any, is the same for the unintended killing as it is for the intended killing.]**

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*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### ***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction if transferred intent is one of the general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence. (*People v. Hood* (1969) 1 Cal.3d 444, 449 [82 Cal.Rptr. 618, 462 P.2d 370].)

Give optional paragraph A if only an unintended victim is killed. Give optional paragraph B if both the intended victim and an unintended victim or victims are killed. (See discussion in Commentary, below.)

Any defenses that apply to the intended killing apply to the unintended killing as well. (*People v. Mathews* (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 1018, 1024 [154 Cal.Rptr. 628].) This includes defenses that decrease the level of culpable homicide such as heat of passion or imperfect self-defense.

Do not give this instruction for a charge of attempted murder. The transferred intent doctrine does not apply to attempted murder. A defendant's guilt of attempted murder must be judged separately for each alleged victim. (*People v. Bland* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 313, 327–328, 331 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d 546, 48 P.3d 1107]; see CALCRIM No. 600, *Attempted Murder*.)

#### ***Related Instructions***

Always give the appropriate related homicide instructions.

### AUTHORITY

- Common Law Doctrine of Transferred Intent. *People v. Mathews* (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 1018, 1024 [154 Cal.Rptr. 628].

### COMMENTARY

#### ***Intent Transfers to Unintended Victim***

“[A] person’s intent to kill the intended target is not ‘used up’ once it is employed to convict the person of murdering that target. It can also be used to convict of the

murder of others the person also killed . . . [A]ssuming legal causation, a person maliciously intending to kill is guilty of the murder of all persons actually killed. If the intent is premeditated, the murder or murders are first degree . . . Intent to kill transfers to an unintended homicide victim even if the intended target is killed.” (*People v. Bland* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 313, 322, 323–324, 326 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d 546, 48 P.3d 1107] [disapproving *People v. Birreuta* (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 454, 458, 463 [208 Cal.Rptr. 635]].)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Elements, §§ 13–15.  
6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 140, *Challenges to Crimes*, § 140.02[3][b], Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.01[2][b][vii] (Matthew Bender).

## 563. Conspiracy to Commit Murder (Pen. Code, § 182)

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(The defendant[s]/Defendant[s] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s]>) (is/are) charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with conspiracy to commit first degree murder [in violation of Penal Code section 182].

To prove that (the/a) defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant intended to agree and did agree with [one or more of] (the other defendant[s]/ [or] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] or description[s] of coparticipant[s]>) to intentionally and unlawfully kill;
2. At the time of the agreement, the defendant and [one or more of] the other alleged member[s] of the conspiracy intended that one or more of them would intentionally and unlawfully kill;
3. (The/One of the) defendant[s][,] [or \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] or description[s] of coparticipant[s]>][,] [or (both/all) of them] committed [at least one of] the following overt act[s] alleged to accomplish the killing: \_\_\_\_\_ <insert the alleged overt acts>;

**AND**

4. [At least one of these/This] overt act[s] was committed in California.

To decide whether (the/a) defendant committed (this/these) overt act[s], consider all of the evidence presented about the overt act[s].

To decide whether (the/a) defendant and [one or more of] the other alleged member[s] of the conspiracy intended to commit *murder in the first degree*, please refer to Instructions 520 (*First or Second Degree Murder With Malice Aforethought*) and 521 (*First Degree Murder*) which define that crime.

When deciding whether (the/a) defendant and [one or more of] the other alleged member[s] of the conspiracy intended to commit *murder in the first degree*, do not consider implied malice. Conspiracy to commit murder requires an intent to kill.

The People must prove that the members of the alleged conspiracy had an agreement and intent to commit murder. The People do not have to prove that any of the members of the alleged conspiracy actually met or came to a detailed or formal agreement to commit that crime. An agreement may be inferred from conduct if you conclude that members of the alleged conspiracy acted with a common purpose to commit the crime.

**An overt act is an act by one or more of the members of the conspiracy that is done to help accomplish the agreed upon crime. The overt act must happen after the defendant has agreed to commit the crime. The overt act must be more than the act of agreeing or planning to commit the crime, but it does not have to be a criminal act itself.**

**[You must all agree that at least one alleged overt act was committed in California by at least one alleged member of the conspiracy, but you do not have to all agree on which specific overt act or acts were committed or who committed the overt act or acts.]**

**[You must make a separate decision as to whether each defendant was a member of the alleged conspiracy.]**

**[A member of a conspiracy does not have to personally know the identity or roles of all the other members.]**

**[Someone who merely accompanies or associates with members of a conspiracy but who does not intend to commit the crime is not a member of the conspiracy.]**

**[Evidence that a person did an act or made a statement that helped accomplish the goal of the conspiracy is not enough, by itself, to prove that the person was a member of the conspiracy.]**

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2006; Revised April 2010, February 2014, September 2020*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime when the defendant is charged with conspiracy. (See *People v. Morante* (1999) 20 Cal.4th 403, 416 [84 Cal.Rptr.2d 665, 975 P.2d 1071].) Use this instruction only if the defendant is charged with conspiracy to commit murder. If the defendant is charged with conspiracy to commit another crime, give CALCRIM No. 415, *Conspiracy*. If the defendant is not charged with conspiracy but evidence of a conspiracy has been admitted for another purpose, do not give either instruction. Give CALCRIM No. 416, *Evidence of Uncharged Conspiracy*.

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the elements of the offense alleged to be the target of the conspiracy. (*People v. Cortez* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1223, 1238–1239 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 733, 960 P.2d 537]; *People v. Fenenbock* (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1688, 1706 [54 Cal.Rptr.2d 608].) Give all appropriate instructions defining the elements of murder.

In elements 1 and 3, insert the names or descriptions of alleged coconspirators if they are not defendants in the trial. (See *People v. Liu* (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1131 [54 Cal.Rptr.2d 578].) See also the Commentary section below.



Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “You must all agree that at least one overt act alleged” if multiple overt acts are alleged in connection with a single conspiracy. (See *People v. Russo* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1124, 1135–1136 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 436, 25 P.3d 641].)

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “You must make a separate decision” if more than one defendant is charged with conspiracy. (See *People v. Fulton* (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 91, 101 [201 Cal.Rptr. 879]; *People v. Crain* (1951) 102 Cal.App.2d 566, 581–582 [228 P.2d 307].)

Do not cross-reference the murder instructions unless they have been modified to delete references to implied malice. Otherwise, a reference to implied malice could confuse jurors, because conspiracy to commit murder may not be based on a theory of implied malice. (*People v. Swain* (1996) 12 Cal.4th 593, 602–603, 607 [49 Cal.Rptr.2d 390, 909 P.2d 994].)

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “A member of a conspiracy does not have to personally know,” on request if there is evidence that the defendant did not personally know all the alleged coconspirators. (See *People v. Van Eyk* (1961) 56 Cal.2d 471, 479 [15 Cal.Rptr. 150, 364 P.2d 326].)

Give the two final bracketed sentences on request. (See *People v. Toledo-Corro* (1959) 174 Cal.App.2d 812, 820 [345 P.2d 529].)

### ***Defenses—Instructional Duty***

If there is sufficient evidence that the defendant withdrew from the alleged conspiracy, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give CALCRIM No. 420, *Withdrawal From Conspiracy*.

If the case involves an issue regarding the statute of limitations or evidence of withdrawal by the defendant, a unanimity instruction may be required. (*People v. Russo* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1124, 1136, fn. 2 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 436, 25 P.3d 641]; see also Related Issues section to CALCRIM No. 415, *Conspiracy*, and CALCRIM 3500, *Unanimity*.)

### ***Related Instructions***

CALCRIM No. 415, *Conspiracy*.

CALCRIM No. 520, *Murder With Malice Aforethought*.

CALCRIM No. 521, *First Degree Murder*

## **AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 182(a), 183; *People v. Morante* (1999) 20 Cal.4th 403, 416 [84 Cal.Rptr.2d 665, 975 P.2d 1071]; *People v. Swain* (1996) 12 Cal.4th 593, 600 [49 Cal.Rptr.2d 390, 909 P.2d 994]; *People v. Liu* (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1128 [54 Cal.Rptr.2d 578].
- Overt Act Defined. Pen. Code, § 184; *People v. Saugstad* (1962) 203 Cal.App.2d 536, 549–550 [21 Cal.Rptr. 740]; *People v. Zamora* (1976) 18 Cal.3d 538, 549, fn. 8 [134 Cal.Rptr. 784, 557 P.2d 75].
- Elements of Underlying Offense. *People v. Fenenbock* (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 307

1688, 1706 [54 Cal.Rptr.2d 608]; *People v. Cortez* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1223, 1238–1239 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 733, 960 P.2d 537].

- Express Malice Murder. *People v. Swain* (1996) 12 Cal.4th 593, 602–603, 607 [49 Cal.Rptr.2d 390, 909 P.2d 994].
- Premeditated First Degree Murder. *People v. Cortez* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1223, 1232 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 733, 960 P.2d 537].
- Unanimity on Specific Overt Act Not Required. *People v. Russo* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1124, 1133–1135 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 436, 25 P.3d 641].
- No Conspiracy to Commit Second Degree Murder. *People v. Beck and Cruz* (2019) 8 Cal.5th 548, 641 [256 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 453 P.3d 1038].

### COMMENTARY

It is sufficient to refer to coconspirators in the accusatory pleading as “persons unknown.” (*People v. Sacramento Butchers’ Protective Association* (1910) 12 Cal.App. 471, 483 [107 P. 712]; *People v. Roy* (1967) 251 Cal.App.2d 459, 463 [59 Cal.Rptr. 636]; see 1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Elements, § 87.) Nevertheless, this instruction assumes the prosecution has named at least two members of the alleged conspiracy, whether charged or not.

Conspiracy to commit murder cannot be based on a theory of implied malice. (*People v. Swain* (1996) 12 Cal.4th 593, 602–603, 607 [49 Cal.Rptr.2d 390, 909 P.2d 994].) All conspiracy to commit murder is necessarily conspiracy to commit premeditated first degree murder. (*People v. Cortez* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1223, 1232 [77 Cal.Rptr. 2d 733, 960 P.2d 537].)

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

There is no crime of conspiracy to commit attempted murder. (*People v. Iniguez* (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 75, 79 [116 Cal.Rptr.2d 634].)

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct the jury on a lesser included target offense if there is substantial evidence from which the jury could find a conspiracy to commit that offense. (*People v. Horn* (1974) 12 Cal.3d 290, 297 [115 Cal.Rptr. 516, 524 P.2d 1300], disapproved on other ground in *People v. Cortez* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1223, 1237–1238 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 733, 960 P.2d 537]; *People v. Cook* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 910, 918 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 204]; *People v. Kelley* (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 1358, 1365–1366, 1370 [269 Cal.Rptr. 900].)

There is a split of authority whether a court may look to the overt acts in the accusatory pleadings to determine if it has a duty to instruct on any lesser included offenses to the charged conspiracy. (*People v. Cook, supra*, 91 Cal.App.4th at pp. 919–920, 922 [court may look to overt acts pleaded in charge of conspiracy to determine whether charged offense includes a lesser included offense]; contra, *People v. Fenenbock, supra*, 46 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1708–1709 [court should examine description of agreement in pleading, not description of overt acts, to decide whether lesser offense was necessarily the target of the conspiracy].)

**RELATED ISSUES*****Multiple Conspiracies***

Separately planned murders are punishable as separate conspiracies, even if the separate murders are incidental to a single objective. (*People v. Liu* (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1133 [54 Cal.Rptr.2d 578].)

See the Related Issues section to CALCRIM No. 415, *Conspiracy*.

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Elements, §§ 82–83.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 141, *Conspiracy, Solicitation, and Attempt*, §§ 141.01[2], 141.02[3], [4][b], [5][c], Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.01[2][e] (Matthew Bender).

**564–569. Reserved for Future Use**



## **F. MANSLAUGHTER**

### **(i) Voluntary**

#### **570. Voluntary Manslaughter: Heat of Passion—Lesser Included Offense (Pen. Code, § 192(a))**

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**A killing that would otherwise be murder is reduced to voluntary manslaughter if the defendant killed someone because of a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion.**

**The defendant killed someone because of a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion if:**

- 1. The defendant was provoked;**
- 2. As a result of the provocation, the defendant acted rashly and under the influence of intense emotion that obscured (his/her) reasoning or judgment;**

**AND**

- 3. The provocation would have caused a person of average disposition to act rashly and without due deliberation, that is, from passion rather than from judgment.**

**Heat of passion does not require anger, rage, or any specific emotion. It can be any violent or intense emotion that causes a person to act without due deliberation and reflection.**

**In order for heat of passion to reduce a murder to voluntary manslaughter, the defendant must have acted under the direct and immediate influence of provocation as I have defined it. While no specific type of provocation is required, slight or remote provocation is not sufficient. Sufficient provocation may occur over a short or long period of time.**

**It is not enough that the defendant simply was provoked. The defendant is not allowed to set up (his/her) own standard of conduct. You must decide whether the defendant was provoked and whether the provocation was sufficient. In deciding whether the provocation was sufficient, consider whether a person of average disposition, in the same situation and knowing the same facts, would have reacted from passion rather than from judgment.**

**[If enough time passed between the provocation and the killing for a person of average disposition to “cool off” and regain his or her clear reasoning and judgment, then the killing is not reduced to voluntary manslaughter on this basis.]**

**The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not kill as the result of a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of murder.**

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*New January 2006; Revised December 2008, February 2014, August 2015*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a  **sua sponte**  duty to instruct on voluntary manslaughter on either theory, heat of passion or imperfect self-defense, when evidence of either is “substantial enough to merit consideration” by the jury. (*People v. Breverman* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 153–163 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094]; *People v. Barton* (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 201 [47 Cal.Rptr.2d 569, 906 P.2d 531].)

If the victim’s gender identity or sexual orientation raises specific issues concerning whether provocation was objectively reasonable, give an instruction tailored to those issues on request. (Pen. Code, § 192(f), amended effective January 1, 2015.)

### *Related Instructions*

CALCRIM No. 511, *Excusable Homicide: Accident in the Heat of Passion*.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 192(a).
- Heat of Passion Defined. *People v. Beltran* (2013) 56 Cal.4th 935, 938, 942, 957 [157 Cal.Rptr. 3d 503, 301 P.3d 1120]; *People v. Breverman* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 163 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094]; *People v. Valentine* (1946) 28 Cal.2d 121, 139 [169 P.2d 1]; *People v. Lee* (1999) 20 Cal.4th 47, 59 [82 Cal.Rptr.2d 625, 971 P.2d 1001].
- “Average Person” Need Not Have Been Provoked to Kill, Just to Act Rashly and Without Deliberation. (*People v. Beltran* (2013) 56 Cal.4th 935, 938, 942, 957 [157 Cal.Rptr. 3d 503, 301 P.3d 1120]); *People v. Najera* (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 212, 223 [41 Cal.Rptr.3d 244].
- Gender Identity and Sexual Orientation Not Proper Basis for Finding Provocation Objectively Reasonable. Pen. Code, § 192(f), amended effective January 1, 2015.

## LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Attempted Voluntary Manslaughter. *People v. Van Ronk* (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 818, 824–825 [217 Cal.Rptr. 581]; *People v. Williams* (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 1018, 1024–1026 [162 Cal.Rptr. 748].

Involuntary manslaughter is *not* a lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter. (*People v. Orr* (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 780, 784 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 553].)

## RELATED ISSUES

### ***Heat of Passion: Sufficiency of Provocation—Examples***

In *People v. Breverman*, sufficient evidence of provocation existed where a mob of young men trespassed onto defendant's yard and attacked defendant's car with weapons. (*People v. Breverman* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 163–164 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094].) Provocation has also been found sufficient based on the murder of a family member (*People v. Brooks* (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 687, 694 [230 Cal.Rptr. 86]); a sudden and violent quarrel (*People v. Elmore* (1914) 167 Cal. 205, 211 [138 P. 989]); verbal taunts by an unfaithful wife (*People v. Berry* (1976) 18 Cal.3d 509, 515 [134 Cal.Rptr. 415, 556 P.2d 777]); and the infidelity of a lover (*People v. Borchers* (1958) 50 Cal.2d 321, 328–329 [325 P.2d 97]).

In the following cases, evidence has been found inadequate to warrant instruction on provocation: evidence of name calling, smirking, or staring and looking stone-faced (*People v. Lucas* (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 721, 739 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 282]); calling someone a particular epithet (*People v. Manriquez* (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 585–586 [36 Cal.Rptr.3d 340, 123 P.3d 614]); refusing to have sex in exchange for drugs (*People v. Michael Sims Dixon* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1547, 1555–1556 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 859]); a victim's resistance against a rape attempt (*People v. Rich* (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1036, 1112 [248 Cal.Rptr. 510, 755 P.2d 960]); the desire for revenge (*People v. Fenenbock* (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1688, 1704 [54 Cal.Rptr.2d 608]); and a long history of criticism, reproach and ridicule where the defendant had not seen the victims for over two weeks prior to the killings (*People v. Kanawyer* (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1246–1247 [7 Cal.Rptr.3d 401]). In addition the Supreme Court has suggested that mere vandalism of an automobile is insufficient for provocation. (See *People v. Breverman* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 164, fn. 11 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094]; *In re Christian S.* (1994) 7 Cal.4th 768, 779, fn. 3 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 33, 872 P.2d 574].)

### ***Heat of Passion: Types of Provocation***

Heat of passion does not require anger or rage. It can be “any violent, intense, high-wrought or enthusiastic emotion.” (*People v. Breverman* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 163–164 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094].)

### ***Heat of Passion: Verbal Provocation Sufficient***

The provocative conduct by the victim may be physical or verbal, but the conduct must be sufficiently provocative that it would cause an ordinary person of average disposition to act rashly or without due deliberation and reflection. (*People v. Lee* (1999) 20 Cal.4th 47, 59 [82 Cal.Rptr.2d 625, 971 P.2d 1001]; *People v. Valentine* (1946) 28 Cal.2d 121, 138–139 [169 P.2d 1].)

### ***Heat of Passion: Defendant Initial Aggressor***

“[A] defendant who provokes a physical encounter by rude challenges to another person to fight, coupled with threats of violence and death to that person and his entire family, is not entitled to claim that he was provoked into using deadly force when the challenged person responds without apparent (or actual) use of such

force.” (*People v. Johnston* (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 1299, 1303, 1312–1313 [7 Cal.Rptr.3d 161].)

***Heat of Passion: Defendant’s Own Standard***

Unrestrained and unprovoked rage does not constitute heat of passion and a person of extremely violent temperament cannot substitute his or her own subjective standard for heat of passion. (*People v. Valentine* (1946) 28 Cal.2d 121, 139 [169 P.2d 1] [court approved admonishing jury on this point]; *People v. Danielly* (1949) 33 Cal.2d 362, 377 [202 P.2d 18]; *People v. Berry* (1976) 18 Cal.3d 509, 515 [134 Cal.Rptr. 415, 556 P.2d 777].) The objective element of this form of voluntary manslaughter is not satisfied by evidence of a defendant’s “extraordinary character and environmental deficiencies.” (*People v. Steele* (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1230, 1253 [120 Cal.Rptr.2d 432, 47 P.3d 225] [evidence of intoxication, mental deficiencies, and psychological dysfunction due to traumatic experiences in Vietnam are not provocation by the victim].)

***Premeditation and Deliberation—Heat of Passion Provocation***

Provocation and heat of passion that is insufficient to reduce a murder to manslaughter may nonetheless reduce murder from first to second degree. (*People v. Thomas* (1945) 25 Cal.2d 880, 903 [156 P.2d 7] [provocation raised reasonable doubt about the idea of premeditation or deliberation].) There is, however, no sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on this issue because provocation in this context is a defense to the element of deliberation, not an element of the crime, as it is in the manslaughter context. (*People v. Middleton* (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 19, 32–33 [60 Cal.Rptr.2d 366], disapproved on other grounds in *People v. Gonzalez* (2003) 31 Cal.4th 745, 752 [3 Cal.Rptr.3d 676, 74 P.3d 771].) On request, give CALCRIM No. 522, *Provocation: Effect on Degree of Murder*.

***Fetus***

Manslaughter does not apply to the death of a fetus. (*People v. Carlson* (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 349, 355 [112 Cal.Rptr. 321].) While the Legislature has included the killing of a fetus, as well as a human being, within the definition of murder under Penal Code section 187, it has “left untouched the provisions of section 192, defining manslaughter [as] the ‘unlawful killing of a human being.’” (*Ibid.*)

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person §§ 111, 224, 226–245.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, §§ 85.03[2][g], 85.04[1][c] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, §§ 142.01[3][e], 142.02[1][a], [e], [f], [2][a], [3][c] (Matthew Bender).



## 571. Voluntary Manslaughter: Imperfect Self-Defense or Imperfect Defense of Another—Lesser Included Offense (Pen. Code, § 192)

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A killing that would otherwise be murder is reduced to voluntary manslaughter if the defendant killed a person because (he/she) acted in (imperfect self-defense/ [or] imperfect defense of another).

If you conclude the defendant acted in complete (self-defense/ [or] defense of another), (his/her) action was lawful and you must find (him/her) not guilty of any crime. The difference between complete (self-defense/ [or] defense of another) and (imperfect self-defense/ [or] imperfect defense of another) depends on whether the defendant's belief in the need to use deadly force was reasonable.

The defendant acted in (imperfect self-defense/ [or] imperfect defense of another) if:

1. The defendant actually believed that (he/she/ [or] someone else/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of third party>) was in imminent danger of being killed or suffering great bodily injury;

**AND**

2. The defendant actually believed that the immediate use of deadly force was necessary to defend against the danger;

**BUT**

3. At least one of those beliefs was unreasonable.

Belief in future harm is not sufficient, no matter how great or how likely the harm is believed to be.

In evaluating the defendant's beliefs, consider all the circumstances as they were known and appeared to the defendant.

<The following definition may be given if requested>

[A danger is *imminent* if, when the fatal wound occurred, the danger actually existed or the defendant believed it existed. The danger must seem immediate and present, so that it must be instantly dealt with. It may not be merely prospective or in the near future.]

[Imperfect self-defense does not apply when the defendant, through (his/her) own wrongful conduct, has created circumstances that justify (his/her) adversary's use of force.]

[If you find that \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of decedent/victim> threatened or harmed the defendant [or others] in the past, you may consider that information in evaluating the defendant's beliefs.]

[If you find that the defendant knew that \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of

*decedent/victim*> had threatened or harmed others in the past, you may consider that information in evaluating the defendant’s beliefs.]

[If you find that the defendant received a threat from someone else that (he/she) associated with \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of decedent/victim>, you may consider that threat in evaluating the defendant’s beliefs.]

[*Great bodily injury* means significant or substantial physical injury. It is an injury that is greater than minor or moderate harm.]

The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not acting in (imperfect self-defense/ [or] imperfect defense of another). If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of murder.

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2012, February 2015, September 2020*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on voluntary manslaughter on either theory, heat of passion or imperfect self-defense, when evidence of either is “substantial enough to merit consideration” by the jury. (*People v. Breverman* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 153–163 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094]; *People v. Barton* (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 201 [47 Cal.Rptr.2d 569, 906 P.2d 531].)

See discussion of imperfect self-defense in related issues section of CALCRIM No. 505, *Justifiable Homicide: Self-Defense or Defense of Another*.

The second sentence of the great bodily injury definition could result in error if the prosecution improperly argues great bodily injury may be shown by greater than minor injury alone. (Compare *People v. Medellin* (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 519, 533–535 [258 Cal.Rptr.3d 867] [the definition was reasonably susceptible to prosecutor’s erroneous argument that the injury need only be greater than minor] with *People v. Quinonez* (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 457, 466 [260 Cal.Rptr.3d 86] [upholding instructions containing great bodily injury definition as written].)

### *Related Instructions*

CALCRIM No. 505, *Justifiable Homicide: Self-Defense or Defense of Another*.

CALCRIM No. 3470, *Right to Self-Defense or Defense of Another (Non-Homicide)*.

CALCRIM No. 3471, *Right to Self-Defense: Mutual Combat or Initial Aggressor*.

CALCRIM No. 3472, *Right to Self-Defense: May Not Be Contrived*.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 192(a).
- Imperfect Self-Defense Defined. *People v. Flannel* (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 680–683 [160 Cal.Rptr. 84, 603 P.2d 1]; *People v. Barton* (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186,

- 201 [47 Cal.Rptr.2d 569, 906 P.2d 531]; *In re Christian S.* (1994) 7 Cal.4th 768, 773 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 33, 872 P.2d 574]; see *People v. Uriarte* (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 192, 197–198 [272 Cal.Rptr. 693] [insufficient evidence to support defense of another person].
- Imperfect Defense of Others. *People v. Randle* (2005) 35 Cal.4th 987, 995–1000 [28 Cal.Rptr.3d 725, 111 P.3d 987], overruled on another ground in *People v. Chun* (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172 [91 Cal.Rptr.3d 106, 203 P.3d 425].
  - Imperfect Self-Defense May be Available When Defendant Set in Motion Chain of Events Leading to Victim’s Attack, but Not When Victim was Legally Justified in Resorting to Self-Defense. *People v. Enraca* (2012) 53 Cal.4th 735, 761 [137 Cal.Rptr.3d 117, 269 P.3d 543]; *People v. Vasquez* (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1176, 1179–1180 [39 Cal.Rptr.3d 433].
  - Imperfect Self-Defense Does Not Apply When Defendant’s Belief in Need for Self-Defense is Entirely Delusional. *People v. Elmore* (2014) 59 Cal.4th 121, 145 [172 Cal.Rptr.3d 413, 325 P.3d 951].
  - This Instruction Upheld. *People v. Lopez* (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1297, 1306 [132 Cal.Rptr.3d 248]; *People v. Genovese* (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 817, 832 [85 Cal.Rptr.3d 664].
  - Defendant Relying on Imperfect Self-Defense Must Actually, Although Not Reasonably, Associate Threat With Victim. *People v. Minifie* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1055, 1069 [56 Cal.Rptr.2d 133, 920 P.2d 1337] [in dicta].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Attempted Voluntary Manslaughter. *People v. Van Ronk* (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 818, 822 [217 Cal.Rptr. 581]; *People v. Williams* (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 1018, 1024–1026 [162 Cal.Rptr. 748].

Involuntary manslaughter is *not* a lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter. (*People v. Orr* (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 780, 784 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 553].)

### RELATED ISSUES

#### ***Battered Woman’s Syndrome***

Evidence relating to battered woman’s syndrome may be considered by the jury when deciding if the defendant actually feared the batterer and if that fear was reasonable. (See *People v. Humphrey* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073, 1082–1089 [56 Cal.Rptr.2d 142, 921 P.2d 1].)

#### ***Blakeley Not Retroactive***

The decision in *Blakeley*—that one who, acting with conscious disregard for life, unintentionally kills in imperfect self-defense is guilty of voluntary manslaughter—may not be applied to defendants whose offense occurred prior to *Blakeley*’s June 2, 2000, date of decision. (*People v. Blakeley* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 82, 91–93 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 451, 999 P.2d 675].) If a defendant asserts a killing was done in an honest but mistaken belief in the need to act in self-defense and the offense occurred prior to June 2, 2000, the jury must be instructed that an unintentional

killing in imperfect self-defense is involuntary manslaughter. (*People v. Johnson* (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 566, 576–577 [119 Cal.Rptr.2d 802]; *People v. Blakeley, supra*, 23 Cal.4th at p. 93.)

### ***Inapplicable to Felony Murder***

Imperfect self-defense does not apply to felony murder. “Because malice is irrelevant in first and second degree felony murder prosecutions, a claim of imperfect self-defense, offered to negate malice, is likewise irrelevant.” (See *People v. Tabios* (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1, 6–9 [78 Cal.Rptr.2d 753]; see also *People v. Anderson* (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1646, 1666 [285 Cal.Rptr. 523]; *People v. Loustana* (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 163, 170 [226 Cal.Rptr. 216].)

### ***Fetus***

Manslaughter does not apply to the death of a fetus. (*People v. Carlson* (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 349, 355 [112 Cal.Rptr. 321].) While the Legislature has included the killing of a fetus, as well as a human being, within the definition of murder under Penal Code section 187, it has “left untouched the provisions of section 192, defining manslaughter [as] the ‘unlawful killing of a human being.’” (*Ibid.*)

See also the Related Issues Section to CALCRIM No. 505, *Justifiable Homicide: Self-Defense or Defense of Another*.

### ***Reasonable Person Standard Not Modified by Evidence of Mental Impairment***

In *People v. Jefferson* (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 508, 519 [14 Cal.Rptr.3d 473], the court rejected the argument that the reasonable person standard for self-defense should be the standard of a mentally ill person like the defendant. “The common law does not take account of a person’s mental capacity when determining whether he has acted as the reasonable person would have acted. The law holds ‘the mentally deranged or insane defendant accountable for his negligence as if the person were a normal, prudent person.’ (Prosser & Keeton, Torts (5th ed. 1984) § 32, p. 177.)” (*Ibid.*; see also Rest.2d Torts, § 283B.)

## **SECONDARY SOURCES**

1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, §§ 242–244.

3 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 73, *Defenses and Justifications*, § 73.11[1][c], [2][a] (Matthew Bender).

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, §§ 85.03[2][g], 85.04[1][c] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, §§ 142.01[3][d.1], [e], 142.02[1][a], [e], [f], [2][a], [3][c] (Matthew Bender).

**572. Voluntary Manslaughter: Murder Not Charged (Pen. Code, § 192(a))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with voluntary manslaughter [in violation of Penal Code section 192(a)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of voluntary manslaughter, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant committed an act that caused the death of another person;

[AND]

2. When the defendant acted, (he/she) unlawfully intended to kill someone(;/.)

*<Give element 3 when instructing on self-defense or defense of another.>*

[AND]

3. (He/She) killed without lawful excuse or justification.]

Or the People must prove that:

1. The defendant intentionally committed an act that caused the death of another person;
2. The natural consequences of the act were dangerous to human life;
3. At the time (he/she) acted, (he/she) knew the act was dangerous to human life;

[AND]

4. (He/She) deliberately acted with conscious disregard for human life(;/.)

*<Give element 5 when instructing on self-defense or defense of another.>*

[AND]

5. (He/She) killed without lawful excuse or justification.]

[An act causes death if the death is the direct, natural, and probable consequence of the act and the death would not have happened without the act. A *natural and probable consequence* is one that a reasonable person would know is likely to happen if nothing unusual intervenes. In deciding whether a consequence is natural and probable, consider all of the circumstances established by the evidence.]

[There may be more than one cause of death. An act causes death only if

**it is a substantial factor in causing the death. A *substantial factor* is more than a trivial or remote factor. However, it does not need to be the only factor that causes the death.]**

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*New January 2006*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime. The court should give this instruction **only** in cases where voluntary manslaughter is charged alone, without murder. In such cases,

[A] conviction of voluntary manslaughter may be sustained upon proof and findings that the defendant committed an unlawful and intentional homicide.

Provocation and imperfect self-defense are not additional elements of voluntary manslaughter which must be proved and found beyond reasonable doubt in order to permit a conviction of that offense.

(*People v. Rios* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 450, 463, 469 [97 Cal.Rptr.2d 512, 2 P.3d 1066].) “[V]oluntary manslaughter . . . is *also* committed when one kills unlawfully, and with *conscious disregard for life*.” (*People v. Rios, supra*, 23 Cal.4th at p. 461, fn. 7 [emphasis in original], citing *People v. Blakeley* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 82, 90–91 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 451, 999 P.2d 675]; *People v. Lasko* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 101, 108–110 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 441, 999 P.2d 666].)

If causation is at issue, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on proximate cause. (*People v. Bernhardt* (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 567, 590–591 [35 Cal.Rptr. 401].) If the evidence indicates that there was only one cause of death, the court should give the “direct, natural, and probable” language in the first bracketed paragraph on causation. If there is evidence of multiple causes of death, the court should also give the “substantial factor” instruction in the second bracketed paragraph on causation. (See *People v. Autry* (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 363 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 135]; *People v. Pike* (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 732, 746–747 [243 Cal.Rptr. 54].) See also CALCRIM No. 620, *Causation: Special Issues*.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code § 192(a); *People v. Rios* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 450, 463, 469 [97 Cal.Rptr.2d 512, 2 P.3d 1066].

## RELATED ISSUES

### *Blakeley Not Retroactive*

The decision in *Blakeley*—that one who, acting with conscious disregard for life, unintentionally kills in imperfect self-defense is guilty of voluntary manslaughter—may not be applied to defendants whose offense occurred prior to *Blakeley*’s June 2, 2000, date of decision. (*People v. Blakeley* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 82, 91–93 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 451, 999 P.2d 675].) If a defendant asserts a killing was done

in an honest but mistaken belief in the need to act in self-defense and the offense occurred prior to June 2, 2000, the jury must be instructed that an unintentional killing in imperfect self-defense is involuntary manslaughter. (*People v. Johnson* (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 566, 576–577 [119 Cal.Rptr.2d 802]; *People v. Blakeley, supra*, 23 Cal.4th at p. 93.) In such cases, do not give the portion of the instruction that begins, “Or the People must prove that” or any of the elements that follow.

***Fetus***

Manslaughter does not apply to the death of a fetus. (*People v. Carlson* (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 349, 355 [112 Cal.Rptr. 321].) While the Legislature has included the killing of a fetus, as well as a human being, within the definition of murder under Penal Code section 187, it has “left untouched the provisions of section 192, defining manslaughter [as] the ‘unlawful killing of a human being.’ ” (*Ibid.*)

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, §§ 224, 226–228.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 140, *Challenges to Crimes*, § 140.04, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.02[1][a], [e], [f], [2][a] (Matthew Bender).

**573–579. Reserved for Future Use**



## (ii) Involuntary

### 580. Involuntary Manslaughter: Lesser Included Offense (Pen. Code, § 192(b))

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When a person commits an unlawful killing but does not intend to kill and does not act with conscious disregard for human life, then the crime is involuntary manslaughter.

The difference between other homicide offenses and involuntary manslaughter depends on whether the person was aware of the risk to life that his or her actions created and consciously disregarded that risk. An unlawful killing caused by a willful act done with full knowledge and awareness that the person is endangering the life of another, and done in conscious disregard of that risk, is voluntary manslaughter or murder. An unlawful killing resulting from a willful act committed without intent to kill and without conscious disregard of the risk to human life is involuntary manslaughter.

The defendant committed involuntary manslaughter if:

1. The defendant committed (a crime/ [or] a lawful act in an unlawful manner);
2. The defendant committed the (crime/ [or] act) with criminal negligence;

AND

3. The defendant's acts caused the death of another person.

[The People allege that the defendant committed the following crime[s]: \_\_\_\_\_ <insert misdemeanor[s]/infraction[s]/noninherently dangerous (felony/felonies)>.

Instruction[s] \_\_\_\_\_ tell[s] you what the People must prove in order to prove that the defendant committed \_\_\_\_\_ <insert misdemeanor[s]/infraction[s]/ noninherently dangerous (felony/felonies)>.]

[The People [also] allege that the defendant committed the following lawful act[s] with criminal negligence: \_\_\_\_\_ <insert act[s] alleged>.]

*Criminal negligence* involves more than ordinary carelessness, inattention, or mistake in judgment. A person acts with criminal negligence when:

1. He or she acts in a reckless way that creates a high risk of death or great bodily injury;

AND



2. A reasonable person would have known that acting in that way would create such a risk.

In other words, a person acts with criminal negligence when the way he or she acts is so different from the way an ordinarily careful person would act in the same situation that his or her act amounts to disregard for human life or indifference to the consequences of that act.

[An act causes death if the death is the direct, natural, and probable consequence of the act and the death would not have happened without the act. A *natural and probable consequence* is one that a reasonable person would know is likely to happen if nothing unusual intervenes. In deciding whether a consequence is natural and probable, consider all of the circumstances established by the evidence.]

[There may be more than one cause of death. An act causes death only if it is a substantial factor in causing the death. A *substantial factor* is more than a trivial or remote factor. However, it does not need to be the only factor that causes the death.]

*Great bodily injury* means significant or substantial physical injury. It is an injury that is greater than minor or moderate harm.

[The People allege that the defendant committed the following (crime[s]/ [and] lawful act[s] with criminal negligence): \_\_\_\_\_ <insert alleged predicate acts when multiple acts alleged>. You may not find the defendant guilty unless all of you agree that the People have proved that the defendant committed at least one of these alleged acts and you all agree that the same act or acts were proved.]

In order to prove murder or voluntary manslaughter, the People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted with intent to kill or with conscious disregard for human life. If the People have not met either of these burdens, you must find the defendant not guilty of murder and not guilty of voluntary manslaughter.

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*New January 2006; Revised April 2011, February 2013, September 2018, September 2020*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on involuntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of murder when there is sufficient evidence that the defendant lacked malice. (*People v. Glenn* (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1461, 1465–1467 [280 Cal.Rptr. 609], overruled in part in *People v. Blakeley* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 82, 91 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 451, 999 P.2d 675].)

When instructing on involuntary manslaughter as a lesser offense, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on both theories of involuntary manslaughter (misdemeanor/infracton/noninherently dangerous felony and lawful act committed without due caution and circumspection) if both theories are supported by the evidence. (*People v. Lee* (1999) 20 Cal.4th 47, 61 [82 Cal.Rptr.2d 625, 971 P.2d 1001].) In element 2, instruct on either or both of theories of involuntary manslaughter as appropriate.

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to specify the predicate misdemeanor, infracton or noninherently dangerous felony alleged and to instruct on the elements of the predicate offense(s). (*People v. Milham* (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 487, 506 [205 Cal.Rptr. 688]; *People v. Ellis* (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1339 [82 Cal.Rptr.2d 409]; *People v. Burroughs* (1984) 35 Cal.3d 824, 835 [201 Cal.Rptr. 319, 678 P.2d 894], disapproved on other grounds in *People v. Blakeley* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 82, 89 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 451, 999 P.2d 675].)

If causation is at issue, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on proximate cause. (*People v. Bernhardt* (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 567, 590–591 [35 Cal.Rptr. 401].) If the evidence indicates that there was only one cause of death, the court should give the “direct, natural, and probable” language in the first bracketed paragraph on causation. If there is evidence of multiple causes of death, the court should also give the “substantial factor” instruction in the second bracketed paragraph on causation. (See *People v. Austry* (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 363 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 135]; *People v. Pike* (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 732, 746–747 [243 Cal.Rptr. 54].) See also CALCRIM No. 620, *Causation: Special Issues*.

In cases involving vehicular manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192(c)), there is a split in authority on whether there is a **sua sponte** duty to give a unanimity instruction when multiple predicate offenses are alleged. (*People v. Gary* (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1212, 1218 [235 Cal.Rptr. 30], overruled on other grounds in *People v. Flood* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 481 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180, 957 P.2d 869]; *People v. Durkin* (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d Supp. 9, 13 [252 Cal.Rptr. 735]; *People v. Mitchell* (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 216, 222 [232 Cal.Rptr. 438]; *People v. Leffel* (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 575, 586–587 [249 Cal.Rptr. 906].) A unanimity instruction is included in a bracketed paragraph, should the court determine that such an instruction is appropriate.

The second sentence of the great bodily injury definition could result in error if the prosecution improperly argues great bodily injury may be shown by greater than minor injury alone. (Compare *People v. Medellin* (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 519, 533–535 [258 Cal.Rptr.3d 867] [the definition was reasonably susceptible to prosecutor’s erroneous argument that the injury need only be greater than minor] with *People v. Quinonez* (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 457, 466 [260 Cal.Rptr.3d 86] [upholding instructions containing great bodily injury definition as written].)

#### AUTHORITY

- Involuntary Manslaughter Defined. Pen. Code, § 192(b).
- Due Caution and Circumspection. *People v. Penny* (1955) 44 Cal.2d 861, 324

- 879–880 [285 P.2d 926]; *People v. Rodriguez* (1960) 186 Cal.App.2d 433, 440 [8 Cal.Rptr. 863].
- Criminal Negligence Requirement; This Instruction Upheld. *People v. Butler* (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 998, 1014 [114 Cal.Rptr.3d 696].
  - Unlawful Act Not Amounting to a Felony. *People v. Thompson* (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 40, 53 [93 Cal.Rptr.2d 803].
  - Unlawful Act Must Be Dangerous Under the Circumstances of Its Commission. *People v. Wells* (1996) 12 Cal.4th 979, 982 [50 Cal.Rptr.2d 699, 911 P.2d 1374]; *People v. Cox* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 665, 674 [97 Cal.Rptr.2d 647, 2 P.3d 1189].
  - Proximate Cause. *People v. Roberts* (1992) 2 Cal.4th 271, 315–321 [6 Cal.Rptr.2d 276, 826 P.2d 274]; *People v. Rodriguez* (1960) 186 Cal.App.2d 433, 440 [8 Cal.Rptr. 863].
  - Lack of Due Caution and Circumspection Contrasted With Conscious Disregard of Life. *People v. Watson* (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290, 296–297 [179 Cal.Rptr. 43, 637 P.2d 279]; *People v. Evers* (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 588, 596 [12 Cal.Rptr.2d 637].
  - Inherently Dangerous Assaultive Felonies. *People v. Bryant* (2013) 56 Cal.4th 959, 964 [157 Cal.Rptr.3d 522, 301 P.3d 1136]; *People v. Brothers* (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 24, 33–34 [186 Cal.Rptr.3d 98].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

Involuntary manslaughter is a lesser included offense of both degrees of murder, but it is not a lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter. (*People v. Orr* (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 780, 784 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 553].)

There is no crime of attempted involuntary manslaughter. (*People v. Johnson* (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1329, 1332 [59 Cal.Rptr.2d 798]; *People v. Broussard* (1977) 76 Cal.App.3d 193, 197 [142 Cal.Rptr. 664].)

Aggravated assault is not a lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter. (*People v. Murray* (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1133, 1140 [84 Cal.Rptr.3d 676].)

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Imperfect Self-Defense and Involuntary Manslaughter*

Imperfect self-defense is a “mitigating circumstance” that “reduce[s] an intentional, unlawful killing from murder to voluntary manslaughter by *negating the element of malice* that otherwise inheres in such a homicide.” (*People v. Rios* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 450, 461 [97 Cal.Rptr.2d 512, 2 P.3d 1066] [citations omitted, emphasis in original].) However, evidence of imperfect self-defense may support a finding of *involuntary* manslaughter, where the evidence demonstrates *the absence of* (as opposed to *the negation of*) the elements of malice. (*People v. Blakeley* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 82, 91 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 451, 999 P.2d 675] [discussing dissenting opinion of Mosk, J.].) However, a court should not instruct on involuntary manslaughter unless there is evidence supporting the statutory elements of that crime.

See also the Related Issues section to CALCRIM No. 581, *Involuntary Manslaughter: Murder Not Charged*.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

4 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, §§ 246–260.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.02[2][a][i] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 140, *Challenges to Crimes*, §§ 140.02[4], 140.04, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, §§ 142.01[3][d.1], [e], 142.02[1][a], [b], [e], [f], [2][b], [3][c] (Matthew Bender).

**581. Involuntary Manslaughter: Murder Not Charged (Pen. Code, § 192(b))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with involuntary manslaughter [in violation of Penal Code section 192(b)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant committed (a crime/ [or] a lawful act in an unlawful manner);
2. The defendant committed the (crime/ [or] act) with criminal negligence;

**AND**

3. The defendant's acts caused the death of another person.

[The People allege that the defendant committed the following crime[s]: \_\_\_\_\_ <insert misdemeanor[s]/infraction[s])/noninherently dangerous (felony/felonies)>.

Instruction[s] \_\_\_\_\_ tell[s] you what the People must prove in order to prove that the defendant committed \_\_\_\_\_ <insert misdemeanor[s]/infraction[s])/ noninherently dangerous (felony/felonies)>.]

[The People [also] allege that the defendant committed the following lawful act[s] with criminal negligence: \_\_\_\_\_ <insert act[s] alleged>.]

*Criminal negligence* involves more than ordinary carelessness, inattention, or mistake in judgment. A person acts with criminal negligence when:

1. He or she acts in a reckless way that creates a high risk of death or great bodily injury;

**AND**

2. A reasonable person would have known that acting in that way would create such a risk.

In other words, a person acts with criminal negligence when the way he or she acts is so different from the way an ordinarily careful person would act in the same situation that his or her act amounts to disregard for human life or indifference to the consequences of that act.

[An act causes death if the death is the direct, natural, and probable consequence of the act and the death would not have happened without the act. A *natural and probable consequence* is one that a reasonable

person would know is likely to happen if nothing unusual intervenes. In deciding whether a consequence is natural and probable, consider all of the circumstances established by the evidence.]

[There may be more than one cause of death. An act causes death only if it is a substantial factor in causing the death. A *substantial factor* is more than a trivial or remote factor. However, it does not need to be the only factor that causes the death.]

*Great bodily injury* means significant or substantial physical injury. It is an injury that is greater than minor or moderate harm.

[The People allege that the defendant committed the following (crime[s]/ [and] lawful act[s] with criminal negligence): \_\_\_\_\_ <insert alleged predicate acts when multiple acts alleged>. You may not find the defendant guilty unless all of you agree that the People have proved that the defendant committed at least one of these alleged acts and you all agree on which act (he/she) committed.]

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*New January 2006; Revised April 2011, September 2020*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the elements of the offense.

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on both theories of involuntary manslaughter (misdemeanor/infracton/noninherently dangerous felony and lawful act committed without due caution and circumspection) if both theories are supported by the evidence. (*People v. Lee* (1999) 20 Cal.4th 47, 61 [82 Cal.Rptr.2d 625, 971 P.2d 1001].) In element 1, instruct on either or both theories of involuntary manslaughter as appropriate.

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to specify the predicate misdemeanor, infracton or noninherently dangerous felony alleged and to instruct on the elements of the predicate offense(s). (*People v. Milham* (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 487, 506 [205 Cal.Rptr. 688]; *People v. Ellis* (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1339 [82 Cal.Rptr.2d 409]; *People v. Burroughs* (1984) 35 Cal.3d 824, 835 [201 Cal.Rptr. 319, 678 P.2d 894], disapproved on other grounds in *People v. Blakeley* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 82, 89 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 451, 999 P.2d 675].)

If causation is at issue, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on proximate cause. (*People v. Bernhardt* (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 567, 590–591 [35 Cal.Rptr. 401].) If the evidence indicates that there was only one cause of death, the court should give the “direct, natural, and probable” language in the first bracketed paragraph on causation. If there is evidence of multiple causes of death, the court should also give the “substantial factor” instruction in the second bracketed paragraph on causation. (See *People v. Austry* (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 363 [43

Cal.Rptr.2d 135]; *People v. Pike* (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 732, 746–747 [243 Cal.Rptr. 54].)

In cases involving vehicular manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192(c)), there is a split in authority on whether there is a **sua sponte** duty to give a unanimity instruction when multiple predicate offenses are alleged. (*People v. Gary* (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1212, 1218 [235 Cal.Rptr. 30], overruled on other grounds in *People v. Flood* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 481 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180, 957 P.2d 869]; *People v. Durkin* (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d Supp. 9, 13 [252 Cal.Rptr. 735]; *People v. Mitchell* (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 216, 222 [232 Cal.Rptr. 438]; *People v. Leffel* (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 575, 586–587 [249 Cal.Rptr. 906].) A unanimity instruction is included in a bracketed paragraph for the court to use at its discretion.

The second sentence of the great bodily injury definition could result in error if the prosecution improperly argues great bodily injury may be shown by greater than minor injury alone. (Compare *People v. Medellin* (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 519, 533–535 [258 Cal.Rptr.3d 867] [the definition was reasonably susceptible to prosecutor’s erroneous argument that the injury need only be greater than minor] with *People v. Quinonez* (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 457, 466 [260 Cal.Rptr.3d 86] [upholding instructions containing great bodily injury definition as written].)

### AUTHORITY

- Involuntary Manslaughter Defined. Pen. Code, § 192(b).
- Due Caution and Circumspection. *People v. Penny* (1955) 44 Cal.2d 861, 879–880 [285 P.2d 926]; *People v. Rodriguez* (1960) 186 Cal.App.2d 433, 440 [8 Cal.Rptr. 863].
- Unlawful Act Not Amounting to a Felony. *People v. Thompson* (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 40, 53 [93 Cal.Rptr.2d 803].
- Criminal Negligence Requirement. *People v. Butler* (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 998, 1014 [114 Cal.Rptr.3d 696].
- Unlawful Act Must Be Dangerous Under the Circumstances of Its Commission. *People v. Wells* (1996) 12 Cal.4th 979, 982 [50 Cal.Rptr.2d 699, 911 P.2d 1374]; *People v. Cox* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 665, 674 [97 Cal.Rptr.2d 647, 2 P.3d 1189].
- Proximate Cause. *People v. Roberts* (1992) 2 Cal.4th 271, 315–321 [6 Cal.Rptr.2d 276, 826 P.2d 274]; *People v. Rodriguez* (1960) 186 Cal.App.2d 433, 440 [8 Cal.Rptr. 863].
- Lack of Due Caution and Circumspection Contrasted With Conscious Disregard of Life. *People v. Watson* (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290, 296–297 [179 Cal.Rptr. 43, 637 P.2d 279]; *People v. Evers* (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 588, 596 [12 Cal.Rptr.2d 637].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

There is no crime of attempted involuntary manslaughter. (*People v. Johnson* (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1329, 1332 [59 Cal.Rptr.2d 798].)



Aggravated assault is not a lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter. (*People v. Murray* (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1133, 1140 [84 Cal.Rptr.3d 676].)

## RELATED ISSUES

### *Due Caution and Circumspection*

“The words lack of ‘due caution and circumspection’ have been heretofore held to be the equivalent of ‘criminal negligence.’” (*People v. Penny* (1955) 44 Cal.2d 861, 879 [285 P.2d 926].)

### *Felonies as Predicate “Unlawful Act”*

“[T]he only logically permissible construction of section 192 is that an unintentional homicide committed in the course of a noninherently dangerous felony may properly support a conviction of involuntary manslaughter, if that felony is committed without due caution and circumspection.” (*People v. Burroughs* (1984) 35 Cal.3d 824, 835 [201 Cal.Rptr. 319, 678 P.2d 894], disapproved on other grounds in *People v. Blakeley* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 82, 89 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 451, 999 P.2d 675] [practicing medicine without a license cannot be predicate offense for second degree murder because not inherently dangerous but can be for involuntary manslaughter even though Penal Code section 192 specifies an “unlawful act, not amounting to a felony”].)

### *No Inherently Dangerous Requirement for Predicate Misdemeanor/Infraction*

“[T]he offense which constitutes the ‘unlawful act’ need not be an inherently dangerous misdemeanor or infraction. Rather, to be an ‘unlawful act’ within the meaning of section 192(c)(1), the offense must be dangerous under the circumstances of its commission. An unlawful act committed with gross negligence would necessarily be so.” (*People v. Wells* (1996) 12 Cal.4th 979, 982 [50 Cal.Rptr.2d 699, 911 P.2d 1374].)

### *Fetus*

Manslaughter does not apply to the death of a fetus. (*People v. Carlson* (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 349, 355 [112 Cal.Rptr. 321].) While the Legislature has included the killing of a fetus, as well as a human being, within the definition of murder under Penal Code section 187, it has “left untouched the provisions of section 192, defining manslaughter [as] the ‘unlawful killing of a human being.’” (*Ibid.*)

## SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, §§ 225, 246–260.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.02[2][a][i] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 140, *Challenges to Crimes*, §§ 140.02[4], 140.04, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.02[1][a], [b], [e], [f], [2][b], [3][c] (Matthew Bender).



**582. Involuntary Manslaughter: Failure to Perform Legal Duty—Murder Not Charged (Pen. Code, § 192(b))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with involuntary manslaughter [in violation of Penal Code section 192(b)] based on failure to perform a legal duty.

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant had a legal duty to \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of decedent>;
2. The defendant failed to perform that legal duty;
3. The defendant's failure was criminally negligent;

AND

4. The defendant's failure caused the death of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of decedent>.

(A/An) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of person owing duty> has a legal duty to (help/care for/rescue/warn/maintain the property of/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert other required action[s]>) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of decedent, not name>.

**Criminal negligence** involves more than ordinary carelessness, inattention, or mistake in judgment. A person acts with criminal negligence when:

1. He or she acts in a reckless way that creates a high risk of death or great bodily injury;

AND

2. A reasonable person would have known that acting in that way would create such a risk.

In other words, a person acts with criminal negligence when the way he or she acts is so different from how an ordinarily careful person would act in the same situation that his or her act amounts to disregard for human life or indifference to the consequences of that act.

[*Great bodily injury* means significant or substantial physical injury. It is an injury that is greater than minor or moderate harm.]

[An act causes death if the death is the direct, natural, and probable consequence of the act and the death would not have happened without the act. A *natural and probable consequence* is one that a reasonable person would know is likely to happen if nothing unusual intervenes. In

**deciding whether a consequence is natural and probable, consider all of the circumstances established by the evidence.]**

**[There may be more than one cause of death. An act causes death, only if it is a substantial factor in causing the death. A *substantial factor* is more than a trivial or remote factor. However, it does not need to be the only factor that causes the death.]**

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*New January 2006; Revised September 2020*

## BENCH NOTES

### ***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

The second sentence of the great bodily injury definition could result in error if the prosecution improperly argues great bodily injury may be shown by greater than minor injury alone. (Compare *People v. Medellin* (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 519, 533–535 [258 Cal.Rptr.3d 867] [the definition was reasonably susceptible to prosecutor’s erroneous argument that the injury need only be greater than minor] with *People v. Quinonez* (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 457, 466 [260 Cal.Rptr.3d 86] [upholding instructions containing great bodily injury definition as written].)

### ***Legal Duty***

The existence of a legal duty is a matter of law to be decided by the judge. (*Kentucky Fried Chicken v. Superior Court* (1997) 14 Cal.4th 814, 819 [59 Cal.Rptr.2d 756, 927 P.2d 1260]; *Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hospital* (1985) 38 Cal.3d 112, 124 [211 Cal.Rptr. 356, 695 P.2d 653].) The court should instruct the jury if a legal duty exists. (See *People v. Burden* (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 603, 614 [140 Cal.Rptr. 282] [proper instruction that parent has legal duty to furnish necessary clothing, food, and medical attention for his or her minor child].) In the instruction on legal duty, the court should use generic terms to describe the relationship and duty owed. For example:

A parent has a legal duty to care for a child.

A paid caretaker has a legal duty to care for the person he or she was hired to care for.

A person who has assumed responsibility for another person has a legal duty to care for that other person.

The court should not state “the defendant had a legal duty to the decedent.” (See *People v. Brown* (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 444–445 [250 Cal.Rptr. 604, 758 P.2d 1135] [correct to state “a Garden Grove Regular Police Officer [is a] peace officer”; would be error to state “Officer Reed was a peace officer”].)

However, in a small number of cases where the legal duty to act is based on the defendant having created or increased risk to the victim, the existence of the legal

duty may depend on facts in dispute. (See *People v. Oliver* (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 138, 149 [258 Cal.Rptr. 138].) If there is a conflict in testimony over the facts necessary to establish that the defendant owed a legal duty to the victim, then the issue must be submitted to the jury. In such cases, the court should insert a section similar to the following:

**The People must prove that the defendant had a legal duty to (help/rescue/warn/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert other required action[s]>) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of decedent>.**

**In order to prove that the defendant had this legal duty, the People must prove that the defendant \_\_\_\_\_ <insert facts that establish legal duty>.**

**If you decide that the People have proved that the defendant \_\_\_\_\_ <insert facts that establish legal duty>, then the defendant had a legal duty to (help/rescue/warn/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert other required action[s]>) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of decedent>.**

**If you have a reasonable doubt whether the defendant \_\_\_\_\_ <insert facts that establish legal duty>, then you must find (him/her) not guilty.**

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 192(b); *People v. Oliver* (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 138, 146 [258 Cal.Rptr. 138].
- Criminal Negligence. *People v. Penny* (1955) 44 Cal.2d 861, 879–880 [285 P.2d 926]; *People v. Rodriguez* (1960) 186 Cal.App.2d 433, 440 [8 Cal.Rptr. 863].
- Legal Duty. *People v. Heitzman* (1994) 9 Cal.4th 189, 198–199 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d 236, 886 P.2d 1229]; *People v. Oliver* (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 138, 149 [258 Cal.Rptr. 138].
- Causation. *People v. Roberts* (1992) 2 Cal.4th 271, 315–321 [6 Cal.Rptr.2d 276, 826 P.2d 274].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

Aggravated assault is not a lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter. (*People v. Murray* (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1133, 1140 [84 Cal.Rptr.3d 676].)

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Legal Duty to Aid*

In *People v. Oliver* (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 138, 147 [258 Cal.Rptr. 138], the court explained the requirement of a legal duty to act as follows:

A necessary element of negligence, whether criminal or civil, is a duty owed to the person injured and a breach of that duty . . . . Generally, one has no legal duty to rescue or render aid to another in peril, even if the other is in danger of losing his or her life, absent a special relationship which gives rise to such duty . . . . In California civil cases, courts have found a special relationship

giving rise to an affirmative duty to act where some act or omission on the part of the defendant either created or increased the risk of injury to the plaintiff, or created a dependency relationship inducing reliance or preventing assistance from others . . . . Where, however, the defendant took no affirmative action which contributed to, increased, or changed the risk which would otherwise have existed, and did not voluntarily assume any responsibility to protect the person or induce a false sense of security, courts have refused to find a special relationship giving rise to a duty to act.

***Duty Based on Dependency/Voluntary Assumption of Responsibility***

A legal duty to act exists when the defendant is a caretaker or has voluntarily assumed responsibility for the victim. (*Walker v. Superior Court* (1988) 47 Cal.3d 112, 134–138 [253 Cal.Rptr. 1, 763 P.2d 852] [parent to child]; *People v. Montecino* (1944) 66 Cal.App.2d 85, 100 [152 P.2d 5] [contracted caretaker to dependent].)

***Duty Based on Conduct Creating or Increasing Risk***

A legal duty to act may also exist where the defendant’s behavior created or substantially increased the risk of harm to the victim, either by creating the dangerous situation or by preventing others from rendering aid. (*People v. Oliver* (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 138, 147–148 [258 Cal.Rptr. 138] [defendant had duty to act where she drove victim to her home knowing he was drunk, knowingly allowed him to use her bathroom to ingest additional drugs, and watched him collapse on the floor]; *Sea Horse Ranch, Inc. v. Superior Court* (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 446, 456 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 681] [defendant had duty to prevent horses from running onto adjacent freeway creating risk].)

## SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, §§ 258–260.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 140, *Challenges to Crimes*, §§ 140.03, 140.04, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.02[2][b] (Matthew Bender).

**583–589. Reserved for Future Use**

### (iii) Vehicular

#### 590. Gross Vehicular Manslaughter While Intoxicated (Pen. Code, § 191.5(a))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated [in violation of Penal Code section 191.5(a)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant (drove under the influence of (an alcoholic beverage/ [or] a drug) [or under the combined influence of an alcoholic beverage and a drug]/drove while having a blood alcohol level of 0.08 or higher/drove under the influence of (an alcoholic beverage/ [or] a drug) [or under the combined influence of an alcoholic beverage and a drug] when under the age of 21/ drove while having a blood alcohol level of 0.05 or higher when under the age of 21);
2. While driving that vehicle under the influence of (an alcoholic beverage/ [or] a drug) [or under the combined influence of an alcoholic beverage and a drug], the defendant also committed (a/ an) (misdemeanor[,]/ [or] infraction[,]/ [or] otherwise lawful act that might cause death);
3. The defendant committed the (misdemeanor[,]/ [or] infraction[,]/ [or] otherwise lawful act that might cause death) with gross negligence;

**AND**

4. The defendant's grossly negligent conduct caused the death of another person.

[The People allege that the defendant committed the following (misdemeanor[s]/ [and] infraction[s]): \_\_\_\_\_ <insert misdemeanor[s] /infraction[s]>.

Instruction[s] \_\_\_\_\_ tell[s] you what the People must prove in order to prove that the defendant committed \_\_\_\_\_ <insert misdemeanor[s]/infraction[s]>.]

[The People [also] allege that the defendant committed the following otherwise lawful act(s) that might cause death: \_\_\_\_\_ <insert act[s] alleged>.]

Instruction[s] \_\_\_\_\_ tell[s] you what the People must prove in order to prove that the defendant (drove under the influence of (an

alcoholic beverage/ [or] a drug) [or under the combined influence of an alcoholic beverage and a drug]/drove while having a blood alcohol level of 0.08 or higher/drove under the influence of (an alcoholic beverage/ [or] a drug) [or under the combined influence of an alcoholic beverage and a drug] when under the age of 21/drove while having a blood alcohol level of 0.05 or higher when under the age of 21).

*Gross negligence* involves more than ordinary carelessness, inattention, or mistake in judgment. A person acts with gross negligence when:

1. He or she acts in a reckless way that creates a high risk of death or great bodily injury;

AND

2. A reasonable person would have known that acting in that way would create such a risk.

In other words, a person acts with gross negligence when the way he or she acts is so different from the way an ordinarily careful person would act in the same situation that his or her act amounts to disregard for human life or indifference to the consequences of that act.

The combination of driving a vehicle while under the influence of (an alcoholic beverage/ [and/or] a drug) and violating a traffic law is not enough by itself to establish gross negligence. In evaluating whether the defendant acted with gross negligence, consider the level of the defendant's intoxication, if any; the way the defendant drove; and any other relevant aspects of the defendant's conduct.

[*Great bodily injury* means significant or substantial physical injury. It is an injury that is greater than minor or moderate harm.]

[A person facing a sudden and unexpected emergency situation not caused by that person's own negligence is required only to use the same care and judgment that an ordinarily careful person would use in the same situation, even if it appears later that a different course of action would have been safer.]

[An act causes death if the death is the direct, natural, and probable consequence of the act and the death would not have happened without the act. A *natural and probable consequence* is one that a reasonable person would know is likely to happen if nothing unusual intervenes. In deciding whether a consequence is natural and probable, consider all of the circumstances established by the evidence.]

[There may be more than one cause of death. An act causes death only if it is a substantial factor in causing the death. A *substantial factor* is more than a trivial or remote factor. However, it does not need to be the only factor that causes the death.]

[The People allege that the defendant committed the following (misdemeanor[s][,]/ [and] infraction[s][,]/ [and] otherwise lawful act[s] that might cause death): \_\_\_\_\_ <insert alleged predicate acts when multiple acts alleged>. You may not find the defendant guilty unless all of you agree that the People have proved that the defendant committed at least one of these alleged (misdemeanors[,]/ [or] infractions[,]/ [or] otherwise lawful acts that might cause death) and you all agree on which (misdemeanor[,]/ [or] infraction[,]/ [or] otherwise lawful act that might cause death) the defendant committed.]

[The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of that crime. You must consider whether the defendant is guilty of the lesser crime[s] of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert lesser offense[s]>.]

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*New January 2006; Revised June 2007, September 2020*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to specify the predicate misdemeanor(s) or infraction(s) alleged and to instruct on the elements of the predicate offense(s). (*People v. Milham* (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 487, 506 [205 Cal.Rptr. 688]; *People v. Ellis* (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1339 [82 Cal.Rptr.2d 409].) In element 1, instruct on the particular “under the influence” offense charged. In element 2, instruct on either theory of vehicular manslaughter (misdemeanor/infraction or lawful act committed with negligence) as appropriate. The court **must** also give the appropriate instruction on the elements of the driving under the influence offense and the predicate misdemeanor or infraction.

If causation is at issue, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on proximate cause. (*People v. Bernhardt* (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 567, 590–591 [35 Cal.Rptr. 401].) If the evidence indicates that there was only one cause of death, the court should give the “direct, natural, and probable” language in the first bracketed paragraph on causation. If there is evidence of multiple causes of death, the court should also give the “substantial factor” instruction in the second bracketed paragraph on causation. (See *People v. Autry* (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 363 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 135]; *People v. Pike* (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 732, 746–747 [243 Cal.Rptr. 54].)

There is a split in authority over whether there is a **sua sponte** duty to give a unanimity instruction when multiple predicate offenses are alleged. (*People v. Gary* (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1212, 1218 [235 Cal.Rptr. 30] [unanimity instruction required, overruled on other grounds in *People v. Flood* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 481



[76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180, 957 P.2d 869]; *People v. Durkin* (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d Supp. 9, 13 [252 Cal.Rptr. 735] [unanimity instruction not required but preferable]; *People v. Mitchell* (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 216, 222 [232 Cal.Rptr. 438] [unanimity instruction not required]; *People v. Leffel* (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 575, 586–587 [249 Cal.Rptr. 906] [unanimity instruction not required, harmless error if was required].) A unanimity instruction is included in a bracketed paragraph for the court to use at its discretion.

If there is sufficient evidence and the defendant requests it, the court should instruct on the imminent peril/sudden emergency doctrine. (*People v. Boulware* (1940) 41 Cal.App.2d 268, 269–270 [106 P.2d 436].) Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “A person facing a sudden and unexpected emergency.”

If the defendant is charged with one or more prior conviction (see Pen. Code, § 191.5(d)), the court should also give CALCRIM No. 3100, *Prior Conviction: Nonbifurcated Trial*, unless the defendant has stipulated to the prior conviction or the court has granted a bifurcated trial. (See Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 3100.)

The second sentence of the great bodily injury definition could result in error if the prosecution improperly argues great bodily injury may be shown by greater than minor injury alone. (Compare *People v. Medellin* (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 519, 533–535 [258 Cal.Rptr.3d 867] [the definition was reasonably susceptible to prosecutor’s erroneous argument that the injury need only be greater than minor] with *People v. Quinonez* (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 457, 466 [260 Cal.Rptr.3d 86] [upholding instructions containing great bodily injury definition as written].)

### AUTHORITY

- Gross Vehicular Manslaughter While Intoxicated. Pen. Code, § 191.5(a).
- Unlawful Act Dangerous Under the Circumstances of Its Commission. *People v. Wells* (1996) 12 Cal.4th 979, 982 [50 Cal.Rptr.2d 699, 911 P.2d 1374].
- Specifying Predicate Unlawful Act. *People v. Milham* (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 487, 506 [205 Cal.Rptr. 688].
- Elements of the Predicate Unlawful Act. *People v. Ellis* (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1339 [82 Cal.Rptr.2d 409].
- Unanimity Instruction. *People v. Gary* (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1212, 1218 [235 Cal.Rptr. 30], overruled on other grounds in *People v. Flood* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 481 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180, 957 P.2d 869]; *People v. Durkin* (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d Supp. 9, 13 [252 Cal.Rptr. 735]; *People v. Mitchell* (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 216, 222 [232 Cal.Rptr. 438]; *People v. Leffel* (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 575, 586–587 [249 Cal.Rptr. 906].
- Gross Negligence. *People v. Penny*, (1955) 44 Cal.2d 861, 879–880 [285 P.2d 926]; *People v. Rodriguez* (1960) 186 Cal.App.2d 433, 440 [8 Cal.Rptr. 863].
- Gross Negligence—Overall Circumstances. *People v. Bennett* (1992) 54 Cal.3d 1032, 1039 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 8, 819 P.2d 849].
- Causation. *People v. Rodriguez* (1960) 186 Cal.App.2d 433, 440 [8 Cal.Rptr. 863].



- Imminent Peril/Sudden Emergency Doctrine. *People v. Boulware* (1940) 41 Cal.App.2d 268, 269 [106 P.2d 436].
- This Instruction Upheld. *People v. Hovda* (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1355, 1358 [98 Cal.Rptr.3d 499].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Vehicular Manslaughter With Gross Negligence Without Intoxication. Pen. Code, § 192(c)(1); *People v. Miranda* (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1464, 1466–1467 [26 Cal.Rptr.2d 610].
- Vehicular Manslaughter With Ordinary Negligence While Intoxicated. Pen. Code, § 191.5(b); *People v. Verlinde* (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1165–1166 [123 Cal.Rptr.2d 322].
- Vehicular Manslaughter With Ordinary Negligence Without Intoxication. Pen. Code, § 192(c)(2); *People v. Rodgers* (1949) 94 Cal.App.2d 166, 166 [210 P.2d 71].
- Injury to Someone While Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol or Drugs. Veh. Code, § 23153; *People v. Miranda* (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1464, 1466–1467 [26 Cal.Rptr.2d 610].

Gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated is *not* a lesser included offense of murder. (*People v. Sanchez* (2001) 24 Cal.4th 983, 992 [103 Cal.Rptr.2d 698, 16 P.3d 118].)

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *DUI Cannot Serve as Predicate Unlawful Act*

The Vehicle Code driving-under-the-influence offense of the first element cannot do double duty as the predicate unlawful act for the second element. (*People v. Soledad* (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 74, 81 [235 Cal.Rptr. 208].) “[T]he trial court erroneously omitted the ‘unlawful act’ element of vehicular manslaughter when instructing in . . . [the elements] by referring to Vehicle Code section 23152 rather than another ‘unlawful act’ as required by the statute.” (*Id.* at p. 82.)

#### *Predicate Act Need Not Be Inherently Dangerous*

“[T]he offense which constitutes the ‘unlawful act’ need not be an inherently dangerous misdemeanor or infraction. Rather, to be an ‘unlawful act’ within the meaning of section 192(c)(1), the offense must be dangerous under the circumstances of its commission. An unlawful act committed with gross negligence would necessarily be so.” (*People v. Wells* (1996) 12 Cal.4th 979, 982 [50 Cal.Rptr.2d 699, 911 P.2d 1374].)

#### *Lawful Act in an Unlawful Manner: Negligence*

The statute uses the phrase “lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful manner.” (Pen. Code, § 191.5.) “[C]ommitting a lawful act in an unlawful manner simply means to commit a lawful act with negligence, that is, without reasonable caution and care.” (*People v. Thompson* (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 40, 53 [93

Cal.Rptr.2d 803].) Because the instruction lists the negligence requirement as element 3, the phrase “in an unlawful manner” is omitted from element 2 as repetitive.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, §§ 263–272.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.02[2][a][i] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 140, *Challenges to Crimes*, § 140.04, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.02[2][c], [4], Ch. 145, *Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses*, §§ 145.02[4][c], 145.03[1][a] (Matthew Bender).

**591. Vehicular Manslaughter While Intoxicated—Ordinary  
Negligence (Pen. Code, § 191.5(b))**

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*<If vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated—ordinary negligence is a charged offense, give alternative A; if this instruction is being given as a lesser included offense, give alternative B.>*

*<Introductory Sentence: Alternative A—Charged Offense>*

**[The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with vehicular manslaughter with ordinary negligence while intoxicated [in violation of Penal Code section 191.5(b)].]**

*<Introductory Sentence: Alternative B—Lesser Included Offense>*

**[Vehicular manslaughter with ordinary negligence while intoxicated is a lesser crime than the charged crime of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated.]**

**To prove that the defendant is guilty of vehicular manslaughter with ordinary negligence while intoxicated, the People must prove that:**

- 1. The defendant (drove under the influence of (an alcoholic beverage/[or] a drug) [or under the combined influence of an alcoholic beverage and a drug]/drove while having a blood alcohol level of 0.08 or higher/ drove under the influence of (an alcoholic beverage/ [or] a drug) [or under the combined influence of an alcoholic beverage and a drug] when under the age of 21/ drove while having a blood alcohol level of 0.05 or higher when under the age of 21/operated a vessel under the influence of (an alcoholic beverage/ [or] a drug) [or a combined influence of an alcoholic beverage and a drug]/operated a vessel while having a blood alcohol level of 0.08 or higher);**
- 2. While (driving that vehicle/operating that vessel) under the influence of (an alcoholic beverage/ [or] a drug) [or under the combined influence of an alcoholic beverage and a drug], the defendant also committed (a/an) (misdemeanor[,]/ [or] infraction[,]) /[or] otherwise lawful act that might cause death);**
- 3. The defendant committed the (misdemeanor[,]/ [or] infraction[,]) /[or] otherwise lawful act that might cause death) with ordinary negligence;**

**AND**

- 4. The defendant's negligent conduct caused the death of another person.**

**[The People allege that the defendant committed the following**

(misdemeanor[s]/ [and] infraction[s]): \_\_\_\_\_ <insert  
misdemeanor[s]/ infraction[s]>.

**Instruction[s]** \_\_\_\_\_ tell[s] you what the People must prove in order to prove that the defendant committed \_\_\_\_\_ <insert  
misdemeanor[s]/infraction[s]>.]

[The People [also] allege that the defendant committed the following otherwise lawful act(s) that might cause death: \_\_\_\_\_ <insert  
act[s] alleged>.]

**Instruction[s]** \_\_\_\_\_ tell[s] you what the People must prove in order to prove that the defendant (drove under the influence of (an alcoholic beverage/ [or] a drug) [or a combined influence of an alcoholic beverage and a drug]/drove while having a blood alcohol level of 0.08 or higher/ drove under the influence of (an alcoholic beverage/ [or] a drug) [or a combined influence of an alcoholic beverage and a drug] when under the age of 21/drove while having a blood alcohol level of 0.05 or higher when under the age of 21/operated a vessel under the influence of (an alcoholic beverage/ [or] a drug [or a combined influence of an alcoholic beverage and a drug])/operated a vessel while having a blood alcohol level of 0.08 or higher).

[The difference between this offense and the charged offense of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated is the degree of negligence required. I have already defined *gross negligence* for you.]

*Ordinary negligence*[, on the other hand,] is the failure to use reasonable care to prevent reasonably foreseeable harm to oneself or someone else. A person is negligent if he or she (does something that a reasonably careful person would not do in the same situation/ [or] fails to do something that a reasonably careful person would do in the same situation).

[A person facing a sudden and unexpected emergency situation not caused by that person's own negligence is required only to use the same care and judgment that an ordinarily careful person would use in the same situation, even if it appears later that a different course of action would have been safer.]

[An act causes death if the death is the direct, natural, and probable consequence of the act and the death would not have happened without the act. A *natural and probable consequence* is one that a reasonable person would know is likely to happen if nothing unusual intervenes. In deciding whether a consequence is natural and probable, consider all of the circumstances established by the evidence.]

[There may be more than one cause of death. An act causes death only if it is a substantial factor in causing the death. A *substantial factor* is more

than a trivial or remote factor. However, it does not need to be the only factor that causes the death.]

[The People allege that the defendant committed the following (misdemeanor[s][,]/ [and] infraction[s][,]/ [and] otherwise lawful act[s] that might cause death): \_\_\_\_\_ <insert alleged predicate acts when multiple acts alleged>. You may not find the defendant guilty unless all of you agree that the People have proved that the defendant committed at least one of these alleged (misdemeanors[,]/ [or] infractions[,]/ [or] otherwise lawful acts that might cause death) and you all agree on which (misdemeanor[,]/ [or] infraction[,]/ [or] otherwise lawful act that might cause death) the defendant committed.]

[The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed vehicular manslaughter with ordinary negligence while intoxicated. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of that crime. You must consider whether the defendant is guilty of the lesser crime[s] of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert lesser offense[s]>.]

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*New January 2006; Revised June 2007, March 2021*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

Important note: The legislature repealed Penal Code section 192(c)(3) in the form that was previously the basis for this instruction effective January 1, 2007.

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to specify the predicate misdemeanor(s) or infraction(s) alleged and to instruct on the elements of the predicate offense(s). (*People v. Milham* (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 487, 506 [205 Cal.Rptr. 688]; *People v. Ellis* (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1339 [82 Cal.Rptr.2d 409].) In element 1, instruct on the particular “under the influence” offense charged. In element 2, instruct on either theory of vehicular manslaughter (misdemeanor/infraction or lawful act committed with negligence) as appropriate. The court **must** also give the appropriate instruction on the elements of the driving under the influence offense and the predicate misdemeanor or infraction.

If causation is at issue, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on proximate cause. (*People v. Bernhardt* (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 567, 590–591 [35 Cal.Rptr. 401].) If the evidence indicates that there was only one cause of death, the court should give the “direct, natural, and probable” language in the first bracketed paragraph on causation. If there is evidence of multiple causes of death, the court should also give the “substantial factor” instruction in the second bracketed paragraph on causation. (See *People v. Autry* (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 363 [43

Cal.Rptr.2d 135]; *People v. Pike* (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 732, 746–747 [243 Cal.Rptr. 54].)

There is a split in authority over whether there is a **sua sponte** duty to give an unanimity instruction when multiple predicate offenses are alleged. (*People v. Gary* (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1212, 1218 [235 Cal.Rptr. 30] [unanimity instruction required, overruled on other grounds in *People v. Flood* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 481 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180, 957 P.2d 869]]; *People v. Durkin* (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d Supp. 9, 13 [252 Cal.Rptr. 735] [unanimity instruction not required but preferable]; *People v. Mitchell* (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 216, 222 [232 Cal.Rptr. 438] [unanimity instruction not required]; *People v. Leffel* (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 575, 586–587 [249 Cal.Rptr. 906] [unanimity instruction not required, harmless error if was required].) A unanimity instruction is included in a bracketed paragraph for the court to use at its discretion.

If there is sufficient evidence and the defendant requests it, the court should instruct on the imminent peril/sudden emergency doctrine. (*People v. Boulware* (1940) 41 Cal.App.2d 268, 269–270 [106 P.2d 436].) Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “A person facing a sudden and unexpected emergency.”

### AUTHORITY

- Vehicular Manslaughter While Intoxicated. Pen. Code, § 191.5(b).
- Vehicular Manslaughter During Operation of a Vessel While Intoxicated. Pen. Code, § 192.5(c).
- Unlawful Act Dangerous Under the Circumstances of Its Commission. *People v. Wells* (1996) 12 Cal.4th 979, 982 [50 Cal.Rptr.2d 699, 911 P.2d 1374].
- Specifying Predicate Unlawful Act. *People v. Milham* (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 487, 506 [205 Cal.Rptr. 688].
- Elements of the Predicate Unlawful Act. *People v. Ellis* (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1339 [82 Cal.Rptr.2d 409].
- Unanimity Instruction. *People v. Gary* (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1212, 1218 [235 Cal.Rptr. 30], overruled on other grounds in *People v. Flood* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 481 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180, 957 P.2d 869]; *People v. Durkin* (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d Supp. 9, 13 [252 Cal.Rptr. 735]; *People v. Mitchell* (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 216, 222 [232 Cal.Rptr. 438]; *People v. Leffel* (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 575, 586–587 [249 Cal.Rptr. 906].
- Ordinary Negligence. Pen. Code, § 7, subd. 2; Rest.2d Torts, § 282.
- Causation. *People v. Rodriguez* (1960) 186 Cal.App.2d 433, 440 [8 Cal. Rptr. 863].
- Imminent Peril/Sudden Emergency Doctrine. *People v. Boulware* (1940) 41 Cal.App.2d 268, 269 [106 P.2d 436].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Vehicular Manslaughter With Ordinary Negligence Without Intoxication. Pen.

Code, § 192(c)(2); see *People v. Miranda* (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1464, 1466–1467 [26 Cal.Rptr.2d 610].

- Injury to Same Victim While Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol or Drugs. Veh. Code, § 23153; *People v. Machuca* (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 393, 400–401 [263 Cal.Rptr.3d 52]; *People v. Miranda* (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1464, 1466–1467 [26 Cal.Rptr.2d 610].

### RELATED ISSUES

See the Related Issues section to CALCRIM No. 590, *Gross Vehicular Manslaughter While Intoxicated*.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, §§ 263–271.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.02[2][a][i] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 140, *Challenges to Crimes*, § 140.04, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.02[1][a], [2][c], [4], Ch. 145, *Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses*, § 145.02[4][c] (Matthew Bender).

## 592. Gross Vehicular Manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192(c)(1))

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*<If gross vehicular manslaughter is a charged offense, give alternative A; if this instruction is being given as a lesser included offense, give alternative B.>*

*<Introductory Sentence: Alternative A—Charged Offense>*

**[The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with gross vehicular manslaughter [in violation of Penal Code section 192(c)(1)].]**

*<Introductory Sentence: Alternative B—Lesser Included Offense>*

**[Gross vehicular manslaughter is a lesser crime than gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated.]**

**To prove that the defendant is guilty of gross vehicular manslaughter, the People must prove that:**

- 1. The defendant (drove a vehicle/operated a vessel);**
- 2. While (driving that vehicle/operating that vessel), the defendant committed (a/an) (misdemeanor[,]/ [or] infraction[,]/ [or] otherwise lawful act that might cause death);**
- 3. The defendant committed the (misdemeanor[,]/ [or] infraction[,]/ [or] otherwise lawful act that might cause death) with gross negligence;**

**AND**

- 4. The defendant's grossly negligent conduct caused the death of another person.**

***Gross negligence* involves more than ordinary carelessness, inattention, or mistake in judgment. A person acts with gross negligence when:**

- 1. He or she acts in a reckless way that creates a high risk of death or great bodily injury;**

**AND**

- 2. A reasonable person would have known that acting in that way would create such a risk.**

**In other words, a person acts with gross negligence when the way he or she acts is so different from how an ordinarily careful person would act in the same situation that his or her act amounts to disregard for human life or indifference to the consequences of that act.**

**[*Great bodily injury* means significant or substantial physical injury. It is an injury that is greater than minor or moderate harm.]**



[A person facing a sudden and unexpected emergency situation not caused by that person's own negligence is required only to use the same care and judgment that an ordinarily careful person would use in the same situation, even if it appears later that a different course of action would have been safer.]

[An act causes death if the death is the direct, natural, and probable consequence of the act and the death would not have happened without the act. A *natural and probable consequence* is one that a reasonable person would know is likely to happen if nothing unusual intervenes. In deciding whether a consequence is natural and probable, consider all of the circumstances established by the evidence.]

[There may be more than one cause of death. An act causes death only if it is a substantial factor in causing the death. A *substantial factor* is more than a trivial or remote factor. However, it does not need to be the only factor that causes the death.]

[The People allege that the defendant committed the following (misdemeanor[s]/ [and] infraction[s]): \_\_\_\_\_ <insert misdemeanor[s]/ infraction[s]>.

Instruction[s] \_\_\_\_\_ tell[s] you what the People must prove in order to prove that the defendant committed \_\_\_\_\_ <insert misdemeanor[s]/ infraction[s]>.]

[The People [also] allege that the defendant committed the following otherwise lawful act(s) that might cause death: \_\_\_\_\_ <insert act[s] alleged>.]

[You may not find the defendant guilty unless all of you agree that the People have proved that the defendant committed at least one alleged (misdemeanor[,]/ [or] infraction[,]/ [or] otherwise lawful act that might cause death) and you all agree on which (misdemeanor[,]/ [or] infraction[,]/ [or] otherwise lawful act that might cause death) the defendant committed.]

[The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed gross vehicular manslaughter. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of that crime. You must consider whether the defendant is guilty of the lesser crime[s] of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert lesser offense[s]>.]

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2015, September 2020*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to specify the predicate misdemeanor(s) or infraction(s) alleged and to instruct on the elements of the predicate offense(s). (*People v. Milham* (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 487, 506 [205 Cal.Rptr. 688]; *People v. Ellis* (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1339 [82 Cal.Rptr.2d 409].) In element 2, instruct on either theory of vehicular manslaughter (misdemeanor/infraction or lawful act committed with negligence) as appropriate. The court **must** also give the appropriate instruction on the elements of the the predicate misdemeanor or infraction.

If causation is at issue, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on proximate cause. (*People v. Bernhardt* (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 567, 590–591 [35 Cal.Rptr. 401].) If the evidence indicates that there was only one cause of death, the court should give the “direct, natural, and probable” language in the first bracketed paragraph on causation. If there is evidence of multiple causes of death, the court should also give the “substantial factor” instruction in the second bracketed paragraph on causation. (See *People v. Autry* (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 363 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 135]; *People v. Pike* (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 732, 746–747 [243 Cal.Rptr. 54].)

There is a split in authority over whether there is a **sua sponte** duty to give a unanimity instruction when multiple predicate offenses are alleged. (*People v. Gary* (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1212, 1218 [235 Cal.Rptr. 30] [unanimity instruction required, overruled on other grounds in *People v. Flood* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 481 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180, 957 P.2d 869]; *People v. Durkin* (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d Supp. 9, 13 [252 Cal.Rptr. 735] [unanimity instruction not required but preferable]; *People v. Mitchell* (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 216, 222 [232 Cal.Rptr. 438] [unanimity instruction not required]; *People v. Leffel* (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 575, 586–587 [249 Cal.Rptr. 906] [unanimity instruction not required, harmless error if was required].) A unanimity instruction is included in a bracketed paragraph for the court to use at its discretion.

If there is sufficient evidence and the defendant requests it, the court should instruct on the imminent peril/sudden emergency doctrine. (*People v. Boulware* (1940) 41 Cal.App.2d 268, 269–270 [106 P.2d 436].) Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “A person facing a sudden and unexpected emergency.”

The second sentence of the great bodily injury definition could result in error if the prosecution improperly argues great bodily injury may be shown by greater than minor injury alone. (Compare *People v. Medellin* (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 519, 533–535 [258 Cal.Rptr.3d 867] [the definition was reasonably susceptible to prosecutor’s erroneous argument that the injury need only be greater than minor] with *People v. Quinonez* (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 457, 466 [260 Cal.Rptr.3d 86] [upholding instructions containing great bodily injury definition as written].)

### AUTHORITY

- Gross Vehicular Manslaughter. Pen. Code, § 192(c)(1).
- Gross Vehicular Manslaughter During Operation of a Vessel. Pen. Code, § 192.5(a).

- Unlawful Act Dangerous Under the Circumstances of Its Commission. *People v. Wells* (1996) 12 Cal.4th 979, 982 [50 Cal.Rptr.2d 699, 911 P.2d 1374].
- Specifying Predicate Unlawful Act. *People v. Milham* (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 487, 506 [205 Cal.Rptr. 688].
- Elements of Predicate Unlawful Act. *People v. Ellis* (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1339 [82 Cal.Rptr.2d 409].
- Unanimity Instruction. *People v. Gary* (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1212, 1218 [235 Cal.Rptr. 30], overruled on other grounds in *People v. Flood* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 481 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180, 957 P.2d 869]; *People v. Durkin* (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d Supp. 9, 13 [252 Cal.Rptr. 735]; *People v. Mitchell* (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 216, 222 [232 Cal.Rptr. 438]; *People v. Leffel* (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 575, 586–587 [249 Cal.Rptr. 906].
- Gross Negligence. *People v. Bennett* (1992) 54 Cal.3d 1032, 1036 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 8, 819 P.2d 849].
- Causation. *People v. Rodriguez* (1960) 186 Cal.App.2d 433, 440 [8 Cal. Rptr. 863].
- Imminent Peril/Sudden Emergency Doctrine. *People v. Boulware* (1940) 41 Cal.App.2d 268, 269 [106 P.2d 436].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Vehicular Manslaughter With Ordinary Negligence. Pen. Code, § 192(c)(2); see *People v. Verlinde* (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1165–1166 [123 Cal.Rptr.2d 322].
- Manslaughter During Operation of a Vessel Without Gross Negligence. Pen. Code, § 192.5(b).

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Predicate Act Need Not Be Inherently Dangerous*

“[T]he offense which constitutes the ‘unlawful act’ need not be an inherently dangerous misdemeanor or infraction. Rather, to be an ‘unlawful act’ within the meaning of section 192(c)(1), the offense must be dangerous under the circumstances of its commission. An unlawful act committed with gross negligence would necessarily be so.” (*People v. Wells* (1996) 12 Cal.4th 979, 982 [50 Cal.Rptr.2d 699, 911 P.2d 1374].)

#### *Lawful Act in an Unlawful Manner: Negligence*

The statute uses the phrase “lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful manner.” (Pen. Code, § 192(c)(1).) “[C]ommitting a lawful act in an unlawful manner simply means to commit a lawful act with negligence, that is, without reasonable caution and care.” (*People v. Thompson* (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 40, 53 [93 Cal.Rptr.2d 803].) Because the instruction lists the negligence requirement as element 3, the phrase “in an unlawful manner” is omitted from element 2 as repetitive.

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, §§ 262–268.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.02[2][a][i] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 140, *Challenges to Crimes*, § 140.04, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.02[1][a], [2][c], [4] (Matthew Bender).

**593. Misdemeanor Vehicular Manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192(c)(2))**

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*<If misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter—ordinary negligence is a charged offense, give alternative A; if this instruction is being given as a lesser included offense, give alternative B.>*

*<Introductory Sentence: Alternative A—Charged Offense>*

**[The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with vehicular manslaughter [in violation of Penal Code section 192(c)(2)].]**

*<Introductory Sentence: Alternative B—Lesser Included Offense>*

**[Vehicular manslaughter with ordinary negligence is a lesser crime than (gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated/ [and] gross vehicular manslaughter/ [and] vehicular manslaughter with ordinary negligence while intoxicated.)]**

**To prove that the defendant is guilty of vehicular manslaughter with ordinary negligence, the People must prove that:**

- 1. While (driving a vehicle/operating a vessel), the defendant committed (a misdemeanor[,]/ [or] an infraction/ [or] a lawful act in an unlawful manner);**
- 2. The (misdemeanor[,]/ [or] infraction/ [or] otherwise lawful act) was dangerous to human life under the circumstances of its commission;**
- 3. The defendant committed the (misdemeanor[,]/ [or] infraction/ [or] otherwise lawful act) with ordinary negligence;**

**AND**

- 4. The (misdemeanor[,]/ [or] infraction/ [or] otherwise lawful act) caused the death of another person.**

**[The People allege that the defendant committed the following (misdemeanor[s]/ [and] infraction[s]): \_\_\_\_\_ <insert misdemeanor[s]/ infraction[s]>.**

**Instruction[s] \_\_\_\_\_ tell[s] you what the People must prove in order to prove that the defendant committed \_\_\_\_\_ <insert misdemeanor[s]/infraction[s]>.**

**[The People [also] allege that the defendant committed the following otherwise lawful act[s] with ordinary negligence: \_\_\_\_\_ <insert act[s] alleged>.]**

**[The difference between this offense and the charged offense of gross vehicular manslaughter is the degree of negligence required. I have**

already defined gross negligence for you.]

*Ordinary negligence*[, on the other hand,] is the failure to use reasonable care to prevent reasonably foreseeable harm to oneself or someone else. A person is negligent if he or she (does something that a reasonably careful person would not do in the same situation/ [or] fails to do something that a reasonably careful person would do in the same situation).

[A person facing a sudden and unexpected emergency situation not caused by that person's own negligence is required only to use the same care and judgment that an ordinarily careful person would use in the same situation, even if it appears later that a different course of action would have been safer.]

[An act causes death if the death is the direct, natural, and probable consequence of the act and the death would not have happened without the act. A *natural and probable consequence* is one that a reasonable person would know is likely to happen if nothing unusual intervenes. In deciding whether a consequence is natural and probable, consider all of the circumstances established by the evidence.]

[There may be more than one cause of death. An act causes death only if it is a substantial factor in causing the death. A *substantial factor* is more than a trivial or remote factor. However, it does not need to be the only factor that causes the death.]

[The People allege that the defendant committed the following (misdemeanor[s][,]/ [and] infraction[s][,]/ [and] lawful act[s] that might cause death): \_\_\_\_\_ <insert alleged predicate acts when multiple acts alleged>. You may not find the defendant guilty unless all of you agree that the People have proved that the defendant committed at least one of these alleged (misdemeanors[,]/ [or] infractions[,]/ [or] otherwise lawful acts that might cause death) and you all agree on which (misdemeanor[,]/ [or] infraction[,]/ [or] otherwise lawful act that might cause death) the defendant committed.]

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*New January 2006; Revised December 2008, October 2010, April 2011*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to specify the predicate misdemeanor(s) or infraction(s) alleged and to instruct on the elements of the predicate offense(s). (*People v. Milham* (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 487, 506 [205 Cal.Rptr. 688]; *People v.*

*Ellis* (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1339 [82 Cal.Rptr.2d 409].) In element 2, instruct on either theory of vehicular manslaughter (misdemeanor/infracton or lawful act committed with negligence) as appropriate. The court **must** also give the appropriate instruction on the elements of the predicate misdemeanor or infracton.

If causation is at issue, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on proximate cause. (*People v. Bernhardt* (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 567, 590–591 [35 Cal.Rptr. 401].) If the evidence indicates that there was only one cause of death, the court should give the “direct, natural, and probable” language in the first bracketed paragraph on causation. If there is evidence of multiple causes of death, the court should also give the “substantial factor” instruction in the second bracketed paragraph on causation. (See *People v. Autry* (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 363 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 135]; *People v. Pike* (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 732, 746–747 [243 Cal.Rptr. 54].)

There is a split in authority over whether there is a **sua sponte** duty to give a unanimity instruction when multiple predicate offenses are alleged. (*People v. Gary* (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1212, 1218 [235 Cal.Rptr. 30] [unanimity instruction required, overruled on other grounds in *People v. Flood* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 481 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180, 957 P.2d 869]]; *People v. Durkin* (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d Supp. 9, 13 [252 Cal.Rptr. 735] [unanimity instruction not required but preferable]; *People v. Mitchell* (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 216, 222 [232 Cal.Rptr. 438] [unanimity instruction not required]; *People v. Leffel* (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 575, 586–587 [249 Cal.Rptr. 906] [unanimity instruction not required, harmless error if was required].) A unanimity instruction is included in a bracketed paragraph for the court to use at its discretion. In the definition of ordinary negligence, the court should use the entire phrase “harm to oneself or someone else” if the facts of the case show a failure by the defendant to prevent harm to him-or herself rather than solely harm to another.

If there is sufficient evidence and the defendant requests it, the court should instruct on the imminent peril/sudden emergency doctrine. (*People v. Boulware* (1940) 41 Cal.App.2d 268, 269–270 [106 P.2d 436].) Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “A person facing a sudden and unexpected emergency.”

### AUTHORITY

- Vehicular Manslaughter Without Gross Negligence. Pen. Code, § 192(c)(2).
- Vehicular Manslaughter During Operation of a Vessel Without Gross Negligence. Pen. Code, § 192.5(b).
- Unlawful Act Dangerous Under the Circumstances of Its Commission. *People v. Wells* (1996) 12 Cal.4th 979, 982 [50 Cal.Rptr.2d 699, 911 P.2d 1374].
- Specifying Predicate Unlawful Act. *People v. Milham* (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 487, 506 [205 Cal.Rptr. 688].
- Elements of Predicate Unlawful Act. *People v. Ellis* (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1339 [82 Cal.Rptr.2d 409].
- Unanimity Instruction. *People v. Gary* (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1212, 1218



[235 Cal.Rptr. 30], overruled on other grounds in *People v. Flood* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 481 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180, 957 P.2d 869]; *People v. Durkin* (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d Supp. 9, 13 [252 Cal.Rptr. 735]; *People v. Mitchell* (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 216, 222 [232 Cal.Rptr. 438]; *People v. Leffel* (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 575, 586–587 [249 Cal.Rptr. 906].

- Ordinary Negligence. Pen. Code, § 7, subd. 2; Rest.2d Torts, § 282.
- Causation. *People v. Rodriguez* (1960) 186 Cal.App.2d 433, 440 [8 Cal.Rptr. 863].
- Imminent Peril/Sudden Emergency Doctrine. *People v. Boulware* (1940) 41 Cal.App.2d 268, 269 [106 P.2d 436].
- Criminal Negligence Requirement. *People v. Butler* (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 998, 1014 [114 Cal.Rptr.3d 696].

### RELATED ISSUES

See the Related Issues section to CALCRIM No. 592, *Gross Vehicular Manslaughter*.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, §§ 263–271.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.02[2][a][i] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 140, *Challenges to Crimes*, § 140.04, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.02[1][a], [2][c], [4] (Matthew Bender).



**594. Vehicular Manslaughter: Collision for Financial Gain (Pen. Code, § 192(c)(3))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with vehicular manslaughter by causing a collision for financial gain [in violation of Penal Code section 192(c)(3)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. While driving a vehicle, the defendant knowingly caused or participated in a vehicular collision;
2. When the defendant acted, (he/she) knew that the purpose of the vehicular collision was to make a false or fraudulent insurance claim for financial gain;
3. When the defendant acted, (he/she) did so with intent to defraud;

AND

4. The collision caused the death of another person.

A person *intends to defraud* if he or she intends to deceive another person in order to cause a loss of, or damage to, a legal, financial, or property right.

[For the purpose of this instruction, a *person* includes (a governmental agency/a corporation/a business/an association/the body politic).]

[An act causes death if the death is the direct, natural, and probable consequence of the act and the death would not have happened without the act. A *natural and probable consequence* is one that a reasonable person would know is likely to happen if nothing unusual intervenes. In deciding whether a consequence is natural and probable, consider all of the circumstances established by the evidence.]

[There may be more than one cause of death. An act causes death only if it is a substantial factor in causing the death. A *substantial factor* is more than a trivial or remote factor. However, it does not need to be the only factor that causes the death.]

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*New January 2006; Revised April 2020*

**BENCH NOTES**

***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If causation is at issue, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on proximate cause. (*People v. Bernhardt* (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 567, 590–591 [35 Cal.Rptr. 401].) If the evidence indicates that there was only one cause of death, the court should give the “direct, natural, and probable” language in the first bracketed paragraph on causation. If there is evidence of multiple causes of death, the court should also give the “substantial factor” instruction in the second bracketed paragraph on causation. (See *People v. Autry* (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 363 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 135]; *People v. Pike* (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 732, 746–747 [243 Cal.Rptr. 54].)

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “For the purpose of this instruction” if the evidence shows an intent to defraud an entity or association rather than a natural person. (Pen. Code, § 8.)

### ***Related Instructions***

CALCRIM No. 2002, *Insurance Fraud: Vehicle Accident*.

## **AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 192(c)(3).
- Causation. *People v. Rodriguez* (1960) 186 Cal.App.2d 433, 440 [8 Cal.Rptr. 863].
- Intent to Defraud—Defined. *People v. Pugh* (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 66, 72 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 770]; *People v. Gaul-Alexander* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 735, 745 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 176].
- Intent to Defraud Entity. Pen. Code, § 8.

## **RELATED ISSUES**

### ***Does Not Preclude Murder Charge***

Section 192(c)(3) of the Penal Code states that: “This paragraph does not prevent prosecution of a defendant for the crime of murder.”

### ***Probable and Natural Consequences of a Conspiracy***

A nondriver coconspirator may be liable for a death that results from a conspiracy to commit a vehicular collision for insurance fraud under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. (*People v. Superior Court (Shamis)* (1998) 58 Cal.App.4th 833, 842–843 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 388].)

## **SECONDARY SOURCES**

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, §§ 262–263.

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property, § 222.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 140, *Challenges to Crimes*, § 140.04, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.02[2][c], [4] (Matthew Bender).

## 595. Vehicular Manslaughter: Speeding Laws Defined

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<A. *Violation of Maximum Speed Law, Veh. Code, § 22349*>

[To prove that the defendant committed a violation of the maximum speed law, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant drove a vehicle on a highway;

AND

2. The defendant drove faster than (65/55/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert other posted speed limit>) mph.

[The term *highway* describes any area publicly maintained and open to the public for purposes of vehicular travel and includes a street.]]

<B. *Violation of Basic Speed Law, Veh. Code, § 22350*>

[To prove that the defendant committed a violation of the basic speed law, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant drove a vehicle on a highway;

AND

2. The defendant drove (faster than a reasonable person would have driven considering the weather, visibility, traffic, and conditions of the highway/ [or] at a speed that endangered the safety of other people or property).

The speed of travel, alone, does not establish whether a person did or did not violate the basic speed law. When determining whether the defendant violated the basic speed law, consider not only the speed, but also all the surrounding conditions known by the defendant and also what a reasonable person would have considered a safe rate of travel given those conditions.

[The term *highway* describes any area publicly maintained and open to the public for purposes of vehicular travel and includes a street.]]

<C. *Violation of Prima Facie Speed Law, Veh. Code, §§ 22351, 22352*>

[To prove that the defendant committed a violation of the prima facie speed law, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant drove a vehicle on a highway;
2. The defendant drove faster than (15/25) mph;

[AND]

3. The defendant drove \_\_\_\_\_ <insert appropriate description

*from Veh. Code, § 22352 of area where alleged violation occurred>(;/.)*

[AND

4. **The defendant’s rate of speed was faster than a reasonable person would have driven considering the weather, visibility, traffic, and conditions of the highway.]**

[The term *highway* describes any area publicly maintained and open to the public for purposes of vehicular travel and includes a street.]

[When determining whether the defendant drove faster than a reasonable person would have driven, consider not only the speed, but also all the surrounding conditions known by the defendant and also what a reasonable person would have considered a safe rate of travel given those conditions.

**The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s rate of travel was not reasonable given the overall conditions, even if the rate of travel was faster than the prima facie speed law. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant did not violate the prima facie speed law.]]**

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*New January 2006*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

In a vehicular manslaughter case, the court has a **sua sponte** duty instruct on the elements of the predicate misdemeanors or infractions alleged. (*People v. Ellis* (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1339 [82 Cal.Rptr.2d 409].) This instruction covers some of the more common infractions alleged. The court **must** give all appropriate instructions defining the element of vehicular manslaughter with this instruction.

When instructing on the prima facie speed law, insert the appropriate description of where the defendant was driving when the alleged violation occurred. If the defendant presents evidence that the rate of travel was not in violation of the basic speed law even though in violation of the prima facie speed law, give bracketed element 4 and the two bracketed paragraphs that begin, “When determining whether the defendant drove faster than a reasonable person.”.(Veh. Code, §§ 22351, 22352.)

The court should define the term highway; however, it need only be defined once. If the court instructs on multiple Vehicle Code sections, give the bracketed definition of highway at the end of the last Vehicle Code section instructed on.

## AUTHORITY

- Maximum Speed Law. Veh. Code, § 22349.
- Basic Speed Law. Veh. Code, § 22350.

- Prima Facie Speed Law. Veh. Code, §§ 22351, 22352.
- Highway Defined. Veh. Code, § 360.
- Duty to Instruct on Elements of Predicate Offense. *People v. Ellis* (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1339 [82 Cal.Rptr.2d 409].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, § 320.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.02[2][c], [3][b], Ch. 145, *Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses*, § 145.02[1][d] (Matthew Bender).

**596–599. Reserved for Future Use**



## G. ATTEMPT

### 600. Attempted Murder (Pen. Code, §§ 21a, 663, 664)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with attempted murder.

To prove that the defendant is guilty of attempted murder, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant took at least one direct but ineffective step toward killing (another person/ [or] a fetus);

AND

2. The defendant intended to kill (that/a) (person/ [or] fetus).

A *direct step* requires more than merely planning or preparing to commit murder or obtaining or arranging for something needed to commit murder. A direct step is one that goes beyond planning or preparation and shows that a person is putting his or her plan into action. A direct step indicates a definite and unambiguous intent to kill. It is a direct movement toward the commission of the crime after preparations are made. It is an immediate step that puts the plan in motion so that the plan would have been completed if some circumstance outside the plan had not interrupted the attempt.

[A person who attempts to commit murder is guilty of attempted murder even if, after taking a direct step toward killing, he or she abandons further efforts to complete the crime, or his or her attempt fails or is interrupted by someone or something beyond his or her control. On the other hand, if a person freely and voluntarily abandons his or her plans before taking a direct step toward committing the murder, then that person is not guilty of attempted murder.]

[The defendant may be guilty of attempted murder even if you conclude that murder was actually completed.]

[A *fetus* is an unborn human being that has progressed beyond the embryonic stage after major structures have been outlined, which typically occurs at seven to eight weeks after fertilization.]

*<Give when kill zone theory applies>*

[A person may intend to kill a primary target and also [a] secondary target[s] within a zone of fatal harm or “kill zone.” A “kill zone” is an area in which the defendant used lethal force that was designed and intended to kill everyone in the area around the primary target.

In order to convict the defendant of the attempted murder of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name or description of victim charged in attempted*

*murder count[s] on concurrent-intent theory>, the People must prove that the defendant not only intended to kill \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of primary target alleged> but also either intended to kill \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name or description of victim charged in attempted murder count[s] on concurrent-intent theory>, or intended to kill everyone within the kill zone.*

**In determining whether the defendant intended to kill \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name or description of victim charged in attempted murder count[s] on concurrent-intent theory>, the People must prove that (1) the only reasonable conclusion from the defendant’s use of lethal force, is that the defendant intended to create a kill zone; and (2) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name or description of victim charged in attempted murder count[s] on concurrent-intent theory> was located within the kill zone.**

**In determining whether the defendant intended to create a “kill zone” and the scope of such a zone, you should consider all of the circumstances including, but not limited to, the following:**

- **The type of weapon used(;/.)]**
- **The number of shots fired(;/.)]**
- **The distance between the defendant and \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name or description of victim charged in attempted murder count[s] on concurrent-intent theory>(;/.)]**
- **The distance between \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name or description of victim charged in attempted murder count[s] on concurrent-intent theory> and the primary target.]**

**If you have a reasonable doubt whether the defendant intended to kill \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name or description of victim charged in attempted murder count[s] on concurrent-intent theory> or intended to kill \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name or description of primary target alleged> by killing everyone in the kill zone, then you must find the defendant not guilty of the attempted murder of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name or description of victim charged in attempted murder count[s] on concurrent-intent theory>.]**

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*New January 2006; Revised December 2008, August 2009, April 2011, August 2013, September 2019, April 2020*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the elements of the crime of attempted murder when charged, or if not charged, when the evidence raises a question whether all the elements of the charged offense are present. (See *People v.*



*Breverman* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 154 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094] [discussing duty to instruct on lesser included offenses in homicide generally.]

The second bracketed paragraph is provided for cases in which the prosecution theory is that the defendant created a “kill zone,” harboring the specific and concurrent intent to kill others in the zone. (*People v. Bland* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 313, 331 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d 546, 48 P.3d 1107].) “The conclusion that transferred intent does not apply to attempted murder still permits a person who shoots at a group of people to be punished for the actions towards everyone in the group even if that person primarily targeted only one of them.” (*Id.* at p. 329.)

The *Bland* court stated that a special instruction on this issue was not required. (*Id.* at p. 331, fn. 6.) The bracketed language is provided for the court to use at its discretion.

Give the next-to-last bracketed paragraph when the defendant has been charged only with attempt to commit murder, but the evidence at trial reveals that the murder was actually completed. (See Pen. Code, § 663.)

Penal Code section 188, as amended by Statutes 2018, ch. 1015 (S.B. 1437), became effective January 1, 2019. The amendment added “malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.” The natural and probable consequences doctrine as the basis for attempted murder may be affected by this statutory change.

### ***Related Instructions***

CALCRIM Nos. 3470–3477, Defense Instructions.

CALCRIM No. 601, *Attempted Murder: Deliberation and Premeditation*.

CALCRIM No. 602, *Attempted Murder: Peace Officer, Firefighter, Custodial Officer, or Custody Assistant*.

CALCRIM No. 603, *Attempted Voluntary Manslaughter: Heat of Passion—Lesser Included Offense*.

CALCRIM No. 604, *Attempted Voluntary Manslaughter: Imperfect Self-Defense—Lesser Included Offense*.

## **AUTHORITY**

- Attempt Defined. Pen. Code, §§ 21a, 663, 664.
- Murder Defined. Pen. Code, § 187.
- Specific Intent to Kill Required. *People v. Guerra* (1985) 40 Cal.3d 377, 386 [220 Cal.Rptr. 374, 708 P.2d 1252].
- Fetus Defined. *People v. Davis* (1994) 7 Cal.4th 797, 814–815 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 50, 872 P.2d 591]; *People v. Taylor* (2004) 32 Cal.4th 863, 867 [11 Cal.Rptr.3d 510, 86 P.3d 881].
- Kill Zone Explained. *People v. Canizales* (2019) 7 Cal.5th 591, 607–608 [248 Cal.Rptr.3d 370, 442 P.3d 686]; *People v. Stone* (2009) 46 Cal.4th 131, 137–138 [92 Cal.Rptr.3d 362, 205 P.3d 272].

- This Instruction Correctly States the Law of Attempted Murder. *People v. Lawrence* (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 547, 556–557 [99 Cal.Rptr.3d 324].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

Attempted voluntary manslaughter is a lesser included offense. (*People v. Van Ronk* (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 818, 824–825 [217 Cal.Rptr. 581]; *People v. Williams* (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 1018, 1024–1026 [162 Cal.Rptr. 748].)

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Specific Intent Required*

“[T]he crime of attempted murder requires a specific intent to kill . . . .” (*People v. Guerra* (1985) 40 Cal.3d 377, 386 [220 Cal.Rptr. 374, 708 P.2d 1252].)

In instructing upon the crime of attempt to commit murder, there should never be any reference whatsoever to implied malice. Nothing less than a specific intent to kill must be found before a defendant can be convicted of attempt to commit murder, and the instructions in this respect should be lean and unequivocal in explaining to the jury that only a specific intent to kill will do.

(*People v. Santascoy* (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 909, 918 [200 Cal.Rptr. 709].)

#### *Solicitation*

Attempted solicitation of murder is a crime. (*People v. Saephanh* (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 451, 460 [94 Cal.Rptr.2d 910].)

#### *Single Bullet, Two Victims*

A shooter who fires a single bullet at two victims who are both in his line of fire can be found to have acted with express malice toward both victims. (*People v. Smith* (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 744 [37 Cal.Rptr.3d 163, 124 P.3d 730]. See also *People v. Perez* (2010) 50 Cal.4th 222, 225 [112 Cal.Rptr.3d 310, 234 P.3d 557].)

#### *No Attempted Involuntary Manslaughter*

“[T]here is no such crime as attempted involuntary manslaughter.” (*People v. Johnson* (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1329, 1332 [59 Cal.Rptr.2d 798].)

#### *Transferred and Concurrent Intent*

“[T]he doctrine of transferred intent does not apply to attempted murder.” (*People v. Bland* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 313, 331 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d 546, 48 P.3d 1107].) “[T]he defendant may be convicted of the attempted murders of any[one] within the kill zone, although on a concurrent, not transferred, intent theory.” (*Id.*)

#### *Kill Zone Theory*

Give the kill zone instruction “only in those cases where the court concludes there is sufficient evidence to support a jury determination that the *only* reasonable inference from the circumstances of the offense is that a defendant intended to kill everyone in the zone of fatal harm. The use or attempted use of force that merely *endangered* everyone in the area is insufficient to support a kill zone instruction.” (*People v. Canizales* (2019) 7 Cal.5th 591, 608 [248 Cal.Rptr.3d 370, 442 P.3d 686].)

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Elements, §§ 56–71.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 140, *Challenges to Crimes*, § 140.02[3]; Ch. 141, *Conspiracy, Solicitation, and Attempt*, § 141.20; Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.01[3][e] (Matthew Bender).

**601. Attempted Murder: Deliberation and Premeditation (Pen. Code, §§ 21a, 189, 664(a))**

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If you find the defendant guilty of attempted murder [under Count \_\_\_\_\_], you must then decide whether the People have proved the additional allegation that the attempted murder was done willfully, and with deliberation and premeditation.

(The defendant/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name or description of principal if not defendant>) acted **willfully** if (he/she) intended to kill when (he/she) acted. (The defendant/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name or description of principal if not defendant>) **deliberated** if (he/she) carefully weighed the considerations for and against (his/her) choice and, knowing the consequences, decided to kill. (The defendant/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name or description of principal if not defendant>) acted with **premeditation** if (he/she) decided to kill before completing the act[s] of attempted murder.

[The attempted murder was done willfully and with deliberation and premeditation if either the defendant or \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name or description of principal> or both of them acted with that state of mind.]

The length of time the person spends considering whether to kill does not alone determine whether the attempted killing is deliberate and premeditated. The amount of time required for deliberation and premeditation may vary from person to person and according to the circumstances. A decision to kill made rashly, impulsively, or without careful consideration of the choice and its consequences is not deliberate and premeditated. On the other hand, a cold, calculated decision to kill can be reached quickly. The test is the extent of the reflection, not the length of time.

The People have the burden of proving this allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you must find this allegation has not been proved.

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2013, February 2015*

**BENCH NOTES**

***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the sentencing enhancement. (*Apprendi v. New Jersey* (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 475–476, 490 [120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435]; Pen. Code, § 664(a).) Give this instruction when an enhancement for deliberation and premeditation is charged.

This instruction **must** be given with CALCRIM No. 600, *Attempted Murder*.

When a charged attempted murder also forms the basis for a charge of provocative

act murder, the court must take care to clarify that the defendant must have personally premeditated and deliberated an attempted murder in order to be convicted of *first degree murder* resulting from attempted murder under the provocative act doctrine. As described in CALCRIM No. 560, *Homicide: Provocative Act by Defendant*, the mental state for first degree murder under the provocative act murder doctrine requires that the defendant “personally premeditated and deliberated the attempted murder that provoked a lethal response.” (*People v. Gonzalez* (2012) 54 Cal.4th 643, 662 [142 Cal.Rptr.3d 893, 278 P.3d 1242].)

### AUTHORITY

- Willful, Deliberate, and Premeditated Murder. Pen. Code, § 189.
- Willful, Deliberate, and Premeditated Attempted Murder. Pen. Code, § 664(a).
- Premeditation and Deliberation Defined. *People v. Pearson* (2013) 56 Cal.4th 393, 443–444 [154 Cal.Rptr.3d 541, 297 P.3d 793]; *People v. Anderson* (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, 26–27 [73 Cal.Rptr. 550, 447 P.2d 942]; *People v. Bender* (1945) 27 Cal.2d 164, 183–184 [163 P.2d 8]; *People v. Daugherty* (1953) 40 Cal.2d 876, 901–902 [256 P.2d 911].
- Attempted Premeditated Murder and the Natural and Probable Consequences Doctrine. *People v. Favor* (2012) 54 Cal.4th 868, 879 [143 Cal.Rptr.3d 659, 279 P.3d 1131].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Accomplice Liability*

An aider and abettor is subject to this penalty provision where the principal attempted a willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder even though the accomplice did not personally deliberate or premeditate. (*People v. Lee* (2003) 31 Cal.4th 613, 622–623 [3 Cal.Rptr.3d 402, 74 P.3d 176]; *People v. Laster* (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1450, 1473 [61 Cal.Rptr.2d 680].) The accomplice must still share the intent to kill. (*People v. Lee, supra*, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 623–624.)

See the Related Issues Section to CALCRIM No. 521, *Murder: Degrees* for discussion of “deliberate and premeditated.”

### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Elements, §§ 56–57.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 140, *Challenges to Crimes*, § 140.02[3]; Ch. 141, *Conspiracy, Solicitation, and Attempt*, §§ 141.20[2], 141.21; Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.01[1][e], [g], [3][e] (Matthew Bender).

**602. Attempted Murder: Peace Officer, Firefighter, Custodial Officer, or Custody Assistant (Pen. Code, §§ 21a, 664(e))**

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If you find the defendant guilty of attempted murder [under Count \_\_\_\_\_], you must then decide whether the People have proved the additional allegation that (he/she) attempted to murder a (peace officer/firefighter/custodial officer).

To prove this allegation, the People must prove that:

1. \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert officer's name, excluding title>* was a (peace officer/firefighter/custodial officer/custody assistant/nonsworn uniformed employee of a sheriff's department) lawfully performing (his/her) duties as a (peace officer/firefighter/custodial officer/custody assistant/nonsworn uniformed employee of a sheriff's department);

AND

2. When the defendant attempted the murder, the defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, that \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert officer's name, excluding title>* was a (peace officer/firefighter/custodial officer/custody assistant/nonsworn uniformed employee of a sheriff's department) who was performing (his/her) duties.

[A person who is employed as a police officer by \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of agency that employs police officer>* is a **peace officer**.]

[A person employed by \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of agency that employs peace officer, e.g., "the Department of Fish and Wildlife">* is a **peace officer** if \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert description of facts necessary to make employee a peace officer, e.g., "designated by the director of the agency as a peace officer">*. ]

[The duties of (a/an) \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert title of peace officer, firefighter, custodial officer, custody assistant or nonsworn uniformed employee of a sheriff's department>* include \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert job duties>*. ]

[A **firefighter** includes anyone who is an officer, employee, or member of a (governmentally operated (fire department/fire protection or firefighting agency) in this state/federal fire department/federal fire protection or firefighting agency), whether or not he or she is paid for his or her services.]

[A **custodial officer** is someone who works for a law enforcement agency of a city or county, is responsible for maintaining custody of prisoners, and helps operate a local detention facility. [[A/An] (county jail/city jail/ \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert other detention facility>*) is a local detention facility.]

**[A custodial officer is not a peace officer.]**

*<If the custodial officer is employed by a law enforcement agency of San Diego County, Fresno County, Kern County, Stanislaus County, Riverside County, Santa Clara County, or a county having a population of 425,000 or less, give the following sentence in place of the definition above.>*

**[A person designated as (a/an) (correctional officer/jailer/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert similar title>) employed by the county of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of county designated by Penal Code section 831.5(a)> is a custodial officer.]**

**[A custody assistant is a person who is a full-time, non-peace officer employee of the county sheriff's department who assists peace officer personnel in maintaining order and security in a custody detention, court detention, or station jail facility of the sheriff's department.]**

**[For the purpose of this instruction, a nonsworn uniformed employee of a sheriff's department is someone whose job includes the care or control of inmates in a detention facility. [A prison, jail, camp, or other correctional facility used for the confinement of adults or both adults and minors/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert other applicable definition from Penal Code section 289.6(c)> is a detention facility for the purpose of this definition.]**

*<When lawful performance is an issue, give the following paragraph and Instruction 2670, Lawful Performance: Peace Officer.>*

**[A peace officer is not lawfully performing his or her duties if he or she is (unlawfully arresting or detaining someone/ [or] using unreasonable or excessive force in his or her duties). Instruction 2670 explains (when an arrest or detention is unlawful/ [and] when force is unreasonable or excessive).]**

*<When lawful performance is an issue, give the following paragraph and Instruction 2671, Lawful Performance: Custodial Officer.>*

**[A custodial officer is not lawfully performing his or her duties if he or she is using unreasonable or excessive force in his or her duties. Instruction 2671 explains when force is unreasonable or excessive.]**

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2006, June 2007*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the sentencing enhancement. (*Apprendi v. New Jersey* (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 475–476, 490 [120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435].)



In order to be “engaged in the performance of his or her duties,” a peace officer or custodial officer must be acting lawfully. (*People v. Gonzalez* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1217 [275 Cal.Rptr. 729, 800 P.2d 1159].) “[D]isputed facts bearing on the issue of legal cause must be submitted to the jury considering an engaged-in-duty element.” (*Ibid.*) If excessive force is an issue, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct the jury that the defendant is not guilty of the offense charged, or any lesser included offense in which lawful performance is an element, if the defendant used reasonable force in response to excessive force. (*People v. Olguin* (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 39, 46–47 [173 Cal.Rptr. 663].) On request, the court must instruct that the prosecution has the burden of proving the lawfulness of the arrest beyond a reasonable doubt. (*People v. Castain* (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 138, 145 [175 Cal.Rptr. 651].) If lawful performance of a peace officer is an issue, give the bracketed paragraph on lawful performance of a peace officer and the appropriate portions of CALCRIM No. 2670, *Lawful Performance: Peace Officer*. If lawful performance of a custodial officer is an issue, give the bracketed paragraph on lawful performance of a custodial officer and the appropriate portions of CALCRIM No. 2671, *Lawful Performance: Custodial Officer*.

The jury must determine whether the alleged victim is a peace officer. (*People v. Brown* (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 444–445 [250 Cal.Rptr. 604, 758 P.2d 1135].) The court may instruct the jury on the appropriate definition of “peace officer” from the statute (e.g., “a Garden Grove Regular Police Officer and a Garden Grove Reserve Police Officer are peace officers”). (*Ibid.*) However, the court may not instruct the jury that the alleged victim was a peace officer as a matter of law (e.g., “Officer Reed was a peace officer”). (*Ibid.*) If the alleged victim is a police officer, give the bracketed sentence that begins with “A person employed as a police officer.” If the alleged victim is another type of peace officer, give the bracketed sentence that begins with “A person employed by.”

Penal Code section 664(e) refers to the definition of peace officer used in Penal Code section 190.2(a)(7), which defines “peace officer” as “defined in Section 830.1, 830.2, 830.3, 830.31, 830.32, 830.33, 830.34, 830.35, 830.36, 830.37, 830.4, 830.5, 830.6, 830.10, 830.11, or 830.12.”

Penal Code section 664(e) refers to the definition of firefighter used in Penal Code section 190.2(a)(9), which defines “firefighter” “as defined in Section 245.1.”

The court may give the bracketed sentence that begins, “The duties of (a/an) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert title . . . > include,” on request. The court may insert a description of the officer’s duties such as “the correct service of a facially valid search . . . warrant.” (*People v. Gonzalez* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1222 [275 Cal.Rptr. 729, 800 P.2d 1159].)

In the bracketed definition of “local detention facility,” do not insert the name of a specific detention facility. Instead, insert a description of the type of detention facility at issue in the case. (See *People v. Flood* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 482 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180, 957 P.2d 869] [jury must determine if alleged victim is a peace officer]; see Penal Code section 6031.4 [defining local detention facility].)



**AUTHORITY**

- Attempted Murder on a Peace Officer or Firefighter. Pen. Code, § 664(e).
- Peace Officer Defined. Pen. Code, § 830 et seq.
- Firefighter Defined. Pen. Code, § 245.1.
- Custody Assistant Defined. Pen. Code, § 831.7.
- Nonsworn Uniformed Employee of Sheriff's Department Defined. Pen. Code, § 664(e).
- Custodial Officer as Referenced in Pen. Code, § 664, Defined. Pen. Code, §§ 831(a) and 831.5(a).

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

3 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, § 303.  
6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 141, *Conspiracy, Solicitation, and Attempt*, §§ 141.20[2], 141.21; Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.01[3][e] (Matthew Bender).

**603. Attempted Voluntary Manslaughter: Heat of Passion—Lesser Included Offense (Pen. Code, §§ 21a, 192, 664)**

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**An attempted killing that would otherwise be attempted murder is reduced to attempted voluntary manslaughter if the defendant attempted to kill someone because of a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion.**

**The defendant attempted to kill someone because of a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion if:**

- 1. The defendant took at least one direct but ineffective step toward killing a person;**
- 2. The defendant intended to kill that person;**
- 3. The defendant attempted the killing because (he/she) was provoked;**
- 4. The provocation would have caused a person of average disposition to act rashly and without due deliberation, that is, from passion rather than from judgment;**

**AND**

- 5. The attempted killing was a rash act done under the influence of intense emotion that obscured the defendant’s reasoning or judgment.**

**Heat of passion does not require anger, rage, or any specific emotion. It can be any violent or intense emotion that causes a person to act without due deliberation and reflection.**

**In order for a sudden quarrel or heat of passion to reduce an attempted murder to attempted voluntary manslaughter, the defendant must have acted under the direct and immediate influence of provocation as I have defined it. While no specific type of provocation is required, slight or remote provocation is not sufficient. Sufficient provocation may occur over a short or long period of time.**

**It is not enough that the defendant simply was provoked. The defendant is not allowed to set up (his/her) own standard of conduct. You must decide whether the defendant was provoked and whether the provocation was sufficient. In deciding whether the provocation was sufficient, consider whether a person of average disposition, in the same situation and knowing the same facts, would have reacted from passion rather than judgment.**

**[If enough time passed between the provocation and the attempted killing for a person of average disposition to “cool off” and regain his or her clear reasoning and judgment, then the attempted murder is not**

reduced to attempted voluntary manslaughter on this basis.]

**The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant attempted to kill someone and was not acting as a result of a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of attempted murder.**

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2009, April 2010, April 2011, August 2015*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on attempted voluntary manslaughter on either theory, heat of passion or imperfect self-defense, when evidence of either is “substantial enough to merit consideration” by the jury. (See *People v. Breverman* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 153–163 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094] [discussing charge of completed murder]; *People v. Barton* (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 201 [47 Cal.Rptr.2d 569, 906 P.2d 531] [same].)

If the victim’s gender identity or sexual orientation raises specific issues concerning whether provocation was objectively reasonable, give an instruction tailored to those issues on request. (Pen. Code, § 192(f), amended effective January 1, 2015.)

### *Related Instructions*

CALCRIM No. 511, *Excusable Homicide: Accident in the Heat of Passion*.

CALCRIM No. 570, *Voluntary Manslaughter: Heat of Passion—Lesser Included Offense*.

CALCRIM No. 604, *Attempted Voluntary Manslaughter: Imperfect Self-Defense—Lesser Included Offense*.

## AUTHORITY

- Attempt Defined. Pen. Code, §§ 21a, 664.
- Manslaughter Defined. Pen. Code, § 192.
- Attempted Voluntary Manslaughter. *People v. Van Ronk* (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 818, 824–825 [217 Cal.Rptr. 581]; *People v. Williams* (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 1018, 1024–1026 [162 Cal.Rptr. 748].
- Gender Identity and Sexual Orientation Not Proper Basis for Finding Provocation Objectively Reasonable. Pen. Code, § 192(f), amended effective January 1, 2015.

## RELATED ISSUES

### *Specific Intent to Kill Required*

An attempt to commit a crime requires an intention to commit the crime and an overt act towards its completion. Where a person intends to kill another person and makes an unsuccessful attempt to do so, his intention may be accompanied

by any of the aggravating or mitigating circumstances which can accompany the completed crimes. In other words, the intent to kill may have been formed after premeditation or deliberation, it may have been formed upon a sudden explosion of violence, or it may have been brought about by a heat of passion or an unreasonable but good faith belief in the necessity of self-defense.

(*People v. Van Ronk* (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 818, 824 [217 Cal.Rptr. 581] [citation omitted].)

***No Attempted Involuntary Manslaughter***

There is no crime of attempted *involuntary* manslaughter. (*People v. Johnson* (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1329, 1332 [59 Cal.Rptr.2d 798].)

See the Related Issues section to CALCRIM No. 570, *Voluntary Manslaughter: Heat of Passion—Lesser Included Offense*.

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person § 224.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 141, *Conspiracy, Solicitation, and Attempt*, §§ 141.20[2], 141.21; Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, §§ 142.01[3][e], 142.02[2][a] (Matthew Bender).

**604. Attempted Voluntary Manslaughter: Imperfect Self-Defense—Lesser Included Offense (Pen. Code, §§ 21a, 192, 664)**

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An attempted killing that would otherwise be attempted murder is reduced to attempted voluntary manslaughter if the defendant attempted to kill a person because (he/she) acted in imperfect (self-defense/ [or] defense of another).

If you conclude the defendant acted in complete (self-defense/ [or] defense of another), (his/her) action was lawful and you must find (him/her) not guilty of any crime. The difference between complete (self-defense/ [or] defense of another) and imperfect (self-defense/ [or] defense of another) depends on whether the defendant's belief in the need to use deadly force was reasonable.

The defendant acted in imperfect (self-defense/ [or] defense of another) if:

1. The defendant took at least one direct but ineffective step toward killing a person.
2. The defendant intended to kill when (he/she) acted.
3. The defendant believed that (he/she/ [or] someone else/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of third party>) was in imminent danger of being killed or suffering great bodily injury.

**AND**

4. The defendant believed that the immediate use of deadly force was necessary to defend against the danger.

**BUT**

5. At least one of the defendant's beliefs was unreasonable.

[*Great bodily injury* means significant or substantial physical injury. It is an injury that is greater than minor or moderate harm.]

Belief in future harm is not sufficient, no matter how great or how likely the harm is believed to be. The defendant must have actually believed there was imminent danger of death or great bodily injury to (himself/ herself/ [or] someone else).

In evaluating the defendant's beliefs, consider all the circumstances as they were known and appeared to the defendant.

[If you find that \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name or description of alleged victim> threatened or harmed the defendant [or others] in the past, you may consider that information in evaluating the defendant's beliefs.]

[If you find that the defendant knew that \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name or

*description of alleged victim*> **had threatened or harmed others in the past, you may consider that information in evaluating the defendant’s beliefs.]**

**[If you find that the defendant received a threat from someone else that (he/she) reasonably associated with \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name or description of alleged victim>, you may consider that threat in evaluating the defendant’s beliefs.]**

**The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not acting in imperfect self-defense. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of attempted murder.**

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2009, October 2010, February 2012, February 2013, September 2020*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on attempted voluntary manslaughter on either theory, heat of passion or imperfect self-defense, when evidence of either is “substantial enough to merit consideration” by the jury. (See *People v. Breverman* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 153–163 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094] [discussing charge of completed murder]; *People v. Barton* (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 201 [47 Cal.Rptr.2d 569, 906 P.2d 531] [same].)

The second sentence of the great bodily injury definition could result in error if the prosecution improperly argues great bodily injury may be shown by greater than minor injury alone. (Compare *People v. Medellin* (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 519, 533–535 [258 Cal.Rptr.3d 867] [the definition was reasonably susceptible to prosecutor’s erroneous argument that the injury need only be greater than minor] with *People v. Quinonez* (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 457, 466 [260 Cal.Rptr.3d 86] [upholding instructions containing great bodily injury definition as written].)

### *Perfect Self-Defense*

Most courts hold that an instruction on imperfect self-defense **is required** in every case in which a court instructs on perfect self-defense. If there is substantial evidence of a defendant’s belief in the need for self-defense, there will *always* be substantial evidence to support an imperfect self-defense instruction because the reasonableness of that belief will always be at issue. (See *People v. Ceja* (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 78, 85–86 [31 Cal.Rptr.2d 475], overruled in part in *People v. Blakeley* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 82, 91 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 451, 999 P.2d 675]; see also *People v. De Leon* (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 815, 824 [12 Cal.Rptr.2d 825].) The court in *People v. Rodriguez* disagreed, however, and found that an imperfect self-defense instruction was not required sua sponte on the facts of the case where the defendant’s version of the crime “could only lead to an acquittal based on justifiable homicide,” and

when the prosecutor's version of the crime could only lead to a conviction of first degree murder. (*People v. Rodriguez* (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1250, 1275 [62 Cal.Rptr.2d 345]; see also *People v. Williams* (1992) 4 Cal.4th 354, 362 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 441, 841 P.2d 961] [in a rape prosecution, the court was not required to give a mistake-of-fact instruction where the two sides gave wholly divergent accounts with no middle ground to support a mistake-of-fact instruction].)

In evaluating whether the defendant actually believed in the need for self-defense, the jury may consider the effect of antecedent threats and assaults against the defendant, including threats received by the defendant from a third party that the defendant reasonably associated with the aggressor. (*People v. Minifie* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1055, 1065, 1069 [56 Cal.Rptr.2d 133, 920 P.2d 1337].) If there is sufficient evidence, the court should give the bracketed paragraphs on prior threats or assaults on request.

### ***Related Instructions***

CALCRIM Nos. 3470–3477, Defense Instructions.

CALCRIM No. 571, *Voluntary Manslaughter: Imperfect Self-Defense—Lesser Included Offense*.

CALCRIM No. 603, *Attempted Voluntary Manslaughter: Heat of Passion—Lesser Included Offense*.

## **AUTHORITY**

- Attempt Defined. Pen. Code, §§ 21a, 664.
- Manslaughter Defined. Pen. Code, § 192.
- Attempted Voluntary Manslaughter. *People v. Van Ronk* (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 818, 824–825 [217 Cal.Rptr. 581]; *People v. Williams* (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 1018, 1024–1026 [162 Cal.Rptr. 748].
- Imperfect Self-Defense Defined. *People v. Flannel* (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 680–683 [160 Cal.Rptr. 84, 603 P.2d 1]; *People v. Barton* (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 201 [47 Cal.Rptr.2d 569, 906 P.2d 531]; *In re Christian S.* (1994) 7 Cal.4th 768, 773 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 33, 872 P.2d 574]; see *People v. Uriarte* (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 192, 197–198 [272 Cal.Rptr. 693] [insufficient evidence to support defense of another person].
- This Instruction Upheld. *People v. Lopez* (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1297, 1307 [132 Cal.Rptr.3d 248].

## **RELATED ISSUES**

See the Related Issues section to CALCRIM No. 603, *Attempted Voluntary Manslaughter: Heat of Passion—Lesser Included Offense* and CALCRIM No. 571, *Voluntary Manslaughter: Imperfect Self-Defense—Lesser Included Offense*.

## **SECONDARY SOURCES**

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, § 224.

3 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 73, *Defenses and Justifications*, § 73.11 (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 141, *Conspiracy, Solicitation, and Attempt*, §§ 141.20[2], 141.21; Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, §§ 142.01[3][e], 142.02[2][a] (Matthew Bender).

**605–619. Reserved for Future Use**



## H. CAUSATION: SPECIAL ISSUES

### 620. Causation: Special Issues

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**There may be more than one cause of death. An act causes death only if it is a substantial factor in causing the death. A *substantial factor* is more than a trivial or remote factor. However, it does not need to be the only factor that causes the death.**

*<A. Negligence of Decedent or Third Party, Not Medical Personnel>*

**[The failure of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of decedent>* or another person to use reasonable care may have contributed to the death. But if the defendant’s act was a substantial factor causing the death, then the defendant is legally responsible for the death even though \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of decedent>* or another person may have failed to use reasonable care.]**

*<B. Negligence of Medical Personnel>*

**[The failure of the (doctor(s)/ [or] medical staff) to use reasonable care in treating \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of decedent>* may have contributed to the death. But if the injury inflicted by the defendant was a substantial factor causing the death, then the defendant is legally responsible for the death even though the (doctor[s]/ [or] medical staff) may have failed to use reasonable care. On the other hand, if the injury inflicted by the defendant was not a substantial factor causing the death, but the death was caused by grossly improper treatment by the (doctor[s]/[or] medical staff), then the defendant is not legally responsible for the death.]**

*<C. Vulnerable Victim—Injury Accelerating Death>*

**[\_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of decedent>* may have suffered from an illness or physical condition that made (him/her) more likely to die from the injury than the average person. The fact that \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of decedent>* may have been more physically vulnerable is not a defense to (murder/ [or] manslaughter). If the defendant’s act was a substantial factor causing the death, then the defendant is legally responsible for the death. This is true even if \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of decedent>* would have died in a short time as a result of other causes or if another person of average health would not have died as a result of the defendant’s actions.]**

**If you have a reasonable doubt whether the defendant’s act caused the death, you must find (him/her) not guilty.**

New January 2006

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

If causation is at issue, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on proximate cause. (*People v. Bernhardt* (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 567, 590–591 [35 Cal.Rptr. 401].)

## AUTHORITY

- Negligence of Third Party. *People v. Clark* (1951) 106 Cal.App.2d 271, 277–278 [235 P.2d 56]; *People v. Pike* (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 732, 746–747 [243 Cal.Rptr. 54].
- Negligence of Medical Staff. *People v. McGee* (1947) 31 Cal.2d 229, 240–241 [187 P.2d 706]; *People v. Roberts* (1992) 2 Cal.4th 271, 312 [6 Cal.Rptr.2d 276, 826 P.2d 274].
- Vulnerable Victim. *People v. Catlin* (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 155–157 [109 Cal.Rptr.2d 31, 26 P.3d 357]; *People v. Phillips* (1966) 64 Cal.2d 574, 579 [51 Cal.Rptr. 225, 414 P.2d 353], disapproved on other grounds in *People v. Flood* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 490, fn. 12 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180, 957 P.2d 869]; *People v. Stamp* (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 203, 209 [82 Cal.Rptr. 598].

## SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Elements, §§ 39, 40, 45.

**621–624. Reserved for Future Use**

## I. IMPAIRMENT DEFENSE

### 625. Voluntary Intoxication: Effects on Homicide Crimes (Pen. Code, § 29.4)

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**You may consider evidence, if any, of the defendant’s voluntary intoxication only in a limited way. You may consider that evidence only in deciding whether the defendant acted with an intent to kill[,] [or] [the defendant acted with deliberation and premeditation[,] [[or] the defendant was unconscious when (he/she) acted[,] [or the defendant \_\_\_\_\_ <insert other specific intent required in a homicide charge or other charged offense>.]**

**A person is *voluntarily intoxicated* if he or she becomes intoxicated by willingly using any intoxicating drug, drink, or other substance knowing that it could produce an intoxicating effect, or willingly assuming the risk of that effect.**

**You may not consider evidence of voluntary intoxication for any other purpose.**

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2014, February 2016, March 2019*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

With the statutory elimination of diminished capacity as a defense, there is no sua sponte duty to instruct on the effect of voluntary intoxication on the mental states required for homicide. (Pen. Code, § 28(b); *People v. Saille* (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1103, 1119–1120 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 364, 820 P.2d 588].) However, subsequent cases affirm that voluntary intoxication can be used to negate an element of the crime that must be proven by the prosecution. (*People v. Reyes* (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 975, 982 [61 Cal.Rptr.2d 39]; *People v. Visciotti* (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1, 56–57 [5 Cal.Rptr.2d 495, 825 P.2d 388].) Such an instruction is a “pinpoint” instruction, which must be given on request when there is sufficient evidence supporting the theory. (*People v. Saille, supra*, 54 Cal.3d at p. 1120.)

Include the bracketed language regarding unconsciousness if the court also gives CALCRIM No. 626, *Voluntary Intoxication Causing Unconsciousness: Effects on Homicide Crimes*.

If the defendant is charged with a homicide crime that has as an element an additional specific intent requirement other than intent to kill, include the required intent in the last bracketed portion of the second sentence. For example, if the defendant is charged with torture murder, include “whether the defendant intended to inflict extreme and prolonged pain.” Or, if the defendant is charged with felony-

murder, insert intent to commit the felony where indicated. Similarly, if the defendant is also charged with a nonhomicide crime with a specific intent requirement, include that intent requirement. For example, if the defendant is charged with murder and robbery, include “whether the defendant intended to permanently deprive the owner of the property.”

Evidence of voluntary intoxication is inadmissible on the question of whether a defendant believed it necessary to act in self-defense. (*People v. Soto* (2018) 4 Cal.5th 968, 970 [231 Cal.Rptr.3rd 732, 415 P.3d 789].)

### AUTHORITY

- Voluntary Intoxication Defined. Pen. Code, § 29.4(c).
- Unconsciousness Not Required. *People v. Ray* (1975) 14 Cal.3d 20, 28–29 [120 Cal.Rptr. 377, 533 P.2d 1017], disapproved on other grounds in *People v. Blakeley* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 82, 89 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 451, 999 P.2d 675].
- No Sua Sponte Duty to Instruct. *People v. Saille* (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1103, 1120 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 364, 820 P.2d 588].
- Evidence of Intoxication Inapplicable to Implied Malice. Pen. Code, § 29.4(b); *People v. Martin* (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1107, 1114–1115 [93 Cal.Rptr.2d 433].
- Applies to Attempted Murder. *People v. Castillo* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1009, 1016 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 648, 945 P.2d 1197].
- Voluntary Intoxication Relevant to Knowledge. *People v. Reyes* (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 975, 982–986 [61 Cal.Rptr.2d 39].
- This Instruction Upheld. *People v. Turk* (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1361, 1381 [80 Cal.Rptr.3d 473]; *People v. Timms* (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1292, 1298 [60 Cal.Rptr.3d 677].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *General Instruction on Voluntary Intoxication*

This instruction is a specific application of CALCRIM No. 3426, *Voluntary Intoxication*, to homicide.

#### *Unconsciousness*

Unconsciousness (as defined in CALCRIM No. 3425, *Unconsciousness*) is not required. (*People v. Ray* (1975) 14 Cal.3d 20, 28–29 [120 Cal.Rptr. 377, 533 P.2d 1017], disapproved on other grounds in *People v. Blakeley* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 82, 89 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 451, 999 P.2d 675].)

#### *Not Applicable in Murder Cases Based Exclusively on Implied Malice*

This instruction is inapplicable to cases where the murder charge is exclusively based on a theory of *implied* malice because voluntary intoxication can only negate *express* malice. (Pen. Code, § 29.4(b); *People v. Martin* (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1107, 1114–1115 [93 Cal.Rptr.2d 433].) Drunk-driving second degree murder is one type of case that is typically based exclusively on an implied malice theory.

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Defenses, §§ 30–34.

3 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 73, *Defenses and Justifications*, §§ 73.01[4], 73.04 (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, §§ 142.01[3][d.1], [e], 142.02[1][e], [f], [2][b], [3][c] (Matthew Bender).

## 626. Voluntary Intoxication Causing Unconsciousness: Effects on Homicide Crimes (Pen. Code, § 29.4)

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Voluntary intoxication may cause a person to be unconscious of his or her actions. A very intoxicated person may still be capable of physical movement but may not be aware of his or her actions or the nature of those actions.

A person is *voluntarily intoxicated* if he or she becomes intoxicated by willingly using any intoxicating drug, drink, or other substance knowing that it could produce an intoxicating effect, or willingly assuming the risk of that effect.

When a person voluntarily causes his or her own intoxication to the point of unconsciousness, the person assumes the risk that while unconscious he or she will commit acts inherently dangerous to human life. If someone dies as a result of the actions of a person who was unconscious due to voluntary intoxication, then the killing is involuntary manslaughter.

Involuntary manslaughter has been proved if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that:

1. The defendant killed without legal justification or excuse;
2. The defendant did not act with the intent to kill;
3. The defendant did not act with a conscious disregard for human life;

AND

4. As a result of voluntary intoxication, the defendant was not conscious of (his/her) actions or the nature of those actions.

The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not unconscious. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of (murder/ [or] voluntary manslaughter).

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2014*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on voluntary intoxication causing unconsciousness if there is evidence to support this finding. (*People v. Graham* (1969) 71 Cal.2d 303, 316 [78 Cal.Rptr. 217, 455 P.2d 153] [partially abrogated by Pen. Code, § 29.4(c)]; *People v. Ochoa* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 423–424 [79

Cal.Rptr.2d 408, 966 P.2d 442].) However, the court may properly refuse to give this instruction when the evidence shows that the defendant acted with malice before becoming intoxicated. (*People v. Whitfield* (1994) 7 Cal.4th 437, 455 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 858, 868 P.2d 272] [partially abrogated by amendments to Pen. Code, § 29.4(a)].)

In *People v. Ochoa* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 423–424 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 408, 966 P.2d 442] [quoting *People v. Graham* (1969) 71 Cal.2d 303, 316 [78 Cal.Rptr. 217, 455 P.2d 153]], the court stated,

[I]f the state of unconsciousness results from intoxication voluntarily induced . . . it is not a complete defense. If the intoxication is voluntarily induced, it can never excuse homicide . . . [The] requisite element of criminal negligence is deemed to exist irrespective of unconsciousness, and a defendant stands guilty of involuntary manslaughter if he voluntarily procured his own intoxication.

The committee has chosen not to include the phrase “criminal negligence is deemed to exist” because the committee concluded that this unnecessarily complicates the issue for the jury.

### AUTHORITY

- Definition of Voluntary Intoxication. Pen. Code, § 29.4(c).
- Presumption of Criminal Negligence. *People v. Graham* (1969) 71 Cal.2d 303, 317, fn. 4 [78 Cal.Rptr. 217, 455 P.2d 153] [partially abrogated by Pen. Code, § 29.4(c)].
- Malice Preceded Intoxication. *People v. Whitfield* (1994) 7 Cal.4th 437, 455 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 858, 868 P.2d 272] [partially abrogated by amendments to Pen. Code, § 29.4(a)].
- Criminal Negligence. *People v. Penny* (1955) 44 Cal.2d 861, 879–880 [285 P.2d 926]; *People v. Rodriguez* (1960) 186 Cal.App.2d 433, 440 [8 Cal.Rptr. 863].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Unconsciousness Does Not Require Inability to Move*

“[U]nconsciousness can exist . . . where the subject physically acts in fact but is not, at the time, conscious of acting.” (*People v. Ochoa* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 424 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 408, 966 P.2d 442] [citations and internal quotation marks omitted]; see also *People v. Hughes* (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 343–344 [116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401, 39 P.3d 432].)

#### *Malice Preceded Intoxication: Drunk Driving*

In a case in which the defendant was convicted of second degree murder following a fatal drunk driving accident, the trial court properly refused to give an unconsciousness instruction where the defendant’s long history of drinking and driving established that he acted with malice prior to becoming intoxicated. (*People v. Whitfield* (1994) 7 Cal.4th 437, 455 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 858, 868 P.2d 272] [partially abrogated by amendments to Pen. Code, § 29.4(a)].)

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, § 252.

3 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 73, *Defenses and Justifications*, §§ 73.01[4], 73.04 (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, §§ 142.01[3][d.1], [e], 142.02[1][e], [f], [2][b], [3][c] (Matthew Bender).



## 627. Hallucination: Effect on Premeditation

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**A hallucination is a perception not based on objective reality. In other words, a person has a hallucination when that person believes that he or she is seeing or hearing [or otherwise perceiving] something that is not actually present or happening.**

**You may consider evidence of hallucinations, if any, in deciding whether the defendant acted with deliberation and premeditation.**

**The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted with deliberation and premeditation. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of first degree murder.**

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2015, September 2017*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

This is a pinpoint instruction to be given only on request when the evidence supports the defense theory. (*People v. McCarrick* (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 227, 243 [210 Cal.Rptr.3d 838].) The court may need to modify this instruction if evidence of delusions, rather than hallucinations, is offered. (*People v. Gana* (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 598, 605–606 [186 Cal.Rptr.3d 724].)

“[E]vidence of a hallucination—a perception with no objective reality—is inadmissible to negate malice so as to mitigate murder to voluntary manslaughter but is admissible to negate deliberation and premeditation so as to reduce first degree murder to second degree murder.” (*People v. Padilla* (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 675, 677 [126 Cal.Rptr.2d 889].)

### AUTHORITY

- Hallucination Evidence. *People v. Padilla* (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 675, 677 [126 Cal.Rptr.2d 889].
- Hallucination Alone Not a Basis for Imperfect Self-Defense. *People v. Mejia-Lenares* (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1437 [38 Cal.Rptr.3d 404].
- Imperfect Self-Defense Does Not Apply When Defendant’s Belief in Need for Self-Defense is Entirely Delusional. *People v. Elmore* (2014) 59 Cal.4th 121, 145 [172 Cal.Rptr.3d 413, 325 P.3d 951].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, §§ 107–108.

3 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 73,

*Defenses and Justifications*, § 73.03 (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.01[1][g] (Matthew Bender).

**628–639. Reserved for Future Use**

## J. CHARGE TO JURY

### 640. Deliberations and Completion of Verdict Forms: For Use When Defendant Is Charged With First Degree Murder and Jury Is Given Not Guilty Forms for Each Level of Homicide

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[For each count charging murder,] (Y/y)ou (have been/will be) given verdict forms for guilty and not guilty of first degree murder (, /and) [second degree murder] [(, /and)] [voluntary manslaughter] [(, /and)] [involuntary manslaughter].

You may consider these different kinds of homicide in whatever order you wish, but I can accept a verdict of guilty or not guilty of

\_\_\_\_\_ *<insert second degree murder or, if the jury is not instructed on second degree murder as a lesser included offense, each form of manslaughter, voluntary and/or involuntary, on which the jury is instructed>* only if all of you have found the defendant not guilty of first degree murder, [and I can accept a verdict of guilty or not guilty of (voluntary/involuntary/voluntary or involuntary) manslaughter only if all of you have found the defendant not guilty of both first and second degree murder].

[As with all of the charges in this case,] (To/to) return a verdict of guilty or not guilty on a count, you must all agree on that decision.

Follow these directions before you give me any completed and signed final verdict form[s]. [Return the unused verdict form[s] to me, unsigned.]

1. If all of you agree that the People have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of first degree murder, complete and sign that verdict form. Do not complete or sign any other verdict forms [for that count].
2. If all of you cannot agree whether the defendant is guilty of first degree murder, inform me that you cannot reach an agreement and do not complete or sign any verdict forms [for that count].

*<In addition to paragraphs 1–2, give the following if the jury is instructed on second degree murder as a lesser included offense.>*

3. If all of you agree that the defendant is not guilty of first degree murder but also agree that the defendant is guilty of second degree murder, complete and sign the form for not guilty of first degree murder and the form for guilty of second degree murder. Do not complete or sign any other verdict forms [for that count].
4. If all of you agree that the defendant is not guilty of first degree

**murder but cannot agree whether the defendant is guilty of second degree murder, complete and sign the form for not guilty of first degree murder and inform me that you cannot reach further agreement. Do not complete or sign any other verdict forms [for that count].]**

*<In addition to paragraphs 1–4, give the following if the jury is instructed on second degree murder as the only lesser included offense.>*

- [5. If all of you agree that the defendant is not guilty of first degree murder and not guilty of second degree murder, complete and sign the verdict forms for not guilty of both. Do not complete or sign any other verdict forms [for that count].]**

*<In addition to paragraphs 1–4, give the following if the jury is instructed on second degree murder and only one form of manslaughter (voluntary or involuntary) as lesser included offenses.>*

- [5. If all of you agree that the defendant is not guilty of first degree murder and not guilty of second degree murder, but also agree that the defendant is guilty of (voluntary/involuntary) manslaughter, complete and sign the forms for not guilty of first degree murder and not guilty of second degree murder and the form for guilty of (voluntary/involuntary) manslaughter. Do not complete or sign any other verdict forms [for that count].]**
- 6. If all of you agree that the defendant is not guilty of first degree murder and not guilty of second degree murder, but cannot agree whether the defendant is guilty of (voluntary/involuntary) manslaughter, complete and sign the forms for not guilty of first degree murder and not guilty of second degree murder and inform me that you cannot reach further agreement. Do not complete or sign any other verdict forms [for that count].]**
- 7. If all of you agree that the defendant is not guilty of first degree murder, not guilty of second degree murder, and not guilty of (voluntary/involuntary) manslaughter, complete and sign the verdict forms for not guilty of each crime. Do not complete or sign any other verdict forms [for that count].]**

*<In addition to paragraphs 1–4, give the following if the jury is instructed on second degree murder and both voluntary and involuntary manslaughter as lesser included offenses.>*

- [5. If all of you agree that the defendant is not guilty of first degree murder and not guilty of second degree murder, complete and sign the forms for not guilty of first degree murder and not guilty of second degree murder.**

6. **If all of you agree on a verdict of guilty or not guilty of voluntary or involuntary manslaughter, complete and sign the appropriate verdict form for each charge on which you agree. You may not find the defendant guilty of both voluntary and involuntary manslaughter [as to any count]. Do not complete or sign any other verdict forms [for that count].**
7. **If you cannot reach agreement as to voluntary manslaughter or involuntary manslaughter, inform me of your disagreement. Do not complete or sign any verdict form for any charge on which you cannot reach agreement.]**

*<In addition to paragraphs 1–2, give the following if the jury is not instructed on second degree murder and the jury is instructed on one form of manslaughter (voluntary or involuntary) as the only lesser included offense.>*

3. **If all of you agree that the defendant is not guilty of first degree murder but also agree that the defendant is guilty of (voluntary/involuntary) manslaughter, complete and sign the form for not guilty of first degree murder and the form for guilty of (voluntary/involuntary) manslaughter. Do not complete or sign any other verdict forms [for that count].**
4. **If all of you agree that the defendant is not guilty of first degree murder but cannot agree whether the defendant is guilty of (voluntary/involuntary) manslaughter, complete and sign the form for not guilty of first degree murder and inform me that you cannot reach further agreement. Do not complete or sign any other verdict forms [for that count].**
5. **If all of you agree that the defendant is not guilty of first degree murder or (voluntary/involuntary) manslaughter, complete and sign the verdict forms for not guilty of each crime. Do not complete or sign any other verdict forms [for that count].]**

*<In addition to paragraphs 1–2, give the following if the jury is instructed on both voluntary and involuntary manslaughter, but not second degree murder, as lesser included offenses.>*

3. **If all of you agree that the defendant is not guilty of first degree murder, complete and sign the form for not guilty of first degree murder.**
4. **If all of you agree on a verdict of guilty or not guilty of voluntary or involuntary manslaughter, complete and sign the appropriate verdict form for each charge on which you agree. You may not find the defendant guilty of both voluntary and involuntary manslaughter [as to any count]. Do not complete or sign any**

other verdict forms [for that count].

5. **If you cannot reach agreement as to voluntary manslaughter or involuntary manslaughter, inform me of your disagreement. Do not complete or sign any verdict form for any charge on which you cannot reach agreement.]**

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*New January 2006; Revised April 2008, August 2009*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

In all homicide cases in which the defendant is charged with first degree murder and one or more lesser offense is submitted to the jury, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction or CALCRIM No. 641, *Deliberations and Completion of Verdict Forms: For Use When Defendant Is Charged With First Degree Murder and Jury Is Given Only One Not Guilty Verdict Form for Each Count; Not to Be Used When Both Voluntary and Involuntary Manslaughter Are Lesser Included Offenses*. (See *People v. Avalos* (1984) 37 Cal.3d 216, 228 [207 Cal.Rptr. 549, 689 P.2d 121] [must instruct jury that it must be unanimous as to degree of murder]; *People v. Dixon* (1979) 24 Cal.3d 43, 52 [154 Cal.Rptr. 236, 592 P.2d 752] [jury must determine degree]; *People v. Breverman* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 162 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094] [duty to instruct on lesser included offenses]; *People v. Dewberry* (1959) 51 Cal.2d 548, 555–557 [334 P.2d 852] [duty to instruct that if jury has reasonable doubt of greater offense must acquit of that charge]; *People v. Fields* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 289, 309–310 [52 Cal.Rptr.2d 282, 914 P.2d 832] [duty to instruct that jury cannot convict of a lesser offense unless it has concluded that defendant is not guilty of the greater offense]; *Stone v. Superior Court* (1982) 31 Cal.3d 503, 519 [183 Cal.Rptr. 647, 646 P.2d 809] [duty to give jury opportunity to render a verdict of partial acquittal on a greater offense], clarified in *People v. Marshall* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 826 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 347, 919 P.2d 1280] [no duty to inquire about partial acquittal in absence of indication jury may have found defendant not guilty of greater offense].)

In *Stone v. Superior Court*, *supra*, 31 Cal.3d at p. 519, the Supreme Court suggested that the trial court provide the jury with verdict forms of guilty/not guilty on each of the charged and lesser offenses. The court later referred to this “as a judicially declared rule of criminal procedure.” (*People v. Kurtzman* (1988) 46 Cal.3d 322, 329 [250 Cal.Rptr. 244, 758 P.2d 572].) However, this is not a mandatory procedure. (*Ibid.*)

If the court chooses to follow the procedure suggested in *Stone*, the court may give this instruction or CALCRIM No. 642, *Deliberations and Completion of Verdict Forms: For Use When Defendant Is Charged With Second Degree Murder and Jury Is Given Not Guilty Forms for Each Level of Homicide*, in place of this instruction.

The court should tell the jury it may not return a guilty verdict on a lesser included

offense unless it has found the defendant not guilty of the greater offense. (*People v. Fields, supra*, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 310–311.) If the jury announces that it is deadlocked on the greater offense but, despite the court’s instructions, has returned a guilty verdict on the lesser included offense, the court should again instruct the jury that it may not convict of the lesser included offense unless it has found the defendant not guilty of the greater offense. (*Ibid.*) The court should direct the jury to reconsider the “lone verdict of conviction of the lesser included offense” in light of this instruction. (*Ibid.*; Pen. Code, § 1161.) If the jury is deadlocked on the greater offense but the court nevertheless records a guilty verdict on the lesser included offense and then discharges the jury, retrial on the greater offense will be barred. (*People v. Fields, supra*, 13 Cal.4th at p. 307; Pen. Code, § 1023.)

If, after following the procedures required by *Fields*, the jury declares that it is deadlocked on the greater offense, then the prosecution must elect one of the following options: (1) the prosecutor may request that the court declare a mistrial on the greater offense without recording the verdict on the lesser offense, allowing the prosecutor to retry the defendant for the greater offense; or (2) the prosecutor may ask the court to record the verdict on the lesser offense and to dismiss the greater offense, opting to accept the current conviction rather than retry the defendant on the greater offense. (*People v. Fields, supra*, 13 Cal.4th at p. 311.)

The court may not control the sequence in which the jury considers the various homicide offenses. (*People v. Kurtzman, supra*, 46 Cal.3d at pp. 330–331.)

Do not give this instruction if felony murder is the only theory for first degree murder. (*People v. Mendoza* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 896, 908–909 [98 Cal.Rptr.2d 431, 4 P.3d 265].)

### AUTHORITY

- Lesser Included Offenses-Duty to Instruct. Pen. Code, § 1159; *People v. Breverman* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 162 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094].
- Degree to Be Set by Jury. Pen. Code, § 1157; *People v. Avalos* (1984) 37 Cal.3d 216, 228 [207 Cal.Rptr. 549, 689 P.2d 121]; *People v. Dixon* (1979) 24 Cal.3d 43, 52 [154 Cal.Rptr. 236, 592 P.2d 752].
- Reasonable Doubt as to Degree. Pen. Code, § 1097; *People v. Morse* (1964) 60 Cal.2d 631, 657 [36 Cal.Rptr. 201, 388 P.2d 33]; *People v. Dewberry* (1959) 51 Cal.2d 548, 555–557 [334 P.2d 852].
- Conviction of Lesser Precludes Re-trial on Greater. Pen. Code, § 1023; *People v. Fields* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 289, 309–310 [52 Cal.Rptr.2d 282, 914 P.2d 832]; *People v. Kurtzman* (1988) 46 Cal.3d 322, 329 [250 Cal.Rptr. 244, 758 P.2d 572].
- Court May Ask Jury to Reconsider Conviction on Lesser Absent Finding on Greater. Pen. Code, § 1161; *People v. Fields* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 289, 310 [52 Cal.Rptr.2d 282, 914 P.2d 832].
- Must Permit Partial Verdict of Acquittal on Greater. *People v. Marshall* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 826 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 347, 919 P.2d 1280]; *Stone v. Superior*

*Court* (1982) 31 Cal.3d 503, 519 [183 Cal.Rptr. 647, 646 P.2d 809].

- Involuntary Manslaughter Not a Lesser Included Offense of Voluntary Manslaughter. *People v. Orr* (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 780, 784–785 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 553].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

5 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, § 713.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.20 (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, §§ 142.01[3][e], 142.02[3][c] (Matthew Bender).



**641. Deliberations and Completion of Verdict Forms: For Use  
When Defendant Is Charged With First Degree Murder and Jury Is  
Given Only One Not Guilty Verdict Form for Each Count; Not to  
Be Used When Both Voluntary and Involuntary Manslaughter Are  
Lesser Included Offenses**

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[For each count charging (murder/ manslaughter),] (Y/y)ou (have been/ will be) given verdict forms for [guilty of first degree murder][,] [guilty of second degree murder][,] [guilty of voluntary manslaughter][,] [guilty of involuntary manslaughter][,] and not guilty.

You may consider these different kinds of homicide in whatever order you wish, but I can accept a verdict of guilty of a lesser crime only if all of you have found the defendant not guilty of [all of] the greater crime[s].

[As with all the charges in this case,] (To/to) return a verdict of guilty or not guilty on a count, you must all agree on that decision.

Follow these directions before you give me any completed and signed, final verdict form. You will complete and sign only one verdict form [per count]. [Return the unused verdict forms to me, unsigned.]

1. If all of you agree that the People have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of first degree murder, complete and sign that verdict form. Do not complete or sign any other verdict forms [for that count].
2. If all of you cannot agree whether the defendant is guilty of first degree murder, inform me only that you cannot reach an agreement and do not complete or sign any verdict forms [for that count].

*<In addition to paragraphs 1–2, give the following if the jury is instructed on second degree murder as a lesser included offense.>*

3. If all of you agree that the defendant is not guilty of first degree murder but also agree that the defendant is guilty of second degree murder, complete and sign the form for guilty of second degree murder. Do not complete or sign any other verdict forms [for that count].
4. If all of you agree that the defendant is not guilty of first degree murder but cannot agree whether the defendant is guilty of second degree murder, inform me that you cannot reach agreement [on that count]. Do not complete or sign any verdict forms [for that count].

*<In addition to paragraphs 1–4, give the following if the jury is*

*instructed on second degree murder as the only lesser included offense.>*

**[5. If all of you agree that the defendant is not guilty of first degree murder and not guilty of second degree murder, complete and sign the not guilty verdict form.] Do not complete or sign any other verdict forms [for that count].**

*<In addition to paragraphs 1–4, give the following if the jury is instructed on second degree murder and only one form of manslaughter (voluntary or involuntary) as lesser included offenses.>*

- [5. If all of you agree that the defendant is not guilty of first degree murder and not guilty of second degree murder, but also agree that the defendant is guilty of (voluntary/involuntary) manslaughter, complete and sign the form for guilty of (voluntary/involuntary) manslaughter. Do not complete or sign any other verdict forms [for that count].**
- 6. If all of you agree that the defendant is not guilty of first degree murder and not guilty of second degree murder, but cannot agree whether the defendant is guilty of (voluntary/involuntary) manslaughter, inform me that you cannot reach agreement [on that count]. Do not complete or sign any verdict forms [for that count].**
- 7. If all of you agree that the defendant is not guilty of first degree murder, not guilty of second degree murder, and not guilty of (voluntary/involuntary) manslaughter, complete and sign the verdict form for not guilty. Do not complete or sign any other verdict forms [for that count].]**

*<In addition to paragraphs 1–2, give the following if the jury is not instructed on second degree murder and the jury is instructed on one form of manslaughter (voluntary or involuntary) as the only lesser included offense.>*

- [3. If all of you agree that the defendant is not guilty of first degree murder but also agree that the defendant is guilty of (voluntary/involuntary) manslaughter, complete and sign the form for guilty of (voluntary/involuntary) manslaughter. Do not complete or sign any other verdict forms [for that count].**
- 4. If all of you agree that the defendant is not guilty of first degree murder but cannot agree whether the defendant is guilty of (voluntary/involuntary) manslaughter, inform me that you cannot reach agreement [for that count]. Do not complete or sign any verdict forms [for that count].**

- 5. If all of you agree that the defendant is not guilty of first degree murder or (voluntary/involuntary) manslaughter, complete and sign the verdict form for not guilty. Do not complete or sign any other verdict forms [for that count].]**

*<If the jury is instructed on both voluntary and involuntary manslaughter as lesser included offenses, whether the jury is instructed on second degree murder or not, the court must give the jury guilty and not guilty verdict forms as to first degree murder and all lesser crimes, and instruct pursuant to CALCRIM 640.>*

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*New January 2006; Revised April 2008, August 2009*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

In all homicide cases in which the defendant is charged with first degree murder and one or more lesser offense is submitted to the jury, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction or CALCRIM No. 640, *Deliberations and Completion of Verdict Forms: For Use When the Defendant Is Charged With First Degree Murder and the Jury Is Given Not Guilty Forms for Each Level of Homicide*. (See *People v. Avalos* (1984) 37 Cal.3d 216, 228 [207 Cal.Rptr. 549, 689 P.2d 121] [must instruct jury that it must be unanimous as to degree of murder]; *People v. Dixon* (1979) 24 Cal.3d 43, 52 [154 Cal.Rptr. 236, 592 P.2d 752] [jury must determine degree]; *People v. Breverman* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 162 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094] [duty to instruct on lesser included offenses]; *People v. Dewberry* (1959) 51 Cal.2d 548, 555–557 [334 P.2d 852] [duty to instruct that if jury has reasonable doubt of greater offense must acquit of that charge]; *People v. Fields* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 289, 309–310 [52 Cal.Rptr.2d 282, 914 P.2d 832] [duty to instruct that jury cannot convict of a lesser offense unless it has concluded that defendant is not guilty of the greater offense]; *Stone v. Superior Court* (1982) 31 Cal.3d 503, 519 [183 Cal.Rptr. 647, 646 P.2d 809] [duty to give jury opportunity to render a verdict of partial acquittal on a greater offense], clarified in *People v. Marshall* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 826 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 347, 919 P.2d 1280] [no duty to inquire about partial acquittal in absence of indication jury may have found defendant not guilty of greater offense].)

In *Stone v. Superior Court*, *supra*, 31 Cal.3d at p. 519, the Supreme Court suggested that the trial court provide the jury with verdict forms of guilty/not guilty on each of the charged and lesser offenses. The court later referred to this “as a judicially declared rule of criminal procedure.” (*People v. Kurtzman* (1988) 46 Cal.3d 322, 329 [250 Cal.Rptr. 244, 758 P.2d 572].) However, this is not a mandatory procedure. (*Ibid.*) If the court chooses not to follow the procedure suggested in *Stone*, the court may give this instruction. If the jury later declares that it is unable to reach a verdict on a lesser offense, then the court must provide the jury an opportunity to acquit on the greater offense. (*People v. Marshall*, *supra*, 13 Cal.4th at p. 826; *Stone v.*

*Superior Court, supra*, 31 Cal.3d at p. 519.) In such cases, the court must give CALCRIM No. 640 and must provide the jury with verdict forms of guilty/not guilty for each offense. (*People v. Marshall, supra*, 13 Cal.4th at p. 826; *Stone v. Superior Court, supra*, 31 Cal.3d at p. 519.)

If the greatest offense charged is second degree murder, the court should give CALCRIM 643, *Deliberations and Completion of Verdict Forms: For Use When Defendant Is Charged With Second Degree Murder and Jury Is Given Only One Not Guilty Verdict Form for Each Count; Not to Be Used When Both Voluntary and Involuntary Manslaughter Are Lesser Included Offenses* instead of this instruction.

The court should tell the jury it may not return a guilty verdict on a lesser included offense unless it has found the defendant not guilty of the greater offense. (*People v. Fields, supra*, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 310–311.) If the jury announces that it is deadlocked on the greater offense but, despite the court’s instructions, has returned a guilty verdict on the lesser included offense, the court should again instruct the jury that it may not convict of the lesser included offense unless it has found the defendant not guilty of the greater offense. (*Ibid.*) The court should direct the jury to reconsider the “lone verdict of conviction of the lesser included offense” in light of this instruction. (*Ibid.*; Pen. Code, § 1161.) If the jury is deadlocked on the greater offense but the court nevertheless records a guilty verdict on the lesser included offense and then discharges the jury, retrial on the greater offense will be barred. (*People v. Fields, supra*, 13 Cal.4th at p. 307; Pen. Code, § 1023.)

If, after following the procedures required by *Fields*, the jury declares that it is deadlocked on the greater offense, then the prosecution must elect one of the following options: (1) the prosecutor may request that the court declare a mistrial on the greater offense without recording the verdict on the lesser offense, allowing the prosecutor to re-try the defendant for the greater offense; or (2) the prosecutor may ask the court to record the verdict on the lesser offense and to dismiss the greater offense, opting to accept the current conviction rather than re-try the defendant on the greater offense. (*People v. Fields, supra*, 13 Cal.4th at p. 311.)

The court may not control the sequence in which the jury considers the various homicide offenses. (*People v. Kurtzman, supra*, 46 Cal.3d at pp. 322, 330.)

Do not give this instruction if felony murder is the only theory for first degree murder. (*People v. Mendoza* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 896, 908–909 [98 Cal.Rptr.2d 431, 4 P.3d 265].)

### AUTHORITY

- Lesser Included Offenses-Duty to Instruct. Pen. Code, § 1159; *People v. Breverman* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 162 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094].
- Degree to Be Set by Jury. Pen. Code, § 1157; *People v. Avalos* (1984) 37 Cal.3d 216, 228 [207 Cal.Rptr. 549, 689 P.2d 121]; *People v. Dixon* (1979) 24 Cal.3d 43, 52 [154 Cal.Rptr. 236, 592 P.2d 752].
- Reasonable Doubt as to Degree. Pen. Code, § 1097; *People v. Morse* (1964) 60

Cal.2d 631, 657 [36 Cal.Rptr. 201, 388 P.2d 33]; *People v. Dewberry* (1959) 51 Cal.2d 548, 555–557 [334 P.2d 852].

- Conviction of Lesser Precludes Re-trial on Greater. Pen. Code, § 1023; *People v. Fields* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 289, 309–310 [52 Cal.Rptr.2d 282, 914 P.2d 832]; *People v. Kurtzman* (1988) 46 Cal.3d 322, 329 [250 Cal.Rptr. 244, 758 P.2d 572].
- Court May Ask Jury to Reconsider Conviction on Lesser Absent Finding on Greater. Pen. Code, § 1161; *People v. Fields* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 289, 310 [52 Cal.Rptr.2d 282, 914 P.2d 832].
- Must Permit Partial Verdict of Acquittal on Greater. *People v. Marshall* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 826 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 347, 919 P.2d 1280]; *Stone v. Superior Court* (1982) 31 Cal.3d 503, 519 [183 Cal.Rptr. 647, 646 P.2d 809].
- Involuntary Manslaughter Not a Lesser Included Offense of Voluntary Manslaughter. *People v. Orr* (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 780, 784–785 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 553].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

5 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, § 713.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.20 (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, §§ 142.01[3][e], 142.02[3][c] (Matthew Bender).

**642. Deliberations and Completion of Verdict Forms: For Use  
When Defendant Is Charged With Second Degree Murder and Jury  
Is Given Not Guilty Forms for Each Level of Homicide**

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[For each count charging second degree murder,] (Y/y)ou (have been/will be) given verdict forms for guilty and not guilty of second degree murder (, /and) [voluntary manslaughter (, /and)] [involuntary manslaughter].

You may consider these different kinds of homicide in whatever order you wish, but I can accept a verdict of guilty or not guilty of [voluntary] [or] [involuntary] manslaughter only if all of you have found the defendant not guilty of second degree murder.

[As with all of the charges in this case,] (To/to) return a verdict of guilty or not guilty on a count, you must all agree on that decision.

Follow these directions before you give me any completed and signed final verdict form[s]. [Return the unused verdict form[s] to me, unsigned.]

1. If all of you agree that the People have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of second degree murder, complete and sign that verdict form. Do not complete or sign any other verdict forms [for that count].
2. If all of you cannot agree whether the defendant is guilty of second degree murder, inform me that you cannot reach an agreement and do not complete or sign any verdict forms [for that count].

*<In addition to paragraphs 1–2, give the following if the jury is instructed on only one form of manslaughter (voluntary or involuntary) as a lesser included offense.>*

- [3. If all of you agree that the defendant is not guilty of second degree murder but also agree that the defendant is guilty of (voluntary/involuntary) manslaughter, complete and sign the form for not guilty of second degree murder and the form for guilty of (voluntary/involuntary) manslaughter. Do not complete or sign any other verdict forms [for that count].
4. If all of you agree that the defendant is not guilty of second degree murder but cannot agree whether the defendant is guilty of (voluntary/involuntary) manslaughter, complete and sign the form for not guilty of second degree murder and inform me that you cannot reach further agreement. Do not complete or sign any other verdict forms [for that count].

5. **If all of you agree that the defendant is not guilty of second degree murder and not guilty of (voluntary/involuntary) manslaughter, complete and sign the verdict forms for not guilty of both.]**

*<In addition to paragraphs 1–2, give the following if the jury is instructed on both voluntary and involuntary manslaughter as lesser included offenses.>*

- [3. **If all of you agree that the defendant is not guilty of second degree murder, complete and sign the form for not guilty of second degree murder.**
4. **If all of you agree on a verdict of guilty or not guilty of voluntary manslaughter or involuntary manslaughter, complete and sign the appropriate verdict form for each charge on which you agree. Do not complete or sign any other verdict forms [for that count]. You may not find the defendant guilty of both voluntary and involuntary manslaughter [as to any count].**
5. **If you cannot reach agreement as to voluntary manslaughter or involuntary manslaughter, inform me of your disagreement. Do not complete or sign any verdict form for any charge on which you cannot reach agreement.]**

*New August 2009*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

In all homicide cases in which second degree murder is the greatest offense charged and one or more lesser offense is submitted to the jury, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction. (See *People v. Avalos* (1984) 37 Cal.3d 216, 228 [207 Cal.Rptr. 549, 689 P.2d 121] [must instruct jury that it must be unanimous as to degree of murder]; *People v. Dixon* (1979) 24 Cal.3d 43, 52 [154 Cal.Rptr. 236, 592 P.2d 752] [jury must determine degree]; *People v. Breverman* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 162 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094] [duty to instruct on lesser included offenses]; *People v. Dewberry* (1959) 51 Cal.2d 548, 555–557 [334 P.2d 852] [duty to instruct that if jury has reasonable doubt of greater offense must acquit of that charge]; *People v. Fields* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 289, 309–310 [52 Cal.Rptr.2d 282, 914 P.2d 832] [duty to instruct that jury cannot convict of a lesser offense unless it has concluded that defendant is not guilty of the greater offense]; *Stone v. Superior Court* (1982) 31 Cal.3d 503, 519 [183 Cal.Rptr. 647, 646 P.2d 809] [duty to give jury opportunity to render a verdict of partial acquittal on a greater offense], clarified in *People v. Marshall* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 826 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 347, 919 P.2d 1280] [no duty to inquire about partial acquittal in absence of indication jury may have found defendant not guilty of greater offense].)



In *Stone v. Superior Court*, *supra*, 31 Cal.3d at p. 519, the Supreme Court suggested that the trial court provide the jury with verdict forms of guilty/not guilty on each of the charged and lesser offenses. The court later referred to this “as a judicially declared rule of criminal procedure.” (*People v. Kurtzman* (1988) 46 Cal.3d 322, 329 [250 Cal.Rptr. 244, 758 P.2d 572].) However, this is not a mandatory procedure. (*Ibid.*)

If the court chooses not to follow the procedure suggested in *Stone*, the court may give CALCRIM No. 643, *Deliberations and Completion of Verdict Forms: For Use When Defendant Is Charged With Second Degree Murder and Jury Is Given Only One Not Guilty Verdict Form for Each Count; Not to Be Used When Both Voluntary and Involuntary Manslaughter Are Lesser Included Offenses*, in place of this instruction.

The court should tell the jury it may not return a guilty verdict on a lesser included offense unless it has found the defendant not guilty of the greater offense. (*People v. Fields*, *supra*, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 310–311.) If the jury announces that it is deadlocked on the greater offense but, despite the court’s instructions, has returned a guilty verdict on the lesser included offense, the court should again instruct the jury that it may not convict of the lesser included offense unless it has found the defendant not guilty of the greater offense. (*Ibid.*) The court should direct the jury to reconsider the “lone verdict of conviction of the lesser included offense” in light of this instruction. (*Ibid.*; Pen. Code, § 1161.) If the jury is deadlocked on the greater offense but the court nevertheless records a guilty verdict on the lesser included offense and then discharges the jury, retrial on the greater offense will be barred. (*People v. Fields*, *supra*, 13 Cal.4th at p. 307; Pen. Code, § 1023.)

If, after following the procedures required by *Fields*, the jury declares that it is deadlocked on the greater offense, then the prosecution must elect one of the following options: (1) the prosecutor may request that the court declare a mistrial on the greater offense without recording the verdict on the lesser offense, allowing the prosecutor to retry the defendant for the greater offense; or (2) the prosecutor may ask the court to record the verdict on the lesser offense and to dismiss the greater offense, opting to accept the current conviction rather than retry the defendant on the greater offense. (*People v. Fields*, *supra*, 13 Cal.4th at p. 311.)

The court may not control the sequence in which the jury considers the various homicide offenses. (*People v. Kurtzman*, *supra*, 46 Cal.3d at pp. 330–331.)

### AUTHORITY

- Lesser Included Offenses-Duty to Instruct. Pen. Code, § 1159; *People v. Breverman* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 162 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094].
- Degree to Be Set by Jury. Pen. Code, § 1157; *People v. Avalos* (1984) 37 Cal.3d 216, 228 [207 Cal.Rptr. 549, 689 P.2d 121]; *People v. Dixon* (1979) 24 Cal.3d 43, 52 [154 Cal.Rptr. 236, 592 P.2d 752].
- Reasonable Doubt as to Degree. Pen. Code, § 1097; *People v. Morse* (1964) 60



Cal.2d 631, 657 [36 Cal.Rptr. 201, 388 P.2d 33]; *People v. Dewberry* (1959) 51 Cal.2d 548, 555–557 [334 P.2d 852].

- Conviction of Lesser Precludes Re-trial on Greater. Pen. Code, § 1023; *People v. Fields* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 289, 309–310 [52 Cal.Rptr.2d 282, 914 P.2d 832]; *People v. Kurtzman* (1988) 46 Cal.3d 322, 329 [250 Cal.Rptr. 244, 758 P.2d 572].
- Court May Ask Jury to Reconsider Conviction on Lesser Absent Finding on Greater. Pen. Code, § 1161; *People v. Fields* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 289, 310 [52 Cal.Rptr.2d 282, 914 P.2d 832].
- Must Permit Partial Verdict of Acquittal on Greater. *People v. Marshall* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 826 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 347, 919 P.2d 1280]; *Stone v. Superior Court* (1982) 31 Cal.3d 503, 519 [183 Cal.Rptr. 647, 646 P.2d 809].
- Involuntary Manslaughter Not a Lesser Included Offense of Voluntary Manslaughter. *People v. Orr* (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 780, 784–785 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 553].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

5 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, § 713.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.20 (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, §§ 142.01[3][e], 142.02[3][c] (Matthew Bender).

**643. Deliberations and Completion of Verdict Forms: For Use When Defendant Is Charged With Second Degree Murder and Jury Is Given Only One Not Guilty Verdict Form for Each Count; Not to Be Used When Both Voluntary and Involuntary Manslaughter Are Lesser Included Offenses**

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[For each count charging second degree murder,] (Y/y)ou (have been/will be) given verdict forms for guilty of second degree murder, guilty of (voluntary /involuntary) manslaughter and not guilty.

You may consider these different kinds of homicide in whatever order you wish, but I can accept a verdict of guilty of (voluntary/involuntary) manslaughter only if all of you have found the defendant not guilty of second degree murder.

[As with all the charges in this case,] (To/to) return a verdict of guilty or not guilty on a count, you must all agree on that decision.

Follow these directions before you give me any completed and signed, final verdict form. You will complete and sign only one verdict form [per count]. [Return the unused verdict forms to me, unsigned.]

1. If all of you agree that the People have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of second degree murder, complete and sign that verdict form. Do not complete or sign any other verdict forms [for that count].
2. If all of you cannot agree whether the defendant is guilty of second degree murder, inform me only that you cannot reach an agreement and do not complete or sign any verdict forms [for that count].
3. If all of you agree that the defendant is not guilty of second degree murder, but also agree that the defendant is guilty of (voluntary/involuntary) manslaughter, complete and sign the form for guilty of (voluntary/involuntary) manslaughter. Do not complete or sign any other verdict forms [for that count].
4. If all of you agree that the defendant is not guilty of second degree murder and cannot agree whether the defendant is guilty of (voluntary/involuntary) manslaughter, inform me that you cannot reach agreement [on that count]. Do not complete or sign any other verdict forms [for that count].
5. If all of you agree that the defendant is not guilty of second degree murder and not guilty of (voluntary/involuntary) manslaughter, complete and sign the verdict form for not guilty. Do not complete or sign any other verdict forms [for that count].

*<If the jury is instructed on both voluntary and involuntary manslaughter as lesser included offenses, this instruction may not be used. The court must give the jury guilty and not guilty verdict forms as to second degree murder and each form of manslaughter, and must instruct pursuant to CALCRIM 642.>*

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*New August 2009*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

In all homicide cases in which the greatest offense charged is second degree murder and one or more lesser offense is submitted to the jury, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction or CALCRIM No. 642, *Deliberations and Completion of Verdict Forms: For Use When Defendant Is Charged With Second Degree Murder and Jury Is Given Not Guilty Forms for Each Level of Homicide*. (See *People v. Avalos* (1984) 37 Cal.3d 216, 228 [207 Cal.Rptr. 549, 689 P.2d 121] [must instruct jury that it must be unanimous as to degree of murder]; *People v. Dixon* (1979) 24 Cal.3d 43, 52 [154 Cal.Rptr. 236, 592 P.2d 752] [jury must determine degree]; *People v. Breverman* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 162 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094] [duty to instruct on lesser included offenses]; *People v. Dewberry* (1959) 51 Cal.2d 548, 555–557 [334 P.2d 852] [duty to instruct that if jury has reasonable doubt of greater offense must acquit of that charge]; *People v. Fields* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 289, 309–310 [52 Cal.Rptr.2d 282, 914 P.2d 832] [duty to instruct that jury cannot convict of a lesser offense unless it has concluded that defendant is not guilty of the greater offense]; *Stone v. Superior Court* (1982) 31 Cal.3d 503, 519 [183 Cal.Rptr. 647, 646 P.2d 809] [duty to give jury opportunity to render a verdict of partial acquittal on a greater offense], clarified in *People v. Marshall* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 826 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 347, 919 P.2d 1280] [no duty to inquire about partial acquittal in absence of indication jury may have found defendant not guilty of greater offense].)

In *Stone v. Superior Court*, *supra*, 31 Cal.3d at p. 519, the Supreme Court suggested that the trial court provide the jury with verdict forms of guilty/not guilty on each of the charged and lesser offenses. The court later referred to this “as a judicially declared rule of criminal procedure.” (*People v. Kurtzman* (1988) 46 Cal.3d 322, 329 [250 Cal.Rptr. 244, 758 P.2d 572].) However, this is not a mandatory procedure. (*Ibid.*) If the court chooses not to follow the procedure suggested in *Stone*, the court may give this instruction. If the jury later declares that it is unable to reach a verdict on a lesser offense, then the court must provide the jury an opportunity to acquit on the greater offense. (*People v. Marshall*, *supra*, 13 Cal.4th at p. 826; *Stone v. Superior Court*, *supra*, 31 Cal.3d at p. 519.) In such cases, the court must give CALCRIM No. 642 and must provide the jury with verdict forms of guilty/not guilty for each offense. (*People v. Marshall*, *supra*, 13 Cal.4th at p. 826; *Stone v. Superior Court*, *supra*, 31 Cal.3d at p. 519.)

The court should tell the jury it may not return a guilty verdict on a lesser included offense unless it has found the defendant not guilty of the greater offense. (*People v. Fields, supra*, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 310–311.) If the jury announces that it is deadlocked on the greater offense but, despite the court’s instructions, has returned a guilty verdict on the lesser included offense, the court should again instruct the jury that it may not convict of the lesser included offense unless it has found the defendant not guilty of the greater offense. (*Ibid.*) The court should direct the jury to reconsider the “lone verdict of conviction of the lesser included offense” in light of this instruction. (*Ibid.*; Pen. Code, § 1161.) If the jury is deadlocked on the greater offense but the court nevertheless records a guilty verdict on the lesser included offense and then discharges the jury, retrial on the greater offense will be barred. (*People v. Fields, supra*, 13 Cal.4th at p. 307; Pen. Code, § 1023.)

If, after following the procedures required by *Fields*, the jury declares that it is deadlocked on the greater offense, then the prosecution must elect one of the following options: (1) the prosecutor may request that the court declare a mistrial on the greater offense without recording the verdict on the lesser offense, allowing the prosecutor to re-try the defendant for the greater offense; or (2) the prosecutor may ask the court to record the verdict on the lesser offense and to dismiss the greater offense, opting to accept the current conviction rather than re-try the defendant on the greater offense. (*People v. Fields, supra*, 13 Cal.4th at p. 311.)

The court may not control the sequence in which the jury considers the various homicide offenses. (*People v. Kurtzman, supra*, 46 Cal.3d at pp. 322, 330.)

### AUTHORITY

- Lesser Included Offenses-Duty to Instruct. Pen. Code, § 1159; *People v. Breverman* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 162 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094].
- Degree to Be Set by Jury. Pen. Code, § 1157; *People v. Avalos* (1984) 37 Cal.3d 216, 228 [207 Cal.Rptr. 549, 689 P.2d 121]; *People v. Dixon* (1979) 24 Cal.3d 43, 52 [154 Cal.Rptr. 236, 592 P.2d 752].
- Reasonable Doubt as to Degree. Pen. Code, § 1097; *People v. Morse* (1964) 60 Cal.2d 631, 657 [36 Cal.Rptr. 201, 388 P.2d 33]; *People v. Dewberry* (1959) 51 Cal.2d 548, 555–557 [334 P.2d 852].
- Conviction of Lesser Precludes Re-trial on Greater. Pen. Code, § 1023; *People v. Fields* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 289, 309–310 [52 Cal.Rptr.2d 282, 914 P.2d 832]; *People v. Kurtzman* (1988) 46 Cal.3d 322, 329 [250 Cal.Rptr. 244, 758 P.2d 572].
- Court May Ask Jury to Reconsider Conviction on Lesser Absent Finding on Greater. Pen. Code, § 1161; *People v. Fields* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 289, 310 [52 Cal.Rptr.2d 282, 914 P.2d 832].
- Must Permit Partial Verdict of Acquittal on Greater. *People v. Marshall* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 826 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 347, 919 P.2d 1280]; *Stone v. Superior Court* (1982) 31 Cal.3d 503, 519 [183 Cal.Rptr. 647, 646 P.2d 809].
- Involuntary Manslaughter Not a Lesser Included Offense of Voluntary

Manslaughter. *People v. Orr* (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 780, 784–785 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 553].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

5 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, § 713.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.20 (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, §§ 142.01[3][e], 142.02[3][c] (Matthew Bender).

**644–699. Reserved for Future Use**



## K. SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES

### (i) General Instructions

#### 700. Special Circumstances: Introduction (Pen. Code, § 190.2)

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If you find (the/a) defendant guilty of first degree murder, you must also decide whether the People have proved that [one or more of] the special circumstance[s] is true.

The People have the burden of proving (the/each) special circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the special circumstance has not been proved. [You must return a verdict form stating true or not true for each special circumstance on which you all agree.]

In order for you to return a finding that a special circumstance is or is not true, all 12 of you must agree.

[You must (consider each special circumstance separately/ [and you must] consider each special circumstance separately for each defendant).]

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*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct the jury on the special circumstances and to instruct that, in the case of a reasonable doubt, the jury must find the special circumstance not true. (Pen. Code, § 190.4; see *People v. Frierson* (1979) 25 Cal.3d 142, 180 [158 Cal.Rptr. 281, 599 P.2d 587]; *People v. Ochoa* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 420 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 408, 966 P.2d 442].)

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct the jury to consider each special circumstance separately. (See *People v. Holt* (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 681 [63 Cal.Rptr.2d 782, 937 P.2d 213].) Give the bracketed paragraph if more than one special circumstance is charged or there are multiple defendants.

Where multiple special circumstances are charged, the court may accept a partial verdict if the jury is unable to unanimously agree on all of the special circumstances. (Pen. Code, § 190.4.)

### AUTHORITY

- Reasonable Doubt. Pen. Code, § 190.4; *People v. Frierson* (1979) 25 Cal.3d 142, 180 [158 Cal.Rptr. 281, 599 P.2d 587]; *People v. Ochoa* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 420 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 408, 966 P.2d 442].

- Partial Verdict. Pen. Code, § 190.4.
- Consider Each Special Circumstance Separately. *People v. Holt* (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 681 [63 Cal.Rptr.2d 782, 937 P.2d 213].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### ***Right to Jury Trial on Special Circumstances***

Unless specifically waived, the defendant has a right to jury trial on the special circumstance allegations even if the defendant pleaded guilty to the underlying charges. (*People v. Granger* (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 422, 428 [164 Cal.Rptr. 363].)

#### ***Prior Conviction for Murder Requires Bifurcated Trial***

If the defendant is charged with the special circumstance of a prior conviction for murder, under Penal Code section 190.2(a)(2), the court must bifurcate the trial. (Pen. Code, § 190.1.) The jury should first determine whether the defendant is guilty of first degree murder and whether any other special circumstances charged are true. (*Ibid.*) The prior conviction special circumstance should then be submitted to the jury in a separate proceeding. (*Ibid.*)

#### ***All Special Circumstances Constitutional Except Heinous or Atrocious Murder***

The special circumstance for a heinous, atrocious, or cruel murder (Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(14)) has been held to be unconstitutionally vague. (*People v. Superior Court (Engert)* (1982) 31 Cal.3d 797, 803 [183 Cal.Rptr. 800, 647 P.2d 76]; *People v. Sanders* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 471, 520 [273 Cal.Rptr. 537, 797 P.2d 561].) No other special circumstance has been found unconstitutional.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

3 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012), Punishment, § 544.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 87, *Death Penalty*, §§ 87.02, 87.10–87.15, 87.24 (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.01[4][a] (Matthew Bender).



## 701. Special Circumstances: Intent Requirement for Accomplice Before June 6, 1990

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If you decide that (the/a) defendant is guilty of first degree murder but was not the actual killer, then, when you consider the special circumstance[s] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert special circumstance[s] without intent requirement for actual killer>, you must also decide whether the defendant acted with the intent to kill.

In order to prove (this/these) special circumstance[s] for a defendant who is not the actual killer but who is guilty of first degree murder as (an aider and abettor/ [or] a member of a conspiracy), the People must prove that the defendant acted with the intent to kill.

[The People do not have to prove that the actual killer acted with the intent to kill in order for (this/these) special circumstance[s] to be true. [If you decide that the defendant is guilty of first degree murder, but you cannot agree whether the defendant was the actual killer, then, in order to find (this/these) special circumstance[s] true, you must find that the defendant acted with the intent to kill.]]

If the defendant was not the actual killer, then the People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that (he/she) acted with the intent to kill for the special circumstance[s] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert special circumstance[s] without intent requirement for actual killer> to be true. If the People have not met this burden, you must find (this/these) special circumstance[s] (has/have) not been proved true [for that defendant].

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New January 2006

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct the jury on the mental state required for accomplice liability when a special circumstance is charged and there is sufficient evidence to support the finding that the defendant was not the actual killer. (See *People v. Jones* (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1084, 1117 [135 Cal.Rptr.2d 370, 70 P.3d 359].) If there is sufficient evidence to show that the defendant may have been an accomplice and not the actual killer, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give the accomplice intent instruction, regardless of the prosecution's theory of the case. (*Ibid.*)

For all murders committed prior to June 6, 1990, the People must prove that an aider and abettor or coconspirator acted with intent to kill for all special circumstances except Penal Code section 190.2(a)(2) (prior conviction for murder).

(*People v. Anderson* (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1147 [240 Cal.Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306] [modifying *Carlos v. Superior Court* (1983) 35 Cal.3d 131, 135 [197 Cal.Rptr. 79, 672 P.2d 862]]; see pre-June 6, 1990, Pen. Code, § 190.2(b).) Since the Supreme Court ruling in *People v. Anderson, supra*, the People do not have to show intent to kill on the part of the actual killer unless specified in the special circumstance. (*People v. Anderson, supra*, 43 Cal.3d at p. 1147.) However, if the killing occurred during the window of time between *Carlos* and *Anderson* (1983 to 1987), then the People must also prove intent to kill on the part of the actual killer. (*People v. Bolden* (2002) 29 Cal.4th 515, 560 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 802, 58 P.3d 931].)

Use this instruction for any case in which the jury could conclude that the defendant was an accomplice to a homicide that occurred prior to June 6, 1990, where any special circumstance is charged that does not require intent to kill on the part of the actual killer, other than Penal Code section 190.2(a)(2). For those special circumstances where intent to kill is required for both the actual killer and the accomplice, this instruction is not required. For those special circumstances, the instruction on the special circumstance states “the defendant intended to kill” as an element.

The court should carefully review the prior versions of Penal Code section 190.2 to determine if the special circumstance required intent to kill at the time of the killing because the special circumstances have been amended by referendum several times.

Give the bracketed paragraph stating that the People do not have to prove intent to kill on the part of the actual killer if there is a codefendant alleged to be the actual killer or if the jury could convict the defendant as either the actual killer or an accomplice.

If the jury could convict the defendant either as a principal or as an accomplice, and the defendant is charged with a special circumstance that does not require intent to kill by the principal, then jury must find intent to kill if they cannot agree that the defendant was the actual killer. (*People v. Jones* (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1084, 1117 [135 Cal.Rptr.2d 370, 70 P.3d 359].) In such cases, the court should give both bracketed paragraphs.

If the homicide occurred between 1983 and 1987, do not give this instruction. (*People v. Bolden* (2002) 29 Cal.4th 515, 560 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 802, 58 P.3d 931].) For homicides during that period, the prosecution must prove intent to kill by the actual killer as well as the accomplice. The court should make sure that the instruction on the special circumstance states that the prosecution must prove that the defendant intended to kill.

Do not give this instruction if accomplice liability is not at issue in the case.

### ***Related Instructions***

CALCRIM No. 702, *Special Circumstances: Intent Requirement for Accomplice After June 5, 1990—Other Than Felony Murder*.

CALCRIM No. 703, *Special Circumstances: Intent Requirement for Accomplice After June 5, 1990—Felony Murder*.

**AUTHORITY**

- Accomplice Intent Requirement. Pre-June 6, 1990, Pen. Code, § 190.2(b); *People v. Anderson* (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1147 [240 Cal.Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306].

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

3 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, §§ 536, 543.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 87, *Death Penalty*, § 87.14 (Matthew Bender).

**702. Special Circumstances: Intent Requirement for Accomplice  
After June 5, 1990—Other Than Felony Murder (Pen. Code,  
§ 190.2(c))**

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**If you decide that (the/a) defendant is guilty of first degree murder but was not the actual killer, then, when you consider the special circumstance[s] of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert only special circumstance[s] under Pen. Code, §§ 190.2(a)(2), (3), (4), (5) or (6)>, you must also decide whether the defendant acted with the intent to kill.**

**In order to prove (this/these) special circumstance[s] for a defendant who is not the actual killer but who is guilty of first degree murder as (an aider and abettor/ [or] a member of a conspiracy), the People must prove that the defendant acted with the intent to kill.**

**[The People do not have to prove that the actual killer acted with the intent to kill in order for (this/these) special circumstance[s] to be true. [If you decide that the defendant is guilty of first degree murder, but you cannot agree whether the defendant was the actual killer, then, in order to find (this/these) special circumstance[s] true, you must find that the defendant acted with the intent to kill.]]**

**If the defendant was not the actual killer, then the People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that (he/she) acted with the intent to kill for the special circumstance[s] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert only special circumstance[s] under Pen. Code, §§ 190.2(a)(2), (3), (4), (5) or (6)> to be true. If the People have not met this burden, you must find (this/these) special circumstance[s] (has/have) not been proved true [for that defendant].**

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*New January 2006*

## **BENCH NOTES**

### ***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct the jury on the mental state required for accomplice liability when a special circumstance is charged and there is sufficient evidence to support the finding that the defendant was not the actual killer. (See *People v. Jones* (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1084, 1117 [135 Cal.Rptr.2d 370, 70 P.3d 359].) If there is sufficient evidence to show that the defendant may have been an accomplice and not the actual killer, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give the accomplice intent instruction, regardless of the prosecution's theory of the case. (*Ibid.*)

Proposition 115 modified the intent requirement of the special circumstance law, codifying the decisions of *People v. Anderson* (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1147 [240

Cal.Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306], and *Tison v. Arizona* (1987) 481 U.S. 137, 157–158 [107 S.Ct. 1676, 95 L.Ed.2d 127]. The current law provides that the actual killer does not have to act with intent to kill unless the special circumstance specifically requires intent. (Pen. Code, § 190.2(b).) A defendant who is not the actual killer must act with intent to kill unless the felony-murder special circumstance is charged. (Pen. Code, §§ 190.2(c), (d).) If the felony-murder special circumstance is charged, then the People must prove that a defendant who was not the actual killer either acted with intent to kill or was a major participant and acted with reckless indifference to human life. (Pen. Code, § 190.2(d); *People v. Estrada* (1995) 11 Cal.4th 568, 571 [46 Cal.Rptr.2d 586, 904 P.2d 1197].)

Use this instruction for any case in which the jury could conclude that the defendant was an accomplice to a homicide that occurred after June 5, 1990, and the defendant is charged with a special circumstance, other than felony murder, that does not require intent to kill by the actual killer. Currently, the only special circumstances, other than felony murder, that do not require intent to kill by the actual killer are: Prior conviction for murder (§ 190.2(a)(2)); Multiple offenses of murder (§ 190.2(a)(3)); Murder by hidden explosive (§ 190.2(a)(4)); Murder to avoid arrest (§ 190.2(a)(5)); and Murder by mail bomb (§ 190.2(a)(6)). However, the court should carefully review the prior versions of Penal Code section 190.2 to determine if the special circumstance required intent to kill at the time of the killing because the special circumstances have been amended by referendum several times.

For those special circumstances where intent to kill is required for both the actual killer and the accomplice, this instruction is not required. For those special circumstances, the instruction on the special circumstance states “the defendant intended to kill” as an element.

When the felony-murder special circumstance is charged, use CALCRIM No. 703, *Special Circumstances: Intent Requirement for Accomplice After June 5, 1990—Felony Murder*.

Give the bracketed paragraph stating that the People do not have to prove intent to kill on the part of the actual killer if there is a codefendant alleged to be the actual killer or if the jury could convict the defendant as either the actual killer or an accomplice.

If the jury could convict the defendant either as a principal or as an accomplice, and the defendant is charged with one of the special circumstances that does not require intent to kill by the principal, then the jury must find intent to kill if they cannot agree that the defendant was the actual killer. (*People v. Jones* (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1084, 1117 [135 Cal.Rptr.2d 370, 70 P.3d 359].) In such cases, the court should then give both bracketed paragraphs.

Do not give this instruction if accomplice liability is not at issue in the case.

### ***Related Instructions***

CALCRIM No. 701, *Special Circumstances: Intent Requirement for Accomplice Before June 6, 1990*.

CALCRIM No. 703, *Special Circumstances: Intent Requirement for Accomplice After June 5, 1990—Felony Murder*.

### AUTHORITY

- Accomplice Intent Requirement. Pen. Code, § 190.2(c).
- Constitutional Standard for Intent by Accomplice. *Tison v. Arizona* (1987) 481 U.S. 137, 157–158 [107 S.Ct. 1676, 95 L.Ed.2d 127].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

3 Witkin & Epstein, California. Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, §§ 536, 543.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 87, *Death Penalty*, § 87.14 (Matthew Bender).

**703. Special Circumstances: Intent Requirement for Accomplice  
After June 5, 1990—Felony Murder (Pen. Code, § 190.2(d))**

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If you decide that (the/a) defendant is guilty of first degree murder but was not the actual killer, then, when you consider the special circumstance[s] of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert felony murder special circumstance[s]>, you must also decide whether the defendant acted either with intent to kill or with reckless indifference to human life.

In order to prove (this/these) special circumstance[s] for a defendant who is not the actual killer but who is guilty of first degree murder as (an aider and abettor/ [or] a member of a conspiracy), the People must prove either that the defendant intended to kill, or the People must prove all of the following:

1. The defendant's participation in the crime began before or during the killing;
2. The defendant was a major participant in the crime;

**AND**

3. When the defendant participated in the crime, (he/she) acted with reckless indifference to human life.

[A person *acts with reckless indifference to human life* when he or she knowingly engages in criminal activity that he or she knows involves a grave risk of death.]

[The People do not have to prove that the actual killer acted with intent to kill or with reckless indifference to human life in order for the special circumstance[s] of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert felony-murder special circumstance[s]> to be true.]

[If you decide that the defendant is guilty of first degree murder, but you cannot agree whether the defendant was the actual killer, then, in order to find (this/these) special circumstance[s] true, you must find either that the defendant acted with intent to kill or you must find that the defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life and was a *major participant* in the crime.]

[When you decide whether the defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life, consider all the evidence. No one of the following factors is necessary, nor is any one of them necessarily enough, to determine whether the defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life. Among the factors you may consider are:

- [• Did the defendant know that [a] lethal weapon[s] would be present during the \_\_\_\_\_ <insert underlying felony>?]

- Did the defendant know that [a] lethal weapon[s] (was/were) likely to be used?]
- Did the defendant know that [a] lethal weapon[s] (was/were) used?]
- Did the defendant know the number of weapons involved?]
- Was the defendant near the person(s) killed when the killing occurred?]
- Did the defendant have an opportunity to stop the killing or to help the victim(s)?]
- How long did the crime last?]
- Was the defendant aware of anything that would make a coparticipant likely to kill?]
- Did the defendant try to minimize the possibility of violence?]
- \_\_\_\_\_ <insert any other relevant factors>]]

[When you decide whether the defendant was a *major participant*, consider all the evidence. No one of these following factors is necessary, nor is any one of them necessarily enough, to determine whether the defendant was a major participant. Among the factors you may consider are:

- [What was the defendant's role in planning the crime that led to the death[s]?]
- What was the defendant's role in supplying or using lethal weapons?]
- What did the defendant know about dangers posed by the crime, any weapons used, or past experience or conduct of the other participant[s]?]
- Was the defendant in a position to facilitate or to prevent the death ?]
- Did the defendant's action or inaction play a role in the death?]
- What did the defendant do after lethal force was used?]
- \_\_\_\_\_ <insert any other relevant factors.>]]

If the defendant was not the actual killer, then the People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that (he/she) acted with either the intent to kill or with reckless indifference to human life and was a major participant in the crime for the special circumstance[s] of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert felony murder special circumstance[s]> to be true. If the People have not met this burden, you must find (this/these) special



**circumstance[s] (has/have) not been proved true [for that defendant].**

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*New January 2006; Revised April 2008, February 2016, August 2016, September 2019, April 2020*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct the jury on the mental state required for accomplice liability when a special circumstance is charged and there is sufficient evidence to support the finding that the defendant was not the actual killer. (See *People v. Jones* (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1084, 1117 [135 Cal.Rptr.2d 370, 70 P.3d 359].) If there is sufficient evidence to show that the defendant may have been an accomplice and not the actual killer, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give the accomplice intent instruction, regardless of the prosecution's theory of the case. (*Ibid.*)

**Do not** give this instruction when giving CALCRIM No. 731, *Special Circumstances: Murder in Commission of Felony—Kidnapping With Intent to Kill After March 8, 2000* or CALCRIM No. 732, *Special Circumstances: Murder in Commission of Felony—Arson With Intent to Kill*. (*People v. Odom* (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 237, 256–257 [197 Cal.Rptr.3d 774].)

When multiple special circumstances are charged, one or more of which require intent to kill, the court may need to modify this instruction.

Proposition 115 modified the intent requirement of the special circumstance law, codifying the decisions of *People v. Anderson* (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1147 [240 Cal.Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306], and *Tison v. Arizona* (1987) 481 U.S. 137, 157–158 [107 S.Ct. 1676, 95 L.Ed.2d 127]. The current law provides that the actual killer does not have to act with intent to kill unless the special circumstance specifically requires intent. (Pen. Code, § 190.2(b).) If the felony-murder special circumstance is charged, then the People must prove that a defendant who was not the actual killer was a major participant and acted with intent to kill or with reckless indifference to human life. (Pen. Code, § 190.2(d); *People v. Banks* (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788, 807–809 [189 Cal.Rptr.3d 208, 351 P.3d 330]; *People v. Estrada* (1995) 11 Cal.4th 568, 571 [46 Cal.Rptr.2d 586, 904 P.2d 1197].)

Use this instruction for any case in which the jury could conclude that the defendant was an accomplice to a killing that occurred after June 5, 1990, when the felony-murder special circumstance is charged.

Give the bracketed paragraph stating that the People do not have to prove intent to kill or reckless indifference on the part of the actual killer if there is a codefendant alleged to be the actual killer or if the jury could convict the defendant as either the actual killer or an accomplice.

If the jury could convict the defendant either as a principal or as an accomplice, the jury must find intent to kill or reckless indifference if they cannot agree that the

defendant was the actual killer. (*People v. Jones* (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1084, 1117 [135 Cal.Rptr.2d 370, 70 P.3d 359].) In such cases, the court should give both the bracketed paragraph stating that the People do not have to prove intent to kill or reckless indifference on the part of the actual killer, and the bracketed paragraph that begins with “[I]f you decide that the defendant is guilty of first degree murder, but you cannot agree whether the defendant was the actual killer . . . .”

In *People v. Banks* (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788, 803–808 [189 Cal.Rptr.3d 208, 351 P.3d 330], the court identified certain factors to guide the jury in its determination of whether the defendant was a major participant, but stopped short of holding that the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on those factors. The trial court should determine whether the *Banks* factors need be given.

The court does not have a sua sponte duty to define “reckless indifference to human life.” (*People v. Estrada* (1995) 11 Cal.4th 568, 578 [46 Cal.Rptr.2d 586, 904 P.2d 1197].) However, this “holding should not be understood to discourage trial courts from amplifying the statutory language for the jury.” (*Id.* at p. 579.) The court may give the bracketed definition of reckless indifference if requested.

In *People v. Clark* (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 614–620 [203 Cal.Rptr.3d 407, 372 P.3d 811], the court identified certain factors to guide the jury in its determination of whether the defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life but did not hold that the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on those factors. *Clark* noted that these factors had been applied by appellate courts “in cases involving nonshooter aiders and abettors to commercial armed robbery felony murders.” (*Id.* at p. 618.) The trial court should determine whether the *Clark* factors need be given.

Do not give this instruction if accomplice liability is not at issue in the case.

### AUTHORITY

- Accomplice Intent Requirement, Felony Murder. Pen. Code, § 190.2(d).
- Reckless Indifference to Human Life. *People v. Clark* (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 614–620 [203 Cal.Rptr.3d 407, 372 P.3d 811]; *People v. Banks* (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788, 807–811 [189 Cal.Rptr.3d 208, 351 P.3d 330]; *People v. Estrada* (1995) 11 Cal.4th 568, 578 [46 Cal.Rptr.2d 586, 904 P.2d 1197]; *Tison v. Arizona* (1987) 481 U.S. 137, 157–158 [107 S.Ct. 1676, 95 L.Ed.2d 127].
- Constitutional Standard for Intent by Accomplice. *Tison v. Arizona* (1987) 481 U.S. 137, 157–158 [107 S.Ct. 1676, 95 L.Ed.2d 127].
- Major Participant. *People v. Banks* (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788, 803–808 [189 Cal.Rptr.3d 208, 351 P.3d 330].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

3 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, §§ 536, 543.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 87, *Death Penalty*, § 87.14[2][b][ii] (Matthew Bender).

## 704. Special Circumstances: Circumstantial Evidence—Sufficiency

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**Before you may rely on circumstantial evidence to conclude that a special circumstance allegation is true, you must be convinced that the People have proved each fact essential to that conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt.**

**Also, before you may rely on circumstantial evidence to find that a special circumstance allegation is true, you must be convinced that the only reasonable conclusion supported by the circumstantial evidence is that the special circumstance allegation is true. If you can draw two or more reasonable conclusions from the circumstantial evidence, and one of those reasonable conclusions supports a finding that the special circumstance allegation is true and another reasonable conclusion supports a finding that it is not true, you must conclude that the allegation was not proved by the circumstantial evidence. However, when considering circumstantial evidence, you must accept only reasonable conclusions and reject any that are unreasonable.**

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*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on how to evaluate circumstantial evidence if the prosecution substantially relies on circumstantial evidence to establish any element of the case. (*People v. Yrigoyen* (1955) 45 Cal.2d 46, 49 [286 P.2d 1] [duty exists where circumstantial evidence relied on to prove any element, including intent]; *People v. Bloyd* (1987) 43 Cal.3d 333, 351–352 [233 Cal.Rptr. 368, 729 P.2d 802].)

Give CALCRIM No. 223, *Direct and Circumstantial Evidence: Defined*, with this instruction.

The Supreme Court has held that it is appropriate to give an instruction specifically tailored to the use of circumstantial evidence in determining the truth of a special circumstance allegation. (*People v. Maury* (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 428 [133 Cal.Rptr.2d 561, 68 P.3d 1]; *People v. Hughes* (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 346 [116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401, 39 P.3d 432]; *People v. Lewis* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 653 [106 Cal.Rptr.2d 629, 22 P.3d 392].) However, the court is not *required* to give this instruction if it has also given the more general instruction on circumstantial evidence. (*People v. Hines* (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1051 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 594, 938

P.2d 388]; *People v. Lewis*, *supra*, 25 Cal.4th at p. 653; see CALCRIM No. 224, *Circumstantial Evidence: Sufficiency of Evidence*.)

***Related Instructions***

CALCRIM No. 223, *Direct and Circumstantial Evidence: Defined*.

CALCRIM No. 224, *Circumstantial Evidence: Sufficiency of Evidence*.

CALCRIM No. 225, *Circumstantial Evidence: Intent or Mental State*.

CALCRIM No. 705, *Special Circumstances: Circumstantial Evidence—Intent or Mental State*.

**AUTHORITY**

- Duty to Instruct on Circumstantial Evidence Generally. *People v. Yrigoyen* (1955) 45 Cal.2d 46, 49 [286 P.2d 1]; *People v. Bloyd* (1987) 43 Cal.3d 333, 351–352 [233 Cal.Rptr. 368, 729 P.2d 802].
- Appropriate to Instruct on Special Circumstance. *People v. Maury* (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 428 [133 Cal.Rptr.2d 561, 68 P.3d 1]; *People v. Hughes* (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 346 [116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401, 39 P.3d 432]; *People v. Lewis* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 653 [106 Cal.Rptr.2d 629, 22 P.3d 392].
- Instruction Duplicative, Not Required. *People v. Lewis* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 653 [106 Cal.Rptr.2d 629, 22 P.3d 392]; *People v. Hines* (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1051 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 594, 938 P.2d 388].

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

3 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, § 544.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 83, *Evidence*, § 83.03, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.03[2][a] (Matthew Bender).

## 705. Special Circumstances: Circumstantial Evidence—Intent or Mental State

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In order to prove the special circumstance[s] of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert special circumstance[s] with intent requirement>, the People must prove not only that the defendant did the act[s] charged, but also that (he/she) acted with a particular intent or mental state. The instruction for (each/the) special circumstance explains the intent or mental state required.

An intent or mental state may be proved by circumstantial evidence.

Before you may rely on circumstantial evidence to conclude that the defendant had the required intent or mental state, you must be convinced that the People have proved each fact essential to that conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt.

Also, before you may rely on circumstantial evidence to conclude that the defendant had the required intent or mental state, you must be convinced that the only reasonable conclusion supported by the circumstantial evidence is that the defendant had the required intent or mental state. If you can draw two or more reasonable conclusions from the circumstantial evidence, and one of those reasonable conclusions supports a finding that the defendant did have the required intent or mental state and another reasonable conclusion supports a finding that the defendant did not have the required intent or mental state, you must conclude that the required intent or mental state was not proved by the circumstantial evidence. However, when considering circumstantial evidence, you must accept only reasonable conclusions and reject any that are unreasonable.

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*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on how to evaluate circumstantial evidence if the prosecution substantially relies on circumstantial evidence to establish any element of the case. (*People v. Yrigoyen* (1955) 45 Cal.2d 46, 49 [286 P.2d 1] [duty exists where circumstantial evidence relied on to prove any element, including intent]; *People v. Bloyd* (1987) 43 Cal.3d 333, 351–352 [233 Cal.Rptr. 368, 729 P.2d 802].)

Give CALCRIM No. 223, *Direct and Circumstantial Evidence: Defined*, with this instruction.

The Supreme Court has held that it is appropriate to give an instruction specifically tailored to the use of circumstantial evidence in determining the truth of a special

circumstance allegation. (*People v. Maury* (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 428 [133 Cal.Rptr.2d 561, 68 P.3d 1]; *People v. Hughes* (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 346 [116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401, 39 P.3d 432]; *People v. Lewis* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 653 [106 Cal.Rptr.2d 629, 22 P.3d 392].) However, the court is not *required* to give this instruction if it has also given the more general instruction on circumstantial evidence. (*People v. Hines* (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1051 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 594, 938 P.2d 388]; *People v. Lewis, supra*, 25 Cal.4th at p. 653; see CALCRIM No. 225, *Circumstantial Evidence: Intent or Mental State*.)

If intent or mental state is the only element of the special circumstance that rests substantially on circumstantial evidence, then this instruction should be given in place of CALCRIM No. 704, *Special Circumstances: Circumstantial Evidence—Sufficiency*. (See *People v. Marshall* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 849 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 347, 919 P.2d 1280]). If other elements of the special circumstance also rest substantially or entirely on circumstantial evidence, the court may give the more general instruction, CALCRIM No. 704, instead of this instruction. (*People v. Hughes, supra*, 27 Cal.4th at p. 347.) The court may choose to give both instructions (CALCRIM Nos. 704 and 705) and may also choose to give both circumstantial evidence instructions for non-special circumstance cases (CALCRIM Nos. 224 and 225). (See *People v. Maury, supra*, 30 Cal.4th at p. 428.)

### ***Related Instructions***

CALCRIM No. 223, *Direct and Circumstantial Evidence: Defined*.

CALCRIM No. 224, *Circumstantial Evidence: Sufficiency of Evidence*.

CALCRIM No. 225, *Circumstantial Evidence: Intent or Mental State*.

CALCRIM No. 704, *Special Circumstances: Circumstantial Evidence—Sufficiency*.

## **AUTHORITY**

- Duty to Instruct on Circumstantial Evidence Generally. *People v. Yrigoyen* (1955) 45 Cal.2d 46, 49 [286 P.2d 1]; *People v. Bloyd* (1987) 43 Cal.3d 333, 351–352 [233 Cal.Rptr. 368, 729 P.2d 802].
- Appropriate to Instruct on Special Circumstance. *People v. Maury* (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 428 [133 Cal.Rptr.2d 561, 68 P.3d 1]; *People v. Hughes* (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 346 [116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401, 39 P.3d 432]; *People v. Lewis* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 653 [106 Cal.Rptr.2d 629, 22 P.3d 392].
- Instruction Duplicative, Not Required. *People v. Lewis* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 653 [106 Cal.Rptr.2d 629, 22 P.3d 392]; *People v. Hines* (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1051 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 594, 938 P.2d 388].

## **SECONDARY SOURCES**

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 87, *Death Penalty*, § 87.14 (Matthew Bender).

## 706. Special Circumstances: Jury May Not Consider Punishment

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**In your deliberations, you may not consider or discuss penalty or punishment in any way when deciding whether a special circumstance, or any other charge, has been proved.**

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*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct the jury not to consider penalty or punishment when deciding on the special circumstances or other charges. (*People v. Robertson* (1982) 33 Cal.3d 21, 36 [188 Cal.Rptr. 77, 655 P.2d 279]; *People v. Holt* (1984) 37 Cal.3d 436, 458 [208 Cal.Rptr. 547, 690 P.2d 1207] [jury may not consider punishment in deciding on special circumstances].)

### AUTHORITY

- Duty to Instruct. *People v. Robertson* (1982) 33 Cal.3d 21, 36 [188 Cal.Rptr. 77, 655 P.2d 279].
- Jury May Not Consider Punishment. *People v. Holt* (1984) 37 Cal.3d 436, 458 [208 Cal.Rptr. 547, 690 P.2d 1207].



**707. Special Circumstances: Accomplice Testimony Must Be Corroborated—Dispute Whether Witness Is Accomplice (Pen. Code, § 1111)**

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**In order to prove the special circumstance[s] of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert special circumstance[s] requiring proof of additional crime>, the People must prove that the defendant committed \_\_\_\_\_ <insert crime[s] (other than murder) that must be proved>. The People have presented the (statement[s]/ [or] testimony) of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] of witness[es]> on this issue.**

**Before you may consider the (statement[s]/ [or] testimony) of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] of witness[es]> on the question of whether the special circumstance[s] (was/were) proved, you must decide whether (he/she/they) (was/were) [an] accomplice[s]. A person is an *accomplice* if he or she is subject to prosecution for the identical offense alleged against the defendant. Someone is subject to prosecution if he or she personally committed the offense or if:**

- 1. He or she knew of the criminal purpose of the person who committed the offense;**

**AND**

- 2. He or she intended to, and did, in fact, (aid, facilitate, promote, encourage, or instigate the commission of the offense[,]/ [or] participate in a criminal conspiracy to commit the offense).**

**The burden is on the defendant to prove that it is more likely than not that \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] of witness[es]> (was/were) subject to prosecution for the identical offense.**

**[An accomplice does not need to be present when the crime is committed. On the other hand, a person is not an accomplice just because he or she is present at the scene of a crime, even if he or she knows that a crime [will be committed or] is being committed and does nothing to stop it.]**

**[A person who lacks criminal intent but who pretends to join in a crime only to detect or prosecute (the person/those) who commit[s] that crime is not an accomplice.]**

**[A person may be an accomplice even if he or she is not actually prosecuted for the crime.]**

**[You may not conclude that a child under 14 years old was an accomplice unless you also decide that when the child acted, (he/she) understood:**

- 1. The nature and effect of the criminal conduct;**



2. That the conduct was wrongful and forbidden;

AND

3. That (he/she) could be punished for participating in the conduct.]

If you find that \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name[s] of witness[es]>* (was/were) [an] accomplice[s], then you may not find that the special circumstance[s] of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert special circumstance[s] requiring proof of additional crime>* (is/are) true based on (his/her/their) (statement[s]/ [or] testimony) alone. You may use the (statement[s]/ [or] testimony) of an accomplice to find the special circumstance true only if:

1. The accomplice's (statement[s]/ [and] testimony) (is/are) supported by other evidence that you believe;
2. That supporting evidence is independent of the accomplice's (statement[s]/ [and] testimony);

AND

3. That supporting evidence tends to connect the defendant to the commission of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert crime[s] (other than murder) that must be proved>*.

Supporting evidence, however, may be slight. It does not need to be enough, by itself, to prove that the defendant committed \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert crime[s] (other than murder) that must be proved>*, and it does not need to support every fact (mentioned by the witness in the statement/ [or] about which the witness testified). On the other hand, it is not enough if the supporting evidence merely shows that a crime was committed or the circumstances of its commission. The supporting evidence must tend to connect the defendant to the commission of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert crime[s] (other than murder) that must be proved>*.

[The evidence needed to support the (statement[s]/ [or] testimony) of one accomplice cannot be provided by the (statement[s]/ [or] testimony) of another accomplice.]

Any (statement/ [or] testimony) of an accomplice that tends to incriminate the defendant should be viewed with caution. You may not, however, arbitrarily disregard it. You should give that (statement/ [or] testimony) the weight you think it deserves after examining it with care and caution and in light of all the other evidence.

If you decide that \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name[s] of witness[es]>* (was/ were) not [an] accomplice[s], you should evaluate (his/her/their) (statement[s]/ [or] testimony) as you would that of any other witness.

**BENCH NOTES*****Instructional Duty***

There is a **sua sponte** duty to instruct that testimony by an accomplice must be corroborated if that testimony is used to prove a special circumstance based on a crime other than the murder charged in the case. (*People v. Hamilton* (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1142, 1177 [259 Cal.Rptr. 701, 774 P.2d 730].) “When the special circumstance requires proof of some other crime [besides the charged murder], that crime cannot be proved by the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. But when . . . it requires only proof of the motive for the murder for which defendant has already been convicted, the corroboration requirement . . . does not apply.” (*Ibid.*; see also *People v. Rices* (2017) 4 Cal.5th 49, 85–86 [226 Cal.Rptr.3d 118, 406 P.3d 788].)

“Whether a person is an accomplice is a question of fact for the jury unless the facts and the inferences to be drawn therefrom are undisputed.” (*People v. Coffman and Marlow* (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 104 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 710, 96 P.3d 30].) When the court concludes that the witness is an accomplice as a matter of law or the parties agree about the witness’s status as an accomplice, do not give this instruction. Give CALCRIM No. 708, *Special Circumstances: Accomplice Testimony Must Be Corroborated—No Dispute Whether Witness Is Accomplice*.

When the witness is a codefendant whose testimony includes incriminating statements, the court **should not** instruct that the witness is an accomplice as a matter of law. (*People v. Hill* (1967) 66 Cal.2d 536, 555 [58 Cal.Rptr. 340, 426 P.2d 908].) Instead, the court should give this instruction, informing the jury that it must decide whether the testifying codefendant is an accomplice. In addition, the court should instruct that when the jury considers this testimony as it relates to the testifying codefendant’s defense, the jury should evaluate the testimony using the general rules of credibility, but if the jury considers testimony as incriminating evidence against the nontestifying codefendant, the testimony must be corroborated and should be viewed with caution. (See *People v. Coffman and Marlow* (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 103–106 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 710, 96 P.3d 30].)

When the witness is an accomplice as a matter of law or the parties agree about the witness’s status as an accomplice, give CALCRIM No. 708, *Special Circumstances: Accomplice Testimony Must Be Corroborated—No Dispute Whether Witness Is Accomplice*.

Give the bracketed paragraph beginning “A person who lacks criminal intent” when the evidence suggests that the witness did not share the defendant’s specific criminal intent, e.g., witness is an undercover police officer or an unwitting assistant.

Give the bracketed paragraph beginning “You may not conclude that a child under 14 years old” on request if the defendant claims that a child witness’s testimony

must be corroborated because the child acted as an accomplice. (Pen. Code, § 26; *People v. Williams* (1936) 12 Cal.App.2d 207, 209 [55 P.2d 223].)

***Related Instructions***

CALCRIM No. 708, *Special Circumstances: Accomplice Testimony Must Be Corroborated—No Dispute Whether Witness Is Accomplice.*

CALCRIM No. 334, *Accomplice Testimony Must Be Corroborated: Dispute Whether Witness Is Accomplice.*

CALCRIM No. 335, *Accomplice Testimony: No Dispute Whether Witness Is Accomplice.*

**AUTHORITY**

- Duty to Instruct. Pen. Code, § 1111; *People v. Hamilton* (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1142, 1177 [259 Cal.Rptr. 701, 774 P.2d 730]; *People v. Guiuan* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 558, 569 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 239, 957 P.2d 928].
- Accomplice May Not Provide Sole Basis for Admission of Other Evidence. *People v. Bowley* (1963) 59 Cal.2d 855, 863 [31 Cal.Rptr. 471, 382 P.2d 591].
- Consideration of Incriminating Testimony. *People v. Guiuan* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 558, 569 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 239, 957 P.2d 928].
- Defendant’s Burden of Proof. *People v. Belton* (1979) 23 Cal.3d 516, 523 [153 Cal.Rptr. 195, 591 P.2d 485].
- Defense Admissions May Provide Necessary Corroboration. *People v. Williams* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 680 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573, 941 P.2d 752].
- Definition of Accomplice as Aider and Abettor. *People v. Stankewitz* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 72, 90–91 [270 Cal.Rptr. 817, 793 P.2d 23].
- Extent of Corroboration Required. *People v. Szeto* (1981) 29 Cal.3d 20, 27 [171 Cal.Rptr. 652, 623 P.2d 213].
- One Accomplice May Not Corroborate Another. *People v. Montgomery* (1941) 47 Cal.App.2d 1, 15 [117 P.2d 437], disapproved on other grounds in *People v. Dillon* (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 454 fn. 2 [194 Cal.Rptr. 390, 668 P.2d 697], and *Murgia v. Municipal Court* (1975) 15 Cal.3d 286, 301 fn. 11 [124 Cal.Rptr. 204, 540 P.2d 44].
- Presence or Knowledge Insufficient. *People v. Boyd* (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 541, 557, fn. 14 [271 Cal.Rptr. 738]; *In re Michael T.* (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 907, 911 [149 Cal.Rptr. 87].
- Testimony of Feigned Accomplice Need Not Be Corroborated. *People v. Salazar* (1962) 201 Cal.App.2d 284, 287 [20 Cal.Rptr. 25]; but see *People v. Brocklehurst* (1971) 14 Cal.App.3d 473, 476 [92 Cal.Rptr. 340]; *People v. Bohmer* (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 185, 191–193 [120 Cal.Rptr. 136].
- Uncorroborated Accomplice Testimony May Establish Corpus Delicti. *People v. Williams* (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1268, 1317 [248 Cal.Rptr. 834, 756 P.2d 221].
- Witness an Accomplice as a Matter of Law. *People v. Williams* (1997) 16

Cal.4th 635, 679 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573, 941 P.2d 752].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

3 Witkin & Epstein, California Evidence (4th ed. 2012) Presentation at Trial, § 122.

3 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, § 543.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 82, *Witnesses*, § 82.03, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.03[2][d], Ch. 87, *Death Penalty*, § 87.23[4][b] (Matthew Bender).

**708. Special Circumstances: Accomplice Testimony Must Be Corroborated—No Dispute Whether Witness Is Accomplice (Pen. Code, § 1111)**

---

**In order to prove the special circumstance[s] of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert special circumstance[s] requiring proof of additional crime>, the People must prove that the defendant committed \_\_\_\_\_ <insert crime[s] (other than murder) that must be proved>. The People have presented the (statement[s]/ [or] testimony) of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] of witness[es]> on this issue.**

**If the crime[s] of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert crime[s]> (was/were) committed, then \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] of witness[es]> (was/were) [an] accomplice[s] to (that/those) crime[s].**

**You may not find that the special circumstance[s] of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert special circumstance[s] requiring proof of additional crime> is true based on the (statement[s]/ [or] testimony) of an accomplice alone. You may use the (statement[s]/ [or] testimony) of an accomplice to find the special circumstance true only if:**

- 1. The accomplice’s (statement[s]/ [and] testimony) (is/are) supported by other evidence that you believe;**
- 2. That supporting evidence is independent of the accomplice’s (statement[s]/ [and] testimony);**

**AND**

- 3. That supporting evidence tends to connect the defendant to the commission of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert crime[s] (other than murder) that must be proved>.**

**Supporting evidence, however, may be slight. It does not need to be enough, by itself, to prove that the defendant committed \_\_\_\_\_ <insert crime[s] (other than murder) that must be proved>, and it does not need to support every fact (mentioned by the witness in the statement/ [or] about which the witness testified). On the other hand, it is not enough if the supporting evidence merely shows that a crime was committed or the circumstances of its commission. The supporting evidence must tend to connect the defendant to the commission of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert crime[s] (other than murder) that must be proved>.**

**[The evidence needed to support the (statement[s]/ [or] testimony) of one accomplice cannot be provided by the (statement[s]/ [or] testimony) of another accomplice.]**

**Any (statement/ [or] testimony) of an accomplice that tends to incriminate the defendant should be viewed with caution. You may not,**

**however, arbitrarily disregard it. You should give that (statement/ [or] testimony) the weight you think it deserves after examining it with care and caution and in light of all the other evidence.**

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*New January 2006; Revised March 2019*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

There is a **sua sponte** duty to instruct that testimony by an accomplice must be corroborated if that testimony is used to prove a special circumstance based on a crime other than the murder charged in the case. (*People v. Hamilton* (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1142, 1177 [259 Cal.Rptr. 701, 774 P.2d 730].) “When the special circumstance requires proof of some other crime [besides the charged murder], that crime cannot be proved by the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. But when . . . it requires only proof of the motive for the murder for which defendant has already been convicted, the corroboration requirement . . . does not apply.” (*Ibid.*; see also *People v. Rices* (2017) 4 Cal.5th 49, 85–86 [226 Cal.Rptr.3d 118, 406 P.3d 788].)

“Whether a person is an accomplice is a question of fact for the jury unless the facts and the inferences to be drawn therefrom are undisputed.” (*People v. Coffman and Marlow* (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 104 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 710, 96 P.3d 30].) Give this instruction only if the court concludes that the witness is an accomplice as a matter of law or the parties agree about the witness’s status as an accomplice. (*People v. Verlinde* (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1161 [123 Cal.Rptr.2d 322] [only give instruction “‘if undisputed evidence established the complicity’ ”].) If there is a dispute about whether the witness is an accomplice, give CALCRIM No. 707, *Special Circumstances: Accomplice Testimony Must Be Corroborated—Dispute Whether Witness Is Accomplice*.

When the witness is a codefendant whose testimony includes incriminating statements, the court **should not** instruct that the witness is an accomplice as a matter of law. (*People v. Hill* (1967) 66 Cal.2d 536, 555 [58 Cal.Rptr. 340, 426 P.2d 908].) Instead, the court should give this instruction, informing the jury that it must decide whether the testifying codefendant is an accomplice. In addition, the court should instruct that when the jury considers this testimony as it relates to the testifying codefendant’s defense, the jury should evaluate the testimony using the general rules of credibility, but if the jury considers testimony as incriminating evidence against the nontestifying codefendant, the testimony must be corroborated and should be viewed with caution.

### *Related Instructions*

CALCRIM No. 707, *Special Circumstances: Accomplice Testimony Must Be Corroborated—Dispute Whether Witness Is Accomplice*.

CALCRIM No. 334, *Accomplice Testimony Must Be Corroborated: Dispute Whether*

*Witness Is Accomplice.*

CALCRIM No. 335, *Accomplice Testimony; No Dispute Whether Witness Is Accomplice.*

### AUTHORITY

- Duty to Instruct. Pen. Code, § 1111; *People v. Hamilton* (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1142, 1177 [259 Cal.Rptr. 701, 774 P.2d 730]; *People v. Guiuan* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 558, 569 [76 Cal.Rptr. 2d 239, 957 P.2d 928].
- Accomplice May Not Provide Sole Basis for Admission of Other Evidence. *People v. Bowley* (1963) 59 Cal.2d 855, 863 [31 Cal.Rptr. 471, 382 P.2d 591].
- Consideration of Incriminating Testimony. *People v. Guiuan* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 558, 569 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 239, 957 P.2d 928].
- Defense Admissions May Provide Necessary Corroboration. *People v. Williams* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 680 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573, 941 P.2d 752].
- Definition of Accomplice as Aider and Abettor. *People v. Stankewitz* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 72, 90–91 [270 Cal.Rptr. 817, 793 P.2d 23].
- Extent of Corroboration Required. *People v. Szeto* (1981) 29 Cal.3d 20, 27 [171 Cal.Rptr. 652, 623 P.2d 213].
- One Accomplice May Not Corroborate Another. *People v. Montgomery* (1941) 47 Cal.App.2d 1, 15 [117 P.2d 437], disapproved on other grounds in *People v. Dillon* (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 454 fn. 2 [194 Cal.Rptr. 390, 668 P.2d 697], and *Murgia v. Municipal Court* (1975) 15 Cal.3d 286, 301 fn. 11 [124 Cal.Rptr. 204, 540 P.2d 44].
- Presence or Knowledge Insufficient. *People v. Boyd* (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 541, 557, fn. 14 [271 Cal.Rptr. 738]; *In re Michael T.* (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 907, 911 [149 Cal.Rptr. 87].
- Testimony of Feigned Accomplice Need Not Be Corroborated. *People v. Salazar* (1962) 201 Cal.App.2d 284, 287 [20 Cal.Rptr. 25]; but see *People v. Brocklehurst* (1971) 14 Cal.App.3d 473, 476 [92 Cal.Rptr. 340]; *People v. Bohmer* (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 185, 191–193 [120 Cal.Rptr. 136].
- Uncorroborated Accomplice Testimony May Establish Corpus Delicti. *People v. Williams* (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1268, 1317 [248 Cal.Rptr. 834, 756 P.2d 221].
- Witness an Accomplice as a Matter of Law. *People v. Williams* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 679 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573, 941 P.2d 752].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

3 Witkin & Epstein, *California Evidence* (4th ed. 2012) Presentation at Trial, § 122.

3 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, § 543.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 82, *Witnesses*, § 82.03, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.03[2][d], Ch. 87, *Death Penalty*, § 87.23[4][b] (Matthew Bender).

**709–719. Reserved for Future Use**



## (ii) Special Circumstances

### 720. Special Circumstances: Financial Gain (Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(1))

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The defendant is charged with the special circumstance of murder for financial gain [in violation of Penal Code section 190.2(a)(1)].

To prove that this special circumstance is true, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant intended to kill;

[AND]

2. The killing was carried out for financial gain(;/.)

<Give element 3 only if robbery-murder also charged; see Bench Notes.>

[AND]

3. (The defendant/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name or description of principal if not defendant>) expected the financial gain to result from the death of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of decedent>.]

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New January 2006

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the elements of the special circumstance. (See *People v. Williams* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 689 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573, 941 P.2d 752].)

The third element should only be given when the defendant is also charged with a robbery-murder special circumstance. (*People v. Bigelow* (1984) 37 Cal.3d 731, 751 [209 Cal.Rptr. 328, 691 P.2d 994]; *People v. Howard* (1988) 44 Cal.3d 375, 409 [243 Cal.Rptr. 842, 749 P.2d 279].) When both are charged, there is a risk that the jury will read the financial gain circumstance broadly, causing it to overlap with the robbery-murder special circumstance. (*People v. Bigelow, supra*, 37 Cal.3d at p. 751.) In such cases, the financial gain special circumstance is subject to “a limiting construction under which . . . [it] applies only when the victim’s death is the consideration for, or an essential prerequisite to, the financial gain sought by the defendant.” (*Ibid.*)

The third element **should not** be given if the robbery-murder special circumstance is not charged. (*People v. Howard* (1988) 44 Cal.3d 375, 410 [243 Cal.Rptr. 842, 749 P.2d 279].) “*Bigelow’s* formulation should be applied when it is important to serve the purposes underlying that decision, but . . . it is not intended to restrict



construction of ‘for financial gain’ when overlap is *not* a concern.” (*Ibid.* [emphasis in original].) In such cases, the unadorned language of the statute is sufficiently clear for the jury to understand. (*Id.* at pp. 408–409; *People v. Noguera* (1992) 4 Cal.4th 599, 635–637 [15 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, 842 P.2d 1160].)

### AUTHORITY

- Special Circumstance. Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(1).
- Cannot Overlap With Robbery Murder. *People v. Bigelow* (1984) 37 Cal.3d 731, 751 [209 Cal.Rptr. 328, 691 P.2d 994]; *People v. Montiel* (1985) 39 Cal.3d 910, 927 [218 Cal.Rptr. 572, 705 P.2d 1248].
- Language of Statute Sufficient If No Robbery-Murder Charge. *People v. Howard* (1988) 44 Cal.3d 375, 410 [243 Cal.Rptr. 842, 749 P.2d 279]; *People v. Noguera* (1992) 4 Cal.4th 599, 635–637 [15 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, 842 P.2d 1160].
- Expectation of Financial Benefit. *People v. Howard* (1988) 44 Cal.3d 375, 409 [243 Cal.Rptr. 842, 749 P.2d 279]; *People v. Edelbacher* (1989) 47 Cal.3d 983, 1025 [254 Cal.Rptr. 586, 766 P.2d 1]; *People v. Noguera* (1992) 4 Cal.4th 599, 636 [15 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, 842 P.2d 1160].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### ***Financial Gain Need Not Be Primary or Sole Motive***

“[T]he relevant inquiry is whether the defendant committed the murder in the expectation that he would thereby obtain the desired financial gain.” (*People v. Howard* (1988) 44 Cal.3d 375, 409 [243 Cal.Rptr. 842, 749 P.2d 279]; *People v. Noguera* (1992) 4 Cal.4th 599, 636 [15 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, 842 P.2d 1160].) Financial gain does not have to be “a ‘dominant,’ ‘substantial,’ or ‘significant’ motive.” (*People v. Noguera, supra*, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 635–636 [special circumstance applied where defendant both wanted to kill wife in order to be with another woman and to inherit her estate]; *People v. Michaels* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 486, 519 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 285, 49 P.3d 1032] [applied where defendant wanted to protect friend from abuse by victim and help friend get proceeds of insurance policy].)

#### ***Need Not Actually Receive Financial Gain***

“Proof of actual pecuniary benefit to the defendant from the victim’s death is neither necessary nor sufficient to establish the financial-gain special circumstance.” (*People v. Edelbacher* (1989) 47 Cal.3d 983, 1025–1026 [254 Cal.Rptr. 586, 766 P.2d 1] [financial gain element satisfied where defendant believed death would relieve him of debt to victim even though legally not true]; *People v. Noguera* (1992) 4 Cal.4th 599, 636 [15 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, 842 P.2d 1160]; *People v. Michaels* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 486, 519 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 285, 49 P.3d 1032] [satisfied even though insurance company refused to pay].)

#### ***Defendant May Act for Another to Receive Financial Gain***

“Defendant’s other proffered instructions were similarly flawed. His second alternative would not have embraced the prospect that the killing was committed with the expectation that *another* would benefit financially . . . .” (*People v.*

*Howard* (1988) 44 Cal.3d 375, 409, fn. 9 [243 Cal.Rptr. 842, 749 P.2d 279] [emphasis in original]; see also *People v. Michaels* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 486, 519 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 285, 49 P.3d 1032] [defendant killed for friend to receive insurance proceeds].)

***Financial Gain Need Not Be Cash***

“[A] murder for the purpose of avoiding a debt is a murder for financial gain . . . .” (*People v. Edelbacher* (1989) 47 Cal.3d 983, 1025 [254 Cal.Rptr. 586, 766 P.2d 1] [avoidance of child support payments]; see also *People v. Silberman* (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 1099, 1114–1115 [261 Cal.Rptr. 45] [prevent discovery of embezzlement].) “A murder for purposes of eliminating a business competitor is a murder for financial gain . . . .” (*People v. McLead* (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 906, 918 [276 Cal.Rptr. 187] [elimination of rival drug dealer].) “[I]t makes little difference whether the coin of the bargain is money or something else of value: the vice of the agreement is the same, the calculated hiring of another to commit premeditated murder.” (*People v. Padilla* (1995) 11 Cal.4th 891, 933 [47 Cal.Rptr.2d 426, 906 P.2d 388] [payment in drugs sufficient].)

***Murder for Hire: Hirer Need Not Receive Financial Gain***

[W]hen a person commits murder for hire, the one who did the hiring is guilty of the financial gain special circumstance only as an *accomplice*. (See, e.g., *People v. Bigelow, supra*, 37 Cal.3d at p. 750, fn. 11 [construing the 1978 law].) Moreover, in this case, before defendant could be found subject to the financial gain special circumstance as an accomplice, the jury was required to find that defendant had the intent to kill. (See *People v. Anderson* (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1142 [240 Cal.Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306] [“. . . section 190.2(b) lays down a special rule for a certain class of first degree murderers: if the defendant is guilty as an aider and abettor, he must be proved to have acted with intent to kill before any special circumstance (with the exception of a prior murder conviction) can be found true.”].)

(*People v. Padilla* (1995) 11 Cal.4th 891, 933 [47 Cal.Rptr.2d 426, 906 P.2d 388] [emphasis in original]; see also *People v. Bigelow* (1984) 37 Cal.3d 731, 751, fn. 11 [209 Cal.Rptr. 328, 691 P.2d 994]; *People v. Freeman* (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 337, 339 [238 Cal.Rptr. 257].)

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

3 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, § 521.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 87, *Death Penalty*, §§ 87.13[1], 87.14 (Matthew Bender).

## 721. Special Circumstances: Multiple Murder Convictions (Same Case) (Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(3))

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The defendant is charged with the special circumstance of having been convicted of more than one murder in this case [in violation of Penal Code section 190.2(a)(3)].

To prove that this special circumstance is true, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant has been convicted of at least one charge of first degree murder in this case;

AND

2. The defendant has also been convicted of at least one additional charge of either first or second degree murder in this case.
- 

*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the elements of the special circumstance. (See *People v. Williams* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 689 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573, 941 P.2d 752].) The court must submit the multiple-murder special circumstance to the jury unless the defendant has specifically waived jury trial on the special circumstance. (*People v. Marshall* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 850 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 347, 919 P.2d 1280].)

Intent to kill is not required for the actual killer but is required for an accomplice. If the evidence raises the issue of accomplice liability, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on that issue. (See *People v. Jones* (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1084, 1117 [135 Cal.Rptr.2d 370, 70 P.3d 359].) Give CALCRIM No. 702, *Special Circumstances: Intent Requirement for Accomplice After June 5, 1990—Other Than Felony Murder*. If the homicide occurred prior to June 5, 1990, give CALCRIM No. 701, *Special Circumstances: Intent Requirement for Accomplice Before June 6, 1990*.

In a case in which the prosecution seeks the death penalty, only one special circumstance of multiple murder may be alleged. (*People v. Harris* (1984) 36 Cal.3d 36, 67 [201 Cal.Rptr. 782, 679 P.2d 433]; *People v. Anderson* (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1150 [240 Cal.Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306].)

### AUTHORITY

- Special Circumstance. Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(3).
- One Special Circumstance May Be Alleged When Death Penalty Sought. *People v. Harris* (1984) 36 Cal.3d 36, 67 [201 Cal.Rptr. 782, 679 P.2d 433];

*People v. Anderson* (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1150 [240 Cal.Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306].

- Must Submit to Jury. *People v. Marshall* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 850 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 347, 919 P.2d 1280].
- Intent to Kill Not Required for Actual Killer. *People v. Anderson* (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1150 [240 Cal.Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### ***Applies to Killing of Woman and Fetus***

Application of the multiple-murder special circumstance to the killing of a woman and her unborn fetus is constitutional. (*People v. Dennis* (1998) 17 Cal.4th 468, 510 [71 Cal.Rptr.2d 680, 950 P.2d 1035].)

#### ***One Count of First Degree Murder Required***

The defendant must be convicted of one count of first degree murder for this special circumstance to apply. (*People v. Williams* (1988) 44 Cal.3d 883, 923 [245 Cal.Rptr. 336, 751 P.2d 395]; *People v. Cooper* (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 828 [281 Cal.Rptr. 90, 809 P.2d 865].) However, the additional murder or murders may be second degree. (See *People v. Miller* (1990) 50 Cal.3d 954, 995 [269 Cal.Rptr. 492, 790 P.2d 1289].)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

3 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, § 520.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 87, *Death Penalty*, § 87.13[3] (Matthew Bender).

**722. Special Circumstances: By Means of Destructive Device  
(Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(4) & (6))**

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The defendant is charged with the special circumstance of murder by use of (a/an) (bomb[,]/ [or] explosive[,]/ [or] destructive device) [in violation of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert appropriate code section[s]>].

To prove that this special circumstance is true, the People must prove that:

1. The murder was committed by using (a/an) (bomb[,]/ [or] explosive[,]/ [or] destructive device);

<Alternative 2A—device planted, Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(4)>

2. The (bomb[,]/ [or] explosive[,]/ [or] destructive device) was planted, hidden, or concealed in (a/an) (place[,]/ [or] area[,]/ [or] dwelling[,]/ [or] building[,]/ [or] structure);

<Alternative 2B—device mailed or delivered, Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(6)>

2. The defendant (mailed or delivered[,]/ [or] attempted to mail or deliver[,]/ [or] caused to be mailed or delivered) the (bomb[,]/ [or] explosive[,]/ [or] destructive device);

**AND**

3. The defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, that (his/ her) actions would create a great risk of death to one or more human beings.

[An *explosive* is any substance, or combination of substances, (1) whose main or common purpose is to detonate or rapidly combust and (2) that is capable of a relatively instantaneous or rapid release of gas and heat.]

[An *explosive* is also any substance whose main purpose is to be combined with other substances to create a new substance that can release gas and heat rapidly or relatively instantaneously.]

[\_\_\_\_\_ <insert type of explosive from Health & Saf. Code, § 12000> is an explosive.]

[A *destructive device* is \_\_\_\_\_ <insert definition supported by evidence from Pen. Code, § 16460>.]

[\_\_\_\_\_ <insert type of destructive device from Pen. Code, § 16460> is a destructive device.]

[For the purpose of this special circumstance, *delivery* of (a/an) (bomb[,]/ [or] explosive[,]/ [or] destructive device) includes throwing it.]

*New January 2006; Revised February 2012*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the elements of the special circumstance. (See *People v. Williams* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 689 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573, 941 P.2d 752].)

Intent to kill is not required for the actual killer but is required for an accomplice. If the evidence raises the issue of accomplice liability, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on that issue. (See *People v. Jones* (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1084, 1117 [135 Cal.Rptr.2d 370, 70 P.3d 359].) Give CALCRIM No. 702, *Special Circumstances: Intent Requirement for Accomplice After June 5, 1990—Other Than Felony Murder*. If the homicide occurred prior to June 5, 1990, give CALCRIM No. 701, *Special Circumstances: Intent Requirement for Accomplice Before June 6, 1990*.

In element 2, give alternative 2A, stating that the device was “planted,” if the defendant is charged with the special circumstance under Penal Code section 190.2(a)(4). Give alternative 2B, stating that the device was “mailed or delivered,” if the defendant is charged with the special circumstance under Penal Code section 190.2(a)(6).

Give the bracketed paragraphs defining “explosive” if an explosive was used. (Health & Safety Code, § 12000; *People v. Clark* (1990) 50 Cal.3d 583, 603 [268 Cal.Rptr. 399, 789 P.2d 127].) Give the bracketed definition of “destructive device,” inserting the appropriate description from Penal Code section 16460, if a device covered by that statute was used. If the case involves a specific explosive listed in Health and Safety Code section 12000 or a specific destructive device listed in Penal Code section 16460, the court may also give the bracketed sentence stating that the listed item “is an explosive” or “is a destructive device.” For example, “Dynamite is an explosive.” However, the court may not instruct the jury that the defendant used an explosive. For example, the court may not state that “the defendant used an explosive, dynamite,” or “the material used by the defendant, dynamite, is an explosive.” (*People v. Dimitrov* (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 18, 25–26 [39 Cal.Rptr.2d 257].)

Appellate courts have held that the term “bomb” is not vague and is understood in its “common, accepted, and popular sense.” (*People v. Quinn* (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 251, 258 [129 Cal.Rptr. 139]; *People v. Dimitrov, supra*, 33 Cal.App.4th at p. 25.) If the court wishes to define the term “bomb,” the court may use the following definition: “A *bomb* is a device carrying an explosive charge fused to blow up or detonate under certain conditions.” (See *People v. Morse* (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 620, 647, fn. 8 [3 Cal.Rptr.2d 343].)

Give the bracketed sentence stating that “deliver” includes throwing if the facts demonstrate the item was thrown. (*People v. Snead* (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1088, 1095 [24 Cal.Rptr.2d 922].)

**AUTHORITY**

- Special Circumstance: Planting Device. Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(4).
- Special Circumstance: Mailing or Delivering Device. Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(6).
- Explosive Defined. Health & Saf. Code, § 12000; *People v. Clark* (1990) 50 Cal.3d 583, 603 [268 Cal.Rptr. 399, 789 P.2d 127].
- Destructive Device Defined. Penal Code, § 16460.

**RELATED ISSUES*****Gasoline Not an Explosive***

“Under the statutory definition of explosive, the nature of the substance, not the manner in which a substance is used, is determinative.” (*People v. Clark* (1990) 50 Cal.3d 583, 604 [268 Cal.Rptr. 399, 789 P.2d 127] [gasoline, by its nature, not an explosive even where used to ignite a fire].)

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

3 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, § 524.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 87, *Death Penalty*, § 87.13[4], [6] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.01[2][a][ii] (Matthew Bender).



## 723. Special Circumstances: Murder to Prevent Arrest or Complete Escape (Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(5))

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The defendant is charged with the special circumstance of murder (to prevent arrest/ [or] to escape from custody) [in violation of Penal Code section 190.2(a)(5)].

To prove that this special circumstance is true, the People must prove that:

1. [The murder was committed to avoid or prevent a lawful arrest(./;)]

[OR

- 2.] [The murder was committed while completing or attempting to complete an escape from lawful custody.]

<A. *Lawful Arrest*>

[In order for a killing to be committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest, a lawful arrest must be [or appear to be] imminent.]

[Instruction 2670 explains when an officer is lawfully arresting someone.]

<B. *Escape From Custody*>

[A killing is committed *while completing or attempting to complete escape* from lawful custody if a person is killed during the escape itself or while the prisoner[s] (is/are) fleeing from the scene.

A killing is not committed *while completing or attempting to complete escape* if the prisoner[s] (has/have) actually reached a temporary place of safety before the killing.]

[*Lawful custody* includes (confinement/placement) in (county jail/prison/ the California Youth Authority/work furlough/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name or description of other detention facility, see Pen. Code, § 4532>. [A person is in lawful custody if he or she has been entrusted to the custody of an officer or other individual during a temporary release from the place of confinement.]]

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*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the elements of the special circumstance. (See *People v. Williams* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 689 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573, 941 P.2d 752].)



Intent to kill is not required for the actual killer but is required for an accomplice. If the evidence raises the issue of accomplice liability, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on that issue. (See *People v. Jones* (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1084, 1117 [135 Cal.Rptr.2d 370, 70 P.3d 359].) Give CALCRIM No. 702, *Special Circumstances: Intent Requirement for Accomplice After June 5, 1990—Other Than Felony Murder*. If the homicide occurred prior to June 5, 1990, give CALCRIM No. 701, *Special Circumstances: Intent Requirement for Accomplice Before June 6, 1990*.

Give the bracketed paragraph stating that the arrest must be “imminent” only if the evidence does not clearly establish that an arrest would have been made in the near future. (See *People v. Bigelow* (1984) 37 Cal.3d 731, 752 [209 Cal.Rptr. 328, 691 P.2d 994]; *People v. Cummings* (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1233, 1300–1301 [18 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 850 P.2d 1].) For example, it may be appropriate to instruct that the arrest must be imminent if no peace officer is present or if the decedent is not a peace officer. (See *People v. Cummings, supra*, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 1300–1301; but see *People v. Vorise* (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 312, 322 [85 Cal.Rptr.2d 12].)

If the lawfulness of the arrest is an issue, give relevant portion of CALCRIM No. 2670, *Lawful Performance: Peace Officer*, and the bracketed sentence telling the jury that CALCRIM No. 2670 explains lawful arrest.

Give the bracketed paragraphs defining “completing or attempting to complete escape” if there is an issue in the case about whether the defendant had reached a temporary place of safety prior to the killing. (See *People v. Bigelow* (1984) 37 Cal.3d 731, 754 [209 Cal.Rptr. 328, 691 P.2d 994].)

Give the bracketed paragraph explaining lawful custody if there is an issue about whether the defendant was in lawful custody. (See Pen. Code, § 4532; *People v. Diaz* (1978) 22 Cal.3d 712, 716–717 [150 Cal.Rptr. 471, 586 P.2d 952].)

### AUTHORITY

- Special Circumstance. Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(5).
- Arrest Must Be Imminent. *People v. Bigelow* (1984) 37 Cal.3d 731, 752 [209 Cal.Rptr. 328, 691 P.2d 994]; *People v. Coleman* (1989) 48 Cal.3d 112, 146 [255 Cal.Rptr. 813, 768 P.2d 32]; *People v. Cummings* (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1233, 1300–1301 [18 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 850 P.2d 1].
- Killing During Escape Must Be During Hot Pursuit. *People v. Bigelow* (1984) 37 Cal.3d 731, 754 [209 Cal.Rptr. 328, 691 P.2d 994].
- Lawful Custody. See Pen. Code, § 4532 (escape from custody); *People v. Diaz* (1978) 22 Cal.3d 712, 716–717 [150 Cal.Rptr. 471, 586 P.2d 952].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

3 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, § 522.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 87, *Death Penalty*, § 87.13[5] (Matthew Bender).

**724. Special Circumstances: Murder of Peace Officer, Federal Officer, or Firefighter (Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(7), (8) & (9))**

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The defendant is charged with the special circumstance of murder of a (peace officer/federal law enforcement officer/firefighter) [in violation of Penal Code section 190.2(a)].

To prove that this special circumstance is true, the People must prove that:

1. \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert officer's name, excluding title>* was a (peace officer/federal law enforcement officer/firefighter) [lawfully performing (his/her) duties as a (peace officer/federal law enforcement officer/firefighter)];
2. The defendant intended to kill \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert officer's name, excluding title>*;

**AND**

*<Alternative 3A—killing during performance of duties>*

- [3. When \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert officer's name, excluding title>* was killed, the defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, that \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert officer's name, excluding title>* was a (peace officer/federal law enforcement officer/firefighter) who was performing (his/her) duties.]

*<Alternative 3B—killing in retaliation>*

- [3. \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert officer's name, excluding title>* was killed in retaliation for the performance of (his/her) official duties.]

[A person who is employed as a police officer by \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of agency that employs police officer>* is a **peace officer**.]

[A person employed by \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of agency that employs peace officer, e.g., "the Department of Fish and Wildlife">* is a **peace officer** if \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert description of facts necessary to make employee a peace officer, e.g., "designated by the director of the agency as a peace officer">*.]

[The duties of (a/an) \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert title of peace officer>* include \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert job duties>*.]

[A **firefighter** includes anyone who is an officer, employee, or member of a (governmentally operated (fire department/fire protection or firefighting agency) in this state/federal fire department/federal fire protection or firefighting agency), whether or not he or she is paid for his or her services.]

<When lawful performance is an issue, give the following paragraph and Instruction 2670, Lawful Performance: Peace Officer.>

**[A peace officer is not lawfully performing his or her duties if he or she is (unlawfully arresting or detaining someone/ [or] using unreasonable or excessive force in his or her duties). Instruction 2670 explains (when an arrest or detention is unlawful/ [and] when force is unreasonable or excessive).]**

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New January 2006

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the elements of the special circumstance. (See *People v. Williams* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 689 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573, 941 P.2d 752].)

“Lawful performance” by the officer is not an element when the prosecution’s theory is that the officer was killed in retaliation for performing his or her duties but is an element when the theory is that the officer was killed while engaging in his or her duties. If the prosecution’s theory is that the killing occurred while the decedent was carrying out official duties, give the bracketed phrase “lawfully performing (his/her) duties” in element 1 and give alternative 3A. If the prosecution’s theory is that the killing was in retaliation for the officer’s performance of his or her duties, do not give the bracketed language in element 1 and give alternative 3B. The retaliation theory does not apply to the killing of a firefighter. (Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(9).)

In order to be “engaged in the performance of his or her duties,” a peace officer must be acting lawfully. (*People v. Gonzalez* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1217 [275 Cal.Rptr. 729, 800 P.2d 1159].) “[D]isputed facts bearing on the issue of legal cause must be submitted to the jury considering an engaged-in-duty element.” (*Ibid.*) If excessive force is an issue, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct the jury that the defendant is not guilty of the offense charged, or any lesser included offense in which lawful performance is an element, if the defendant used reasonable force in response to excessive force. (*People v. Olguin* (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 39, 46–47 [173 Cal.Rptr. 663].) On request, the court must instruct that the prosecution has the burden of proving the lawfulness of the arrest beyond a reasonable doubt. (*People v. Castain* (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 138, 145 [175 Cal.Rptr. 651].) If lawful performance is an issue, give the bracketed paragraph on lawful performance and the appropriate portions of CALCRIM No. 2670, *Lawful Performance: Peace Officer*.

The jury must determine whether the alleged victim is a peace officer. (*People v. Brown* (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 444–445 [250 Cal.Rptr. 604, 758 P.2d 1135].) The court may instruct the jury on the appropriate definition of “peace officer” from the statute (e.g., “a Garden Grove Regular Police Officer and a Garden Grove Reserve Police Officer are peace officers”). (*Ibid.*) However, the court may not instruct the

jury that the alleged victim was a peace officer as a matter of law (e.g., “Officer Reed was a peace officer”). (*Ibid.*) If the alleged victim is a police officer, give the bracketed sentence that begins with “A person employed as a police officer.” If the alleged victim is another type of peace officer, give the bracketed sentence that begins with “A person employed by.”

Penal Code section 190.2(a)(7) defines “peace officer” as “defined in Section 830.1, 830.2, 830.3, 830.31, 830.32, 830.33, 830.34, 830.35, 830.36, 830.37, 830.4, 830.5, 830.6, 830.10, 830.11, or 830.12.”

Penal Code section 190.2(a)(9) defines “firefighter” “as defined in Section 245.1.”

If the decedent was a federal law enforcement officer or agent, then the term “federal law enforcement officer” may need to be defined for the jury depending on the decedent’s position.

The court may give the bracketed sentence that begins, “The duties of (a/an) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert title . . .> include,” on request. The court may insert a description of the officer’s duties such as “the correct service of a facially valid search warrant.” (*People v. Gonzalez* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1222 [275 Cal.Rptr. 729, 800 P.2d 1159].)

### AUTHORITY

- Special Circumstance: Peace Officer. Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(7).
- Special Circumstance: Federal Officer. Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(8).
- Special Circumstance: Firefighter. Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(9).
- Engaged in Performance of Duties. *People v. Gonzalez* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1217 [275 Cal.Rptr. 729, 800 P.2d 1159].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Reasonable Knowledge Standard*

Application of the special circumstance to a defendant who “reasonably should have known” that the decedent was a peace officer is constitutional. (*People v. Rodriguez* (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 781–782 [230 Cal.Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113].)

[I]n appropriate cases it would be proper for the court to instruct that a defendant may not be found guilty of the special circumstance at issue here (even if he reasonably should have known his victim was a peace officer engaged in the performance of his duty) if, by reason of *non-self-induced* “diminished capacity,” defendant was *unable actually to know* the status of his victim.

(*Id.* at p. 781, fn. 18 [emphasis in original].)

Such an instruction is not warranted in a case where the defendant is voluntarily intoxicated or has otherwise “self-induced diminished capacity.” (*People v. Brown* (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 445, fn. 7 [250 Cal.Rptr. 604, 758 P.2d 1135].)

See the Related Issues section to CALCRIM No. 2670, *Lawful Performance: Peace Officer*.

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

3 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, §§ 538–539.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 87, *Death Penalty*, §§ 87.13[7], [8], [9], 87.14 (Matthew Bender).

## 725. Special Circumstances: Murder of Witness (Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(10))

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The defendant is charged with the special circumstance of murder of a witness [in violation of Penal Code section 190.2(a)(10)].

To prove that this special circumstance is true, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant intended to kill \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of decedent>;
2. \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of decedent> was a witness to a crime;
3. The killing was not committed during the commission [or attempted commission] of the crime to which \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of decedent> was a witness;

AND

4. The defendant intended that \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of decedent> be killed (to prevent (him/her) from testifying in a (criminal/ [or] juvenile) proceeding/ [or] in retaliation for (his/her) testimony in a (criminal/ [or] juvenile) proceeding).

[A killing is committed during the commission [or attempted commission] of a crime if the killing and the crime are part of one continuous transaction. The continuous transaction may occur over a period of time or in more than one location.]

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2013*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the elements of the special circumstance. (See *People v. Williams* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 689 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573, 941 P.2d 752].)

The last bracketed paragraph should be given if there is evidence that the killing and the crime witnessed were part of one continuous transaction. The court may choose to give further instruction on one continuous transaction on request. (See *People v. Silva* (1988) 45 Cal.3d 604, 631 [247 Cal.Rptr. 573, 754 P.2d 1070].)

### AUTHORITY

- Special Circumstance. Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(10).
- Continuous Transaction. *People v. Clark* (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 1015–1016 [131 Cal.Rptr.3d 225, 261 P.3d 243]; *People v. Silva* (1988) 45 Cal.3d 604, 631

[247 Cal.Rptr. 573, 754 P.2d 1070]; *People v. Beardslee* (1991) 53 Cal.3d 68, 95 [279 Cal.Rptr. 276, 806 P.2d 1311].

## RELATED ISSUES

### ***Purpose of Killing***

In order for this special circumstance to apply, the defendant must kill the witness for the purpose of preventing him or her from testifying or in retaliation for his or her testimony. (*People v. Stanley* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 800 [42 Cal.Rptr.2d 543, 897 P.2d 481].) However, this does not have to be the sole or predominant purpose of the killing. (*Ibid.*; *People v. Sanders* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 471, 519 [273 Cal.Rptr. 537, 797 P.2d 561].)

### ***Victim Does Not Have to Be An Eyewitness or Important Witness***

“[N]othing in the language of the applicable special circumstance or in our decisions applying this special circumstance supports the suggestion that the special circumstance is confined to the killing of an ‘eyewitness,’ as opposed to any other witness who might testify in a criminal proceeding.” (*People v. Jones* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 535, 550 [54 Cal.Rptr.2d 42, 917 P.2d 1165].) “It is no defense to the special circumstance allegation that the victim was not an important witness in the criminal proceeding, so long as one of the defendant’s purposes was to prevent the witness from testifying.” (*People v. Jenkins* (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 1018 [95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044]; see also *People v. Bolter* (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 240, 242–243 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 760] [special circumstance applied to retaliation for testifying where witness’s actual testimony was “innocuous”].)

### ***Defendant Must Believe Victim Will Be Witness***

“[S]ection 190.2, subd. (a)(10) is applicable if defendant *believes* the victim will be a witness in a criminal prosecution, whether or not such a proceeding is pending or about to be initiated.” (*People v. Jenkins* (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 1018 [95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377] [emphasis in original]; see also *People v. Weidert* (1985) 39 Cal.3d 836, 853 [218 Cal.Rptr. 57, 705 P.2d 380] [abrogated by statutory amendment]; *People v. Sanders* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 471, 518 [273 Cal.Rptr. 537, 797 P.2d 561].)

### ***“Continuous Transaction” in Context of Witness Special Circumstance***

“[T]o establish one continuous criminal transaction, the time-lag between the first and second killing does not matter so much as whether the defendant shows a common criminal intent toward all the victims upon the initiation of the first criminal act. When that criminal intent toward all victims is present, the criminal transaction does not conclude until the killing of the final victim.” (*People v. San Nicolas* (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614, 655 [21 Cal.Rptr.3d 612, 101 P.3d 509].)

## SECONDARY SOURCES

3 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, § 540.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 87, *Death Penalty*, §§ 87.13[10], 87.14 (Matthew Bender).



**726. Special Circumstances: Murder of Judge, Prosecutor,  
Government Official, or Juror (Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(11), (12), (13)  
& (20))**

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The defendant is charged with the special circumstance of murder of a (prosecutor/judge/government official/juror) [in violation of Penal Code section 190.2(a)].

To prove that this special circumstance is true, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant intended to kill \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of decedent>;
2. \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of decedent> was a (prosecutor/judge/government official/juror in \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name or description of local, state, or federal court of record in this or another state>);

**AND**

3. The defendant intended that \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of decedent> be killed (to prevent (him/her) from performing (his/her) official duties as a (prosecutor/judge/government official/juror)/ [or] in retaliation for \_\_\_\_\_'s <insert name[s] of decedent[s]> performance of (his/her) official duties as a (prosecutor/judge/government official/juror)).

[(A/An) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert title of government official's position> is an (elected/appointed) government official.]

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*New January 2006*

**BENCH NOTES**

***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the elements of the special circumstance. (See *People v. Williams* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 689 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573, 941 P.2d 752].)

The jury must determine whether the decedent is a prosecutor, judge, juror, or government official. (*People v. Brown* (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 444–445 [250 Cal.Rptr. 604, 758 P.2d 1135].) The court may instruct the jury on the appropriate definition of “government official” (e.g., “a Garden Grove Regular Police Officer and a Garden Grove Reserve Police Officer are government officials”). (*Ibid.*) However, the court may not instruct the jury that the decedent was a government official as a matter of law (e.g., “Officer Reed was a government official”). (*Ibid.*)



**AUTHORITY**

- Special Circumstance: Prosecutor. Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(11).
- Special Circumstance: Judge. Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(12).
- Special Circumstance: Government Official. Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(13).
- Special Circumstance: Juror. Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(20).

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

3 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, § 541.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 87, *Death Penalty*, §§ 87.13[11], [12], [13], [20], 87.14 (Matthew Bender).

**727. Special Circumstances: Lying in Wait—Before March 8, 2000  
(Former Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(15))**

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The defendant is charged with the special circumstance of murder committed while lying in wait [in violation of former Penal Code section 190.2(a)(15)].

To prove that this special circumstance is true, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant intentionally killed \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of decedent>;

**AND**

2. The defendant committed the murder while lying in wait.

A person commits murder while lying in wait if:

1. He or she concealed his or her purpose from the person killed;
2. He or she waited and watched for an opportunity to act;
3. Immediately after watching and waiting, he or she made a surprise attack on the person killed from a position of advantage;

**AND**

4. He or she intended to kill the person by taking the person by surprise.

The lying in wait does not need to continue for any particular period of time, but its duration must be substantial and must show a state of mind equivalent to deliberation and premeditation.

The defendant acted *deliberately* if (he/she) carefully weighed the considerations for and against (his/her) choice and, knowing the consequences, decided to kill. The defendant acted with *premeditation* if (he/she) decided to kill before committing the act that caused death.

In order for a murder to be committed while lying in wait, the attack must immediately follow the period of watching and waiting. The lethal acts must begin at and flow continuously from the moment the concealment and watchful waiting ends. If there is a detectable interval between the period of watching and waiting and the period during which the killing takes place, then the murder is not committed while lying in wait. If you have a reasonable doubt whether the murder was committed while lying in wait, you must find this special circumstance has not been proved.

[A person can conceal his or her purpose even if the person killed is

aware of the other person’s physical presence.]

[The concealment can be accomplished by ambush or some other secret plan.]

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*New January 2006*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the elements of the special circumstance. (See *People v. Williams* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 689 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573, 941 P.2d 752].)

Prior to March 8, 2000, the lying in wait special circumstance required that the murder be committed “while” lying in wait. Effective March 8, 2000, the special circumstance was amended to require that the murder be committed “by means of” lying in wait. Use this instruction only for homicides alleged to have occurred prior to March 8, 2000. (See *Domino v. Superior Court* (1982) 129 Cal.App.3d 1000, 1007 [181 Cal.Rptr. 486] [“while lying in wait” distinguished from “by means of lying in wait”]; *People v. Morales* (1989) 48 Cal.3d 527, 558 [257 Cal.Rptr. 64, 770 P.2d 244].)

For cases after March 8, 2000, use CALCRIM No. 728, *Special Circumstances: Lying in Wait—After March 7, 2000, Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(15)*. (*People v. Michaels* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 486, 516–517 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 285, 49 P.3d 1032] [noting amendment to statute].)

Give the bracketed paragraph stating that physical concealment is not required if the evidence shows that the decedent was aware of the defendant’s presence. (*People v. Morales* (1989) 48 Cal.3d 527, 554–556 [257 Cal.Rptr. 64, 770 P.2d 244].) Give the bracketed paragraph stating that concealment may be accomplished by ambush if the evidence shows an attack from a hidden position.

## AUTHORITY

- Special Circumstance. Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(15) (before March 8, 2000).
- While Lying in Wait. *Domino v. Superior Court* (1982) 129 Cal.App.3d 1000, 1007 [181 Cal.Rptr. 486]; *People v. Morales* (1989) 48 Cal.3d 527, 558 [257 Cal.Rptr. 64, 770 P.2d 244]; *People v. Michaels* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 486, 516–517 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 285, 49 P.3d 1032].
- Physical Concealment Not Required. *People v. Morales* (1989) 48 Cal.3d 527, 554–556 [257 Cal.Rptr. 64, 770 P.2d 244].

## RELATED ISSUES

### *Dual Purpose*

“[I]f a person lies in wait intending first to rape and second to kill, then immediately proceeds to carry out that intent (or attempts to rape, then kills), the elements of the

lying-in-wait special circumstance are met.” (*People v. Carpenter* (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 389 [63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708].)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

3 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, §§ 525–526.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 87, *Death Penalty*, §§ 87.13[15][a], 87.14 (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.01[2][a][iv] (Matthew Bender).

**728. Special Circumstances: Lying in Wait—After March 7, 2000  
(Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(15))**

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The defendant is charged with the special circumstance of murder committed by means of lying in wait [in violation of Penal Code section 190.2(a)(15)].

To prove that this special circumstance is true, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant intentionally killed \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of decedent>;

**AND**

2. The defendant committed the murder by means of lying in wait.

A person commits a murder by means of lying in wait if:

1. He or she concealed his or her purpose from the person killed;
2. He or she waited and watched for an opportunity to act;
3. Then he or she made a surprise attack on the person killed from a position of advantage;

**AND**

4. He or she intended to kill the person by taking the person by surprise.

The lying in wait does not need to continue for any particular period of time, but its duration must be substantial and must show a state of mind equivalent to deliberation or premeditation.

The defendant acted *deliberately* if (he/she) carefully weighed the considerations for and against (his/her) choice and, knowing the consequences, decided to kill. The defendant acted with *premeditation* if (he/she) decided to kill before committing the act that caused death.

[A person can conceal his or her purpose even if the person killed is aware of the other person's physical presence.]

[The concealment can be accomplished by ambush or some other secret plan.]

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*New January 2006*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the elements of the special circumstance. (See *People v. Williams* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 689 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573, 941 P.2d 752].)

Effective March 8, 2000, the special circumstance was amended to require that the murder be committed “by means of” lying in wait rather than “while” lying in wait. (*People v. Michaels* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 486, 516–517 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 285, 49 P.3d 1032] [noting amendment to statute]; *People v. Superior Court (Bradway)* (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 297, 309 [129 Cal.Rptr.2d 324] [holding amended statute is not unconstitutionally vague].) Use this instruction for cases in which the alleged homicide occurred on or after March 8, 2000.

Give the bracketed paragraph stating that physical concealment is not required if the evidence shows that the decedent was aware of the defendant’s presence. (*People v. Morales* (1989) 48 Cal.3d 527, 554–556 [257 Cal.Rptr. 64, 770 P.2d 244].) Give the bracketed paragraph stating that concealment may be accomplished by ambush if the evidence shows an attack from a hidden position.

## AUTHORITY

- Special Circumstance. Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(15).
- Amended Statute Not Unconstitutionally Vague. *People v. Superior Court of San Diego County (Bradway)* (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 297, 309 [129 Cal.Rptr.2d 324].
- Physical Concealment Not Required. *People v. Morales* (1989) 48 Cal.3d 527, 554–556 [257 Cal.Rptr. 64, 770 P.2d 244].
- Definition of Lying in Wait. *People v. Poindexter* (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 572, 582–585 [50 Cal.Rptr.3d 489].

## RELATED ISSUES

### *Dual Purpose*

“[I]f a person lies in wait intending first to rape and second to kill, then immediately proceeds to carry out that intent (or attempts to rape, then kills), the elements of the lying-in-wait special circumstance are met.” (*People v. Carpenter* (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 389 [63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708].)

## SECONDARY SOURCES

3 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, §§ 525–526.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 87, *Death Penalty*, §§ 87.13[15][b], 87.14 (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.01[2][a][iv] (Matthew Bender).

## 729. Special Circumstances: Murder Because of Race, Religion, or Nationality (Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(16))

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The defendant is charged with the special circumstance of murder committed because of the deceased's (race[,]/ color[,]/ religion[,]/ nationality[,]/ [or] country of origin) [in violation of Penal Code section 190.2(a)(16)].

To prove that this special circumstance is true, the People must prove that the defendant intended to kill because of the deceased person's (race[,]/ color[,]/ religion[,]/ nationality[,]/ [or] country of origin).

[If the defendant had more than one reason to (commit[,]/ participate in[,]/ [or] aid and abet) the murder, the deceased person's (race[,]/ color[,]/ religion[,]/ nationality[,]/ [or] country of origin) must have been a substantial factor motivating the defendant's conduct. A *substantial factor* is more than a trivial or remote factor, but it does not need to be the only factor that motivated the defendant.]

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*New January 2006; Revised March 2017*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the elements of the special circumstance. (See *People v. Williams* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 689 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573, 941 P.2d 752].)

Give the bracketed paragraph if there is evidence that the defendant had more than one reason to commit the murder. (*In re M.S.* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 698, 719–720 [42 Cal.Rptr.2d 355, 896 P.2d 1365].)

**Do not** give CALCRIM No. 370, *Motive*, with this instruction because motive is an element of this special circumstance. (See *People v. Valenti* (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1140, 1165 [197 Cal.Rptr.3d 317]; *People v. Maurer* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1121, 1126–1127 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 335].)

### AUTHORITY

- Special Circumstance. Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(16).
- Special Circumstance Constitutional. *People v. Sassounian* (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 361, 413 [226 Cal.Rptr. 880]; *People v. Talamantez* (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 443, 469 [215 Cal.Rptr. 542].
- “Because of” Defined. Pen. Code, § 190.03(c); *People v. Superior Court (Aishman)* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 735, 741 [42 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 896 P.2d 1387]; *In re M.S.* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 698, 719–720 [42 Cal.Rptr.2d 355, 896 P.2d 1365].

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

3 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, § 531.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 87, *Death Penalty*, §§ 87.13[16], 87.14 (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.01[4][a][ii] (Matthew Bender).



### 730. Special Circumstances: Murder in Commission of Felony (Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(17))

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The defendant is charged with the special circumstance of murder committed while engaged in the commission of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert felony or felonies from Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(17)>* [in violation of Penal Code section 190.2(a)(17)].

To prove that this special circumstance is true, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant (committed [or attempted to commit][,]/ [or] aided and abetted[,]/ [or] was a member of a conspiracy to commit) \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert felony or felonies from Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(17)>*;
2. The defendant (intended to commit[,]/ [or] intended to aid and abet the perpetrator in committing[,]/ [or] intended that one or more of the members of the conspiracy commit) \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert felony or felonies from Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(17)>*;

*<Give element 3 if defendant did not personally commit or attempt felony.>*

3. If the defendant did not personally commit [or attempt to commit] \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert felony or felonies from Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(17)>*, then a perpetrator, (whom the defendant was aiding and abetting before or during the killing/ [or] with whom the defendant conspired), personally committed [or attempted to commit] \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert felony or felonies from Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(17)>*;

**AND**

- (3/4). (The defendant/ \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name or description of person causing death if not defendant>*) did an act that caused the death of another person.

To decide whether (the defendant/ [and] the perpetrator) committed [or attempted to commit] \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert felony or felonies from Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(17)>*, please refer to the separate instructions that I (will give/have given) you on (that/those) crime[s]. [To decide whether the defendant aided and abetted a crime, please refer to the separate instructions that I (will give/have given) you on aiding and abetting.] [To decide whether the defendant was a member of a conspiracy to commit a crime, please refer to the separate instructions that I (will give/have given) you on conspiracy.] You must apply those instructions when you decide whether the People have proved this special circumstance.

*<Make certain that all appropriate instructions on all underlying felonies, aiding and abetting, and conspiracy are given.>*

**[The defendant must have (intended to commit[,]/ [or] aided and abetted/ [or] been a member of a conspiracy to commit) the (felony/ felonies) of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert felony or felonies from Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(17)> before or at the time of the act causing the death.]**

**[In addition, in order for this special circumstance to be true, the People must prove that the defendant intended to commit \_\_\_\_\_ <insert felony or felonies from Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(17)> independent of the killing. If you find that the defendant only intended to commit murder and the commission of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert felony or felonies from Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(17)> was merely part of or incidental to the commission of that murder, then the special circumstance has not been proved.]**

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2006, April 2008, August 2013, March 2021*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the elements of the special circumstance. (See *People v. Williams* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 689 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573, 941 P.2d 752].) The court also has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the elements of any felonies alleged. (*People v. Cain* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 36 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 481, 892 P.2d 1224].)

If the evidence raises the potential for accomplice liability, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on that issue. Give CALCRIM No. 703, *Special Circumstances: Intent Requirement for Accomplice After June 5, 1990—Felony Murder, Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(17)*. If the homicide occurred on or before June 5, 1990, give CALCRIM No. 701, *Special Circumstances: Intent Requirement for Accomplice Before June 6, 1990*.

If the facts raise an issue whether the homicidal act caused the death, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give CALCRIM No. 240, *Causation*.

If the prosecution’s theory is that the defendant committed or attempted to commit the underlying felony, then select “committed [or attempted to commit]” in element 1 and “intended to commit” in element 2. In addition, in the paragraph that begins with “To decide whether,” select “the defendant” in the first sentence. Give all appropriate instructions on any underlying felonies.

If the prosecution’s theory is that the defendant aided and abetted or conspired to commit the felony, select one or both of these options in element 1 and the corresponding intent requirement in element 2. Give bracketed element 3. In addition, in the paragraph that begins with “To decide whether,” select “the perpetrator” in the first sentence. Give the second and/or third bracketed sentences. Give all appropriate instructions on any underlying felonies and on aiding and

abetting and/or conspiracy with this instruction.

If there is evidence that the defendant did not form the intent to commit the felony until after the homicide, the defendant is entitled on request to an instruction pinpointing this issue. (*People v. Hudson* (1955) 45 Cal.2d 121, 124–127 [287 P.2d 497]; *People v. Silva* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 345, 371 [106 Cal.Rptr.2d 93, 21 P.3d 769].) Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “The defendant must have (intended to commit.” For an instruction specially tailored to robbery-murder cases, see *People v. Turner* (1990) 50 Cal.3d 668, 691 [268 Cal.Rptr. 706, 789 P.2d 887].

In addition, the court must give the final bracketed paragraph stating that the felony must be independent of the murder if the evidence supports a reasonable inference that the felony was committed merely to facilitate the murder. (*People v. Green* (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 61 [164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468]; *People v. Clark* (1990) 50 Cal.3d 583, 609 [268 Cal.Rptr. 399, 789 P.2d 127]; *People v. Kimble* (1988) 44 Cal.3d 480, 501 [244 Cal.Rptr. 148, 749 P.2d 803]; *People v. Navarette* (2003) 30 Cal.4th 458, 505 [133 Cal.Rptr.2d 89, 66 P.3d 1182].)

Proposition 115 added Penal Code section 190.41, eliminating the corpus delicti rule for the felony-murder special circumstance. (Pen. Code, § 190.41; *Tapia v. Superior Court* (1991) 53 Cal.3d 282, 298 [279 Cal.Rptr. 592, 807 P.2d 434].) If, however, the alleged homicide predates the effective date of the statute (June 6, 1990), then the court must modify this instruction to require proof of the corpus delicti of the underlying felony independent of the defendant’s extrajudicial statements. (*Tapia v. Superior Court, supra*, 53 Cal.3d at p. 298.)

If the alleged homicide occurred between 1983 and 1987 (the window of time between *Carlos v. Superior Court* (1983) 35 Cal.3d 131, 135 [197 Cal.Rptr. 79, 672 P.2d 862] and *People v. Anderson* (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1147 [240 Cal.Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306]), then the prosecution must also prove intent to kill on the part of the actual killer. (*People v. Bolden* (2002) 29 Cal.4th 515, 560 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 802, 58 P.3d 931]; *People v. Mendoza* (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 182 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 485, 6 P.3d 150].) The court should then modify this instruction to specify intent to kill as an element.

## AUTHORITY

- Special Circumstance. Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(17).
- Specific Intent to Commit Felony Required. *People v. Valdez* (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 105 [8 Cal.Rptr.3d 271, 82 P.3d 296].
- Provocative Act Murder. *People v. Briscoe* (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 568, 596 [112 Cal.Rptr.2d 401] [citing *People v. Kainzrants* (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1081 [53 Cal.Rptr.2d 207]].
- Concurrent Intent. *People v. Mendoza* (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 183 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 485, 6 P.3d 150]; *People v. Clark* (1990) 50 Cal.3d 583, 608–609 [268 Cal.Rptr. 399, 789 P.2d 127].
- Felony Cannot Be Incidental to Murder. *People v. Green* (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 61 [164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468], disapproved on other grounds in *People v.*

*Hall* (1986) 41 Cal.3d 826, 834 fn. 3 [226 Cal.Rptr. 112, 718 P.2d 99]; *People v. Mendoza* (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 182 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 485, 6 P.3d 150].

- Instruction on Felony as Incidental to Murder. *People v. Kimble* (1988) 44 Cal.3d 480, 501 [244 Cal.Rptr. 148, 749 P.2d 803]; *People v. Clark* (1990) 50 Cal.3d 583, 609 [268 Cal.Rptr. 399, 789 P.2d 127]; *People v. Navarette* (2003) 30 Cal.4th 458, 505 [133 Cal.Rptr.2d 89, 66 P.3d 1182].
- Proposition 115 Amendments to Special Circumstance. *Tapia v. Superior Court* (1991) 53 Cal.3d 282, 298 [279 Cal.Rptr. 592, 807 P.2d 434].
- Meaning of “Actual Killer.” *People v. Garcia* (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 123, 149–155 [259 Cal.Rptr.3d 600].

## RELATED ISSUES

### *Applies to Felony Murder and Provocative Act Murder*

“The fact that the defendant is convicted of murder under the application of the provocative act murder doctrine rather than pursuant to the felony-murder doctrine is irrelevant to the question of whether the murder qualified as a special-circumstances murder under former section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17). The statute requires only that the murder be committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of an enumerated felony.” (*People v. Briscoe* (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 568, 596 [112 Cal.Rptr.2d 401] [citing *People v. Kainzrants* (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1081 [53 Cal.Rptr.2d 207]].)

### *Concurrent Intent to Kill and Commit Felony*

“Concurrent intent to kill and to commit an independent felony will support a felony-murder special circumstance.” (*People v. Mendoza* (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 183 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 485, 6 P.3d 150]; *People v. Clark* (1990) 50 Cal.3d 583, 608–609 [268 Cal.Rptr. 399, 789 P.2d 127].)

### *Multiple Special Circumstances May Be Alleged*

The defendant may be charged with multiple felony-related special circumstances based on multiple felonies committed against one victim or multiple victims of one felony. (*People v. Holt* (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 682 [63 Cal.Rptr.2d 782, 937 P.2d 213]; *People v. Andrews* (1989) 49 Cal.3d 200, 225–226 [260 Cal.Rptr. 583, 776 P.2d 285].)

### *Actual Killer vs. Aider and Abettor*

The meaning of actual killer is literal. It is not enough that the defendant’s act formed part of a series of events that resulted in the death, if the act itself would not cause death. (*People v. Garcia* (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 123, 149–155 [259 Cal.Rptr.3d 600].)

## SECONDARY SOURCES

3 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, §§ 532–534, 536.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 87, *Death Penalty*, § 87.13[17] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.01[2][b] (Matthew Bender).

**731. Special Circumstances: Murder in Commission of  
Felony—Kidnapping With Intent to Kill After March 8, 2000 (Pen.  
Code, § 190.2(a)(17))**

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The defendant is charged with the special circumstance of intentional murder while engaged in the commission of kidnapping [in violation of Penal Code section 190.2(a)(17)].

To prove that this special circumstance is true, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant (committed [or attempted to commit][,]/ [or] aided and abetted[,]/ [or] was a member of a conspiracy to commit) kidnapping;
2. The defendant (intended to commit[,]/ [or] intended to aid and abet the perpetrator in committing[,]/ [or] intended that one or more of the members of the conspiracy commit) kidnapping;

*<Give element 3 if defendant did not personally commit or attempt kidnapping.>*

- [3. If the defendant did not personally commit [or attempt to commit] kidnapping, then another perpetrator, (whom the defendant was aiding and abetting/ [or] with whom the defendant conspired), personally committed [or attempted to commit] kidnapping;]

- (3/4). (The defendant/\_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name or description of person causing death if not defendant>*) did an act that was a substantial factor in causing the death of another person;

**AND**

- (4/5). The defendant intended that the other person be killed.

To decide whether (the defendant/ [and] the perpetrator) committed [or attempted to commit] kidnapping, please refer to the separate instructions that I (will give/have given) you on that crime. [To decide whether the defendant aided and abetted the crime, please refer to the separate instructions that I (will give/have given) you on aiding and abetting.] [To decide whether the defendant was a member of a conspiracy to commit the crime, please refer to the separate instructions that I (will give/have given) you on conspiracy.] You must apply those instructions when you decide whether the People have proved this special circumstance.

*<Make certain that all appropriate instructions on underlying kidnapping, aiding and abetting, and conspiracy are given.>*

**An act causes death if the death is the direct, natural, and probable consequence of the act and the death would not have happened without the act. A *natural and probable consequence* is one that a reasonable person would know is likely to happen if nothing unusual intervenes. In deciding whether a consequence is natural and probable, consider all the circumstances established by the evidence.**

**There may be more than one cause of death. An act causes death only if it is a *substantial factor* in causing the death. A substantial factor is more than a trivial or remote factor. However, it does not need to be the only factor that causes the death.**

**[If all the listed elements are proved, you may find this special circumstance true even if the defendant intended solely to commit murder and the commission of kidnapping was merely part of or incidental to the commission of that murder.]**

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2013, August 2016*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the elements of the special circumstance. (See *People v. Williams* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 689 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573, 941 P.2d 752].) The court also has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the elements of the kidnapping alleged. (*People v. Cain* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 36 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 481, 892 P.2d 1224].)

**Do not** give CALCRIM No. 703, *Special Circumstances: Intent requirement for Accomplice After June 5, 1990*, together with this instruction. See *People v. Odum* (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 237, 256–257 [197 Cal.Rptr.3d 774].

Subparagraph (M) of Penal Code section 190.2(a)(17) eliminates the application of *People v. Green* (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 61 [164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468], to intentional murders during the commission of kidnapping or arson of an inhabited structure. The statute may only be applied to alleged homicides after the effective date, March 8, 2000. This instruction may be given alone or with CALCRIM No. 730, *Special Circumstances: Murder in Commission of Felony, Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(17)*.

For the standard felony-murder special circumstance, it is not necessary for the actual killer to intend to kill. (Pen. Code, § 190.2(b).) However, an accomplice who is not the actual killer must either act with intent to kill or be a major participant and act with reckless indifference to human life. (Pen. Code, § 190.2(d).)

Subparagraph (M) of Penal Code section 190.2(a)(17) does not specify whether the defendant must personally intend to kill or whether accomplice liability may be based on an actual killer who intended to kill even if the defendant did not. (See Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(17)(M).) This instruction has been drafted to require that the



defendant intend to kill, whether the defendant is an accomplice or the actual killer. If the evidence raises the potential for accomplice liability and the court concludes that the accomplice need not personally intend to kill, then the court must modify element 5 to state that the person who caused the death intended to kill. In such cases, the court also has a **suu sponte** duty give CALCRIM No. 703, *Special Circumstances: Intent Requirement for Accomplice After June 5, 1990—Felony Murder*, Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(17).

If the facts raise an issue whether the homicidal act caused the death, the court has a **suu sponte** duty to give CALCRIM No. 240, *Causation*.

If the prosecution’s theory is that the defendant committed or attempted to commit kidnapping, then select “committed [or attempted to commit]” in element 1 and “intended to commit” in element 2. In addition, in the paragraph that begins with “To decide whether,” select “the defendant” in the first sentence. Give all appropriate instructions on kidnapping.

If the prosecution’s theory is that the defendant aided and abetted or conspired to commit kidnapping, select one or both of these options in element 1 and the corresponding intent requirement in element 2. Give bracketed element 3. In addition, in the paragraph that begins with “To decide whether,” select “the perpetrator” in the first sentence. Give the second and/or third bracketed sentences. Give all appropriate instructions on kidnapping and on aiding and abetting and/or conspiracy with this instruction.

When giving this instruction with CALCRIM No. 730, give the final bracketed paragraph.

### ***Related Instructions***

CALCRIM No. 1200, *Kidnapping: For Child Molestation*.

CALCRIM No. 1201, *Kidnapping: Child or Person Incapable of Consent*.

CALCRIM No. 1202, *Kidnapping: For Ransom, Reward, or Extortion*.

CALCRIM No. 1203, *Kidnapping: For Robbery, Rape, or Other Sex Offenses*.

CALCRIM No. 1204, *Kidnapping During Carjacking*.

CALCRIM No. 1215, *Kidnapping*.

## **AUTHORITY**

- Special Circumstance. Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(17)(B), (H) & (M).

## **SECONDARY SOURCES**

3 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, §§ 532–533.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 87, *Death Penalty*, §§ 87.13[17], 87.14 (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, §§ 142.01[2][b], 142.14[3] (Matthew Bender).



**732. Special Circumstances: Murder in Commission of  
Felony—Arson With Intent to Kill (Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(17))**

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The defendant is charged with the special circumstance of intentional murder while engaged in the commission of arson that burned an (inhabited structure/[or] inhabited property) [in violation of Penal Code section 190.2(a)(17)].

To prove that this special circumstance is true, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant (committed [or attempted to commit][,]/ [or] aided and abetted[,]/ [or] was a member of a conspiracy to commit) arson that burned an (inhabited structure/[or] inhabited property);
2. The defendant (intended to commit[,]/ [or] intended to aid and abet the perpetrator in committing[,]/ [or] intended that one or more of the members of the conspiracy commit) arson that burned an (inhabited structure/[or] inhabited property);

*<Give element 3 if defendant did not personally commit or attempt arson.>*

- [3. If the defendant did not personally commit [or attempt to commit] arson, then another perpetrator, (whom the defendant was aiding and abetting/ [or] with whom the defendant conspired), personally committed [or attempted to commit] arson that burned an (inhabited structure/[or] inhabited property);]
- (3/4). The commission [or attempted commission] of the arson was a substantial factor in causing the death of another person;

**AND**

- (4/5). The defendant intended that the other person be killed.

To decide whether (the defendant/ [and] the perpetrator) committed [or attempted to commit] arson that burned an (inhabited structure/[or] inhabited property), please refer to the separate instructions that I (will give/have given) you on that crime. [To decide whether the defendant aided and abetted the crime, please refer to the separate instructions that I (will give/have given) you on aiding and abetting.] [To decide whether the defendant was a member of a conspiracy to commit the crime, please refer to the separate instructions that I (will give/have given) you on conspiracy.] You must apply those instructions when you decide whether the People have proved this special circumstance.

*<Make certain that all appropriate instructions on underlying arson, aiding*

*and abetting, and conspiracy are given.>*

**An act causes death if the death is the direct, natural, and probable consequence of the act and the death would not have happened without the act. A *natural and probable consequence* is one that a reasonable person would know is likely to happen if nothing unusual intervenes. In deciding whether a consequence is natural and probable, consider all the circumstances established by the evidence.**

**There may be more than one cause of death. An act causes death only if it is a *substantial factor* in causing the death. A substantial factor is more than a trivial or remote factor. However, it does not need to be the only factor that causes the death.**

**[If all the listed elements are proved, you may find this special circumstance true even if the defendant intended solely to commit murder and the commission of arson was merely part of or incidental to the commission of that murder.]**

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2013, August 2016, September 2019*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the elements of the special circumstance. (See *People v. Williams* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 689 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573, 941 P.2d 752].) The court also has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the elements of the arson alleged. (*People v. Cain* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 36 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 481, 892 P.2d 1224].)

**Do not** give CALCRIM No. 703, *Special Circumstances: Intent requirement for Accomplice After June 5, 1990*, together with this instruction. See *People v. Odom* (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 237, 256–257 [197 Cal.Rptr.3d 774].

Subparagraph (M) of Penal Code section 190.2(a)(17) eliminates the application of *People v. Green* (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 61 [164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468], to intentional murders during the commission of kidnapping or arson of an inhabited structure. The statute may only be applied to alleged homicides after the effective date, March 8, 2000. This instruction may be given alone or with CALCRIM No. 730, *Special Circumstances: Murder in Commission of Felony, Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(17)*.

For the standard felony-murder special circumstance, it is not necessary for the actual killer to intend to kill. (Pen. Code, § 190.2(b).) However, an accomplice who is not the actual killer must either act with intent to kill or be a major participant and act with reckless indifference to human life. (Pen. Code, § 190.2(d).)

Subparagraph (M) of Penal Code section 190.2(a)(17) does not specify whether the defendant must personally intend to kill or whether accomplice liability may be based on an actual killer who intended to kill even if the defendant did not. (See

Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(17)(M).) This instruction has been drafted to require that the defendant intend to kill, whether the defendant is an accomplice or the actual killer. If the evidence raises the potential for accomplice liability and the court concludes that the accomplice need not personally intend to kill, then the court must modify element 5 to state that the person who caused the death intended to kill. In such cases, the court also has a **sua sponte** duty give CALCRIM No. 703, *Special Circumstances: Intent Requirement for Accomplice After June 5, 1990—Felony Murder*, Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(17).

If causation is at issue, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on proximate cause. (*People v. Bernhardt* (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 567, 590–591 [35 Cal.Rptr. 401]; *People v. Cervantes* (2001) 26 Cal.4th 860, 865–874 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 148, 29 P.3d 225].) Because causation is likely to be an issue in any case where this instruction is given, the committee has included the paragraph that begins with “An act causes death if.” If there is evidence of multiple potential causes, the court should also give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “There may be more than one cause of death.” (*People v. Sanchez* (2001) 26 Cal.4th 834, 845–849 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 129, 29 P.3d 209]; *People v. Autry* (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 363 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 135].)

If the prosecution’s theory is that the defendant committed or attempted to commit arson, then select “committed [or attempted to commit]” in element 1 and “intended to commit” in element 2. In addition, in the paragraph that begins with “To decide whether,” select “the defendant” in the first sentence. Give all appropriate instructions on arson.

If the prosecution’s theory is that the defendant aided and abetted or conspired to commit arson, select one or both of these options in element 1 and the corresponding intent requirement in element 2. Give bracketed element 3. In addition, in the paragraph that begins with “To decide whether,” select “the perpetrator” in the first sentence. Give the second and/or third bracketed sentences. Give all appropriate instructions on arson and on aiding and abetting and/or conspiracy with this instruction.

When giving this instruction with CALCRIM No. 730, give the final bracketed paragraph.

### ***Related Instructions***

CALCRIM No. 1502, *Arson: Inhabited Structure or Property*.

## **AUTHORITY**

- Special Circumstance. Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(17) (H) & (M).

## **SECONDARY SOURCES**

3 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, §§ 532–533.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 87, *Death Penalty*, §§ 87.13[17], 87.14 (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.01[2][b] (Matthew Bender).

### 733. Special Circumstances: Murder With Torture (Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(18))

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The defendant is charged with the special circumstance of murder involving the infliction of torture [in violation of Penal Code section 190.2(a)(18)].

To prove that this special circumstance is true, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant intended to kill \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of decedent>;
2. The defendant also intended to inflict extreme physical pain and suffering on \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of decedent> while that person was still alive;
3. The defendant intended to inflict such pain and suffering on \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of decedent> for the calculated purpose of revenge, extortion, persuasion, or any other sadistic reason;

**AND**

<Alternative A—on or after June 6, 1990>

- [4. The defendant did an act involving the infliction of extreme physical pain and suffering on \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of decedent>.]

<Alternative B—before June 6, 1990>

- [4. The defendant in fact inflicted extreme physical pain on \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of decedent>.]

**There is no requirement that the person killed be aware of the pain.**

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2013*

#### **BENCH NOTES**

##### ***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the elements of the special circumstance. (See *People v. Williams* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 689 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573, 941 P.2d 752].)

In element 4, always give alternative 4A unless the homicide occurred prior to June 6, 1990. (*People v. Davenport* (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 271 [221 Cal.Rptr. 794, 710 P.2d 861].) If the homicide occurred prior to June 6, 1990, give alternative 4B. For homicides after that date, alternative 4B should not be given. (*People v. Crittenden* (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 140, fn. 14 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887].)

## AUTHORITY

- Special Circumstance. Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(18).
- Must Specifically Intend to Torture. *People v. Davenport* (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 265–266 [221 Cal.Rptr. 794, 710 P.2d 861]; *People v. Pensinger* (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1210, 1255 [278 Cal.Rptr. 640, 805 P.2d 899].
- Causation Not Required. *People v. Crittenden* (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 141–142 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887].
- Pain Not an Element. *People v. Davenport* (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 271 [221 Cal.Rptr. 794, 710 P.2d 861]; *People v. Crittenden* (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 140, fn. 14. [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887]
- Intent to Torture Need Not be Deliberate, and Premeditated. *People v. Cole* (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1227–1228 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 532, 95 P.3d 811].
- Prolonged Pain Not Required. *People v. Cole* (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1227–1228 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 532, 95 P.3d 811].
- Spatial and Temporal Nexus. *People v. Gonzales* (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1234, 1278 [144 Cal.Rptr.3d 757, 281 P.3d 834].

## RELATED ISSUES

### *Causation Not Required for Special Circumstance*

“[T]he prosecution was not required to prove that the acts of torture inflicted upon [the victim] were the cause of his death” in order to prove the torture-murder special circumstance. (*People v. Crittenden* (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 142 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887].) Causation is required for first degree murder by torture. (*Ibid.*)

### *Instruction on Voluntary Intoxication*

“[A] court should instruct a jury in a torture-murder case, when evidence of intoxication warrants it, that intoxication is relevant to the specific intent to inflict cruel suffering.” (*People v. Pensinger* (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1210, 1242 [278 Cal.Rptr. 640, 805 P.2d 899]; see CALCRIM No. 625, *Voluntary Intoxication: Effects on Homicide Crimes.*)

### *Pain Not an Element*

As with first degree murder by torture, all that is required for the special circumstance is the calculated *intent to cause pain* for the purpose of revenge, extortion, persuasion, or any other sadistic purpose. Prior to June 6, 1990, the special circumstance stated “torture requires proof of the infliction of extreme physical pain.” (Pre-June 6, 1990, Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(18).) Proposition 115 eliminated this language. Thus, for all homicides after June 6, 1990, there is no requirement under the special circumstance that the victim actually suffer pain. (*People v. Pensinger* (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1210, 1239 [278 Cal.Rptr. 640, 805 P.2d 899]; *People v. Davenport* (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 271 [221 Cal.Rptr. 794, 710 P.2d

861]; *People v. Crittenden* (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 140, fn. 14 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887].)

***Deliberate, and Premeditated Intent to Inflict Pain Not Required***

“[P]remeditated and deliberate intent to torture is not an element of the torture-murder special circumstance.” (*People v. Cole* (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1227 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 532, 95 P.3d 811] [italics omitted].)

***Prolonged Pain Not Required***

“We have held that by enacting the torture-murder special circumstance statute (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(18)), the electorate meant to foreclose any requirement that the defendant be proved to have intended to inflict *prolonged* pain.” (*People v. Cole* (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1228 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 532, 95 P.3d 811] [italics in original, citation and internal quotation marks omitted].)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

3 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, §§ 525–526.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 87, *Death Penalty*, §§ 87.13[18], 87.14 (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.01[2][a][v] (Matthew Bender).

## 734. Special Circumstances: Murder by Poison (Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(19))

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The defendant is charged with the special circumstance of murder by poison [in violation of Penal Code section 190.2(a)(19)].

To prove that this special circumstance is true, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant intended to kill \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of decedent>;

AND

2. The defendant killed \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of decedent> by the administration of poison.

[Poison is a substance, applied externally to the body or introduced into the body, that can kill by its own inherent qualities.]

[\_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of substance> is a poison.]

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New January 2006

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the elements of the special circumstance. (See *People v. Williams* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 689 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573, 941 P.2d 752].)

Give the bracketed definition of poison if there is a dispute over whether the substance is a poison. Give the bracketed paragraph stating that the substance is a poison if the parties agree that the substance is a poison.

### AUTHORITY

- Special Circumstance. Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(19).
- Special Circumstance Is Constitutional. *People v. Catlin* (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 159 [109 Cal.Rptr.2d 31, 26 P.3d 357].
- Poison Defined. *People v. Van Deleer* (1878) 53 Cal. 147, 149.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

3 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, §§ 527–528.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 87, *Death Penalty*, §§ 87.13[19], 87.14 (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes*



*Against the Person*, § 142.01[2][a][iii] (Matthew Bender).

## 735. Special Circumstances: Discharge From Vehicle (Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(21))

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The defendant is charged with the special circumstance of committing murder by shooting a firearm from a motor vehicle [in violation of Penal Code section 190.2(a)(21)].

To prove that this special circumstance is true, the People must prove that:

1. (The defendant/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name or description of principal if not defendant>) shot a firearm from a motor vehicle, killing \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of decedent>;
2. (The defendant/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name or description of principal if not defendant>) intentionally shot at a person who was outside the vehicle;

AND

3. At the time of the shooting, the defendant intended to kill.

[A *firearm* is any device designed to be used as a weapon, from which a projectile is discharged or expelled through a barrel by the force of an explosion or other form of combustion.]

[A *motor vehicle* includes (a/an) (passenger vehicle/motorcycle/motor scooter/bus/school bus/commercial vehicle/truck tractor and trailer/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert other type of motor vehicle>).]

[The terms (*firearm/ [and] motor vehicle*) (is/are) defined elsewhere in another instruction to which you should refer.]

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New January 2006

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a *sua sponte* duty to instruct on the elements of the special circumstance. (See *People v. Williams* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 689 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573, 941 P.2d 752].)

### AUTHORITY

- Special Circumstance. Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(21).
- Motor Vehicle Defined. Veh. Code, § 415.
- Special Circumstance Is Constitutional. *People v. Rodriguez* (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 157, 172 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 676].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

3 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, § 529.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 87, *Death Penalty*, §§ 87.13[21], 87.14 (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.01[2][a][vii] (Matthew Bender).

**736. Special Circumstances: Killing by Street Gang Member (Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(22))**

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The defendant is charged with the special circumstance of committing murder while an active participant in a criminal street gang [in violation of Penal Code section 190.2(a)(22)].

To prove that this special circumstance is true, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant intentionally killed \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of victim>;
2. At the time of the killing, the defendant was an active participant in a criminal street gang;
3. The defendant knew that members of the gang engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity;

AND

4. The murder was carried out to further the activities of the criminal street gang.

*Active participation* means involvement with a criminal street gang in a way that is more than passive or in name only.

[The People do not have to prove that the defendant devoted all or a substantial part of (his/her) time or efforts to the gang, or that (he/she) was an actual member of the gang.]

<If criminal street gang has already been defined>

[A criminal street gang is defined in another instruction to which you should refer.]

<If criminal street gang has not already been defined in another instruction>

[A *criminal street gang* is any ongoing organization, association, or group of three or more persons, whether formal or informal:

1. That has a common name or common identifying sign or symbol;
2. That has, as one or more of its primary activities, the commission of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert one or more crimes listed in Pen. Code, § 186.22(e)(1)–(25), (31)–(33)>;

AND

3. Whose members, whether acting alone or together, engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity.

In order to qualify as a *primary* activity, the crime must be one of the

group's chief or principal activities rather than an occasional act committed by one or more persons who happen to be members of the group.

*A pattern of criminal gang activity, as used here, means:*

1. [The] (commission of[,]/ [or] attempted commission of[,]/ [or] conspiracy to commit[,]/ [or] solicitation to commit[,]/ [or] conviction of[,]/ [or] (Having/having) a juvenile petition sustained for commission of):

*<Give 1A if the crime or crimes are in Pen. Code, § 186.22(e)(1)–(25), (31)–(33)>*

**1A. (any combination of two or more of the following crimes/[,][or] two or more occurrences of [one or more of the following crimes]:) \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert one or more crimes listed in Pen. Code, § 186.22(e)(1)–(25), (31)–(33)>*;**

**[OR]**

*<Give 1B if one or more of the crimes are in Pen. Code, § 186.22(e)(26)–(30)>*

**1B. [at least one of the following crimes:] \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert one or more crimes from Pen. Code, § 186.22(e)(1)–(25), (31)–(33)>***

**AND**

**[at least one of the following crimes:] \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert one or more crimes in Pen. Code, § 186.22(e)(26)–(30)>*;**

2. At least one of those crimes was committed after September 26, 1988;
3. The most recent crime occurred within three years of one of the earlier crimes;

**AND**

4. The crimes were committed on separate occasions, or by two or more persons.]

**[The crimes, if any, that establish a pattern of criminal gang activity, need not be gang-related.]**

**[If you find the defendant guilty of a crime in this case, you may consider that crime in deciding whether one of the group's primary activities was commission of that crime and whether a pattern of criminal gang activity has been proved.]**

**[You may not find that there was a pattern of criminal gang activity unless all of you agree that two or more crimes that satisfy these**

requirements were committed, but you do not have to all agree on which crimes were committed.]

[Other instructions explain what is necessary for the People to prove that a member of the gang [or the defendant] committed \_\_\_\_\_ <insert crimes from Pen. Code, § 186.22(e)(1)–(33) inserted in definition of pattern of criminal gang activity>.]

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2006, June 2007, February 2014, February 2016*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the elements of the special circumstance. (See *People v. Williams* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 689 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573, 941 P.2d 752].) The effective date of this special circumstance was March 8, 2000.

In element 2 of the paragraph defining a “criminal street gang,” insert one or more of the crimes listed in Penal Code section 186.22(e)(1)–(25), (31)–(33) that are alleged to be the primary activities of the gang. (See *People v. Sengpadychith* (2001) 26 Cal.4th 316, 323–324 [109 Cal.Rptr.2d 851, 27 P.3d 739].)

In element 1A of the paragraph defining a “pattern of criminal gang activity,” insert one or more of the crimes listed in Penal Code section 186.22(e) that have been committed, attempted, or solicited two or more times (See *In re Nathaniel C.* (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 990, 1002–1003 [279 Cal.Rptr. 236] [two instances of same offense, or single incident with multiple participants committing one or more specified offenses, are sufficient].) if the alleged crime or crimes are listed in Penal Code section 186.22(e)(1)–(25), (31)–(33). Give on request the bracketed phrase “any combination of” if two or more different crimes are inserted in the blank. If one or more of the alleged crimes are listed in Penal Code section 186.22(e)(26)–(30), give element 1B and insert that crime or crimes and one or more of the crimes listed in Penal Code section 186.22(e)(1)–(25), (31)–(33). (See Pen. Code, § 186.22(j) [“A pattern of gang activity cannot be established solely by proof of commission of offenses enumerated in paragraphs (26) to (30), inclusive, of subdivision (e), alone.”].)

On request, give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “The People do not need to prove that the defendant devoted all or a substantial part of . . .” (See Pen. Code, § 186.22(i).)

On request, give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “If you find the defendant guilty of a crime in this case.” (*People v. Sengpadychith, supra*, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 322–323; *People v. Duran* (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1448, 1464–1465 [119 Cal.Rptr.2d 272].)

On request, give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “You may not find that

there was a pattern of criminal gang activity.” (*People v. Funes* (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1506, 1527–1528 [28 Cal.Rptr.2d 758]; see also Related Issues section to CALCRIM No. 1400, *Active Participation in Criminal Street Gang*.)

On request, the court must give a limiting instruction on the gang evidence. (*People v. Hernandez* (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1040, 1051–1052 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 880, 94 P.3d 1080].) If requested, give CALCRIM No. 1403, *Limited Purpose of Evidence of Gang Activity*.

### ***Related Instructions***

CALCRIM No. 562, *Transferred Intent*.

CALCRIM No. 1400, *Active Participation in Criminal Street Gang*.

### **AUTHORITY**

- Special Circumstance. Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(22).
- Active Participation Defined. Pen. Code, § 186.22(i); *People v. Castenada* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 743, 747 [97 Cal.Rptr.2d 906, 3 P.3d 278].
- Criminal Street Gang Defined. Pen. Code, § 186.22(f); see *People v. Duran*, *supra*, 97 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1464–1465.
- Transferred Intent Under Penal Code Section 190.2(a)(22). *People v. Shabazz* (2006) 38 Cal.4th 55 [40 Cal.Rptr.3d 750, 130 P.3d 519].
- Pattern of Criminal Gang Activity Defined. Pen. Code, § 186.22(e), (j); *People v. Gardeley* (1996) 14 Cal.4th 605, 624–625 [59 Cal.Rptr.2d 356, 927 P.2d 713]; *In re Nathaniel C.* (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 990, 1002–1003 [279 Cal.Rptr. 236].
- Felonious Criminal Conduct Defined. *People v. Green* (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 692, 704 [278 Cal.Rptr. 140].
- Separate Intent From Underlying Felony. *People v. Herrera* (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1456, 1467–1468 [83 Cal.Rptr.2d 307].
- Crimes Committed After Charged Offense Not Predicates. *People v. Duran*, *supra*, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 1458.
- Proof of Sufficient Connection Among Gang “Subsets” and Umbrella Gang Required. *People v. Prunty* (2015) 62 Cal.4th 59, 81–85 [192 Cal.Rptr.3d 309, 355 P.3d 480].

### **RELATED ISSUES**

See the Bench Notes and Related Issues section to CALCRIM No. 1400, *Active Participation in Criminal Street Gang*.

The criminal street gang special circumstance applies when a participant in a criminal street gang intends to kill one person but kills someone else by mistake. *People v. Shabazz* (2006) 38 Cal.4th 55, 66 [40 Cal.Rptr.3d 750, 130 P.3d 519]; see CALCRIM No. 562, *Transferred Intent*.

### **SECONDARY SOURCES**

3 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, § 523.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 87, *Death Penalty*, §§ 87.13[22], 87.14 (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.03[3][a] (Matthew Bender).



## 737. Special Circumstances: Murder of Transportation Worker (Pen. Code, § 190.25)

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The defendant is charged with the special circumstance of murdering (a/an) (operator/driver/station agent/ticket agent) of (a/an) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of vehicle or transportation entity specified in Pen. Code, § 190.25> [in violation of Penal Code section 190.25].

To prove that this special circumstance is true, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant intended to kill \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of decedent>;
2. \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of decedent> was (a/an) (operator/driver/station agent/ticket agent) of (a/an) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of vehicle or transportation entity specified in Pen. Code, § 190.25> performing (his/her) duties;

AND

3. When \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of decedent> was killed, the defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, that \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of decedent> was (a/an) (operator/driver/station agent/ticket agent) of (a/an) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of vehicle or transportation entity specified in Pen. Code, § 190.25> and that (he/she) was performing (his/her) duties.

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New January 2006

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the elements of the special circumstance. (See *People v. Williams* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 689 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573, 941 P.2d 752].)

This special circumstance alone does not provide for the death penalty. (*People v. Marks* (2003) 31 Cal.4th 197, 234 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 252, 72 P.3d 1222].) However, if the defendant is also convicted of a special circumstances listed in Penal Code section 190.2(a), the defendant may be eligible for the death penalty. (*Ibid.*; see also Pen. Code, § 190.25(c).)

### AUTHORITY

- Special Circumstance. Pen. Code, § 190.25.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

3 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, § 542.  
483

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 87, *Death Penalty*, § 87.14 (Matthew Bender).

**738–749. Reserved for Future Use**

### (iii) Special Circumstances With Prior Murder

#### 750. Special Circumstances: Prior Murder Conviction (Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(2))—Trial on Prior Murder (Pen. Code, § 190.1(a) & (b))

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The defendant is charged with the special circumstance of having been convicted previously of murder. You must now decide if the People have proved that this special circumstance is true.

To prove that this special circumstance is true, the People must prove that the defendant was convicted previously of murder in the (first/second) degree.

[A conviction of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of offense from other state> is the same as a conviction for (first/second) degree murder.]

[In deciding whether the People have proved this special circumstance, consider only the evidence presented in this proceeding. Do not consider your verdict or any evidence from the earlier part of the trial.]

[You may not return a finding that this special circumstance has or has not been proved unless all 12 of you agree on that finding.]

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New January 2006

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the elements of the special circumstance. (See *People v. Williams* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 689 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573, 941 P.2d 752].) The court must bifurcate trial on this special circumstance from trial on the other charges unless the defendant specifically waives bifurcation. (Pen. Code, § 190.1(b); *Curl v. Superior Court* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1292, 1302 [276 Cal.Rptr. 49, 801 P.2d 292].)

The court **must also give** CALCRIM No. 221, *Reasonable Doubt: Bifurcated Trial* and CALCRIM No. 3550, *Pre-Deliberation Instructions*.

If the defendant has waived bifurcation, the court should give paragraphs one and two. The court may also give paragraph three if appropriate. The remainder of the instruction should not be given.

“The jury sitting as trier of fact must determine ‘the truth of’ the prior conviction—i.e., the fact that defendant was previously convicted of first or second degree murder.” (*Curl v. Superior Court* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1292, 1301 [276 Cal.Rptr. 49, 801 P.2d 292].) The court must determine the validity of the prior conviction. (*Id.* at p. 1302.) For an out-of-state prior, the court must determine whether the elements of the offense for which the defendant was convicted satisfy the elements of first or second degree murder in California. (*People v. Martinez* (2003) 31 Cal.4th

673, 684–686 [3 Cal.Rptr.3d 648, 74 P.3d 748]; *People v. Andrews* (1989) 49 Cal.3d 200, 223 [260 Cal.Rptr. 583, 776 P.2d 285].)

Give the bracketed paragraph that begins, “In deciding whether the People have proved,” on request.

### AUTHORITY

- Special Circumstance. Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(2).
- Bifurcated Trial. Pen. Code, § 190.1(a) & (b).
- Fact of Conviction Determined by Jury. *Curl v. Superior Court* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1292, 1301 [276 Cal.Rptr. 49, 801 P.2d 292].
- Validity of Conviction Determined by Court. *Curl v. Superior Court* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1292, 1302 [276 Cal.Rptr. 49, 801 P.2d 292].
- Out-of-State Priors. *People v. Martinez* (2003) 31 Cal.4th 673, 684–686 [3 Cal.Rptr.3d 648, 74 P.3d 748]; *People v. Trevino* (2001) 26 Cal.4th 237, 242 [109 Cal.Rptr.2d 567, 27 P.3d 283]; *People v. Andrews* (1989) 49 Cal.3d 200, 223 [260 Cal.Rptr. 583, 776 P.2d 285].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Order of Conviction Relevant, Not Order of Murders*

“The unambiguous language and purpose of section 190.2(a)(2) thus require that a person such as defendant, already convicted of murder in a prior proceeding, must be considered eligible for the death penalty if convicted of first degree murder in a subsequent trial. The order of the commission of the homicides is immaterial.” (*People v. Hendricks* (1987) 43 Cal.3d 584, 596 [238 Cal.Rptr. 66, 737 P.2d 1350]; *People v. Gurule* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 636 [123 Cal.Rptr.2d 345, 51 P.3d 224].)

#### *Intent to Kill Not Required*

“Defendant also contends that section 190.2(a)(2) requires a finding of intent to kill. Plainly, the provision does not expressly require such a finding.” (*People v. Hendricks* (1987) 43 Cal.3d 584, 596 [238 Cal.Rptr. 66, 737 P.2d 1350]; *People v. Gurule* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 633 [123 Cal.Rptr.2d 345, 51 P.3d 224].)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

3 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, § 519.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 87, *Death Penalty*, §§ 87.02[1], 87.12, 87.13[2] (Matthew Bender).

**751. Second Degree Murder With Prior Prison for Murder (Pen. Code, § 190.05)**

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The defendant is charged with the additional allegation of having previously served a prison term for murder. You must now decide if the People have proved this allegation.

To prove that this allegation is true, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant was convicted previously of murder in the (first/second) degree;

**AND**

2. The defendant served time in prison as a result of that conviction.

[A conviction of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of offense from other state>* is the same as a conviction for (first/second) degree murder.]

[For the purpose of this allegation, serving time in \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of institution from Pen. Code, § 190.05>* qualifies as serving time in prison.]

*<Limiting instruction alternative A—bifurcated trial>*

[In deciding whether the People have proved this allegation, consider only the evidence presented in this proceeding. Do not consider your verdict or any evidence from the earlier part of the trial.]

*<Limiting instruction alternative B—nonbifurcated trial>*

[Consider the evidence presented on this allegation only when deciding whether the defendant was previously convicted of the crime[s] alleged [or for the limited purpose of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert other permitted purpose, e.g., assessing credibility of the defendant>*]. Do not consider this evidence for any other purpose.]

[You may not return a finding that this allegation has or has not been proved unless all 12 of you agree on that finding.]

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*New January 2006*

**BENCH NOTES**

***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the elements of the additional allegation. (See Pen. Code, § 190.05(c) [must submit special allegation to jury].)

Penal Code section 190.05 provides for possible sentences of either life without parole or 15 years to life for a defendant convicted of second degree murder who

has served a prior prison term for first or second degree murder. (Pen. Code, § 190.05(a).) The statute requires the jury to find the fact of the conviction true beyond a reasonable doubt. (Pen. Code, § 190.05(c), (d).) The statute does not require that trial on the prior conviction be bifurcated from trial on the underlying charge. If the court does use a bifurcated trial, the court **must** also give CALCRIM No. 221, *Reasonable Doubt: Bifurcated Trial*, and CALCRIM No. 3550, *Pre-Deliberation Instructions*. (See *People v. Gutierrez* (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1576, 1579 [28 Cal.Rptr.2d 897].) The court must also give the last bracketed sentence.

On request, the court should give one of the appropriate limiting instruction, depending on whether the court has granted a bifurcated trial.

If the prior is found true, the court must then proceed with a separate penalty phase in which the jury determines which of the two possible sentences is appropriate. (Pen. Code, § 190.05(e); *People v. Gutierrez, supra*, 23 Cal.App.4th at p. 1579.) The court should then modify the death penalty phase instructions for use in this penalty phase trial. The factors for the jury to consider under Penal Code section 190.05(e) are identical to the factors to be considered in a death penalty trial. Thus, the court needs to change only the penalties that the jury must choose between.

### AUTHORITY

- Second Degree Murder With Prior Prison for Murder. Pen. Code, § 190.05.
- Right to Jury Trial on Prior Conviction. Pen. Code, § 190.05(c).
- Reasonable Doubt Standard. Pen. Code, § 190.05(d).
- Separate Penalty Phase. Pen. Code, § 190.05(e).

### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, § 186.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 87, *Death Penalty*, §§ 87.02[2], 87.12 (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.01[4][d] (Matthew Bender).

**752–759. Reserved for Future Use**

## L. DEATH PENALTY

### 760. Death Penalty: Introduction to Penalty Phase

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**This [phase of the] trial is to determine (the/each) defendant’s penalty. The law provides for two possible penalties: death or life in prison without the possibility of parole. You must decide which penalty (the/each) defendant will receive.**

**[You must disregard all of the instructions I gave you earlier. I will give you a set of instructions that apply only to this phase of the trial. Some of these instructions will be the same or similar to instructions you have heard before. However, you must follow only this new set of instructions in this phase of the trial.]**

**[The first step in this process is the opening statements.**

**Next, the People will offer evidence. Evidence usually includes witness testimony and exhibits. After the People’s case, the defense (will/may) also present evidence.**

**After you have heard all the evidence and [before] the attorneys have given their final arguments, I will instruct you on the law that applies to the case.**

**After you have heard the arguments and instructions, you will go to the jury room to deliberate.]**

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2014*

### BENCH NOTES

#### ***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on general concepts of law. (*People v. Babbitt* (1988) 45 Cal.3d 660, 718 [248 Cal.Rptr. 69, 755 P.2d 253].) Because the introductory instructions for the guilt phase contain concepts that do not apply to the penalty phase, the court must clarify for the jury which instructions apply to the penalty phase. (*People v. Babbitt, supra*, 45 Cal.3d at p. 718, fn. 26; *People v. Weaver* (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 982 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 29 P.3d 103], cert. den. sub nom. *Weaver v. California* (2002) 535 U.S. 1058 [122 S.Ct. 1920, 152 L.Ed.2d 828].) The Supreme Court has stated that, in order to avoid confusion, the trial court should provide the jury with a completely new set of instructions for the penalty phase. (*People v. Weaver, supra*, 26 Cal.4th at p. 982.)

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give the bracketed paragraph instructing the jury to disregard all previous instructions unless the current jury did not hear the guilt phase of the case. (See *People v. Arias* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 171 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d

770, 913 P.2d 980], cert. den. sub nom. *Arias v. California* (1997) 520 U.S. 1251 [117 S.Ct. 2408, 138 L.Ed.2d 175].)

This instruction should be followed by any other introductory instructions the court deems appropriate prior to the presentation of penalty phase evidence. The committee recommends that the court give CALCRIM No. 101, *Cautionary Admonitions: Jury Conduct (Before or After Jury Is Selected)*. The court may also consider giving CALCRIM No. 102, *Note-Taking*; CALCRIM No. 104, *Evidence*; and CALCRIM No. 105, *Witnesses*.

When CALCRIM No. 101, *Cautionary Admonitions: Jury Conduct (Before or After Jury Is Selected)*, is given, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to delete the sentence which reads “Do not let bias, sympathy, prejudice, or public opinion influence your decision.” (*People v. Lanphear* (1984) 36 Cal.3d 163, 165 [203 Cal.Rptr. 122, 680 P.2d 1081]; *California v. Brown* (1987) 479 U.S. 538, 545 [107 S.Ct. 837, 93 L.Ed.2d 934].) The court should also delete the following sentence: “You must reach your verdict without any consideration of punishment.”

If the current jury did not hear the previous phases of the case, the court should give the bracketed paragraphs that begin with “The first step in this process.”

### AUTHORITY

- Death Penalty Statute. Pen. Code, § 190.3.
- Must Tell Jury Which Instructions Apply. *People v. Babbitt* (1988) 45 Cal.3d 660, 718, fn. 26 [248 Cal.Rptr. 69, 755 P.2d 253].
- Should Give Jury New Set of Instructions. *People v. Weaver* (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 982 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 29 P.3d 103], cert. den. sub nom. *Weaver v. California* (2002) 535 U.S. 1058 [122 S.Ct. 1920, 152 L.Ed.2d 828].
- Error to Instruct Not to Consider Sympathy. *People v. Easley* (1983) 34 Cal.3d 858, 876 [196 Cal.Rptr. 309, 671 P.2d 813]; *People v. Lanphear* (1984) 36 Cal.3d 163, 165 [203 Cal.Rptr. 122, 680 P.2d 1081]; *California v. Brown* (1987) 479 U.S. 538, 542 [107 S.Ct. 837, 93 L.Ed.2d 934].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

3 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, § 547.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 87, *Death Penalty*, §§ 87.20–87.26 (Matthew Bender).



## 761. Death Penalty: Duty of Jury

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**I will now instruct you on the law that applies to this [phase of the] case. [I will give you a copy of the instructions to use in the jury room.] [Each of you has a copy of these instructions to use in the jury room.]**

**[You must disregard all of the instructions I gave you earlier. I will give you a set of instructions that apply only to this phase of the trial. Some of these instructions will be the same or similar to instructions you have heard before. However, you must follow only this new set of instructions in this phase of the trial.]**

**You must decide whether (the/each) defendant will be sentenced to death or life in prison without the possibility of parole. It is up to you and you alone to decide what the penalty will be. [In reaching your decision, consider all of the evidence from the entire trial [unless I specifically instruct you not to consider something from an earlier phase].] Do not allow bias, prejudice, or public opinion to influence your opinion in any way.**

**You must follow the law as I explain it to you, even if you disagree with it. If you believe that the attorneys' comments on the law conflict with my instructions, you must follow my instructions.**

**Pay careful attention to all of these instructions and consider them together. If I repeat any instruction or idea, do not conclude that it is more important than any other instruction or idea just because I repeated it.**

**Some words or phrases used during this trial have legal meanings that are different from their meanings in everyday use. These words and phrases will be specifically defined in these instructions. Please be sure to listen carefully and follow the definitions that I give you. Words and phrases not specifically defined in these instructions are to be applied using their ordinary, everyday meanings.**

**Some of these instructions may not apply, depending on your findings about the facts of the case. [Do not assume just because I give a particular instruction that I am suggesting anything about the facts.] After you have decided what the facts are, follow the instructions that apply to the facts as you find them.**

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*New January 2006*

### **BENCH NOTES**

#### ***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on general concepts of law. (*People v. Babbitt* (1988) 45 Cal.3d 660, 718 [248 Cal.Rptr. 69, 755 P.2d 253].) Because the

introductory instructions for the guilt phase contain concepts that do not apply to the penalty phase, the court must clarify for the jury which instructions apply to the penalty phase. (*People v. Babbitt* (1988) 45 Cal.3d 660, 718, fn. 26 [248 Cal.Rptr. 69, 755 P.2d 253]; *People v. Weaver* (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 982 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 29 P.3d 103], cert. den. sub nom. *Weaver v. California* (2002) 535 U.S. 1058 [122 S.Ct. 1920, 152 L.Ed.2d 828].) The Supreme Court has stated that, in order to avoid confusion, the trial court should provide the jury with a completely new set of instructions for the penalty phase. (*People v. Weaver, supra*, 26 Cal.4th at p. 982.)

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give the bracketed paragraph instructing the jury to disregard all previous instructions unless the current jury did not hear the guilt phase of the case. (See *People v. Arias* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 171 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980], cert. den. sub nom. *Arias v. California* (1997) 520 U.S. 1251 [117 S.Ct. 2408, 138 L.Ed.2d 175].)

The court should give the bracketed portion of the last paragraph that begins with “Do not assume just because,” unless the court will be commenting on the evidence pursuant to Penal Code section 1127. The committee recommends against any comment on the evidence in the penalty phase of a capital case.

This instruction should be followed by any other general instructions on evidence or principles of law the court deems appropriate based on the facts of the case. Specifically:

- The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give CALCRIM No. 222, *Evidence* and CALCRIM No. 226, *Witnesses*. (See *People v. Miranda* (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 107–108 [241 Cal.Rptr. 594, 744 P.2d 1127].)
- The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give CALCRIM No. 221, *Reasonable Doubt: Bifurcated Trial*, if the prosecution offers aggravating evidence of other criminal conduct or other felony convictions. However, the reasonable doubt standard does not apply to the question of whether the jury should impose the death penalty or to proof of other aggravating factors. (*People v. Miranda, supra*, 44 Cal.3d at p. 107; *People v. Rodriguez* (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 777–779 [230 Cal.Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113].)
- If the prosecution relies on circumstantial evidence to prove other criminal conduct, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on circumstantial evidence in the penalty phase. (See *People v. Brown* (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 564 [3 Cal.Rptr.3d 145, 73 P.3d 1137] [no error where prosecution relied exclusively on direct evidence].)
- When requested, the court must give instructions admonishing the jury not to consider the defendant’s failure to testify during the penalty phase. (*People v. Melton* (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 757–758 [244 Cal.Rptr. 867, 750 P.2d 741].)

### AUTHORITY

- Death Penalty Statute. Pen. Code, § 190.3.
- Must Tell Jury Which Instructions Apply. *People v. Babbitt* (1988) 45 Cal.3d 660, 718, fn. 26 [248 Cal.Rptr. 69, 755 P.2d 253].

- Should Give Jury New Set of Instructions. *People v. Weaver* (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 982 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 29 P.3d 103], cert. den. sub nom. *Weaver v. California* (2002) 535 U.S. 1058 [122 S.Ct. 1920, 152 L.Ed.2d 828].
- Error to Instruct Not to Consider Sympathy. *People v. Lanphear* (1984) 36 Cal.3d 163, 165 [203 Cal.Rptr. 122, 680 P.2d 1081]; *California v. Brown* (1987) 479 U.S. 538, 542 [107 S.Ct. 837, 93 L.Ed.2d 934].
- Reasonable Doubt. *People v. Miranda* (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 107 [241 Cal.Rptr. 594, 744 P.2d 1127]; *People v. Rodriguez* (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 777–779 [230 Cal.Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113].
- Circumstantial Evidence. *People v. Brown* (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 564 [3 Cal.Rptr.3d 145, 73 P.3d 1137].
- Defendant’s Failure to Testify. *People v. Melton* (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 757–758 [244 Cal.Rptr. 867, 750 P.2d 741].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

3 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, § 549.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 87, *Death Penalty*, § 87.24 (Matthew Bender).

### **762. Reserved for Future Use**

### 763. Death Penalty: Factors to Consider—Not Identified as Aggravating or Mitigating (Pen. Code, § 190.3)

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In reaching your decision, you must consider and weigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances or factors shown by the evidence.

An *aggravating circumstance or factor* is any fact, condition, or event relating to the commission of a crime, above and beyond the elements of the crime itself, that increases the wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct, the enormity of the offense, or the harmful impact of the crime. An aggravating circumstance may support a decision to impose the death penalty.

A *mitigating circumstance or factor* is any fact, condition, or event that makes the death penalty less appropriate as a punishment, even though it does not legally justify or excuse the crime. A mitigating circumstance is something that reduces the defendant's blameworthiness or otherwise supports a less severe punishment. A mitigating circumstance may support a decision not to impose the death penalty.

Under the law, you must consider, weigh, and be guided by specific factors, where applicable, some of which may be aggravating and some of which may be mitigating. I will read you the entire list of factors. Some of them may not apply to this case. If you find there is no evidence of a factor, then you should disregard that factor.

The factors are:

- (a) The circumstances of the crime[s] of which the defendant was convicted in this case and any special circumstances that were found true.
- (b) Whether or not the defendant has engaged in violent criminal activity other than the crime[s] of which the defendant was convicted in this case. *Violent criminal activity* is criminal activity involving the unlawful use, attempt to use, or direct or implied threat to use force or violence against a person. [The other violent criminal activity alleged in this case will be described in these instructions.]
- (c) Whether or not the defendant has been convicted of any prior felony other than the crime[s] of which (he/she) was convicted in this case.
- (d) Whether the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance when (he/she) committed the crime[s] of which (he/she) was convicted in this case.
- (e) Whether the victim participated in the defendant's homicidal

conduct or consented to the homicidal act.

- (f) Whether the defendant reasonably believed that circumstances morally justified or extenuated (his/her) conduct in committing the crime[s] of which (he/she) was convicted in this case.
- (g) Whether at the time of the murder the defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of another person.
- (h) Whether, at the time of the offense, the defendant's capacity to appreciate the criminality of (his/her) conduct or to follow the requirements of the law was impaired as a result of mental disease, defect, or intoxication.
- (i) The defendant's age at the time of the crime[s] of which (he/she) was convicted in this case.
- (j) Whether the defendant was an accomplice to the murder and (his/her) participation in the murder was relatively minor.
- (k) Any other circumstance, whether related to these charges or not, that lessens the gravity of the crime[s] even though the circumstance is not a legal excuse or justification. These circumstances include sympathy or compassion for the defendant or anything you consider to be a mitigating factor, regardless of whether it is one of the factors listed above.

[You must disregard any jury instruction given to you in the guilt [and sanity] phase[s] of this trial if it conflicts with your consideration and weighing of these factors.]

Do not consider the absence of a mitigating factor as an aggravating factor.

[You may not consider as an aggravating factor anything other than the factors contained in this list that you conclude are aggravating in this case. You must not take into account any other facts or circumstances as a basis for imposing the death penalty.]

[Even if a fact is both a "special circumstance" and also a "circumstance of the crime," you may consider that fact only once as an aggravating factor in your weighing process. Do not double-count that fact simply because it is both a "special circumstance" and a "circumstance of the crime."]

[Although you may consider sympathy or compassion for the defendant, you may not let sympathy for the defendant's family influence your decision. [However, you may consider evidence about the impact the defendant's execution would have on (his/her) family if that evidence demonstrates some positive quality of the defendant's background or

character.]]

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2006, June 2007, April 2008, December 2008, March 2021*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct the jury on the factors to consider in reaching a decision on the appropriate sentence. (*Lockett v. Ohio* (1978) 438 U.S. 586, 604–605 [98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973]; *People v. Benson* (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 799 [276 Cal.Rptr. 827, 802 P.2d 330].)

Although not required, “[i]t is . . . the better practice for a court to instruct on all the statutory penalty factors, directing the jury to be guided by those that are applicable on the record.” (*People v. Marshall* (1990) 50 Cal.3d 907, 932 [269 Cal.Rptr. 269, 790 P.2d 676], cert. den. sub nom. *Marshall v. California* (1991) 498 U.S. 1110; *People v. Miranda* (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 104–105 [241 Cal.Rptr. 594, 744 P.2d 1127]; *People v. Melton* (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 770 [244 Cal.Rptr. 867, 750 P.2d 741].) The jury must be instructed to consider only those factors that are “applicable.” (*Williams v. Calderon* (1998) 48 F.Supp.2d 979, 1023.)

When the court will be instructing the jury on prior violent criminal activity in aggravation, give the bracketed sentence that begins with “The other violent criminal activity alleged in this case.” (See *People v. Robertson* (1982) 33 Cal.3d 21, 55 [188 Cal.Rptr. 77, 655 P.2d 279]; *People v. Yeoman* (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 151 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 186, 72 P.3d 1166].) The court also has a **sua sponte** duty to give CALCRIM No. 764, *Death Penalty: Evidence of Other Violent Crimes*, in addition to this instruction.

When the court will be instructing the jury on prior felony convictions, the court also has a **sua sponte** duty to give CALCRIM No. 765, *Death Penalty: Conviction for Other Felony Crimes*, in addition to this instruction.

On request, the court must instruct the jury not to double-count any “circumstances of the crime” that are also “special circumstances.” (*People v. Melton, supra*, 44 Cal.3d at p. 768.) When requested, give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “Even if a fact is both a ‘special circumstance’ and also a ‘circumstance of the crime’.”

On request, give the bracketed sentence that begins with “You may not let sympathy for the defendant’s family.” (*People v. Ochoa* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 456 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 408, 966 P.2d 442].) On request, give the bracketed sentence that begins with “However, you may consider evidence about the impact the defendant’s execution.” (*Ibid.*)

The bracketed sentence that begins with “You must disregard any jury instruction” may be given unless the jury did not hear a prior phase of the case. (See *People v. Arias* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 171 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980], cert. den. sub

nom. *Arias v. California* (1997) 520 U.S. 1251 [117 S.Ct. 2408, 138 L.Ed.2d 175].)

### AUTHORITY

- Death Penalty Statute. Pen. Code, § 190.3.
- Jury Must Be Instructed to Consider Any Mitigating Evidence and Sympathy. *Lockett v. Ohio* (1978) 438 U.S. 586, 604–605 [98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973]; *People v. Benson* (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 799 [276 Cal.Rptr. 827, 802 P.2d 330]; *People v. Easley* (1983) 34 Cal.3d 858, 876 [196 Cal.Rptr. 309, 671 P.2d 813].
- Should Instruct on All Factors. *People v. Marshall* (1990) 50 Cal.3d 907, 932 [269 Cal.Rptr. 269, 790 P.2d 676], cert. den. sub nom. *Marshall v. California* (1991) 498 U.S. 1110 [111 S.Ct. 1023, 112 L.Ed.2d 1105].
- Must Instruct to Consider Only “Applicable Factors”. *Williams v. Calderon* (1998) 48 F.Supp.2d 979, 1023; *People v. Marshall* (1990) 50 Cal.3d 907, 932 [269 Cal.Rptr. 269, 790 P.2d 676], cert. den. sub nom. *Marshall v. California* (1991) 498 U.S. 1110 [111 S.Ct. 1023, 112 L.Ed.2d 1105].
- Mitigating Factor Must Be Supported by Evidence. *Delo v. Lashley* (1993) 507 U.S. 272, 275, 277 [113 S.Ct. 1222, 122 L.Ed.2d 620].
- Aggravating and Mitigating Defined. *People v. Dyer* (1988) 45 Cal.3d 26, 77–78 [246 Cal.Rptr. 209, 753 P.2d 1]; *People v. Adcox* (1988) 47 Cal.3d 207, 269–270 [253 Cal.Rptr. 55, 763 P.2d 906].
- On Request Must Instruct to Consider Only Statutory Aggravating Factors. *People v. Hillhouse* (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 509 [117 Cal.Rptr. 2d 45, 40 P.3d 754], cert. den. sub nom. *Hillhouse v. California* (2003) 537 U.S. 1114 [123 S.Ct. 869, 154 L.Ed.2d 789]; *People v. Gordon* (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1223, 1275, fn. 14 [270 Cal.Rptr. 451, 792 P.2d 251].
- Mitigating Factors Are Examples. *People v. Melton* (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 760 [244 Cal.Rptr. 867, 750 P.2d 741]; *Belmontes v. Woodford* (2003) 350 F.3d 861, 897.
- Must Instruct to Not Double-Count. *People v. Melton* (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 768 [244 Cal.Rptr. 867, 750 P.2d 741].
- Threats of Violence Must Be Directed at Persons. *People v. Kirkpatrick* (1994) 7 Cal.4th 988, 1016 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 818, 874 P.2d 248].

### COMMENTARY

#### ***Aggravating and Mitigating Factors—Need Not Specify***

The court is not required to identify for the jury which factors may be aggravating and which may be mitigating. (*People v. Hillhouse* (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 509 [117 Cal.Rptr.2d 45, 40 P.3d 754], cert. den. sub nom. *Hillhouse v. California* (2003) 537 U.S. 1114 [123 S.Ct. 869, 154 L.Ed.2d 789].) “The aggravating or mitigating nature of the factors is self-evident within the context of each case.” (*Ibid.*) However, the court is required on request to instruct the jury to consider only the aggravating factors listed. (*Ibid.*; *People v. Gordon* (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1223, 1275, fn. 14 [270



Cal.Rptr. 451, 792 P.2d 251].) In *People v. Hillhouse*, the Supreme Court stated, “we suggest that, on request, the court merely tell the jury it may not consider in aggravation anything other than the aggravating statutory factors.” The committee has rephrased this for clarity and included in the text of this instruction, “You may not consider as an aggravating factor anything other than the factors contained in this list that you conclude are aggravating in this case.” (*People v. Hillhouse* (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 509, fn. 6 [117 Cal.Rptr.2d 45, 40 P.3d 754], cert. den. sub nom. *Hillhouse v. California* (2003) 537 U.S. 1114 [123 S.Ct. 869, 154 L.Ed.2d 789].)

Although the court is not required to specify which factors are the aggravating factors, it is not error for the court to do so. (*People v. Musselwhite* (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1216, 1269 [74 Cal.Rptr.2d 212, 954 P.2d 475].) In *People v. Musselwhite*, *supra*, 17 Cal.4th at p. 1269, decided prior to *Hillhouse*, the Supreme Court held that the trial court properly instructed the jury that “*only* factors (a), (b) and (c) of section 190.3 could be considered in aggravation . . .” (italics in original).

### SECONDARY SOURCES

3 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, §§ 545, 549–550, 563, 568, 571–572, 584–591.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 87, *Death Penalty*, §§ 87.23, 87.24 (Matthew Bender).



## 764. Death Penalty: Evidence of Other Violent Crimes

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The People allege as an aggravating circumstance that (the defendant/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of defendant>) committed \_\_\_\_\_ <insert specific description of alleged offense[s]>.

The People must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (the defendant/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of defendant>) committed [each of] the alleged crime[s]. [Consider each of the alleged crimes separately.] If you have a reasonable doubt whether (the defendant/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of defendant>) committed (the/an) alleged crime, you must completely disregard any evidence of that crime. If the People have proved that (the defendant/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of defendant>) committed (the/an) alleged crime, you may consider the evidence of that alleged crime as an aggravating circumstance.

[To decide whether the defendant committed \_\_\_\_\_ <insert specific description of alleged offense[s]>, please refer to the separate instructions that I (will give/have given) you on (that/those) crime[s].]

Each of you must decide for yourself whether the People have proved that the defendant committed an alleged crime. You do not all need to agree whether an alleged crime has been proved. If any juror individually concludes that an alleged crime has been proved, that juror may give the evidence whatever weight he or she believes is appropriate. On the other hand, if any juror individually concludes that an alleged crime has not been proved, that juror must disregard the evidence completely.

You may not consider any other evidence of alleged criminal activity as an aggravating circumstance [except for the alleged prior felony conviction[s] about which I will now instruct you].

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*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct that alleged prior crimes offered in aggravation must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. (*People v. Robertson* (1982) 33 Cal.3d 21, 53–55 [188 Cal.Rptr. 77, 655 P.2d 279]; *People v. Davenport* (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 281 [221 Cal.Rptr. 794, 710 P.2d 861].) Evidence of prior crimes is limited to offenses involving the “use or attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied threat to use force or violence.” (Pen. Code, § 190.3(b).)

The prosecution must specify what prior crimes are alleged in aggravation and the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct the jury to consider only evidence relating to

those alleged crimes. (*People v. Robertson* (1982) 33 Cal.3d 21, 55 [188 Cal.Rptr. 77, 655 P.2d 279]; *People v. Yeoman* (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 151 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 186, 72 P.3d 1166].)

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give any necessary instructions on defenses to the alleged prior crimes, including instructions on voluntary intoxication as a defense. (*People v. Montiel* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 877, 942 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 705, 855 P.2d 1277].)

When requested by the defense, the court must instruct on the elements of the alleged prior offense. (*People v. Brown* (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 571 [3 Cal.Rptr.3d 145, 73 P.3d 1137]; *People v. Cox* (2003) 30 Cal.4th 916, 964 [135 Cal.Rptr.2d 272, 70 P.3d 277]; *People v. Anderson* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 589, fn. 14 [106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347] [rule not changed by *Apprendi v. New Jersey* (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 475–476, 490 [120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435]], cert. den. sub nom. *Anderson v. California* (2002) 534 U.S. 1136 [122 S.Ct. 1082, 151 L.Ed.2d 982].) However, the court is not required to instruct on the elements sua sponte. (*People v. Brown, supra*, 31 Cal.4th at p. 571; *People v. Cox, supra*, 30 Cal.4th at p. 964.) The defense may, for tactical reasons, prefer not to have the jury hear the elements.

Give the bracketed portion in the final paragraph when the court is also instructing the jury on prior felony convictions alleged in aggravation. (See CALCRIM No. 765, *Death Penalty: Conviction for Other Felony Crimes*.)

If the case involves only one defendant, the court should use the word “defendant” throughout the instruction. If the case involves codefendants tried jointly, the court should insert the name of the specific defendant alleged to have committed the prior crimes in the places indicated in the instruction.

### AUTHORITY

- Factor (b). Pen. Code, § 190.3.
- Must Instruct on Reasonable Doubt. *People v. Robertson* (1982) 33 Cal.3d 21, 53–55 [188 Cal.Rptr. 77, 655 P.2d 279]; *People v. Davenport* (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 281 [221 Cal.Rptr. 794, 710 P.2d 861].
- Must Instruct Jury to Consider Only Specified Prior Crimes Evidence. *People v. Robertson* (1982) 33 Cal.3d 21, 55 [188 Cal.Rptr. 77, 655 P.2d 279]; *People v. Yeoman* (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 151 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 186, 72 P.3d 1166].
- Instruct on Elements Only When Requested. *People v. Brown* (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 571 [3 Cal.Rptr.3d 145, 73 P.3d 1137]; *People v. Cox* (2003) 30 Cal.4th 916, 964 [135 Cal.Rptr.2d 272, 70 P.3d 277]; *People v. Anderson* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 589, fn. 14 [106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347], cert. den. sub nom. *Anderson v. California* (2002) 534 U.S. 1136 [122 S.Ct. 1082, 151 L.Ed.2d 982].
- Defense Instructions to Uncharged Crimes. *People v. Montiel* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 877, 942 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 705, 855 P.2d 1277].
- Constitutional to Admit Evidence of Uncharged Crimes. *People v. Balderas*

(1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 205 [222 Cal.Rptr. 184, 711 P.2d 480]; *People v. Brown* (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 571 [3 Cal.Rptr.3d 145, 73 P.3d 1137].

- No Unanimity Requirement. *People v. Benson* (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 811 [276 Cal.Rptr. 827, 802 P.2d 330].

## RELATED ISSUES

### *Need Not Instruct on Presumption of Innocence*

The court is not required to instruct on the presumption of innocence regarding alleged prior crimes. (*People v. Benson* (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 809–810 [276 Cal.Rptr. 827, 802 P.2d 330].)

### *No Unanimity Requirement*

“We see nothing improper in permitting each juror individually to decide whether uncharged criminal activity has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt and, if so, what weight that activity should be given in deciding the penalty.” (*People v. Benson* (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 811 [276 Cal.Rptr. 827, 802 P.2d 330].)

### *No Requirement to Instruct Jury Must Find “Violence or Threat of Violence” Beyond a Reasonable Doubt*

The court is required to instruct the jury that the alleged prior crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. However, the court does not have to instruct the jury that the fact that the alleged crime involved violence or the threat of violence must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. (*People v. Ochoa* (2002) 26 Cal.4th 398, 453 [110 Cal.Rptr.2d 324, 28 P.3d 78], cert. den. sub nom. *Ochoa v. California* (1999) 535 U.S. 1040 [122 S.Ct. 1803, 152 L.Ed.2d 660].)

### *May Use Same Conduct Under Factor (b) and Factor (c)*

“Where violent ‘criminal activity’ results in a ‘prior felony conviction,’ it shows both a propensity for violence and an inability or unwillingness to be deterred by prior criminal sanctions. The jury was entitled to consider the relevance of defendant’s prior conviction for both purposes under factors (b) and (c).” (*People v. Whitt* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 620, 654 [274 Cal.Rptr. 252, 798 P.2d 849] [emphasis in original]; *People v. Yeoman* (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 156 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 186, 72 P.3d 1166].)

## SECONDARY SOURCES

3 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, §§ 558–561.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 87, *Death Penalty*, §§ 87.23, 87.24 (Matthew Bender).

## 765. Death Penalty: Conviction for Other Felony Crimes

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**The People allege as an aggravating circumstance that (the defendant/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of defendant>) was convicted of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of felony conviction> on \_\_\_\_\_ <insert date of conviction>. <Repeat for each felony conviction alleged.>**

**The People must prove (this/these) allegation[s] beyond a reasonable doubt. If you have a reasonable doubt whether (the defendant/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of defendant>) was convicted of (the/an) alleged crime, you must completely disregard any evidence of that crime. If the People have proved that (the defendant/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of defendant>) was convicted of (the/an) alleged prior crime, you may consider the fact of that prior conviction as an aggravating circumstance.**

**You may not consider any other evidence of alleged criminal activity as an aggravating circumstance [except for the alleged criminal activity I discussed in the previous instruction].**

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*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct that alleged prior felony convictions offered in aggravation must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. (See *People v. Robertson* (1982) 33 Cal.3d 21, 53–55 [188 Cal.Rptr. 77, 655 P.2d 279]; *People v. Davenport* (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 281 [221 Cal.Rptr. 794, 710 P.2d 861].)

The prosecution must specify what convictions are alleged in aggravation, and the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct the jury to consider only evidence relating to those prior convictions. (See *People v. Robertson* (1982) 33 Cal.3d 21, 55 [188 Cal.Rptr. 77, 655 P.2d 279]; *People v. Yeoman* (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 151 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 186, 72 P.3d 1166].)

To be admissible under factor (c), the defendant must have been convicted of the other felony offense prior to the commission of the offenses charged in the current case. (*People v. Balderas* (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 205 [222 Cal.Rptr. 184, 711 P.2d 480]; *People v. Kaurish* (1990) 52 Cal.3d 648, 702 [276 Cal.Rptr. 788, 802 P.2d 278].)

Give the bracketed portion in the final paragraph when the court is also instructing the jury on prior violent crimes alleged in aggravation. (See CALCRIM No. 764, *Death Penalty: Evidence of Other Violent Crimes*.)

In *People v. Benson* (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 811 [276 Cal.Rptr. 827, 802 P.2d 330], the Supreme Court held that the jury need not be unanimous about whether prior violent crimes offered under factor (b) have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Supreme Court has not ruled on whether this also applies to prior felony convictions offered under factor (c). If the court determines that the jury need not be unanimous about whether prior felony convictions have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the court may, on request, add the following paragraph:

Each of you must decide for yourself whether the People have proved that the defendant was convicted of an alleged crime. You do not all need to agree whether an alleged conviction has been proved. If any juror individually concludes that an alleged conviction has been proved, that juror may give the evidence whatever weight he or she believes is appropriate. On the other hand, if any juror individually concludes that an alleged conviction has not been proved, that juror must disregard the evidence completely.

If the case involves only one defendant, the court should use the word “defendant” throughout the instruction. If the case involves codefendants tried jointly, the court should insert the name of the specific defendant alleged to have been convicted of the prior felony in the places indicated in the instruction.

### AUTHORITY

- Factor (c). Pen. Code, § 190.3.
- Must Be Proved Beyond a Reasonable Doubt. *People v. Robertson* (1982) 33 Cal.3d 21, 53–55 [188 Cal.Rptr. 77, 655 P.2d 279]; *People v. Davenport* (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 281 [221 Cal.Rptr. 794, 710 P.2d 861].
- Must Pre-Date Current Offense. *People v. Balderas* (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 205 [222 Cal.Rptr. 184, 711 P.2d 480]; *People v. Kaurish* (1990) 52 Cal.3d 648, 702 [276 Cal.Rptr. 788, 802 P.2d 278].
- Defendant May Raise Constitutional Challenge to Prior. *People v. La Fargue* (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 878, 890 [195 Cal.Rptr. 438].
- Out-of-State Convictions. *People v. Lang* (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1038–1039 [264 Cal.Rptr. 386, 782 P.2d 627].
- Constitutional to Admit Evidence of Prior Convictions. *People v. Kaurish* (1990) 52 Cal.3d 648, 701 [276 Cal.Rptr. 788, 802 P.2d 278].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Out-of-State Felony Convictions*

“In the absence of limitation, a reference to ‘prior felony convictions’ is deemed to include any prior conviction which was a felony under the laws of the convicting jurisdiction.” (*People v. Lang* (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1038–1039 [264 Cal.Rptr. 386, 782 P.2d 627].) Thus, the out-of-state prior does not have to qualify as a felony under California law. (*Ibid.*)

#### *Constitutional Challenge*

The defendant may bring a constitutional challenge to the validity of the prior conviction. (*People v. La Fargue* (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 878, 890 [195 Cal.Rptr. 438].) If the conviction is from another country, the defendant may challenge the

prior on the basis that the foreign jurisdiction does not provide the procedural safeguards mandated by the United States Constitution. (*Ibid.*)

***Evidence of Charges and Underlying Facts Not Admissible, Only Conviction***

“Because the . . . burglaries were nonviolent crimes, only evidence authenticating defendant’s *conviction* for these crimes was relevant and admissible under section 190.3, factor (c). Unlike violent criminal activity admissible under factor (b), the *charges* leading to a conviction of a nonviolent crime are inadmissible.” (*People v. Kaurish* (1990) 52 Cal.3d 648, 703 [276 Cal.Rptr. 788, 802 P.2d 278] [emphasis in original]; *People v. Stanley* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 819 [42 Cal.Rptr.2d 543, 897 P.2d 481] [facts admissible under factor (b) but not under factor (c)].)

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

3 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, § 562.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 87, *Death Penalty*, §§ 87.23, 87.24 (Matthew Bender).

## 766. Death Penalty: Weighing Process

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**You have sole responsibility to decide which penalty (the/each) defendant will receive.**

**You must consider the arguments of counsel and all the evidence presented [during (both/all) phases of the trial] [except for the items of evidence I specifically instructed you not to consider].**

**In reaching your decision, you must consider, take into account, and be guided by the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Each of you is free to assign whatever moral or sympathetic value you find appropriate to each individual factor and to all of them together. Do not simply count the number of aggravating and mitigating factors and decide based on the higher number alone. Consider the relative or combined weight of the factors and evaluate them in terms of their relative convincing force on the question of punishment.**

**Each of you must decide for yourself whether aggravating or mitigating factors exist. You do not all need to agree whether such factors exist. If any juror individually concludes that a factor exists, that juror may give the factor whatever weight he or she believes is appropriate.**

**Determine which penalty is appropriate and justified by considering all the evidence and the totality of any aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Even without mitigating circumstances, you may decide that the aggravating circumstances are not substantial enough to warrant death. To return a judgment of death, each of you must be persuaded that the aggravating circumstances both outweigh the mitigating circumstances and are also so substantial in comparison to the mitigating circumstances that a sentence of death is appropriate and justified.**

**To return a verdict of either death or life without the possibility of parole, all 12 of you must agree on that verdict.**

**[You must separately consider which sentence to impose on each defendant. If you cannot agree on the sentence[s] for one [or more] defendant[s] but you do agree on the sentence[s] for the other defendant[s], then you must return a verdict for (the/each) defendant on whose sentence you do agree.]**

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2012, September 2020*

### **BENCH NOTES**

#### ***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct the jury on the weighing process in a capital case. (*People v. Brown* (1985) 40 Cal.3d 512, 544 [230 Cal.Rptr. 834, 726



P.2d 516]; *People v. Benson* (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 799 [276 Cal.Rptr. 827, 802 P.2d 330].)

Following this instruction, the court **must give** CALCRIM No. 3550, *Pre-Deliberation Instructions*, explaining how to proceed in deliberations.

### AUTHORITY

- Death Penalty Statute. Pen. Code, § 190.3.
- Error to Instruct “Shall Impose Death.” *People v. Brown* (1985) 40 Cal.3d 512, 544 [230 Cal.Rptr. 834, 726 P.2d 516].
- Must Instruct on Weighing Process. *People v. Brown* (1985) 40 Cal.3d 512, 544 [230 Cal.Rptr. 834, 726 P.2d 516]; *People v. Benson* (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 799 [276 Cal.Rptr. 827, 802 P.2d 330]; *People v. Duncan* (1991) 53 Cal.3d 955, 977–979 [281 Cal.Rptr. 273, 810 P.2d 131].
- Aggravating Factors “So Substantial in Comparison to” Mitigating. *People v. Duncan* (1991) 53 Cal.3d 955, 977–979 [281 Cal.Rptr. 273, 810 P.2d 131].
- This Instruction Approved in Dicta. *People v. Murtishaw* (2011) 51 Cal.4th 574, 588–589 [121 Cal.Rptr.3d 586, 247 P.3d 941].
- Responding to Juror Inquiry re Commutation of Sentence. *People v. Letner and Tobin* (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 204–207 [112 Cal.Rptr.3d 746, 235 P.3d 62].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### ***No Presumption of Life and No Reasonable Doubt Standard***

The court is not required to instruct the jury that there is a presumption in favor of a life sentence; that the aggravating factors (other than prior crimes) must be found beyond a reasonable doubt; or that the jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating factors substantially outweigh the mitigating factors. (*People v. Benson* (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 800 [276 Cal.Rptr. 827, 802 P.2d 330]; *People v. Miranda* (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 107 [241 Cal.Rptr. 594, 744 P.2d 1127]; *People v. Rodriguez* (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 777–779 [230 Cal.Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113].)

#### ***Unanimity on Factors Not Required***

The court is not required to instruct the jury that they must unanimously agree on any aggravating circumstance. (*People v. Rodriguez* (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 777–779 [230 Cal.Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113].)

#### ***Commutation Power***

The court must not state or imply to the jury that the ultimate authority for selecting the sentence to be imposed lies elsewhere. (*Caldwell v. Mississippi* (1985) 472 U.S. 320, 328–329 [105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231].)

#### ***Deadlock—No Duty to Inform Jury Not Required to Return Verdict***

“[W]here, as here, there is no jury deadlock, a court is not required to instruct the jury that it has the choice not to deliver any verdict.” (*People v. Miranda* (1987) 44



Cal.3d 57, 105 [241 Cal.Rptr. 594, 744 P.2d 1127].)

***Deadlock—Questions From the Jury About What Will Happen***

If the jury inquires about what will happen in the event of a deadlock, the court should instruct jurors: “[T]hat subject is not for the jury to consider or to concern itself with. You must make every effort to reach [a] unanimous decision if at all possible.” (*People v. Virgil* (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1210, 1281, [126 Cal.Rptr.3d 465, 253 P.3d 553], citing *People v. Thomas* (1992) 2 Cal.4th 489 [7 Cal.Rptr.2d 199, 828 P.2d 101].)

***No Duty to Instruct Not to Consider Deterrence or Costs***

“Questions of deterrence or cost in carrying out a capital sentence are for the Legislature, not for the jury considering a particular case.” (*People v. Benson* (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 807 [276 Cal.Rptr. 827, 802 P.2d 330] [citation and internal quotation marks omitted].) Where “[t]he issue of deterrence or cost [is] not raised at trial, either expressly or by implication,” the court need not instruct the jury to disregard these matters. (*Ibid.*)

## SECONDARY SOURCES

3 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, §§ 549–550, 584–587, 589–591.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 87, *Death Penalty*, §§ 87.23[2], 87.24[1] (Matthew Bender).

## 767. Jurors' Responsibility During Deliberation in Death Penalty Case

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**It is your responsibility to decide which penalty is appropriate for the defendant in this case. Base your decision only on the evidence you have heard in court and on the instructions that I have given you. Do not speculate or consider anything other than the evidence and my instructions.**

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*New April 2010; Revised April 2011, September 2020*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

This instruction may be given on request and must be given in response to a jury question about commutation of sentence. (*People v. Letner and Tobin* (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 204–207 [112 Cal.Rptr.3d 746, 235 P.3d 62]; *People v. Ramos* (1984) 37 Cal.3d 136, 159, fn. 12 [207 Cal.Rptr. 800, 689 P.2d 430]). “The key in *Ramos* is whether the jury raises the commutation issue so that it ‘cannot be avoided.’” (*People v. Bramit* (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1221, 1251 [96 Cal.Rptr.3d 574, 210 P.3d 1171] (conc. opn. of Moreno, J.)) Commutation instructions are proper, however, when the jury implicitly raises the issue of commutation. No direct question is necessary. (*People v. Beames* (2007) 40 Cal.4th 907, 932 [55 Cal.Rptr.3d 865, 153 P.3d 955].)

### AUTHORITY

- Instructional Requirements. Pen. Code, § 190.3; *People v. Letner and Tobin* (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 204–207 [112 Cal.Rptr.3d 746, 235 P.3d 62]; *People v. Ramos* (1984) 37 Cal.3d 136, 159, fn. 12 [207 Cal.Rptr. 800, 689 P.2d 430]).

### SECONDARY SOURCES

3 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, § 589.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 87, *Death Penalty*, § 87.02 (Matthew Bender).

## 768. Penalty Trial: Pre-Deliberation Instructions

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When you go to the jury room, the first thing you should do is (choose a foreperson/decide whether to retain the same foreperson). The foreperson should see to it that your discussions are carried on in an organized way and that everyone has a fair chance to be heard. Please treat one another courteously.

It is your duty to talk with one another and to deliberate in the jury room in order to agree on a penalty if you can. Each of you must decide the penalty for yourself, but only after you have discussed the evidence with the other jurors. Do not hesitate to change your mind if you become convinced that you are wrong. But do not change your mind just because other jurors disagree with you.

Keep an open mind and openly exchange your thoughts and ideas about this case. Stating your opinions too strongly at the beginning or immediately announcing how you plan to vote may interfere with an open discussion.

Do not talk about the case or about any of the people or any subject involved in it with anyone, including, but not limited to, your spouse or other family, or friends, spiritual leaders or advisors, or therapists. You must discuss the case only in the jury room and only when all jurors are present. Do not discuss your deliberations with anyone. Do not communicate using: \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert currently popular social media>* \_\_\_\_\_ during your deliberations.

It is very important that you not use the Internet (, a dictionary/[, or \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert other relevant source of information>*]) in any way in connection with this case during your deliberations or at any time until your jury service is completed.

[During the trial, several items were received into evidence as exhibits. You may examine whatever exhibits you think will help you in your deliberations. (These exhibits will be sent into the jury room with you when you begin to deliberate./If you wish to see any exhibits, please request them in writing.)]

If you need to communicate with me while you are deliberating, send a note through the bailiff, signed by the foreperson or by one or more members of the jury. To have a complete record of this trial, it is important that you not communicate with me except by a written note. If you have questions, I will talk with the attorneys before I answer, so it may take some time. You should continue your deliberations while you wait for my answer. I will answer any questions in writing or orally here in open court.

**Do not reveal to me or anyone else any aspect of your deliberations or how the vote stands on the question of penalty unless I ask you to do so.**

**Your verdict of either death or life without possibility of parole must be unanimous. This means that, to return a verdict, all of you must agree to it. [Do not reach a decision by the flip of a coin or by any similar act.]**

*<During a retrial, give the following paragraph on request to inform jury about prior proceedings without introducing extraneous matters>*

**[Sometimes issues are tried in separate trials. The only issue in this trial is the penalty.]**

**It is not my role to tell you what your verdict should be. [Do not take anything I said or did during the trial as an indication of what I think about the facts, the witnesses, or what your verdict should be.]**

**You will be given [a] verdict form[s]. As soon as all jurors have agreed on a verdict, the foreperson must date and sign the [appropriate] verdict form[s] and notify the bailiff.**

*New March 2021*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct that the jury’s verdict must be unanimous. Although there is no sua sponte duty to instruct on the other topics relating to deliberations, there is authority approving such instructions. (See *People v. Gainer* (1977) 19 Cal.3d 835, 856 [139 Cal.Rptr. 861, 566 P.2d 997]; *People v. Selby* (1926) 198 Cal. 426, 439 [245 P. 426]; *People v. Hunt* (1915) 26 Cal.App. 514, 517 [147 P. 476].)

If the court automatically sends exhibits into the jury room, give the bracketed sentence that begins with “These exhibits will be sent into the jury room.” If not, give the bracketed phrase that begins with “You may examine whatever exhibits you think.”

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “Do not take anything I said or did during the trial” unless the court will be commenting on the evidence. (See Pen. Code, §§ 1127, 1093(f).)

Give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “Sometimes issues are tried in separate trials” if requested. (*People v. Hicks* (2017) 4 Cal.5th 203, 205 [226 Cal.Rptr.3d 565, 407 P.3d 409].)

## AUTHORITY

- Exhibits. Pen. Code, § 1137.
- Questions. Pen. Code, § 1138.
- Verdict Forms. Pen. Code, § 1140.

- Unanimous Verdict. Cal. Const., art. I, § 16; Pen. Code, § 190.4(b); *People v. Howard* (1930) 211 Cal. 322, 325 [295 P. 333]; *People v. Kelso* (1945) 25 Cal.2d 848, 853–854 [155 P.2d 819]; *People v. Collins* (1976) 17 Cal.3d 687, 692 [131 Cal.Rptr. 782, 552 P.2d 742]; *People v. Anderson* (2018) 5 Cal.5th 372, 425 [235 Cal.Rptr.3d 1].
- Duty to Deliberate. *People v. Gainer* (1977) 19 Cal.3d 835, 856 [139 Cal.Rptr. 861, 566 P.2d 997].
- Judge’s Conduct as Indication of Verdict. *People v. Hunt* (1915) 26 Cal.App. 514, 517 [147 P. 476].
- Keep an Open Mind. *People v. Selby* (1926) 198 Cal. 426, 439 [245 P. 426].
- Hung Jury. *People v. Gainer* (1977) 19 Cal.3d 835, 850–852 [139 Cal.Rptr. 861, 566 P.2d 997]; *People v. Moore* (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1118–1121 [117 Cal.Rptr.2d 715].

## RELATED ISSUES

### *Admonition Not to Discuss Case with Anyone*

In *People v. Danks* (2004) 32 Cal.4th 269, 298–300 [8 Cal.Rptr.3d 767, 82 P.3d 1249], a capital case, two jurors violated the court’s admonition not to discuss the case with anyone by consulting with their pastors regarding the death penalty. The Supreme Court stated:

It is troubling that during deliberations not one but two jurors had conversations with their pastors that ultimately addressed the issue being resolved at the penalty phase in this case. Because jurors instructed not to speak to anyone about the case except a fellow juror during deliberations . . . may assume such an instruction does not apply to confidential relationships, we recommend the jury be expressly instructed that they may not speak to anyone about the case, except a fellow juror during deliberations, and that this includes, but is not limited to, spouses, spiritual leaders or advisers, or therapists. Moreover, the jury should also be instructed that if anyone, other than a fellow juror during deliberations, tells a juror his or her view of the evidence in the case, the juror should report that conversation immediately to the court.

(*Id.* at p. 306, fn. 11.)

The court may, in its discretion, add the suggested language to the fourth paragraph of this instruction.

## SECONDARY SOURCES

4 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial §§ 726–727.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, §§ 85.02, 85.03[1], 85.05[1] (Matthew Bender).

### **769–774. Reserved for Future Use**

## 775. Death Penalty: Mental Retardation (Pen. Code, § 1376)

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I will now instruct you on the law that applies to this [phase of the] case.

[You must disregard all the instructions I gave you earlier and decide this phase of the trial applying only the instructions that I am giving you now. Some of these instructions will be the same or similar to instructions you have heard before. However, you must follow only this new set of instructions in this phase of the trial.]

You must decide whether the defendant is mentally retarded.

In order to establish that (he/she) is mentally retarded, the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that:

1. (His/Her) general intellectual functioning is significantly below average;
2. (He/She) also has deficits in two or more areas of adaptive behavior;

AND

3. These conditions were observable before the defendant reached the age of 18 years.

*Adaptive behavior* is the set of learned skills that people generally need to function in their everyday lives. Those skill areas include communication, self-care, home-living, social/interpersonal skills, use of community resources, self-direction, functional academic skills, work, leisure, health and safety.

*Proof by a preponderance of the evidence* is a different standard than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. To meet the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence, the defendant must prove that it is more likely than not that (he/she) is mentally retarded. If the defendant has not met this burden, you must find that (he/she) has not proved that (he/she) is mentally retarded. In order to return a finding that the defendant is or is not mentally retarded, you must all agree on that finding.

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*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on general concepts of law. (*People v. Babbitt* (1988) 45 Cal.3d 660, 718 [248 Cal.Rptr. 69, 755 P.2d 253].) In the context of penalty phase instructions, the Supreme Court has stated that the trial court must clarify for the jury which instructions apply to the penalty phase. (*People v. Babbitt*,

*supra*, 45 Cal.3d at p. 718, fn. 26; *People v. Weaver* (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 982 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 29 P.3d 103], cert. den. sub nom. *Weaver v. California* (2002) 535 U.S. 1058 [122 S.Ct. 1920, 152 L.Ed.2d 828].) In order to avoid confusion, the Supreme Court has indicated that the preferable practice is for the court to provide the jury with a completely new set of instructions. (*People v. Weaver, supra*, 26 Cal.4th at p. 982.) The committee recommends this approach in the mental retardation phase as well.

When the defendant in a capital trial raises the issue of mental retardation, the jury must decide the question unless the defendant has waived a jury on the issue. (Pen. Code, § 1376(b)(1).) The hearing on mental retardation shall be conducted after the guilt phase and prior to the penalty phase. (*Ibid.*) If the defendant has entered a plea of not guilty by insanity, the hearing on mental retardation shall be conducted after the sanity phase. (Pen. Code, § 1376(e).) The defense bears the burden of proving mental retardation by a preponderance of the evidence. (Pen. Code, § 1376(b)(2).)

The court **must** also give any necessary instructions on witnesses and evidence, such as CALCRIM No. 222, *Evidence*, CALCRIM No. 226, *Witnesses*, and CALCRIM No. 332, *Expert Witness*. The court must conclude with CALCRIM No. 3550, *Pre-Deliberation Instructions*.

### AUTHORITY

- Hearing on Mental Retardation in Death Penalty Case. Pen. Code, § 1376.
- Execution of Mentally Retarded Unconstitutional. *Atkins v. Virginia* (2002) 536 U.S. 304, 319–321 [122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335].
- Mental Retardation Defined. Pen. Code, § 1376(a); *In re Hawthorne* (2005) 35 Cal.4th 40, 47–49 [24 Cal.Rptr.3d 189, 105 P.3d 552]; American Association on Mental Retardation, [http://www.aamr.org/Policies/faq\\_mental\\_retardation.shtml](http://www.aamr.org/Policies/faq_mental_retardation.shtml) (accessed August 16, 2006 [case sensitive]).
- Should Give Jury New Set of Instructions (Penalty Phase). *People v. Weaver* (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 982 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 29 P.3d 103], cert. den. sub nom. *Weaver v. California* (2002) 535 U.S. 1058 [122 S.Ct. 1920, 152 L.Ed.2d 828].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Scope of Expert Testing*

When the defendant places at issue the question of whether he or she is mentally retarded, the defendant must submit to examination by a prosecution expert. (*Centeno v. Superior Court* (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 30, 40 [11 Cal.Rptr.3d 533].) “However, those examinations are permissible only to the extent they are reasonably related to the determination of the existence of the mental condition raised . . . [On] a defense objection to specific proposed prosecution tests, the trial court must make a threshold determination that the tests bear some reasonable relation to measuring mental retardation, including factors that might confound or explain the testing, such as malingering . . . The trial court must prohibit any tests it concludes are not reasonably related to determining mental retardation.” (*Id.* at p. 45.)

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 87, *Death Penalty*, §§ 87.16, 87.17, 87.18 (Matthew Bender).

**776–799 Reserved for Future Use**



## ASSAULTIVE AND BATTERY CRIMES

### A. MAYHEM

800. Aggravated Mayhem (Pen. Code, § 205)

801. Mayhem (Pen. Code, § 203)

802–809. Reserved for Future Use

### B. TORTURE

810. Torture (Pen. Code, § 206)

811–819. Reserved for Future Use

### C. ABUSE OF OR INJURY TO CHILD, ELDER OR DEPENDENT ADULT, SPOUSE

#### (i) Child

820. Assault Causing Death of Child (Pen. Code, § 273ab(a))

821. Child Abuse Likely to Produce Great Bodily Harm or Death (Pen. Code, § 273a(a))

822. Inflicting Physical Punishment on Child (Pen. Code, § 273d(a))

823. Child Abuse (Misdemeanor) (Pen. Code, § 273a(b))

824–829. Reserved for Future Use

#### (ii) Elder or Dependent Adult

830. Abuse of Elder or Dependent Adult Likely to Produce Great Bodily Harm or Death (Pen. Code, § 368(b)(1))

831. Abuse of Elder or Dependent Adult (Pen. Code, § 368(c))

832–839. Reserved for Future Use

#### (iii) Spouse, etc.

840. Inflicting Injury on Spouse, Cohabitant, or Fellow Parent Resulting in Traumatic Condition (Pen. Code, § 273.5(a))

841. Simple Battery: Against Spouse, Cohabitant, or Fellow Parent (Pen. Code, § 243(e)(1))

842–849. Reserved for Future Use

#### (iv) Evidence

850. Testimony on Intimate Partner Battering and Its Effects: Credibility of Complaining Witness

851. Testimony on Intimate Partner Battering and Its Effects: Offered by the Defense

852A. Evidence of Uncharged Domestic Violence

852B. Evidence of Charged Domestic Violence

853A. Evidence of Uncharged Abuse of Elder or Dependent Person

853B. Evidence of Charged Abuse of Elder or Dependent Person

854–859. Reserved for Future Use

**D. ASSAULT**

**(i) With Weapon or Force Likely**

**(A) On Specified People**

860. Assault on Firefighter or Peace Officer With Deadly Weapon or Force Likely to Produce Great Bodily Injury (Pen. Code, §§ 240, 245(c) & (d))

861. Assault on Firefighter or Peace Officer With Stun Gun or Less Lethal Weapon (Pen. Code, §§ 240, 244.5(c))

862. Assault on Custodial Officer With Deadly Weapon or Force Likely to Produce Great Bodily Injury (Pen. Code, §§ 240, 245, 245.3)

863. Assault on Transportation Personnel or Passenger With Deadly Weapon or Force Likely to Produce Great Bodily Injury (Pen. Code, §§ 240, 245, 245.2)

864–874. Reserved for Future Use

**(B) General**

875. Assault With Deadly Weapon or Force Likely to Produce Great Bodily Injury (Pen. Code, §§ 240, 245(a)(1)–(4), (b))

876. Assault With Stun Gun or Less Lethal Weapon (Pen. Code, §§ 240, 244.5(b))

877. Assault With Caustic Chemicals (Pen. Code, § 244)

878–889. Reserved for Future Use

**(ii) With Intent to Commit Other Offense**

890. Assault With Intent to Commit Specified Crimes [While Committing First Degree Burglary] (Pen. Code, § 220(a), (b))

891. Assault With Intent to Commit Mayhem (Pen. Code, § 220(a))

892–899. Reserved for Future Use

**(iii) Simple Assault on Specified People or in Specified Location**

900. Assault on Firefighter, Peace Officer or Other Specified Victim (Pen. Code, §§ 240, 241)

901. Assault on Custodial Officer (Pen. Code, §§ 240, 241.1)

902. Assault on Military Personnel (Pen. Code, §§ 240, 241.8)

903. Assault on School District Peace Officer (Pen. Code, §§ 240, 241.4)

904. Assault on School Employee (Pen. Code, §§ 240, 241.6)

905. Assault on Juror (Pen. Code, §§ 240, 241.7)

906. Assault Committed on School or Park Property (Pen. Code, §§ 240, 241.2)

907. Assault Committed on Public Transportation Provider’s Property or Vehicle (Pen. Code, §§ 240, 241.3)

908–914. Reserved for Future Use

**(iv) Simple Assault**

915. Simple Assault (Pen. Code, § 240)

## ASSAULTIVE AND BATTERY CRIMES

- 916. Assault by Conditional Threat
- 917. Insulting Words Are Not a Defense
- 918–924. Reserved for Future Use

### **E. BATTERY**

#### **(i) Causing Injury**

- 925. Battery Causing Serious Bodily Injury (Pen. Code, §§ 242, 243(d))
- 926. Battery Causing Injury to Specified Victim Not a Peace Officer (Pen. Code, §§ 242, 243(b)–(c)(1))
- 927–934. Reserved for Future Use

#### **(ii) Sexual Battery**

- 935. Sexual Battery: Felony (Pen. Code, §§ 242, 243.4(a) & (d))
- 936. Sexual Battery on Institutionalized Victim (Pen. Code, §§ 242, 243.4(b) & (d))
- 937. Sexual Battery: By Fraudulent Representation (Pen. Code, §§ 242, 243.4(c))
- 938. Sexual Battery: Misdemeanor (Pen. Code, § 243.4(e)(1))
- 939–944. Reserved for Future Use

#### **(iii) On Specified Person or in Specified Location**

- 945. Battery Against Peace Officer (Pen. Code, §§ 242, 243(b), (c)(2))
- 946. Battery Against Custodial Officer (Pen. Code, §§ 242, 243.1)
- 947. Simple Battery on Military Personnel (Pen. Code, §§ 242, 243.10)
- 948. Battery Against Transportation Personnel or Passenger (Pen. Code, §§ 242, 243.3)
- 949. Battery Against School Employee (Pen. Code, §§ 242, 243.6)
- 950. Battery Against a Juror (Pen. Code, §§ 242, 243.7)
- 951. Battery Committed on School, Park, or Hospital Property (Pen. Code, §§ 242, 243.2)
- 952–959. Reserved for Future Use

#### **(iv) Simple Battery**

- 960. Simple Battery (Pen. Code, § 242)
- 961–964. Reserved for Future Use

### **F. SHOOTING AND BRANDISHING**

#### **(i) Shooting**

- 965. Shooting at Inhabited House or Occupied Motor Vehicle (Pen. Code, § 246)
- 966. Shooting at Uninhabited House or Unoccupied Motor Vehicle (Pen. Code, § 247(b))
- 967. Shooting at Unoccupied Aircraft (Pen. Code, § 247(a))
- 968. Shooting From Motor Vehicle (Pen. Code, § 26100(c) & (d))
- 969. Permitting Someone to Shoot From Vehicle (Pen. Code, § 26100(b))

970. Shooting Firearm or BB Device in Grossly Negligent Manner (Pen. Code, § 246.3)

971–979. Reserved for Future Use

**(ii) Brandishing**

980. Brandishing Firearm in Presence of Occupant of Motor Vehicle (Pen. Code, § 417.3)

981. Brandishing Firearm in Presence of Peace Officer (Pen. Code, § 417(c) & (e))

982. Brandishing Firearm or Deadly Weapon to Resist Arrest (Pen. Code, § 417.8)

983. Brandishing Firearm or Deadly Weapon: Misdemeanor (Pen. Code, § 417(a)(1) & (2))

984. Brandishing Firearm: Misdemeanor—Public Place (Pen. Code, § 417(a)(2)(A))

985. Brandishing Imitation Firearm (Pen. Code, § 417.4)

986–999. Reserved for Future Use

## A. MAYHEM

### 800. Aggravated Mayhem (Pen. Code, § 205)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with aggravated mayhem [in violation of Penal Code section 205].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant unlawfully and maliciously (disabled or disfigured someone permanently/ [or] deprived someone else of a limb, organ, or part of (his/her) body);
2. When the defendant acted, (he/she) intended to (permanently disable or disfigure the other person/ [or] deprive the other person of a limb, organ, or part of (his/her) body);

AND

3. Under the circumstances, the defendant's act showed extreme indifference to the physical or psychological well-being of the other person.

Someone acts *maliciously* when he or she intentionally does a wrongful act or when he or she acts with the unlawful intent to annoy or injure someone else.

[A disfiguring injury may be *permanent* even if it can be repaired by medical procedures.]

[The People do not have to prove that the defendant intended to kill.]

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2015, September 2018*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

In element 1, give the first option if the defendant was prosecuted for permanently disabling or disfiguring the victim. Give the second option if the defendant was prosecuted for depriving someone of a limb, organ, or body part. (See Pen. Code, § 205.)

The bracketed sentence regarding “permanent injury” may be given on request if there is evidence that the injury may be repaired by medical procedures. (*People v. Hill* (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1566, 1574–1575 [28 Cal.Rptr.2d 783] [not error to

instruct that an injury may be permanent even though cosmetic repair may be medically feasible.)

The bracketed sentence stating that “The People do not have to prove that the defendant intended to kill,” may be given on request if there is no evidence or conflicting evidence that the defendant intended to kill someone. (See Pen. Code, § 205.)

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 205.
- Malicious Defined. Pen. Code, § 7, subd. 4; *People v. Lopez* (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 545, 550 [222 Cal.Rptr. 101].
- Permanent Disability. See, e.g., *People v. Thomas* (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 507, 512 [158 Cal.Rptr. 120] [serious ankle injury lasting over six months], overruled on other grounds *People v. Kimble* (1988) 44 Cal.3d 480, 498 [244 Cal.Rptr. 148, 749 P.2d 803].
- Permanent Disfigurement. See *People v. Hill* (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1566, 1571 [28 Cal.Rptr.2d 783]; see also *People v. Newble* (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 444, 451 [174 Cal.Rptr. 637] [head is member of body for purposes of disfigurement].
- Specific Intent to Cause Maiming Injury. *People v. Ferrell* (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 828, 833 [267 Cal.Rptr. 283]; *People v. Lee* (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 320, 324–325 [269 Cal.Rptr. 434].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Simple Mayhem. *People v. Robinson* (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 69, 77–80 [180 Cal.Rptr.3d 796].
- Attempted Aggravated Mayhem. Pen. Code, §§ 205, 663.
- Assault. Pen. Code, § 240.
- Battery. Pen. Code, § 242.

Assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245(a)(1)) is not a lesser included offense to mayhem. (*People v. Ausbie* (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 855, 862–863 [20 Cal.Rptr.3d 371]).

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Victim Must Be Alive*

A victim of mayhem must be alive at the time of the act. (*People v. Kraft* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1058 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 5 P.3d 68]; see *People v. Jentry* (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 615, 629 [138 Cal.Rptr. 250].)

#### *Evidence of Indiscriminate Attack or Actual Injury Constituting Mayhem Insufficient to Show Specific Intent*

“Aggravated mayhem . . . requires the specific intent to cause the maiming injury. [Citation.] Evidence that shows no more than an ‘indiscriminate attack’ is insufficient to prove the required specific intent. [Citation.] Furthermore, specific

intent to maim may not be inferred solely from evidence that the injury inflicted actually constitutes mayhem; instead, there must be other facts and circumstances which support an inference of intent to maim rather than to attack indiscriminately. [Citation.]” (*People v. Park* (2000) 112 Cal.App.4th 61, 64 [4 Cal.Rptr.3d 815].)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

4 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person §§ 89–91.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.16[2] (Matthew Bender).

## 801. Mayhem (Pen. Code, § 203)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with mayhem [in violation of Penal Code section 203].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of mayhem, the People must prove that the defendant unlawfully and maliciously:

[1. Removed a part of someone's body(;/.)]

[OR]

[2. Disabled or made useless a part of someone's body and the disability was more than slight or temporary(;/.)]

[OR]

[3. Permanently disfigured someone(;/.)]

[OR]

[4. Cut or disabled someone's tongue(;/.)]

[OR]

[5. Slit someone's (nose[, ]/ear[,]/ [or] lip) (;/.)]

[OR]

[6. Put out someone's eye or injured someone's eye in a way that so significantly reduced (his/her) ability to see that the eye was useless for the purpose of ordinary sight.]

Someone acts *maliciously* when he or she intentionally does a wrongful act or when he or she acts with the unlawful intent to annoy or injure someone else.

[A disfiguring injury may be *permanent* even if it can be repaired by medical procedures.]

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2006, February 2014, March 2017*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

Whether the complaining witness suffered a serious bodily injury is a question for the jury to determine. If the defendant disputes that the injury suffered was a serious bodily injury, use the first bracketed paragraph. If the parties stipulate that the injury suffered was a serious bodily injury, use the second bracketed paragraph.



The last bracketed sentence may be given on request if there is evidence of a disfiguring injury that may be repaired by medical procedures. (See *People v. Hill* (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1566, 1574–1575 [28 Cal.Rptr.2d 783] [not error to instruct that injury may be permanent even though cosmetic repair may be medically feasible].)

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 203.
- Malicious Defined. Pen. Code, § 7, subd. 4; *People v. Lopez* (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 545, 550 [222 Cal.Rptr. 101].
- No Serious Bodily Injury Requirement. *People v. Santana* (2013) 56 Cal.4th 999, 1010 [157 Cal.Rptr.3d 547, 301 P.3d 1157].
- Disabled. See, e.g., *People v. Thomas* (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 507, 512 [158 Cal.Rptr. 120] [serious ankle injury lasting over six months], overruled on other grounds in *People v. Kimble* (1988) 44 Cal.3d 480, 498 [244 Cal.Rptr. 148, 749 P.2d 803].
- General Intent Crime. *People v. Villegas* (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1226 [113 Cal.Rptr.2d 1]; *People v. Sekona* (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 443, 453 [32 Cal.Rptr.2d 606].
- Permanent Disfigurement. *People v. Hill* (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1566, 1571 [28 Cal.Rptr.2d 783]; *Goodman v. Superior Court* (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 621, 624 [148 Cal.Rptr. 799]; see also *People v. Newble* (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 444, 451 [174 Cal.Rptr. 637] [head is member of body for purposes of disfigurement].
- Put Out Eye. *People v. Dennis* (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 1135, 1138 [215 Cal.Rptr. 750]; *People v. Green* (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 1, 3–4 [130 Cal.Rptr. 318] [addressing corrective lenses]; *People v. Nunes* (1920) 47 Cal.App. 346, 350 [190 P. 486].
- Slit Lip. *People v. Caldwell* (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 947, 952 [200 Cal.Rptr. 508] [defendant bit through victim’s lower lip].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Attempted Mayhem. Pen. Code, §§ 203, 663.
- Assault. Pen. Code, § 240; see *People v. De Angelis* (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 837, 841 [159 Cal.Rptr. 111] [mayhem occurred during continuing assault].
- Battery. Pen. Code, § 242.

Assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245(a)(1)) is not a lesser included offense to mayhem. (*People v. Ausbie* (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 855, 862–863 [20 Cal.Rptr.3d 371].)

Battery with serious bodily injury is not a lesser included offense of mayhem under the statutory elements test. *People v. Poisson* (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 121, 123–125 [200 Cal.Rptr.3d 542].

## RELATED ISSUES

### *Disfigurement*

Disfigurement constitutes mayhem “only when the injury is permanent.” (*Goodman v. Superior Court* (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 621, 624 [148 Cal.Rptr. 799]; *People v. Hill* (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1566, 1571 [28 Cal.Rptr.2d 783].) However, the “possibility that a victim’s disfigurement might be alleviated through reconstructive surgery is no bar to a finding of ‘permanent’ injury.” (*People v. Williams* (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1767, 1774 [54 Cal.Rptr.2d 521].) “We . . . reject [the] contention that evidence of medical alleviation may be used in a mayhem trial to prove an injury, permanent by its nature, may be corrected by medical procedures.” (*People v. Hill, supra*, 23 Cal.App.4th at p. 1574.) In addition, “[t]he fact that [disfiguring injuries] are on a normally unexposed portion of [a] body does not render them any less significant.” (*People v. Keenan* (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 26, 36 [277 Cal.Rptr. 687] [burns inflicted on victim’s breasts by a cigarette].)

### *Imperfect Self-Defense Not Available*

“[A]part from the *McKelvy* lead opinion, there is no authority to support [the] claim that the mere use of the term ‘malicious’ in section 203 requires a court to instruct a jury that an actual but unreasonable belief will negate the malice required to convict for mayhem . . . . [Mayhem] involves a different requisite mental state and has no statutory history recognizing a malice aforethought element or the availability of the *Flannel* defense.” (*People v. Sekona* (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 443, 457 [32 Cal.Rptr.2d 606]; contra, *People v. McKelvy* (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 694, 702–704 [239 Cal.Rptr. 782] (lead opn. of Kline, P.J.).)

### *Victim Must Be Alive*

A victim of mayhem must be alive at the time of the act. (*People v. Kraft* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1058 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 5 P.3d 68]; see *People v. Jentry* (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 615, 629 [138 Cal.Rptr. 250].)

## SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, §§ 84–88.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.16 (Matthew Bender).

### **802–809. Reserved for Future Use**

## B. TORTURE

### 810. Torture (Pen. Code, § 206)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with torture [in violation of Penal Code section 206].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant inflicted great bodily injury on someone else;

AND

2. When inflicting the injury, the defendant intended to cause cruel or extreme pain and suffering for the purpose of revenge, extortion, persuasion, or for any sadistic purpose.

*Great bodily injury* means significant or substantial physical injury. It is an injury that is greater than minor or moderate harm.

[It is not required that a victim actually suffer pain.]

[Someone acts for the purpose of *extortion* if he or she intends to (1) obtain a person's property with the person's consent and (2) obtain the person's consent through the use of force or fear.]

[Someone acts for the purpose of *extortion* if he or she (1) intends to get a public official to do an official act and (2) uses force or fear to make the official do the act. An *official act* is an act that an officer does in his or her official capacity using the authority of his or her public office.]

[Someone acts with a *sadistic purpose* if he or she intends to inflict pain on someone else in order to experience pleasure himself or herself.]

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*New January 2006; Revised September 2020*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

Unlike murder by torture, the crime of torture does not require that the intent to cause pain be premeditated or that any cruel or extreme pain be prolonged. (*People v. Pre* (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 413, 419–420 [11 Cal.Rptr.3d 739]; *People v. Aguilar* (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1196, 1204–1205 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 619]; *People v. Vital* (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 441, 444 [52 Cal.Rptr.2d 676].) Torture as defined in section 206 of the Penal Code focuses on the mental state of the perpetrator and not the

actual pain inflicted. (*People v. Hale* (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 94, 108 [88 Cal.Rptr.2d 904].) Give the first bracketed paragraph on request if there is no proof that the alleged victim actually suffered pain. (See Pen. Code, § 206.)

“Extortion” need not be defined for purposes of torture. (*People v. Barrera* (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1555, 1564 [18 Cal.Rptr.2d 395]; but see *People v. Hill* (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 661, 668 [190 Cal.Rptr. 628] [term should be defined for kidnapping under Pen. Code, § 209].) Nevertheless, either of the bracketed definitions of extortion, and the related definition of “official act,” may be given on request if any of these issues are raised in the case. (See Pen. Code, § 518 [defining “extortion”]; *People v. Norris* (1985) 40 Cal.3d 51, 55–56 [219 Cal.Rptr. 7, 706 P.2d 1141] [defining “official act”].) Extortion may also be committed by using “the color of official right” to make an official do an act. (Pen. Code, § 518; see *Evans v. United States* (1992) 504 U.S. 255, 258 [112 S.Ct. 1881, 119 L.Ed.2d 57]; *McCormick v. United States* (1990) 500 U.S. 257, 273 [111 S.Ct. 1807, 114 L.Ed.2d 307] [both discussing common law definition of the term].) It appears that this type of extortion would rarely occur in the context of torture, so it is excluded from this instruction.

“Sadistic purpose” may be defined on request. (See *People v. Barrera, supra*, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 1564; *People v. Raley* (1992) 2 Cal.4th 870, 899–901 [8 Cal.Rptr.2d 678, 830 P.2d 712] [approving use of phrase in torture-murder and special circumstances torture-murder instructions].)

The second sentence of the great bodily injury definition could result in error if the prosecution improperly argues great bodily injury may be shown by greater than minor injury alone. (Compare *People v. Medellin* (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 519, 533–535 [258 Cal.Rptr.3d 867] [the definition was reasonably susceptible to prosecutor’s erroneous argument that the injury need only be greater than minor] with *People v. Quinonez* (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 457, 466 [260 Cal.Rptr.3d 86] [upholding instructions containing great bodily injury definition as written].)

### **Related Instructions**

First degree murder by torture defines torture differently for the purposes of murder. See CALCRIM No. 521, *Murder: Degrees*.

### **AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 206.
- Extortion Defined. Pen. Code, § 518.
- Great Bodily Injury Defined. Pen. Code, § 12022.7(f); see, e.g., *People v. Hale* (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 94, 108 [88 Cal.Rptr.2d 904] [broken and smashed teeth, split lip, and facial cut sufficient evidence of great bodily injury].
- Cruel Pain Equivalent to Extreme or Severe Pain. *People v. Aguilar* (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1196, 1202 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 619].
- Intent. *People v. Pre* (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 413, 419–420 [11 Cal.Rptr.3d 739]; *People v. Hale* (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 94, 106–107 [88 Cal.Rptr.2d 904]; *People v. Jung* (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1036, 1042–1043 [84 Cal.Rptr.2d 5]; see *People v. Aguilar* (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1196, 1204–1206 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 619]

[neither premeditation nor intent to inflict prolonged pain are elements of torture].

- Sadistic Purpose Defined. *People v. Raley* (1992) 2 Cal.4th 870, 899–901 [8 Cal.Rptr.2d 678, 830 P.2d 712]; *People v. Aguilar* (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1196, 1202–1204 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 619]; see *People v. Healy* (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1142 [18 Cal.Rptr.2d 274] [sexual element not required].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

In *People v. Martinez* (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1035, 1042–1046 [23 Cal.Rptr.3d 508], the court held that none of the following offenses were lesser included offenses to torture: assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245(a)(1)); corporal injury on a cohabitant (Pen. Code, § 273.5); forcible rape (Pen. Code, § 261(a)(2)); forcible oral copulation (Pen. Code, § 287(c)); criminal threats (Pen. Code, § 422); dissuading a witness by force or threats (Pen. Code, § 136.1(c)(1)); false imprisonment by violence. (Pen. Code, § 236.)

The court did not decide whether assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury is a lesser included offense to torture. (*Id.* at p. 1043–1044.)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, §§ 92–95.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.15 (Matthew Bender).

**811–819. Reserved for Future Use**



## C. ABUSE OF OR INJURY TO CHILD, ELDER OR DEPENDENT ADULT, SPOUSE

### (i) Child

#### 820. Assault Causing Death of Child (Pen. Code, § 273ab(a))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with killing a child under the age of 8 by assaulting the child with force likely to produce great bodily injury [in violation of Penal Code section 273ab(a)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant had care or custody of a child who was under the age of 8;
2. The defendant did an act that by its nature would directly and probably result in the application of force to the child;
3. The defendant did that act willfully;
4. The force used was likely to produce great bodily injury;
5. When the defendant acted, (he/she) was aware of facts that would lead a reasonable person to realize that (his/her) act by its nature would directly and probably result in great bodily injury to the child;
6. When the defendant acted, (he/she) had the present ability to apply force likely to produce great bodily injury to the child;

[AND]

7. The defendant's act caused the child's death(;/.)

<Give element 8 when instructing on parental right to discipline>

[AND]

8. When the defendant acted, (he/she) was not reasonably disciplining a child.]

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose. It is not required that he or she intend to break the law, hurt someone else, or gain any advantage.

*Great bodily injury* means significant or substantial physical injury. It is an injury that is greater than minor or moderate harm.

An act *causes death* if:

1. The death was the natural and probable consequence of the act;
  2. The act was a direct and substantial factor in causing the death;
- AND
3. The death would not have happened without the act.

*A natural and probable consequence* is one that a reasonable person would know is likely to happen if nothing unusual intervenes. In deciding whether a consequence is natural and probable, consider all of the circumstances established by the evidence.

*A substantial factor* is more than a trivial or remote factor. However, it does not need to be the only factor that caused the death.

[Under the law, a person becomes one year older as soon as the first minute of his or her birthday has begun.]

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2014, September 2020*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If there is sufficient evidence, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense of disciplining a child. (*People v. Whitehurst* (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1045, 1049 [12 Cal.Rptr.2d 33].) Give bracketed element 8 and CALCRIM No. 3405, *Parental Right to Punish a Child*.

Give the bracketed paragraph about calculating age if requested. (Fam. Code, § 6500; *In re Harris* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 849–850 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391].)

The second sentence of the great bodily injury definition could result in error if the prosecution improperly argues great bodily injury may be shown by greater than minor injury alone. (Compare *People v. Medellin* (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 519, 533–535 [258 Cal.Rptr.3d 867] [the definition was reasonably susceptible to prosecutor’s erroneous argument that the injury need only be greater than minor] with *People v. Quinonez* (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 457, 466 [260 Cal.Rptr.3d 86] [upholding instructions containing great bodily injury definition as written].)

### *Related Instructions*

CALCRIM No. 875, *Assault With Deadly Weapon or Force Likely to Produce Great Bodily Injury*.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 273ab(a); see *People v. Malfavon* (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 727, 735 [125 Cal.Rptr.2d 618] [sometimes called “child abuse homicide”].



- Great Bodily Injury Defined. Pen. Code, § 12022.7(f); *People v. Albritton* (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 647, 658 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 169].
- Willful Defined. Pen. Code, § 7, subd. 1; see *People v. Lara* (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 102, 107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
- Force Likely to Produce Great Bodily Injury. *People v. Preller* (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 93, 97–98 [62 Cal.Rptr.2d 507] [need not prove that reasonable person would believe force would be likely to result in child’s death].
- General Intent Crime. *People v. Albritton* (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 647, 658–659 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 169].
- Mental State for Assault. *People v. Williams* (2001) 26 Cal.4th 779, 790 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 114, 29 P.3d 197].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Attempted Assault on Child With Force Likely to Produce Great Bodily Injury. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 273ab(b).
- Assault. Pen. Code, § 240.
- Assault With Force Likely to Produce Great Bodily Injury. Pen. Code, § 245(a)(1); *People v. Basuta* (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 370, 392 [114 Cal.Rptr.2d 285].

Involuntary manslaughter is not a lesser included offense of Penal Code section 273ab. (*People v. Stewart* (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 785, 796 [91 Cal.Rptr.2d 888]; *Orlina v. Superior Court* (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 258, 261–262 [86 Cal.Rptr.2d 384].)

Neither murder nor child abuse homicide is a necessarily included offense within the other. (*People v. Malfavon* (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 727, 743–744 [125 Cal.Rptr.2d 618].)

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Care or Custody*

“The terms ‘care or custody’ do not imply a familial relationship but only a willingness to assume duties correspondent to the role of a caregiver.” (*People v. Cochran* (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 826, 832 [73 Cal.Rptr.2d 257].)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, § 115.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, §§ 142.13[2A], 142.23[7] (Matthew Bender).

**821. Child Abuse Likely to Produce Great Bodily Harm or Death  
(Pen. Code, § 273a(a))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with child abuse likely to produce (great bodily harm/ [or] death) [in violation of Penal Code section 273a(a)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

*<Alternative A—inflicted pain>*

- [1. The defendant willfully inflicted unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering on a child;]**

*<Alternative B—caused or permitted to suffer pain>*

- [1. The defendant willfully caused or permitted a child to suffer unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering;]**

*<Alternative C—while having custody, caused or permitted to suffer injury>*

- [1. The defendant, while having care or custody of a child, willfully caused or permitted the child's person or health to be injured;]**

*<Alternative D—while having custody, caused or permitted to be placed in danger>*

- [1. The defendant, while having care or custody of a child, willfully caused or permitted the child to be placed in a situation where the child's person or health was endangered;]**

**[AND]**

- 2. The defendant (inflicted pain or suffering on the child/ [or] caused or permitted the child to (suffer/ [or] be injured/ [or] be endangered)) under circumstances or conditions likely to produce (great bodily harm/ [or] death)(;/.)**

*<Give element 3 when giving alternatives 1B, 1C or 1D>*

**[AND]**

- [3. The defendant was criminally negligent when (he/she) caused or permitted the child to (suffer/ [or] be injured/ [or] be endangered)(;/.)]**

*<Give element 4 when instructing on parental right to discipline>*

**[AND]**

- 4. The defendant did not act while reasonably disciplining a child.]**

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose.

The phrase *likely to produce (great bodily harm/ [or] death)* means the probability of (great bodily harm/ [or] death) is high.

*Great bodily harm* means significant or substantial physical injury. It is an injury that is greater than minor or moderate harm.

A *child* is any person under the age of 18 years.

[Under the law, a person becomes one year older as soon as the first minute of his or her birthday has begun.]

[*Unjustifiable* physical pain or mental suffering is pain or suffering that is not reasonably necessary or is excessive under the circumstances.]

[*Criminal negligence* involves more than ordinary carelessness, inattention, or mistake in judgment. A person acts with *criminal negligence* when:

1. He or she acts in a reckless way that is a gross departure from the way an ordinarily careful person would act in the same situation;
2. The person's acts amount to disregard for human life or indifference to the consequences of his or her acts;

AND

3. A reasonable person would have known that acting in that way would naturally and probably result in harm to others.]

[A child does not need to actually suffer great bodily harm. But if a child does suffer great bodily harm, you may consider that fact, along with all the other evidence, in deciding whether the defendant committed the offense.]

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2006, April 2010, October 2010, February 2013*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If there is sufficient evidence, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense of disciplining a child. (*People v. Whitehurst* (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1045, 1049 [12 Cal.Rptr.2d 33].) Give bracketed element 4 and CALCRIM No. 3405, *Parental Right to Punish a Child*.

Give element 1A if it is alleged that the defendant directly inflicted unjustifiable

physical pain or mental suffering. Give element 1B if it is alleged that the defendant caused or permitted a child to suffer. If it is alleged that the defendant had care or custody of a child and caused or permitted the child's person or health to be injured, give element 1C. Finally, give element 1D if it is alleged that the defendant had care or custody of a child and endangered the child's person or health. (See Pen. Code, § 273a(a).)

Give bracketed element 3 and the bracketed definition of “criminally negligent” if element 1B, 1C, or 1D is given alleging that the defendant committed any indirect acts. (See *People v. Valdez* (2002) 27 Cal.4th 778, 788–789 [118 Cal.Rptr.2d 3, 42 P.3d 511]; *People v. Peabody* (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 43, 48–49 [119 Cal.Rptr. 780].)

Give on request the bracketed definition of “unjustifiable” physical pain or mental suffering if there is a question about the necessity or degree of pain or suffering. (See *People v. Curtiss* (1931) 116 Cal.App. Supp. 771, 779–780 [300 P. 801].)

Give on request the bracketed paragraph stating that a child need not actually suffer great bodily harm. (See *People v. Cortes* (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 62, 80 [83 Cal.Rptr.2d 519]; *People v. Jaramillo* (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 830, 835 [159 Cal.Rptr. 771].)

Give the bracketed paragraph about calculating age if requested. (Fam. Code, § 6500; *In re Harris* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 849–850 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391].)

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 273a(a); *People v. Cortes* (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 62, 80 [83 Cal.Rptr.2d 519]; *People v. Smith* (1984) 35 Cal.3d 798, 806 [201 Cal.Rptr. 311, 678 P.2d 886].
- Child Defined. See Fam. Code, § 6500; *People v. Thomas* (1976) 65 Cal.App.3d 854, 857–858 [135 Cal.Rptr. 644] [in context of Pen. Code, § 273d].
- Likely Defined. *People v. Chaffin* (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1348, 1351–1352 [93 Cal.Rptr.3d 531] [questioning analysis of term in *People v. Wilson*]; *People v. Wilson* (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1204 [41 Cal.Rptr.3d 919].
- Great Bodily Harm or Injury Defined. Pen. Code, § 12022.7(f); *People v. Cortes* (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 62, 80 [83 Cal.Rptr.2d 519].
- Willful Defined. Pen. Code, § 7, subd. 1; see *People v. Lara* (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 102, 107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402]; *People v. Vargas* (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 1455, 1462, 1468–1469 [251 Cal.Rptr. 904].
- Criminal Negligence Required for Indirect Conduct. *People v. Valdez* (2002) 27 Cal.4th 778, 788, 789 [118 Cal.Rptr.2d 3, 42 P.3d 511]; *People v. Peabody* (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 43, 47, 48–49 [119 Cal.Rptr. 780]; see *People v. Penny* (1955) 44 Cal.2d 861, 879–880 [285 P.2d 926] [criminal negligence for homicide]; *Walker v. Superior Court* (1988) 47 Cal.3d 112, 135 [253 Cal.Rptr. 1, 763 P.2d 852].
- General Criminal Intent Required for Direct Infliction of Pain or

Suffering. *People v. Sargent* (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1206, 1224 [81 Cal.Rptr.2d 835, 970 P.2d 409]; see *People v. Atkins* (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 348, 361 [125 Cal.Rptr. 855]; *People v. Wright* (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 6, 14 [131 Cal.Rptr. 311].

### COMMENTARY

Any violation of Penal Code section 273a(a) must be willful. (*People v. Smith* (1984) 35 Cal.3d 798, 806 [678 P.2d 886]; *People v. Cortes* (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 62, 80 [83 Cal.Rptr.2d 519]; but see *People v. Valdez* (2002) 27 Cal.4th 778, 789 [118 Cal.Rptr.2d 3, 42 P.3d 511] [the prong punishing a *direct infliction* of unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering does not expressly require that the conduct be willful].) Following *Smith* and *Cortes*, the committee has included “willfully” in element 1A regarding direct infliction of abuse until there is further guidance from the courts.

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Attempted Child Abuse. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 273a(a).
- Misdemeanor Child Abuse. Pen. Code, § 273a(b).

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Care or Custody*

“The terms ‘care or custody’ do not imply a familial relationship but only a willingness to assume duties correspondent to the role of a caregiver.” (*People v. Toney* (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 618, 621–622 [90 Cal.Rptr.2d 578] [quoting *People v. Cochran* (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 826, 832 [73 Cal.Rptr.2d 257]].)

#### *Prenatal Conduct*

Penal Code section 273a does not apply to prenatal conduct endangering an unborn child. (*Reyes v. Superior Court* (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 214, 217–218, 219 [141 Cal.Rptr. 912].)

#### *Unanimity*

The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on unanimity when the prosecution has presented evidence of multiple acts to prove a single count. (*People v. Russo* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1124, 1132 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 436, 25 P.3d 641].) However, the court does not have to instruct on unanimity if the offense constitutes a “continuous course of conduct.” (*People v. Napoles* (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 108, 115–116 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 777].) Child abuse may be a continuous course of conduct or a single, isolated incident. (*Ibid.*) The court should carefully examine the statute charged, the pleadings, and the evidence presented to determine whether the offense constitutes a continuous course of conduct. (*Ibid.*) See generally CALCRIM No. 3500, *Unanimity*.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Sex Offenses and Crimes Against Decency, §§ 161–168.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes* 535

*Against the Person*, §§ 142.01[2][a][v], 142.23[7] (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, *Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure* § 12:17 (The Rutter Group).

**822. Inflicting Physical Punishment on Child (Pen. Code,  
§ 273d(a))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with inflicting on a child cruel or inhuman physical punishment or injury that caused a traumatic condition [in violation of Penal Code section 273d(a)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant willfully inflicted (cruel or inhuman physical punishment/ [and/or] an injury) on a child;

[AND]

2. The (punishment/ [and/or] injury) inflicted by the defendant caused a traumatic physical condition to the child(;/.)

<Give element 3 when instructing on parental right to discipline>

[AND]

3. When the defendant acted, (he/she) was not reasonably disciplining a child.]

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose.

A *child* is any person under the age of 18 years.

[Under the law, a person becomes one year older as soon as the first minute of his or her birthday has begun.]

A *traumatic physical condition* is a wound or other bodily injury, whether minor or serious, caused by the direct application of physical force.

A (punishment/ [and/or] injury) *caused* a traumatic physical condition if:

1. The traumatic condition was the natural and probable consequence of the (punishment/ [and/or] injury);
2. The (punishment/ [and/or] injury) was a direct and substantial factor in causing the condition;

AND

3. The condition would not have happened without the (punishment/ [and/or] injury).

A *natural and probable consequence* is one that a reasonable person would know is likely to happen if nothing unusual intervenes. In deciding whether a consequence is natural and probable, consider all of the circumstances established by the evidence.

**A *substantial factor* is more than a trivial or remote factor. However, it does not need to be the only factor that caused the traumatic condition.**

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*New January 2006*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If there is sufficient evidence, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense of disciplining a child. (*People v. Whitehurst* (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1045, 1049 [12 Cal.Rptr.2d 33].) Give bracketed element 3 and CALCRIM No. 3405, *Parental Right to Punish a Child*.

Give the bracketed paragraph about calculating age if requested. (Fam. Code, § 6500; *In re Harris* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 849–850 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391].)

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 273d(a).
- Willful Defined. Pen. Code, § 7, subd. 1; see *People v. Lara* (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 102, 107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
- Child Defined. *People v. Thomas* (1976) 65 Cal.App.3d 854, 857–858 [135 Cal.Rptr. 644] [victim’s size and age relevant to reasonableness of corporal punishment]; see Fam. Code, § 6500.
- Duty to Define Traumatic Condition. *People v. Burns* (1948) 88 Cal.App.2d 867, 873–874 [200 P.2d 134].
- General Intent Crime. *People v. Atkins* (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 348, 358 [125 Cal.Rptr. 855].
- Traumatic Condition Defined. *People v. Thomas* (1976) 65 Cal.App.3d 854, 857 [135 Cal.Rptr. 644]; *People v. Stewart* (1961) 188 Cal.App.2d 88, 91 [10 Cal.Rptr. 217]; see *People v. Gutierrez* (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 944, 951–953 [217 Cal.Rptr. 616] [in context of Pen. Code, § 273.5].

## LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Attempted Infliction of Corporal Punishment. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 273d.
- Simple Assault. Pen. Code, § 240.
- Simple Battery. Pen. Code, § 242; see *People v. Sargent* (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1206, 1220 [81 Cal.Rptr.2d 835, 970 P.2d 409]; *People v. Stewart* (1961) 188 Cal.App.2d 88, 89 [10 Cal.Rptr. 217].

Willfully causing or permitting a child to suffer, or willfully inflicting on a child, unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering under circumstances other than those



likely to produce great bodily harm or death (Pen. Code, § 273a(b)) is not a lesser included offense of Penal Code section 273d. (See *People v. Lofink* (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 161, 166 [253 Cal.Rptr. 384].)

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Spanking*

It is not unlawful for a parent to spank a child for disciplinary purposes with an object other than the hand. The punishment, however, must be necessary and not excessive in relation to the individual circumstances. (80 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 203 (1997).)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Sex Offenses and Crimes Against Decency, §§ 170–172.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, Crimes Against the Person, §§ 142.13[2], 142.23[7] (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure § 12:17 (The Rutter Group).

## 823. Child Abuse (Misdemeanor) (Pen. Code, § 273a(b))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with child abuse [in violation of Penal Code section 273a(b)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

*<Alternative 1A—inflicted pain>*

- [1. The defendant willfully inflicted unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering on a child;]

*<Alternative 1B—caused or permitted to suffer pain>*

- [1. The defendant willfully caused or permitted a child to suffer unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering;]

*<Alternative 1C—while having custody, caused or permitted to suffer injury>*

- [1. The defendant, while having care or custody of a child, willfully caused or permitted the child's person or health to be injured;]

*<Alternative 1D—while having custody, caused or permitted to be placed in danger>*

- [1. The defendant, while having care or custody of a child, willfully caused or permitted the child to be placed in a situation where the child's person or health was endangered;]

*<Give element 2 when giving alternative 1B, 1C, or 1D.>*

[AND]

- [2. The defendant was criminally negligent when (he/she) caused or permitted the child to (suffer[,]/ [or] be injured[,]/ [or] be endangered)(;/.)]

*<Give element 2/3 when instructing on parental right to discipline.>*

[AND]

- (2/3). The defendant did not act while reasonably disciplining a child.]

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose.

A *child* is any person under the age of 18 years.

[Under the law, a person becomes one year older as soon as the first minute of his or her birthday has begun.]

[*Unjustifiable* physical pain or mental suffering is pain or suffering that

is not reasonably necessary or is excessive under the circumstances.]

**[Criminal negligence involves more than ordinary carelessness, inattention, or mistake in judgment. A person acts with criminal negligence when:**

- 1. He or she acts in a reckless way that is a gross departure from the way an ordinarily careful person would act in the same situation;**
- 2. The person's acts amount to disregard for human life or indifference to the consequences of his or her acts;**

**AND**

- 3. A reasonable person would have known that acting in that way would naturally and probably result in harm to others.]**

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2006, August 2009, October 2010, February 2013*

## **BENCH NOTES**

### ***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If there is sufficient evidence, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense of disciplining a child. (*People v. Whitehurst* (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1045, 1049 [12 Cal.Rptr.2d 33].) Give bracketed element 2/3 and CALCRIM No. 3405, *Parental Right to Punish a Child*.

Give alternative 1A if it is alleged that the defendant directly inflicted unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering. Give alternative 1B if it is alleged that the defendant caused or permitted a child to suffer. If it is alleged that the defendant had care or custody of a child and caused or permitted the child's person or health to be injured, give alternative 1C. Finally, give alternative 1D if it is alleged that the defendant had care or custody of a child and endangered the child's person or health. (See Pen. Code, § 273a(b).)

Give bracketed element 2 and the bracketed definition of "criminal negligence" if alternative 1B, 1C, or 1D is given alleging that the defendant committed any indirect acts. (See *People v. Valdez* (2002) 27 Cal.4th 778, 788–789 [118 Cal.Rptr.2d 3, 42 P.3d 511]; *People v. Peabody* (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 43, 48–49 [119 Cal.Rptr. 780].)

Give on request the bracketed definition of "unjustifiable" physical pain or mental suffering if there is a question about the necessity or degree of pain or suffering. (See *People v. Curtiss* (1931) 116 Cal.App. Supp. 771, 779–780 [300 P. 801].)

Give the bracketed paragraph about calculating age if requested. (Fam. Code,

§ 6500; *In re Harris* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 849–850 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391].)

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 273a(b); *People v. Burton* (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 447, 453–457 [49 Cal.Rptr.3d 334]; *People v. Cortes* (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 62, 80 [83 Cal.Rptr.2d 519]; *People v. Smith* (1984) 35 Cal.3d 798, 806 [201 Cal.Rptr. 311, 678 P.2d 886].
- Child Defined. See Fam. Code, § 6500; *People v. Thomas* (1976) 65 Cal.App.3d 854, 857–858 [135 Cal.Rptr. 644] [in context of Pen. Code, § 273d].
- Willfully Defined. Pen. Code, § 7(1); see *People v. Lara* (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 102, 107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402]; *People v. Vargas* (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 1455, 1462, 1468–1469 [251 Cal.Rptr. 904].
- Criminal Negligence Required for Indirect Conduct. *People v. Valdez* (2002) 27 Cal.4th 778, 788–789 [118 Cal.Rptr.2d 3, 42 P.3d 511]; *People v. Peabody* (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 43, 47, 48–49 [119 Cal.Rptr. 780]; see *People v. Penny* (1955) 44 Cal.2d 861, 879–880 [285 P.2d 926] [criminal negligence for homicide]; *Walker v. Superior Court* (1988) 47 Cal.3d 112, 135 [253 Cal.Rptr.1, 763 P.2d 852].
- General Criminal Intent Required for Direct Infliction of Pain or Suffering. *People v. Sargent* (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1206, 1224 [81 Cal.Rptr.2d 835, 970 P.2d 409]; see *People v. Atkins* (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 348, 358 [125 Cal.Rptr. 855]; *People v. Wright* (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 6, 14 [131 Cal.Rptr. 311].

### COMMENTARY

See Commentary to CALCRIM No. 821, *Child Abuse Likely to Produce Great Bodily Harm or Death*.

### RELATED ISSUES

See the Related Issues section of CALCRIM No. 821, *Child Abuse Likely to Produce Great Bodily Harm or Death*.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Sex Offenses and Crimes Against Decency, §§ 166–172.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, §§ 142.13[1], 142.23[7] (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, *Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure* § 12:17 (The Rutter Group).

### 824–829. Reserved for Future Use

## (ii) Elder or Dependent Adult

### 830. Abuse of Elder or Dependent Adult Likely to Produce Great Bodily Harm or Death (Pen. Code, § 368(b)(1))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with (elder/dependent adult) abuse likely to produce great bodily harm or death [in violation of Penal Code section 368(b)(1)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

*<Alternative A—inflicted pain>*

- [1. The defendant willfully inflicted unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering on \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name or description of elder or dependent adult>;***

*<Alternative B—caused or permitted to suffer pain>*

- [1. The defendant willfully caused or permitted \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name or description of elder or dependent adult>* to suffer unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering;]**

*<Alternative C—while having custody, caused or permitted to be injured>*

- [1. The defendant, while having care or custody of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name or description of elder or dependent adult>* willfully caused or permitted (his/her) person or health to be injured;]**

*<Alternative D—while having custody, caused or permitted to be placed in danger>*

- [1. The defendant, while having care or custody of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name or description of elder or dependent adult>* willfully caused or permitted (him/her) to be placed in a situation where (his/her) person or health was endangered;]**
- 2. The defendant (inflicted suffering on \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name or description of elder or dependent adult>*/ [or] caused or permitted \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of elder or dependent adult>* to (suffer/ [or] be injured/ [or] be endangered)) under circumstances or conditions likely to produce great bodily harm or death;**
- 3. \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name or description of elder or dependent adult>* (is/was) (an elder/a dependent adult)(;/.)**

**[AND]**

- 4. When the defendant acted, (he/she) knew or reasonably should have known that \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name or description of elder***

*or dependent adult*> was (an elder/a dependent adult)(;/.)

<Give element 5 when giving alternative 1B and it is alleged the defendant permitted the suffering.>

[AND]

- [5. The defendant had a legal duty to supervise and control the conduct of the person[s] who caused or inflicted unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering on \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name or description of elder or dependent adult>, but failed to supervise or control that conduct(;/.)]**

<Give element 6 when giving alternative 1B, 1C, or 1D.>

[AND]

- 6. The defendant was criminally negligent when (he/she) caused or permitted \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name or description of elder or dependent adult> to (suffer/ [or] be injured/ [or] be endangered).]**

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose.

*Great bodily harm* means significant or substantial physical injury. It is an injury that is greater than minor or moderate harm.

[An *elder* is someone who is at least 65 years old.]

[A *dependent adult* is someone who is between 18 and 64 years old and has physical or mental limitations that restrict his or her ability to carry out normal activities or to protect his or her rights. [This definition includes an adult who has physical or developmental disabilities or whose physical or mental abilities have decreased because of age.] [A *dependent adult* is also someone between 18 and 64 years old who is an inpatient in a (health facility/psychiatric health facility/ [or] chemical dependency recovery hospital).]

[*Unjustifiable* physical pain or mental suffering is pain or suffering that is not reasonably necessary or is excessive under the circumstances.]

[A person who does not have care or custody of (an elder/a dependent adult) may still have a *legal duty to supervise and control the conduct of a third person* who can inflict abuse on the (elder/dependent adult) if the person has a special relationship with the third person. A special relationship is created, for example, when (1) a person takes charge of a third person whom (he/she) knows or should know is likely to cause bodily harm to others if not controlled, and (2) the person has the ability to control the third person's conduct.]

[*Criminal negligence* involves more than ordinary carelessness, inattention, or mistake in judgment. A person acts with criminal negligence when:

1. He or she acts in a reckless way that creates a high risk of death or great bodily harm;

AND

2. A reasonable person would have known that acting in that way would create such a risk.

In other words, a person acts with criminal negligence when the way he or she acts is so different from the way an ordinarily careful person would act in the same situation that his or her act amounts to disregard for human life or indifference to the consequences of that act.]

[(An elder/A dependent adult) does not need to actually suffer great bodily harm. But if (an elder/a dependent adult) does suffer great bodily harm, you may consider that fact, along with all the other evidence, in deciding whether the defendant committed the offense.]

[Under the law, a person becomes one year older as soon as the first minute of his or her birthday has begun.]

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*New January 2006; Revised March 2017*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

Give element 1A if it is alleged that the defendant directly inflicted unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering. Give element 1B if it is alleged that the defendant caused or permitted an elder or dependent adult to suffer. If it is alleged that the defendant had care or custody of an elder or dependent adult and that the defendant caused or permitted the elder's or dependent adult's person or health to be injured, give element 1C. Finally, give element 1D if it is alleged that the defendant had care or custody of an elder or dependent adult and that the defendant endangered the elder's or dependent adult's person or health. (See Pen. Code, § 368(b)(1).)

Give bracketed element 5 if it is alleged under element 1B that the defendant *permitted* an elder or dependent adult to suffer unjustifiable pain or mental suffering. (See *People v. Heitzman* (1994) 9 Cal.4th 189, 212 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d 236, 886 P.2d 1229].) If element 5 is given, also give the bracketed paragraph defining who has a "legal duty to control the conduct of a third person."

Give bracketed element 6 regarding criminal negligence, and the bracketed definition of "criminally negligent," if element 1B, 1C, or 1D is given alleging that the defendant committed any indirect act. (*People v. Manis* (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 110, 114 [12 Cal.Rptr.2d 619], disapproved on other grounds by *People v. Heitzman* (1994) 9 Cal.4th 189, 212 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d 236, 886 P.2d 1229]; *People v. Superior Court (Holvey)* (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 51, 60 [252 Cal.Rptr. 335], disapproved on



other grounds by *People v. Heitzman* (1994) 9 Cal.4th 189, 212 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d 236, 886 P.2d 1229]; see *People v. Valdez* (2002) 27 Cal.4th 778, 788, 789 [118 Cal.Rptr.2d 3, 42 P.3d 511]; *People v. Peabody* (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 43, 48–49 [119 Cal.Rptr. 780] [latter two cases in context of parallel child abuse statute].)

Give the bracketed definition of “elder” or “dependent adult” depending on the status of the alleged victim. (See Pen. Code, § 368(g) & (h).)

Give on request the bracketed definition of “unjustifiable” physical pain or mental suffering if there is a question about the necessity for or the degree of pain or suffering. (See *People v. Curtiss* (1931) 116 Cal.App. Supp. 771, 779–780 [300 P. 801].)

If there is a question whether an elder or dependent adult suffered great bodily harm, give on request the bracketed paragraph stating that a person “does not need to actually suffer great bodily harm.” (See *People v. Cortes* (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 62, 80 [83 Cal.Rptr.2d 519]; *People v. Jaramillo* (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 830, 835 [159 Cal.Rptr. 771] [in context of parallel child abuse statute].)

If a victim actually suffers great bodily injury or dies, the defendant’s sentence may be enhanced based on the victim’s age. (See Pen. Code, § 368(b)(2) & (3); see *People v. Adams* (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1192, 1198 [113 Cal.Rptr.2d 722].) Give CALCRIM No. 3162, *Great Bodily Injury: Age of Victim*, or any other appropriate instructions on enhancements. (See series 3100–3399.)

Give the bracketed paragraph about calculating age if requested. (Fam. Code, § 6500; *In re Harris* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 849–850 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391].)

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 368(b)(1).
- Great Bodily Harm or Injury Defined. Pen. Code, §§ 368(b)(2), 12022.7(f); see *People v. Cortes* (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 62, 80 [83 Cal.Rptr.2d 519] [in context of parallel child abuse statute].
- Sentence Enhancements. Pen. Code, § 368(b)(2) & (3); see *People v. Adams* (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1192, 1198 [113 Cal.Rptr.2d 722].
- Willful Defined. Pen. Code, § 7, subd. 1; see *People v. Lara* (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 102, 107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402]; *People v. Vargas* (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 1455, 1462, 1468–1469 [251 Cal.Rptr. 904].
- Criminal Negligence Required for Indirect Conduct. *People v. Manis* (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 110, 114 [12 Cal.Rptr.2d 619]; *People v. Superior Court (Holvey)* (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 51, 60 [252 Cal.Rptr. 335]; see *People v. Valdez* (2002) 27 Cal.4th 778, 788, 789 [118 Cal.Rptr.2d 3, 42 P.3d 511]; *People v. Peabody* (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 43, 47, 48–49 [119 Cal.Rptr. 780] [in context of parallel child abuse statute].
- Duty to Control Conduct of Person Inflicting Abuse. *People v. Heitzman* (1994) 9 Cal.4th 189, 212 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d 236, 886 P.2d 1229].



- General Criminal Intent Required for Direct Infliction of Pain or Suffering. See *People v. Sargent* (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1206, 1224 [81 Cal.Rptr.2d 835, 970 P.2d 409] [in context of parallel child abuse statute].

### COMMENTARY

Any violation of Penal Code section 368(b)(1) must be willful. (See *People v. Smith* (1984) 35 Cal.3d 798, 806 [201 Cal.Rptr. 311, 678 P.2d 886]; *People v. Cortes* (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 62, 80 [83 Cal.Rptr.2d 519] [both in context of parallel child abuse statute]; but see *People v. Valdez* (2002) 27 Cal.4th 778, 789 [118 Cal.Rptr.2d 3, 42 P.3d 511] [the prong punishing a *direct infliction* of unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering does not expressly require that the conduct be willful].)

Following *Smith* and *Cortes*, the committee has included “willfully” in element 1A regarding direct infliction of abuse until there is further guidance from the courts.

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Attempted Abuse of Elder or Dependent Adult. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 368(b)(1).
- Misdemeanor Abuse of Elder or Dependent Adult. Pen. Code, § 368(c).

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Care or Custody*

“The terms ‘care or custody’ do not imply a familial relationship but only a willingness to assume duties correspondent to the role of a caregiver.” (See *People v. Toney* (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 618, 621–622 [90 Cal.Rptr.2d 578] [quoting *People v. Cochran* (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 826, 832 [73 Cal.Rptr.2d 257]; both in context of parallel child abuse statute].)

#### *Unanimity*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on unanimity when the prosecution has presented evidence of multiple acts to prove a single count. (*People v. Russo* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1124, 1132 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 436, 25 P.3d 641].) However, the court does not have to instruct on unanimity if the offense constitutes a “continuous course of conduct.” (*People v. Napoles* (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 108, 115–116 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 777].) Elder abuse may be a continuous course of conduct or a single, isolated incident. (*People v. Rae* (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 116, 123 [125 Cal.Rptr.2d 312].) The court should carefully examine the statute charged, the pleadings, and the evidence presented to determine whether the offense constitutes a continuous course of conduct. (*People v. Napoles, supra*, 104 Cal.App.4th at pp. 115–116.) See generally CALCRIM No. 3500, *Unanimity*.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Sex Offenses and Crimes Against Decency, §§ 179–187.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, §§ 142.11[1][f], 142.13[5] (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure § 12:17 (The Rutter Group).

## 831. Abuse of Elder or Dependent Adult (Pen. Code, § 368(c))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with (elder/dependent adult) abuse [in violation of Penal Code section 368(c)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

*<Alternative 1A—inflicted pain>*

- [1. The defendant willfully inflicted unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering on \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name or description of elder or dependent adult>;]**

*<Alternative 1B—caused or permitted to suffer pain>*

- [1. The defendant allowed someone, whose conduct the defendant had a duty to supervise and control, to inflict unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering on \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name or description of elder or dependent adult>;]**

*<Alternative 1C—while having custody, caused or permitted to be injured>*

- [1. The defendant, while having care or custody of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name or description of elder or dependent adult>, willfully caused or permitted that person or (his/her) health to be injured;]**

*<Alternative 1D—while having custody, caused or permitted to be placed in danger>*

- [1. The defendant, while having care or custody of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name or description of elder or dependent adult>, willfully caused or permitted that person to be placed in a situation where (his/her) person or health was endangered;]**
- 2. \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name or description of elder or dependent adult> (is/was) (an elder/a dependent adult);**

**[AND]**

- 3. When the defendant acted, (he/she) knew or reasonably should have known that \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name or description of elder or dependent adult> was (an elder/a dependent adult)(;/.)**

*<Give element 4 when giving alternative 1B and it is alleged the defendant permitted the suffering.>*

**[AND]**

- [4. The defendant had a legal duty to supervise and control the conduct of the person[s] who caused or inflicted unjustifiable**

**physical pain or mental suffering on \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name or description of elder or dependent adult>, but failed to supervise or control that conduct(;/.)]**

<Give element 5 when giving alternative 1B, 1C, or 1D.>

**[AND**

**(4/5). The defendant was criminally negligent when (he/she) caused or permitted \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name or description of elder or dependent adult> to (suffer[,]/ [or] be injured[,]/ [or] be endangered).]**

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose.

[An *elder* is someone who is at least 65 years old.]

[A *dependent adult* is someone who is between 18 and 64 years old and has physical or mental limitations that restrict his or her ability to carry out normal activities or to protect his or her rights. [This definition includes an adult who has physical or developmental disabilities or whose physical or mental abilities have decreased because of age.] [A *dependent adult* is also someone between 18 and 64 years old who is an inpatient in a (health facility/psychiatric health facility/ [or] chemical dependency recovery hospital).]

[*Unjustifiable* physical pain or mental suffering is pain or suffering that is not reasonably necessary or is excessive under the circumstances.]

[A person who does not have care or custody of (an elder/a dependent adult) may still have a *legal duty to supervise and control the conduct of a third person* who can inflict abuse on the (elder/dependent adult) if the person has a special relationship with the third person. A special relationship is created, for example, when (1) a person takes charge of a third person whom (he/she) knows or should know is likely to cause bodily harm to others if not controlled, and (2) the person has the ability to control the third person's conduct.]

[*Criminal negligence* involves more than ordinary carelessness, inattention, or mistake in judgment. A person acts with criminal negligence when:

1. He or she acts in a reckless way that creates a high risk of death or great bodily harm;

**AND**

2. A reasonable person would have known that acting in that way would create such a risk.

**In other words, a person acts with criminal negligence when the way he**

**or she acts is so different from the way an ordinarily careful person would act in the same situation that his or her act amounts to disregard for human life or indifference to the consequences of that act.]**

**[Under the law, a person becomes one year older as soon as the first minute of his or her birthday has begun.]**

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*New January 2006*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

Give alternative 1A if it is alleged that the defendant directly inflicted unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering. Give alternative 1B if it is alleged that the defendant caused or permitted an elder or dependent adult to suffer. If it is alleged that the defendant had care or custody of an elder or dependent adult and that the defendant caused or permitted the elder's or dependent adult's person or health to be injured, give alternative 1C. Finally, give alternative 1D if it is alleged that the defendant had care or custody of an elder or dependent adult and that the defendant endangered the elder's or dependent adult's person or health. (See Pen. Code, § 368(c).)

Give bracketed element 4 if it is alleged under alternative 1B that the defendant *permitted* an elder or dependent adult to suffer unjustifiable pain or mental suffering. (See *People v. Heitzman* (1994) 9 Cal.4th 189, 212 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d 236, 886 P.2d 1229].) If element 4 is given, also give the bracketed paragraph defining who has a "legal duty to supervise and control the conduct of a third person."

Give bracketed element 5 regarding criminal negligence, and the bracketed definition of "criminal negligence," if alternative 1B, 1C, or 1D is given alleging that the defendant committed any indirect act. (*People v. Manis* (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 110, 114 [12 Cal.Rptr.2d 619], disapproved on other grounds in *People v. Heitzman* (1994) 9 Cal.4th 189, 212 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d 236, 886 P.2d 1229]; *People v. Superior Court (Holvey)* (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 51, 60 [252 Cal.Rptr. 335], disapproved on other grounds in *People v. Heitzman* (1994) 9 Cal.4th 189, 212 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d 236, 886 P.2d 1229]; see *People v. Valdez* (2002) 27 Cal.4th 778, 788, 789 [118 Cal.Rptr.2d 3, 42 P.3d 511]; *People v. Peabody* (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 43, 48–49 [119 Cal.Rptr. 780] [latter two cases in context of parallel child abuse statute].)

Give the bracketed definition of "elder" or "dependent adult" depending on the status of the alleged victim. (See Pen. Code, § 368(g) & (h).)

Give on request the bracketed definition of "unjustifiable" physical pain or mental suffering if there is a question about the necessity for or the degree of pain or

suffering. (See *People v. Curtiss* (1931) 116 Cal.App. Supp. 771, 779–780 [300 P. 801].)

Give the bracketed paragraph about calculating age if requested. (Fam. Code, § 6500; *In re Harris* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 849–850 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391].)

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 368(c).
- Willfully Defined. Pen. Code, § 7, subd. 1; see *People v. Lara* (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 102, 107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402]; *People v. Vargas* (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 1455, 1462, 1468–1469 [251 Cal.Rptr. 904].
- Criminal Negligence Required for Indirect Conduct. *People v. Manis* (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 110, 114 [12 Cal.Rptr.2d 619]; *People v. Superior Court (Holvey)* (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 51, 60 [252 Cal.Rptr. 335]; see *People v. Valdez* (2002) 27 Cal.4th 778, 788, 789 [118 Cal.Rptr.2d 3, 42 P.3d 511]; *People v. Peabody* (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 43, 47, 48–49 [119 Cal.Rptr. 780] [in context of parallel child abuse statute].
- Duty to Control Conduct of Person Inflicting Abuse. *People v. Heitzman* (1994) 9 Cal.4th 189, 212 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d 236, 886 P.2d 1229].
- General Criminal Intent Required for Direct Infliction of Pain or Suffering. See *People v. Sargent* (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1206, 1224 [81 Cal.Rptr.2d 835, 970 P.2d 409] [in context of parallel child abuse statute].

### COMMENTARY

See Commentary to CALCRIM No. 830, *Abuse of Elder or Dependent Adult Likely to Produce Great Bodily Harm or Death*.

### RELATED ISSUES

See the Related Issues section of CALCRIM No. 830, *Abuse of Elder or Dependent Adult Likely to Produce Great Bodily Harm or Death*.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Sex Offenses and Crimes Against Decency, §§ 179–185.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.13[5] (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, *Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure* § 12:17 (The Rutter Group).

### **832–839. Reserved for Future Use**

**(iii) Spouse, etc.**

**840. Inflicting Injury on Spouse, Cohabitant, or Fellow Parent  
Resulting in Traumatic Condition (Pen. Code, § 273.5(a))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with inflicting an injury on [his/her] ([former] spouse/[former] cohabitant/the (mother/father) of (his/her) child/someone with whom (he/she) had, or previously had, an engagement or dating relationship that resulted in a traumatic condition [in violation of Penal Code section 273.5(a)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant willfully [and unlawfully] inflicted a physical injury on (his/her) ([former] spouse/[former] cohabitant/the (mother/father) of (his/her) child)/someone with whom (he/she) had, or previously had, an engagement or dating relationship);

[AND]

2. The injury inflicted by the defendant resulted in a traumatic condition.

<Give element 3 when instructing on self-defense or defense of another>

[AND]

3. The defendant did not act (in self-defense/ [or] in defense of someone else).]

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose.

A *traumatic condition* is a wound or other bodily injury, whether minor or serious, caused by the direct application of physical force.

[The term *cohabitants* means two unrelated persons living together for a substantial period of time, resulting in some permanency of the relationship. Factors that may determine whether people are cohabiting include, but are not limited to, (1) sexual relations between the parties while sharing the same residence, (2) sharing of income or expenses, (3) joint use or ownership of property, (4) the parties' holding themselves out as (spouses/domestic partners), (5) the continuity of the relationship, and (6) the length of the relationship.]

[The term *dating relationship* means frequent, intimate associations primarily characterized by the expectation of affection or sexual involvement [independent of financial considerations].]

[A person may cohabit simultaneously with two or more people at

different locations, during the same time frame, if he or she maintains substantial ongoing relationships with each person and lives with each person for significant periods.]

[A person is considered to be the (mother/father) of another person's child if the alleged male parent is presumed under law to be the natural father. \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of presumed father> is presumed under law to be the natural father of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of child>.]

[A traumatic condition is the *result of an injury* if:

1. The traumatic condition was the natural and probable consequence of the injury;
2. The injury was a direct and substantial factor in causing the condition;

AND

3. The condition would not have happened without the injury.

*A natural and probable consequence* is one that a reasonable person would know is likely to happen if nothing unusual intervenes. In deciding whether a consequence is natural and probable, consider all of the circumstances established by the evidence.

*A substantial factor* is more than a trivial or remote factor. However, it does not need to be the only factor that resulted in the traumatic condition.]

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*New January 2006; Revised June 2007, August 2012, August 2014, February 2015, February 2016, March 2018*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If there is sufficient evidence of self-defense or defense of another, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense. Give bracketed element 3 and any appropriate defense instructions. (See CALCRIM Nos. 3470–3477.)

If causation is at issue, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on proximate cause. (*People v. Bernhardt* (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 567, 590–591 [35 Cal.Rptr. 401]; *People v. Cervantes* (2001) 26 Cal.4th 860, 865–874 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 148, 29 P.3d 225].) Give the bracketed paragraph that begins, “A traumatic condition is the *result of an injury* if . . . .”

If there is sufficient evidence that an alleged victim's injuries were caused by an accident, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on accident. (*People v.*



*Gonzales* (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 382, 390 [88 Cal.Rptr.2d 111].) Give CALCRIM No. 3404, *Accident*.

Give the bracketed language “[and unlawfully]” in element 1 if there is evidence that the defendant acted in self-defense.

Give the third bracketed sentence that begins “A person may cohabit simultaneously with two or more people,” on request if there is evidence that the defendant cohabited with two or more people. (See *People v. Moore* (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1323, 1335 [52 Cal.Rptr.2d 256].)

Give on request the bracketed paragraph that begins “A person is considered to be the (mother/father)” if an alleged parental relationship is based on the statutory presumption that the male parent is the natural father. (See Pen. Code, § 273.5(d); see also *People v. Vega* (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 706, 711 [39 Cal.Rptr.2d 479] [parentage can be established without resort to any presumption].)

If the defendant is charged with an enhancement for a prior conviction for a similar offense within seven years and has not stipulated to the prior conviction, give CALCRIM No. 3100, *Prior Conviction: Nonbifurcated Trial*. If the court has granted a bifurcated trial, see CALCRIM No. 3101, *Prior Conviction: Bifurcated Trial*.

If there is evidence that the traumatic condition resulted from strangulation or suffocation, consider instructing according to the special definition provided in Pen. Code, § 273.5(d).

The amendment to Penal Code section 273.5(b) adding “someone with whom the offender has, or previously had, an engagement or dating relationship as defined in Penal Code section 243(f)(10)” to the list of potential victims became effective on January 1, 2014.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 273.5(a).
- Traumatic Condition Defined. Pen. Code, § 273.5(d); *People v. Gutierrez* (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 944, 952 [217 Cal.Rptr. 616].
- Willful Defined. Pen. Code, § 7, subd. 1; see *People v. Lara* (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 102, 107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
- Cohabitant Defined. *People v. Holifield* (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 993, 1000 [252 Cal.Rptr. 729]; *People v. Ballard* (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 311, 318–319 [249 Cal.Rptr. 806].
- Direct Application of Force. *People v. Jackson* (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 574, 580 [91 Cal.Rptr.2d 805].
- Duty to Define Traumatic Condition. *People v. Burns* (1948) 88 Cal.App.2d 867, 873–874 [200 P.2d 134].
- Strangulation and Suffocation. Pen. Code, § 273.5(d).
- General Intent Crime. See *People v. Thurston* (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1050,

1055 [84 Cal.Rptr.2d 221]; *People v. Campbell* (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 305, 307–309 [90 Cal.Rptr.2d 315]; contra *People v. Rodriguez* (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1398, 1402 [7 Cal.Rptr.2d 495] [dictum].

- Simultaneous Cohabitation. *People v. Moore* (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1323, 1335 [52 Cal.Rptr.2d 256].
- Dating Relationship Defined. Pen. Code, § 243(f)(10).

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Attempted Infliction of Corporal Punishment on Spouse. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 273.5(a); *People v. Kinsey* (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1621, 1627, 1628 [47 Cal.Rptr.2d 769] [attempt requires intent to cause traumatic condition, but does not require a resulting “traumatic condition”].
- Misdemeanor Battery. Pen. Code, §§ 242, 243(a); see *People v. Gutierrez* (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 944, 952 [217 Cal.Rptr. 616].
- Battery Against Spouse, Cohabitant, or Fellow Parent. Pen. Code, § 243(e)(1); see *People v. Jackson* (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 574, 580 [91 Cal.Rptr.2d 805].
- Simple Assault. Pen. Code, §§ 240, 241(a); *People v. Van Os* (1950) 96 Cal.App.2d 204, 206 [214 P.2d 554].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Continuous Course of Conduct*

Penal Code section 273.5 is aimed at a continuous course of conduct. The prosecutor is not required to choose a particular act and the jury is not required to unanimously agree on the same act or acts before a guilty verdict can be returned. (*People v. Thompson* (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 220, 224–225 [206 Cal.Rptr. 516].)

#### *Multiple Acts of Abuse*

A defendant can be charged with multiple violations of Penal Code section 273.5 when each battery satisfies the elements of section 273.5. (*People v. Healy* (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1140 [18 Cal.Rptr.2d 274].)

#### *Prospective Parents of Unborn Children*

Penal Code section 273.5(a) does not apply to a man who inflicts an injury upon a woman who is pregnant with his unborn child. “A pregnant woman is not a ‘mother’ and a fetus is not a ‘child’ as those terms are used in that section.” (*People v. Ward* (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 122, 126, 129 [72 Cal.Rptr.2d 531].)

#### *Termination of Parental Rights*

Penal Code section 273.5 “applies to a man who batters the mother of his child even after parental rights to that child have been terminated.” (*People v. Mora* (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1349, 1356 [59 Cal.Rptr.2d 801].)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, §§ 64–67.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.13[3] (Matthew Bender).

**841. Simple Battery: Against Spouse, Cohabitant, or Fellow Parent (Pen. Code, § 243(e)(1))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with battery against [his/her] ([former] spouse/cohabitant/fiancé[e]/a person with whom the defendant currently has, or previously had, a (dating/ [or] engagement) relationship/the (mother/father) of (his/her) child) [in violation of Penal Code section 243(e)(1)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant willfully [and unlawfully] touched \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of complaining witness> in a harmful or offensive manner;

[AND]

2. \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of complaining witness> is (the/a) (defendant's [former] spouse/defendant's cohabitant/defendant's fiancé[e]/person with whom the defendant currently has, or previously had, a (dating/ [or] engagement) relationship/(mother/father) of the defendant's child)(;/.)

<Give element 3 when instructing on self-defense or defense of another.>

[AND]

3. The defendant did not act (in self-defense/ [or] in defense of someone else.)

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose. It is not required that he or she intend to break the law, hurt someone else, or gain any advantage.

The slightest touching can be enough to commit a battery if it is done in a rude or angry way. Making contact with another person, including through his or her clothing, is enough. The touching does not have to cause pain or injury of any kind.

[The touching can be done indirectly by causing an object [or someone else] to touch the other person.]

[The term *cohabitants* means two unrelated persons living together for a substantial period of time, resulting in some permanency of the relationship. Factors that may determine whether people are cohabiting include, but are not limited to, (1) sexual relations between the parties while sharing the same residence, (2) sharing of income or expenses, (3) joint use or ownership of property, (4) the parties' holding themselves out as (husband and wife/domestic partners), (5) the continuity of the

relationship, and (6) the length of the relationship.]

[A person may cohabit simultaneously with two or more people at different locations, during the same time frame, if he or she maintains substantial ongoing relationships with each person and lives with each person for significant periods.]

[The term *dating relationship* means frequent, intimate associations primarily characterized by the expectation of affection or sexual involvement independent of financial considerations.]

[A person is considered to be the (mother/father) of another person's child if the alleged male parent is presumed under the law to be the natural father. \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of presumed father> is presumed under law to be the natural father of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of child>.]

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*New January 2006; Revised June 2007, February 2016*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If there is sufficient evidence of self-defense or defense of another, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense. Give bracketed element 3 and any appropriate defense instructions. (See CALCRIM Nos. 3470–3477.)

Give the bracketed language “[and unlawfully]” in element 1 if there is evidence that the defendant acted in self-defense.

Give the bracketed paragraph on indirect touching if that is an issue.

Give the third bracketed sentence that begins with “A person may cohabit simultaneously with two or more people” on request if there is evidence that the defendant cohabited with two or more people. (See *People v. Moore* (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1323, 1335 [52 Cal.Rptr.2d 256].)

Give on request the bracketed paragraph that begins with “A person is considered to be the (mother/father)” if an alleged parental relationship is based on the statutory presumption that the male parent is the natural father. (See Pen. Code, § 273.5(d); see also *People v. Vega* (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 706, 711 [39 Cal.Rptr.2d 479] [parentage can be established without resort to any presumption].)

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 243(e)(1).
- Willfully Defined. Pen. Code, § 7, subd. 1; *People v. Lara* (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 102, 107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
- Least Touching. *People v. Myers* (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 328, 335 [71

Cal.Rptr.2d 518] [citing *People v. Rocha* (1971) 3 Cal.3d 893, 899–900, fn. 12 [92 Cal.Rptr. 172, 479 P.2d 372]].

- Cohabitant Defined. *People v. Holifield* (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 993, 1000 [252 Cal.Rptr. 729]; *People v. Ballard* (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 311, 318–319 [249 Cal.Rptr. 806].
- Dating Relationship Defined. Pen. Code, § 243(f)(10).
- Simultaneous Cohabitation. *People v. Moore* (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1323, 1335 [52 Cal.Rptr.2d 256].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Assault. Pen. Code, § 240.
- Simple Battery. Pen. Code, §§ 242, 243(a).

### RELATED ISSUES

See the Related Issues section of CALCRIM No. 960, *Simple Battery*.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, § 19.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.12[2] (Matthew Bender).

**842–849. Reserved for Future Use**

## (iv) Evidence

### 850. Testimony on Intimate Partner Battering and Its Effects: Credibility of Complaining Witness

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You have heard testimony from \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of expert> regarding the effect of (battered women’s syndrome/intimate partner battering/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert other description used by expert for syndrome>).

\_\_\_\_\_’s <insert name of expert> testimony about (battered women’s syndrome/intimate partner battering/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert other description used by expert for syndrome>) is not evidence that the defendant committed any of the crimes charged against (him/her) [or any conduct or crime[s] with which (he/she) was not charged].

You may consider this evidence only in deciding whether or not \_\_\_\_\_’s <insert name of alleged victim of abuse> conduct was not inconsistent with the conduct of someone who has been abused, and in evaluating the believability of (his/her) testimony.

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*New January 2006; Revised March 2017, April 2020*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

Several courts of review have concluded there is no sua sponte duty to give a similar limiting instruction (see CALCRIM No. 1193, *Testimony on Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome*) when an expert testifies on child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome. (*People v. Mateo* (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1063, 1073–1074 [197 Cal.Rptr.3d 248]; *People v. Sanchez* (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 721, 736 [256 Cal.Rptr. 446] and *People v. Stark* (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 107, 116 [261 Cal.Rptr. 479] [instruction required only on request].) See also *People v. Humphrey* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073, 1088, fn. 5, 1090–1091, 1100 [56 Cal.Rptr.2d 142, 921 P.2d 1], which concludes that a limiting instruction on battered woman syndrome is required only on request. But see *People v. Housley* (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 947, 958–959 [9 Cal.Rptr.2d 431], which did find a sua sponte duty to give CALCRIM No. 1193.

In *People v. Brown* (2004) 33 Cal.4th 892, 906–908 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 447, 94 P.3d 574], the Supreme Court held that testimony from an expert in battered women’s syndrome could be admitted under Evidence Code section 801 even though there was no evidence of prior incidents of violence between the defendant and the alleged victim. The court held that the expert could testify generally about the “cycle of violence” and the frequency of recantation by victims of domestic abuse, without testifying specifically about “battered women’s syndrome”. (*Ibid.*) It is

unclear if the court is required to give a cautionary admonition sua sponte when such evidence is admitted.

### ***Related Instructions***

If this instruction is given, also give CALCRIM No. 303, *Limited Purpose Evidence in General*, and CALCRIM No. 332, *Expert Witness Testimony*.

See also CALCRIM No. 851, *Testimony on Intimate Partner Battering and Its Effects: Offered by the Defense*.

## **AUTHORITY**

- Instructional Requirements. See Evid. Code, § 1107(a); *People v. Humphrey* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073, 1088, fn. 5 [56 Cal.Rptr.2d 142, 921 P.2d 1].
- Abuse Defined. Evid. Code, § 1107(c); Fam. Code, § 6203.
- Domestic Violence Defined. Evid. Code, § 1107(c); Fam. Code, § 6211.
- Relevant After Single Incident of Abuse. See *People v. Brown* (2004) 33 Cal.4th 892, 906–908 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 447, 94 P.3d 574]; *People v. Williams* (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1118, 1129 [93 Cal.Rptr.2d 356].
- Relevant to Rehabilitate Victim’s Credibility. *People v. Gadlin* (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 587, 594–595 [92 Cal.Rptr.2d 890] [victim recanted incident and reunited with abuser]; *People v. Morgan* (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1215–1217 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 772] [victim recanted].
- This Instruction Upheld. *People v. Sexton* (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 457, 465–468 [250 Cal.Rptr.3d 496].

## **RELATED ISSUES**

### ***Assumptions Underlying Expert Testimony***

It is unnecessary, and potentially misleading, to instruct that the expert testimony assumes that physical or mental abuse has in fact occurred. (See *People v. Gilbert* (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1372, 1387 [7 Cal.Rptr.2d 660] [in context of child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome].)

### ***Definition and Preferred Name***

In 2004, the Legislature amended Evidence Code section 1107(d), changing all references from “battered women’s syndrome” to “intimate partner battering and its effects.” Previous decisional law continues to apply. (Evid. Code, § 1107(f).) Battered women’s syndrome has been defined as “a series of common characteristics that appear in women who are abused physically and psychologically over an extended period of time by the dominant male figure in their lives.” (*People v. Humphrey* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073, 1083–1084 [56 Cal.Rptr.2d 142, 921 P.2d 1].) The Supreme Court had previously noted that experts prefer to call the syndrome “expert testimony on battered women’s experiences.” (See *People v. Humphrey, supra*, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 1083–1084, fn. 3.)

### ***No Testimony on Actual State of Mind***

While evidence is admissible “to explain how [a] defendant’s asserted subjective perception of a need to defend herself ‘would reasonably follow from the



defendant's experience as a battered woman,' ” an expert may not give an opinion “that the defendant *actually perceived* that she was in danger and needed to defend herself.” (*People v. Erickson* (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1391, 1400, 1401 [67 Cal.Rptr.2d 740] [§ 1107(a) codifies existing rules regarding battered women's syndrome testimony; original italics].) Section 1107 “does not create an exception to Penal Code section 29,” which prohibits an expert who is testifying about a mental defect from testifying about whether a defendant had a required mental state. (*People v. Erickson, supra*, 57 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1401–1402 [syndrome was characterized as mental defect].)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

- 1 Witkin, California Evidence (5th ed. 2012) Opinion Evidence, §§ 49–52.
- 3 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 71, *Scientific and Expert Evidence*, § 71.04[1][d][v][C] (Matthew Bender).

## 851. Testimony on Intimate Partner Battering and Its Effects: Offered by the Defense

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You have heard testimony from \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of expert> regarding the effect of (battered women’s syndrome/intimate partner battering/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert other description used by expert for syndrome>).

\_\_\_\_\_’s <insert name of expert> testimony about (battered women’s syndrome/intimate partner battering/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert other description used by expert for syndrome>) is not evidence that the defendant committed any of the crimes charged against (him/her).

You may consider this evidence only in deciding whether the defendant actually believed that (he/she) needed to defend (himself/herself) against an immediate threat of great bodily injury or death, and whether that belief was reasonable or unreasonable.

When deciding whether the defendant’s belief was reasonable or unreasonable, consider all the circumstances as they were known by or appeared to the defendant. Also consider what conduct would appear to be necessary to a reasonable person in a similar situation with similar knowledge.

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New January 2006

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction if an expert testifies on intimate partner battering and its effects, previously known as battered women’s syndrome. (See *People v. Housley* (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 947, 958–959 [8 Cal.Rptr.2d 431] [sua sponte duty in context of child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome]; *People v. Bledsoe* (1984) 36 Cal.3d 236, 250 [203 Cal.Rptr. 450, 681 P.2d 291] [rape trauma syndrome not admissible to prove rape occurred].)

The court may need to modify this instruction if the defense offers testimony on intimate partner battering and its effects on an issue other than whether the defendant actually and reasonably believed in the need for self-defense. (See *People v. Coffman and Marlow* (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 98–101 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 710, 96 P.3d 30] [evidence offered to show defendant did not act with intent to kill but acted out of fear of codefendant].)

#### *Related Instructions*

If this instruction is given, also give CALCRIM No. 303, *Limited Purpose Evidence in General* and CALCRIM No. 332, *Expert Witness Testimony*.

See also:

CALCRIM No. 850, *Testimony on Intimate Partner Battering and Its Effects: Credibility of Complaining Witness*.

CALCRIM No. 505, *Justifiable Homicide: Self-Defense or Defense of Another*.

CALCRIM No. 571, *Voluntary Manslaughter: Imperfect Self-Defense*.

### AUTHORITY

- Instructional Requirements. See Evid. Code, § 1107(a); *People v. Humphrey* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073, 1088, fn. 5 [56 Cal.Rptr.2d 142, 921 P.2d 1]; *People v. Jaspas* (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 99, 111, fn. 6 [119 Cal.Rptr.2d 470].
- Abuse Defined. Evid. Code, § 1107(c); Fam. Code, § 6203.
- Domestic Violence Defined. Evid. Code, § 1107(c); Fam. Code, § 6211.
- Relevant After Single Incident of Abuse. See *People v. Brown* (2004) 33 Cal.4th 892, 906–908 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 447, 94 P.3d 574]; *People v. Williams* (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1118, 1129 [93 Cal.Rptr.2d 356].
- Relevant to Claim of Self-Defense. *People v. Humphrey* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073, 1082–1083, 1088–1089 [56 Cal.Rptr.2d 142, 921 P.2d 1].

### RELATED ISSUES

See the Related Issues section of CALCRIM No. 850, *Testimony on Intimate Partner Battering and Its Effects: Credibility of Complaining Witness*.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin, *California Evidence* (5th ed. 2012) Opinion Evidence, §§ 49–52.

3 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 71, *Scientific and Expert Evidence*, § 71.04[1][d][v][C]; Ch. 73, *Defenses and Justifications*, § 73.11[1][c] (Matthew Bender).

## 852A. Evidence of Uncharged Domestic Violence

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The People presented evidence that the defendant committed domestic violence that was not charged in this case[, specifically: \_\_\_\_\_  
<insert other domestic violence alleged>.]

<Alternative A—As defined in Pen. Code, § 13700>

[**Domestic violence** means abuse committed against (an adult/a fully emancipated minor) who is a (spouse[,]/ [or] former spouse[,]/ [or] cohabitant[,]/ [or] former cohabitant[,]/ [or] person with whom the defendant has had a child[,]/ [or] person who dated or is dating the defendant[,]/ [or] person who was or is engaged to the defendant).]

<Alternative B—As defined in Fam. Code, § 6211>

[**Domestic violence** means abuse committed against a (child/grandchild/parent/grandparent/brother/sister) of the defendant.]

**Abuse** means intentionally or recklessly causing or attempting to cause bodily injury, or placing another person in reasonable fear of imminent serious bodily injury to himself or herself or to someone else.

[A **fully emancipated minor** is a person under the age of 18 who has gained certain adult rights by marrying, being on active duty for the United States armed services, or otherwise being declared emancipated under the law.]

[The term **cohabitants** means two unrelated persons living together for a substantial period of time, resulting in some permanency of the relationship. Factors that may determine whether people are cohabiting include, but are not limited to, (1) sexual relations between the parties while sharing the same residence, (2) sharing of income or expenses, (3) joint use or ownership of property, (4) the parties' holding themselves out as husband and wife, (5) the parties' registering as domestic partners, (6) the continuity of the relationship, and (7) the length of the relationship.]

You may consider this evidence only if the People have proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant in fact committed the uncharged domestic violence. Proof by a preponderance of the evidence is a different burden of proof from proof beyond a reasonable doubt. A fact is proved by a preponderance of the evidence if you conclude that it is more likely than not that the fact is true.

If the People have not met this burden of proof, you must disregard this evidence entirely.

If you decide that the defendant committed the uncharged domestic

**violence, you may, but are not required to, conclude from that evidence that the defendant was disposed or inclined to commit domestic violence and, based on that decision, also conclude that the defendant was likely to commit [and did commit] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert charged offense[s] involving domestic violence>, as charged here. If you conclude that the defendant committed the uncharged domestic violence, that conclusion is only one factor to consider along with all the other evidence. It is not sufficient by itself to prove that the defendant is guilty of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert charged offense[s] involving domestic violence>. The People must still prove (the/each) (charge/ [and] allegation) beyond a reasonable doubt.**

**[Do not consider this evidence for any other purpose [except for the limited purpose of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert other permitted purpose, e.g., determining the defendant's credibility>].]**

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2006, June 2007, April 2008, February 2014, March 2017*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court must give this instruction on request when evidence of other domestic violence has been introduced. (See *People v. Falsetta* (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 924 [89 Cal.Rptr.2d 847, 986 P.2d 182] [error to refuse limiting instruction on request]; *People v. Jennings* (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1301, 1317–1318 [97 Cal.Rptr.2d 727]; *People v. Willoughby* (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 1054, 1067 [210 Cal.Rptr. 880] [general limiting instructions should be given when evidence of past offenses would be highly prejudicial without them].)

If the court has admitted evidence that the defendant was convicted of a felony or committed a misdemeanor for the purpose of impeachment in addition to evidence admitted under Evidence Code section 1109, then the court must specify for the jury what evidence it may consider under section 1109. (*People v. Rollo* (1977) 20 Cal.3d 109, 123, fn. 6 [141 Cal.Rptr. 177, 569 P.2d 771] [discussing section 1101(b); superseded in part on other grounds as recognized in *People v. Olmedo* (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 1085, 1096 [213 Cal.Rptr. 742]].) In the first sentence, insert a description of the uncharged offense allegedly shown by the section 1109 evidence. If the court has not admitted any felony convictions or misdemeanor conduct for impeachment, then, in the first sentence, the court is not required to insert a description of the conduct alleged.

The definition of “domestic violence” contained in Evidence Code section 1109(d) was amended, effective January 1, 2006. The definition is now in subd. (d)(3), which states that, as used in section 1109:

‘Domestic violence’ has the meaning set forth in Section 13700 of the Penal Code. Subject to a hearing conducted pursuant to section 352, which shall

include consideration of any corroboration and remoteness in time, ‘domestic violence’ has the further meaning as set forth in section 6211 of the Family Code, if the act occurred no more than five years before the charged offense.

If the court determines that the evidence is admissible pursuant to the definition of domestic violence contained in Penal Code section 13700, give the definition of domestic violence labeled alternative A. If the court determines that the evidence is admissible pursuant to the definition contained in Family Code section 6211, give the definition labeled alternative B.

Depending on the evidence, give on request the bracketed paragraphs defining “emancipated minor” (see Fam. Code, § 7000 et seq.) and “cohabitant” (see Pen. Code, § 13700(b)).

In the paragraph that begins with “If you decide that the defendant committed,” the committee has placed the phrase “and did commit” in brackets. One appellate court has criticized instructing the jury that it may draw an inference about disposition. (*People v. James* (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1343, 1357, fn. 8 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 823].) The court should review the Commentary section below and give the bracketed phrase at its discretion.

Give the final sentence that begins with “Do not consider” on request.

### ***Related Instructions***

CALCRIM No. 375, *Evidence of Uncharged Offense to Prove Identity, Intent, Common Plan, etc.*

CALCRIM No. 1191A, *Evidence of Uncharged Sex Offense.*

CALCRIM No. 1191B, *Evidence of Charged Sex Offense.*

CALCRIM No. 852B, *Evidence of Charged Domestic Violence.*

CALCRIM No. 853A, *Evidence of Uncharged Abuse of Elder or Dependent Person.*

CALCRIM No. 853B, *Evidence of Charged Abuse of Elder or Dependent Person.*

## **AUTHORITY**

- Instructional Requirement. Evid. Code, § 1109(a)(1); see *People v. Reliford* (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1007, 1012–1016 [130 Cal.Rptr.2d 254, 62 P.3d 601]; *People v. Frazier* (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 30, 37 [107 Cal.Rptr.2d 100]; *People v. Falsetta* (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 923–924 [89 Cal.Rptr.2d 847, 986 P.2d 182] [dictum].
- Abuse Defined. Pen. Code, § 13700(a).
- Cohabitant Defined. Pen. Code, § 13700(b).
- Domestic Violence Defined. Evid. Code, § 1109(d)(3); Pen. Code, § 13700(b); Fam. Code, § 6211; see *People v. Poplar* (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1129, 1139 [83 Cal.Rptr.2d 320] [spousal rape is higher level of domestic violence].
- Emancipation of Minors Law. Fam. Code, § 7000 et seq.
- Other Crimes Proved by Preponderance of Evidence. *People v. Carpenter*

(1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 382 [63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708]; *People v. James* (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1343, 1359 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 823].

- Propensity Evidence Alone Is Not Sufficient to Support Conviction Beyond a Reasonable Doubt. *People v. Younger* (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1360, 1382 [101 Cal.Rptr.2d 624]; *People v. James* (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1343, 1357–1358, fn. 8 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 823]; see *People v. Hill* (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 273, 277–278 [103 Cal.Rptr.2d 127] [in context of prior sexual offenses].
- Charged Sex Offenses Proved Beyond a Reasonable Doubt May Be Evidence of Propensity. *People v. Cruz* (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 1178, 1186–1186 [206 Cal.Rptr.3d 835]; *People v. Villatoro* (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1152, 1161 [144 Cal.Rptr.3d 401, 281 P.3d 390].
- Previous Version of This Instruction Upheld. *People v. Johnson* (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 731, 738 [79 Cal.Rptr.3d 568].
- No Sua Sponte Duty to Give Similar Instruction. *People v. Cottone* (2013) 57 Cal.4th 269, 293, fn. 15 [159 Cal.Rptr.3d 385, 303 P.3d 1163].

### COMMENTARY

The paragraph that begins with “If you decide that the defendant committed” tells the jury that they may draw an inference of disposition. (See *People v. Hill* (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 273, 275–279 [103 Cal.Rptr.2d 127]; *People v. Brown* (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1324, 1334–1335 [92 Cal.Rptr.2d 433].) One appellate court, however, suggests using more general terms to instruct the jury how they may use evidence of other domestic violence offenses, “leaving particular inferences for the argument of counsel and the jury’s common sense.” (*People v. James* (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1343, 1357, fn. 8 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 823] [includes suggested instruction].) If the trial court adopts this approach, the paragraph that begins with “If you decide that the defendant committed the uncharged domestic violence” may be replaced with the following:

If you decide that the defendant committed the uncharged domestic violence, you may consider that evidence and weigh it together with all the other evidence received during the trial to help you determine whether the defendant committed \_\_\_\_\_ <insert charged offense involving domestic violence>. Remember, however, that evidence of uncharged domestic violence is not sufficient alone to find the defendant guilty of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert charged offense involving domestic violence>. The People must still prove (the/each) (charge/ [and] allegation) of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert charged offense involving domestic violence> beyond a reasonable doubt.

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Constitutional Challenges*

Evidence Code section 1109 does not violate a defendant’s rights to due process (*People v. Escobar* (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1085, 1095–1096 [98 Cal.Rptr.2d 696]; *People v. Hoover* (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1020, 1028–1029 [92 Cal.Rptr.2d 208]; *People v. Johnson* (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 410, 420 [91 Cal.Rptr.2d 596]; see *People*



*v. Falsetta* (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 915–922 [89 Cal.Rptr.2d 847, 986 P.2d 182] (construing Evid. Code, § 1108, a parallel statute to Evid. Code, § 1109); *People v. Branch* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 274, 281 [109 Cal.Rptr.2d 870] (construing Evid. Code, § 1108) or equal protection (*People v. Jennings* (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1301, 1310–1313 [97 Cal.Rptr.2d 727]; see *People v. Fitch* (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 172, 184–185 [63 Cal.Rptr.2d 753] (construing Evid. Code, § 1108).

### **Exceptions**

Evidence of domestic violence occurring more than 10 years before the charged offense is inadmissible under section 1109 of the Evidence Code, unless the court determines that the admission of this evidence is in the interest of justice. (Evid. Code, § 1109(e).) Evidence of the findings and determinations of administrative agencies regulating health facilities is also inadmissible under section 1109. (Evid. Code, § 1109(f).)

See the Related Issues sections of CALCRIM No. 375, *Evidence of Uncharged Offense to Prove Identity, Intent, Common Plan, etc.*, and CALCRIM No. 1191, *Evidence of Uncharged Sex Offense*.

## **SECONDARY SOURCES**

5 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, §§ 720–722.

1 Witkin, *California Evidence* (5th ed. 2012) Circumstantial Evidence, §§ 101, 102.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 83, *Evidence*, § 83.12[1] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.13 (Matthew Bender).



## 852B. Evidence of Charged Domestic Violence

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The People presented evidence that the defendant committed the crime[s] of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of offense[s]> charged in Count[s] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert count[s] of domestic violence offense[s] charged in this case>.

If the People have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed one or more of these crimes, you may, but are not required to, conclude from that evidence that the defendant was disposed or inclined to commit domestic violence offenses, and based on that decision, also conclude that the defendant was likely to commit [and did commit] the other domestic violence offenses charged in this case.

If you find that the defendant committed one or more of these crimes, that conclusion is only one factor to consider along with all the other evidence. It is not sufficient by itself to prove that the defendant is guilty of another crime. The People must still prove (the/each) (charge/ [and] allegation) beyond a reasonable doubt.

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*New March 2017*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court must give this instruction on request if the People rely on charged offenses as evidence of predisposition to commit similar crimes charged in the same case. (Evid. Code § 355.)

#### *Related Instructions*

CALCRIM No. 375, *Evidence of Uncharged Offense to Prove Identity, Intent, Common Plan, etc.*

CALCRIM No. 1191A, *Evidence of Uncharged Sex Offense.*

CALCRIM No. 1191B, *Evidence of Charged Sex Offense.*

CALCRIM No. 852A, *Evidence of Uncharged Domestic Violence.*

CALCRIM No. 853A, *Evidence of Uncharged Abuse of Elder or Dependent Person.*

CALCRIM No. 853B, *Evidence of Charged Abuse of Elder or Dependent Person.*

### AUTHORITY

- Charged Offenses Proved Beyond a Reasonable Doubt May Be Evidence of Propensity. *People v. Cruz* (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 1178, 1186-1186 [206 Cal.Rptr.3d 835]; *People v. Villatoro* (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1152, 1161 [144 Cal.Rptr.3d 401, 281 P.3d 390].

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

5 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, §§ 720–722.

1 Witkin, California Evidence (5th ed. 2012) Circumstantial Evidence, §§ 101, 102.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 83, *Evidence*, § 83.12[1] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.13 (Matthew Bender).

## 853A. Evidence of Uncharged Abuse of Elder or Dependent Person

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The People presented evidence that the defendant committed abuse of (an elder/a dependent person) that was not charged in this case[, specifically: \_\_\_\_\_ <insert other abuse alleged>.] Abuse of (an elder/a dependent person) means (physical abuse[,]/ [or] sexual abuse[,]/ [or] neglect[,]/ [or] financial abuse[,]/ [or] abandonment[,]/ [or] isolation[,]/ [or] abduction[,]/[or] the act by a care custodian of not providing goods or services that are necessary to avoid physical harm or mental suffering[,]/ [or] [other] treatment that results in physical harm or pain or mental suffering).

[An *elder* is a person residing in California who is age 65 or older.]

[A *dependent person* is a person who has physical or mental impairments that substantially restrict his or her ability to carry out normal activities or to protect his or her rights. This definition includes, but is not limited to, those who have developmental disabilities or whose physical or mental abilities have significantly diminished because of age.]

You may consider this evidence only if the People have proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant in fact committed the uncharged abuse of (an elder/a dependent person). Proof by a preponderance of the evidence is a different burden of proof from proof beyond a reasonable doubt. A fact is proved by a preponderance of the evidence if you conclude that it is more likely than not that the fact is true.

If the People have not met this burden of proof, you must disregard this evidence entirely.

If you decide that the defendant committed the uncharged abuse of (an elder/a dependent person), you may, but are not required to, conclude from that evidence that the defendant was disposed or inclined to commit abuse of (an elder/a dependent person), and based on that decision, also conclude that the defendant was likely to commit [and did commit] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert charged offense[s] involving abuse of elder or dependent person>, as charged here. If you conclude that the defendant committed the uncharged abuse of (an elder/a dependent person), that conclusion is only one factor to consider along with all the other evidence. It is not sufficient by itself to prove that the defendant is guilty of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert charged offense[s] involving abuse of elder or dependent person>. The People must still prove (the/each) (charge/ [and] allegation) beyond a reasonable doubt.

[Do not consider this evidence for any other purpose [except for the

**limited purpose of \_\_\_\_\_** <insert other permitted purpose, e.g., determining the defendant's credibility>].]

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*New January 2006; Revised April 2008, February 2014, March 2017*

## BENCH NOTES

### ***Instructional Duty***

The court must give this instruction on request when evidence of other abuse of an elder or dependent person has been introduced. (See *People v. Falsetta* (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 924 [89 Cal.Rptr.2d 847, 986 P.2d 182] [error to refuse limiting instruction on request]; *People v. Jennings* (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1301, 1317–1318 [97 Cal.Rptr.2d 727]; *People v. Willoughby* (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 1054, 1067 [210 Cal.Rptr. 880] [general limiting instructions should be given when evidence of past offenses would be highly prejudicial without them].)

If the court has admitted evidence that the defendant was convicted of a felony or committed a misdemeanor for the purpose of impeachment in addition to evidence admitted under Evidence Code section 1109, then the court must specify for the jury what evidence it may consider under section 1109. (*People v. Rollo* (1977) 20 Cal.3d 109, 123, fn. 6 [141 Cal.Rptr. 177, 569 P.2d 771] [discussing section 1101(b); superseded in part on other grounds as recognized in *People v. Olmedo* (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 1085, 1096 [213 Cal.Rptr. 742]].) In the first sentence, insert a description of the uncharged offense allegedly shown by the section 1109 evidence. If the court has not admitted any felony convictions or misdemeanor conduct for impeachment, then, in the first sentence, the court is not required to insert a description of the conduct alleged.

Depending on the evidence, give on request the bracketed definition of an elder or dependent person. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 15610.23 [dependent adult], 15610.27 [elder].) Other terms may be defined on request depending on the evidence. See the Authority section below for references to selected definitions from the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15600 et seq.)

In the paragraph that begins with “If you decide that the defendant committed,” the committee has placed the phrase “and did commit” in brackets. One appellate court has criticized instructing the jury that it may draw an inference about disposition. (*People v. James* (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1343, 1357, fn. 8 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 823].) The court should review the Commentary section below and give the bracketed phrase at its discretion.

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “Do not consider” on request.

### ***Related Instructions***

CALCRIM No. 375, *Evidence of Uncharged Offense to Prove Identity, Intent, or Common Plan, etc.*

CALCRIM No. 852A, *Evidence of Uncharged Domestic Violence.*

CALCRIM No. 852B, *Evidence of Charged Domestic Violence*.

CALCRIM No. 853B, *Evidence of Charged Abuse of Elder or Dependent Person*.

CALCRIM No. 1191A, *Evidence of Uncharged Sex Offense*.

CALCRIM No. 1191B, *Evidence of Charged Sex Offense*.

### AUTHORITY

- Instructional Requirement. Evid. Code, § 1109(a)(2).
- Abandonment Defined. Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.05.
- Abduction Defined. Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.06.
- Abuse of Elder or Dependent Person Defined. Evid. Code, § 1109(d)(1).
- Care Custodian Defined. Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.17.
- Dependent Person Defined. Evid. Code, § 177.
- Elder Defined. Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.27.
- Financial Abuse Defined. Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.30.
- Goods and Services Defined. Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.35.
- Isolation Defined. Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.43.
- Mental Suffering Defined. Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.53.
- Neglect Defined. Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.57.
- Physical Abuse Defined. Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.63.
- Other Crimes Proved by Preponderance of Evidence. *People v. Carpenter* (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 382 [63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708]; *People v. James* (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1343, 1359 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 823].
- Propensity Evidence Alone Is Not Sufficient to Support Conviction Beyond a Reasonable Doubt. *People v. Younger* (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1360, 1382 [101 Cal.Rptr.2d 624]; *People v. James, supra*, 81 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1357–1358, fn. 8 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 823] [in context of prior domestic violence offenses]; see *People v. Hill* (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 273, 277–278 [103 Cal.Rptr.2d 127] [in context of prior sexual offenses].
- Charged Sex Offenses Proved Beyond a Reasonable Doubt May Be Evidence of Propensity. *People v. Cruz* (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 1178, 1186–1186 [206 Cal.Rptr.3d 835]; *People v. Villatoro* (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1152, 1161 [144 Cal.Rptr.3d 401, 281 P.3d 390].
- No Sua Sponte Duty To Give Similar Instruction. *People v. Cottone* (2013) 57 Cal.4th 269, 293, fn. 15 [159 Cal.Rptr.3d 385, 303 P.3d 1163].

### COMMENTARY

The paragraph that begins with “If you decide that the defendant committed” tells the jury that they may draw an inference of disposition. (See *People v. Hill, supra*, 86 Cal.App.4th at pp. 275–279; *People v. Brown* (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1324,

1334–1335 [92 Cal.Rptr.2d 433].) One appellate court, however, suggests using more general terms to instruct the jury how they may use evidence of other domestic violence offenses, “leaving particular inferences for the argument of counsel and the jury’s common sense.” (*People v. James, supra*, 81 Cal.App.4th at p. 1357, fn. 8 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 823] [includes suggested instruction].) If the trial court adopts this approach, the paragraph that begins with “If you decide that the defendant committed the uncharged abuse of (an elder/a dependent person)” may be replaced with the following:

If you decide that the defendant committed the uncharged abuse of (an elder/a dependent person), you may consider that evidence and weigh it together with all the other evidence received during the trial to help you determine whether the defendant committed \_\_\_\_\_ <insert charged offense involving abuse of elder or dependent person>. Remember, however, that evidence of uncharged abuse of (an elder/a dependent person) is not sufficient alone to find the defendant guilty of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert charged offense involving abuse of elder or dependent person>. The People must still prove (the/each) (charge/ [and] allegation) of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert charged offense involving abuse of elder or dependent person> beyond a reasonable doubt.

## RELATED ISSUES

### *Exceptions*

Evidence of abuse of an elder or dependent person occurring more than 10 years before the charged offense is inadmissible under Evidence Code section 1109, unless the court determines that the admission of this evidence is in the interest of justice. (Evid. Code, § 1109(e).) Evidence of the findings and determinations of administrative agencies regulating health facilities is also inadmissible under section 1109. (Evid. Code, § 1109(f).)

See the Related Issues sections of CALCRIM No. 375, *Evidence of Uncharged Offense to Prove Identity, Intent, Common Plan, etc.*, CALCRIM No. 852, *Evidence of Uncharged Domestic Violence*, and CALCRIM No. 1191, *Evidence of Uncharged Sex Offense*.

## SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin, *California Evidence* (5th ed. 2012) Circumstantial Evidence, §§ 101, 102.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 83, *Evidence*, § 83.12[1] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.13[5] (Matthew Bender).

## 853B. Evidence of Charged Abuse of Elder or Dependent Person

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The People presented evidence that the defendant committed the crime[s] of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of offense[s]> charged in Count[s] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert count[s] of elder or dependent person abuse charged in this case>.

If the People have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed one or more of these crimes, you may, but are not required to, conclude from that evidence that the defendant was disposed or inclined to commit abuse of (elders/ [or] dependent persons), and based on that decision, also conclude that the defendant was likely to commit [and did commit] the other (elder/ [or] dependent person) abuse offense[s] charged in this case.

If you find that the defendant committed one or more of these crimes, that conclusion is only one factor to consider along with all the other evidence. It is not sufficient by itself to prove that the defendant is guilty of another crime. The People must still prove (the/each) (charge/ [and] allegation) beyond a reasonable doubt.

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*New March 2017*

### BENCH NOTES

#### ***Instructional Duty***

The court must give this instruction on request if the People rely on charged offenses as evidence of predisposition to commit similar crimes charged in the same case. (Evid. Code § 355.)

#### ***Related Instructions***

CALCRIM No. 1191A, *Evidence of Uncharged Sex Offense*.

CALCRIM No. 1191B, *Evidence of Charged Sex Offense*.

CALCRIM No. 852A, *Evidence of Domestic Violence*.

CALCRIM No. 852B, *Evidence of Domestic Violence*.

CALCRIM No. 853A, *Evidence of Elder or Dependent Person Abuse*.

### AUTHORITY

- Charged Offenses Proved Beyond a Reasonable Doubt May Be Evidence of Propensity. *People v. Cruz* (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 1178, 1186-1186 [206 Cal.Rptr.3d 835]; *People v. Villatoro* (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1152, 1161 [144 Cal.Rptr.3d 401, 281 P.3d 390].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin, *California Evidence* (5th ed. 2012) Circumstantial Evidence, §§ 101, 102.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 83, *Evidence*, § 83.12[1] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.13[5] (Matthew Bender).

**854–859. Reserved for Future Use**



## D. ASSAULT

### (i) With Weapon or Force Likely

#### (A) On Specified People

#### 860. Assault on Firefighter or Peace Officer With Deadly Weapon or Force Likely to Produce Great Bodily Injury (Pen. Code, §§ 240, 245(c) & (d))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with assault with (force likely to produce great bodily injury/a deadly weapon/a firearm/a semiautomatic firearm/a machine gun/an assault weapon/a .50 BMG rifle) on a (firefighter/peace officer) [in violation of Penal Code section 245].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove [either] that:

*<Alternative 1A—force with weapon>*

- [1A. The defendant did an act with (a deadly weapon/a firearm/a semiautomatic firearm/a machine gun/an assault weapon/a .50 BMG rifle) that by its nature would directly and probably result in the application of force to a person;]

[OR]

*<Alternative 1B—force without weapon>*

- [1Bi. The defendant did an act that by its nature would directly and probably result in the application of force to a person, and
- 1Bii. The force used was likely to produce great bodily injury;]
2. The defendant did that act willfully;
  3. When the defendant acted, (he/she) was aware of facts that would lead a reasonable person to realize that (his/her) act by its nature would directly and probably result in the application of force to someone;
  4. When the defendant acted, (he/she) had the present ability to apply force (likely to produce great bodily injury/with a deadly weapon/with a firearm/with a semiautomatic firearm/with a machine gun/with an assault weapon/with a .50 BMG rifle) to a person;
  5. When the defendant acted, the person assaulted was lawfully

performing (his/her) duties as a (firefighter/peace officer);

[AND]

6. When the defendant acted, (he/she) knew, or reasonably should have known, that the person assaulted was a (firefighter/peace officer) who was performing (his/her) duties(;/.)

<Give element 7 when instructing on self-defense or defense of another.>

[AND]

7. The defendant did not act (in self-defense/ [or] in defense of someone else.)]

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose. It is not required that he or she intend to break the law, hurt someone else, or gain any advantage.

[The terms *application of force* and *apply force* mean to touch in a harmful or offensive manner. The slightest touching can be enough if it is done in a rude or angry way. Making contact with another person, including through his or her clothing, is enough. The touching does not have to cause pain or injury of any kind.]

[The touching can be done indirectly by causing an object [or someone else] to touch the other person.]

[The People are not required to prove that the defendant actually touched someone.]

The People are not required to prove that the defendant actually intended to use force against someone when (he/she) acted.

No one needs to actually have been injured by defendant's act. But if someone was injured, you may consider that fact, along with all the other evidence, in deciding whether the defendant committed an assault[, and if so, what kind of assault it was].

[Voluntary intoxication is not a defense to assault.]

[*Great bodily injury* means significant or substantial physical injury. It is an injury that is greater than minor or moderate harm.]

[A *deadly weapon* is any object, instrument, or weapon [that is inherently deadly or one] that is used in such a way that it is capable of causing and likely to cause death or great bodily injury.]

[An object is *inherently deadly* if it is deadly or dangerous in the ordinary use for which it is designed.]

[In deciding whether an object is a deadly weapon, consider all the surrounding circumstances.]

[A *firearm* is any device designed to be used as a weapon, from which a projectile is discharged or expelled through a barrel by the force of an explosion or other form of combustion.]

[A *semiautomatic firearm* extracts a fired cartridge and chambers a fresh cartridge with each single pull of the trigger.]

[A *machine gun* is any weapon that (shoots/is designed to shoot/ [or] can readily be restored to shoot) automatically more than one shot by a single function of the trigger and without manual reloading.]

[An *assault weapon* includes \_\_\_\_\_ <insert names of appropriate designated assault weapons listed in Pen. Code, § 30510 and further defined by Pen. Code § 30515>.]

[A *.50 BMG rifle* is a center fire rifle that can fire a .50 BMG cartridge [and that is not an assault weapon or a machine gun]. A *.50 BMG cartridge* is a cartridge that is designed and intended to be fired from a center fire rifle and that has all three of the following characteristics:

1. The overall length is 5.54 inches from the base of the cartridge to the tip of the bullet;
2. The bullet diameter for the cartridge is from .510 to, and including, .511 inch;

AND

3. The case base diameter for the cartridge is from .800 inch to, and including, .804 inch.]

[The term[s] (*great bodily injury*[/] *deadly weapon*[/] *firearm*[/] *machine gun*[/] *assault weapon*[/] [and] *.50 BMG rifle*) (is/are) defined in another instruction to which you should refer.]

[A person who is employed as a police officer by \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of agency that employs police officer> is a *peace officer*.]

[A person employed by \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of agency that employs peace officer, e.g., “the Department of Fish and Wildlife”> is a *peace officer* if \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of facts necessary to make employee a peace officer, e.g., “designated by the director of the agency as a peace officer”>.]

[The duties of a \_\_\_\_\_ <insert title of officer> include \_\_\_\_\_ <insert job duties>.]

[A *firefighter* includes anyone who is an officer, employee, or member of a (governmentally operated (fire department/fire protection or firefighting agency) in this state/federal fire department/federal fire protection or firefighting agency), whether or not he or she is paid for his or her services.]

*New January 2006; Revised April 2011, February 2012, February 2013, September 2019, April 2020, September 2020*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If there is sufficient evidence of self-defense or defense of another, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense. Give bracketed element 7 and any appropriate defense instructions. (See CALCRIM Nos. 3470–3477.)

In addition, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on defendant’s reliance on self-defense as it relates to the use of excessive force. (*People v. White* (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 161, 167–168 [161 Cal.Rptr. 541].) If excessive force is an issue, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct the jury that the defendant is not guilty of the offense charged, or any lesser included offense in which lawful performance is an element, if the defendant used reasonable force in response to excessive force. (*People v. Olguin* (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 39, 46–47 [173 Cal.Rptr. 663].) On request, the court must instruct that the prosecution has the burden of proving the lawfulness of the arrest beyond a reasonable doubt. (*People v. Castain* (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 138, 145 [175 Cal.Rptr. 651].) If lawful performance is an issue, give the appropriate portions of CALCRIM No. 2670, *Lawful Performance: Peace Officer*. In addition, give CALCRIM No. 2672, *Lawful Performance: Resisting Unlawful Arrest With Force*, if requested.

Give element 1A if it is alleged the assault was committed with a deadly weapon, a firearm, a semiautomatic firearm, a machine gun, an assault weapon, or .50 BMG rifle. Give element 1B if it is alleged that the assault was committed with force likely to produce great bodily injury. (See Pen. Code, § 245(c) & (d).)

Give the bracketed definition of “application or force and apply force” on request.

Give the relevant bracketed definitions unless the court has already given the definition in other instructions. In such cases, the court may give the bracketed sentence stating that the term is defined elsewhere.

Give the bracketed phrase “that is inherently deadly or one” and give the bracketed definition of *inherently deadly* only if the object is a deadly weapon as a matter of law. (*People v. Stutelberg* (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 314, 317–318 [240 Cal.Rptr.3d 156].)

Give the bracketed portion that begins with “In deciding whether” if the object is not a weapon as a matter of law and is capable of innocent uses. (*People v. Aguilar* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1023, 1028–1029 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 655, 945 P.2d 1204]; *People v. Godwin* (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1562, 1573–1574 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 545].)

If determining whether the item is an inherently deadly weapon requires resolution of a factual issue, give both bracketed instructions.

The jury must determine whether the alleged victim is a peace officer. (*People v.*

*Brown* (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 444–445 [250 Cal.Rptr. 604, 758 P.2d 1135].) The court may instruct the jury on the appropriate definition of “peace officer” from the statute (e.g., “a Garden Grove Regular Police Officer and a Garden Grove Reserve Police Officer are peace officers”). (*Ibid.*) However, the court may not instruct the jury that the alleged victim was a peace officer as a matter of law (e.g., “Officer Reed was a peace officer”). (*Ibid.*) If the alleged victim is a police officer, give the bracketed sentence that begins with “A person employed as a police officer.” If the alleged victim is another type of peace officer, give the bracketed sentence that begins with “A person employed by.”

The court may give the bracketed sentence that begins, “The duties of a \_\_\_\_\_ <insert title . . .> include,” on request. The court may insert a description of the officer’s duties such as “the correct service of a facially valid search warrant.” (*People v. Gonzalez* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1222 [275 Cal.Rptr. 729, 800 P.2d 1159].)

Do not give an attempt instruction in conjunction with this instruction. There is no crime of “attempted assault” in California. (*In re James M.* (1973) 9 Cal.3d 517, 519, 521–522 [108 Cal.Rptr. 89, 510 P.2d 33].)

The second sentence of the great bodily injury definition could result in error if the prosecution improperly argues great bodily injury may be shown by greater than minor injury alone. (Compare *People v. Medellin* (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 519, 533–535 [258 Cal.Rptr.3d 867] [the definition was reasonably susceptible to prosecutor’s erroneous argument that the injury need only be greater than minor] with *People v. Quinonez* (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 457, 466 [260 Cal.Rptr.3d 86] [upholding instructions containing great bodily injury definition as written].)

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 240, 245(c) & (d)(1)–(3).
- Assault Weapon Defined. Pen. Code, §§ 30510, 30515.
- Firearm Defined. Pen. Code, § 16520.
- Machine Gun Defined. Pen. Code, § 16880.
- Semiautomatic Pistol Defined. Pen. Code, § 17140.
- .50 BMG Rifle Defined. Pen. Code, § 30530.
- Peace Officer Defined. Pen. Code, § 830 et seq.
- Firefighter Defined. Pen. Code, § 245.1.
- Willful Defined. Pen. Code, § 7(1); *People v. Lara* (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 102, 107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
- Deadly Weapon Defined. *People v. Brown* (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1, 6–8 [147 Cal.Rptr.3d 848]; *People v. Aguilar* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1023, 1028–1029 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 655, 945 P.2d 1204].
- Mental State for Assault. *People v. Williams* (2001) 26 Cal.4th 779, 790 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 114, 29 P.3d 197].

- Least Touching. *People v. Myers* (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 328, 335 [71 Cal.Rptr.2d 518] [citing *People v. Rocha* (1971) 3 Cal.3d 893, 899–900, fn. 12 [92 Cal.Rptr. 172, 479 P.2d 372]].
- Inherently Deadly Defined. *People v. Perez* (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1055, 1065 [232 Cal.Rptr.3d 51, 416 P.3d 42]; *People v. Aguilar* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1023, 1028–1029 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 655, 945 P.2d 1204].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Assault. Pen. Code, § 240.
- Assault With a Deadly Weapon. Pen. Code, § 245.
- Assault on a Peace Officer. Pen. Code, § 241(b).

### RELATED ISSUES

See the Related Issues section to CALCRIM No. 2670, *Lawful Performance: Peace Officer*.

#### *Dual Convictions Prohibited*

Penal Code § 245(c) describes a single offense. (*In re C.D.* (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 1021, 1029 [227 Cal.Rptr.3d 360] [“Aggravated assault against a peace officer under section 245, subdivision (c), remains a single offense, and multiple violations of the statute cannot be found when they are based on the same act or course of conduct.”]) See CALCRIM No. 3516, Multiple Counts: Alternative Charges For One Event—Dual Conviction Prohibited.

If both theories of assault are included in the case, the jury must unanimously agree which theory or theories are the basis for the verdict.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, § 69.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.11; Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.01[1][j] (Matthew Bender).

**861. Assault on Firefighter or Peace Officer With Stun Gun or Less Lethal Weapon (Pen. Code, §§ 240, 244.5(c))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with assault with a (stun gun/ [or] less lethal weapon) on a (firefighter/peace officer) [in violation of Penal Code section 244.5(c)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant did an act with a (stun gun/[or] less lethal weapon) that by its nature would directly and probably result in the application of force to a person;
2. The defendant did that act willfully;
3. When the defendant acted, (he/she) was aware of facts that would lead a reasonable person to realize that (his/her) act by its nature would directly and probably result in the application of force to someone;
4. When the defendant acted, (he/she) had the present ability to apply force with a (stun gun/[or] less lethal weapon) to a person;
5. When the defendant acted, the person assaulted was lawfully performing (his/her) duties as a (firefighter/peace officer);

[AND]

6. When the defendant acted, (he/she) knew, or reasonably should have known, that the person assaulted was a (firefighter/peace officer) who was performing (his/her) duties(;/.)

*<Give element 7 when instructing on self-defense or defense of another.>*

[AND]

7. The defendant did not act (in self-defense/ [or] in defense of someone else).]

[A *stun gun* is anything, except a less lethal weapon, that is used or intended to be used as either an offensive or defensive weapon and is capable of temporarily immobilizing someone by inflicting an electrical charge.]

[A \_\_\_\_\_ is a less lethal weapon.]

[\_\_\_\_\_ is less lethal ammunition.]

[A *less lethal weapon* is any device that is either designed to or that has been converted to expel or propel less lethal ammunition by any action, mechanism, or process for the purpose of incapacitating, immobilizing,



or stunning a human being through the infliction of any less than lethal impairment of physical condition, function, or senses, including physical pain or discomfort. It is not necessary that the weapon leave any lasting or permanent incapacitation, discomfort, pain, or other injury or disability in order to qualify as a *less lethal weapon*.]

[*Less lethal ammunition* is any ammunition that is designed to be used in any less lethal weapon or any other kind of weapon, including, but not limited to, firearms, pistols, revolvers, shotguns, rifles, and spring, compressed air, and compressed gas weapons. When used in a less lethal weapon or other weapon, *less lethal ammunition* is designed to immobilize or incapacitate or stun a human being by inflicting less than lethal impairment of physical condition, function, or senses, including physical pain or discomfort.]

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose. It is not required that he or she intend to break the law, hurt someone else, or gain any advantage.

The terms *application of force* and *apply force* mean to touch in a harmful or offensive manner. The slightest touching can be enough if it is done in a rude or angry way. Making contact with another person, including through his or her clothing, is enough. The touching does not have to cause pain or injury of any kind.

[The touching can be done indirectly by causing an object [or someone else] to touch the other person.]

[The People are not required to prove that the defendant actually touched someone.]

The People are not required to prove that the defendant actually intended to use force against someone when (he/she) acted.

No one needs to actually have been injured by the defendant's act. But if someone was injured, you may consider that fact, along with all the other evidence, in deciding whether the defendant committed an assault[, and if so, what kind of assault it was].

[Voluntary intoxication is not a defense to assault.]

[A person who is employed as a police officer by \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of agency that employs police officer> is a *peace officer*.]

[A person employed by \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of agency that employs peace officer, e.g., "the Department of Fish and Wildlife"> is a *peace officer* if \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of facts necessary to make employee a peace officer, e.g., "designated by the director of the agency as a peace officer">.]

[The duties of a \_\_\_\_\_ <insert title of officer> include \_\_\_\_\_ <insert job duties>.]



**[A firefighter includes anyone who is an officer, employee, or member of a (governmentally operated (fire department/fire protection or firefighting agency) in this state/federal fire department/federal fire protection or firefighting agency), whether or not he or she is paid for his or her services.]**

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2009, April 2011, February 2012*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If there is sufficient evidence of self-defense or defense of another, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense. Give bracketed element 7 and any appropriate defense instructions. (See CALCRIM Nos. 3470–3477.)

In addition, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on defendant’s reliance on self-defense as it relates to the use of excessive force. (*People v. White* (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 161, 167–168 [161 Cal.Rptr. 541].) If excessive force is an issue, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct the jury that the defendant is not guilty of the offense charged, or any lesser included offense in which lawful performance is an element, if the defendant used reasonable force in response to excessive force. (*People v. Olguin* (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 39, 46–47 [173 Cal.Rptr. 663].) On request, the court must instruct that the prosecution has the burden of proving the lawfulness of the arrest beyond a reasonable doubt. (*People v. Castain* (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 138, 145 [175 Cal.Rptr. 651].) If lawful performance is an issue, give the appropriate portions of CALCRIM No. 2670, *Lawful Performance: Peace Officer*. In addition, give CALCRIM No. 2672, *Lawful Performance: Resisting Unlawful Arrest With Force*, if requested.

The jury must determine whether the alleged victim is a peace officer. (*People v. Brown* (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 444–445 [250 Cal.Rptr. 604, 758 P.2d 1135].) The court may instruct the jury on the appropriate definition of “peace officer” from the statute (e.g., “a Garden Grove Regular Police Officer and a Garden Grove Reserve Police Officer are peace officers”). (*Ibid.*) However, the court may not instruct the jury that the alleged victim was a peace officer as a matter of law (e.g., “Officer Reed was a peace officer”). (*Ibid.*) If the alleged victim is a police officer, give the bracketed sentence that begins with “A person employed as a police officer.” If the alleged victim is another type of peace officer, give the bracketed sentence that begins with “A person employed by.”

The court may give the bracketed sentence that begins, “The duties of a \_\_\_\_\_ <insert title . . .> include,” on request. The court may insert a description of the officer’s duties such as “the correct service of a facially valid search warrant.” (*People v. Gonzalez* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1222 [275 Cal.Rptr. 729, 800 P.2d 1159].)

Do not give an attempt instruction in conjunction with this instruction. There is no crime of “attempted assault” in California. (*In re James M.* (1973) 9 Cal.3d 517, 519, 521–522 [108 Cal.Rptr. 89, 510 P.2d 33].)

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 240, 244.5.
- Firefighter Defined. Pen. Code, § 245.1.
- Peace Officer Defined. Pen. Code, § 830 et seq.
- Willful Defined. Pen. Code, § 7(1); *People v. Lara* (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 102, 107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
- Mental State for Assault. *People v. Williams* (2001) 26 Cal.4th 779, 790 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 114, 29 P.3d 197].
- Least Touching. *People v. Myers* (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 328, 335 [71 Cal.Rptr.2d 518] [citing *People v. Rocha* (1971) 3 Cal.3d 893, 899–900, fn. 12 [92 Cal.Rptr. 172, 479 P.2d 372]].
- Less Lethal Weapon Defined. Pen. Code, § 16780.
- Less Lethal Ammunition Defined. Pen. Code, § 16770.

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Assault. Pen. Code, § 240.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, § 69.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.11[3]; Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.01[1][j] (Matthew Bender).

**862. Assault on Custodial Officer With Deadly Weapon or Force Likely to Produce Great Bodily Injury (Pen. Code, §§ 240, 245, 245.3)**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with assault with (force likely to produce great bodily injury/a deadly weapon) on a custodial officer [in violation of Penal Code section 245.3].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

*<Alternative 1A—force with weapon>*

- [1. The defendant willfully did an act with a deadly weapon that by its nature would directly and probably result in the application of force to a person;]**

*<Alternative 1B—force without weapon>*

**[1A. The defendant did an act that by its nature would directly and probably result in the application of force to a person, and**

**1B. The force used was likely to produce great bodily injury;]**

- 2. The defendant did that act willfully;**
- 3. When the defendant acted, (he/she) was aware of facts that would lead a reasonable person to realize that (his/her) act by its nature would directly and probably result in the application of force to someone;**
- 4. When the defendant acted, (he/she) had the present ability to apply force (likely to produce great bodily injury/with a deadly weapon) to a person;**
- 5. When the defendant acted, the person assaulted was lawfully performing (his/her) duties as a custodial officer;**

**[AND]**

- 6. When the defendant acted, (he/she) knew, or reasonably should have known, both that the person assaulted was a custodial officer and that (he/she) was performing (his/her) duties as a custodial officer(;/.)**

*<Give element 7 when instructing on self-defense or defense of another.>*

**[AND]**

- 7. The defendant did not act (in self-defense/ [or] in defense of someone else).]**

**Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on**

purpose. It is not required that he or she intend to break the law, hurt someone else, or gain any advantage.

[The terms *application of force* and *apply force* mean to touch in a harmful or offensive manner. The slightest touching can be enough if it is done in a rude or angry way. Making contact with another person, including through his or her clothing, is enough. The touching does not have to cause pain or injury of any kind.]

[The touching can be done indirectly by causing an object [or someone else] to touch the other person.]

[The People are not required to prove that the defendant actually touched someone.]

The People are not required to prove that the defendant actually intended to use force against someone when (he/she) acted.

No one needs to actually have been injured by defendant's act. But if someone was injured, you may consider that fact, along with all the other evidence, in deciding whether the defendant committed an assault[, and if so, what kind of assault it was].

[Voluntary intoxication is not a defense to assault.]

[*Great bodily injury* means significant or substantial physical injury. It is an injury that is greater than minor or moderate harm.]

[A *deadly weapon* is any object, instrument, or weapon [that is inherently deadly or one] that is used in such a way that it is capable of causing and likely to cause death or great bodily injury.]

[An object is *inherently deadly* if it is deadly or dangerous in the ordinary use for which it was designed.]

[In deciding whether an object is a deadly weapon, consider all the surrounding circumstances.]

[The term[s] (*great bodily injury/ [and] deadly weapon*) (is/are) defined in another instruction to which you should refer.]

A *custodial officer* is someone who works for a law enforcement agency of a city or county, is responsible for maintaining custody of prisoners, and helps operate a local detention facility. [A (county jail/city jail/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert other detention facility>) is a local detention facility.]  
[A custodial officer is not a peace officer.]

**BENCH NOTES*****Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If there is sufficient evidence of self-defense or defense of another, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense. Give bracketed element 7 and any appropriate defense instructions. (See CALCRIM Nos. 3470–3477.)

In addition, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on defendant’s reliance on self-defense as it relates to the use of excessive force. (*People v. White* (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 161, 167–168 [161 Cal.Rptr. 541].) If excessive force is an issue, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct the jury that the defendant is not guilty of the offense charged, or any lesser included offense in which lawful performance is an element, if the defendant used reasonable force in response to excessive force. (*People v. Olguin* (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 39, 46–47 [173 Cal.Rptr. 663].) If lawful performance is an issue, give the appropriate portions of CALCRIM No. 2671, *Lawful Performance: Custodial Officer*.

Give element 1A if it is alleged the assault was committed with a deadly weapon. Give element 1B if it is alleged that the assault was committed with force likely to produce great bodily injury. (See Pen. Code, § 245.3.)

Give the bracketed definition of “application or force and apply force” on request.

Give the relevant bracketed definitions unless the court has already given the definition in other instructions. In such cases, the court may give the bracketed sentence stating that the term is defined elsewhere.

Give the bracketed phrase “that is inherently deadly or one” and give the bracketed definition of *inherently deadly* only if the object is a deadly weapon as a matter of law. (*People v. Stutelberg* (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 314, 317–318 [240 Cal.Rptr.3d 156].)

Give the bracketed portion that begins with “In deciding whether” if the object is not a weapon as a matter of law and is capable of innocent uses. (*People v. Aguilar* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1023, 1028–1029 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 655, 945 P.2d 1204]; *People v. Godwin* (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1562, 1573–1574 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 545].)

If determining whether the item is an inherently deadly weapon requires resolution of a factual issue, give both bracketed instructions.

In the bracketed definition of “local detention facility,” do not insert the name of a specific detention facility. Instead, insert a description of the type of detention facility at issue in the case. (See *People v. Flood* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 482 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180, 957 P.2d 869] [jury must determine if alleged victim is a peace officer]; see Penal Code section 6031.4 [defining local detention facility].)

Do not give an attempt instruction in conjunction with this instruction. There is no crime of “attempted assault” in California. (*In re James M.* (1973) 9 Cal.3d 517, 519, 521–522 [108 Cal.Rptr. 89, 510 P.2d 33].)

The second sentence of the great bodily injury definition could result in error if the prosecution improperly argues great bodily injury may be shown by greater than minor injury alone. (Compare *People v. Medellin* (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 519, 533–535 [258 Cal.Rptr.3d 867] [the definition was reasonably susceptible to prosecutor’s erroneous argument that the injury need only be greater than minor] with *People v. Quinonez* (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 457, 466 [260 Cal.Rptr.3d 86] [upholding instructions containing great bodily injury definition as written].)

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 240, 245, 245.3.
- Custodial Officer Defined. Pen. Code, § 831.
- Local Detention Facility Defined. Pen. Code, § 6031.4.
- Willful Defined. Pen. Code, § 7(1); *People v. Lara* (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 102, 107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
- Deadly Weapon Defined. *People v. Brown* (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1, 6–8 [147 Cal.Rptr.3d 848]; *People v. Aguilar* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1023, 1028–1029 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 655, 945 P.2d 1204].
- Mental State for Assault. *People v. Williams* (2001) 26 Cal.4th 779, 790 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 114, 29 P.3d 197].
- Least Touching. *People v. Myers* (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 328, 335 [71 Cal.Rptr.2d 518] [citing *People v. Rocha* (1971) 3 Cal.3d 893, 899–900, fn. 12 [92 Cal.Rptr. 172, 479 P.2d 372]].
- Inherently Deadly Defined. *People v. Perez* (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1055, 1065 [232 Cal.Rptr.3d 51, 416 P.3d 42]; *People v. Aguilar* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1023, 1028–1029 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 655, 945 P.2d 1204].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, §§ 72–74.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.11; Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.01[1][j] (Matthew Bender).

**863. Assault on Transportation Personnel or Passenger With  
Deadly Weapon or Force Likely to Produce Great Bodily Injury  
(Pen. Code, §§ 240, 245, 245.2)**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with assault with (force likely to produce great bodily injury/a deadly weapon) on (a/an) (operator/driver/station agent/ticket agent/passenger) of (a/an) \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of vehicle or transportation entity specified in Pen. Code, § 245.2>* [in violation of Penal Code section 245.2].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

*<Alternative 1A—force with weapon>*

1. The defendant willfully did an act with a deadly weapon that by its nature would directly and probably result in the application of force to a person;]

*<Alternative 1B—force without weapon>*

- 1A. The defendant did an act that by its nature would directly and probably result in the application of force to a person, and
- 1B. The force used was likely to produce great bodily injury;]
2. The defendant did that act willfully;
3. When the defendant acted, (he/she) was aware of facts that would lead a reasonable person to realize that (his/her) act by its nature would directly and probably result in the application of force to someone;
4. When the defendant acted, (he/she) had the present ability to apply force (likely to produce great bodily injury/with a deadly weapon) to a person;

*<Alternative 5A—transportation personnel>*

5. When the defendant acted, the person assaulted was performing (his/her) duties as (a/an) (operator/driver/station agent/ticket agent) of (a/an) \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of vehicle or transportation entity specified in Pen. Code, § 245.2>*;]

*<Alternative 5B—passenger>*

5. The person assaulted was a passenger of (a/an) \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of vehicle or transportation entity specified in Pen. Code, § 245.2>*;]

[AND]



6. When the defendant acted, (he/she) knew, or reasonably should have known, [both] that the person assaulted was (a/an) (operator/driver/station agent/ticket agent/passenger) of (a/an) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of vehicle or transportation entity specified in Pen. Code, § 245.2> [and that (he/she) was performing (his/her) duties](;/.)

<Give element 7 when instructing on self-defense or defense of another.>

[AND

7. The defendant did not act (in self-defense/ [or] in defense of someone else).]

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose. It is not required that he or she intend to break the law, hurt someone else, or gain any advantage.

[The terms *application of force* and *apply force* mean to touch in a harmful or offensive manner. The slightest touching can be enough if it is done in a rude or angry way. Making contact with another person, including through his or her clothing, is enough. The touching does not have to cause pain or injury of any kind.]

[The touching can be done indirectly by causing an object [or someone else] to touch the other person.]

[The People are not required to prove that the defendant actually touched someone.]

The People are not required to prove that the defendant actually intended to use force against someone when (he/she) acted.

No one needs to actually have been injured by defendant's act. But if someone was injured, you may consider that fact, along with all the other evidence, in deciding whether the defendant committed an assault[, and if so, what kind of assault it was].

[Voluntary intoxication is not a defense to assault.]

[*Great bodily injury* means significant or substantial physical injury. It is an injury that is greater than minor or moderate harm.]

[A *deadly weapon* is any object, instrument, or weapon [that is inherently deadly or one] that is used in such a way that it is capable of causing and likely to cause death or great bodily injury.]

[An object is *inherently deadly* if it is deadly or dangerous in the ordinary use for which it was designed.]

[In deciding whether an object is a deadly weapon, consider all the surrounding circumstances.]



[The term[s] (*great bodily injury*/ [and] *deadly weapon*) (is/are) defined in another instruction to which you should refer.]

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2013, September 2019, September 2020*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If there is sufficient evidence of self-defense or defense of another, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense. Give bracketed element 7 and any appropriate defense instructions. (See CALCRIM Nos. 3470–3477.)

Give element 1A if it is alleged the assault was committed with a deadly weapon. Give element 1B if it is alleged that the assault was committed with force likely to produce great bodily injury. (See Pen. Code, § 245.2.)

If the victim was an operator, driver, station agent, or ticket agent of an identified vehicle or transportation entity, give element 5A and the bracketed language in element 6. If the victim was a passenger, give element 5B and omit the bracketed language in element 6.

Give the bracketed definition of “application or force and apply force” on request.

Give the relevant bracketed definitions unless the court has already given the definition in other instructions. In such cases, the court may give the bracketed sentence stating that the term is defined elsewhere.

Give the bracketed phrase “that is inherently deadly or one” and give the bracketed definition of *inherently deadly* only if the object is a deadly weapon as a matter of law. (*People v. Stutelberg* (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 314, 317–318 [240 Cal.Rptr.3d 156].)

Give the bracketed portion that begins with “In deciding whether” if the object is not a weapon as a matter of law and is capable of innocent uses. (*People v. Aguilar* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1023, 1028–1029 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 655, 945 P.2d 1204]; *People v. Godwin* (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1562, 1573–1574 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 545].)

If determining whether the item is an inherently deadly weapon requires resolution of a factual issue, give both bracketed instructions.

Do not give an attempt instruction in conjunction with this instruction. There is no crime of “attempted assault” in California. (*In re James M.* (1973) 9 Cal.3d 517, 519, 521–522 [108 Cal.Rptr. 89, 510 P.2d 33].)

The second sentence of the great bodily injury definition could result in error if the prosecution improperly argues great bodily injury may be shown by greater than minor injury alone. (Compare *People v. Medellin* (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 519, 533–535 [258 Cal.Rptr.3d 867] [the definition was reasonably susceptible to prosecutor’s erroneous argument that the injury need only be greater than minor]

with *People v. Quinonez* (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 457, 466 [260 Cal.Rptr.3d 86] [upholding instructions containing great bodily injury definition as written].)

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 240, 245, 245.2.
- Willful Defined. Pen. Code, § 7(1); *People v. Lara* (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 102, 107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
- Deadly Weapon Defined. *People v. Brown* (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1, 6–8 [147 Cal.Rptr.3d 848]; *People v. Aguilar* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1023, 1028–1029 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 655, 945 P.2d 1204].
- Mental State for Assault. *People v. Williams* (2001) 26 Cal.4th 779, 790 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 114, 29 P.3d 197].
- Least Touching. *People v. Myers* (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 328, 335 [71 Cal.Rptr.2d 518] [citing *People v. Rocha* (1971) 3 Cal.3d 893, 899–900, fn. 12 [92 Cal.Rptr. 172, 479 P.2d 372]].
- Inherently Deadly Defined. *People v. Perez* (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1055, 1065 [232 Cal.Rptr.3d 51, 416 P.3d 42]; *People v. Aguilar* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1023, 1028–1029 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 655, 945 P.2d 1204].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Assault. Pen. Code, § 240.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, § 79.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.11[3]; Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.01[1][j] (Matthew Bender).

**864–874. Reserved for Future Use**

## (B) General

### 875. Assault With Deadly Weapon or Force Likely to Produce Great Bodily Injury (Pen. Code, §§ 240, 245(a)(1)–(4), (b))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with assault with (force likely to produce great bodily injury/a deadly weapon other than a firearm/a firearm/a semiautomatic firearm/a machine gun/an assault weapon/a .50 BMG rifle) [in violation of Penal Code section 245].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

*<Alternative 1A—force with weapon>*

1. The defendant did an act with (a deadly weapon other than a firearm/a firearm/a semiautomatic firearm/a machine gun/an assault weapon/a .50 BMG rifle) that by its nature would directly and probably result in the application of force to a person;]

*<Alternative 1B—force without weapon>*

[1A. The defendant did an act that by its nature would directly and probably result in the application of force to a person, and

1B. The force used was likely to produce great bodily injury;]

2. The defendant did that act willfully;
3. When the defendant acted, (he/she) was aware of facts that would lead a reasonable person to realize that (his/her) act by its nature would directly and probably result in the application of force to someone;

[AND]

4. When the defendant acted, (he/she) had the present ability to apply force (likely to produce great bodily injury/with a deadly weapon other than a firearm/with a firearm/with a semiautomatic firearm/with a machine gun/with an assault weapon/with a .50 BMG rifle) to a person(;/.)

*<Give element 5 when instructing on self-defense or defense of another>*

[AND]

5. The defendant did not act (in self-defense/ [or] in defense of someone else).]

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose. It is not required that he or she intend to break the law, hurt

someone else, or gain any advantage.

[The terms *application of force* and *apply force* mean to touch in a harmful or offensive manner. The slightest touching can be enough if it is done in a rude or angry way. Making contact with another person, including through his or her clothing, is enough. The touching does not have to cause pain or injury of any kind.]

[The touching can be done indirectly by causing an object [or someone else] to touch the other person.]

[The People are not required to prove that the defendant actually touched someone.]

The People are not required to prove that the defendant actually intended to use force against someone when (he/she) acted.

No one needs to actually have been injured by defendant's act. But if someone was injured, you may consider that fact, along with all the other evidence, in deciding whether the defendant committed an assault[, and if so, what kind of assault it was].

[Voluntary intoxication is not a defense to assault.]

[*Great bodily injury* means significant or substantial physical injury. It is an injury that is greater than minor or moderate harm.]

[A *deadly weapon other than a firearm* is any object, instrument, or weapon [that is inherently deadly or one] that is used in such a way that it is capable of causing and likely to cause death or great bodily injury.]

[An object is *inherently deadly* if it is deadly or dangerous in the ordinary use for which it was designed.]

[In deciding whether an object is a deadly weapon, consider all the surrounding circumstances.]

[A *firearm* is any device designed to be used as a weapon, from which a projectile is discharged or expelled through a barrel by the force of an explosion or other form of combustion.]

[A *semiautomatic pistol* extracts a fired cartridge and chambers a fresh cartridge with each single pull of the trigger.]

[A *machine gun* is any weapon that (shoots/is designed to shoot/ [or] can readily be restored to shoot) automatically more than one shot by a single function of the trigger and without manual reloading.]

[An *assault weapon* includes \_\_\_\_\_ <insert names of appropriate designated assault weapons listed in Pen. Code, § 30510 or as defined by Pen. Code, § 30515>.]

[A *.50 BMG rifle* is a center fire rifle that can fire a .50 BMG cartridge

[and that is not an assault weapon or a machine gun]. A *.50 BMG cartridge* is a cartridge that is designed and intended to be fired from a center fire rifle and that has all three of the following characteristics:

1. The overall length is 5.54 inches from the base of the cartridge to the tip of the bullet;
2. The bullet diameter for the cartridge is from .510 to, and including, .511 inch;

AND

3. The case base diameter for the cartridge is from .800 inch to, and including, .804 inch.]

[The term[s] (*great bodily injury*[/] *deadly weapon other than a firearm*[/] *firearm*[/] *machine gun*[/] *assault weapon*[/] [and] *.50 BMG rifle*) (is/are) defined in another instruction to which you should refer.]

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*New January 2006; Revised June 2007, August 2009, October 2010, February 2012, February 2013, August 2013, September 2019, September 2020*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If there is sufficient evidence of self-defense or defense of another, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense. Give bracketed element 4 and any appropriate defense instructions. (See CALCRIM Nos. 3470–3477.)

Give element 1A if it is alleged the assault was committed with a deadly weapon other than a firearm, firearm, semiautomatic firearm, machine gun, an assault weapon, or .50 BMG rifle. Give element 1B if it is alleged that the assault was committed with force likely to produce great bodily injury. (See Pen. Code, § 245(a).)

Give the bracketed definition of “application or force and apply force” on request.

Give the relevant bracketed definitions unless the court has already given the definition in other instructions. In such cases, the court may give the bracketed sentence stating that the term is defined elsewhere.

Give the bracketed phrase “that is inherently deadly or one” and give the bracketed definition of *inherently deadly* only if the object is a deadly weapon as a matter of law. (*People v. Stutelberg* (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 314, 317–318 [240 Cal.Rptr.3d 156].)

Give the bracketed portion that begins with “In deciding whether” if the object is not a deadly weapon as a matter of law and is capable of innocent uses. (*People v. Aguilar* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1023, 1028–1029 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 655, 945 P.2d 1204];

*People v. Godwin* (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1562, 1573–1574 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 545].)

If determining whether the item is an inherently deadly weapon requires resolution of a factual issue, give both bracketed instructions.

Do not give an attempt instruction in conjunction with this instruction. There is no crime of “attempted assault” in California. (*In re James M.* (1973) 9 Cal.3d 517, 519, 521–522 [108 Cal.Rptr. 89, 510 P.2d 33].)

If the charging document names more than one victim, modification of this instruction may be necessary to clarify that each victim must have been subject to the application of force. (*People v. Velasquez* (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1170, 1176–1177 [150 Cal.Rptr.3d 612].)

The second sentence of the great bodily injury definition could result in error if the prosecution improperly argues great bodily injury may be shown by greater than minor injury alone. (Compare *People v. Medellin* (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 519, 533–535 [258 Cal.Rptr.3d 867] [the definition was reasonably susceptible to prosecutor’s erroneous argument that the injury need only be greater than minor] with *People v. Quinonez* (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 457, 466 [260 Cal.Rptr.3d 86] [upholding instructions containing great bodily injury definition as written].)

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 240, 245(a)(1)–(3) & (b).
- To Have Present Ability to Inflict Injury, Gun Must Be Loaded Unless Used as Club or Bludgeon. *People v. Rodriguez* (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 11, fn. 3 [82 Cal.Rptr.2d 413, 971 P.2d 618].
- This Instruction Affirmed. *People v. Golde* (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 101, 122–123 [77 Cal.Rptr.3d 120].
- Assault Weapon Defined. Pen. Code, §§ 30510, 30515.
- Semiautomatic Pistol Defined. Pen. Code, § 17140.
- Firearm Defined. Pen. Code, § 16520.
- Machine Gun Defined. Pen. Code, § 16880.
- .50 BMG Rifle Defined. Pen. Code, § 30530.
- Willful Defined. Pen. Code, § 7, subd. 1; *People v. Lara* (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 102, 107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
- Deadly Weapon Defined. *People v. Brown* (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1, 6–8 [147 Cal.Rptr.3d 848]; *People v. Aguilar* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1023, 1028–1029 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 655, 945 P.2d 1204].
- Mental State for Assault. *People v. Williams* (2001) 26 Cal.4th 779, 790 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 114, 29 P.3d 197].
- Least Touching. *People v. Myers* (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 328, 335 [71 Cal.Rptr.2d 518] [citing *People v. Rocha* (1971) 3 Cal.3d 893, 899–900, fn. 12 [92 Cal.Rptr. 172, 479 P.2d 372]].

- Inherently Deadly Defined. *People v. Perez* (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1055, 1065 [232 Cal.Rptr.3d 51, 416 P.3d 42]; *People v. Aguilar* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1023, 1028–1029 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 655, 945 P.2d 1204].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Assault. Pen. Code, § 240.

Assault with a firearm is a lesser included offense of assault with a semiautomatic firearm. (*People v. Martinez* (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 197, 199 [145 Cal.Rptr.3d 141].)

A misdemeanor brandishing of a weapon or firearm under Penal Code section 417 is not a lesser and necessarily included offense of assault with a deadly weapon. (*People v. Escarcega* (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 391, 398 [117 Cal.Rptr. 595]; *People v. Steele* (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 212, 218, 221 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 458].)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, § 41.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.11[3] (Matthew Bender).

**876. Assault With Stun Gun or Less Lethal Weapon (Pen. Code, §§ 240, 244.5(b))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with assault with a (stun gun/[or] less lethal weapon) [in violation of Penal Code section 244.5(b)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant did an act with a (stun gun/[or] less lethal weapon) that by its nature would directly and probably result in the application of force to a person;
2. The defendant did that act willfully;
3. When the defendant acted, (he/she) was aware of facts that would lead a reasonable person to realize that (his/her) act by its nature would directly and probably result in the application of force to someone;

[AND]

4. When the defendant acted, (he/she) had the present ability to apply force with a (stun gun/[or] less lethal weapon) to a person(;/.)

*<Give element 5 when instructing on self-defense or defense of another.>*

[AND]

5. The defendant did not act (in self-defense/ [or] in defense of someone else).]

[A stun gun is anything, except a less lethal weapon, that is used or intended to be used as either an offensive or defensive weapon and is capable of temporarily immobilizing someone by inflicting an electrical charge.]

[A *less lethal weapon* is any device that is either designed to or that has been converted to expel or propel less lethal ammunition by any action, mechanism, or process for the purpose of incapacitating, immobilizing, or stunning a human being through the infliction of any less than lethal impairment of physical condition, function, or senses, including physical pain or discomfort. It is not necessary that the weapon leave any lasting or permanent incapacitation, discomfort, pain, or other injury or disability in order to qualify as a *less lethal weapon*.]

[*Less lethal ammunition* is any ammunition that is designed to be used in any less lethal weapon or any other kind of weapon, including, but not limited to, firearms, pistols, revolvers, shotguns, rifles, and spring,



compressed air, and compressed gas weapons. When used in a less lethal weapon or other weapon, *less lethal ammunition* is designed to immobilize or incapacitate or stun a human being by inflicting less than lethal impairment of physical condition, function, or senses, including physical pain or discomfort.]

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose. It is not required that he or she intend to break the law, hurt someone else, or gain any advantage.

The terms *application of force* and *apply force* mean to touch in a harmful or offensive manner. The slightest touching can be enough if it is done in a rude or angry way. Making contact with another person, including through his or her clothing, is enough. The touching does not have to cause pain or injury of any kind.

[The touching can be done indirectly by causing an object [or someone else] to touch the other person.]

[The People are not required to prove that the defendant actually touched someone.]

The People are not required to prove that the defendant actually intended to use force against someone when (he/she) acted.

No one needs to actually have been injured by the defendant's act. But if someone was injured, you may consider that fact, along with all the other evidence, in deciding whether the defendant committed an assault[, and if so, what kind of assault it was].

[Voluntary intoxication is not a defense to assault.]

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2009, February 2012*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If there is sufficient evidence of self-defense or defense of another, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense. Give bracketed element 5 and any appropriate defense instructions. (See CALCRIM Nos. 3470–3477.)

Do not give an attempt instruction in conjunction with this instruction. There is no crime of “attempted assault” in California. (*In re James M.* (1973) 9 Cal.3d 517, 519, 521–522 [108 Cal.Rptr. 89, 510 P.2d 33].)

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 240, 244.5.

- Willful Defined. Pen. Code, § 7, subd. 1; *People v. Lara* (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 102, 107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
- Mental State for Assault. *People v. Williams* (2001) 26 Cal.4th 779, 790 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 114, 29 P.3d 197].
- Least Touching. *People v. Myers* (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 328, 335 [71 Cal.Rptr.2d 518] [citing *People v. Rocha* (1971) 3 Cal.3d 893, 899–900, fn. 12 [92 Cal.Rptr. 172, 479 P.2d 372]].
- Less Lethal Weapon Defined. Pen. Code, § 16780.
- Less Lethal Ammunition Defined. Pen. Code, § 16770.

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Assault. Pen. Code, § 240.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, § 53.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.11[3] (Matthew Bender).

## 877. Assault With Caustic Chemicals (Pen. Code, § 244)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with (placing/ [or] throwing) caustic chemicals on someone else [in violation of Penal Code section 244].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant willfully and maliciously (placed[,]/ threw[,]/ caused to be placed[,]/ [or] caused to be thrown) any (caustic chemical[,]/ corrosive acid[,]/ flammable substance[,]/ [or] vitriol) on someone else;

[AND]

2. When the defendant acted, (he/she) intended to injure the flesh of or disfigure the other person's body(;/.)

<Give element 3 when instructing on self-defense or defense of another>

[AND]

3. The defendant did not act (in self-defense/ [or] in defense of someone else).]

[A *flammable substance* includes gasoline, petroleum products, or flammable liquids with a flashpoint of 150 degrees Fahrenheit or less.]

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose.

Someone acts *maliciously* when he or she intentionally does a wrongful act or when he or she acts with the unlawful intent to disturb, defraud, annoy, or injure someone else.

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*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If there is sufficient evidence of self-defense or defense of another, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense. Give bracketed element 3 and any appropriate defense instructions. (See CALCRIM Nos. 3470–3477.)

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 244.

- Malicious Defined. Pen. Code, § 7(4).
- Willful Defined. Pen. Code, § 7(1); *People v. Lara* (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 102, 107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
- Simple Assault Not a Lesser Included Offense. *People v. Warren* (1963) 223 Cal.App.2d 798, 801 [36 Cal.Rptr. 127].
- Threat of Great Bodily Harm Not Required. *People v. Day* (1926) 199 Cal. 78, 85–86 [248 P. 250].
- Mental State for Assault. *People v. Williams* (2001) 26 Cal.4th 779, 790 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 114, 29 P.3d 197].

### COMMENTARY

Although Penal Code section 244 is titled “assault with caustic chemicals,” this statute does not truly define an assault crime since actual contact with the other person is required.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, § 54.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.11 (Matthew Bender).

**878–889. Reserved for Future Use**

## (ii) With Intent to Commit Other Offense

### 890. Assault With Intent to Commit Specified Crimes [While Committing First Degree Burglary] (Pen. Code, § 220(a), (b))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with assault with intent to commit \_\_\_\_\_ <insert crime specified in Penal Code section 220(a)> [while committing first degree burglary] [in violation of Penal Code section 220((a)/ [and] (b))].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant did an act that by its nature would directly and probably result in the application of force to a person;
2. The defendant did that act willfully;
3. When the defendant acted, (he/she) was aware of facts that would lead a reasonable person to realize that (his/her) act by its nature would directly and probably result in the application of force to someone;
4. When the defendant acted, (he/she) had the present ability to apply force to a person;

[AND]

5. When the defendant acted, (he/she) intended to commit \_\_\_\_\_ <insert crime specified in Pen. Code, § 220(a)>;

[AND]

6. When the defendant acted, (he/she) was committing a first degree burglary.]

<If the court concludes that the first degree burglary requirement in Pen. Code, § 220(b) is a penalty allegation and not an element of the offense, give the bracketed language below in place of element 6.>

[If you find the defendant guilty of the charged crime, you must then decide whether the People have proved the additional allegation that the crime was committed in the commission of a first degree burglary.]

[First degree burglary is defined in another instruction to which you should refer.]

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose.

The terms *application of force* and *apply force* mean to touch in a

**harmful or offensive manner. The slightest touching can be enough if it is done in a rude or angry way. Making contact with another person, including through his or her clothing, is enough. The touching does not have to cause pain or injury of any kind.**

[The touching can be done indirectly by causing an object [or someone else] to touch the other person.]

[The People are not required to prove that the defendant actually touched someone.]

**No one needs to actually have been injured by the defendant's act. But if someone was injured, you may consider that fact, along with all the other evidence, in deciding whether the defendant committed an assault[, and if so, what kind of assault it was].**

**To decide whether the defendant intended to commit \_\_\_\_\_ <insert crime specified in Pen. Code, § 220(a)> please refer to Instruction[s] \_\_\_\_\_ which define[s] (that/those) crime[s].**

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*New January 2006; Revised April 2010, October 2010, August 2012*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give a *Mayberry* consent instruction if the defense is supported by substantial evidence and is consistent with the defense raised at trial. (*People v. May* (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 118, 124–125 [261 Cal.Rptr. 502]; see *People v. Mayberry* (1975) 15 Cal.3d 143 [125 Cal.Rptr. 745, 542 P.2d 1337]; see also CALCRIM No. 1000, *Rape or Spousal Rape by Force, Fear, or Threats* [alternative paragraph on reasonable and actual belief in consent].)

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the sex offense or offense alleged. (*People v. May* (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 118, 129 [261 Cal.Rptr. 502].) In the blanks, specify the sex offense or offenses that the defendant is charged with intending to commit. Included sex offenses are: rape (Pen. Code, § 261); oral copulation (Pen. Code, § 287 [including in-concert offense]); sodomy (Pen. Code, § 286 [including in-concert offense]); sexual penetration (Pen. Code, § 289); rape, spousal rape, or sexual penetration in concert (Pen. Code, § 264.1); and lewd or lascivious acts (Pen. Code, § 288). (See Pen. Code, § 220.) Give the appropriate instructions on the offense or offenses alleged.

The court should also give CALCRIM Nos. 1700 and 1701 on burglary, if defendant is charged with committing the offense during a first degree burglary, as well as the appropriate CALCRIM instruction on the target crime charged pursuant to Penal Code section 220.

If the specified crime is mayhem, give CALCRIM No. 891, *Assault With Intent to Commit Mayhem*.

Element 6 is in brackets because there is no guidance from courts of review regarding whether the first degree burglary requirement in Penal Code section 220(b) is an element or an enhancement.

### ***Related Instructions***

CALCRIM No. 915, *Simple Assault*.

## **AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 220.
- Elements for Assault. Pen. Code, § 240; *People v. Williams* (2001) 26 Cal.4th 779, 790 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 114, 29 P.3d 197].
- Court Must Instruct on Elements of Intended Crime. *People v. May* (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 118, 129 [261 Cal.Rptr. 502] [in context of assault to commit rape].

## **LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES**

- Simple Assault. Pen. Code, § 240; see *People v. Greene* (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 622, 653 [110 Cal.Rptr. 160] [in context of charged assault with intent to commit rape].

Both assault with intent to commit rape and first degree burglary are lesser included offenses of assault with intent to commit rape during first degree burglary (Pen. Code, § 220(b); *People v. Dyser* (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1015, 1021 [135 Cal.Rptr.3d 891].)

There is no crime of attempted assault to commit an offense. (See *People v. Duens* (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 310, 314 [134 Cal.Rptr. 341] [in context of assault to commit rape].)

## **RELATED ISSUES**

### ***Abandonment***

An assault with intent to commit another crime is complete at any point during the incident when the defendant entertains the intent to commit the crime. “It makes no difference whatsoever that he later abandons that intent.” (See *People v. Trotter* (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 1217, 1223 [207 Cal.Rptr. 165]; *People v. Meichtry* (1951) 37 Cal.2d 385, 388–389 [231 P.2d 847] [both in context of assault to commit rape].)

## **SECONDARY SOURCES**

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, §§ 28–34.

5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 91, *Sentencing*, § 91.60 (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.11 (Matthew Bender).

**891. Assault With Intent to Commit Mayhem (Pen. Code, § 220(a))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with assault with intent to commit mayhem [in violation of Penal Code section 220(a)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant did an act that by its nature would directly and probably result in the application of force to a person;
2. The defendant did that act willfully;
3. When the defendant acted, (he/she) was aware of facts that would lead a reasonable person to realize that (his/her) act by its nature would directly and probably result in the application of force to someone;
4. When the defendant acted, (he/she) had the present ability to apply force to a person;

AND

5. When the defendant acted, (he/she) intended to commit mayhem.

The defendant intended to commit mayhem if (he/she) intended to unlawfully and maliciously:

- [1. Remove a part of someone's body(;/.)]  
[OR]
- [2. Disable or make useless a part of someone's body by inflicting a more than slight or temporary disability(;/.)]  
[OR]
- [3. Permanently disfigure someone(;/.)]  
[OR]
- [4. Cut or disable someone's tongue(;/.)]  
[OR]
- [5. Slit someone's (nose[,]/ear[,]/ [or] lip) (;/.)]  
[OR]
- [6. Put out someone's eye or injure someone's eye in a way that would so significantly reduce (his/her) ability to see that the eye would be useless for the purpose of ordinary sight.]

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose.



Someone acts *maliciously* when he or she intentionally does a wrongful act or when he or she acts with the unlawful intent to annoy or injure someone else.

The terms *application of force* and *apply force* mean to touch in a harmful or offensive manner. The slightest touching can be enough if it is done in a rude or angry way. Making contact with another person, including through his or her clothing, is enough. The touching does not have to cause pain or injury of any kind.

[The touching can be done indirectly by causing an object [or someone else] to touch the other person.]

[The People are not required to prove that the defendant actually touched someone.]

No one needs to actually have been injured by the defendant's act. But if someone was injured, you may consider that fact, along with all the other evidence, in deciding whether the defendant committed an assault[, and if so, what kind of assault it was].

[A disfiguring injury may be *permanent* even if it can be repaired by medical procedures.]

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*New January 2006; Revised April 2010*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

**Do not** use this instruction if defendant is charged with having committed this crime during the commission of a first degree burglary. Use CALCRIM No. 890, *Assault With Intent to Commit Specified Crimes [While Committing First Degree Burglary]* instead.

Depending on the evidence, select the appropriate elements of mayhem. (See *People v. May* (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 118, 129 [261 Cal.Rptr. 502] [in context of assault to commit rape].) See generally CALCRIM No. 801, *Mayhem*.

The last bracketed sentence may be given on request if there is evidence of a disfiguring injury that may be repaired by medical procedures. (See *People v. Hill* (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1566, 1574–1575 [28 Cal.Rptr.2d 783] [not error to instruct that injury may be permanent even though cosmetic repair may be medically feasible].)

### *Related Instructions*

CALCRIM No. 915, *Simple Assault*.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 220.

- Elements for Assault. Pen. Code, § 240; *People v. Williams* (2001) 26 Cal.4th 779, 790 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 114, 29 P.3d 197].
- Elements for Mayhem. Pen. Code, § 203.
- Court Must Instruct on Elements of Intended Crime. *People v. May* (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 118, 129 [261 Cal.Rptr. 502] [in context of assault to commit rape].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Attempted Mayhem. Pen. Code, §§ 663, 203.
- Simple Assault. Pen. Code, § 240; see *People v. Greene* (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 622, 653 [110 Cal.Rptr. 160] [in context of charged assault with intent to commit rape].

There is no crime of attempted assault to commit an offense. (See *People v. Duens* (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 310, 314 [134 Cal.Rptr. 341] [in context of assault to commit rape].)

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Abandonment*

An assault with intent to commit another crime is complete at any point during the incident when the defendant entertains the intent to commit the crime. “It makes no difference whatsoever that he later abandons that intent.” (See *People v. Trotter* (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 1217, 1223 [207 Cal.Rptr. 165]; *People v. Meichtry* (1951) 37 Cal.2d 385, 388–389 [231 P.2d 847] [both in context of assault to commit rape].)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, §§ 28–34.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, §§ 142.11, 142.16 (Matthew Bender).

**892–899. Reserved for Future Use**

### (iii) Simple Assault on Specified People or in Specified Location

#### 900. Assault on Firefighter, Peace Officer or Other Specified Victim (Pen. Code, §§ 240, 241)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with assault on a (firefighter/peace officer/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of other person from Pen. Code, § 241(b/c)>) [in violation of Penal Code section 241(b/c)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant did an act that by its nature would directly and probably result in the application of force to a person;
2. The defendant did that act willfully;
3. When the defendant acted, (he/she) was aware of facts that would lead a reasonable person to realize that (his/her) act would directly, naturally, and probably result in the application of force to someone;
4. When the defendant acted, (he/she) had the present ability to apply force to a person;
5. When the defendant acted, the person assaulted was lawfully performing (his/her) duties as a (firefighter/peace officer/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of other person from Pen. Code, § 241(b) or (c)>);

[AND]

6. When the defendant acted, (he/she) knew, or reasonably should have known, that the person assaulted was a (firefighter/peace officer/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of other person from Pen. Code, § 241(b) or (c)>) (who was performing (his/her) duties/ providing emergency medical care)(;/.)

<Give element 7 when instructing on self-defense or defense of another.>

[AND]

7. The defendant did not act (in self-defense/ [or] in defense of someone else).]

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose. It is not required that he or she intend to break the law, hurt someone else, or gain any advantage.

The terms *application of force* and *apply force* mean to touch in a

harmful or offensive manner. The slightest touching can be enough if it is done in a rude or angry way. Making contact with another person, including through his or her clothing, is enough. The touching does not have to cause pain or injury of any kind.

[The touching can be done indirectly by causing an object [or someone else] to touch the other person.]

[The People are not required to prove that the defendant actually touched someone.]

The People are not required to prove that the defendant actually intended to use force against someone when (he/she) acted.

No one needs to actually have been injured by the defendant's act. But if someone was injured, you may consider that fact, along with all the other evidence, in deciding whether the defendant committed an assault[, and if so, what kind of assault it was].

[Voluntary intoxication is not a defense to assault.]

[A person employed as a police officer by \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of agency that employs police officer> is a *peace officer*.]

[A person employed by \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of agency that employs peace officer, e.g., "the Department of Fish and Wildlife"> is a *peace officer* if \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of facts necessary to make employee a peace officer, e.g., "designated by the director of the agency as a peace officer">.]

[The duties of a \_\_\_\_\_ <insert title of peace officer specified in Pen. Code, § 830 et seq.> include \_\_\_\_\_ <insert job duties>.]

[A *firefighter* includes anyone who is an officer, employee, or member of a (governmentally operated (fire department/fire protection or firefighting agency) in this state/federal fire department/federal fire protection or firefighting agency), whether or not he or she is paid for his or her services.]

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*New January 2006; Revised April 2008, April 2011*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If there is sufficient evidence of self-defense or defense of another, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense. Give bracketed element 7 and any appropriate defense instructions. (See CALCRIM Nos. 3470–3477.)

Select the option in element six for “providing emergency medical care” if the victim is a physician or nurse engaged in rendering emergency medical care.

In order to be “engaged in the performance of his or her duties,” a peace officer must be acting lawfully. (*People v. Gonzalez* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1217 [275 Cal.Rptr. 729, 800 P.2d 1159].) “[D]isputed facts bearing on the issue of legal cause must be submitted to the jury considering an engaged-in-duty element.” (*Ibid.*) The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on defendant’s reliance on self-defense as it relates to the use of excessive force. (*People v. White* (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 161, 167–168 [161 Cal.Rptr. 541].) If excessive force is an issue, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct the jury that the defendant is not guilty of the offense charged, or any lesser included offense in which lawful performance is an element, if the defendant used reasonable force in response to excessive force. (*People v. Olguin* (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 39, 46–47 [173 Cal.Rptr. 663].) On request, the court must also instruct that the People have the burden of proving the lawfulness of an arrest beyond a reasonable doubt. (*People v. Castain* (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 138, 145 [175 Cal.Rptr. 651].) Give the appropriate portions of CALCRIM No. 2670, *Lawful Performance: Peace Officer*.

The jury must determine whether the alleged victim is a peace officer. (*People v. Brown* (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 444–445 [250 Cal.Rptr. 604, 758 P.2d 1135].) The court may instruct the jury on the appropriate definition of “peace officer” from the statute (e.g., “a Garden Grove Regular Police Officer and a Garden Grove Reserve Police Officer are peace officers”). (*Ibid.*) However, the court may not instruct the jury that the alleged victim was a peace officer as a matter of law (e.g., “Officer Reed was a peace officer”). (*Ibid.*) If the alleged victim is a police officer, give the bracketed sentence that begins with “A person employed as a police officer.” If the alleged victim is another type of peace officer, give the bracketed sentence that begins with “A person employed by.”

The court may give the bracketed sentence that begins with “The duties of a \_\_\_\_\_ <insert title of peace officer specified in Pen. Code, § 830 et seq.> include” on request. The court may insert a description of the officer’s duties such as “the correct service of a facially valid search warrant.” (*People v. Gonzalez, supra*, 51 Cal.3d at p. 1222.)

Do not give an attempt instruction in conjunction with this instruction. There is no crime of “attempted assault” in California. (*In re James M.* (1973) 9 Cal.3d 517, 519, 521–522 [108 Cal.Rptr. 89, 510 P.2d 33].)

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 240, 241.
- Firefighter Defined. Pen. Code, § 245.1.
- Peace Officer Defined. Pen. Code, § 830 et seq.
- Willfully Defined. Pen. Code, § 7, subd. 1; *People v. Lara* (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 102, 107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].

- Mental State for Assault. *People v. Williams* (2001) 26 Cal.4th 779, 790 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 114, 29 P.3d 197].
- Least Touching. *People v. Myers* (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 328, 335 [71 Cal.Rptr.2d 518] [citing *People v. Rocha* (1971) 3 Cal.3d 893, 899–900, fn. 12 [92 Cal.Rptr. 172, 479 P.2d 372]].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Simple Assault. Pen. Code, § 240.

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Resisting Arrest*

“[A] person may not use force to resist any arrest, lawful or unlawful, except that he may use reasonable force to defend life and limb against excessive force . . . .” (*People v. Curtis* (1969) 70 Cal.2d 347, 357 [74 Cal.Rptr. 713, 450 P.2d 33].) “[I]f the arrest is ultimately determined factually to be unlawful [but the officer did not use excessive force], the defendant can be validly convicted only of simple assault or battery,” not assault or battery of a peace officer. (*Id.* at pp. 355–356.) See CALCRIM No. 2672, *Lawful Performance: Resisting Unlawful Arrest With Force*.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, § 69.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.11 (Matthew Bender).

## 901. Assault on Custodial Officer (Pen. Code, §§ 240, 241.1)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with assault on a custodial officer [in violation of Penal Code section 241.1].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant did an act that by its nature would directly and probably result in the application of force to a person;
2. The defendant did that act willfully;
3. When the defendant acted, (he/she) was aware of facts that would lead a reasonable person to realize that (his/her) act by its nature would directly and probably result in the application of force to someone;
4. When the defendant acted, (he/she) had the present ability to apply force to a person;
5. When the defendant acted, the person assaulted was lawfully performing (his/her) duties as a custodial officer;

[AND]

6. When the defendant acted, (he/she) knew, or reasonably should have known, both that the person assaulted was a custodial officer and that (he/she) was performing (his/her) duties as a custodial officer(;/.)

<Give element 7 when instructing on self-defense or defense of another>

[AND]

7. The defendant did not act (in self-defense/ [or] in defense of someone else).]

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose. It is not required that he or she intend to break the law, hurt someone else, or gain any advantage.

The terms *application of force* and *apply force* mean to touch in a harmful or offensive manner. The slightest touching can be enough if it is done in a rude or angry way. Making contact with another person, including through his or her clothing, is enough. The touching does not have to cause pain or injury of any kind.

[The touching can be done indirectly by causing an object [or someone else] to touch the other person.]

[The People are not required to prove that the defendant actually touched someone.]

The People are not required to prove that the defendant actually intended to use force against someone when (he/she) acted.

No one needs to actually have been injured by the defendant's act. But if someone was injured, you may consider that fact, along with all the other evidence, in deciding whether the defendant committed an assault[, and if so, what kind of assault it was].

[Voluntary intoxication is not a defense to assault.]

A *custodial officer* is someone who works for a law enforcement agency of a city or county, is responsible for maintaining custody of prisoners, and helps operate a local detention facility. [A (county jail/city jail/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert other detention facility>) is a local detention facility.]  
[A custodial officer is not a peace officer.]

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*New January 2006; Revised April 2011*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If there is sufficient evidence of self-defense or defense of another, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense. Give bracketed element 7 and any appropriate defense instructions. (See CALCRIM Nos. 3470–3477.)

In addition, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on defendant's reliance on self-defense as it relates to the use of excessive force. (*People v. White* (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 161, 167–168 [161 Cal.Rptr. 541].) If excessive force is an issue, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct the jury that the defendant is not guilty of the offense charged, or any lesser included offense in which lawful performance is an element, if the defendant used reasonable force in response to excessive force. (*People v. Olguin* (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 39, 46–47 [173 Cal.Rptr. 663].) If lawful performance is an issue, give the appropriate portions of CALCRIM No. 2671, *Lawful Performance: Custodial Officer*.

In the bracketed definition of “local detention facility,” do not insert the name of a specific detention facility. Instead, insert a description of the type of detention facility at issue in the case. (See *People v. Flood* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 482 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180, 957 P.2d 869] [jury must determine if alleged victim is a peace officer]; see Penal Code section 6031.4 [defining local detention facility].)

Do not give an attempt instruction in conjunction with this instruction. There is no crime of “attempted assault” in California. (*In re James M.* (1973) 9 Cal.3d 517, 519, 521–522 [108 Cal.Rptr. 89, 510 P.2d 33].)

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 240, 241.1.



- Custodial Officer Defined. Pen. Code, § 831.
- Local Detention Facility Defined. Pen. Code, § 6031.4.
- Willful Defined. Pen. Code, § 7, subd. 1; *People v. Lara* (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 102, 107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
- Mental State for Assault. *People v. Williams* (2001) 26 Cal.4th 779, 790 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 114, 29 P.3d 197].
- Least Touching. *People v. Myers* (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 328, 335 [71 Cal.Rptr.2d 518] [citing *People v. Rocha* (1971) 3 Cal.3d 893, 899–900, fn. 12 [92 Cal.Rptr. 172, 479 P.2d 372]].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, §§ 72–74.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.11 (Matthew Bender).

## 902. Assault on Military Personnel (Pen. Code, §§ 240, 241.8)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with assault on a member of the United States Armed Forces [in violation of Penal Code section 241.8].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant did an act that by its nature would directly and probably result in the application of force to a person;
2. The defendant did that act willfully;
3. When the defendant acted, (he/she) was aware of facts that would lead a reasonable person to realize that (his/her) act would directly, naturally, and probably result in the application of force to someone;
4. When the defendant acted, (he/she) had the present ability to apply force to a person;
5. The person assaulted was a member of the United States Armed Forces at the time of the assault;

[AND]

6. The defendant knew the other person was a member of the United States Armed Forces and assaulted the other person because of that person's service(;/.)

*<Give element 7 when instructing on self-defense or defense of another.>*

[AND]

7. The defendant did not act (in self-defense/ [or] in defense of someone else.)

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose. It is not required that he or she intend to break the law, hurt someone else, or gain any advantage.

The terms *application of force* and *apply force* mean to touch in a harmful or offensive manner. The slightest touching can be enough if it is done in a rude or angry way. Making contact with another person, including through his or her clothing, is enough. The touching does not have to cause pain or injury of any kind.

[The touching can be done indirectly by causing an object [or someone else] to touch the other person.]

[The People are not required to prove that the defendant actually touched someone.]

**The People are not required to prove that the defendant actually intended to use force against someone when (he/she) acted.**

**No one needs to actually have been injured by the defendant’s act. But if someone was injured, you may consider that fact, along with all the other evidence, in deciding whether the defendant committed an assault[, and if so, what kind of assault it was].**

**A \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description, e.g., “private in the United States Army”> is a member of the United States Armed Forces.**

**A person commits an assault because of someone’s service in the Armed Forces if:**

- 1. That person is biased against the assaulted person based on the assaulted person’s military service;**

**AND**

- 2. That bias caused the person to commit the alleged assault.**

**If the defendant had more than one reason to commit the alleged assault, the bias described here must have been a substantial motivating factor. A *substantial factor* is more than a trivial or remote factor. However, it does not need to be the only factor that motivated the assault.**

**[Voluntary intoxication is not a defense to assault.]**

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*New January 2006; Revised March 2017*

## **BENCH NOTES**

### ***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If there is sufficient evidence of self-defense or defense of another, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on that defense. Give bracketed element 7 and any appropriate defense instructions. (See CALCRIM Nos. 3470–3477.)

The jury must determine whether the alleged victim is a member of the United States Armed Forces. (See *People v. Brown* (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 444–445 [250 Cal.Rptr. 604, 758 P.2d 1135].) The court may instruct the jury on the appropriate definition of member of the armed forces. However, the court may not instruct the jury that the alleged victim was a member of the armed forces as a matter of law. (*Ibid.*)

Do not give an attempt instruction in conjunction with this instruction. There is no crime of “attempted assault” in California. (*In re James M.* (1973) 9 Cal.3d 517, 519, 521–522 [108 Cal.Rptr. 89, 510 P.2d 33].)

**Do not** give CALCRIM No. 370, *Motive*, with this instruction because motive is an

element of this crime. (See *People v. Valenti* (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1140, 1165 [197 Cal.Rptr.3d 317]; *People v. Maurer* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1121, 1126–1127 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 335].)

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 240, 241.8.
- Willfully Defined. Pen. Code, § 7, subd. 1; *People v. Lara* (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 102, 107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
- Mental State for Assault. *People v. Williams* (2001) 26 Cal.4th 779, 790 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 114, 29 P.3d 197].
- Least Touching. *People v. Myers* (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 328, 335 [71 Cal.Rptr.2d 518] [citing *People v. Rocha* (1971) 3 Cal.3d 893, 899–900, fn. 12 [92 Cal.Rptr. 172, 479 P.2d 372]].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Simple Assault. Pen. Code, § 240.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, § 69.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.11 (Matthew Bender).

**903. Assault on School District Peace Officer (Pen. Code, §§ 240, 241.4)**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with assault on a school district peace officer [in violation of Penal Code section 241.4].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant did an act that by its nature would directly and probably result in the application of force to a person;
2. The defendant did that act willfully;
3. When the defendant acted, (he/she) was aware of facts that would lead a reasonable person to realize that (his/her) act by its nature would directly and probably result in the application of force to someone;
4. When the defendant acted, (he/she) had the present ability to apply force to a person;
5. When the defendant acted, the person assaulted was lawfully performing (his/her) duties as a school district peace officer;

[AND]

6. When the defendant acted, (he/she) knew, or reasonably should have known, both that the person assaulted was a school district peace officer and that (he/she) was performing (his/her) duties as a school district peace officer(;/.)

<Give element 7 when instructing on self-defense or defense of another.>

[AND]

7. The defendant did not act (in self-defense/ [or] in defense of someone else).]

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose. It is not required that he or she intend to break the law, hurt someone else, or gain any advantage.

The terms *application of force* and *apply force* mean to touch in a harmful or offensive manner. The slightest touching can be enough if it is done in a rude or angry way. Making contact with another person, including through his or her clothing, is enough. The touching does not have to cause pain or injury of any kind.

[The touching can be done indirectly by causing an object [or someone else] to touch the other person.]

[The People are not required to prove that the defendant actually touched someone.]

The People are not required to prove that the defendant actually intended to use force against someone when (he/she) acted.

No one needs to actually have been injured by defendant's act. But if someone was injured, you may consider that fact, along with all the other evidence, in deciding whether the defendant committed an assault[, and if so, what kind of assault it was].

[Voluntary intoxication is not a defense to assault.]

*A school district peace officer is a peace officer who is a member of a police department of a school district under Education Code section 38000.*

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*New January 2006; Revised April 2011*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If there is sufficient evidence of self-defense or defense of another, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense. Give bracketed element 7 and any appropriate defense instructions. (See CALCRIM Nos. 3470–3477.)

In addition, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on defendant's reliance on self-defense as it relates to the use of excessive force. (*People v. White* (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 161, 167–168 [161 Cal.Rptr. 541].) If excessive force is an issue, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct the jury that the defendant is not guilty of the offense charged, or any lesser included offense in which lawful performance is an element, if the defendant used reasonable force in response to excessive force. (*People v. Olguin* (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 39, 46–47 [173 Cal.Rptr. 663].) On request, the court must instruct that the prosecution has the burden of proving the lawfulness of the arrest beyond a reasonable doubt. (*People v. Castain* (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 138, 145 [175 Cal.Rptr. 651].) If lawful performance is an issue, give the appropriate portions of CALCRIM No. 2670, *Lawful Performance: Peace Officer*. In addition, give CALCRIM No. 2672, *Lawful Performance: Resisting Unlawful Arrest With Force*, if requested.

Do not give an attempt instruction in conjunction with this instruction. There is no crime of “attempted assault” in California. (*In re James M.* (1973) 9 Cal.3d 517, 519, 521–522 [108 Cal.Rptr. 89, 510 P.2d 33].)

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 240, 241.4; Educ. Code, § 38000.

- Willful Defined. Pen. Code, § 7(1); *People v. Lara* (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 102, 107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
- Mental State for Assault. *People v. Williams* (2001) 26 Cal.4th 779, 790 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 114, 29 P.3d 197].
- Least Touching. *People v. Myers* (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 328, 335 [71 Cal.Rptr.2d 518] [citing *People v. Rocha* (1971) 3 Cal.3d 893, 899–900, fn. 12 [92 Cal.Rptr. 172, 479 P.2d 372]].

### COMMENTARY

A school district peace officer is anyone so designated by the superintendent of the school district, but is not vested with general police powers. (See Educ. Code, § 38000(a).) The scope of authority for school district peace officers is set forth in Penal Code section 830.32. (See Educ. Code, § 38001.)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, §§ 72–74.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.11; Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.02 (Matthew Bender).

## 904. Assault on School Employee (Pen. Code, §§ 240, 241.6)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with assault on a school employee [in violation of Penal Code section 241.6].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant did an act that by its nature would directly and probably result in the application of force to a person;
2. The defendant did that act willfully;
3. When the defendant acted, (he/she) was aware of facts that would lead a reasonable person to realize that (his/her) act by its nature would directly and probably result in the application of force to someone;
4. When the defendant acted, (he/she) had the present ability to apply force to a person;
5. When the defendant acted, (he/she) knew, or reasonably should have known, that the person assaulted was a school employee [and that (he/she) was performing (his/her) duties as a school employee];

[AND]

6. (When the defendant acted, the person assaulted was performing (his/her) duties[,]/ [or] (The/the) defendant acted in retaliation for something the school employee had done in the course of (his/her) duties)(;/.)

<Give element 7 when instructing on self-defense or defense of another.>

[AND]

7. The defendant did not act (in self-defense/ [or] in defense of someone else).]

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose. It is not required that he or she intend to break the law, hurt someone else, or gain any advantage.

The terms *application of force* and *apply force* mean to touch in a harmful or offensive manner. The slightest touching can be enough if it is done in a rude or angry way. Making contact with another person, including through his or her clothing, is enough. The touching does not have to cause pain or injury of any kind.

[The touching can be done indirectly by causing an object [or someone else] to touch the other person.]



**[The People are not required to prove that the defendant actually touched someone.]**

**The People are not required to prove that the defendant actually intended to use force against someone when (he/she) acted.**

**No one needs to actually have been injured by defendant's act. But if someone was injured, you may consider that fact, along with all the other evidence, in deciding whether the defendant committed an assault[, and if so, what kind of assault it was].**

**[Voluntary intoxication is not a defense to assault.]**

**A *school employee* is any person employed as a permanent or probationary certificated or classified employee of a school district on a part-time or full-time basis, including a substitute teacher, student teacher, or school board member.**

**[It is not a defense that an assault took place off campus or outside of school hours.]**

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*New January 2006; Revised March 2017*

## **BENCH NOTES**

### ***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If there is sufficient evidence of self-defense or defense of another, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense. Give bracketed element 7 and any appropriate defense instructions. (See CALCRIM Nos. 3470–3477.)

If the sole motivation alleged for the assault is retaliation, **do not** give CALCRIM No. 370, *Motive*, do not give the bracketed clause in element 5, and give only the second option in element 6. (See *People v. Valenti* (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1140, 1165 [197 Cal.Rptr.3d 317]; *People v. Maurer* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1121, 1126–1127 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 335].)

Do not give an attempt instruction in conjunction with this instruction. There is no crime of “attempted assault” in California. (*In re James M.* (1973) 9 Cal.3d 517, 519, 521–522 [108 Cal.Rptr. 89, 510 P.2d 33].)

## **AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 240, 241.6.
- Willful Defined. Pen. Code, § 7, subd. 1; *People v. Lara* (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 102, 107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
- Mental State for Assault. *People v. Williams* (2001) 26 Cal.4th 779, 790 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 114, 29 P.3d 197].

- Least Touching. *People v. Myers* (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 328, 335 [71 Cal.Rptr.2d 518] [citing *People v. Rocha* (1971) 3 Cal.3d 893, 899–900, fn. 12 [92 Cal.Rptr. 172, 479 P.2d 372]].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, §§ 21, 23, 80.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.11; Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.02 (Matthew Bender).

## 905. Assault on Juror (Pen. Code, §§ 240, 241.7)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with assault on a juror [in violation of Penal Code section 241.7].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant was a party to a case for which a jury had been selected;
2. The defendant did an act that by its nature would directly and probably result in the application of force to someone who had been sworn as a juror [or alternate juror] to decide that case;
3. The defendant did that act willfully;
4. When the defendant acted, (he/she) was aware of facts that would lead a reasonable person to realize that (his/her) act by its nature would directly and probably result in the application of force to someone;

[AND]

5. When the defendant acted, (he/she) had the present ability to apply force to a person(;/.)

<Give element 6 when instructing on self-defense or defense of another.>

[AND]

6. The defendant did not act (in self-defense/ [or] in defense of someone else).]

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose. It is not required that he or she intend to break the law, hurt someone else, or gain any advantage.

The terms *application of force* and *apply force* mean to touch in a harmful or offensive manner. The slightest touching can be enough if it is done in a rude or angry way. Making contact with another person, including through his or her clothing, is enough. The touching does not have to cause pain or injury of any kind.

[The touching can be done indirectly by causing an object [or someone else] to touch the other person.]

[The People are not required to prove that the defendant actually touched someone.]

The People are not required to prove that the defendant actually intended to use force against someone when (he/she) acted.

**No one needs to actually have been injured by defendant’s act. But if someone was injured, you may consider that fact, along with all the other evidence, in deciding whether the defendant committed an assault[, and if so, what kind of assault it was].**

**[Voluntary intoxication is not a defense to assault.]**

**[It is not a defense that an assault was committed after the trial was completed.]**

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*New January 2006*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If there is sufficient evidence of self-defense or defense of another, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense. Give bracketed element 6 and any appropriate defense instructions. (See CALCRIM Nos. 3470–3477.)

Do not give an attempt instruction in conjunction with this instruction. There is no crime of “attempted assault” in California. (*In re James M.* (1973) 9 Cal.3d 517, 519, 521–522 [108 Cal.Rptr. 89, 510 P.2d 33].)

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 240, 241.7.
- Willful Defined. Pen. Code, § 7(1); *People v. Lara* (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 102, 107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
- Mental State for Assault. *People v. Williams* (2001) 26 Cal.4th 779, 790 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 114, 29 P.3d 197].
- Least Touching. *People v. Myers* (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 328, 335 [71 Cal.Rptr.2d 518] [citing *People v. Rocha* (1971) 3 Cal.3d 893, 899–900, fn. 12 [92 Cal.Rptr. 172, 479 P.2d 372]].

## COMMENTARY

Unlike other statutes penalizing assault on a particular person, Penal Code section 241.7 does not state that the defendant must have known that the person assaulted was a juror. Thus, the committee has not included knowledge among the elements.

## SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, § 78.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.11 (Matthew Bender).

**906. Assault Committed on School or Park Property (Pen. Code, §§ 240, 241.2)**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with assaulting a person on (school/park) property [in violation of Penal Code section 241.2].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant did an act that by its nature would directly and probably result in the application of force to a person;
2. The defendant did that act willfully;
3. When the defendant acted, (he/she) was aware of facts that would lead a reasonable person to realize that (his/her) act by its nature would directly and probably result in the application of force to someone;
4. When the defendant acted, (he/she) had the present ability to apply force to a person;

[AND]

5. When the defendant acted, (he/she) was on (school/park) property.

<Give element 6 when instructing on self-defense or defense of another.>

[AND]

6. The defendant did not act (in self-defense/ [or] in defense of someone else).]

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose. It is not required that he or she intend to break the law, hurt someone else, or gain any advantage.

The terms *application of force* and *apply force* mean to touch in a harmful or offensive manner. The slightest touching can be enough if it is done in a rude or angry way. Making contact with another person, including through his or her clothing, is enough. The touching does not have to cause pain or injury of any kind.

[The touching can be done indirectly by causing an object [or someone else] to touch the other person.]

[The People are not required to prove that the defendant actually touched someone.]

The People are not required to prove that the defendant actually intended to use force against someone when (he/she) acted.

**No one needs to actually have been injured by the defendant’s act. But if someone was injured, you may consider that fact, along with all the other evidence, in deciding whether the defendant committed an assault[, and if so, what kind of assault it was].**

**[Voluntary intoxication is not a defense to assault.]**

**[A *school* is any (elementary school/junior high school/four-year high school/senior high school/adult school [or any branch thereof]/opportunity school/continuation high school/regional occupational center/evening high school/technical school/community college).]**

**[A *park* is any publicly maintained or operated park. It does not include any facility that is being used for professional sports or commercial events.]**

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*New January 2006*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If there is sufficient evidence of self-defense or defense of another, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense. Give bracketed element 6 and any appropriate defense instructions. (See CALCRIM Nos. 3470–3477.)

Do not give an attempt instruction in conjunction with this instruction. There is no crime of “attempted assault” in California. (*In re James M.* (1973) 9 Cal.3d 517, 519, 521–522 [108 Cal.Rptr. 89, 510 P.2d 33].)

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 240, 241.2.
- Willful Defined. Pen. Code, § 7, subd. 1; *People v. Lara* (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 102, 107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
- Mental State for Assault. *People v. Williams* (2001) 26 Cal.4th 779, 790 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 114, 29 P.3d 197].
- Least Touching. *People v. Myers* (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 328, 335 [71 Cal.Rptr.2d 518] [citing *People v. Rocha* (1971) 3 Cal.3d 893, 899–900, fn. 12 [92 Cal.Rptr. 172, 479 P.2d 372]].

## SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, § 24.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes* 632

*Against the Person*, § 142.11; Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.02 (Matthew Bender).

**907. Assault Committed on Public Transportation Provider's  
Property or Vehicle (Pen. Code, §§ 240, 241.3)**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with assaulting a person on a public transportation provider's (property/vehicle) [in violation of Penal Code section 241.3].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant did an act that by its nature would directly and probably result in the application of force to a person;
2. The defendant did that act willfully;
3. When the defendant acted, (he/she) was aware of facts that would lead a reasonable person to realize that (his/her) act by its nature would directly and probably result in the application of force to someone;
4. When the defendant acted, (he/she) had the present ability to apply force to a person;

[AND]

5. When the defendant acted, (he/she) was on (the property of a public transportation provider/a motor vehicle of a public transportation provider)(;/.)

<Give element 6 when instructing on self-defense or defense of another.>

[AND]

6. The defendant did not act (in self-defense/ [or] in defense of someone else).]

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose. It is not required that he or she intend to break the law, hurt someone else, or gain any advantage.

The terms *application of force* and *apply force* mean to touch in a harmful or offensive manner. The slightest touching can be enough if it is done in a rude or angry way. Making contact with another person, including through his or her clothing, is enough. The touching does not have to cause pain or injury of any kind.

[The touching can be done indirectly by causing an object [or someone else] to touch the other person.]

[The People are not required to prove that the defendant actually touched someone.]



**The People are not required to prove that the defendant actually intended to use force against someone when (he/she) acted.**

**No one needs to actually have been injured by the defendant's act. But if someone was injured, you may consider that fact, along with all the other evidence, in deciding whether the defendant committed an assault[, and if so, what kind of assault it was].**

**[Voluntary intoxication is not a defense to assault.]**

**A *public transportation provider* is a public or private operator of a (bus/taxicab/streetcar/cable car/trackless trolley/school bus/ [or] other motor vehicle) that transports people for (money/hire).**

**[A *motor vehicle* includes a vehicle that runs on stationary rails or on a track or rail suspended in the air.]**

**[The property of the transportation provider includes the entire station where public transportation is available and the parking lot reserved for those who use the system.]**

*New January 2006*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If there is sufficient evidence of self-defense or defense of another, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense. Give bracketed element 6 and any appropriate defense instructions. (See CALCRIM Nos. 3470–3477.)

Do not give an attempt instruction in conjunction with this instruction. There is no crime of “attempted assault” in California. (*In re James M.* (1973) 9 Cal.3d 517, 519, 521–522 [108 Cal.Rptr. 89, 510 P.2d 33].)

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 240, 241.3.
- Willful Defined. Pen. Code, § 7, subd. 1; *People v. Lara* (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 102, 107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
- Mental State for Assault. *People v. Williams* (2001) 26 Cal.4th 779, 790 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 114, 29 P.3d 197].
- Least Touching. *People v. Myers* (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 328, 335 [71 Cal.Rptr.2d 518] [citing *People v. Rocha* (1971) 3 Cal.3d 893, 899–900, fn. 12 [92 Cal.Rptr. 172, 479 P.2d 372]].

## SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, §§ 6–7 (assault generally).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.11 (Matthew Bender).

**908–914. Reserved for Future Use**

## (iv) Simple Assault

### 915. Simple Assault (Pen. Code, § 240)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with assault [in violation of Penal Code section 240].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant did an act that by its nature would directly and probably result in the application of force to a person;
2. The defendant did that act willfully;
3. When the defendant acted, (he/she) was aware of facts that would lead a reasonable person to realize that (his/her) act by its nature would directly and probably result in the application of force to someone;

[AND]

4. When the defendant acted, (he/she) had the present ability to apply force to a person(;/.)

<Give element 5 when instructing on self-defense or defense of another.>

[AND]

5. The defendant did not act (in self-defense/ [or] in defense of someone else).]

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose. It is not required that he or she intend to break the law, hurt someone else, or gain any advantage.

The terms *application of force* and *apply force* mean to touch in a harmful or offensive manner. The slightest touching can be enough if it is done in a rude or angry way. Making contact with another person, including through his or her clothing, is enough. The touching does not have to cause pain or injury of any kind.

[The touching can be done indirectly by causing an object [or someone else] to touch the other person.]

[The People are not required to prove that the defendant actually touched someone.]

The People are not required to prove that the defendant actually intended to use force against someone when (he/she) acted.

No one needs to actually have been injured by the defendant's act. But if

someone was injured, you may consider that fact, along with all the other evidence, in deciding whether the defendant committed an assault[, and if so, what kind of assault it was].

[Voluntary intoxication is not a defense to assault.]

*New January 2006; Revised February 2014*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If there is sufficient evidence of self-defense or defense of another, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense. Give bracketed element 5 and any appropriate defense instructions. (See CALCRIM Nos. 3470–3477.)

Do not give an attempt instruction in conjunction with this instruction. There is no crime of “attempted assault” in California. (*In re James M.* (1973) 9 Cal.3d 517, 519, 521–522 [108 Cal.Rptr. 89, 510 P.2d 33].)

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 240.
- Willful Defined. Pen. Code, § 7(1); *People v. Lara* (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 102, 107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
- Mental State for Assault. *People v. Williams* (2001) 26 Cal.4th 779, 790 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 114, 29 P.3d 197]; *People v. Wright* (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 703, 706 [123 Cal.Rptr.2d 494].
- Least Touching. *People v. Myers* (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 328, 335 [71 Cal.Rptr.2d 518] [citing *People v. Rocha* (1971) 3 Cal.3d 893, 899–900, fn. 12 [92 Cal.Rptr. 172, 479 P.2d 372]].
- This Instruction Upheld. *People v. Ibarra* (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1193–1195 [67 Cal.Rptr.3d 871].

## RELATED ISSUES

### *Transferred Intent*

The doctrine of transferred intent does not apply to general intent crimes such as assault. (*People v. Lee* (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1724, 1737 [34 Cal.Rptr.2d 723].)

## SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, §§ 6–12, 16.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.11 (Matthew Bender).

## 916. Assault by Conditional Threat

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with assault committed by a conditional threat to use force.

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant willfully threatened to use force on another person unless that person immediately did an act that the defendant demanded;
2. The defendant intended to use force immediately to compel the other person to do the act;
3. The defendant had no right to demand that the other person do the act;
4. When the defendant made the threat, (he/she) had the present ability to use force on the other person;

[AND]

5. The defendant placed (himself/herself) in a position to compel performance of the act (he/she) demanded and took all steps necessary to carry out (his/her) intention(;/.)

<Give element 6 when instructing on self-defense or defense of another.>

[AND]

6. The defendant did not act (in self-defense/ [or] in defense of someone else).]

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose.

[The term *use force* means to touch in a harmful or offensive manner. The slightest touching can be enough if it is done in a rude or angry way. It is enough if the touching makes contact with the person, including through his or her clothing. The touching need not cause pain or injury of any kind.]

[The touching can be done indirectly by causing an object [or someone else] to touch the other person.]

No one needs to actually have been injured by defendant's act. But if someone was injured, you may consider that fact, along with all the other evidence, in deciding whether the defendant committed an assault[, and if so, what kind of assault it was].

New January 2006

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If there is sufficient evidence of self-defense or defense of another, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense. Give bracketed element 6 and any appropriate defense instructions. (See CALCRIM Nos. 3470–3477.)

Do not give an attempt instruction in conjunction with this instruction. There is no crime of “attempted assault” in California. (*In re James M.* (1973) 9 Cal.3d 517, 519, 521–522 [108 Cal.Rptr. 89, 510 P.2d 33].)

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. *People v. McMakin* (1857) 8 Cal. 547, 548–549; *People v. McCoy* (1944) 25 Cal.2d 177, 192–193 [153 P.2d 315]; *People v. Lipscomb* (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 564, 570 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 445]; see also *People v. Page* (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1466, 1473 [20 Cal.Rptr.3d 857].
- Mental State for Assault. *People v. Williams* (2001) 26 Cal.4th 779, 790 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 114, 29 P.3d 197].
- Least Touching. *People v. Myers* (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 328, 335 [71 Cal.Rptr.2d 518] [citing *People v. Rocha* (1971) 3 Cal.3d 893, 899–900, fn. 12 [92 Cal.Rptr. 172, 479 P.2d 372]].

## SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, § 45.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, §§ 142.11, 142.11A[1] (Matthew Bender).

## 917. Insulting Words Are Not a Defense

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**Words, no matter how offensive, and acts that are not threatening, are not enough to justify an assault or battery.**

**[However, if you conclude that \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name> spoke or acted in a way that threatened \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of defendant or third party allegedly threatened> with immediate harm [or an unlawful touching]/ [or] great bodily injury/ [or] trespass on land/ [or] trespass against goods], you may consider that evidence in deciding whether \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of defendant> acted in (self-defense/ [or] defense of others).]**

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*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

There is no sua sponte duty to give this instruction. It is no defense to battery or assault that insulting or offensive words, or acts that fall short of a threat of immediate harm, were used. (*People v. Mayes* (1968) 262 Cal.App.2d 195, 197 [68 Cal.Rptr. 476]; *People v. Mueller* (1956) 147 Cal.App.2d 233, 239–240 [305 P.2d 178].)

If the evidence raises the issue of defense of self or others, give the bracketed paragraph along with any other appropriate defense instruction. (See *People v. Johnston* (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 1299, 1303 [7 Cal.Rptr.3d 161]; see CALCRIM Nos. 3470–3477.)

### AUTHORITY

- Instructional Requirements. See *People v. Davis* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 542 [41 Cal.Rptr.2d 826, 896 P.2d 119]; *People v. Mueller* (1956) 147 Cal.App.2d 233, 239–240 [305 P.2d 178].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, §§ 6–7.

3 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 73, *Defenses and Justifications*, § 73.11 (Matthew Bender).

**918–924. Reserved for Future Use**





## E. BATTERY

### (i) Causing Injury

#### 925. Battery Causing Serious Bodily Injury (Pen. Code, §§ 242, 243(d))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with battery causing serious bodily injury [in violation of Penal Code section 243(d)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this charge, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant willfully [and unlawfully] touched \_\_\_\_\_  
<insert name> in a harmful or offensive manner;

[AND]

2. \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name> suffered serious bodily injury as a result of the force used(;/.)

<Give element 3 when instructing on self-defense, defense of another, or reasonable discipline.>

[AND]

3. The defendant did not act (in self-defense/ [or] in defense of someone else/ [or] while reasonably disciplining a child).]

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose. It is not required that he or she intend to break the law, hurt someone else, or gain any advantage.

Making contact with another person, including through his or her clothing, is enough to commit a battery.

[A *serious bodily injury* means a serious impairment of physical condition. Such an injury may include[, but is not limited to]: (loss of consciousness/ concussion/ bone fracture/ protracted loss or impairment of function of any bodily member or organ/ a wound requiring extensive suturing/ [and] serious disfigurement).]

[\_\_\_\_\_ <Insert description of injury when appropriate; see Bench Notes> is a serious bodily injury.]

[The touching can be done indirectly by causing an object [or someone else] to touch the other person.]

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## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If there is sufficient evidence of self-defense or defense of another, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense. Give bracketed element 3, the bracketed words “and unlawfully” in element 1, and any appropriate defense instructions. (See CALCRIM Nos. 3470–3477.)

If there is sufficient evidence of reasonable parental discipline, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense. Give bracketed element 3, the bracketed words “and unlawfully” in element 1, and CALCRIM No. 3405, *Parental Right to Punish a Child*.

Whether the complaining witness suffered a serious bodily injury is a question for the jury to determine. If the defendant disputes that the injury suffered was a serious bodily injury, use the first bracketed paragraph. If the parties stipulate that the injury suffered was a serious bodily injury, use the second bracketed paragraph.

Give the final bracketed paragraph if indirect touching is an issue.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 242, 243(d); see *People v. Martinez* (1970) 3 Cal.App.3d 886, 889 [83 Cal.Rptr. 914] [harmful or offensive touching].
- Serious Bodily Injury Defined. Pen. Code, § 243(f)(4); *People v. Burroughs* (1984) 35 Cal.3d 824, 831 [201 Cal.Rptr. 319, 678 P.2d 894] [serious bodily injury and great bodily injury are essentially equivalent elements], disapproved on other grounds in *People v. Blakeley* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 82, 89 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 451, 999 P.2d 675]; *People v. Taylor* (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 11, 25, fn. 4 [12 Cal.Rptr.3d 693].
- Willful Defined. Pen. Code, § 7(1); *People v. Lara* (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 102, 107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
- Defense of Parental Discipline. *People v. Whitehurst* (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1045, 1051 [12 Cal.Rptr.2d 33].
- Medical Treatment Not an Element. *People v. Wade* (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1148–1150 [139 Cal.Rptr.3d 529].

## LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Assault. Pen. Code, § 240.
- Battery. Pen. Code, § 242.

Assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury is not a lesser included offense. (Pen. Code, § 245; *In re Jose H.* (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1090, 1095 [92 Cal.Rptr.2d 228].)

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, §§ 13–15, 39.

5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 91, *Sentencing*, § 91.35 (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.12 (Matthew Bender).

**926. Battery Causing Injury to Specified Victim Not a Peace Officer (Pen. Code, §§ 242, 243(b)–(c)(1))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with battery against (a/an) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert title specified in Pen. Code, § 243(c)(1)> [in violation of Penal Code section 243].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this charge, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant willfully [and unlawfully] touched \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name> in a harmful or offensive manner;

<Alternative 2A—specified person performing duties>

[2. When the defendant acted, \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name> was a \_\_\_\_\_ <insert title specified in Pen. Code, § 243(c)(1)> and was performing the duties of (a/an) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert title specified in Pen. Code, § 243(c)(1)>.]

<Alternative 2B—nurse or doctor>

[2. When the defendant used that force, \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name> was a (nurse/medical doctor) who was giving emergency medical care outside of a hospital, clinic, or other health care facility;]

[AND]

3. When the defendant acted, (he/she) knew or reasonably should have known, that \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name> was (a/an) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert title specified in Pen. Code, § 243(c)(1)> who was performing (his/her) duties(;/.)

<Give element 4 when the defendant is charged with Pen. Code, § 243(c)(1).>

[AND]

4. \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name> suffered injury as a result of the force used(;/.)]

<Give element 5 when instructing on self-defense or defense of another.>

[AND]

(4/5). The defendant did not act (in self-defense/ [or] in defense of someone else).]

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose. It is not required that he or she intend to break the law, hurt someone else, or gain any advantage.

Making contact with another person, including through his or her

**clothing, is enough to commit a battery.**

[**The duties of (a/an)** \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert title specified in Pen. Code, § 243(c)(1)>* **include** \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert appropriate list of job duties from statutory definition of professions, if available>.*]

[**It does not matter whether** \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name>* **was actually on duty at the time.**]

[**An injury is any physical injury that requires professional medical treatment. The question whether an injury requires such treatment cannot be answered simply by deciding whether or not a person sought or received treatment. You may consider those facts, but you must decide this question based on the nature, extent, and seriousness of the injury itself.**]

[**The touching can be done indirectly by causing an object [or someone else] to touch the other person.**]

*New January 2006*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime. This instruction should be used when the alleged victim is not a peace officer. If the alleged victim is a peace officer, use CALCRIM No. 945, *Battery Against Peace Officer*.

If there is sufficient evidence of self-defense or defense of another, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense. Give bracketed element 2, the bracketed words “and unlawfully” in element 1, and any appropriate defense instructions. (See CALCRIM Nos. 3470–3477.)

If the alleged victim is a doctor or nurse, give element 2B. Otherwise give element 2A.

If the defendant is charged under Penal Code section 243(c)(1), give bracketed element 4 and the definition of “injury.” If the defendant is charged with misdemeanor battery under Penal Code section 243(b), do not give element 4 or the definition of “injury”

Give the appropriate list of job duties for the alleged victim’s profession from the current Penal Code section, if one is provided. Emergency medical technician, nurse, custodial officer, lifeguard, traffic officer, and animal control officer are defined in Penal Code section 243(f). Firefighter is defined in Penal Code section 245.1. If a definition is provided in the statute, it should be given. (See *People v. Lara* (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 658, 669 [35 Cal.Rptr.2d 886].)

Give the final bracketed paragraph if indirect touching is an issue.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 242, 243(b)–(c)(1); see *People v. Martinez* (1970) 3 Cal.App.3d 886, 889 [83 Cal.Rptr. 914] [harmful or offensive touching].
- Willful Defined. Pen. Code, § 7(1); *People v. Lara* (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 102, 107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
- Injury Defined. Pen. Code, § 243(f)(6); *People v. Longoria* (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 12, 17 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 213].

### COMMENTARY

*People v. Longoria* (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 12, 17 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 213], explains the meaning of injury as defined in the statute:

It is the nature, extent, and seriousness of the injury—not the inclination or disinclination of the victim to seek medical treatment—which is determinative. A peace officer who obtains “medical treatment” when none is required, has not sustained an “injury” within the meaning of section 243, subdivision (c). And a peace officer who does not obtain “medical treatment” when such treatment is required, has sustained an “injury” within the meaning of section 243, subdivision (c). The test is objective and factual.

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Assault. Pen. Code, § 240.
- Assault on Specified Victim. Pen. Code, § 241(b).
- Battery. Pen. Code, § 242.
- Misdemeanor Battery on Specified Victim. Pen. Code, § 243(b).
- Resisting Officer. Pen. Code, § 148.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, §§ 13–15, 21–23, 70–74.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.12 (Matthew Bender).

**927–934. Reserved for Future Use**

## (ii) Sexual Battery

### 935. Sexual Battery: Felony (Pen. Code, §§ 242, 243.4(a) & (d))

---

The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with sexual battery [in violation of Penal Code section 243.4].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant [or an accomplice] unlawfully restrained \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of complaining witness>;

<Alternative 2A—defendant touched>

- [2. While \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of complaining witness> was restrained, the defendant touched an intimate part of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of complaining witness>;]

<Alternative 2B—caused complaining witness to touch>

- [2. While \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of complaining witness> was restrained, the defendant (caused \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of complaining witness> to touch (his/her) own intimate part/ [or] caused \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of complaining witness> to touch the intimate part of defendant [or someone else]);]

3. The touching was done against \_\_\_\_\_'s <insert name of complaining witness> will;

AND

4. The touching was done for the specific purpose of sexual arousal, sexual gratification, or sexual abuse.

An *intimate part* is a female's breast or the anus, groin, sexual organ or buttocks of anyone.

Contact must have been made with \_\_\_\_\_'s <insert name of complaining witness> bare skin. This means that:

1. The defendant must have touched the bare skin of \_\_\_\_\_'s <insert name of complaining witness> intimate part;

OR

2. \_\_\_\_\_'s <insert name of complaining witness> bare skin must have touched the defendant's [or \_\_\_\_\_'s <insert name or description of third person>] intimate part either directly or through (his/her) clothing.

Someone is *unlawfully restrained* when his or her liberty is controlled by

words, acts, or authority of another and the restraint is against his or her will. Unlawful restraint requires more than just the physical force necessary to accomplish the sexual touching. [A person does not unlawfully restrain someone if he or she only uses lawful authority for a lawful purpose.]

[A touching is done *against a person's will* if that person does not consent to it. To *consent*, a person must act freely and voluntarily and know the nature of the touching.]

[A person is an *accomplice* if he or she is subject to prosecution for the identical crime charged against the defendant. Someone is subject to prosecution if he or she personally committed the crime or if:

1. He or she knew of the criminal purpose of the person who committed the crime;

AND

2. He or she intended to, and did in fact, (aid, facilitate, promote, encourage, or instigate the commission of the crime/ [or] participate in a criminal conspiracy to commit the crime).]

<Defense: Reasonable Belief in Consent>

[The defendant is not guilty of sexual battery if (he/she) actually and reasonably, even if mistakenly, believed that the other person consented to the touching [and actually and reasonably believed that (he/she) consented throughout the act of touching]. The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not actually and reasonably believe that the other person consented. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty.]

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2016*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense of mistaken but honest and reasonable belief in consent if there is substantial evidence of equivocal conduct that would have led a defendant to reasonably and in good faith believe consent existed where it did not. (See *People v. Andrews* (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 590, 602 [184 Cal.Rptr.3d 183]; following *People v. Williams* (1992) 4 Cal.4th 354, 362 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 441, 841 P.2d 961]; *People v. Mayberry* (1975) 15 Cal.3d 143, 153–158 [125 Cal.Rptr. 745, 542 P.2d 1337].)

Give either alternative 2A or 2B depending on the evidence in the case. The



committee has concluded that the direct touching requirement for felony sexual battery is satisfied when (1) the defendant forces the alleged victim to touch the defendant's intimate parts through the defendant's clothing with the alleged victim's bare skin; (2) the defendant forces the alleged victim to touch any part of the defendant with the victim's unclothed intimate part, whether the defendant's body is clothed or not; or (3) the defendant touches the alleged victim's bare intimate part either directly or through clothing. If a defendant is only charged under Penal Code section 243.4(a), the defendant must touch the victim's intimate part, not the other way around. (*People v. Elam* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 298, 309–310 [110 Cal.Rptr.2d 185].)

The committee omitted the word “masturbate” from the elements because the plain language of Penal Code section 243.4(d) requires only that the victim be compelled to touch him-or herself, and a further finding of whether that act of touching was actually masturbation is unnecessary.

Give the bracketed definition of “against a person's will” on request.

If the court gives the bracketed phrase “or an accomplice” in element 1, the court must also give the bracketed definition of “accomplice.” (*People v. Verlinde* (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1167–1168 [123 Cal.Rptr.2d 322].) Additional paragraphs providing further explanation of the definition of “accomplice” are contained in CALCRIM No. 334, *Accomplice Testimony Must Be Corroborated: Dispute Whether Witness Is Accomplice*. The court should review that instruction and determine whether any of these additional paragraphs should be given.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 242, 243.4(a) & (d).
- Intimate Part. Pen. Code, § 243.4(g)(1).
- Touches Defined. Pen. Code, § 243.4(f).
- Otherwise Lawful Restraint for Unlawful Purpose. *People v. Alford* (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 799, 803–804 [286 Cal.Rptr. 762].
- Sexual Abuse Defined. *People v. White* (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 193, 205 [224 Cal.Rptr. 467] [discussing Pen. Code, § 289].
- Specific Intent Crime. *People v. Chavez* (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 25, 29 [100 Cal.Rptr.2d 680].
- Caused to Masturbate. *People v. Reeves* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 14, 50 [109 Cal.Rptr.2d 728].
- Accomplice Defined. See Pen. Code, § 1111; *People v. Verlinde* (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1167–1168 [123 Cal.Rptr.2d 322]; *People v. Stankewitz* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 72, 90–91 [270 Cal.Rptr. 817, 793 P.2d 23].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Assault. Pen. Code, § 240.
- Misdemeanor Sexual Battery. Pen. Code, § 243.4(e)(1).

### COMMENTARY

In a case addressing the meaning of “for the purpose of . . . sexual abuse” in the context of Penal Code section 289, one court stated, “when a penetration is accomplished for the purpose of causing pain, injury or discomfort, it becomes sexual abuse, even though the perpetrator may not necessarily achieve any sexual arousal or gratification whatsoever.” (*People v. White* (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 193, 205 [224 Cal.Rptr. 467].) If the court concludes it this reasoning applies to the crime sexual battery and a party requests a definition of “sexual abuse,” the following language can be used:

*Sexual abuse* means any touching of a person’s intimate parts in order to cause pain, injury, or discomfort. The perpetrator does not need to achieve any sexual arousal or sexual gratification.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, §§ 26, 81–83.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.22[1] (Matthew Bender).

**936. Sexual Battery on Institutionalized Victim (Pen. Code, §§ 242, 243.4(b) & (d))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with sexual battery [in violation of Penal Code section 243.4].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

<Alternative 1A—defendant touched>

1. While \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of complaining witness> was institutionalized for medical treatment and was seriously disabled or medically incapacitated, the defendant touched an intimate part of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of complaining witness>;]

<Alternative 1B—caused complaining witness to touch>

1. While \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of complaining witness> was institutionalized for medical treatment and was seriously disabled or medically incapacitated, the defendant (caused \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of complaining witness> to touch (his/her) own intimate part/ [or] caused \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of complaining witness> to touch the intimate part of defendant [or someone else]);]

2. The touching was done against \_\_\_\_\_'s <insert name of complaining witness> will;

**AND**

3. The touching was done for the specific purpose of sexual arousal, sexual gratification, or sexual abuse.

An *intimate part* is a female's breast or the anus, groin, sexual organ or buttocks of anyone.

Contact must have been made with \_\_\_\_\_'s <insert name of complaining witness> bare skin. This means that:

1. The defendant must have touched the bare skin of \_\_\_\_\_'s <insert name of complaining witness> intimate part;

**OR**

2. \_\_\_\_\_'s <insert name of complaining witness> bare skin must have touched the defendant's [or \_\_\_\_\_'s <insert name or description of third person>] intimate part either directly or through (his/her) clothing.

[Someone is *institutionalized* if he or she is a patient in a hospital,

medical treatment facility, nursing home, acute care facility, or mental hospital.]

[Someone is *seriously disabled* if he or she has severe physical or sensory disabilities.]

[Someone is *medically incapacitated* if he or she is incapacitated because of prescribed sedatives, anesthesia, or other medication.]

[An act is done *against a person's will* if that person does not consent to the act. In order to *consent*, a person must act freely and voluntarily and know the nature of the act.]

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New January 2006

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

Give either alternative 2A or 2B depending on the evidence in the case. The committee has concluded that the direct touching requirement for felony sexual battery is satisfied when (1) the defendant forces the alleged victim to touch the defendant's intimate parts through the defendant's clothing with the alleged victim's bare skin; (2) the defendant forces the alleged victim to touch any part of the defendant with the victim's unclothed intimate part, whether the defendant's body is clothed or not; or (3) the defendant touches the alleged victim's bare intimate part either directly or through clothing. If a defendant is only charged under Penal Code section 243.4(a), the defendant must touch the victim's intimate part, not the other way around. (*People v. Elam* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 298, 309–310 [110 Cal.Rptr.2d 185].)

The committee omitted the word “masturbate” from the elements because the plain language of Penal Code section 243.4(d) requires only that the victim be compelled to touch him-or herself, and a further finding of whether that act of touching was actually masturbation is unnecessary.

Give the bracketed definition of “against a person's will” on request.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 242, 243.4(b) & (d).
- Institutionalized. Pen. Code, § 243.4(g)(5).
- Intimate Part. Pen. Code, § 243.4(g)(1).
- Medically Incapacitated. Pen. Code, § 243.4(g)(4).
- Seriously Disabled. Pen. Code, § 243.4(g)(3).
- Touches Defined. Pen. Code, § 243.4(f).

- Sexual Abuse Defined. *People v. White* (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 193, 205 [224 Cal.Rptr. 467].
- Specific Intent Crime. *People v. Chavez* (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 25, 29 [100 Cal.Rptr.2d 680].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Assault. Pen. Code, § 240.
- Misdemeanor Sexual Battery. Pen. Code, § 243.4(e)(1).

### COMMENTARY

In a case addressing the meaning of “for the purpose of . . . sexual abuse” in the context of Penal Code section 289, one court stated, “when a penetration is accomplished for the purpose of causing pain, injury or discomfort, it becomes sexual abuse, even though the perpetrator may not necessarily achieve any sexual arousal or gratification whatsoever.” (*People v. White* (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 193, 205 [224 Cal.Rptr. 467].) If the court concludes it this reasoning applies to the crime sexual battery and a party requests a definition of “sexual abuse,” the following language can be used:

*Sexual abuse* means any touching of a person’s intimate parts in order to cause pain, injury, or discomfort. The perpetrator does not need to achieve any sexual arousal or sexual gratification.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Person, § 26.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, Crimes Against the Person, § 142.22[1] (Matthew Bender).

**937. Sexual Battery: By Fraudulent Representation (Pen. Code, §§ 242, 243.4(c))**

---

The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with sexual battery by fraudulent representation [in violation of Penal Code section 243.4(c)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant touched an intimate part of \_\_\_\_\_'s *<insert name of complaining witness>* body;
2. The touching was done for the specific purpose of sexual arousal, sexual gratification, or sexual abuse;
3. The defendant fraudulently represented that the touching served a professional purpose;

AND

4. The person touched was not conscious of the sexual nature of the act because of the fraudulent representation.

An *intimate part* is a female's breast or the anus, groin, sexual organ or buttocks of anyone.

Contact must have been made with \_\_\_\_\_'s *<insert name of complaining witness>* bare skin. This means that the defendant must have touched the bare skin of \_\_\_\_\_'s *<insert name of complaining witness>* intimate part either directly or through the defendant's clothing.

A person is *not conscious of the sexual nature of the act* if he or she is not aware of the essential characteristics of the act because the perpetrator fraudulently represented that the touching served a professional purpose when it did not.

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2012, March 2017*

**BENCH NOTES**

***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

**AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 242, 243.4(c).
- Intimate Part Defined. Pen. Code, § 243.4(g)(1).

- Touches Defined. Pen. Code, § 243.4(f).
- Unconscious of Nature of Act Defined. See Pen. Code, § 261(a)(4)(D) [in context of rape].
- Sexual Abuse Defined. *People v. White* (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 193, 205 [224 Cal.Rptr. 467].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Assault. Pen. Code, § 240.
- Misdemeanor sexual battery is not a lesser included offense of sexual battery by misrepresentation of professional purpose under the statutory elements test. *People v. Robinson* (2016) 63 Cal.4th 200, 210–213 [202 Cal.Rptr.3d 485, 370 P.3d 1043].
- Attempted sexual battery is not a lesser included offense of sexual battery by fraudulent representation. *People v. Babaali* (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 982, 1000 [90 Cal.Rptr.3d 278].

### COMMENTARY

In a case addressing the meaning of for the “purpose of . . . sexual abuse” in the context of Penal Code section 289, one court stated, “when a penetration is accomplished for the purpose of causing pain, injury or discomfort, it becomes sexual abuse, even though the perpetrator may not necessarily achieve any sexual arousal or gratification whatsoever.” (*People v. White* (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 193, 205 [224 Cal.Rptr. 467].) If the court concludes it this reasoning applies to the crime sexual battery and a party requests a definition of “sexual abuse,” the following language can be used:

*Sexual abuse* means any touching of a person’s intimate parts in order to cause pain, injury, or discomfort. The perpetrator does not need to achieve any sexual arousal or sexual gratification.

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Consent Obtained by Fraudulent Representation*

A person may induce someone else to consent to engage in a sexual act by a false or fraudulent representation made with an intent to create fear, and which does induce fear and would cause a reasonable person to act contrary to his or her free will. (Pen. Code, § 266c.) While section 266c requires coercion and fear to obtain consent, it does not involve physical force or violence. (See *People v. Cardenas* (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 927, 937–938 [26 Cal.Rptr.2d 567].)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, § 74.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.22[1] (Matthew Bender).

## 938. Sexual Battery: Misdemeanor (Pen. Code, § 243.4(e)(1))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with sexual battery [in violation of Penal Code section 243.4(e)(1)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant touched an intimate part of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of complaining witness>;
2. The touching was done against \_\_\_\_\_'s <insert name of complaining witness> will;

AND

3. The touching was done for the specific purpose of sexual arousal, sexual gratification, or sexual abuse.

An *intimate part* is a female's breast or the anus, groin, sexual organ, or buttocks of anyone.

*Touching*, as used here, means making physical contact with another person. *Touching* includes contact made through the clothing.

[An act is done *against a person's will* if that person does not consent to the act. In order to *consent*, a person must act freely and voluntarily and know the nature of the act.]

<Defense: Reasonable Belief in Consent>

[The defendant is not guilty of sexual battery if (he/she) actually and reasonably believed that the other person consented to the touching [and actually and reasonably believed that (he/she) consented throughout the act of touching]. The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not actually and reasonably believe that the other person consented. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty.]

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New January 2006, Revised February 2016, September 2017

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense of mistaken but honest and reasonable belief in consent if there is substantial evidence of equivocal conduct that would have led a defendant to reasonably and in good faith believe consent



existed where it did not. (See *People v. Andrews* (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 590, 602 [184 Cal.Rptr.3d 183]; following *People v. Williams* (1992) 4 Cal.4th 354, 362 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 441, 841 P.2d 961]; *People v. Mayberry* (1975) 15 Cal.3d 143, 153–158 [125 Cal.Rptr. 745, 542 P.2d 1337].)

Give the bracketed definition of “against a person’s will” on request.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 243.4(e)(1).
- Touches Defined. Pen. Code, § 243.4(e)(2).
- Intimate Part Defined. Pen. Code, § 243.4(g)(1).
- Consent Defined. Pen. Code, §§ 261.6, 261.7.
- Specific-Intent Crime. *People v. Chavez* (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 25, 29 [100 Cal.Rptr.2d 680].
- Defendant Must Touch Intimate Part of Victim. *People v. Elam* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 298, 309–310 [110 Cal.Rptr.2d 185].
- Defendant Need Not Touch Skin. *People v. Dayan* (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 707, 716 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 391].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Misdemeanor sexual battery is not a lesser included offense of sexual battery by misrepresentation of professional purpose under the statutory elements test. *People v. Robinson* (2016) 63 Cal.4th 200, 210–213 [202 Cal.Rptr.3d 485, 370 P.3d 1043].
- Attempted sexual battery is not a lesser included offense of sexual battery by fraudulent representation. *People v. Babaali* (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 982, 1000 [90 Cal.Rptr.3d 278].

### COMMENTARY

In a case addressing the meaning of for the “purpose of . . . sexual abuse” in the context of Penal Code section 289, one court has stated that “when a penetration is accomplished for the purpose of causing pain, injury or discomfort, it becomes sexual abuse, even though the perpetrator may not necessarily achieve any sexual arousal or gratification whatsoever.” (*People v. White* (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 193, 205 [224 Cal.Rptr. 467].) If the court concludes that this reasoning applies to the crime of sexual battery and a party requests a definition of “sexual abuse,” the following language may be used:

*Sexual abuse* means any touching of a person’s intimate parts in order to cause pain, injury, or discomfort. The perpetrator does not need to achieve any sexual arousal or sexual gratification.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, § 26.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.22[2] (Matthew Bender).

**939–944. Reserved for Future Use**

**(iii) On Specified Person or in Specified Location**

**945. Battery Against Peace Officer (Pen. Code, §§ 242, 243(b), (c)(2))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with battery against a peace officer [in violation of Penal Code section 243].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. \_\_\_\_\_ <Insert officer's name, excluding title> **was a peace officer performing the duties of (a/an) \_\_\_\_\_** <insert title of peace officer specified in Pen. Code, § 830 et seq.>;
2. **The defendant willfully [and unlawfully] touched \_\_\_\_\_** <insert officer's name, excluding title> **in a harmful or offensive manner;**

[AND]

3. **When the defendant acted, (he/she) knew, or reasonably should have known, that \_\_\_\_\_** <insert officer's name, excluding title> **was a peace officer who was performing (his/her) duties(;/.)**

<Give element 4 when instructing on felony battery against a peace officer.>

[AND]

4. \_\_\_\_\_ <insert officer's name, excluding title> **suffered injury as a result of the touching(;/.)**

<Give element 5 when instructing on self-defense or defense of another.>

[AND]

5. **The defendant did not act (in self-defense/ [or] in defense of someone else).]**

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose. It is not required that he or she intend to break the law, hurt someone else, or gain any advantage.

<Do not give this paragraph when instructing on felony battery against a peace officer.>

[The slightest touching can be enough to commit a battery if it is done in a rude or angry way. Making contact with another person, including through his or her clothing, is enough. The touching does not have to cause pain or injury of any kind.]

<Give this definition when instructing on felony battery against a peace officer.>

[An *injury* is any physical injury that requires professional medical treatment. The question whether an injury requires such treatment cannot be answered simply by deciding whether or not a person sought or received treatment. You may consider those facts, but you must decide this question based on the nature, extent, and seriousness of the injury itself.]

[The touching can be done indirectly by causing an object [or someone else] to touch the other person.]

[A person who is employed as a police officer by \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of agency that employs police officer> is a **peace officer**.]

[A person employed by \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of agency that employs peace officer, e.g., “the Department of Fish and Wildlife”> is a **peace officer** if \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of facts necessary to make employee a peace officer, e.g., “designated by the director of the agency as a peace officer”>.]

[The duties of a \_\_\_\_\_ <insert title of officer> include \_\_\_\_\_ <insert job duties>.]

[It does not matter whether \_\_\_\_\_ <insert officer’s name, excluding title> was actually on duty at the time.]

[A \_\_\_\_\_ <insert title of peace officer specified in Pen. Code, § 830 et seq.> is also performing the duties of a peace officer if (he/she) is in a police uniform and performing the duties required of (him/her) as a peace officer and, at the same time, is working in a private capacity as a part-time or casual private security guard or (patrolman/patrolwoman).]

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2006, December 2008, October 2010*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If there is sufficient evidence of self-defense or defense of another, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense. Give bracketed element 5, the bracketed words “and unlawfully” in element 2, and any appropriate defense instructions. (See CALCRIM Nos. 3470–3477.)

In addition, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on defendant’s reliance on self-defense as it relates to the use of excessive force. (*People v. White* (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 161, 167–168 [161 Cal.Rptr. 541].) If excessive force is an issue, the

court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct the jury that the defendant is not guilty of the offense charged, or any lesser included offense in which lawful performance is an element, if the defendant used reasonable force in response to excessive force. (*People v. Olguin* (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 39, 46–47 [173 Cal.Rptr. 663].) On request, the court must instruct that the prosecution has the burden of proving the lawfulness of the arrest beyond a reasonable doubt. (*People v. Castain* (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 138, 145 [175 Cal.Rptr. 651].) If lawful performance is an issue, give the appropriate portions of CALCRIM No. 2670, *Lawful Performance: Peace Officer*. In addition, give CALCRIM No. 2672, *Lawful Performance: Resisting Unlawful Arrest With Force*, if requested.

Give the bracketed paragraph on indirect touching if that is an issue.

The jury must determine whether the alleged victim is a peace officer. (*People v. Brown* (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 444–445 [250 Cal.Rptr. 604, 758 P.2d 1135].) The court may instruct the jury on the appropriate definition of “peace officer” from the statute (e.g., “a Garden Grove Regular Police Officer and a Garden Grove Reserve Police Officer are peace officers”). (*Ibid.*) However, the court may not instruct the jury that the alleged victim was a peace officer as a matter of law (e.g., “Officer Reed was a peace officer”). (*Ibid.*) If the alleged victim is a police officer, give the bracketed sentence that begins with “A person employed as a police officer.” If the alleged victim is another type of peace officer, give the bracketed sentence that begins with “A person employed by.”

The court may give the bracketed sentence that begins, “The duties of a \_\_\_\_\_ <insert title . . .> include,” on request. The court may insert a description of the officer’s duties such as “the correct service of a facially valid search warrant.” (*People v. Gonzalez* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1222 [275 Cal.Rptr. 729, 800 P.2d 1159].)

Give the bracketed language about a peace officer working in a private capacity if relevant. (Pen. Code, § 70.)

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 242, 243(b), (c)(2); see *People v. Martinez* (1970) 3 Cal.App.3d 886, 889 [83 Cal.Rptr. 914] [harmful or offensive touching].
- Peace Officer Defined. Pen. Code, § 830 et seq.
- Willful Defined. Pen. Code, § 7(1); *People v. Lara* (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 102, 107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
- Physical Injury Defined. Pen. Code, § 243(f)(5); *People v. Longoria* (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 12, 17–18 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 213].
- Least Touching. *People v. Myers* (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 328, 335 [71 Cal.Rptr.2d 518] [citing *People v. Rocha* (1971) 3 Cal.3d 893, 899–900, fn. 12 [92 Cal.Rptr. 172, 479 P.2d 372]].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Assault. Pen. Code, § 240.

- Assault on Specified Victim. Pen. Code, § 241(b).
- Battery. Pen. Code, § 242.
- Misdemeanor Battery on Specified Victim. Pen. Code, § 243(b).
- Resisting Officer. Pen. Code, § 148.

### **RELATED ISSUES**

See the Related Issues sections to CALCRIM No. 960, *Simple Battery* and 2670, *Lawful Performance: Peace Officer*.

### **SECONDARY SOURCES**

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, § 5.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.12 (Matthew Bender).

## 946. Battery Against Custodial Officer (Pen. Code, §§ 242, 243.1)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with battery against a custodial officer [in violation of Penal Code section 243.1].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. \_\_\_\_\_ <insert officer's name, excluding title> was a custodial officer performing the duties of a custodial officer;
2. The defendant willfully [and unlawfully] touched \_\_\_\_\_ <insert officer's name, excluding title> in a harmful or offensive manner;

[AND]

3. When the defendant acted, (he/she) knew, or reasonably should have known, that \_\_\_\_\_ <insert officer's name, excluding title> was a custodial officer who was performing (his/her) duties(;/.)

<Give element 4 when instructing on self-defense or defense of another.>

[AND]

4. The defendant did not act (in self-defense/ [or] in defense of someone else).]

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose. It is not required that he or she intend to break the law, hurt someone else, or gain any advantage.

The slightest touching can be enough to commit a battery if it is done in a rude or angry way. Making contact with another person, including through his or her clothing, is enough. The touching does not have to cause pain or injury of any kind.

[The touching can be done indirectly by causing an object [or someone else] to touch the other person.]

A *custodial officer* is someone who works for a law enforcement agency of a city or county, is responsible for maintaining custody of prisoners, and helps operate a local detention facility. [A (county jail/city jail/\_\_\_\_\_ <insert description>) is a local detention facility.] [A custodial officer is not a peace officer.]

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If there is sufficient evidence of self-defense or defense of another, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense. Give bracketed element 4, the bracketed words “and unlawfully” in element 2, and any appropriate defense instructions. (See CALCRIM Nos. 3470–3477.)

In addition, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on defendant’s reliance on self-defense as it relates to the use of excessive force. (*People v. White* (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 161, 167–168 [161 Cal.Rptr. 541].) If excessive force is an issue, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct the jury that the defendant is not guilty of the offense charged, or any lesser included offense in which lawful performance is an element, if the defendant used reasonable force in response to excessive force. (*People v. Olguin* (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 39, 46–47 [173 Cal.Rptr. 663].) If lawful performance is an issue, give the appropriate portions of CALCRIM No. 2671, *Lawful Performance: Custodial Officer*.

Give the bracketed paragraph on indirect touching if that is an issue.

The jury must determine whether the alleged victim is a custodial officer. (See *People v. Brown* (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 444–445 [250 Cal.Rptr. 604, 758 P.2d 1135] [discussing definition of “peace officer”].) The court may instruct the jury on the appropriate definition of “custodial officer” from the statute. (*Ibid.*) However, the court may not instruct the jury that the alleged victim was a custodial officer as a matter of. (*Ibid.*)

If there is a dispute about whether the site of an alleged crime is a local detention facility, see Penal Code section 6031.4.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 242, 243.1; see *In re Rochelle B.* (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1212, 1221 [57 Cal.Rptr.2d 851] [section 243.1 applies only to batteries committed against custodial officers in adult penal institutions]; *People v. Martinez* (1970) 3 Cal.App.3d 886, 889 [83 Cal.Rptr. 914] [harmful or offensive touching].
- Custodial Officer Defined. Pen. Code, § 831.
- Local Detention Facility Defined. Pen. Code, § 6031.4.
- Willful Defined. Pen. Code, § 7(1); *People v. Lara* (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 102, 107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
- Least Touching. *People v. Myers* (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 328, 335 [71 Cal.Rptr.2d 518] [citing *People v. Rocha* (1971) 3 Cal.3d 893, 899–900, fn. 12 [92 Cal.Rptr. 172, 479 P.2d 372]].
- Statute Constitutional. *People v. Wilkinson* (2004) 33 Cal.4th 821, 840–841 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 420, 94 P.3d 551].



**LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES**

- Assault. Pen. Code, § 240.
- Battery on Person Not Confined. Pen. Code, § 243.15.

**RELATED ISSUES**

See the Related Issues sections to CALCRIM No. 960, *Simple Battery*, and CALCRIM No. 2671, *Lawful Performance: Custodial Officer*.

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, §§ 13–15, 72–74.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.12 (Matthew Bender).

**947. Simple Battery on Military Personnel (Pen. Code, §§ 242,  
243.10)**

---

The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with battery against a member of the United States Armed Forces [in violation of Penal Code section 243.10].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant willfully [and unlawfully] touched \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of complaining witness> in a harmful or offensive manner;
2. \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of complaining witness> was a member of the United States Armed Forces at the time of the touching;

[AND]

3. The defendant knew \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of complaining witness> was a member of the United States Armed Forces and touched \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of complaining witness> in a harmful or offensive manner because of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of complaining witness>'s service(;/.)

<Give element 4 when instructing on self-defense or defense of another.>

[AND]

4. The defendant did not act (in self-defense/ [or] in defense of someone else).]

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose. It is not required that he or she intend to break the law, hurt someone else, or gain any advantage.

The slightest touching can be enough to commit a battery if it is done in a rude or angry way. Making contact with another person, including through his or her clothing, is enough. The touching does not have to cause pain or injury of any kind.

[The touching can be done indirectly by causing an object [or someone else] to touch the other person.]

A \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description, e.g., "private in the United States Army"> is a member of the United States Armed Forces.

A person commits a battery *because of someone's service* in the armed forces if:

1. He or she is biased against the person battered based on that person's military service;

**AND****2. That bias caused him or her to commit the alleged battery.**

**If the defendant had more than one reason to commit the alleged battery, the bias described here must have been a substantial motivating factor. A *substantial factor* is more than a trivial or remote factor. However, it does not need to be the only factor that motivated the battery.**

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*New January 2006; Revised March 2017*

**BENCH NOTES*****Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If there is sufficient evidence of self-defense or defense of another, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense. Give bracketed element 3 and any appropriate defense instructions. (See CALCRIM Nos. 3470–3477.)

Give the bracketed paragraph on indirect touching if that is an issue.

The jury must determine whether the alleged victim is a member of the armed forces. (See *People v. Brown* (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 444–445 [250 Cal.Rptr. 604, 758 P.2d 1135].) The court may instruct the jury on the appropriate definition of “member of the armed forces.” However, the court may not instruct the jury that the alleged victim was a member of the armed forces as a matter of law. (*Ibid.*)

**Do not** give CALCRIM No. 370, *Motive*, with this instruction because motive is an element of this crime. (See *People v. Valenti* (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1140, 1165 [197 Cal.Rptr.3d 317]; *People v. Maurer* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1121, 1126–1127 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 335].)

**AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 242, 243.10.
- Willfully Defined. Pen. Code, § 7, subd. 1; *People v. Lara* (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 102, 107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
- Least Touching. *People v. Myers* (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 328, 335 [71 Cal.Rptr.2d 518] [citing *People v. Rocha* (1971) 3 Cal.3d 893, 899–900, fn. 12 [92 Cal.Rptr. 172, 479 P.2d 372]].

**LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES**

- Assault. Pen. Code, § 240.
- Simple Battery. Pen. Code, §§ 242, 243(a).

**RELATED ISSUES**

See the Related Issues section of CALCRIM No. 960, *Simple Battery*.

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, § 19.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.12 (Matthew Bender).

**948. Battery Against Transportation Personnel or Passenger (Pen. Code, §§ 242, 243.3)**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with battery against (a/an) (operator/driver/ passenger/station agent/ticket agent) of (a/an) \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of vehicle or transportation entity specified in Pen. Code, § 243.3>* [in violation of Penal Code section 243.3].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. \_\_\_\_\_ *<Insert name>* was (a/an) (operator/driver/station agent/ticket agent/passenger) of (a/an) \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of vehicle or transportation entity specified in Pen. Code, § 243.3>*;
2. The defendant willfully [and unlawfully] touched \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name>* in a harmful or offensive manner;

*<Give element 3 when alleged victim is an operator, driver, station agent, or ticket agent.>*

- [3. When the defendant acted, \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name>* was performing (his/her) duties as (a/an) (operator/driver/station agent/ticket agent) of (a/an) \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of vehicle or transportation entity specified in Pen. Code, § 243.3>*];

[AND]

4. When the defendant acted, (he/she) knew, or reasonably should have known, that \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name>* was (a/an) (operator/driver/station agent/ticket agent/passenger) of (a/an) \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of vehicle or transportation entity specified in Pen. Code, § 243.3>* [and that \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name>* was performing (his/her) duties](;/)

*<Give element 5 when the defendant is charged with felony battery based on injury.>*

[AND]

- [5. \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name>* suffered an injury as a result of the force used(;/.)]

*<Give element 6 when instructing on self-defense or defense of another.>*

[AND]

6. The defendant did not act (in self-defense/ [or] in defense of someone else).]

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on

purpose. It is not required that he or she intend to break the law, hurt someone else, or gain any advantage.

**Making contact with another person, including through his or her clothing, is enough to commit a battery. [The slightest touching can be enough if it is done in a rude or angry way.] [The touching does not have to cause pain or injury of any kind.]**

**[The touching can be done indirectly by causing an object [or someone else] to touch the other person.]**

**[An *injury* is any physical injury that requires professional medical treatment. The question whether an injury requires such treatment cannot be answered simply by deciding whether or not a person sought or received treatment. You may consider those facts, but you must decide this question based on the nature, extent, and seriousness of the injury itself.]**

*New January 2006*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If there is sufficient evidence of self-defense or defense of another, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense. Give bracketed element 6, the bracketed words “and unlawfully” in element 2, and any appropriate defense instructions. (See CALCRIM Nos. 3470–3477.)

If the alleged victim was an operator, driver, station agent, or ticket agent of a statutorily specified vehicle or transportation entity, give bracketed element 3 and the bracketed language in element 4. If the alleged victim was a passenger, omit bracketed element 3 and the bracketed language in element 4.

Give bracketed element 5 and the bracketed definition of “injury” if the defendant is charged with felony battery based on an injury to the alleged victim. (See Pen. Code, § 243.3.)

Give the final bracketed paragraph if indirect touching is an issue.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 242, 243.3; see *People v. Martinez* (1970) 3 Cal.App.3d 886, 889 [83 Cal.Rptr. 914] [harmful or offensive touching].
- Injury Defined. Pen. Code, § 243(f)(6); *People v. Longoria* (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 12, 17 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 213].
- Willful Defined. Pen. Code, § 7(1); *People v. Lara* (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 102, 107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].

- Least Touching. *People v. Myers* (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 328, 335 [71 Cal.Rptr.2d 518] [citing *People v. Rocha* (1971) 3 Cal.3d 893, 899–900, fn. 12 [92 Cal.Rptr. 172, 479 P.2d 372]].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Assault. Pen. Code, § 240.
- Battery. Pen. Code, § 242.

If the defendant is charged with felony battery on transportation personnel or passenger based on an injury to the alleged victim, then the misdemeanor battery on the specified victim is a lesser included offense. (See Pen. Code, § 243.3.)

### RELATED ISSUES

See the Related Issues sections to CALCRIM No. 960, *Simple Battery*.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, §§ 13–15, 21, 23, 79.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.12 (Matthew Bender).

## 949. Battery Against School Employee (Pen. Code, §§ 242, 243.6)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with battery against a school employee [in violation of Penal Code section 243.6].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. \_\_\_\_\_ <Insert name> was a school employee;
2. The defendant willfully [and unlawfully] touched \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name> in a harmful or offensive manner;

<Alternative 3A—performing duties>

- [3. When the defendant acted, \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name> was performing (his/her) duties as a school employee;]

<Alternative 3B—retaliation>

- [3. When the defendant acted, (he/she) was retaliating against \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name> because of something \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name> had done while performing (his/her) duties as a school employee;]

[AND]

4. When the defendant acted, (he/she) knew, or reasonably should have known, that \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name> was a school employee(;/.)

<Give element 5 when the defendant is charged with felony battery based on injury.>

[AND]

- [5. \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name> suffered injury as a result of the force used(;/.)]

<Give element 6 when instructing on self-defense or defense of another.>

[AND]

6. The defendant did not act (in self-defense/ [or] in defense of someone else.)]

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose. It is not required that he or she intend to break the law, hurt someone else, or gain any advantage.

Making contact with another person, including through his or her clothing, is enough to commit a battery. [The slightest touching can be enough if it is done in a rude or angry way.] [The touching does not



have to cause pain or injury of any kind.]

[The touching can be done indirectly by causing an object [or someone else] to touch the other person.]

[It is not a defense that the touching occurred off campus or outside regular school hours.]

*A school employee* is any person employed as a permanent or probationary certificated or classified employee of a school district on a part-time or full-time basis, including a substitute teacher, student teacher, or school board member.

[An *injury* is any physical injury that requires professional medical treatment. The question whether an injury requires such treatment cannot be answered simply by deciding whether or not a person sought or received treatment. You may consider those facts, but you must decide this question based on the nature, extent, and seriousness of the injury itself.]

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*New January 2006*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If there is sufficient evidence of self-defense or defense of another, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense. Give bracketed element 6, the bracketed words “and unlawfully” in element 2, and any appropriate defense instructions. (See CALCRIM Nos. 3470–3477.)

Give alternative 3A or 3B, depending on whether there is evidence that the defendant used force while the employee was performing job duties or used force in retaliation for something the employee previously did while performing job duties. (See Pen. Code, § 243.6.)

Give element 5 and the bracketed definition of “injury” if the defendant is charged with a felony based on an injury to the alleged victim. (See Pen. Code, § 243.6.)

Give the bracketed paragraph on touching if indirect touching is an issue.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 242, 243.6; *People v. Martinez* (1970) 3 Cal.App.3d 886, 889 [83 Cal.Rptr. 914] [harmful or offensive touching].
- Injury Defined. Pen. Code, § 243(f)(6); *People v. Longoria* (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 12, 17 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 213].
- School Employee Defined. Pen. Code, § 245.5(d).

- Willful Defined. Pen. Code, § 7(1); *People v. Lara* (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 102, 107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
- Least Touching. *People v. Myers* (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 328, 335 [71 Cal.Rptr.2d 518] [citing *People v. Rocha* (1971) 3 Cal.3d 893, 899–900, fn. 12 [92 Cal.Rptr. 172, 479 P.2d 372]].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Assault. Pen. Code, § 240.
- Battery. Pen. Code, § 242.

If the defendant is charged with felony battery on a school employee based on an injury to the alleged victim, then the misdemeanor battery on the specified victim is a lesser included offense. (See Pen. Code, § 243.6.)

### RELATED ISSUES

See the Related Issues sections to CALCRIM No. 960, *Simple Battery*.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, §§ 13–15, 80.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.12; Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.02 (Matthew Bender).

## 950. Battery Against a Juror (Pen. Code, §§ 242, 243.7)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with battery against a juror [in violation of Penal Code section 243.7].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant was a party to a case for which a jury had been selected;
2. \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name> had been sworn as a juror [or alternate juror] to decide that case;

[AND]

3. The defendant willfully [and unlawfully] touched \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name> in a harmful or offensive manner(;/.)

<Give element 4 when instructing on self-defense or defense of another.>

[AND]

4. The defendant did not act (in self-defense/ [or] in defense of someone else).]

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose. It is not required that he or she intend to break the law, hurt someone else, or gain any advantage.

The slightest touching can be enough to commit a battery if it is done in a rude or angry way. Making contact with another person, including through his or her clothing, is enough. The touching does not have to cause pain or injury of any kind.

[The touching can be done indirectly by causing an object [or someone else] to touch the other person.]

[The touching may have taken place either while the case was pending or after it was concluded.]

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*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If there is sufficient evidence of self-defense or defense of another, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense. Give bracketed element 4, the bracketed

words “and unlawfully” in element 3, and any appropriate defense instructions. (See CALCRIM Nos. 3470–3477.)

Give the final bracketed paragraph on touching if indirect touching is an issue.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 242, 243.7; see *People v. Martinez* (1970) 3 Cal.App.3d 886, 889 [83 Cal.Rptr. 914] [harmful or offensive touching].
- Willful Defined. Pen. Code, § 7(1); *People v. Lara* (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 102, 107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
- Least Touching. *People v. Myers* (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 328, 335 [71 Cal.Rptr.2d 518] [citing *People v. Rocha* (1971) 3 Cal.3d 893, 899–900, fn. 12 [92 Cal.Rptr. 172, 479 P.2d 372]].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Assault. Pen. Code, § 240.
- Battery. Pen. Code, § 242.

### COMMENTARY

Unlike other statutes penalizing battery on a particular person, Penal Code section 243.7 does not state that the defendant must have known that the person assaulted was a juror. Thus, the committee has not included knowledge among the elements.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, §§ 13–15, 78.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.12 (Matthew Bender).

**951. Battery Committed on School, Park, or Hospital Property  
(Pen. Code, §§ 242, 243.2)**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with battery against a person on (school property/park property/hospital grounds) [in violation of Penal Code section 243.2].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant willfully [and unlawfully] touched \_\_\_\_\_  
<insert name> in a harmful or offensive manner;

[AND]

2. When the defendant acted, (he/she) was on (school property/park property/the grounds of a hospital)(;/.)

<Give element 3 when instructing on self-defense, defense of another, of reasonable discipline>

[AND]

3. The defendant did not act (in self-defense[,]/ [or] in defense of someone else[,]/ [or] while reasonably disciplining a child).

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose. It is not required that he or she intend to break the law, hurt someone else, or gain any advantage.

The slightest touching can be enough to commit a battery if it is done in a rude or angry way. Making contact with another person, including through his or her clothing, is enough. The touching does not have to cause pain or injury of any kind.

[The touching can be done indirectly by causing an object [or someone else] to touch the other person.]

[A *school* is any (elementary school/junior high school/four-year high school/senior high school/adult school [or any branch thereof]/opportunity school/continuation high school/regional occupational center/evening high school/technical school/community college).]

[A *park* is any publicly maintained or operated park. It does not include any facility that is being used for professional sports or commercial events.]

[A *hospital* is any facility for the diagnosis, care, and treatment of human illness that is (licensed/specifically exempt from licensing) under state law.]

*New January 2006*

## BENCH NOTES

### ***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If there is sufficient evidence of self-defense or defense of another, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense. Give bracketed element 3, the bracketed words “and unlawfully” in element 1, and any appropriate defense instructions. (See CALCRIM Nos. 3470–3477.)

Give the bracketed paragraph on indirect touching if that is an issue. Give any of the bracketed definitions on request depending on the facts in the case.

### ***Related Instructions***

CALCRIM No. 960, *Simple Battery*.

CALCRIM No. 906, *Assault Committed on School or Park Property*.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 242, 243.2.
- Willful Defined. Pen. Code, § 7, subd. 1; *People v. Lara* (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 102, 107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
- Least Touching. *People v. Myers* (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 328, 335 [71 Cal.Rptr.2d 518] [citing *People v. Rocha* (1971) 3 Cal.3d 893, 899–900, fn. 12 [92 Cal.Rptr. 172, 479 P.2d 372]].

## RELATED ISSUES

### ***Touching of Something Attached to or Closely Connected with Person***

The committee could not locate any authority on whether it is sufficient to commit a battery if the defendant touches something attached to or closely connected with the person. Thus, the committee has not included this principle in the instruction.

### ***Labor Dispute***

Penal Code section 243.2 does not apply to conduct arising during the course of an otherwise lawful labor dispute. (Pen. Code, § 243.2(c).)

## SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, §§ 24–25.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.02 (Matthew Bender).

**952–959. Reserved for Future Use**

## (iv) Simple Battery

### 960. Simple Battery (Pen. Code, § 242)

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The defendant is charged with battery [in violation of Penal Code section 242].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant willfully [and unlawfully] touched \_\_\_\_\_  
<insert name> in a harmful or offensive manner(;/.)

<Give element 2 when instructing on self-defense, defense of another, or reasonable discipline.>

[AND

2. The defendant did not act (in self-defense/ [or] in defense of someone else/ [or] while reasonably disciplining a child).]

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose. It is not required that he or she intend to break the law, hurt someone else, or gain any advantage.

The slightest touching can be enough to commit a battery if it is done in a rude or angry way. Making contact with another person, including through his or her clothing, is enough. The touching does not have to cause pain or injury of any kind.

[The touching can be done indirectly by causing an object [or someone else] to touch the other person.]

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2013, February 2014, March 2017*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If there is sufficient evidence of self-defense or defense of another, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense. Give bracketed element 2, the bracketed words “and unlawfully” in element 1, and any appropriate defense instructions. (See CALCRIM Nos. 3470–3477.)

If there is sufficient evidence of reasonable parental discipline, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense. Give bracketed element 2, the bracketed words “and unlawfully” in element 1, and CALCRIM No. 3405, *Parental Right to Punish a Child*.

Give the bracketed paragraph on indirect touching if that is an issue.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 242; see *People v. Martinez* (1970) 3 Cal.App.3d 886, 889 [83 Cal.Rptr. 914] [harmful or offensive touching].
- Willful Defined. Pen. Code, § 7(1); *People v. Lara* (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 102, 107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
- Least Touching. *People v. Myers* (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 328, 335 [71 Cal.Rptr.2d 518] [citing *People v. Rocha* (1971) 3 Cal.3d 893, 899–900, fn. 12 [92 Cal.Rptr. 172, 479 P.2d 372]].
- Defense of Parental Discipline. *People v. Whitehurst* (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1045, 1051 [12 Cal.Rptr.2d 33].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Assault. Pen. Code, § 240.

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Touching of Something Attached to or Closely Connected with Person*

The committee could not locate any authority on whether it is sufficient to commit a battery if the defendant touches something attached to or closely connected with the person. Thus, the committee has not included this principle in the instruction.

#### *Battery Against Elder or Dependent Adult*

When a battery is committed against an elder or dependent adult as defined in Penal Code section 368, with knowledge that the victim is an elder or a dependent adult, special punishments apply. (Pen. Code, § 243.25.)

#### *Related Instruction*

CALCRIM No. 917, *Insulting Words Are Not a Defense*.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, §§ 12–16.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.12 (Matthew Bender).

**961–964. Reserved for Future Use**



## F. SHOOTING AND BRANDISHING

### (i) Shooting

#### 965. Shooting at Inhabited House or Occupied Motor Vehicle (Pen. Code, § 246)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with shooting at an (inhabited house/inhabited house car/inhabited camper/occupied building/occupied motor vehicle/occupied aircraft) [in violation of Penal Code section 246].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant willfully and maliciously shot a firearm;

[AND]

2. The defendant shot the firearm at an (inhabited house/inhabited house car/inhabited camper/occupied building/occupied motor vehicle/occupied aircraft)(;/.)

<Give element 3 when instructing on self-defense or defense of another.>

[AND]

3. The defendant did not act (in self-defense/ [or] in defense of someone else).]

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose.

Someone acts *maliciously* when he or she intentionally does a wrongful act or when he or she acts with the unlawful intent to disturb, annoy, or injure someone else.

[A (house/house car/camper) is *inhabited* if someone uses it as a dwelling, whether or not someone is inside at the time of the alleged shooting.]

[A (house/house car/camper) is *inhabited* if someone used it as a dwelling and left only because a natural or other disaster caused him or her to leave.]

[A (house/house car/camper) is not *inhabited* if the former residents have moved out and do not intend to return, even if some personal property remains inside.]

[A house includes any (structure/garage/office/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert other structure>) that is attached to the house and functionally connected with it.]

[A *motor vehicle* includes a (passenger vehicle/motorcycle/motor scooter/bus/school bus/commercial vehicle/truck tractor and trailer/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert other type of motor vehicle>).]

[A *house car* is a motor vehicle originally designed, or permanently altered, and equipped for human habitation, or to which a camper has been permanently attached.]

[A *camper* is a structure designed to be mounted upon a motor vehicle and to provide facilities for human habitation or camping purposes.]

[An *aircraft* is an airplane or other craft intended for and capable of transporting persons through the air.]

[A *firearm* is any device designed to be used as a weapon, from which a projectile is discharged or expelled through a barrel by the force of an explosion or other form of combustion.]

[The term[s] (*firearm*/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert other term>) (is/are) defined in another instruction to which you should refer.]

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2012, August 2012, September 2017*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If there is sufficient evidence of self-defense or defense of another, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense. Give bracketed element 3 and any appropriate defense instructions. (See CALCRIM Nos. 3470–3477.)

Give the relevant bracketed definitions unless the court has already given the definition in other instructions. In such cases, the court may give the bracketed sentence stating that the term is defined elsewhere.

### *Related Instructions*

CALCRIM No. 966, *Shooting at Uninhabited House or Unoccupied Motor Vehicle*.

CALCRIM No. 967, *Shooting at Unoccupied Aircraft*.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 246.
- Meaning of “at” in Pen. Code, § 246. *People v. Cruz* (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 427, 431–433 [45 Cal.Rptr.2d 148].
- Aircraft Defined. Pen. Code, § 247.
- Camper Defined. Veh. Code, § 243.
- Firearm Defined. Pen. Code, § 16520.

- House Car Defined. Veh. Code, § 362.
- Malicious Defined. Pen. Code, § 7(4); *People v. Watie* (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 866, 879 [124 Cal.Rptr.2d 258].
- Motor Vehicle Defined. Veh. Code, § 415.
- Willful Defined. Pen. Code, § 7(1); *In re Jerry R.* (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1432, 1438 [35 Cal.Rptr.2d 155].
- General Intent Crime. *People v. Jischke* (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 552, 556 [59 Cal.Rptr.2d 269]; *People v. Cruz* (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 427, 431–433 [45 Cal.Rptr.2d 148] [intent to strike building not required].
- Occupied Building. *People v. Adams* (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 346, 354–355 [187 Cal.Rptr. 505] [attached garage].
- Occupied Motor Vehicle. *People v. Buttles* (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1631, 1638 [273 Cal.Rptr. 397] [tractor/trailer rig being operated on a road].
- House Not Inhabited Means Former Residents Not Returning. *People v. Cardona* (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 481, 483 [191 Cal.Rptr. 109].
- Offense of Discharging Firearm at Occupied Vehicle Can Be Committed When Gun Is Inside Vehicle. *People v. Manzo* (2012) 53 Cal.4th 880, 889–890 [138 Cal.Rptr. 16, 270 P.3d 711].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

Assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245) is not necessarily included in the offense of discharging a firearm at an occupied vehicle. (*In re Daniel R.* (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 239, 244, 247 [24 Cal.Rptr.2d 414].)

Grossly negligent discharge of a firearm pursuant to Penal Code section 246.3(a) is a lesser included offense of discharging a firearm at an occupied building. (*People v. Ramirez* (2009) 45 Cal.4th 980, 990 [89 Cal.Rptr.3d 586, 201 P.3d 466].)

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Concurrent Sentence for Firearm Possession*

If a prior felon arrives at the scene already in possession of a firearm and then shoots at an inhabited dwelling, Penal Code section 654 does not preclude imposing sentences for both offenses. (*People v. Jones* (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1139 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 319].)

#### *Shooting Weapon Inside Dwelling*

“[T]he firing of a pistol within a dwelling house does not constitute a violation of Penal Code section 246.” (*People v. Stepney* (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 1016, 1021 [175 Cal.Rptr. 102] [shooting television inside dwelling].) However, shooting from “inside [an] apartment . . . in the direction of the apartment below” is a violation of section 246. (*People v. Jischke* (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 552, 556 [59 Cal.Rptr.2d 269].)

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, §§ 49, 50.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, §§ 144.01[1][i], 144.03[2], [4] (Matthew Bender).

**966. Shooting at Uninhabited House or Unoccupied Motor Vehicle  
(Pen. Code, § 247(b))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with shooting at an (uninhabited house[,]/ [or] uninhabited building[,]/ [or] unoccupied motor vehicle) [in violation of Penal Code section 247(b)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

- [1.] The defendant willfully shot a firearm at an (uninhabited house[,]/ [or] uninhabited building[,]/ [or] unoccupied motor vehicle)(;/.)

*<Give element 2 when consent of the owner is an issue; see Bench Notes.>*

[AND]

- [2. The defendant did the shooting without the owner's permission(;/ .)]

*<Give element 3 when instructing on self-defense or defense of another.>*

[AND]

3. The defendant did not act (in self-defense/ [or] in defense of someone else).]

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose. It is not required that he or she intend to break the law, hurt someone else, or gain any advantage.

[A house includes any (structure/garage/office/ \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert other structure>*) that is attached to the house and functionally connected with it.]

[A *motor vehicle* includes a (passenger vehicle/motorcycle/motor scooter/bus/school bus/commercial vehicle/truck tractor and trailer/ \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert other type of motor vehicle>*).]

[A *firearm* is any device designed to be used as a weapon, from which a projectile is discharged or expelled through a barrel by the force of an explosion or other form of combustion.]

[The term[s] (*firearm*/ \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert other term>*) (is/are) defined in another instruction to which you should refer.]

**BENCH NOTES*****Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

Consent of the owner of the vehicle or building is an affirmative defense. (Pen. Code, § 247(b); *People v. Lam* (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1297, 1301 [19 Cal.Rptr.3d 431].) If there is sufficient evidence of consent, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense. Give bracketed element 2.

If there is sufficient evidence of self-defense or defense of another, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense. Give bracketed element 3 and any appropriate defense instructions. (See CALCRIM Nos. 3470–3477.)

Give the relevant bracketed definitions unless the court has already given the definition in other instructions. In such cases, the court may give the bracketed sentence stating that the term is defined elsewhere.

***Related Instructions***

CALCRIM No. 965, *Shooting at Inhabited House or Occupied Motor Vehicle*.

**AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 247(b).
- Firearm Defined. Pen. Code, § 16520.
- Motor Vehicle Defined. Veh. Code, § 415.

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, §§ 49–50.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.01[1][i] (Matthew Bender).

## 967. Shooting at Unoccupied Aircraft (Pen. Code, § 247(a))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with shooting at an unoccupied aircraft [in violation of Penal Code section 247(a)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant willfully and maliciously shot a firearm;

[AND]

2. The defendant shot the firearm at an unoccupied aircraft(;/.)

<Give element 3 when instructing on self-defense or defense of another.>

[AND]

3. The defendant did not act (in self-defense/ [or] in defense of someone else).]

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose.

Someone acts *maliciously* when he or she intentionally does a wrongful act or when he or she acts with the unlawful intent to disturb, defraud, annoy, or injure someone else.

[An *aircraft* is an airplane or other craft intended for and capable of transporting persons through the air.]

[A *firearm* is any device designed to be used as a weapon, from which a projectile is discharged or expelled through a barrel by the force of an explosion or other form of combustion.]

[The term[s] (*firearm/* \_\_\_\_\_ <*insert other term*>) (is/are) defined in another instruction to which you should refer.]

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2012*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If there is sufficient evidence of self-defense or defense of another, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense. Give bracketed element 3 and any appropriate defense instructions. (See CALCRIM Nos. 3470–3477.)

Give the relevant bracketed definitions unless the court has already given the

definition in other instructions. In such cases, the court may give the bracketed sentence stating that the term is defined elsewhere.

***Related Instructions***

CALCRIM No. 965, *Shooting at Inhabited House or Occupied Motor Vehicle*.

CALCRIM No. 966, *Shooting at Uninhabited House or Unoccupied Motor Vehicle*.

**AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 247(a).
- Firearm Defined. Pen. Code, § 16520.
- Malicious Defined. Pen. Code, § 7(4).
- Aircraft Defined. Pen. Code, § 247.
- Willful Defined. Pen. Code, § 7(1); *In re Jerry R.* (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1432, 1438 [35 Cal.Rptr.2d 155] [in context of Pen. Code, § 246].

**RELATED ISSUES**

***Laser***

Willfully and maliciously discharging a laser at an occupied aircraft that is in motion or flight is a separate crime. (See Pen. Code, § 247.5.) It is also a crime to willfully shine a light or other bright device at an aircraft with the intent to interfere with the aircraft's operation. (See Pen. Code, § 248.)

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, § 52.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.01[1][i] (Matthew Bender).



## 968. Shooting From Motor Vehicle (Pen. Code, § 26100(c) & (d))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with shooting from a motor vehicle [at another person] [in violation of Penal Code section 26100].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant willfully and maliciously shot a firearm from a motor vehicle(;/.)

<Give element 2 when defendant charged with Pen. Code, § 26100(c).>

[AND]

2. The defendant shot the firearm at another person who was not in a motor vehicle(;/.)

<Give element 3 when instructing on self-defense or defense of another.>

[AND]

3. The defendant did not act (in self-defense/ [or] in defense of someone else).]

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose.

Someone acts *maliciously* when he or she intentionally does a wrongful act or when he or she acts with the unlawful intent to disturb, defraud, annoy, or injure someone else.

[A *motor vehicle* includes a (passenger vehicle/motorcycle/motor scooter/bus/school bus/commercial vehicle/truck tractor and trailer/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert other type of motor vehicle>).]

[A *firearm* is any device designed to be used as a weapon, from which a projectile is discharged or expelled through a barrel by the force of an explosion or other form of combustion.]

[The term[s] (*firearm*/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert other term>) (is/are) defined in another instruction to which you should refer.]

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2012*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If there is sufficient evidence of self-defense or defense of another, the court has a

**sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense. Give bracketed element 3 and any appropriate defense instructions. (See CALCRIM Nos. 3470–3477.)

Give the bracketed phrase “at another person” in the first sentence plus bracketed element 2 if the defendant is charged with shooting at someone who was not in a motor vehicle. (See Pen. Code, § 26100(c).) If the defendant is only charged with shooting from a motor vehicle (see Pen. Code, § 26100(d)), give element 1 but not element 2.

Give the relevant bracketed definitions unless the court has already given the definition in other instructions. In such cases, the court may give the bracketed sentence stating that the term is defined elsewhere.

### ***Related Instructions***

CALCRIM No. 969, *Permitting Someone to Shoot From Vehicle*.

### **AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 26100(c) & (d).
- Firearm Defined. Pen. Code, § 16520.
- Malicious Defined. Pen. Code, § 7(4).
- Willful Defined. Pen. Code, § 7(1); *In re Jerry R.* (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1432, 1438 [35 Cal.Rptr.2d 155] [in context of Pen. Code, § 246].
- General Intent Crime. *People v. Laster* (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1450, 1468 [61 Cal.Rptr.2d 680] [dictum].
- Assault With a Firearm is not a Lesser Included Offense. *People v. Licas* (2007) 41 Cal.4th 362 [60 Cal.Rptr.3d 31].

### **RELATED ISSUES**

#### ***Shooting at Animal***

It is a separate crime to shoot from a motor vehicle at any game bird or mammal. (See Fish & G. Code, § 3002.)

### **SECONDARY SOURCES**

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, § 51.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, §§ 144.01[1][i], 144.03[2], [4] (Matthew Bender).

**969. Permitting Someone to Shoot From Vehicle (Pen. Code,  
§ 26100(b))**

---

The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with permitting someone to shoot from a vehicle [in violation of Penal Code section 26100(b)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant was the (driver/ [or] owner) of a vehicle;
2. The defendant permitted someone to shoot a firearm from the vehicle;
3. The defendant knew that (he/she) was permitting someone to shoot a firearm from the vehicle;

**AND**

4. The other person shot the firearm from the vehicle.

[A vehicle owner who permits someone else to shoot a firearm from the vehicle is guilty even if the owner is not in the vehicle when the shooting happens.]

[A *vehicle* is a device by which people or things may be moved on a road or highway. A vehicle does not include a device that is moved only by human power or used only on stationary rails or tracks.]

[A *firearm* is any device designed to be used as a weapon, from which a projectile is discharged or expelled through a barrel by the force of an explosion or other form of combustion.]

[The term[s] (*firearm*/\_\_\_\_\_ <insert other term>) (is/are) defined in another instruction to which you should refer.]

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2012*

**BENCH NOTES**

***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

Give the relevant bracketed definitions unless the court has already given the definition in other instructions. In such cases, the court may give the bracketed sentence stating that the term is defined elsewhere.

***Related Instructions***

CALCRIM No. 968, *Shooting From Motor Vehicle*.

**AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 26100(b).
- Firearm Defined. Pen. Code, § 16520.
- General Intent Crime. *People v. Laster* (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1450, 1468 [61 Cal.Rptr.2d 680].
- Vehicle Defined. Veh. Code, § 670.

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, § 51.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, §§ 144.01[1][i], 144.03[2] (Matthew Bender).

**970. Shooting Firearm or BB Device in Grossly Negligent Manner  
(Pen. Code, § 246.3)**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with shooting a (firearm/BB Device) in a grossly negligent manner [in violation of Penal Code section 246.3].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant intentionally shot a (firearm/BB device);
2. The defendant did the shooting with gross negligence;

[AND]

3. The shooting could have resulted in the injury or death of a person(;/.)

<Give element 4 when instructing on self-defense or defense of another.>

[AND]

4. The defendant did not act (in self-defense/ [or] in defense of someone else).]

*Gross negligence* involves more than ordinary carelessness, inattention, or mistake in judgment. A person acts with gross negligence when:

1. He or she acts in a reckless way that creates a high risk of death or great bodily injury.

AND

2. A reasonable person would have known that acting in that way would create such a risk.

In other words, a person acts with gross negligence when the way he or she acts is so different from the way an ordinarily careful person would act in the same situation that his or her act amounts to disregard for human life or indifference to the consequences of that act.

[*Great bodily injury* means significant or substantial physical injury. It is an injury that is greater than minor or moderate harm.]

[A *firearm* is any device designed to be used as a weapon, from which a projectile is discharged or expelled through a barrel by the force of an explosion or other form of combustion.]

[A *BB device* is any instrument that expels a projectile, such as a BB or a pellet, through the force of air pressure, gas pressure, or spring action.]

**[The term[s] (*great bodily injury*/ [and] *firearm*) (is/are) defined in another instruction to which you should refer.]**

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*New January 2006; Revised June 2007, February 2012, September 2019, September 2020*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If there is sufficient evidence of self-defense or defense of another, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense. Give bracketed element 4 and any appropriate defense instructions. (See CALCRIM Nos. 3470–3477.)

Give the relevant bracketed definitions unless the court has already given the definition in other instructions. In such cases, the court may give the bracketed sentence stating that the term is defined elsewhere.

The second sentence of the great bodily injury definition could result in error if the prosecution improperly argues great bodily injury may be shown by greater than minor injury alone. (Compare *People v. Medellin* (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 519, 533–535 [258 Cal.Rptr.3d 867] [the definition was reasonably susceptible to prosecutor’s erroneous argument that the injury need only be greater than minor] with *People v. Quinonez* (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 457, 466 [260 Cal.Rptr.3d 86] [upholding instructions containing great bodily injury definition as written].)

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 246.3.
- Discharge Must be Intentional. *People v. Robertson* (2004) 34 Cal.4th 156, 167 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 604, 95 P.3d 872]; *In re Jerry R.* (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1432, 1438 [35 Cal.Rptr.2d 155]; *People v. Alonzo* (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 535, 538 [16 Cal.Rptr.2d 656].
- Firearm Defined. Pen. Code, § 16520.
- BB Device Defined. Pen. Code, § 246.3(c).
- Willful Defined. Pen. Code, § 7(1).
- Gross Negligence Defined. *People v. Alonzo* (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 535, 540 [16 Cal.Rptr.2d 656]; see *People v. Penny* (1955) 44 Cal.2d 861, 879–880 [285 P.2d 926].
- Actual Belief Weapon Not Loaded Negates Mental State. *People v. Robertson* (2004) 34 Cal.4th 156, 167 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 604, 95 P.3d 872]; *In re Jerry R.* (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1432, 1438–1439, 1440 [35 Cal.Rptr.2d 155].

## LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

Unlawful possession by a minor of a firearm capable of being concealed on the

person (see Pen. Code, § 29610) is not a necessarily included offense of unlawfully discharging a firearm with gross negligence. (*In re Giovanni M.* (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1061, 1066 [97 Cal.Rptr.2d 319].)

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Actual Belief Weapon Not Loaded Negates Mental State*

“A defendant who believed that the firearm he or she discharged was unloaded . . . would not be guilty of a violation of section 246.3.” (*People v. Robertson* (2004) 34 Cal.4th 156, 167 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 604, 95 P.3d 872] [citing *In re Jerry R.* (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1432, 1438–1439, 1440 [35 Cal.Rptr.2d 155]].)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, § 48.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.01[1][i] (Matthew Bender).

**971–979. Reserved for Future Use**

## (ii) Brandishing

### 980. Brandishing Firearm in Presence of Occupant of Motor Vehicle (Pen. Code, § 417.3)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with brandishing a firearm in the presence of someone in a motor vehicle [in violation of Penal Code section 417.3].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant drew or exhibited a firearm in the presence of another person who was in a motor vehicle that was being driven on a public street or highway;

[AND]

2. The defendant drew or exhibited the firearm against the other person in a threatening manner that would cause a reasonable person to fear bodily harm(;/.)

<Give element 3 when instructing on self-defense or defense of another.>

[AND]

3. The defendant did not act (in self-defense/ [or] in defense of someone else).]

[A *motor vehicle* includes a (passenger vehicle/motorcycle/motor scooter/bus/school bus/commercial vehicle/truck tractor and trailer/\_\_\_\_\_ <insert other type of motor vehicle>).]

[A motor vehicle is *proceeding* on a public street or highway if it is moving on a street or highway with its engine running and propelling the vehicle.]

[A *firearm* is any device designed to be used as a weapon, from which a projectile is discharged or expelled through a barrel by the force of an explosion or other form of combustion.]

[The term[s] (*firearm*/\_\_\_\_\_ <insert other term>) (is/are) defined in another instruction to which you should refer.]

[It is not required that the firearm be loaded.]

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2012*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.



If there is sufficient evidence of self-defense or defense of another, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense. Give bracketed element 3 and any appropriate defense instructions. (See CALCRIM Nos. 3470–3477.)

Give the relevant bracketed definitions unless the court has already given the definition in other instructions. In such cases, the court may give the bracketed sentence stating that the term is defined elsewhere.

Give the bracketed paragraph about the lack of any requirement that the firearm be loaded on request. (See Pen. Code, § 417.3.)

### ***Related Instructions***

For misdemeanor brandishing instructions, see CALCRIM No. 983, *Brandishing Firearm or Deadly Weapon: Misdemeanor*.

## **AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 417.3; *People v. Lara* (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1560, 1565–1566 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 349] [brandishing must be directed against occupant of vehicle].
- Firearm Defined. Pen. Code, § 16520.
- Motor Vehicle Defined. Veh. Code, §§ 415, 670.
- Proceeding Defined. *People v. Howard* (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 94, 97 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d 892].
- Victim’s Awareness of Firearm Not a Required Element. *People v. McKinzie* (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 789, 794 [224 Cal.Rptr. 891] [in context of misdemeanor brandishing under Pen. Code, § 417(a)].

## **LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES**

- Brandishing a Firearm. Pen. Code, § 417.3; *People v. Howard* (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 94, 99 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d 892].

## **SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, §§ 4–7.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.01[1][e] (Matthew Bender).

**981. Brandishing Firearm in Presence of Peace Officer (Pen. Code, § 417(c) & (e))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with brandishing a firearm in the presence of a peace officer [in violation of Penal Code section 417].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant drew or exhibited a firearm in the immediate presence of a peace officer;
2. The defendant drew or exhibited the firearm in a rude, angry, or threatening manner;
3. When the defendant acted, the officer was lawfully performing (his/her) duties;

[AND]

4. When the defendant acted, (he/she) knew, or reasonably should have known, from the person's uniform or other identifying action[s] that the person was a peace officer who was performing (his/her) duties(;/.)

<Give element 5 when instructing on self-defense or defense of another.>

[AND]

5. The defendant did not act (in self-defense/ [or] in defense of someone else).]

[A *firearm* is any device designed to be used as a weapon, from which a projectile is discharged or expelled through a barrel by the force of an explosion or other form of combustion.]

[The term *firearm* is defined in another instruction to which you should refer.]

[It is not required that the firearm be loaded.]

[A person who is employed as a police officer by \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of agency that employs police officer> is a **peace officer**.]

[A person employed by \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of agency that employs peace officer, e.g., "the Department of Fish and Wildlife"> is a **peace officer** if \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of facts necessary to make employee a peace officer, e.g., "designated by the director of the agency as a peace officer">.]

[The duties of a \_\_\_\_\_ <insert title of officer> include \_\_\_\_\_ <insert job duties>.]

*New January 2006; Revised April 2011, February 2012*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If there is sufficient evidence of self-defense or defense of another, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense. Give bracketed element 5 and any appropriate defense instructions. (See CALCRIM Nos. 3470–3477.)

In addition, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on defendant’s reliance on self-defense as it relates to the use of excessive force. (*People v. White* (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 161, 167–168 [161 Cal.Rptr. 541].) If excessive force is an issue, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct the jury that the defendant is not guilty of the offense charged, or any lesser included offense in which lawful performance is an element, if the defendant used reasonable force in response to excessive force. (*People v. Olguin* (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 39, 46–47 [173 Cal.Rptr. 663].) On request, the court must instruct that the prosecution has the burden of proving the lawfulness of the arrest beyond a reasonable doubt. (*People v. Castain* (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 138, 145 [175 Cal.Rptr. 651].) If lawful performance is an issue, give the appropriate portions of CALCRIM No. 2670, *Lawful Performance: Peace Officer*.

Give the bracketed definition of “firearm” unless the court has already given the definition in other instructions. In such cases, the court may give the bracketed sentence stating that the term is defined elsewhere.

Give the bracketed paragraph about the lack of any requirement that the firearm be loaded on request.

The jury must determine whether the alleged victim is a peace officer. (*People v. Brown* (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 444–445 [250 Cal.Rptr. 604, 758 P.2d 1135].) The court may instruct the jury on the appropriate definition of “peace officer” from the statute (e.g., “a Garden Grove Regular Police Officer and a Garden Grove Reserve Police Officer are peace officers”). (*Ibid.*) However, the court may not instruct the jury that the alleged victim was a peace officer as a matter of law (e.g., “Officer Reed was a peace officer”). (*Ibid.*) If the alleged victim is a police officer, give the bracketed sentence that begins with “A person employed as a police officer.” If the alleged victim is another type of peace officer, give the bracketed sentence that begins with “A person employed by.”

The court may give the bracketed sentence that begins, “The duties of a \_\_\_\_\_ <insert title . . .> include,” on request. The court may insert a description of the officer’s duties such as “the correct service of a facially valid

search warrant.” (*People v. Gonzalez* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1222 [275 Cal.Rptr. 729, 800 P.2d 1159].)

### ***Related Instructions***

For misdemeanor brandishing instructions, see CALCRIM No. 983, *Brandishing Firearm or Deadly Weapon: Misdemeanor*.

## **AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 417(c) & (e).
- Firearm Defined. Pen. Code, § 16520; see *In re Jose A.* (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 697, 702 [7 Cal.Rptr.2d 44] [pellet gun not a “firearm” within meaning of Pen. Code, § 417(a)].
- Peace Officer Defined. Pen. Code, § 830 et seq.
- Victim’s Awareness of Firearm Not a Required Element. *People v. McKinzie* (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 789, 794 [224 Cal.Rptr. 891] [in context of misdemeanor brandishing under Pen. Code, § 417(a)].
- Weapon Need Not Be Pointed Directly at Victim. *People v. Sanders* (1995) 11 Cal.4th 475, 542 [46 Cal.Rptr.2d 751, 905 P.2d 420] [in context of Pen. Code, § 417(a)].

## **LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES**

- Brandishing a Firearm. Pen. Code, § 417(a)(2).

## **RELATED ISSUES**

### ***Infliction of Serious Bodily Injury***

It is a separate offense to intentionally inflict serious bodily injury while drawing or exhibiting a firearm in the presence of a peace officer. (See Pen. Code, § 417.6(a); see also Pen. Code, § 417.6(b) [defining “serious bodily injury”].)

### ***Multiple Peace Officers***

A “single act of exhibiting a firearm in the presence of a peace officer . . . cannot be punished as many times as there are peace officers observing the act . . . [T]he multiple-victim exception [under *Neal v. State of California* (1960) 55 Cal.2d 11, 20–21 [9 Cal.Rptr. 607, 357 P.2d 839] for acts of violence against multiple victims] is just that, a multiple-victim exception, not a multiple-observer exception.” (*People v. Hall* (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1084, 1095–1096 [100 Cal.Rptr.2d 279].)

### ***Reasonable Person Standard for Physically Disabled Defendant***

A defendant with a physical disability is entitled to an instruction that the reasonable person standard as used in this instruction means a person with the same physical disability. (*People v. Mathews* (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 89, 99 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 330]; see CALCRIM No. 3429, *Reasonable Person Standard for Physically Disabled Person*.)

## **SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, §§ 8–10.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.01[1][e] (Matthew Bender).

**982. Brandishing Firearm or Deadly Weapon to Resist Arrest  
(Pen. Code, § 417.8)**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with brandishing a (firearm/deadly weapon) to resist arrest or detention [in violation of Penal Code section 417.8].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant drew or exhibited a (firearm/deadly weapon);

AND

2. When the defendant drew or exhibited the (firearm/deadly weapon), (he/she) intended to resist arrest or to prevent a peace officer from arresting or detaining (him/her/someone else).

[A *firearm* is any device designed to be used as a weapon, from which a projectile is discharged or expelled through a barrel by the force of an explosion or other form of combustion.]

[A *deadly weapon* is any object, instrument, or weapon [that is inherently deadly or one] that is used in such a way that it is capable of causing and likely to cause death or great bodily injury.]

[An object is *inherently deadly* if it is deadly or dangerous in the ordinary use for which it was designed.]

[In deciding whether an object is a deadly weapon, consider all the surrounding circumstances.]

[*Great bodily injury* means significant or substantial physical injury. It is an injury that is greater than minor or moderate harm.]

[The term[s] (*firearm*[,] *deadly weapon*[,] [and] *great bodily injury*) (is/ are) defined in another instruction to which you should refer.]

[A person who is employed as a police officer by \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of agency that employs police officer> is a *peace officer*.]

[A person employed by \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of agency that employs peace officer, e.g., “the Department of Fish and Wildlife”> is a *peace officer* if \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of facts necessary to make employee a peace officer, e.g., “designated by the director of the agency as a peace officer”>.]

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New January 2006; Revised February 2012, February 2013, September 2019, September 2020

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

Give the relevant bracketed definitions unless the court has already given the definition in other instructions. In such cases, the court may give the bracketed sentence stating that the term is defined elsewhere.

Give the bracketed paragraph about the lack of any requirement that the firearm be loaded on request.

Give the bracketed phrase “that is inherently deadly or one” and give the bracketed definition of *inherently deadly* only if the object is a deadly weapon as a matter of law. (*People v. Stutelberg* (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 314, 317–318 [240 Cal.Rptr.3d 156].)

Give the bracketed portion that begins with “In deciding whether” if the object is not a weapon as a matter of law and is capable of innocent uses. (*People v. Aguilar* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1023, 1028–1029 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 655, 945 P.2d 1204]; *People v. Godwin* (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1562, 1573–1574 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 545].)

If determining whether the item is an inherently deadly weapon requires resolution of a factual issue, give both bracketed instructions.

The jury must determine whether the alleged victim is a peace officer. (*People v. Brown* (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 444–445 [250 Cal.Rptr. 604, 758 P.2d 1135].) The court may instruct the jury on the appropriate definition of “peace officer” from the statute (e.g., “a Garden Grove Regular Police Officer and a Garden Grove Reserve Police Officer are peace officers”). (*Ibid.*) However, the court may not instruct the jury that the alleged victim was a peace officer as a matter of law (e.g., “Officer Reed was a peace officer”). (*Ibid.*) If the alleged victim is a police officer, give the bracketed sentence that begins with “A person employed as a police officer.” If the alleged victim is another type of peace officer, give the bracketed sentence that begins with “A person employed by.”

The second sentence of the great bodily injury definition could result in error if the prosecution improperly argues great bodily injury may be shown by greater than minor injury alone. (Compare *People v. Medellin* (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 519, 533–535 [258 Cal.Rptr.3d 867] [the definition was reasonably susceptible to prosecutor’s erroneous argument that the injury need only be greater than minor] with *People v. Quinonez* (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 457, 466 [260 Cal.Rptr.3d 86] [upholding instructions containing great bodily injury definition as written].)

### *Related Instructions*

CALCRIM No. 983, *Brandishing Firearm or Deadly Weapon: Misdemeanor*.

CALCRIM No. 981, *Brandishing Firearm in Presence of Peace Officer*.

CALCRIM No. 2653, *Taking Firearm or Weapon While Resisting Peace Officer or Public Officer*.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 417.8.
- Firearm Defined. Pen. Code, § 16520; see *In re Jose A.* (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 697, 702 [7 Cal.Rptr.2d 44] [pellet gun not a “firearm” within meaning of Pen. Code, § 417(a)].
- Peace Officer Defined. Pen. Code, § 830 et seq.
- Deadly Weapon Defined. *People v. Brown* (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1, 6–8 [147 Cal.Rptr.3d 848]; *People v. Aguilar* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1023, 1028–1029 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 655, 945 P.2d 1204] [hands and feet not deadly weapons]; see, e.g., *People v. Simons* (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1100, 1107 [50 Cal.Rptr.2d 351] [screwdriver was capable of being used as a deadly weapon and defendant intended to use it as one if need be]; *People v. Henderson* (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 453, 469–470 [90 Cal.Rptr.2d 450] [pit bulls were deadly weapons under the circumstances].
- Lawful Performance of Duties Not an Element. *People v. Simons* (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1100, 1109–1110 [50 Cal.Rptr.2d 351].
- Inherently Deadly Defined. *People v. Perez* (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1055, 1065 [232 Cal.Rptr.3d 51, 416 P.3d 42]; *People v. Aguilar* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1023, 1028–1029 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 655, 945 P.2d 1204].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

Resisting arrest by a peace officer engaged in the performance of his or her duties in violation of Penal Code section 148(a) is not a lesser included offense of Penal Code section 417.8. (*People v. Simons* (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1100, 1108–1110 [50 Cal.Rptr.2d 351].) Brandishing a deadly weapon in a rude, angry, or threatening manner in violation of Penal Code section 417(a)(1) is also not a lesser included offense of section 417.8. (*People v. Pruett* (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 77, 88 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 750].)

### RELATED ISSUES

See the Related Issues section to CALCRIM No. 981, *Brandishing Firearm in Presence of Peace Officer*.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, §§ 8–10.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.01[1][e] (Matthew Bender).



**983. Brandishing Firearm or Deadly Weapon: Misdemeanor (Pen. Code, § 417(a)(1) & (2))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with brandishing a (firearm/ deadly weapon) [in violation of Penal Code section 417(a)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant drew or exhibited a (firearm/deadly weapon) in the presence of someone else;

[AND]

<Alternative 2A—displayed in rude, angry, or threatening manner>

2. The defendant did so in a rude, angry, or threatening manner(;/ .)]

<Alternative 2B—used in fight>

2. The defendant [unlawfully] used the (firearm/deadly weapon) in a fight or quarrel(;/.)]

<Give element 3 when instructing on self-defense or defense of another.>

[AND]

3. The defendant did not act (in self-defense/ [or] in defense of someone else).]

[A *firearm* is any device designed to be used as a weapon, from which a projectile is discharged or expelled through a barrel by the force of an explosion or other form of combustion.]

[A *deadly weapon* is any object, instrument, or weapon [that is inherently deadly or one] that is used in such a way that it is capable of causing and likely to cause death or great bodily injury.]

[An object is *inherently deadly* if it is deadly or dangerous in the ordinary use for which it was designed.]

[In deciding whether an object is a deadly weapon, consider all the surrounding circumstances.]

[*Great bodily injury* means significant or substantial physical injury. It is an injury that is greater than minor or moderate harm.]

[The term[s] (*firearm*[,]/ *deadly weapon*[,]/ [and] *great bodily injury*) (is/ are) defined in another instruction to which you should refer.]

[It is not required that the firearm be loaded.]

*New January 2006; Revised October 2010, February 2012, February 2013, September 2019, September 2020*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If there is sufficient evidence of self-defense or defense of another, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense. Give bracketed element 3 and any appropriate defense instructions. (See CALCRIM Nos. 3470–3477.)

If the prosecution alleges that the defendant displayed the weapon in a rude, angry, or threatening manner, give alternative 2A. If the prosecution alleges that the defendant used the weapon in a fight, give alternative 2B.

If the defendant is charged under Penal Code section 417(a)(2)(A), the court **must** also give CALCRIM No. 984, *Brandishing Firearm: Misdemeanor—Public Place*.

Give the bracketed definition of “firearm” or “deadly weapon” unless the court has already given the definition in other instructions. In such cases, the court may give the bracketed sentence stating that the term is defined elsewhere.

Give the bracketed phrase “that is inherently deadly or one” and give the bracketed definition of *inherently deadly* only if the object is a deadly weapon as a matter of law. (*People v. Stutelberg* (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 314, 317–318 [240 Cal.Rptr.3d 156].)

Give the bracketed portion that begins with “In deciding whether” if the object is not a weapon as a matter of law and is capable of innocent uses. (*People v. Aguilar* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1023, 1028–1029 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 655, 945 P.2d 1204]; *People v. Godwin* (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1562, 1573–1574 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 545].)

If determining whether the item is an inherently deadly weapon requires resolution of a factual issue, give both bracketed instructions.

On request, give the bracketed sentence stating that the firearm need not be loaded.

The second sentence of the great bodily injury definition could result in error if the prosecution improperly argues great bodily injury may be shown by greater than minor injury alone. (Compare *People v. Medellin* (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 519, 533–535 [258 Cal.Rptr.3d 867] [the definition was reasonably susceptible to prosecutor’s erroneous argument that the injury need only be greater than minor] with *People v. Quinonez* (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 457, 466 [260 Cal.Rptr.3d 86] [upholding instructions containing great bodily injury definition as written].)

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 417(a)(1) & (2).
- Firearm Defined. Pen. Code, § 16520.
- Deadly Weapon Defined. *People v. Brown* (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1, 6–8 [147

Cal.Rptr.3d 848]; *People v. Aguilar* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1023, 1028–1029 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 655, 945 P.2d 1204].

- Victim’s Awareness of Firearm Not a Required Element. *People v. McKinzie* (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 789, 794 [224 Cal.Rptr. 891].
- Weapon Need Not Be Pointed Directly at Victim. *People v. Sanders* (1995) 11 Cal.4th 475, 542 [46 Cal.Rptr.2d 751, 905 P.2d 420].
- Inherently Deadly Defined. *People v. Perez* (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1055, 1065 [232 Cal.Rptr.3d 51, 416 P.3d 42]; *People v. Aguilar* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1023, 1028–1029 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 655, 945 P.2d 1204].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, §§ 4–7.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.01[1][e] (Matthew Bender).

**984. Brandishing Firearm: Misdemeanor—Public Place (Pen. Code, § 417(a)(2)(A))**

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If you find the defendant guilty of brandishing a firearm, you must then decide whether the People have proved the additional allegation that the defendant brandished a firearm that was capable of being concealed on the person while in a public place [in violation of Penal Code section 417(a)(2)(A)].

To prove this allegation, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant drew or exhibited a firearm that was capable of being concealed on the person;

AND

2. When the defendant did so, (he/she) was (in a public place in an incorporated city/ [or] on a public street).

A firearm *capable of being concealed on the person* is a firearm that has a barrel less than 16 inches in length. [A firearm *capable of being concealed on the person* also includes any device that has a barrel 16 inches or more in length that is designed to be interchanged with a barrel less than 16 inches in length.]

[As used here, a *public place* is a place that is open and accessible to anyone who wishes to go there.]

The People have the burden of proving this allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you must find that this allegation has not been proved.

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2012, March 2019*

**BENCH NOTES**

***Instructional Duty***

If the defendant is charged under Penal Code section 417(a)(2)(A), the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on this sentencing factor.

This instruction **must** be given with CALCRIM No. 983, *Brandishing Firearm or Deadly Weapon: Misdemeanor*.

The court must provide the jury with a verdict form on which the jury will indicate if the prosecution has or has not been proved this allegation.

Penal Code section 417(a)(2)(A) applies to a firearm that “is a pistol, revolver, or other firearm capable of being concealed upon the person.” Penal Code section 12001(a)(1) provides a single definition for this class of weapons. Thus, the committee has chosen to use solely the all-inclusive phrase “firearm capable of being concealed on the person.”

**AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 417(a)(2)(A).
- Firearm Capable of Being Concealed Defined. Pen. Code, § 16530.
- Public Place Defined. *In re Zorn* (1963) 59 Cal.2d 650, 652 [30 Cal.Rptr. 811, 381 P.2d 635]; *People v. Strider* (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1393, 1401 [100 Cal.Rptr. 3d 66].

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, § 4–7.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.01[1][d], [e] (Matthew Bender).

## 985. Brandishing Imitation Firearm (Pen. Code, § 417.4)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with brandishing an imitation firearm [in violation of Penal Code section 417.4].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant drew or exhibited an imitation firearm in a threatening manner against another person;
2. The defendant's act caused someone to fear bodily harm to himself or herself or someone else;

[AND]

3. That fear of harm was reasonable(;/.)

*<Give element 4 when instructing on self-defense or defense of another.>*

[AND]

4. When the defendant drew or exhibited the imitation firearm, (he/she) was not acting (in self-defense/ [or] in defense of someone else).]

*An imitation firearm* is a device[, or a toy gun, replica of a firearm, gun-shaped phone case, or BB device,] that is so substantially similar to a real firearm in color and overall appearance that a reasonable person would believe that it is a real firearm. [A *BB device* is an instrument that expels a projectile, such as a BB or other pellet, either 6 millimeters or 8 millimeters in caliber, through the force of air pressure, gas pressure, or spring action, or any spot marker gun that expels a projectile 10 millimeters or less in caliber.]

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2012, February 2016, September 2017*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If there is sufficient evidence of self-defense or defense of another, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense. Give bracketed element 4 and any appropriate defense instructions. (See CALCRIM Nos. 3470–3477.)

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 417.4.
- Imitation Firearm. Pen. Code, § 16700.

- BB Device Defined. Pen. Code, § 16250.
- Reasonable Person Must Be Placed in Fear. *In re Michael D.* (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 115, 124 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d 909].
- Person Placed in Fear May Be Bystander. *In re Michael D.* (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 115, 120–123 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d 909].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Reasonable Person Who Fears Harm May Be Bystander*

Penal Code section 417.4 requires not “only the presence of another person against whom the imitation firearm is displayed or exhibited, but also some person’s knowledge of, and a reaction to, the perpetrator’s action.” (*In re Michael D.* (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 115, 124 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d 909].) Thus, someone must be placed in fear as a result of the defendant’s conduct; however, this does not have to be the person against whom the object is exhibited. (*Id.* at pp. 120–123.) The term “reasonable person,” as used in the statute “refers to anyone who witnesses the actions of the perpetrator, not just to the person against whom the device is drawn or exhibited.” (*Id.* at p. 123.)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, § 5.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.01[1][e], [h] (Matthew Bender).

**986–999. Reserved for Future Use**





## SEX OFFENSES

### A. AGAINST ADULT OR MINOR

#### (i) Rape

- 1000. Rape or Spousal Rape by Force, Fear, or Threats (Pen. Code, § 261(a)(2), (6) & (7))
- 1001. Rape or Spousal Rape in Concert (Pen. Code, § 264.1)
- 1002. Rape of Intoxicated Woman or Spouse (Pen. Code, §§ 261(a)(3), 262(a)(2))
- 1003. Rape of Unconscious Woman or Spouse (Pen. Code, §§ 261(a)(4), 262(a)(3))
- 1004. Rape of a Disabled Woman (Pen. Code, § 261(a)(1))
- 1005. Rape by Fraud (Pen. Code, § 261(a)(5))
- 1006–1014. Reserved for Future Use

#### (ii) Oral Copulation

- 1015. Oral Copulation by Force, Fear, or Threats (Pen. Code, § 287(c)(2) & (3), (k))
- 1016. Oral Copulation in Concert (Pen. Code, § 287(d))
- 1017. Oral Copulation of an Intoxicated Person (Pen. Code, § 287(a), (i))
- 1018. Oral Copulation of an Unconscious Person (Pen. Code, § 287(a), (f))
- 1019. Oral Copulation of a Disabled Person (Pen. Code, § 287(a), (g))
- 1020. Oral Copulation of a Disabled Person in a Mental Hospital (Pen. Code, § 287(a), (h))
- 1021. Oral Copulation by Fraud (Pen. Code, § 287(a), (j))
- 1022. Oral Copulation While in Custody (Pen. Code, § 287(a), (e))
- 1023–1029. Reserved for Future Use

#### (iii) Sodomy

- 1030. Sodomy by Force, Fear, or Threats (Pen. Code, § 286(c)(2), (3), (k))
- 1031. Sodomy in Concert (Pen. Code, § 286(d))
- 1032. Sodomy of an Intoxicated Person (Pen. Code, § 286(i))
- 1033. Sodomy of an Unconscious Person (Pen. Code, § 286(f))
- 1034. Sodomy of a Disabled Person (Pen. Code, § 286(g))
- 1035. Sodomy of a Disabled Person in a Mental Hospital (Pen. Code, § 286(h))
- 1036. Sodomy by Fraud (Pen. Code, § 286(j))
- 1037. Sodomy While in Custody (Pen. Code, § 286(e))
- 1038–1044. Reserved for Future Use

#### (iv) Sexual Penetration

- 1045. Sexual Penetration by Force, Fear, or Threats (Pen. Code, § 289(a)(1), (2), (g))

- 1046. Sexual Penetration in Concert (Pen. Code, §§ 264.1, 289(a)(1))
- 1047. Sexual Penetration of an Intoxicated Person (Pen. Code, § 289(e))
- 1048. Sexual Penetration of an Unconscious Person (Pen. Code, § 289(d))
- 1049. Sexual Penetration of a Disabled Person (Pen. Code, § 289(b))
- 1050. Sexual Penetration of a Disabled Person in a Mental Hospital (Pen. Code, § 289(c))
- 1051. Sexual Penetration by Fraud (Pen. Code, § 289(f))
- 1052–1059. Reserved for Future Use

**(v) Lewd and Lascivious Act**

- 1060. Lewd or Lascivious Act: Dependent Person (Pen. Code, § 288(b)(2) & (c)(2))
- 1061–1069. Reserved for Future Use

**B. AGAINST MINORS ONLY**

**(i) Unlawful Sexual Intercourse**

- 1070. Unlawful Sexual Intercourse: Defendant 21 or Older (Pen. Code, § 261.5(a) & (d))
- 1071. Unlawful Sexual Intercourse: Minor More Than Three Years Younger (Pen. Code, § 261.5(a) & (c))
- 1072. Misdemeanor Unlawful Sexual Intercourse: Minor Within Three Years of Defendant's Age (Pen. Code, § 261.5(a) & (b))
- 1073–1079. Reserved for Future Use

**(ii) Oral Copulation**

- 1080. Oral Copulation With Person Under 14 (Pen. Code, § 287(c)(1))
- 1081. Oral Copulation With Minor: Defendant 21 or Older (Pen. Code, § 287(b)(2))
- 1082. Oral Copulation With Person Under 18 (Pen. Code, § 287(b)(1))
- 1083–1089. Reserved for Future Use

**(iii) Sodomy**

- 1090. Sodomy With Person Under 14 (Pen. Code, § 286(c)(1))
- 1091. Sodomy With Minor: Defendant 21 or Older (Pen. Code, § 286(b)(2))
- 1092. Sodomy With Person Under 18 (Pen. Code, § 286(b)(1))
- 1093–1099. Reserved for Future Use

**(iv) Sexual Penetration**

- 1100. Sexual Penetration With Person Under 14 (Pen. Code, § 289(j))
- 1101. Sexual Penetration With Minor: Defendant 21 or Older (Pen. Code, § 289(i))
- 1102. Sexual Penetration With Person Under 18 (Pen. Code, § 289(h))
- 1103–1109. Reserved for Future Use

## SEX OFFENSES

### (v) Lewd And Lascivious Act

- 1110. Lewd or Lascivious Act: Child Under 14 Years (Pen. Code, § 288(a))
- 1111. Lewd or Lascivious Act: By Force or Fear (Pen. Code, § 288(b)(1))
- 1112. Lewd or Lascivious Act: Child 14 or 15 Years (Pen. Code, § 288(c)(1))
- 1113–1119. Reserved for Future Use

### (vi) Other Offenses

- 1120. Continuous Sexual Abuse (Pen. Code, § 288.5(a))
- 1121. Annoying or Molesting a Child in a Dwelling (Pen. Code, § 647.6(a)–(c))
- 1122. Annoying or Molesting a Child (Pen. Code, § 647.6(a)–(c))
- 1123. Aggravated Sexual Assault of Child Under 14 Years (Pen. Code, § 269(a))
- 1124. Contacting Minor With Intent to Commit Certain Felonies (Pen. Code, § 288.3(a))
- 1125. Arranging Meeting With Minor for Lewd Purpose (Pen. Code, § 288.4(a)(1))
- 1126. Going to Meeting With Minor for Lewd Purpose (Pen. Code, § 288.4(b))
- 1127. Engaging in Sexual Intercourse or Sodomy With Child 10 Years of Age or Younger (Pen. Code, § 288.7(a))
- 1128. Engaging in Oral Copulation or Sexual Penetration With Child 10 Years of Age or Younger (Pen. Code, § 288.7(b))
- 1129–1139. Reserved for Future Use

## C. OTHER SEX RELATED OFFENSES

### (i) Obscene or Harmful Matter

- 1140. Distributing, Sending, or Exhibiting Harmful Material (Pen. Code, § 288.2(a)(1) & (2))
- 1141. Distributing Obscene Matter Showing Sexual Conduct by a Minor (Pen. Code, §§ 311.1(a), 311.2(b))
- 1142. Distributing or Intending to Distribute Obscene Material (Pen. Code, § 311.2(a))
- 1143. Obscene Live Conduct (Pen. Code, § 311.6)
- 1144. Using a Minor to Perform Prohibited Acts (Pen. Code, § 311.4(b), (c))
- 1145. Possession of Matter Depicting Minor Engaged in Sexual Conduct (Pen. Code, § 311.11(a))
- 1146–1149. Reserved for Future Use

### (ii) Pimping, Pandering, Prostitution

- 1150. Pimping (Pen. Code, § 266h)
- 1151. Pandering (Pen. Code, § 266i)
- 1152. Child Procurement (Pen. Code, § 266j)
- 1153. Prostitution: Engaging in Act (Pen. Code, § 647(b))
- 1154. Prostitution: Soliciting Another (Pen. Code, § 647(b))
- 1155. Prostitution: Agreeing to Engage in Act (Pen. Code, § 647(b))

1156. Loitering: For Prostitution (Pen. Code, § 653.22(a))

1157–1159. Reserved for Future Use

**(iii) Conduct in Public**

1160. Indecent Exposure (Pen. Code, § 314)

1161. Lewd Conduct in Public (Pen. Code, § 647(a))

1162. Soliciting Lewd Conduct in Public (Pen. Code, § 647(a))

1163–1169. Reserved for Future Use

**(iv) Failure to Register**

1170. Failure to Register as Sex Offender (Pen. Code, § 290(b))

1171–1179. Reserved for Future Use

**(v) Other Offenses**

1180. Incest (Pen. Code, § 285)

1181. Sexual Abuse of Animal (Pen. Code, §§ 286.5, 597f)

1182–1189. Reserved for Future Use

**D. EVIDENCE**

1190. Other Evidence Not Required to Support Testimony in Sex Offense Case

1191A. Evidence of Uncharged Sex Offense

1191B. Evidence of Charged Sex Offense

1192. Testimony on Rape Trauma Syndrome

1193. Testimony on Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome

1194. Consent: Prior Sexual Intercourse

1195–1199. Reserved for Future Use

## A. AGAINST ADULT OR MINOR

### (i) Rape

#### 1000. Rape or Spousal Rape by Force, Fear, or Threats (Pen. Code, § 261(a)(2), (6) & (7))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with rape [of his wife] by force [in violation of Penal Code section 261(a)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant had sexual intercourse with a woman;
2. He and the woman were (not married/married) to each other at the time of the intercourse;
3. The woman did not consent to the intercourse;

AND

4. The defendant accomplished the intercourse by

*<Alternative 4A—force or fear>*

[force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury to the woman or to someone else.]

*<Alternative 4B—future threats of bodily harm>*

[threatening to retaliate in the future against the woman or someone else when there was a reasonable possibility that the defendant would carry out the threat. A *threat to retaliate* is a threat to kidnap, falsely imprison, or inflict extreme pain, serious bodily injury, or death.]

*<Alternative 4C—threat of official action>*

[threatening to use the authority of a public office to incarcerate, arrest, or deport someone. A *public official* is a person employed by federal, state, or local government who has authority to incarcerate, arrest, or deport. The woman must have reasonably believed that the defendant was a public official even if he was not.]

*Sexual intercourse* means any penetration, no matter how slight, of the vagina or genitalia by the penis. [Ejaculation is not required.]

[To *consent*, a woman must act freely and voluntarily and know the nature of the act.]

[A woman who initially consents to an act of intercourse may change her

mind during the act. If she does so, under the law, the act of intercourse is then committed without her consent if:

1. She communicated through words or acts to the defendant that she no longer consented to the act of intercourse;
2. A reasonable person would have understood that her words or acts expressed her lack of consent;

AND

3. The defendant forcibly continued the act of intercourse despite her objection.]

[It is not required that she physically resist or fight back in order to communicate her lack of consent.]

[Evidence that the defendant and the woman (dated/were married/had been married) is not enough by itself to constitute consent.]

[Evidence that the woman (requested/suggested/communicated) that the defendant use a condom or other birth control device is not enough by itself to constitute consent.]

[Intercourse is *accomplished by force* if a person uses enough physical force to overcome the woman's will.]

[*Duress* means a direct or implied threat of force, violence, danger, or retribution that would cause a reasonable person to do [or submit to] something that she would not do [or submit to] otherwise. When deciding whether the act was accomplished by duress, consider all the circumstances, including the woman's age and her relationship to the defendant.]

[*Retribution* is a form of payback or revenge.]

[*Menace* means a threat, statement, or act showing an intent to injure someone.]

[Intercourse is *accomplished by fear* if the woman is actually and reasonably afraid [or she is actually but unreasonably afraid and the defendant knows of her fear and takes advantage of it].]

[A woman must be alive at the time of the sexual intercourse for the crime of rape to occur.]

<*Defense: Reasonable Belief in Consent*>

[The defendant is not guilty of rape if he actually and reasonably believed that the woman consented to the intercourse [and actually and reasonably believed that she consented throughout the act of intercourse]. The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not actually and reasonably

**believe that the woman consented. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty.]**

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2013, February 2014*

## BENCH NOTES

### ***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of rape or spousal rape. If spousal rape is charged, the court must include the appropriate bracketed language throughout the instruction to indicate that the parties were married.

The court should select the appropriate alternative in element 4 describing how the sexual intercourse was allegedly accomplished.

Rape requires that the victim be alive at the moment of intercourse. (*People v. Ramirez* (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1158, 1175–1177 [270 Cal.Rptr. 286, 791 P.2d 965]; *People v. Carpenter* (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 391 [63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708].) Intercourse with a deceased victim may constitute attempted rape if the defendant intended to rape a live victim. (*People v. Kelly* (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 524–526 [3 Cal.Rptr.2d 677, 822 P.2d 385].) If this is an issue in the case, give the bracketed sentence that begins with “A woman must be alive . . .”

The defendant must continue to actually and reasonably believe in the victim’s consent throughout the act. If the act of intercourse begins consensually and the victim then changes her mind, the victim must clearly and unequivocally communicate to the defendant her withdrawal of consent to the act. If, however, the defendant initiates the use of nonconsensual duress, menace, or force during the act, the victim’s subsequent withdrawal of consent to the act may be inferred from the circumstances and need not be expressed. (*People v. Ireland* (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 328, 338 [114 Cal.Rptr.3d 915]). If there is an issue regarding the defendant’s continued belief in the victim’s consent, give the second optional first sentence in the definition of “*Defense: Reasonable Belief in Consent*.”

### ***Defenses—Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense of reasonable belief in consent if there is “substantial evidence of equivocal conduct that would have led a defendant to reasonably and in good faith believe consent existed where it did not.” (See *People v. Williams* (1992) 4 Cal.4th 354, 362 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 441, 841 P.2d 961]; *People v. Mayberry* (1975) 15 Cal.3d 143, 153–158 [125 Cal.Rptr. 745, 542 P.2d 1337].)

### ***Related Instructions***

CALCRIM No. 1001, *Rape or Spousal Rape in Concert*, may be given in conjunction with this instruction, if appropriate.

## AUTHORITY

### *Rape:*

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 261(a)(2), (6) & (7).
- Consent Defined. Pen. Code, §§ 261.6, 261.7.
- Duress Defined. Pen. Code, § 261(b).
- Menace Defined. Pen. Code, § 261(c).
- Penetration Defined. Pen. Code, § 263; *People v. Karsai* (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 224, 233–234 [182 Cal.Rptr. 406], disapproved on other grounds by *People v. Jones* (1988) 46 Cal.3d 585, 600 [250 Cal.Rptr. 635, 758 P.2d 1165].
- Fear Defined. *People v. Iniguez* (1994) 7 Cal.4th 847, 856–857 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 258, 872 P.2d 1183] [level of fear].
- Force Defined. *People v. Griffin* (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1015, 1023–1024 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 891, 94 P.3d 1089].
- Mistake of Fact Regarding Consent. *People v. Mayberry, supra*, 15 Cal.3d at pp. 153–158; *People v. May* (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 118, 124 [261 Cal.Rptr. 502].
- Circumstances Requiring *Mayberry* Instruction. *People v. Dominguez* (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1141 [47 Cal.Rptr.3d 575, 140 P.3d 866].
- Withdrawal of Consent. *In re John Z.* (2003) 29 Cal.4th 756, 760 [128 Cal.Rptr.2d 783, 60 P.3d 183].
- Inferring Lack of Consent From Circumstances. *People v. Ireland* (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 328, 338 [114 Cal.Rptr.3d 915].
- Victim Need Not Resist. *People v. Barnes* (1986) 42 Cal.3d 284, 297–302 [228 Cal.Rptr. 228, 721 P.2d 110].

### *Spousal Rape:*

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 262(a)(1), (4) & (5).
- Duress Defined. Pen. Code, § 262(b).
- Menace Defined. Pen. Code, § 261(c).
- Mistake of Fact Regarding Consent. *People v. Burnham* (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 1134, 1148–1149 [222 Cal.Rptr. 630, 542 P.2d 1337]; see *People v. Mayberry, supra*, 15 Cal.3d at pp. 153–158; *People v. May* (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 118, 124 [261 Cal.Rptr. 502].

## COMMENTARY

Gender-specific language is used because rape usually occurs between a man and a woman. In keeping with plain English principles, the committee used those terms to make the instruction clear and concrete.

Penal Code section 262 requires that the intercourse be “against the person’s [or victim’s] will.” (Pen. Code, § 262(a)(1), (4) & (5).) “Against the will” has been



defined as without consent. (*People v. Key* (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 888, 895 [203 Cal.Rptr. 144]; see also *People v. Young* (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 248, 257 [235 Cal.Rptr. 361].)

“[T]he offense of forcible rape occurs when, during apparently consensual intercourse, the victim expresses an objection and attempts to stop the act and the defendant forcibly continues despite the objection . . . ‘[I]t is immaterial at what point the victim withdraws her consent, so long as that withdrawal is communicated to the male and he thereafter ignores it.’ ” (*In re John Z.*, *supra*, 29 Cal.4th at p. 760.)

The instruction includes definitions of “duress,” “menace,” and the sufficiency of “fear” because those terms have meanings in the context of rape that are technical and may not be readily apparent to jurors. (See Pen. Code, §§ 262(b) [duress] and (c) [menace]; *People v. Iniguez*, *supra*, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 856–857 [fear].)

The term “force” as used in the rape statutes does not have a specialized meaning and court is not required to define the term *sua sponte*. (*People v. Griffin*, *supra*, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 1023–1024.) In *People v. Griffin*, the Supreme Court further stated,

Nor is there anything in the common usage definitions of the term “force,” or in the express statutory language of section 261 itself, that suggests force in a forcible rape prosecution actually means force “*substantially* different from or *substantially* greater than” the physical force normally inherent in an act of consensual sexual intercourse. [*People v. Cicero* (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 465, 474 [204 Cal.Rptr. 582].] To the contrary, it has long been recognized that “in order to establish force within the meaning of section 261, subdivision (2), the prosecution need only show the defendant used physical force of a degree sufficient to support a finding that the act of sexual intercourse was against the will of the [victim].” (*People v. Young* (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 248, 257–258 [235 Cal.Rptr. 361] . . . .)

(*Ibid.* [emphasis in original].)

The committee has provided a bracketed definition of “force,” consistent with *People v. Griffin*, *supra*, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 1023–1024, that the court may give on request.

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Assault. Pen. Code, § 240.
- Assault With Intent to Commit Rape. Pen. Code, § 220; *In re Jose M.* (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1477 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 55]; *People v. Moran* (1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 724, 730 [109 Cal.Rptr. 287] [where forcible rape is charged].
- Attempted Rape. Pen. Code, §§ 663, 261.
- Attempted Spousal Rape. Pen. Code, §§ 663, 262.
- Battery. Pen. Code, § 242; *People v. Guitierrez* (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1624, 1636 [284 Cal.Rptr. 230], disapproved on other grounds in *People v. Cromer* (2001) 24 Cal.4th 889, 901, fn. 3 [103 Cal.Rptr.2d 23, 15 P.3d 243]; but see

*People v. Marshall* (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 38–39 [61 Cal.Rptr.2d 84, 931 P.2d 262] [battery not a lesser included of attempted rape].

## RELATED ISSUES

### ***Consent Obtained by Fraudulent Representation***

A person may also induce someone else to consent to engage in sexual intercourse by a false or fraudulent representation made with an intent to create fear, and which does induce fear and would cause a reasonable person to act contrary to his or her free will. (Pen. Code, § 266c.) While section 266c requires coercion and fear to obtain consent, it does not involve physical force or violence. (See *People v. Cardenas* (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 927, 937–938 [26 Cal.Rptr.2d 567] [rejecting defendant’s argument that certain acts were consensual and without physical force, and were only violations of section 266c].)

### ***Minor Victim and Unanimity***

“Generic testimony” by a victim who was 15 and 16 years old does not deprive a defendant of a due process right to defend against the charges. If the victim “specifies the type of conduct involved, its frequency, and that the conduct occurred during the limitation period, nothing more is required to establish the substantiality of the victim’s testimony.” (*People v. Matute* (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1437, 1446 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 472] [affirming conviction for multiple counts of rape under Pen. Code, § 261(a)(2); citing *People v. Jones* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 316 [270 Cal.Rptr. 611, 792 P.2d 643]].)

When there is no reasonable likelihood the jury will disagree on particular acts of molestation, and the only question is whether or not the defendant in fact committed all of them, the jury should be given a modified unanimity instruction which, in addition to allowing a conviction if the jurors unanimously agree on specific acts, also allows a conviction if the jury unanimously agrees the defendant committed all the acts described by the victim. (*People v. Matute, supra*, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 1448; *People v. Jones, supra*, 51 Cal.3d at pp. 321–322; see CALCRIM No. 3501, *Unanimity: When Generic Testimony of Offense Presented.*)

### ***Mistake-of-Fact Defense and Developmental Disability***

A defendant cannot base a reasonable-belief-of-consent defense on the fact that he is developmentally disabled and, as a result, did not act as a reasonable person would have acted. (*People v. Castillo* (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 119, 124–125 [238 Cal.Rptr. 207].)

### ***Multiple Rapes***

A penetration, however slight, completes the crime of rape; therefore a separate conviction is proper for each penetration that occurs. (*People v. Harrison* (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 329–334 [256 Cal.Rptr. 401, 768 P.2d 1078].)

### ***Resistance Is Not Required***

Resistance by the victim is not required for rape; any instruction to that effect is erroneous. (*People v. Barnes, supra*, 42 Cal.3d at pp. 292, 302.)

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Sex Offenses and Crimes Against Decency, §§ 1–15, 20, 178.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, §§ 142.20[1][a], [2], 142.23[1][e] (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure §§ 12:16, 12:17 (The Rutter Group).

## 1001. Rape or Spousal Rape in Concert (Pen. Code, § 264.1)

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**The defendant[s]** [\_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] if not all defendants in trial charged with this count>] **(is/are) charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with committing rape by acting in concert [with \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] or description[s] of uncharged participant[s]>] [in violation of Penal Code section 264.1].**

**To prove that a defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:**

<Alternative A—defendant committed rape>

**[1.] [The defendant personally committed forcible rape and voluntarily acted with someone else who aided and abetted its commission(;/.)]**

**[OR]**

<Alternative B—defendant aided and abetted>

**[(1/2).] [The defendant voluntarily aided and abetted someone else who personally committed forcible rape.]**

**To decide whether the defendant[s] [or \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] or description[s] of uncharged participant[s]>] committed rape, please refer to the separate instructions that I (will give/have given) you on that crime. To decide whether the defendant[s] [or \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] or description[s] of uncharged participant[s]>] aided and abetted rape, please refer to the separate instructions that I (will give/have given) you on aiding and abetting. You must apply those instructions when you decide whether the People have proved rape in concert.**

<Make certain that all appropriate instructions on rape and aiding and abetting are given.>

**[To prove the crime of rape in concert, the People do not have to prove a prearranged plan or scheme to commit rape.]**

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*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime. (See Pen. Code, § 264.1; *People v. Ramirez* (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 603, 621 [236 Cal.Rptr. 404] [rape in concert is a separate crime, not an enhancement].) The court also has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on rape. Give one or more of the following instructions defining rape: CALCRIM No. 1000, or CALCRIM Nos. 1005–1114.

Select alternative A or B, or both, depending on whether the defendant personally committed the crime or aided and abetted someone else.

Depending on the evidence, give the final bracketed paragraph on request regarding the lack of a prearranged plan. (See *People v. Calimee* (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 337, 341–342 [122 Cal.Rptr. 658].)

### ***Related Instructions***

See generally CALCRIM No. 400, *Aiding and Abetting: General Principles* and CALCRIM No. 401, *Aiding and Abetting: Intended Crimes*.

## **AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 264.1; see *People v. Mom* (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1224 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 172] [requires no greater force than that necessary for forcible rape], disapproved on other grounds in *People v. Griffin* (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1015, 1028 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 891, 94 P.3d 1089].
- Forcible Rape Defined. Pen. Code, § 261(a)(2).
- Spousal Rape Defined. Pen. Code, § 262(a)(1).
- Aiding and Abetting. *People v. Adams* (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 412, 445–446 [23 Cal.Rptr.2d 512]; see *People v. Beeman* (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 560–561 [199 Cal.Rptr. 60, 674 P.2d 1318].

## **COMMENTARY**

There is conflicting authority whether all types of forcible rape may be the basis for charging a rape in concert. (Compare *In re Jose M.* (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1477 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 55] [rape by duress, menace, and fear unavailable under Pen. Code, § 264.1] and *People v. Mom* (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1222–1223 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 172] [§ 264.1 only includes rape involving “force” and “violence”], disapproved on other grounds in *People v. Griffin* (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1015, 1028 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 891, 94 P.3d 1089], with *People v. Wheeler* (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 902, 907 [139 Cal.Rptr. 737] [§ 264.1 includes any unlawful use of force, including threat of harm].) The instruction addresses rape accomplished by force or violence. (See Pen. Code, §§ 261(a)(2), 264.1.) If another basis for charging rape in concert is argued, for example, rape by duress, menace, fear, or threats (see Pen. Code, § 261(a)(2), (6), & (7)), see CALCRIM No. 1000, *Rape or Spousal Rape by Force, Fear, or Threats* for appropriate language that may be included on request.

Penal Code section 264.1 deals with a crime of substance, and is not an enhancement statute, as discussed in *People v. Best* (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 232, 237 [191 Cal.Rptr. 614].

## **LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES**

- Assault. Pen. Code, § 240.
- Assault With Intent to Commit Rape. Pen. Code, § 220; *In re Jose M.* (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1477 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 55]; *People v. Moran* (1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 724, 730 [109 Cal.Rptr. 287] [where forcible rape is charged].

- Attempted Rape. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 261.
- Battery. Pen. Code, § 242.
- Rape. Pen. Code, §§ 261, 262.

## RELATED ISSUES

### *Need Not Personally Participate*

A defendant may be convicted of rape in concert if he or she was at the general scene of the rape and aided and abetted another person in accomplishing the act, even if the defendant did not personally participate in the act or was not personally present at the exact scene of the act. (See *People v. Lopez* (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 882, 887–888 [172 Cal.Rptr. 374]; *People v. Barnett* (1976) 54 Cal.App.3d 1046, 1049 [127 Cal.Rptr. 88] [oral copulation in concert although not in room when act took place]; *People v. Champion* (1995) 9 Cal.4th 879, 933 [39 Cal.Rptr.2d 547] [rape in concert by holding victim’s family at gun point in another room].)

However, the Supreme Court has not resolved whether a person acts in concert when his accomplice assists in the commission of the crime, but is not present at the general scene (for example, when the accomplice provides the rapist with information about the victim, or pays the rapist to commit the act). (*People v. Champion* (1995) 9 Cal.4th 879, 933, fn. 22 [891 P.2d 93].)

## SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Sex Offenses and Crimes Against Decency, § 21.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.20[1][a], [2][c] (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure §§ 12:16, 12:17 (The Rutter Group).

**1002. Rape of Intoxicated Woman or Spouse (Pen. Code,  
§§ 261(a)(3), 262(a)(2))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with raping (a woman/his wife) while she was intoxicated [in violation of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert appropriate code section[s]>].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant had sexual intercourse with a woman;
2. He and the woman were (not married/married) to each other at the time of the intercourse;
3. The effect of (a/an) (intoxicating/anesthetic/controlled) substance prevented the woman from resisting;

AND

4. The defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the effect of (a/an) (intoxicating/anesthetic/controlled) substance prevented the woman from resisting.

*Sexual intercourse* means any penetration, no matter how slight, of the vagina or genitalia by the penis. [Ejaculation is not required.]

A person is *prevented from resisting* if he or she is so intoxicated that he or she cannot give legal consent. In order to give legal consent, a person must be able to exercise reasonable judgment. In other words, the person must be able to understand and weigh the physical nature of the act, its moral character, and probable consequences. Legal consent is consent given freely and voluntarily by someone who knows the nature of the act involved.

[\_\_\_\_\_ <If appropriate, insert controlled substance> (is/are) [a] controlled substance[s].]

<Defense: Reasonable Belief Capable of Consent>

[The defendant is not guilty of this crime if he actually and reasonably believed that the woman was capable of consenting to sexual intercourse, even if that belief was wrong. The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not actually and reasonably believe that the woman was capable of consenting. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty.]

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

A space is provided to identify controlled substances, if the parties agree.

### *Defenses—Instructional Duty*

There is no sua sponte duty to instruct on the defense of reasonable belief that the person was capable of consent. (*People v. Lujano* (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 187 [223 Cal.Rptr.3d 105].)

### *Related Instructions*

CALCRIM No. 1001, *Rape or Spousal Rape in Concert*, may be given in conjunction with this instruction, if appropriate.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 261(a)(3), 262(a)(2).
- Consent Defined. Pen. Code, § 261.6.
- Controlled Substances. Health & Safety Code, §§ 11054–11058; see *People v. Avila* (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 791, 798, fn. 7 [95 Cal.Rptr.2d 651].
- Penetration Defined. Pen. Code, § 263; *People v. Karsai* (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 224, 233–234 [182 Cal.Rptr. 406], disapproved on other grounds by *People v. Jones* (1988) 46 Cal.3d 585, 600 [250 Cal.Rptr. 635, 758 P.2d 1165].
- Anesthetic Effect. See *People v. Avila* (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 791, 798–799 [95 Cal.Rptr.2d 651] [in context of sodomy].
- General Intent and Knowledge Requirements. *People v. Linwood* (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 59, 67–72 [129 Cal.Rptr.2d 73] [statute is not impermissibly vague and uses appropriate criminal negligence standard].
- “Prevented From Resisting” Defined. *People v. Lujano* (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 187, 192–193 [223 Cal.Rptr.3d 105] [CALCRIM 1032 has correct definition]; *People v. Giardino* (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 454, 465–466 [98 Cal.Rptr.2d 315].
- Reasonable Belief in Capacity to Consent. *People v. Lujano* (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 187, 191–192 [223 Cal.Rptr.3d 105]; *People v. Giardino* (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 454, 471–472 [98 Cal.Rptr.2d 315].
- This Instruction Upheld. *People v. Smith* (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 199, 204–205 [120 Cal.Rptr.3d 52].

## COMMENTARY

Gender-specific language is used because rape usually occurs between a man and a woman. In keeping with plain English principles, the committee used those terms to make the instruction clear and concrete.

## LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Attempted Rape. Pen. Code, §§ 663, 261(a)(3).



- Attempted Rape of Intoxicated Spouse. Pen. Code, §§ 663, 262(a)(2).
- Assault. Pen. Code, § 240.
- Battery. Pen. Code, § 242; *People v. Guitierrez* (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1624, 1636 [284 Cal.Rptr. 230], disapproved on other grounds in *People v. Cromer* (2001) 24 Cal.4th 889, 901, fn. 3 [103 Cal.Rptr.2d 23, 15 P.3d 243]; but see *People v. Marshall* (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 38–39 [61 Cal.Rptr.2d 84, 931 P.2d 262] [battery not a lesser included offense of attempted rape].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Administering Drugs to Assist Commission of Felony*

A person who administers to someone else any chloroform, ether, laudanum, or any controlled substance, anesthetic, or intoxicating agent, with the intent to enable or assist himself or herself or any other person to commit a felony is guilty of a felony. (Pen. Code, § 222.)

See the Related Issues section to CALCRIM No. 1000, *Rape or Spousal Rape by Force, Fear, or Threats*.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

6 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Sex Offenses and Crimes Against Decency, §§ 1–8, 18, 20, 178.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, §§ 142.20[1][a], [5], 142.23[1][e] (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure §§ 12:16, 12:17 (The Rutter Group).

**1003. Rape of Unconscious Woman or Spouse (Pen. Code,  
§§ 261(a)(4), 262(a)(3))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with raping (a woman/his wife) who was unconscious of the nature of the act [in violation of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert appropriate code section[s]>].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant had sexual intercourse with a woman;
2. He and the woman were (not married/married) to each other at the time of the intercourse;
3. The woman was unable to resist because she was unconscious of the nature of the act;

AND

4. The defendant knew that the woman was unable to resist because she was unconscious of the nature of the act.

*Sexual intercourse* means any penetration, no matter how slight, of the vagina or genitalia by the penis. [Ejaculation is not required.]

A woman is *unconscious of the nature of the act* if she is (unconscious or asleep/ [or] not aware that the act is occurring/ [or] not aware of the essential characteristics of the act because the perpetrator tricked, lied to, or concealed information from her/ [or] not aware of the essential characteristics of the act because the perpetrator fraudulently represented that the sexual penetration served a professional purpose when it served no professional purpose).

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2012, August 2013*

**BENCH NOTES**

***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If spousal rape is charged, include the appropriate language throughout the instruction to indicate that the parties were married.

Select the appropriate language defining “unconscious of the nature of the act” based on the facts of the case.

***Related Instructions***

CALCRIM No. 1001, *Rape or Spousal Rape in Concert*, may be given in conjunction with this instruction, if appropriate.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 261(a)(4), 262(a)(3).
- Penetration Defined. Pen. Code, § 263; *People v. Karsai* (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 224, 233–234 [182 Cal.Rptr. 406], disapproved on other grounds by *People v. Jones* (1988) 46 Cal.3d 585, 600 [250 Cal.Rptr. 635, 758 P.2d 1165].
- Unconscious of Nature of Act. *People v. Howard* (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 53, 55 [172 Cal.Rptr. 539] [total unconsciousness is not required]; see *Boro v. Superior Court* (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 1224, 1229–1231 [210 Cal.Rptr. 122] [rape victim not unconscious of nature of act; fraud in the inducement].
- Assault. Pen. Code, § 240.
- Battery. Pen. Code, § 242; *People v. Guitierrez* (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1624, 1636 [284 Cal.Rptr. 230], disapproved on other grounds in *People v. Cromer* (2001) 24 Cal.4th 889, 901, fn. 3 [103 Cal.Rptr.2d 23, 15 P.3d 243]; but see *People v. Marshall* (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 38–39 [61 Cal.Rptr.2d 84, 931 P.2d 262] [battery not a lesser included offense of attempted rape].
- Perpetrator Must Impersonate Spouse of Married Woman Under Current Statute. *People v. Morales* (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 583, 594–595 [150 Cal.Rptr.3d 920].

## COMMENTARY

The statutory language describing unconsciousness includes “was not aware, knowing, perceiving, or cognizant that the act occurred.” (See Pen. Code, §§ 261(a)(4)(B)–(D), 262(a)(3)(B), (C).) The committee did not discern any difference among the statutory terms and therefore used “aware” in the instruction. If there is an issue over a particular term, that term should be inserted in the instruction.

Gender-specific language is used because rape usually occurs between a man and a woman. In keeping with plain English principles, the committee used those terms to make the instruction clear and concrete.

## LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Attempted Rape of Unconscious Woman. Pen. Code, §§ 663, 261(a)(4).
- Attempted Rape of Unconscious Spouse. Pen. Code, §§ 663, 262(a)(3).

## RELATED ISSUES

### *Advance Consent*

Neither a woman’s actual “advance consent” nor a man’s belief in “advance consent” eliminates the wrongfulness of a man’s conduct in knowingly depriving an unconscious woman of her freedom of choice both at the initiation of and during sexual intercourse. A person who commits the prohibited act necessarily acts with a wrongful intent. (*People v. Dancy* (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 21, 37 [124 Cal.Rptr.2d 898].)

See the Related Issues section in CALCRIM No. 1000, *Rape or Spousal Rape by Force, Fear, or Threats*.

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Sex Offenses and Crimes Against Decency, §§ 1–8, 178.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.20[1][a], [5] (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, *Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure* §§ 12:16, 12:17 (The Rutter Group).

## 1004. Rape of a Disabled Woman (Pen. Code, § 261(a)(1))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with raping a mentally or physically disabled woman [in violation of Penal Code section 261(a)(1)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant had sexual intercourse with a woman;
2. He and the woman were not married to each other at the time of the intercourse;
3. The woman had a (mental disorder/developmental or physical disability) that prevented her from legally consenting;

AND

4. The defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the woman had a (mental disorder/developmental or physical disability) that prevented her from legally consenting.

*Sexual intercourse* means any penetration, no matter how slight, of the vagina or genitalia by the penis. [Ejaculation is not required.]

A woman is *prevented from legally consenting* if she is unable to understand the act, its nature, and possible consequences.

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2012*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

#### *Related Instructions*

CALCRIM No. 1001, *Rape or Spousal Rape in Concert*, may be given in conjunction with this instruction, if appropriate.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 261(a)(1).
- Consent Defined. Pen. Code, § 261.6; *People v. Boggs* (1930) 107 Cal.App. 492, 495–496 [290 P. 618].
- Penetration Defined. Pen. Code, § 263; *People v. Karsai* (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 224, 233–234 [182 Cal.Rptr. 406], disapproved on other grounds by *People v. Jones* (1988) 46 Cal.3d 585, 600 [250 Cal.Rptr. 635, 758 P.2d 1165].
- Assault. Pen. Code, § 240.

- Battery. Pen. Code, § 242; *People v. Guitierrez* (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1624, 1636 [284 Cal.Rptr. 230], disapproved on other grounds in *People v. Cromer* (2001) 24 Cal.4th 889, 901, fn. 3 [103 Cal.Rptr.2d 23, 15 P.3d 243]; but see *People v. Marshall* (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 38–39 [61 Cal.Rptr.2d 84, 931 P.2d 262] [battery not a lesser included offense of attempted rape].
- This Instruction Completely Explains Inability to Give Legal Consent. *People v. Miranda* (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1419, fn. 13 [132 Cal.Rptr.3d 315] [in dicta].

### COMMENTARY

Gender-specific language is used because rape usually occurs between a man and a woman. In keeping with plain English principles, the committee used those terms to make the instruction clear and concrete.

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Attempted Rape. Pen. Code, §§ 663, 261.

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *No Duty to Define “Developmental Disability”*

There is no sua sponte duty to define “developmental disability” under Welfare and Institutions Code section 4512(a) or Penal Code section 1370.1(a)(1). The Legislature did not intend to limit this phrase to such technical medical or legal definitions, although a pinpoint instruction may be requested if it helps the jury in any particular case. (*People v. Mobley* (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 761, 781–783 [85 Cal.Rptr.2d 474] [in context of oral copulation].)

See the Related Issues section under CALCRIM No. 1000, *Rape or Spousal Rape by Force, Fear, or Threats*.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Sex Offenses and Crimes Against Decency, §§ 1–8, 19, 178.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.20[1][a], [5] (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, *Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure* §§ 12:16, 12:17 (The Rutter Group).

## 1005. Rape by Fraud (Pen. Code, § 261(a)(5))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with rape by fraud [in violation of Penal Code section 261(a)(5)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant had sexual intercourse with a woman;
2. The defendant and the woman were not married to each other at the time of the intercourse;
3. The woman submitted to the intercourse because she believed the defendant was someone she knew, other than the defendant;

AND

4. The defendant tricked her, lied to her, [used an artifice or pretense,] or concealed information from her, intending to make her believe he was someone she knew, while intending to hide his own identity.

*Sexual intercourse* means any penetration, no matter how slight, of the vagina or genitalia by the penis. [Ejaculation is not required.]

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2015*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

Penal Code section 261(a)(5) was amended effective September 9, 2013, in response to *People v. Morales* (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 583 [150 Cal.Rptr.3d 920].

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 261(a)(5).
- Penetration Defined. Pen. Code, § 263; *People v. Karsai* (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 224, 233–234 [182 Cal.Rptr. 406], disapproved on other grounds by *People v. Jones* (1988) 46 Cal.3d 585, 600 [250 Cal.Rptr. 635, 758 P.2d 1165].

### COMMENTARY

Gender-specific language is used because rape usually occurs between a man and a woman. In keeping with plain English principles, the committee used those terms to make the instruction clear and concrete.

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Attempted Rape. Pen. Code, §§ 663, 261.

**RELATED ISSUES**

See the Related Issues section to CALCRIM No. 1000, *Rape or Spousal Rape by Force, Fear, or Threats*.

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Sex Offenses and Crimes Against Decency, §§ 16–17.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.20[1][a], [6] (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure §§ 12:16, 12:17 (The Rutter Group).

**1006–1014. Reserved for Future Use**



## (ii) Oral Copulation

### 1015. Oral Copulation by Force, Fear, or Threats (Pen. Code, § 287(c)(2) & (3), (k))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with oral copulation by force [in violation of Penal Code section 287].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant committed an act of oral copulation with someone else;
2. The other person did not consent to the act;

AND

3. The defendant accomplished the act by

<Alternative 3A—force or fear>

[force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury to someone.]

<Alternative 3B—future threats of bodily harm>

[threatening to retaliate against someone when there was a reasonable possibility that the threat would be carried out. A *threat to retaliate* is a threat to kidnap, unlawfully restrain or confine, or inflict extreme pain, serious bodily injury, or death.]

<Alternative 3C—threat of official action>

[threatening to use the authority of a public office to incarcerate, arrest, or deport someone. A *public official* is a person employed by a government agency who has the authority to incarcerate, arrest, or deport. The other person must have reasonably believed that the defendant was a public official even if (he/she) was not.]

*Oral copulation* is any contact, no matter how slight, between the mouth of one person and the sexual organ or anus of another person.

Penetration is not required.

[In order to *consent*, a person must act freely and voluntarily and know the nature of the act.]

[Evidence that the defendant and the person (dated/were married/had been married) is not enough by itself to constitute consent.]

[Evidence that the person (requested/suggested/communicated) that the defendant use a condom or other birth control device is not enough by itself to constitute consent.]

[An act is *accomplished by force* if a person uses enough physical force to overcome the other person's will.]

[*Duress* means a direct or implied threat of force, violence, danger, hardship, or retribution that causes a reasonable person to do [or submit to] something that he or she would not otherwise do [or submit to]. When deciding whether the act was accomplished by duress, consider all the circumstances, including the age of the other person and (his/her) relationship to the defendant.]

[*Retribution* is a form of payback or revenge.]

[*Menace* means a threat, statement, or act showing an intent to injure someone.]

[An act is *accomplished by fear* if the other person is actually and reasonably afraid [or (he/she) is actually but unreasonably afraid and the defendant knows of (his/her) fear and takes advantage of it].]

[The defendant is not guilty of forcible oral copulation if he or she actually and reasonably believed that the other person consented to the act. The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not actually and reasonably believe that the person consented. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty.]

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2006*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

Select the appropriate alternative in element 3 to instruct how the act was allegedly accomplished.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 287(c)(2) & (3), (k).
- Consent Defined. Pen. Code, §§ 261.6, 261.7.
- Duress Defined. *People v. Leal* (2004) 33 Cal.4th 999, 1004–1010 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 869, 94 P.3d 1071]; *People v. Pitmon* (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 38, 50 [216 Cal.Rptr. 221].
- Menace Defined. Pen. Code, § 261(c) [in context of rape].
- Oral Copulation Defined. Pen. Code, § 287(a); *People v. Grim* (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1240, 1242–1243 [11 Cal.Rptr.2d 884].
- Threatening to Retaliate Defined. Pen. Code, § 287(l).

- Fear Defined. *People v. Reyes* (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 803, 810 [200 Cal.Rptr. 651]; *People v. Iniguez* (1994) 7 Cal.4th 847 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 258, 872 P.2d 1183] [in context of rape].
- Force Defined. *People v. Griffin* (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1015, 1023–1024 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 891, 94 P.3d 1089]; *People v. Guido* (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 566, 574–576 [22 Cal.Rptr.3d 826].
- Threatening to Retaliate. *People v. White* (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 473, 484–485 [34 Cal.Rptr.3d 848]; *People v. Ward* (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 459, 468 [233 Cal.Rptr. 477].

### COMMENTARY

Penal Code section 287 requires that the oral copulation be “against the will” of the other person. (Pen. Code, § 287(c)(2) & (3), (k).) “Against the will” has been defined as “without consent.” (*People v. Key* (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 888, 895 [203 Cal.Rptr. 144]; see also *People v. Young* (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 248, 257 [235 Cal.Rptr. 361].)

The instruction includes a definition of the sufficiency of “fear” because that term has meaning in the context of forcible oral copulation that is technical and may not be readily apparent to jurors. (See *People v. Iniguez* (1994) 7 Cal.4th 847, 856–857 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 258, 872 P.2d 1183] [fear in context of rape].)

The court is not required to instruct sua sponte on the definition of “duress” or “menace” and Penal Code section 288a does not define either term. (*People v. Pitmon* (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 38, 52 [216 Cal.Rptr. 221] [duress]). Optional definitions are provided for the court to use at its discretion. The definition of “duress” is based on *People v. Leal* (2004) 33 Cal.4th 999, 1004–1010 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 869, 94 P.3d 1071], and *People v. Pitmon* (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 38, 50 [216 Cal.Rptr. 221]. The definition of “menace” is based on the statutory definitions contained in Penal Code sections 261 and 262 [rape]. (See *People v. Cochran* (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 8, 13–14 [126 Cal.Rptr.2d 416] [using rape definition in case involving forcible lewd acts].) In *People v. Leal, supra*, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 1004–1010, the court held that the statutory definition of “duress” contained in Penal Code sections 261 and 262 does not apply to the use of that term in any other statute. The court did not discuss the statutory definition of “menace.” The court should consider the *Leal* opinion before giving the definition of “menace.”

The term “force” as used in the forcible sex offense statutes does not have a specialized meaning and court is not required to define the term sua sponte. (*People v. Griffin* (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1015, 1023–1024; *People v. Guido* (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 566, 574–576 [22 Cal.Rptr.3d 826]). In *People v. Griffin, supra*, the Supreme Court further stated,

Nor is there anything in the common usage definitions of the term “force,” or in the express statutory language of section 261 itself, that suggests force in a forcible rape prosecution actually means force “*substantially* different from or *substantially* greater than” the physical force normally inherent in an act of

consensual sexual intercourse. [*People v. Cicero* (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 465, 474 [204 Cal.Rptr. 582].] To the contrary, it has long been recognized that “in order to establish force within the meaning of section 261, subdivision (2), the prosecution need only show the defendant used physical force of a degree sufficient to support a finding that the act of sexual intercourse was against the will of the [victim].” (*People v. Young* (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 248, 257–258 [235 Cal.Rptr. 361].)

(*People v. Griffin*, *supra*, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 1023–1024 [emphasis in original]; see also *People v. Guido* (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 566, 574–576 [22 Cal.Rptr.3d 826] [*Griffin* reasoning applies to violation of Pen. Code, § 287(c)(2)].)

The committee has provided a bracketed definition of “force,” consistent with *People v. Griffin*, *supra*, that the court may give on request.

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Assault. Pen. Code, § 240.
- Assault With Intent to Commit Oral Copulation. Pen. Code, § 220; see *In re Jose M.* (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1477 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 55] [in context of rape]; *People v. Moran* (1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 724, 730 [109 Cal.Rptr. 287] [where forcible crime is charged].
- Attempted Oral Copulation. Pen. Code, §§ 663, 287.
- Battery. Pen. Code, § 242.

### RELATED ISSUES

#### ***Consent Obtained by Fraudulent Representation***

A person may also induce someone else to consent to engage in oral copulation by a false or fraudulent representation made with an intent to create fear, and which does induce fear and would cause a reasonable person to act contrary to his or her free will. (Pen. Code, § 266c.) While section 266c requires coercion and fear to obtain consent, it does not involve physical force or violence. (See *People v. Cardenas* (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 927, 937–938 [26 Cal.Rptr.2d 567] [rejecting defendant’s argument that certain acts were consensual and without physical force, and were only violations of section 266c].)

#### ***Consent Withdrawn***

A forcible rape occurs when, during apparently consensual intercourse, the victim expresses an objection and attempts to stop the act and the defendant forcibly continues despite the objection. (*In re John Z.* (2003) 29 Cal.4th 756, 760 [128 Cal.Rptr.2d 783, 60 P.3d 183].) If there is an issue whether consent to oral copulation was withdrawn, see CALCRIM No. 1000, *Rape or Spousal Rape by Force, Fear, or Threats*, for language that may be adapted for use in this instruction.

#### ***Multiple Acts of Oral Copulation***

An accused may be convicted for multiple, nonconsensual sex acts of an identical nature that follow one another in quick, uninterrupted succession. (*People v. Catelli*

(1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 1434, 1446–1447 [278 Cal.Rptr. 452] [defendant properly convicted of multiple violations of former Pen. Code, § 288a where he interrupted the acts of copulation and forced victims to change positions.]

***Sexual Organ***

A man’s “sexual organ” for purposes of Penal Code section 287 includes the penis and the scrotum. (Pen. Code, § 287; *People v. Catelli* (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 1434, 1448–1449 [278 Cal.Rptr. 452].)

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Sex Offenses and Crimes Against Decency, §§ 35–38, 178.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.20[1][c], [2] (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure §§ 12:16, 12:17 (The Rutter Group).

## 1016. Oral Copulation in Concert (Pen. Code, § 287(d))

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**The defendant[s]** [\_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] if not all defendants in trial charged with this count>] **(is/are) charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with committing oral copulation by acting in concert [with \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] or description[s] of uncharged participant[s]>] [in violation of Penal Code section 287(d)].**

**To prove that a defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:**

*<Alternative A—defendant committed oral copulation>*

**[1.] [The defendant personally committed oral copulation and voluntarily acted with someone else who aided and abetted its commission(;/.)]**

**[OR]**

*<Alternative B—defendant aided and abetted>*

**[(1/2).] [The defendant voluntarily aided and abetted someone else who personally committed oral copulation.]**

**To decide whether the defendant[s] [or \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] or description[s] of uncharged participant[s]>] committed oral copulation, please refer to the separate instructions that I (will give/have given) you on that crime. To decide whether the defendant[s] [or \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] or description[s] of uncharged participant[s]>] aided and abetted oral copulation, please refer to the separate instructions that I (will give/have given) you on aiding and abetting. You must apply those instructions when you decide whether the People have proved oral copulation in concert.**

*<MAKE CERTAIN THAT ALL APPROPRIATE INSTRUCTIONS ON ORAL COPULATION AND AIDING AND ABETTING ARE GIVEN.>*

**[To prove the crime of oral copulation in concert, the People do not have to prove a prearranged plan or scheme to commit oral copulation.]**

---

*New January 2006*

### **BENCH NOTES**

#### ***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime. (See Pen. Code, § 287(d).) The court also has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on oral copulation. Give one or more of the following instructions defining oral copulation: CALCRIM No. 1015 or CALCRIM Nos. 1017–1022.

Select alternative A or B, or both, depending on whether the defendant personally committed the crime or aided and abetted someone else.

Depending on the evidence, give the final bracketed paragraph on request regarding the lack of a prearranged plan. (See *People v. Calimee* (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 337, 341–342 [122 Cal.Rptr. 658].)

### ***Related Instructions***

See generally CALCRIM No. 400, *Aiding and Abetting: General Principles*, and CALCRIM No. 401, *Aiding and Abetting: Intended Crimes*.

## **AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 287(d).
- Aiding and Abetting. *People v. Adams* (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 412, 429, 444–446 [23 Cal.Rptr.2d 512]; *People v. Caldwell* (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 947, 951–952 [200 Cal.Rptr. 508]; *People v. Calimee* (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 337, 341–342 [122 Cal.Rptr. 658] [in context of sodomy in concert].
- Consent Defined. *People v. Boggs* (1930) 107 Cal.App. 492, 495–496 [290 P. 618].

## **LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES**

- Assault. Pen. Code, § 240.
- Assault With Intent to Commit Oral Copulation. Pen. Code, § 220; see *In re Jose M.* (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1477 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 55] [in context of rape]; *People v. Moran* (1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 724, 730 [109 Cal.Rptr. 287] [when forcible crime is charged].
- Attempted Oral Copulation. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 287.
- Attempted Oral Copulation in Concert. Pen. Code, §§ 663, 287(d).
- Battery. Pen. Code, § 242.
- Oral Copulation. Pen. Code, § 287.

## **RELATED ISSUES**

See the Related Issues sections under CALCRIM No. 1015, *Oral Copulation by Force, Fear, or Threats*, and CALCRIM No. 1001, *Rape or Spousal Rape in Concert*.

## **SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Sex Offenses and Crimes Against Decency, §§ 35, 40, 178.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.20[1][c], [2][c] (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, *Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure* §§ 12:16, 12:17 (The Rutter Group).

**1017. Oral Copulation of an Intoxicated Person (Pen. Code,  
§ 287(a), (i))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with oral copulation of a person while that person was intoxicated [in violation of Penal Code section 287(i)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant committed an act of oral copulation with another person;
2. An (intoxicating/anesthetic/controlled) substance prevented the other person from resisting;

AND

3. The defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the effect of an (intoxicating/anesthetic/controlled) substance prevented the other person from resisting.

*Oral copulation* is any contact, no matter how slight, between the mouth of one person and the sexual organ or anus of another person. Penetration is not required.

A person is *prevented from resisting* if he or she is so intoxicated that he or she cannot give legal consent. In order to give legal consent, a person must be able to exercise reasonable judgment. In other words, the person must be able to understand and weigh the physical nature of the act, its moral character, and probable consequences. Legal consent is consent given freely and voluntarily by someone who knows the nature of the act involved.

[\_\_\_\_\_ <If appropriate, insert controlled substance> (is/are) [a] controlled substance[s].]

<Defense: Reasonable Belief Capable of Consent>

[The defendant is not guilty of this crime if (he/she) actually and reasonably believed that the person was capable of consenting to oral copulation, even if the defendant's belief was wrong. The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not actually and reasonably believe that the woman was capable of consenting. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty.]



## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

A space is provided to identify controlled substances if the parties agree that there is no issue of fact.

### *Defenses—Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense of reasonable belief the person was capable of consent if there is sufficient evidence to support the defense. (See *People v. Giardino* (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 454, 472 [98 Cal.Rptr.2d 315].)

### *Related Instructions*

CALCRIM No. 1016, *Oral Copulation in Concert*, may be given in conjunction with this instruction, if appropriate.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 287(a), (i).
- Consent Defined. Pen. Code, § 261.6.
- Controlled Substances. Health & Safety Code, §§ 11054–11058; see *People v. Avila* (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 791, 798, fn. 7 [95 Cal.Rptr.2d 651].
- Anesthetic Effect. See *People v. Avila* (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 791, 798–799 [95 Cal.Rptr.2d 651] [in context of sodomy].
- Oral Copulation Defined. *People v. Grim* (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1240, 1242–1243 [11 Cal.Rptr.2d 884].
- “Prevented From Resisting” Defined. See *People v. Giardino* (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 454, 465–466 [98 Cal.Rptr.2d 315] [rape of intoxicated woman].

## LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Attempted Oral Copulation. Pen. Code, §§ 663, 287.

## RELATED ISSUES

See the Related Issues section to CALCRIM No. 1015, *Oral Copulation by Force, Fear, or Threats*.

A defendant may be convicted of both oral copulation of an intoxicated person and oral copulation of an unconscious person. (*People v. Gonzalez* (2014) 60 Cal.4th 533 [179 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 335 P.3d 1083]; Pen. Code, § 287(f), (i).)

## SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Sex Offenses and Crimes Against Decency §§ 35–37, 39, 178.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.20[1][c], [5] (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure §§ 12:16, 12:17  
(The Rutter Group).

**1018. Oral Copulation of an Unconscious Person (Pen. Code,  
§ 287(a), (f))**

---

The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with oral copulation of a person who was unconscious of the nature of the act [in violation of Penal Code section 287(f)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant committed an act of oral copulation with another person;
2. The other person was unable to resist because (he/she) was unconscious of the nature of the act;

AND

3. The defendant knew that the other person was unable to resist because (he/she) was unconscious of the nature of the act.

*Oral copulation* is any contact, no matter how slight, between the mouth of one person and the sexual organ or anus of another person. Penetration is not required.

A person is *unconscious of the nature of the act* if he or she is (unconscious or asleep/ [or] not aware that the act is occurring/ [or] not aware of the essential characteristics of the act because the perpetrator tricked, lied to, or concealed information from the person/ [or] not aware of the essential characteristics of the act because the perpetrator fraudulently represented that the oral copulation served a professional purpose when it served no professional purpose).

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2015*

**BENCH NOTES**

***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

***Related Instructions***

CALCRIM No. 1016, *Oral Copulation in Concert*, may be given in conjunction with this instruction, if appropriate.

**AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 287(a), (f).
- Oral Copulation Defined. *People v. Grim* (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1240, 1242–1243 [11 Cal.Rptr.2d 884].

### COMMENTARY

The statutory language describing unconsciousness includes “was not aware, knowing, perceiving, or cognizant that the act occurred.” (See Pen. Code, § 287(f)(2)–(4).) The committee did not discern any difference among the statutory terms and therefore used “aware” in the instruction. If there is an issue over a particular term, that term should be inserted in the instruction.

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Attempted Oral Copulation. Pen. Code, §§ 663, 287.

### RELATED ISSUES

See the Related Issues Section to CALCRIM No. 1015, *Oral Copulation by Force, Fear, or Threats*.

A defendant may be convicted of both oral copulation of an intoxicated person and oral copulation of an unconscious person. (*People v. Gonzalez* (2014) 60 Cal.4th 533 [179 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 335 P.3d 1083]; Pen. Code, § 287(f), (i).)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Sex Offenses and Crimes Against Decency §§ 35–37, 39, 178.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.20[1][c], [5] (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, *Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure* §§ 12:16, 12:17 (The Rutter Group).

**1019. Oral Copulation of a Disabled Person (Pen. Code, § 287(a), (g))**

---

The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with oral copulation of a mentally or physically disabled person [in violation of Penal Code section 287(g)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant committed an act of oral copulation with someone else;
2. The other person had a (mental disorder/developmental or physical disability) that prevented (him/her) from legally consenting;

**AND**

3. The defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the other person had a (mental disorder/developmental or physical disability) that prevented (him/her) from legally consenting.

*Oral copulation* is any contact, no matter how slight, between the mouth of one person and the sexual organ or anus of another person. Penetration is not required.

A person is *prevented from legally consenting* if he or she is unable to understand the act, its nature, and possible consequences.

---

*New January 2006; Revised August 2012*

**BENCH NOTES**

***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

***Related Instructions***

CALCRIM No. 1016, *Oral Copulation in Concert*, may be given in conjunction with this instruction, if appropriate.

**AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 287(a), (g).
- Consent Defined. Pen. Code, § 261.6; *People v. Boggs* (1930) 107 Cal.App. 492, 495–496 [290 P. 618].
- Oral Copulation Defined. *People v. Grim* (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1240, 1242–1243 [11 Cal.Rptr.2d 884].

- This Instruction Completely Explains Inability to Give Legal Consent. *People v. Miranda* (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1419, fn. 13 [132 Cal.Rptr.3d 315] [in dicta].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Attempted Oral Copulation. Pen. Code, §§ 663, 287.

### RELATED ISSUES

See the Related Issues Section to CALCRIM No. 1015, *Oral Copulation by Force, Fear, or Threats*, and CALCRIM No. 1004, *Rape of a Disabled Woman*.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Sex Offenses and Crimes Against Decency, §§ 35–37, 39, 178.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.20[1][c], [5] (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, *Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure* §§ 12:16, 12:17 (The Rutter Group).

**1020. Oral Copulation of a Disabled Person in a Mental Hospital  
(Pen. Code, § 287(a), (h))**

---

The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with oral copulation of a mentally or physically disabled person in a mental hospital [in violation of Penal Code section 287(h)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant committed an act of oral copulation with someone else;
2. The other person had a (mental disorder/developmental or physical disability) that prevented (him/her) from legally consenting;
3. The defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the other person had a (mental disorder/developmental or physical disability) that prevented (him/her) from legally consenting;

**AND**

4. At the time of the act, both people were confined in a state hospital or other mental health facility.

*Oral copulation* is any contact, no matter how slight, between the mouth of one person and the sexual organ or anus of another person. Penetration is not required.

A person is *incapable of giving legal consent* if he or she is unable to understand the act, its nature, and possible consequences.

[\_\_\_\_\_ <Insert name of facility> is a (state hospital/mental health facility).] [A *state hospital* or *other mental health facility* includes a state hospital for the care and treatment of the mentally disordered or any other public or private facility approved by a county mental health director for the care and treatment of the mentally disordered.]

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*New January 2006*

**BENCH NOTES**

***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

A space is provided to identify a facility as a state hospital or other mental health facility if the parties agree that there is no issue of fact. Alternatively, if there is a

factual dispute about whether an institution is a state hospital or other mental health facility, give the final bracketed sentence. (See Pen. Code, § 287(h).)

***Related Instructions***

CALCRIM No. 1016, *Oral Copulation in Concert*, may be given in conjunction with this instruction, if appropriate.

**AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 287(a), (h).
- State Hospital or Mental Health Facility Defined. Pen. Code, § 287(h); see Welf. & Inst. Code, § 7100 [county psychiatric facilities], § 7200 [state hospitals for mentally disordered], § 7500 [state hospitals for developmentally disabled].
- Legal Consent. *People v. Boggs* (1930) 107 Cal.App. 492, 495–496 [290 P. 618].
- Oral Copulation Defined. *People v. Grim* (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1240, 1242–1243 [11 Cal.Rptr.2d 884].

**LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES**

- Attempted Oral Copulation. Pen. Code, §§ 663, 287.

**RELATED ISSUES**

See the Related Issues Section to CALCRIM No. 1015, *Oral Copulation by Force, Fear, or Threats*, and CALCRIM No. 1004, *Rape of a Disabled Woman*.

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Sex Offenses and Crimes Against Decency, §§ 35–37, 39, 178.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.20[1][c], [5] (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, *Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure* §§ 12:16, 12:17 (The Rutter Group).



## 1021. Oral Copulation by Fraud (Pen. Code, § 287(a), (j))

---

The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with oral copulation by fraud [in violation of Penal Code section 287(j)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant committed an act of oral copulation with someone else;
2. The other person submitted to the oral copulation because (he/she) believed the defendant was someone (he/she) knew, other than the defendant;

AND

3. The defendant tricked, lied, [used an artifice or pretense,] or concealed information, intending to make the other person believe (he/she) was someone (he/she) knew, while intending to hide (his/her) own identity.

*Oral copulation* is any contact, no matter how slight, between the mouth of one person and the sexual organ or anus of another person.

Penetration is not required.

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2015*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

Former Penal Code section 288a(a) was amended effective September 9, 2013, in response to *People v. Morales* (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 583 [150 Cal.Rptr.3d 920].

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 287(a), (j).
- Oral Copulation Defined. *People v. Grim* (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1240, 1242–1243 [11 Cal.Rptr.2d 884].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Attempted Oral Copulation. Pen. Code, §§ 663, 287.

### RELATED ISSUES

See the Related Issues Section to CALCRIM No. 1015, *Oral Copulation by Force, Fear, or Threats*.

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Sex Offenses and Crime Against Decency, § 38.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.20[1][c], [6] (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure §§ 12:16, 12:17 (The Rutter Group).

## 1022. Oral Copulation While in Custody (Pen. Code, § 287(a), (e))

---

The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with oral copulation committed while (he/she) was confined in (state prison/a local detention facility) [in violation of Penal Code section 287(e)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant participated in an act of oral copulation with someone else;

**AND**

2. At the time of the act, the defendant was confined in a (state prison/local detention facility).

*Oral copulation* is any contact, no matter how slight, between the mouth of one person and the sexual organ or anus of another person. Penetration is not required.

[ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of facility> is a (state prison/local detention facility).] [A state prison is any prison or institution maintained by the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.] [A local detention facility includes any city, county, or regional jail or other facility used to confine adults [or both adults and minors].]

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2016*

### **BENCH NOTES**

#### ***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

A space is provided to identify a state prison or local detention facility if the parties agree that there is no issue of fact. Alternatively, if there is a factual dispute about whether the defendant was confined in a state prison or local detention facility, give the second or third bracketed sentences (or both, if necessary). (See Pen. Code, §§ 4504, 5003, 6031.4.)

#### ***Related Instructions***

CALCRIM No. 1016, *Oral Copulation in Concert*, may be given in conjunction with this instruction, if appropriate.

### **AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 287(a), (e).
- Local Detention Facility Defined. Pen. Code, § 6031.4.

- State Prison Defined. Pen. Code, §§ 4504, 5003.
- Oral Copulation Defined. *People v. Grim* (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1240, 1242–1243 [11 Cal.Rptr.2d 884].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Attempted Oral Copulation. Pen. Code, §§ 663, 287.

### RELATED ISSUES

See the Related Issues Section to CALCRIM No. 1015, *Oral Copulation by Force, Fear, or Threats*.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Sex Offenses and Crimes Against Decency, §§ 35–36, 178.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.20[1][c], [4] (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, *Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure* §§ 12:16, 12:17 (The Rutter Group).

**1023–1029. Reserved for Future Use**

### (iii) Sodomy

#### 1030. Sodomy by Force, Fear, or Threats (Pen. Code, § 286(c)(2), (3), (k))

---

The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with sodomy by force [in violation of Penal Code section 286].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant committed an act of sodomy with another person;
2. The other person did not consent to the act;

AND

3. The defendant accomplished the act:

<Alternative 3A—force or fear>

[by force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury to another person.]

<Alternative 3B—future threats of bodily harm>

[by threatening to retaliate against someone when there was a reasonable possibility that the defendant would carry out the threat. A *threat to retaliate* is a threat to kidnap, unlawfully restrain or confine, or inflict extreme pain, serious bodily injury, or death.]

<Alternative 3C—threat of official action>

[by threatening to use the authority of a public office to incarcerate, arrest, or deport someone. A *public official* is a person employed by a government agency who has authority to incarcerate, arrest, or deport. The other person must have reasonably believed that the defendant was a public official even if (he/she) was not.]

*Sodomy* is any penetration, no matter how slight, of the anus of one person by the penis of another person. [Ejaculation is not required.]

[In order to *consent*, a person must act freely and voluntarily and know the nature of the act.]

[Evidence that the defendant and the other person (dated/were married/had been married) is not enough by itself to constitute consent.]

[Evidence that the other person (requested/suggested/communicated) that the defendant use a condom or other birth control device is not enough by itself to constitute consent.]

[An act is *accomplished by force* if a person uses enough physical force to overcome the other person's will.]

**[Duress means a direct or implied threat of force, violence, danger, hardship, or retribution that causes a reasonable person to do [or submit to] something that he or she would not otherwise do [or submit to]. When deciding whether the act was accomplished by duress, consider all the circumstances, including the age of the other person and (his/her) relationship to the defendant.]**

**[Retribution is a form of payback or revenge.]**

**[Menace means a threat, statement, or act showing an intent to injure someone.]**

**[An act is *accomplished by fear* if the other person is actually and reasonably afraid [or he or she is actually but unreasonably afraid and the defendant knows of his or her fear and takes advantage of it].]**

**[The other person must be alive at the time of the act for the crime of sodomy to occur.]**

*<Defense: Reasonable Belief in Consent>*

**[The defendant is not guilty of forcible sodomy if (he/she) actually and reasonably believed that the other person consented to the act. The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not actually and reasonably believe that the other person consented. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty.]**

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2006, February 2012*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of sodomy. (Pen. Code, § 286(c)(2), (3), (k); *People v. Martinez* (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 19, 24–26 [232 Cal.Rptr. 736]; *People v. Moore* (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1400, 1407 [260 Cal.Rptr. 134].)

The court should select the appropriate alternative in element 3 to instruct how the sodomy was accomplished.

Sodomy requires that the victim be alive at the moment of the act. (*People v. Ramirez* (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1158, 1175–1177 [270 Cal.Rptr. 286, 791 P.2d 965]; If this is an issue in the case, give the bracketed sentence that begins with “The other person must be alive . . .”

### *Defenses—Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense of reasonable belief in consent if there is “substantial evidence of equivocal conduct that would have led a defendant to reasonably and in good faith believe consent existed where it did not.”

(See *People v. Williams* (1992) 4 Cal.4th 354, 362 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 441, 841 P.2d 961]; *People v. Mayberry* (1975) 15 Cal.3d 143, 153–158 [125 Cal.Rptr. 745, 542 P.2d 1337].)

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 286(c)(2), (3), (k).
- Consent Defined. Pen. Code, §§ 261.6, 261.7.
- Duress Defined. *People v. Leal* (2004) 33 Cal.4th 999, 1004–1010 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 869, 94 P.3d 1071]; *People v. Pitmon* (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 38, 50 [216 Cal.Rptr. 221].
- Menace Defined. Pen. Code, § 261(c) [in context of rape].
- Sodomy Defined. Pen. Code, § 286(a); see *People v. Singh* (1923) 62 Cal.App. 450, 452 [217 P. 121] [ejaculation is not required].
- Threatening to Retaliate Defined. Pen. Code, § 286(l).
- Fear Defined. *People v. Reyes* (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 803, 810 [200 Cal.Rptr. 651]; *People v. Iniguez* (1994) 7 Cal.4th 847, 856 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 258, 872 P.2d 1183] [in context of rape].
- Force Defined. *People v. Griffin* (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1015, 1023–1024 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 891, 94 P.3d 1089]; see also *People v. Guido* (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 566, 574 [22 Cal.Rptr.3d 826].

### COMMENTARY

Penal Code section 286 requires that the sodomy be “against the will” of the other person. (Pen. Code, § 286(c)(2), (3), (k).) “Against the will” has been defined as “without consent.” (*People v. Key* (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 888, 895 [203 Cal.Rptr. 144] [in context of rape]; see also *People v. Young* (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 248, 257 [235 Cal.Rptr. 361].)

The instruction includes a definition of the sufficiency of “fear” because that term has meaning in the context of forcible sodomy that is technical and may not be readily apparent to jurors. (See *People v. Reyes* (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 803, 810 [200 Cal.Rptr. 651] [fear]; *People v. Iniguez* (1994) 7 Cal.4th 847, 856–857 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 258, 872 P.2d 1183] [fear in context of rape].)

The court is not required to instruct sua sponte on the definition of “duress” or “menace” and Penal Code section 286 does not define either term. (*People v. Pitmon* (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 38, 52 [216 Cal.Rptr. 221] [duress]). Optional definitions are provided for the court to use at its discretion. The definition of “duress” is based on *People v. Leal* (2004) 33 Cal.4th 999, 1004–1010 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 869, 94 P.3d 1071], and *People v. Pitmon, supra*, 170 Cal.App.3d at 50. The definition of “menace” is based on the statutory definitions contained in Penal Code sections 261 and 262 [rape]. (See *People v. Cochran* (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 8, 13–14 [126 Cal.Rptr.2d 416] [using rape definition in case involving forcible lewd acts].) In *People v. Leal, supra*, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 1004–1010, the court held

that the statutory definition of “duress” contained in Penal Code sections 261 and 262 does not apply to the use of that term in any other statute. The court did not discuss the statutory definition of “menace.” The court should consider the *Leal* opinion before giving the definition of “menace.”

The term “force” as used in the forcible sex offense statutes does not have a specialized meaning and court is not required to define the term sua sponte. (*People v. Griffin* (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1015, 1023–1024 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 891, 94 P.3d 1089].) In *People v. Griffin, supra*, the Supreme Court further stated,

Nor is there anything in the common usage definitions of the term “force,” or in the express statutory language of section 261 itself, that suggests force in a forcible rape prosecution actually means force “*substantially* different from or *substantially* greater than” the physical force normally inherent in an act of consensual sexual intercourse. (*People v. Cicero* (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 465, 474 [204 Cal.Rptr. 582].) To the contrary, it has long been recognized that “in order to establish force within the meaning of section 261, [former] subdivision (2), the prosecution need only show the defendant used physical force of a degree sufficient to support a finding that the act of sexual intercourse was against the will of the [victim].” (*People v. Young* (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 248, 257–258 [235 Cal.Rptr. 361].)

(*Ibid.* [emphasis in original]; see also *People v. Guido* (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 566, 574 [22 Cal.Rptr.3d 826].)

The committee has provided a bracketed definition of “force,” consistent with *People v. Griffin, supra*, that the court may give on request.

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Assault. Pen. Code, § 240.
- Assault With Intent to Commit Sodomy. Pen. Code, § 220; see *In re Jose M.* (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1477 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 55] [in context of rape]; *People v. Moran* (1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 724, 730 [109 Cal.Rptr. 287] [where forcible crime is charged].
- Attempted Forcible Sodomy. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 286.
- Battery. Pen. Code, § 242; *People v. Hughes* (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 366 [116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401, 39 P.3d 432].

Non-forcible sex crimes requiring the perpetrator and victim to be within certain age limits are not lesser included offenses of forcible sex crimes. (*People v. Scott* (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 784, 794 [100 Cal.Rptr.2d 70].)

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Consent Obtained by Fraudulent Representation*

A person may also induce someone else to consent to engage in sodomy by a false or fraudulent representation made with an intent to create fear, and which does induce fear and would cause a reasonable person to act contrary to his or her free will. (Pen. Code, § 266c.) While section 266c requires coercion and fear to obtain



consent, it does not involve physical force or violence. (See *People v. Cardenas* (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 927, 937–938 [26 Cal.Rptr.2d 567] [rejecting defendant’s argument that certain acts were consensual and without physical force, and were only violations of section 266c].)

***Consent Withdrawn***

A forcible rape occurs when, during apparently consensual intercourse, the victim expresses an objection and attempts to stop the act and the defendant forcibly continues despite the objection. (*In re John Z.* (2003) 29 Cal.4th 756, 760 [128 Cal.Rptr.2d 783, 60 P.3d 183].) If there is an issue whether consent to sodomy was withdrawn, see CALCRIM No. 1000, *Rape or Spousal Rape by Force, Fear, or Threats*, for language that may be adapted for use in this instruction.

***Victim Must Be Alive***

Sodomy requires that the victim be alive at the moment of penetration. (*People v. Davis* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 521, fn. 20 [41 Cal.Rptr.2d 826, 896 P.2d 119]; *People v. Ramirez* (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1158, 1176 [270 Cal.Rptr. 286, 791 P.2d 965].) Sodomy with a deceased victim can constitute attempted sodomy if the defendant attempted an act of forcible sodomy while the victim was alive or with the mistaken belief that the victim was alive. (*People v. Davis, supra*, 10 Cal.4th at p. 521, fn. 20; *People v. Hart* (1999) 20 Cal.4th 546, 611 [85 Cal.Rptr.2d 132, 976 P.2d 683].)

***Penetration May Be Through Victim’s Clothing***

If there is penetration into a victim’s anus by a perpetrator’s sexual organ, it is sodomy, even if the victim is wearing clothing at the time. (*People v. Ribera* (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 81, 85–86 [34 Cal.Rptr.3d 538]).

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Sex Offenses and Crimes Against Decency, §§ 27, 28, 30, 178.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.20[1][b], [2] (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, *Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure* §§ 12:16, 12:17 (The Rutter Group).

## 1031. Sodomy in Concert (Pen. Code, § 286(d))

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**The defendant[s]** [\_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] if not all defendants in trial charged with this count>] **(is/are) charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with committing sodomy by acting in concert [with \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] or description[s] of uncharged participant[s]>] [in violation of Penal Code section 286(d)].**

**To prove that a defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:**

<Alternative A—defendant committed sodomy>

**[1.] [The defendant personally committed sodomy and voluntarily acted with someone else who aided and abetted its commission(;/ .)]**

**[OR]**

<Alternative B—defendant aided and abetted>

**[(1/2).] [The defendant voluntarily aided and abetted someone else who personally committed sodomy.]**

**To decide whether the defendant[s] [or \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] or description[s] of uncharged participant[s]>] committed sodomy, please refer to the separate instructions that I (will give/have given) you on that crime. To decide whether the defendant[s] [or \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] or description[s] of uncharged participant[s]>] aided and abetted sodomy, please refer to the separate instructions that I (will give/have given) you on aiding and abetting. You must apply those instructions when you decide whether the People have proved sodomy in concert.**

*<MAKE CERTAIN THAT ALL APPROPRIATE INSTRUCTIONS ON SODOMY AND AIDING AND ABETTING ARE GIVEN.>*

**[To prove the crime of sodomy in concert, the People do not have to prove a prearranged plan or scheme to commit sodomy.]**

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*New January 2006*

### **BENCH NOTES**

#### ***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime. (*People v. Ramirez* (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 603, 621 [236 Cal.Rptr. 404] [rape in concert is a separate crime, not an enhancement].) The court also has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on sodomy. Give one or more of the following instructions defining sodomy: CALCRIM No. 1030 or CALCRIM Nos. 1032–1037.

Select alternative A or B, or both, depending on whether the defendant personally committed the crime or aided and abetted someone else.

Depending on the evidence, give the final bracketed paragraph on request regarding the lack of a prearranged plan. (See *People v. Calimee* (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 337, 341–342 [122 Cal.Rptr. 658].)

### ***Related Instructions***

See CALCRIM No. 400, *Aiding and Abetting: General Principles*, and CALCRIM No. 401, *Aiding and Abetting: Intended Crimes*.

## **AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 286(d).
- Aiding and Abetting. *People v. Adams* (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 412, 429, 444–446 [23 Cal.Rptr.2d 512]; *People v. Caldwell* (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 947, 951–952 [200 Cal.Rptr. 508]; *People v. Calimee* (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 337, 341–342 [122 Cal.Rptr. 658].

## **LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES**

- Assault. Pen. Code, § 240.
- Assault With Intent to Commit Sodomy. Pen. Code, § 220; see *In re Jose M.* (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1477 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 55] [in context of rape]; *People v. Moran* (1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 724, 730 [109 Cal.Rptr. 287] [where forcible crime is charged].
- Attempted Sodomy. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 286.
- Attempted Sodomy in Concert. Pen. Code, §§ 663, 286(d).
- Battery. Pen. Code, § 242.
- Sodomy. Pen. Code, §§ 663, 286.

## **RELATED ISSUES**

See the Related Issues section under CALCRIM No. 1030, *Sodomy by Force, Fear, or Threats*, and CALCRIM No. 1001, *Rape or Spousal Rape in Concert*.

## **SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Sex Offenses and Crimes Against Decency, § 34.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.20[1][b], [2][c] (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, *Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure* §§ 12:16, 12:17 (The Rutter Group).

## 1032. Sodomy of an Intoxicated Person (Pen. Code, § 286(i))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with sodomy of a person while that person was intoxicated [in violation of Penal Code section 286(i)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant committed an act of sodomy with another person;
2. The effect of (a/an) (intoxicating/anesthetic/controlled) substance prevented the other person from resisting;

AND

3. The defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the effect of that substance prevented the other person from resisting.

*Sodomy* is any penetration, no matter how slight, of the anus of one person by the penis of another person. [Ejaculation is not required.]

A person is *prevented from resisting* if he or she is so intoxicated that he or she cannot give legal consent. In order to give legal consent, a person must be able to exercise reasonable judgment. In other words, the person must be able to understand and weigh the physical nature of the act, its moral character, and probable consequences. Legal consent is consent given freely and voluntarily by someone who knows the nature of the act involved.

[\_\_\_\_\_ <If appropriate, insert controlled substance[s]> (is/are) [a] controlled substance[s].]

<Defense: Reasonable Belief Capable of Consent>

[The defendant is not guilty of this crime if (he/she) actually and reasonably believed that the other person was capable of consenting to the act, even if that belief was wrong. The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not actually and reasonably believe that the other person was capable of consenting. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty.]

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*New January 2006; Revised March 2018*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

A space is provided to identify controlled substances if the parties agree that there is no issue of fact.

***Related Instructions***

CALCRIM No. 1031, *Sodomy in Concert*, may be given in conjunction with this instruction if appropriate.

**AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 286(i); *People v. Avila* (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 791, 802–803 [95 Cal.Rptr.2d 651].
- Anesthetic Effect Defined. *People v. Avila* (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 791, 798–799 [95 Cal.Rptr.2d 651].
- Consent Defined. Pen. Code, § 261.6.
- Controlled Substances Defined. Health & Safety Code, §§ 11054–11058; see *People v. Avila* (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 791, 798, fn. 7 [95 Cal.Rptr.2d 651].
- Prevented From Resisting Defined. *People v. Lujano* (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 187, 192–193 [223 Cal.Rptr.3d 105] [CALCRIM 1032 has correct definition]; *People v. Giardino* (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 454, 465–466 [98 Cal.Rptr.2d 315][in context of rape].
- Reasonable Belief in Capacity to Consent. *People v. Lujano* (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 187, 191–192 [223 Cal.Rptr.3d 105]; *People v. Giardino* (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 454, 471–472 [98 Cal.Rptr.2d 315].
- Sodomy Defined. Pen. Code, § 286(a); see *People v. Singh* (1923) 62 Cal.App. 450, 452 [217 P. 121] [ejaculation is not required].

**LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES**

- Assault. Pen. Code, § 240.
- Attempted Sodomy of Intoxicated Person. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 286(i).
- Battery. Pen. Code, § 242.

**RELATED ISSUES**

See the Related Issues section under CALCRIM No. 1030, *Sodomy by Force, Fear, or Threats*.

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

6 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Sex Offenses and Crimes Against Decency, §§ 28, 31–33, 178.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.20[1][b], [5] (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, *Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure* §§ 12:16, 12:17 (The Rutter Group).

## 1033. Sodomy of an Unconscious Person (Pen. Code, § 286(f))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with sodomy of a person who was unconscious of the nature of the act [in violation of Penal Code section 286(f)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant committed an act of sodomy with another person;
2. The other person was unable to resist because (he/she) was unconscious of the nature of the act;

AND

3. The defendant knew that the other person was unable to resist because (he/she) was unconscious of the nature of the act.

*Sodomy* is any penetration, no matter how slight, of the anus of one person by the penis of another person. [Ejaculation is not required.]

A person is *unconscious of the nature of the act* if he or she is (unconscious or asleep/ [or] not aware that the act is occurring/ [or] not aware of the essential characteristics of the act because the perpetrator tricked, lied to, or concealed information from the person/ [or] not aware of the essential characteristics of the act because the perpetrator fraudulently represented that the sexual penetration served a professional purpose when it served no professional purpose).

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*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

#### *Related Instructions*

CALCRIM No. 1031, *Sodomy in Concert*, may be given in conjunction with this instruction if appropriate.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 286(f).
- Sodomy Defined. Pen. Code, § 286(a); see *People v. Singh* (1923) 62 Cal.App. 450, 452 [217 P. 121] [ejaculation is not required].
- Unconscious of Nature of Act. *People v. Howard* (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 53, 55 [172 Cal.Rptr. 539] [total unconsciousness is not required]; see *Boro v.*

*Superior Court* (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 1224, 1229–1231 [210 Cal.Rptr. 122]  
[rape victim not unconscious of nature of act; fraud in the inducement].

### COMMENTARY

The statutory language describing unconsciousness includes “was not aware, knowing, perceiving, or cognizant that the act occurred.” (See Pen. Code, § 286(f)(2)–(4).) The committee did not discern any difference among the statutory terms and therefore used “aware” in the instruction. If there is an issue over a particular term, that term should be inserted in the instruction.

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Attempted Sodomy of Unconscious Person. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 286(f).

### RELATED ISSUES

See the Related Issues section under CALCRIM No. 1030, *Sodomy by Force, Fear, or Threats*.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Sex Offenses and Crimes Against Decency, §§ 28, 31–33, 178.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.20[1][b], [5] (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, *Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure* §§ 12:16, 12:17 (The Rutter Group).

## 1034. Sodomy of a Disabled Person (Pen. Code, § 286(g))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with sodomy of a mentally or physically disabled person [in violation of Penal Code section 286(g)]. To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant committed an act of sodomy with another person;
2. The other person had a (mental disorder/developmental or physical disability) that prevented (him/her) from legally consenting;

**AND**

3. The defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the other person had a (mental disorder/developmental or physical disability) that prevented (him/her) from legally consenting.

*Sodomy* is any penetration, no matter how slight, of the anus of one person by the penis of another person. [Ejaculation is not required.]

A person is *prevented from legally consenting* if he or she is unable to understand the act, its nature, and possible consequences.

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*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

#### *Related Instructions*

CALCRIM No. 1031, *Sodomy in Concert*, may be given in conjunction with this instruction, if appropriate.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 286(g).
- Prevented from Legally Consenting, Defined. *People v. Boggs* (1930) 107 Cal.App. 492, 495–496 [290 P. 618].
- Sodomy Defined. Pen. Code, § 286(a); see *People v. Singh* (1928) 62 Cal.App. 450, 452 [217 P. 121] [ejaculation is not required].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Attempted Sodomy of Disabled Person. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 286(g).

### RELATED ISSUES

See the Related Issues section under CALCRIM No. 1030, *Sodomy by Force, Fear,*



*or Threats*, and CALCRIM No. 1004, *Rape of a Disabled Woman*.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Sex Offenses and Crimes Against Decency, §§ 28, 31–33, 178.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.20[1][b], [5] (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, *Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure* §§ 12:16, 12:17 (The Rutter Group).

**1035. Sodomy of a Disabled Person in a Mental Hospital (Pen. Code, § 286(h))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with sodomy of a mentally or physically disabled person in a mental hospital [in violation of Penal Code section 286(h)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant committed an act of sodomy with another person;
2. The other person had a (mental disorder/developmental or physical disability) that prevented (him/her) from legally consenting;
3. The defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the other person had a (mental disorder/developmental or physical disability) that prevented (him/her) from legally consenting;

**AND**

4. At the time of the act, both people were confined in a state hospital or other mental health facility.

*Sodomy* is any penetration, no matter how slight, of the anus of one person by the penis of another person. [Ejaculation is not required.]

A person is *prevented from legally consenting* if he or she is unable to understand the act, its nature, and probable consequences.

[\_\_\_\_\_ <If appropriate, insert name of facility> is a (state hospital/mental health facility).] [A *state hospital or other mental health facility* includes a state hospital for the care and treatment of the mentally disordered or any other public or private facility approved by a county mental health director for the care and treatment of the mentally disordered.]

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*New January 2006*

**BENCH NOTES**

***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

A space is provided to identify a facility as a state hospital or other mental health facility if the parties agree that there is no issue of fact. Alternatively, if there is a

factual dispute about whether an institution is a state hospital or other mental health facility, give the final bracketed sentence. (See Pen. Code, § 286(h).)

***Related Instructions***

CALCRIM No. 1031, *Sodomy in Concert*, may be given in conjunction with this instruction, if appropriate.

**AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 286(h).
- Sodomy Defined. Pen. Code, § 286(a); see *People v. Singh* (1928) 62 Cal.App. 450, 452 [217 P. 121] [ejaculation is not required].
- State Hospital or Mental Health Facility Defined. Pen. Code, § 286(h); see Welf. & Inst. Code, § 7100 [county psychiatric facilities], § 7200 [state hospitals for mentally disordered], § 7500 [state hospitals for developmentally disabled].

**LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES**

- Attempted Sodomy of Disabled Person. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 286(h).

**RELATED ISSUES**

See the Related Issues section under CALCRIM No. 1030, *Sodomy by Force, Fear, or Threats*, and CALCRIM No. 1004, *Rape of a Disabled Woman*.

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Sex Offenses and Crimes Against Decency, §§ 28, 31–33, 178.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.20[1][b], [5] (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure §§ 12:16, 12:17 (The Rutter Group).

## 1036. Sodomy by Fraud (Pen. Code, § 286(j))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with sodomy by fraud [in violation of Penal Code section 286(j)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant committed an act of sodomy with someone else;
2. The other person submitted to the sodomy because (he/she) believed the defendant was someone (he/she) knew, other than the defendant;

AND

3. The defendant tricked, lied, [used an artifice or pretense,] or concealed information, intending to make the other person believe that he was someone (he/she) knew, while intending to hide his own identity.

*Sodomy* is any penetration, no matter how slight, of the anus of one person by the penis of another person. [Ejaculation is not required.]

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2015*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

Penal Code section 286(j) was amended effective September 9, 2013, in response to *People v. Morales* (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 583 [150 Cal.Rptr.3d 920].

#### *Related Instructions*

CALCRIM No. 1031, *Sodomy in Concert*, may be given in conjunction with this instruction if appropriate.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 286(j).
- Sodomy Defined. Pen. Code, § 286(a); see *People v. Singh* (1923) 62 Cal.App. 450, 452 [217 P. 121] [ejaculation is not required].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Attempted Sodomy by Fraud. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 286(j).

### RELATED ISSUES

See the Related Issues section under CALCRIM No. 1030, *Sodomy by Force, Fear, or Threats*.

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Sex Offenses and Crimes Against Decency, § 30.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.20[1][b], [6] (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure §§ 12:16, 12:17 (The Rutter Group).

## 1037. Sodomy While in Custody (Pen. Code, § 286(e))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with sodomy while he was confined in (state prison/a local detention facility) [in violation of Penal Code section 286(e)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant participated in an act of sodomy with another person;

AND

2. At the time of the act, the defendant was confined in (state prison/a local detention facility).

*Sodomy* is any penetration, no matter how slight, of the anus of one person by the penis of another person. [E]jaculation is not required.]

[ \_\_\_\_\_ <Insert name of facility> is a (state prison/local detention facility).] [A *state prison* is any prison or institution maintained by the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.] [A *local detention facility* includes any city, county, or regional jail or other facility used to confine adults [or both adults and minors].]

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New January 2006; Revised August 2016

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

A space is provided to identify a state prison or local detention facility if the parties agree that there is no issue of fact. Alternatively, if there is a factual dispute about whether the defendant was confined in a state prison or local detention facility, give the second or third bracketed sentences (or both, if necessary). (See Pen. Code, §§ 4504, 5003, 6031.4.)

#### *Related Instructions*

CALCRIM No. 1031, *Sodomy in Concert*, may be given in conjunction with this instruction if appropriate.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 286(e); *People v. West* (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 892, 898 [277 Cal.Rptr. 237] [only applies to inmates].
- Local Detention Facility Defined. Pen. Code, § 6031.4.

- Sodomy Defined. Pen. Code, § 286(a); see *People v. Singh* (1923) 62 Cal.App. 450, 452 [217 P. 121] [ejaculation is not required].
- State Prison Defined. Pen. Code, §§ 4504, 5003.

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Attempted Sodomy While in Custody. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 286(e).

### RELATED ISSUES

See the Related Issues section under CALCRIM No. 1030, *Sodomy by Force, Fear, or Threats*.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Sex Offenses and Crimes Against Decency, §§ 28, 178.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.20[1][b], [4] (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure §§ 12:16, 12:17 (The Rutter Group).

**1038–1044. Reserved for Future Use**

## (iv) Sexual Penetration

### 1045. Sexual Penetration by Force, Fear, or Threats (Pen. Code, § 289(a)(1), (2), (g))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with sexual penetration by force [in violation of Penal Code section 289].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant committed an act of sexual penetration with another person;
2. The penetration was accomplished by using (a/an) (foreign object[,]/ [or] substance[,]/ [or] instrument[,]/ [or] device[,]/ [or] unknown object);
3. The other person did not consent to the act;

AND

4. The defendant accomplished the act:

*<Alternative 4A—force or fear>*

[by force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury to another person.]

*<Alternative 4B—future threats of bodily harm>*

[by threatening to retaliate against someone when there was a reasonable possibility that the defendant would carry out the threat. *A threat to retaliate* is a threat to kidnap, unlawfully restrain or confine, or inflict extreme pain, serious bodily injury, or death.]

*<Alternative 4C—threat of official action>*

[by threatening to use the authority of a public office to incarcerate, arrest, or deport someone. A *public official* is a person employed by a government agency who has authority to incarcerate, arrest, or deport. The other person must have reasonably believed that the defendant was a public official even if (he/she) was not.]

*Sexual penetration* means (penetration, however slight, of the genital or anal opening of the other person/ [or] causing the other person to penetrate, however slightly, the defendant's or someone else's genital or anal opening/ [or] causing the other person to penetrate, however slightly, his or her own genital or anal opening) for the purpose of sexual abuse, arousal, or gratification.

[A *foreign object, substance, instrument, or device* includes any part of the



body except a sexual organ.] [An *unknown object* includes any foreign object, substance, instrument, or device, or any part of the body, including a penis, if it is not known what object penetrated the opening.]

[Penetration for *sexual abuse* means penetration for the purpose of causing pain, injury, or discomfort.]

[In order to *consent*, a person must act freely and voluntarily and know the nature of the act.]

[Evidence that the defendant and the other person (dated/were married/had been married) is not enough by itself to constitute consent.]

[Evidence that the other person (requested/suggested/communicated) that the defendant use a condom or other birth control device is not enough by itself to constitute consent.]

[An act is *accomplished by force* if a person uses enough physical force to overcome the other person's will.]

[*Duress* means a direct or implied threat of force, violence, danger, hardship, or retribution that is enough to cause a reasonable person of ordinary sensitivity to do [or submit to] something that he or she would not otherwise do [or submit to]. When deciding whether the act was accomplished by duress, consider all the circumstances, including the age of the other person and (his/her) relationship to the defendant.]

[*Retribution* is a form of payback or revenge.]

[*Menace* means a threat, statement, or act showing an intent to injure someone.]

[An act is *accomplished by fear* if the other person is actually and reasonably afraid [or (he/she) is actually but unreasonably afraid and the defendant knows of (his/her) fear and takes advantage of it].]

<Defense: Reasonable Belief in Consent>

[The defendant is not guilty of forcible sexual penetration if (he/she) actually and reasonably believed that the other person consented to the act. The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not actually and reasonably believe that the other person consented. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty.]

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2016, April 2020*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of sexual penetration.

The court should select the appropriate alternative in element 4 to instruct how the sexual penetration was accomplished.

### ***Defenses—Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense of reasonable belief in consent if there is “substantial evidence of equivocal conduct that would have led a defendant to reasonably and in good faith believe consent existed where it did not.” (See *People v. Williams* (1992) 4 Cal.4th 354, 362 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 441, 841 P.2d 961]; *People v. Mayberry* (1975) 15 Cal.3d 143, 153–158 [125 Cal.Rptr. 745, 542 P.2d 1337].)

## **AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 289(a)(1), (2), (g).
- Specific Intent Crime. *People v. McCoy* (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1538 [156 Cal.Rptr.3d 382].
- Consent Defined. Pen. Code, §§ 261.6, 261.7.
- Duress Defined. *People v. Leal* (2004) 33 Cal.4th 999, 1004–1010 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 869, 94 P.3d 1071]; *People v. Pitmon* (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 38, 50 [216 Cal.Rptr. 221].
- Foreign Object, Substance, Instrument, or Device Defined. Pen. Code, § 289(k)(2); *People v. Wilcox* (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 715, 717 [223 Cal.Rptr. 170] [a finger is a “foreign object”].
- Menace Defined. Pen. Code, § 261(c) [in context of rape].
- Sexual Penetration Defined. Pen. Code, § 289(k); see *People v. Quintana* (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1362, 1371 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 235] [penetration of genital opening refers to penetration of labia majora, not the vagina].
- Threatening to Retaliate Defined. Pen. Code, § 289(l).
- Unknown Object Defined. Pen. Code, § 289(k)(3).
- Fear Defined. *People v. Reyes* (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 803, 810 [200 Cal.Rptr. 651]; *People v. Iniguez* (1994) 7 Cal.4th 847 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 258, 872 P.2d 1183] [in context of rape].
- Force Defined. *People v. Griffin* (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1015, 1023–1024 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 891, 94 P.3d 1089].
- Intent. *People v. Senior* (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 765, 776 [5 Cal.Rptr.2d 14] [specific intent is “purpose of sexual arousal, gratification, or abuse”].
- Mistake of Fact Regarding Consent. See *People v. Mayberry* (1975) 15 Cal.3d 143, 153–158 [125 Cal.Rptr. 745, 542 P.2d 1337] [in context of kidnapping and rape].
- Sexual Abuse Defined. *People v. White* (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 193, 205–206 [224 Cal.Rptr. 467].

## **COMMENTARY**

Penal Code section 289 requires that the sexual penetration be “against the victim’s

will.” (Pen. Code, § 289(a)(1), (2), (g).) “Against the will” has been defined as “without consent.” (See *People v. Key* (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 888, 895 [203 Cal.Rptr. 144] [in context of rape]; see also *People v. Young* (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 248, 257 [235 Cal.Rptr. 361].)

The instruction includes an optional definition of the sufficiency of “fear” because that term has meaning in the context of forcible sex offenses that is technical and may not be readily apparent to jurors. (See *People v. Reyes* (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 803, 810 [200 Cal.Rptr. 651] [fear in context of sodomy and oral copulation]; *People v. Iniguez* (1994) 7 Cal.4th 847, 856–857 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 258, 872 P.2d 1183] [fear in context of rape].)

The court is not required to instruct sua sponte on the definition of “duress” or “menace” and Penal Code section 289 does not define either term. (*People v. Pitmon* (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 38, 52 [216 Cal.Rptr. 221] [duress]). Optional definitions are provided for the court to use at its discretion. The definition of “duress” is based on *People v. Leal* (2004) 33 Cal.4th 999, 1004–1010 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 869, 94 P.3d 1071], and *People v. Pitmon* (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 38, 50 [216 Cal.Rptr. 221]. The definition of “menace” is based on the statutory definitions contained in Penal Code sections 261 and 262 [rape]. (See *People v. Cochran* (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 8, 13–14 [126 Cal.Rptr.2d 416] [using rape definition in case involving forcible lewd acts].) In *People v. Leal, supra*, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 1004–1010, the court held that the statutory definition of “duress” contained in Penal Code sections 261 and 262 does not apply to the use of that term in any other statute. The court did not discuss the statutory definition of “menace.” The court should consider the *Leal* opinion before giving the definition of “menace.”

The term “force” as used in the forcible sex offense statutes does not have a specialized meaning and court is not required to define the term sua sponte. (*People v. Griffin* (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1015, 1023–1024 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 891, 94 P.3d 1089].) In *People v. Griffin, supra*, the Supreme Court further stated,

Nor is there anything in the common usage definitions of the term “force,” or in the express statutory language of section 261 itself, that suggests force in a forcible rape prosecution actually means force “*substantially* different from or *substantially* greater than” the physical force normally inherent in an act of consensual sexual intercourse. [*People v. Cicero* (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 465, 474 [204 Cal.Rptr. 582].] To the contrary, it has long been recognized that “in order to establish force within the meaning of section 261, subdivision (2), the prosecution need only show the defendant used physical force of a degree sufficient to support a finding that the act of sexual intercourse was against the will of the [victim].” (*People v. Young* (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 248, 257–258 [235 Cal.Rptr. 361] . . .)

(*Ibid.* at 1023–1024 [emphasis in original].)

The committee has provided a bracketed definition of “force,” consistent with *People v. Griffin, supra*, that the court may give on request.

**LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES**

- Assault. Pen. Code, § 240.
- Assault With Intent to Commit Forcible Sexual Penetration. See Pen. Code, § 220; *In re Jose M.* (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1477 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 55] [in context of rape].
- Attempted Forcible Sexual Penetration. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 289(a)(1), (2), (g).
- Battery. Pen. Code, § 242.
- Sexual Battery. Pen. Code, §§ 243.4(a), (e)(1) under the expanded accusatory pleading test; *People v. Ortega* (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 956, 967–970 [193 Cal.Rptr.3d 142].

Nonforcible sex crimes requiring the perpetrator and victim to be within certain age limits are not lesser included offenses of forcible sex crimes. (*People v. Scott* (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 784, 794 [100 Cal.Rptr.2d 70].)

**RELATED ISSUES*****Consent Obtained by Fraudulent Representation***

A person may also induce someone else to consent to engage in sexual penetration by a false or fraudulent representation made with an intent to create fear, and which does induce fear and would cause a reasonable person to act contrary to his or her free will. (Pen. Code, § 266c [wobbler offense].) While section 266c requires coercion and fear to obtain consent, it does not involve physical force or violence. (See *People v. Cardenas* (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 927, 937–938 [26 Cal.Rptr.2d 567] [rejecting defendant’s argument that certain acts were consensual and without physical force, and were only violations of section 266c].)

***Consent Withdrawn***

A forcible rape occurs when, during apparently consensual intercourse, the victim expresses an objection and attempts to stop the act and the defendant forcibly continues despite the objection. (*In re John Z.* (2003) 29 Cal.4th 756, 760 [128 Cal.Rptr.2d 783, 60 P.3d 183].) If there is an issue whether consent to sexual penetration was withdrawn, see CALCRIM No. 1000, *Rape or Spousal Rape by Force, Fear, or Threats*, for language that may be adapted for use in this instruction.

***Minor Victim***

When sexual penetration is committed against the will of a person who is incapable of consent, such as a baby, and is accomplished by physical force that results in physical injury to the victim, the statutory requirements “against the will” and “use of force” are fully satisfied. (*People v. White* (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 193, 202 [224 Cal.Rptr. 467].)

***Multiple Penetrations***

A violation of section 289 is complete when “slight” penetration occurs. A new and separate violation is completed each time a new and separate penetration, however slight, occurs. (*People v. Harrison* (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 329, 334 [256 Cal.Rptr.

401, 768 P.2d 1078] [disapproving *People v. Hammon* (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 1084, 1097 [236 Cal.Rptr. 822]].)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Sex Offenses and Crimes Against Decency, §§ 56, 58, 178.

3 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, § 292.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.20[1][d], [2] (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, *Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure* §§ 12:16, 12:17 (The Rutter Group).

**1046. Sexual Penetration in Concert (Pen. Code, §§ 264.1, 289(a)(1))**

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**The defendant[s] [\_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] if not all defendants in trial charged with this count>] (is/are) charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with committing sexual penetration by acting in concert [with \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] or description[s] of uncharged participant[s]>] [in violation of Penal Code sections 264.1 and 289(a)(1)].**

**To prove that a defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:**

*<Alternative A—defendant committed sexual penetration>*

**[1.] [The defendant personally committed sexual penetration and voluntarily acted with someone else who aided and abetted its commission(;/.)]**

**[OR]**

*<Alternative B—defendant aided and abetted>*

**[(1/2).] [The defendant voluntarily aided and abetted someone else who personally committed sexual penetration.]**

**To decide whether the defendant[s] [or \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] or description[s] of uncharged participant[s]>] committed sexual penetration, please refer to the separate instructions that I (will give/have given) you on that crime. To decide whether the defendant[s] [or \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] or description[s] of uncharged participant[s]>] aided and abetted sexual penetration, please refer to the separate instructions that I (will give/have given) you on aiding and abetting. You must apply those instructions when you decide whether the People have proved sexual penetration in concert.**

*<MAKE CERTAIN THAT ALL APPROPRIATE INSTRUCTIONS ON SEXUAL PENETRATION AND AIDING AND ABETTING ARE GIVEN.>*

**[To prove the crime of sexual penetration in concert, the People do not have to prove a prearranged plan or scheme to commit sexual penetration.]**

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*New January 2006*

**BENCH NOTES**

***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime. (*People v. Ramirez* (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 603, 621 [236 Cal.Rptr. 404] [rape

in concert is a separate crime, not an enhancement].) The court also has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on sexual penetration. Give one or more of the following instructions defining sexual penetration: CALCRIM Nos. 1045 or 1047–1051.

Select alternative A or B, or both, depending on whether the defendant personally committed the crime or aided and abetted someone else.

Depending on the evidence, give the final bracketed paragraph on request regarding the lack of a prearranged plan. (See *People v. Calimee* (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 337, 341–342 [122 Cal.Rptr. 658].)

### ***Related Instructions***

See generally CALCRIM No. 400, *Aiding and Abetting: General Principles*, and CALCRIM No. 401, *Aiding and Abetting: Intended Crimes*.

## **AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 264.1, 289(a)(1); see *People v. Mom* (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1224 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 172] [rape in concert requires no greater force than that necessary for forcible rape], disapproved on other grounds in *People v. Griffin* (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1015, 1028 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 891, 94 P.3d 1089].
- Aiding and Abetting. *People v. Adams* (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 412, 445–446 [23 Cal.Rptr.2d 512]; see *People v. Beeman* (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 560–561 [199 Cal.Rptr. 60, 674 P.2d 1318].

## **LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES**

- Assault. Pen. Code, § 240.
- Attempted Sexual Penetration. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 289(a)(1).
- Attempted Sexual Penetration in Concert. Pen. Code, §§ 663, 264.1, 289(a)(1).
- Battery. Pen. Code, § 242.
- Sexual Penetration. Pen. Code, § 289(a)(1).

## **RELATED ISSUES**

See the Related Issues section under CALCRIM No. 1045, *Sexual Penetration by Force, Fear, or Threats*, and CALCRIM No. 1001, *Rape or Spousal Rape in Concert*.

## **SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Sex Offenses and Crimes Against Decency, § 21.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.20[1][d], [2][c] (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, *Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure* §§ 12:16, 12:17 (The Rutter Group).



**1047. Sexual Penetration of an Intoxicated Person (Pen. Code,  
§ 289(e))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with sexual penetration of a person while that person was intoxicated [in violation of Penal Code section 289(e)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant committed an act of sexual penetration with another person;
2. The penetration was accomplished by using (a/an) (foreign object[,]/ [or] substance[,]/ [or]instrument[,]/ [or]device[,]/ [or] unknown object);
3. The effect of (a/an) (intoxicating/anesthetic/controlled) substance prevented the other person from resisting the act;

AND

4. The defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the effect of that substance prevented the other person from resisting the act.

*Sexual penetration* means (penetration, however slight, of the genital or anal opening of the other person/ [or] causing the other person to penetrate, however slightly, the defendant's or someone else's genital or anal opening/ [or] causing the other person to penetrate, however slightly, his or her own genital or anal opening) for the purpose of sexual abuse, arousal, or gratification.

A person is *prevented from resisting* if he or she is so intoxicated that he or she cannot give legal consent. In order to give legal consent, a person must be able to exercise reasonable judgment. In other words, the person must be able to understand and weigh the physical nature of the act, its moral character, and probable consequences. Legal consent is consent given freely and voluntarily by someone who knows the nature of the act involved.

[\_\_\_\_\_ <If appropriate, insert controlled substance> (is/are) [a] controlled substance[s].]

[A *foreign object, substance, instrument, or device* includes any part of the body except a sexual organ.] [An *unknown object* includes any foreign object, substance, instrument, or device, or any part of the body, including a penis, if it is not known what object penetrated the opening.]

[Penetration for *sexual abuse* means penetration for the purpose of causing pain, injury, or discomfort.]



<Defense: Reasonable Belief Capable of Consent>

**[The defendant is not guilty of this crime if (he/she) actually and reasonably believed that the person was capable of consenting to the act, even if the defendant’s belief was wrong. The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not actually and reasonably believe that the woman was capable of consenting. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty.]**

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*New January 2006; Revised April 2020*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

A space is provided to identify controlled substances if the parties agree that there is no issue of fact.

### *Defenses—Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense of reasonable belief the person was capable of consent if there is sufficient evidence to support the defense. (See *People v. Giardino* (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 454, 472 [98 Cal.Rptr.2d 315].)

### *Related Instructions*

CALCRIM No. 1046, *Sexual Penetration in Concert*, may be given in conjunction with this instruction if appropriate.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 289(e).
- Specific Intent Crime. *People v. McCoy* (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1538 [156 Cal.Rptr.3d 382].
- Controlled Substances Defined. Health & Safety Code, §§ 11054–11058; see *People v. Avila* (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 791, 798, fn. 7 [95 Cal.Rptr.2d 651].
- Foreign Object, Substance, Instrument, or Device Defined. Pen. Code, § 289(k)(2); *People v. Wilcox* (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 715, 717 [223 Cal.Rptr. 170] [a finger is a “foreign object”].
- Sexual Penetration Defined. Pen. Code, § 289(k)(1); see *People v. Quintana* (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1362, 1371 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 235] [penetration of genital opening refers to penetration of labia majora, not the vagina].
- Unknown Object Defined. Pen. Code, § 289(k)(3).
- Anesthetic Effect Defined. See *People v. Avila* (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 791, 798–799 [95 Cal.Rptr.2d 651] [in context of sodomy].

- Prevented From Resisting Defined. See *People v. Giardino* (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 454, 465–467 [98 Cal.Rptr.2d 315] [in context of rape].
- Sexual Abuse Defined. *People v. White* (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 193, 205–206 [224 Cal.Rptr. 467].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Assault. Pen. Code, § 240.
- Attempted Sexual Penetration. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 289(a)(1) & (2), (g).
- Attempted Sexual Penetration of Intoxicated Person. Pen. Code, §§ 663, 289(e).
- Battery. Pen. Code, § 242.

### RELATED ISSUES

See the Related Issues section under CALCRIM No. 1045, *Sexual Penetration by Force, Fear, or Threats*.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Sex Offenses and Crimes Against Decency, §§ 56, 59–61, 178.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.20[1][d], [5] (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, *Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure* §§ 12:16, 12:17 (The Rutter Group).

**1048. Sexual Penetration of an Unconscious Person (Pen. Code, § 289(d))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with sexual penetration of a person who was unconscious of the nature of the act [in violation of Penal Code section 289(d)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant committed an act of sexual penetration with another person;
2. The penetration was accomplished by using (a/an) (foreign object[,]/ [or] substance[,]/ [or] instrument[,]/ [or] device[,]/ [or] unknown object);
3. The other person was unable to resist because (he/she) was unconscious of the nature of the act;

**AND**

4. The defendant knew that the other person was unable to resist because (he/she) was unconscious of the nature of the act.

*Sexual penetration* means (penetration, however slight, of the genital or anal opening of the other person/ [or] causing the other person to penetrate, however slightly, the defendant's or someone else's genital or anal opening/ [or] causing the other person to penetrate, however slightly, his or her own genital or anal opening) for the purpose of sexual abuse, arousal, or gratification.

A person is *unconscious of the nature of the act* if he or she is (unconscious or asleep/ [or] not aware that the act is occurring/ [or] not aware of the essential characteristics of the act because the perpetrator tricked, lied to, or concealed information from the person/ [or] not aware of the essential characteristics of the act because the perpetrator fraudulently represented that the sexual penetration served a professional purpose when it served no professional purpose).

[A *foreign object, substance, instrument, or device* includes any part of the body except a sexual organ.] [An *unknown object* includes any foreign object, substance, instrument, or device, or any part of the body, including a penis, if it is not known what object penetrated the opening.]

[Penetration for *sexual abuse* means penetration for the purpose of causing pain, injury, or discomfort.]

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## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

### *Related Instructions*

CALCRIM No. 1046, *Sexual Penetration in Concert*, may be given in conjunction with this instruction if appropriate.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 289(d).
- Specific Intent Crime. *People v. McCoy* (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1538 [156 Cal.Rptr.3d 382].
- Foreign Object, Substance, Instrument, or Device Defined. Pen. Code, § 289(k)(2); see *People v. Wilcox* (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 715, 717 [223 Cal.Rptr. 170] [a finger is a “foreign object”].
- Sexual Penetration Defined. Pen. Code, § 289(k)(1); see *People v. Quintana* (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1362, 1371 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 235] [penetration of genital opening refers to penetration of labia majora, not the vagina].
- Unknown Object Defined. Pen. Code, § 289(k)(3).
- Sexual Abuse Defined. *People v. White* (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 193, 205–206 [224 Cal.Rptr. 467].
- Unconscious of Nature of Act. *People v. Howard* (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 53, 55 [172 Cal.Rptr. 539] [total unconsciousness is not required; in context of sodomy and oral copulation]; see *Boro v. Superior Court* (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 1224, 1229–1231 [210 Cal.Rptr. 122] [rape victim not unconscious of nature of act; fraud in the inducement].

## COMMENTARY

The statutory language describing unconsciousness includes “was not aware, knowing, perceiving, or cognizant that the act occurred.” (See Pen. Code, § 289(d)(2).) The committee did not discern any difference among the statutory terms and therefore used “aware” in the instruction. If there is an issue over a particular term, that term should be inserted in the instruction.

## LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Assault. Pen. Code, § 240.
- Attempted Sexual Penetration of Unconscious Person. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 289(d).
- Battery. Pen. Code, § 242.

## RELATED ISSUES

See the Related Issues section under CALCRIM No. 1045, *Sexual Penetration by Force, Fear, or Threats*.

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Sex Offenses and Crimes Against Decency, §§ 56, 59–61, 178.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.20[1][d], [5] (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure §§ 12:16, 12:17 (The Rutter Group).

**1049. Sexual Penetration of a Disabled Person (Pen. Code,  
§ 289(b))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with sexual penetration of a mentally or physically disabled person [in violation of Penal Code section 289(b)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant committed an act of sexual penetration with another person;
2. The penetration was accomplished by using (a/an) (foreign object[,]/ [or] substance[,]/ [or] instrument[,]/ [or] device[,]/ [or] unknown object);
3. The other person had a (mental disorder/developmental or physical disability) that prevented (him/her) from legally consenting;

**AND**

4. The defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the other person had a (mental disorder/developmental or physical disability) that prevented (him/her) from legally consenting.

*Sexual penetration* means (penetration, however slight, of the genital or anal opening of the other person/ [or] causing the other person to penetrate, however slightly, the defendant's or someone else's genital or anal opening/ [or] causing the other person to penetrate, however slightly, his or her own genital or anal opening) for the purpose of sexual abuse, arousal, or gratification.

A person is *prevented from legally consenting* if he or she is unable to understand the act, its nature, and probable consequences.

[A *foreign object, substance, instrument, or device* includes any part of the body except a sexual organ.] [An *unknown object* includes any foreign object, substance, instrument, or device, or any part of the body, including a penis, if it is not known what object was used to accomplish the penetration.]

[Penetration for *sexual abuse* means penetration for the purpose of causing pain, injury, or discomfort.]

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

### *Related Instructions*

CALCRIM No. 1046, *Sexual Penetration in Concert*, may be given in conjunction with this instruction if appropriate.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 289(b).
- Specific Intent Crime. *People v. McCoy* (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1538 [156 Cal.Rptr.3d 382].
- Consent Defined. Pen. Code, § 261.6; see *People v. Boggs* (1930) 107 Cal.App. 492, 495–496 [290 P. 618].
- Foreign Object, Substance, Instrument, or Device Defined. Pen. Code, § 289(k)(2); see *People v. Wilcox* (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 715, 717 [223 Cal.Rptr. 170] [a finger is a “foreign object”].
- Sexual Penetration Defined. Pen. Code, § 289(k)(1); see *People v. Quintana* (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1362, 1371 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 235] [penetration of genital opening refers to penetration of labia majora, not the vagina].
- Unknown Object Defined. Pen. Code, § 289(k)(3).
- Sexual Abuse Defined. *People v. White* (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 193, 205–206 [224 Cal.Rptr. 467].

## LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Assault. Pen. Code, § 240.
- Attempted Sexual Penetration of Disabled Person. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 289(b).
- Battery. Pen. Code, § 242.

## RELATED ISSUES

See the Related Issues section under CALCRIM No. 1045, *Sexual Penetration by Force, Fear, or Threats*, and CALCRIM No. 1004, *Rape of a Disabled Woman*.

## SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Sex Offenses and Crimes Against Decency, §§ 56, 59–61, 178.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.20[1][d], [5] (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, *Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure* §§ 12:16, 12:17 (The Rutter Group).

**1050. Sexual Penetration of a Disabled Person in a Mental Hospital (Pen. Code, § 289(c))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with sexual penetration of a mentally or physically disabled person in a mental hospital [in violation of Penal Code section 289(c)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant committed an act of sexual penetration with another person;
2. The penetration was accomplished by using (a/an) (foreign object[,]/ [or] substance[,]/ [or] instrument[,]/ [or] device[,]/ [or] unknown object);
3. The other person had a (mental disorder/developmental or physical disability) that prevented (him/her) from legally consenting;
4. The defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the other person had a (mental disorder/developmental or physical disability) that prevented (him/her) from legally consenting;

AND

5. At the time of the act, both people were confined in a state hospital or other mental health facility.

*Sexual penetration* means (penetration, however slight, of the genital or anal opening of the other person/ [or] causing the other person to penetrate, however slightly, the defendant's or someone else's genital or anal opening/ [or] causing the other person to penetrate, however slightly, his or her own genital or anal opening) for the purpose of sexual abuse, arousal, or gratification.

A person is *prevented from legally consenting* if he or she is unable to understand the act, its nature, and probable consequences.

[A *foreign object, substance, instrument, or device* includes any part of the body except a sexual organ.] [An *unknown object* includes any foreign object, substance, instrument, or device, or any part of the body, including a penis, if it is not known what object was used to accomplish the penetration.]

[Penetration for *sexual abuse* means penetration for the purpose of causing pain, injury, or discomfort.]

[\_\_\_\_\_ <If appropriate, insert name of facility> is a (state hospital/



**mental health facility).] [A *state hospital or other mental health facility* includes a state hospital for the care and treatment of the mentally disordered or any other public or private facility approved by a county mental health director for the care and treatment of the mentally disordered.]**

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*New January 2006; Revised April 2020*

## BENCH NOTES

### ***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

A space is provided to identify a facility as a state hospital or other mental health facility if the parties agree that there is no issue of fact. Alternatively, if there is a factual dispute about whether an institution is a state hospital or other mental health facility, give the final bracketed sentence. (See Pen. Code, § 289(c).)

### ***Related Instructions***

CALCRIM No. 1046, *Sexual Penetration in Concert*, may be given in conjunction with this instruction if appropriate.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 289(c).
- Specific Intent Crime. *People v. McCoy* (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1538 [156 Cal.Rptr.3d 382].
- Consent Defined. Pen. Code, § 261.6; see *People v. Boggs* (1930) 107 Cal.App. 492, 495–496 [290 P. 618].
- Foreign Object, Substance, Instrument, or Device Defined. Pen. Code, § 289(k)(2); see *People v. Wilcox* (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 715, 717 [223 Cal.Rptr. 170] [a finger is a “foreign object”].
- Sexual Penetration Defined. Pen. Code, § 289(k)(1); see *People v. Quintana* (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1362, 1371 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 235] [penetration of genital opening refers to penetration of labia majora, not the vagina].
- State Hospital or Mental Health Facility Defined. Pen. Code, § 289(c); see Welf. & Inst. Code, § 7100 [county psychiatric facilities], § 7200 [state hospitals for mentally disordered], § 7500 [state hospitals for developmentally disabled].
- Unknown Object Defined. Pen. Code, § 289(k)(3).
- Sexual Abuse Defined. *People v. White* (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 193, 205–206 [224 Cal.Rptr. 467].

## LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Assault. Pen. Code, § 240.

- Attempted Sexual Penetration of Disabled Person. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 289(c).
- Battery. Pen. Code, § 242.

### **RELATED ISSUES**

See the Related Issues section under CALCRIM No. 1045, *Sexual Penetration by Force, Fear, or Threats*, and CALCRIM No. 1004, *Rape of a Disabled Woman*.

### **SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Sex Offenses and Crimes Against Decency, §§ 56, 59–61, 178.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.20[1][d], [5] (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, *Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure* §§ 12:16, 12:17 (The Rutter Group).

## 1051. Sexual Penetration by Fraud (Pen. Code, § 289(f))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with sexual penetration by fraud [in violation of Penal Code section 289(f)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant committed an act of sexual penetration with another person;
2. At the time of the act, the defendant and the other person were not married to each other;
3. The penetration was accomplished by using (a/an) (foreign object[,]/ [or] substance[,]/ [or] instrument[,]/ [or] device[,]/ [or] unknown object);
4. The other person submitted to the act because (he/she) believed the person (committing the act/causing the act to be committed) was someone (he/she) knew, other than the defendant;

**AND**

5. The defendant tricked, lied, [used an artifice or pretense,] or concealed information, intending to make the other person believe that (he/she) was someone (he/she) knew, while intending to hide (his/her) own identity.

*Sexual penetration* means (penetration, however slight, of the genital or anal opening of the other person/ [or] causing the other person to penetrate, however slightly, the defendant's or someone else's genital or anal opening/ [or] causing the other person to penetrate, however slightly, his or her own genital or anal opening) for the purpose of sexual abuse, arousal, or gratification.

[A *foreign object, substance, instrument, or device* includes any part of the body except a sexual organ.] [An *unknown object* includes any foreign object, substance, instrument, or device, or any part of the body, including a penis, if it is not known what object was used to accomplish the penetration.]

[Penetration for *sexual abuse* means penetration for the purpose of causing pain, injury, or discomfort.]

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2015, April 2020*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

Penal Code section 289(f) was amended effective September 9, 2013, in response to *People v. Morales* (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 583 [150 Cal.Rptr.3d 920].

### *Related Instructions*

CALCRIM No. 1046, *Sexual Penetration in Concert*, may be given in conjunction with this instruction if appropriate.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 289(f).
- Specific Intent Crime. *People v. McCoy* (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1538 [156 Cal.Rptr.3d 382].
- Foreign Object, Substance, Instrument, or Device Defined. Pen. Code, § 289(k)(2); see *People v. Wilcox* (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 715, 717 [223 Cal.Rptr. 170] [a finger is a “foreign object”].
- Sexual Penetration Defined. Pen. Code, § 289(k)(1); see *People v. Quintana* (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1362, 1371 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 235] [penetration of genital opening refers to penetration of labia majora, not the vagina].
- Unknown Object Defined. Pen. Code, § 289(k)(3).
- Sexual Abuse Defined. *People v. White* (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 193, 205–206 [224 Cal.Rptr. 467].

## LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Assault. Pen. Code, § 240.
- Attempted Sexual Penetration by Fraud. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 289(f).
- Battery. Pen. Code, § 242.

## RELATED ISSUES

See the Related Issues section under CALCRIM No. 1045, *Sexual Penetration by Force, Fear, or Threats*.

## SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Sex Offenses and Crimes Against Decency, § 58.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.20[1][d], [6] (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, *Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure* §§ 12:16, 12:17 (The Rutter Group).

**1052–1059. Reserved for Future Use**

## (v) Lewd and Lascivious Act

### 1060. Lewd or Lascivious Act: Dependent Person (Pen. Code, § 288(b)(2) & (c)(2))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with a lewd or lascivious act on a dependent person [by force or fear] [in violation of Penal Code section 288].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant was a caretaker of a dependent person;
2. The defendant, while serving as a caretaker, willfully (committed/ conspired to commit/aided and abetted/facilitated) a lewd or lascivious act on that person;

[AND]

3. The defendant (committed/conspired to commit/aided and abetted/facilitated) the act with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust, passions, or sexual desires of (himself/ herself) or the dependent person(;/.)

<Give element 4 when instructing on force or violence>

[AND]

4. In (committing/conspiring to commit/aiding and abetting/ facilitating) the act, the defendant used force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury to the dependent person or someone else.]

*A lewd or lascivious act is any touching of a person with the intent to sexually arouse the perpetrator or the other person. A lewd or lascivious act includes touching any part of the person's body, either on the bare skin or through the clothes the person is wearing. [A lewd or lascivious act includes causing someone to touch his or her own body or someone else's body at the instigation of the perpetrator who has the required intent.]*

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose. It is not required that he or she intend to break the law, hurt someone else, or gain any advantage.

*A caretaker is an owner, operator, administrator, employee, independent contractor, agent, or volunteer of a public or private facility, including (a/an) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert specific facility from Pen. Code, § 288(f)(1)>, that provides care for dependent persons or for those aged 65 or older.*

*A dependent person* is someone who has physical or mental impairments that substantially restrict his or her ability to carry out normal activities or to protect his or her rights. This definition includes, but is not limited to, those who have developmental disabilities or whose physical or mental abilities have been significantly diminished by age.

[Actually arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust, passions, or sexual desires of the perpetrator or dependent person is not required.]

[The *force* used must be substantially different from or substantially greater than the force needed to accomplish the lewd and lascivious act itself.]

[*Duress* is a direct or implied threat of force, violence, danger, hardship, or retribution that causes a reasonable person to do [or submit to] something that he or she would not do [or submit to] otherwise. When deciding whether the act was accomplished by duress, consider all the circumstances, including the age of the dependent person and (his/her) relationship to the defendant.] [*Retribution* is a form of payback or revenge.]

[*Menace* means a threat, statement, or act showing an intent to injure someone.]

[An act is accomplished by *fear* if the dependent person is actually and reasonably afraid [or (he/she) is actually but unreasonably afraid and the defendant knows of (his/her) fear and takes advantage of it].]

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2013, September 2017*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If the defendant is charged in a single count with multiple alleged acts, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on unanimity. (*People v. Jones* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 321–322 [270 Cal.Rptr. 611, 792 P.2d 643].) The court must determine whether it is appropriate to give the standard unanimity instruction, CALCRIM No. 3500, *Unanimity*, or the modified unanimity instruction, CALCRIM No. 3501, *Unanimity: When Generic Testimony of Offense Presented*. Review the discussion in the bench notes to these two instructions and *People v. Jones, supra*, 51 Cal.3d at pp. 321–322.

If the defendant is charged with using force or fear in committing the lewd act on a dependent person, give bracketed element 4 and the bracketed sentence that begins with “The force must be substantially different.” (See *People v. Pitmon* (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 38, 52 [216 Cal.Rptr. 221] [court has **sua sponte** duty to define “force”

as used in Pen. Code, § 288(b)(1)]; *People v. Griffin* (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1015, 1018–1019 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 891, 94 P.3d 1089].) On request, give any of the relevant bracketed definitions of duress, menace, or fear.

In the paragraph defining “caretaker,” insert applicable caretaker facilities listed in Penal Code section 288(f)(1), such as a 24-hour health facility, a home health agency, or a community care or respite care facility, depending on the facts of the case.

Penal Code section 288(b)(2) or (c)(2) does not apply to a caretaker who is a spouse of, or who is in an equivalent domestic relationship with, the dependent person. (Pen. Code, § 288(h).)

Give the bracketed sentence that begins, “Actually arousing, appealing to,” on request. (*People v. McCurdy* (1923) 60 Cal.App. 499, 502 [213 P. 59].)

### ***Defenses—Instructional Duty***

In the context of lewd acts accomplished by force on a minor, there is disagreement as to whether knowing consent by the minor is an affirmative defense. (See *People v. Cicero* (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 465, 484–485 [204 Cal.Rptr. 582] [when no physical harm, knowing consent of minor is an affirmative defense]; *People v. Quinones* (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 1154, 1158 [249 Cal.Rptr. 435] [lewd act need not be against will of victim, following dissent in *Cicero*, *supra*, 157 Cal.App.3d at pp. 487–488, dis. opn. of Regan, Acting P.J.]; *People v. Cardenas* (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 927, 937, fn. 7 [26 Cal.Rptr.2d 567] [dicta].) If the court concludes that consent is a defense and there is sufficient evidence, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense. (See consent defense instructions in CALCRIM No. 1000, *Rape or Spousal Rape by Force, Fear, or Threats*.)

## **AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 288(b)(2) & (c)(2).
- Caretaker Defined. Pen. Code, § 288(f)(1) & (g).
- Dependent Person Defined. Pen. Code, § 288(f)(3).
- Duress Defined. *People v. Leal* (2004) 33 Cal.4th 999, 1004–1010 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 869]; *People v. Pitmon* (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 38, 50 [216 Cal.Rptr. 221]; *People v. Cochran* (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 8, 13–14 [126 Cal.Rptr.2d 416].
- Elder Defined. See Pen. Code, § 368(g).
- Menace Defined. See Pen. Code, § 261(c) [in context of rape].
- Actual Arousal Not Required. See *People v. McCurdy* (1923) 60 Cal.App. 499, 502 [213 P. 59].
- Any Touching With Intent to Arouse. See *People v. Martinez* (1995) 11 Cal.4th 434, 444, 452 [45 Cal.Rptr.2d 905, 903 P.2d 1037] [disapproving *People v. Wallace* (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 568, 574–580 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 67] and its progeny]; see *People v. Diaz* (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1424, 1427–1428 [49 Cal.Rptr.2d 252] [list of examples].



- Dependent Person Touching Own Body Parts at Defendant’s Instigation. See *People v. Meacham* (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 142, 152–153 [199 Cal.Rptr. 586] [“constructive” touching; approving *Austin* instruction]; *People v. Austin* (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 110, 114–115 [168 Cal.Rptr. 401].
- Fear Defined. See *People v. Cardenas* (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 927, 939–940 [26 Cal.Rptr.2d 567]; *People v. Iniguez* (1994) 7 Cal.4th 847 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 258, 872 P.2d 1183] [in context of rape].
- Force Defined. *People v. Cicero* (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 465, 474 [204 Cal.Rptr. 582]; *People v. Pitmon* (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 38, 52 [216 Cal.Rptr. 221]; see also *People v. Griffin* (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1015, 1018–1019 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 891, 94 P.3d 1089] [discussing *Cicero* and *Pitmon*].
- Lewd Defined. See *In re Smith* (1972) 7 Cal.3d 362, 365 [102 Cal.Rptr. 335, 497 P.2d 807] [in context of indecent exposure]; see *Pryor v. Municipal Court* (1979) 25 Cal.3d 238, 256–257, fn. 13 [158 Cal.Rptr. 330, 599 P.2d 636].

### COMMENTARY

The instruction includes definitions of “force” and “fear” because those terms have meanings in the context of the crime of lewd acts by force that are technical and may not be readily apparent to jurors. (*People v. Pitmon* (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 38, 52 [216 Cal.Rptr. 221] [force]; see *People v. Cardenas* (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 927, 939–940 [26 Cal.Rptr.2d 567] [fear]; *People v. Iniguez* (1994) 7 Cal.4th 847, 856–857 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 258, 872 P.2d 1183] [fear in context of rape].) The Court of Appeal has held that the definition of “force” as used in Penal Code section 288(b), subsection (1) (lewd acts by force with a minor) is different from the meaning of “force” as used in other sex offense statutes. (*People v. Cicero* (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 465, 474 [204 Cal.Rptr. 582].) In other sex offense statutes, such as Penal Code section 261 defining rape, “force” does not have a technical meaning and there is no requirement to define the term. (*People v. Griffin* (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1015, 1018–1019 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 891, 94 P.3d 1089].) In Penal Code section 288(b)(1), on the other hand, “force” means force “*substantially* different from or *substantially* greater than” the physical force normally inherent in the sexual act. (*Id.* at p. 1018 [quoting *People v. Cicero* (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 465, 474 [204 Cal.Rptr. 582] [emphasis in *Griffin*].) The court is required to instruct **sua sponte** in this special definition of “force.” (*People v. Pitmon, supra*, 170 Cal.App.3d at p. 52; see also *People v. Griffin, supra*, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 1026–1028.) It would seem that this definition of “force” would also apply to the crime of lewd acts with a dependant person, under Penal Code section 288(b) subsection (2).

The court is not required to instruct *sua sponte* on the definition of “duress” or “menace” and Penal Code section 288 does not define either term. (*People v. Pitmon* (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 38, 52 [216 Cal.Rptr. 221] [duress]). Optional definitions are provided for the court to use at its discretion. The definition of “duress” is based on *People v. Leal* (2004) 33 Cal.4th 999, 1004–1010 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 869, 94 P.3d 1071], and *People v. Pitmon* (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 38, 50 [216 Cal.Rptr. 221]. The definition of “menace” is based on the statutory definitions



contained in Penal Code sections 261 and 262 [rape]. (See *People v. Cochran* (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 8, 13–14 [126 Cal.Rptr.2d 416] [using rape definition in case involving forcible lewd acts].) In *People v. Leal, supra*, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1007, the court held that the statutory definition of “duress” contained in Penal Code sections 261 and 262 does not apply to the use of that term in any other statute. The court did not discuss the statutory definition of “menace.” The court should consider the *Leal* opinion before giving the definition of “menace.”

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Attempted Lewd Act With Dependent Person. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 288(c)(2).
- Attempted Lewd Act by Force With Dependent Person. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 288(b)(2).
- Simple Battery Not Lesser Included Offense of Lewd Act on Dependent Person Under the Statutory Elements Test. *People v. Chenelle* (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 1255, 1263–1264 [209 Cal.Rptr.3d 371].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Developmental Disability*

If the dependent person has a developmental disability, arguably there is no sua sponte duty to define “developmental disability” under Welfare and Institutions Code section 4512(a) or Penal Code section 1370.1(a)(1). The Legislature did not intend to limit this phrase in other code sections to such technical medical or legal definitions, although a pinpoint instruction may be requested if it helps the jury in any particular case. (See *People v. Mobley* (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 761, 781–783 [85 Cal.Rptr.2d 474] [in context of oral copulation of disabled person].)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Sex Offenses and Crimes Against Decency, §§ 41, 47–55, 178.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.21[1][a][iv], [v], [b]–[d] (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure §§ 12:16, 12:17 (The Rutter Group).

**1061–1069. Reserved for Future Use**



## **B. AGAINST MINORS ONLY**

### **(i) Unlawful Sexual Intercourse**

#### **1070. Unlawful Sexual Intercourse: Defendant 21 or Older (Pen. Code, § 261.5(a) & (d))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with having unlawful sexual intercourse with a person who was under the age of 16 years at a time after the defendant had reached (his/her) 21st birthday [in violation of Penal Code section 261.5(d)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

- 1. The defendant had sexual intercourse with another person;**
- 2. The defendant and the other person were not married to each other at the time of the intercourse;**
- 3. The defendant was at least 21 years old at the time of the intercourse;**

**AND**

- 4. The other person was under the age of 16 years at the time of the intercourse.**

*Sexual intercourse* means any penetration, no matter how slight, of the vagina or genitalia by the penis. [Ejaculation is not required.]

[It is not a defense that the other person may have consented to the intercourse.]

[Under the law, a person becomes one year older as soon as the first minute of his or her birthday has begun.]

*<Defense: Good Faith Belief 18 or Over>*

[The defendant is not guilty of this crime if (he/she) reasonably and actually believed that the other person was age 18 or older. In order for reasonable and actual belief to excuse the defendant's behavior, there must be evidence tending to show that (he/she) reasonably and actually believed that the other person was age 18 or older. If you have a reasonable doubt about whether the defendant reasonably and actually believed that the other person was age 18 or older, you must find (him/her) not guilty.]

*New January 2006; Revised April 2008*

## BENCH NOTES

### ***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

For a discussion of the **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense of mistake of fact, see CALCRIM No. 3406.

Give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “It is not a defense that” on request, if there is evidence that the minor consented to the act. (See *People v. Kemp* (1934) 139 Cal.App. 48, 51 [34 P.2d 502].)

Give the bracketed paragraph about calculating age if requested. (Fam. Code, § 6500; *In re Harris* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 849–850 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391].)

### ***Defenses—Instructional Duty***

If there is sufficient evidence that the defendant reasonably and actually believed that the minor was age 18 or older, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense. (See *People v. Hernandez* (1964) 61 Cal.2d 529, 535–536 [39 Cal.Rptr. 361, 393 P.2d 673]; *People v. Winters* (1966) 242 Cal.App.2d 711, 716 [51 Cal.Rptr. 735].)

### ***Related Instruction***

CALCRIM No. 3406, *Mistake of Fact*.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 261.5(a) & (d).
- Minor’s Consent Not a Defense. *People v. Kemp* (1934) 139 Cal.App. 48, 51.
- Penetration Defined. Pen. Code, § 263; *People v. Karsai* (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 224, 233–234 [182 Cal.Rptr. 406], disapproved on other grounds by *People v. Jones* (1988) 46 Cal.3d 585, 600 [250 Cal.Rptr. 635, 758 P.2d 1165].
- Good Faith Belief in Victim’s Age. *People v. Zeihm* (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 1085, 1089 [115 Cal.Rptr. 528].

## LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Attempted Unlawful Sexual Intercourse. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 261.5; see, e.g., *People v. Nicholson* (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 617, 622–624 [159 Cal.Rptr. 766].

Contributing to the delinquency of a minor (Pen. Code, § 272) is not a lesser included offense of unlawful sexual intercourse. (*People v. Bobb* (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 88, 93–96 [254 Cal.Rptr. 707], disapproved on another ground in *People v. Barton* (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 198, fn. 7 [47 Cal.Rptr.2d 569, 906 P.2d 531].)

## RELATED ISSUES

### *Calculating Age*

The “birthday rule” of former Civil Code section 26 (now see Fam. Code, § 6500) applies. A person attains a given age as soon as the first minute of his or her birthday has begun, not on the day before the birthday. (*In re Harris* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 844–845, 849 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391].)

### *Participant Must be Over 21*

One of the two participants in the act of unlawful sexual intercourse must be over 21 and the other person must be under 16. Proof that an aider and abettor was over 21 is insufficient to sustain the aider and abettor’s conviction if neither of the actual participants was over 21 years old. (See *People v. Culbertson* (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 508, 513, 515 [217 Cal.Rptr. 347] [applying same argument to section 287(c), where perpetrator must be 10 years older than victim under 14].)

### *Mistaken Belief About Victim’s Age*

A defendant is not entitled to a mistake of fact instruction if he claims that he believed that the complaining witness was over 16. His belief would still constitute the *mens rea* of intending to have sex with a minor. (*People v. Scott* (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 784, 800–801 [100 Cal.Rptr.2d 70].) However, if he claims that he believed that the complaining witness was over 18 years old, he is entitled to the mistake of fact instruction. (See *People v. Hernandez* (1964) 61 Cal.2d 529, 535–536 [39 Cal.Rptr. 361, 393 P.2d 673].)

### *Married Minor Victim*

A defendant may be convicted of unlawful sexual intercourse even if the minor victim is married or was previously married to another person. (*People v. Courtney* (1960) 180 Cal.App.2d 61, 62 [4 Cal.Rptr. 274] [construing former statute]; *People v. Caldwell* (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 229, 230–231 [63 Cal.Rptr. 63].)

### *Sterility*

Sterility is not a defense to unlawful sexual intercourse. (*People v. Langdon* (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1419, 1421 [238 Cal.Rptr. 158].)

## SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Defenses, §§ 53–54.

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Sex Offenses and Crimes Against Decency, §§ 22–26, 178.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.20[3][a] (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure §§ 12:16, 12:17 (The Rutter Group).

## 1071. Unlawful Sexual Intercourse: Minor More Than Three Years Younger (Pen. Code, § 261.5(a) & (c))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor who was more than three years younger than the defendant [in violation of Penal Code section 261.5(c)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant had sexual intercourse with another person;
2. The defendant and the other person were not married to each other at the time of the intercourse;

AND

3. At the time of the intercourse, the other person was under the age of 18 and more than three years younger than the defendant.

*Sexual intercourse* means any penetration, no matter how slight, of the vagina or genitalia by the penis. [Ejaculation is not required.]

[It is not a defense that the other person may have consented to the intercourse.]

[Under the law, a person becomes one year older as soon as the first minute of his or her birthday has begun.]

<Defense: Good Faith Belief 18 or Over>

[The defendant is not guilty of this crime if (he/she) reasonably and actually believed that the other person was age 18 or older. The People must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not reasonably and actually believe that the other person was at least 18 years old. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of this crime.]

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*New January 2006; Revised September 2020*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

Give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “It is not a defense that” on request, if there is evidence that the minor consented to the act. (See *People v. Kemp* (1934) 139 Cal.App. 48, 51 [34 P.2d 502].)

Give the bracketed paragraph about calculating age if requested. (Fam. Code,

§ 6500; *In re Harris* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 849–850 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391].)

### ***Defenses—Instructional Duty***

If there is sufficient evidence that the defendant reasonably and actually believed that the minor was age 18 or older, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense. (See *People v. Hernandez* (1964) 61 Cal.2d 529, 535–536 [39 Cal.Rptr. 361, 393 P.2d 673]; *People v. Winters* (1966) 242 Cal.App.2d 711, 716 [51 Cal.Rptr. 735].)

## **AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 261.5(a) & (c).
- Minor’s Consent Not a Defense. *People v. Kemp* (1934) 139 Cal.App. 48, 51 [34 P.2d 502].
- Mistake of Fact Regarding Age. *People v. Hernandez* (1964) 61 Cal.2d 529, 535–536 [39 Cal.Rptr. 361, 393 P.2d 673]; see *People v. Zeihm* (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 1085, 1089 [115 Cal.Rptr. 528] [belief about age is a defense], disapproved on other grounds in *People v. Freeman* (1988) 46 Cal.3d 419, 428, fn. 6 [250 Cal.Rptr. 598, 758 P.2d 1128].
- Penetration Defined. Pen. Code, § 263; *People v. Karsai* (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 224, 233–234 [182 Cal.Rptr. 406], disapproved on other grounds by *People v. Jones* (1988) 46 Cal.3d 585, 600 [250 Cal.Rptr. 635, 758 P.2d 1165].

## **LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES**

Contributing to the delinquency of a minor (Pen. Code, § 272) is not a lesser included offense of unlawful sexual intercourse. (*People v. Bobb* (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 88, 93–96 [254 Cal.Rptr. 707], disapproved on another ground in *People v. Barton* (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 198, fn. 7 [47 Cal.Rptr.2d 569, 906 P.2d 531].)

## **RELATED ISSUES**

### ***Minor Perpetrator***

The fact that a minor may be a victim does not exclude a minor from being charged as a perpetrator. (*In re T.A.J.* (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1364 [73 Cal.Rptr.2d 331] [construing Pen. Code, § 261.5(b)].) There is no privacy right among minors to engage in consensual sexual intercourse. (*Id.* at p. 1361.) However, a minor victim of unlawful sexual intercourse cannot be held liable as an aider and abettor, a conspirator, or an accomplice. (*In re Meagan R.* (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 17, 25 [49 Cal.Rptr.2d 325].)

### ***Attempted Sexual Intercourse is Not a Lesser Included Offense***

*People v. Mendoza* (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 72, 83 [191 Cal.Rptr.3d 905].

See the Related Issues section under CALCRIM No. 1070, *Unlawful Sexual Intercourse: Defendant 21 or Older*.

## **SECONDARY SOURCES**

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Defenses, §§ 53–54.

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Sex Offenses and Crimes Against Decency, §§ 22–26, 178.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.20[3][a] (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, *Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure* §§ 12:16, 12:17 (The Rutter Group).



**1072. Misdemeanor Unlawful Sexual Intercourse: Minor Within Three Years of Defendant's Age (Pen. Code, § 261.5(a) & (b))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor whose age was within three years of the defendant's age [in violation of Penal Code section 261.5(b)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant had sexual intercourse with another person;
2. The defendant and the other person were not married to each other at the time of the intercourse;

AND

3. At the time of the intercourse, the other person was under the age of 18 but not more than three years (younger/older) than the defendant.

*Sexual intercourse* means any penetration, no matter how slight, of the vagina or genitalia by the penis. [Ejaculation is not required.]

[It is not a defense that the other person may have consented to the intercourse.]

[Under the law, a person becomes one year older as soon as the first minute of his or her birthday has begun.]

<Defense: Good Faith Belief 18 or Over>

[The defendant is not guilty of this crime if (he/she) reasonably and actually believed that the other person was age 18 or older. The People must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not reasonably and actually believe that the other person was at least 18 years old. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of this crime.]

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*New January 2006*

**BENCH NOTES**

***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

Give the bracketed paragraph that begins with "It is not a defense that" on request, if there is evidence that the minor consented to the act. (See *People v. Kemp* (1934) 139 Cal.App. 48, 51 [34 P.2d 502].)

Give the bracketed paragraph about calculating age if requested. (Fam. Code, § 6500; *In re Harris* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 849–850 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391].)

### ***Defenses—Instructional Duty***

If there is sufficient evidence that the defendant reasonably and actually believed that the minor was age 18 or older, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense. (See *People v. Hernandez* (1964) 61 Cal.2d 529, 535–536 [39 Cal.Rptr. 361, 393 P.2d 673]; *People v. Winters* (1966) 242 Cal.App.2d 711, 716 [51 Cal.Rptr. 735].)

## **AUTHORITY**

- Elements of Misdemeanor Offense. Pen. Code, § 261.5(a) & (b).
- Minor’s Consent Not a Defense. *People v. Kemp* (1934) 139 Cal.App. 48, 51 [34 P.2d 502].
- Mistake of Fact Regarding Age. *People v. Hernandez* (1964) 61 Cal.2d 529, 535–536 [39 Cal.Rptr. 361, 393 P.2d 673]; see *People v. Zeihm* (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 1085, 1089 [115 Cal.Rptr. 528] [belief about age is a defense], disapproved on other grounds in *People v. Freeman* (1988) 46 Cal.3d 419, 428, fn. 6 [250 Cal.Rptr. 598, 758 P.2d 1128].
- Penetration Defined. Pen. Code, § 263; *People v. Karsai* (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 224, 233–234 [182 Cal.Rptr. 406], disapproved on other grounds by *People v. Jones* (1988) 46 Cal.3d 585, 600 [250 Cal.Rptr. 635, 758 P.2d 1165].

## **LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES**

- Attempted Unlawful Sexual Intercourse. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 261.5; see, e.g., *People v. Nicholson* (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 617, 622–624 [159 Cal.Rptr. 707].

Contributing to the delinquency of a minor (Pen. Code, § 272) is not a lesser included offense of unlawful sexual intercourse. (*People v. Bobb* (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 88, 93–96 [254 Cal.Rptr. 707], disapproved on another ground in *People v. Barton* (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 198, fn. 7 [47 Cal.Rptr.2d 569, 906 P.2d 531].)

## **RELATED ISSUES**

See the Related Issues section under CALCRIM No. 1070, *Unlawful Sexual Intercourse: Defendant 21 or Older*, and CALCRIM No. 1071, *Unlawful Sexual Intercourse: Minor More Than Three Years Younger*.

## **SECONDARY SOURCES**

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Defenses, §§ 53–54.

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Sex Offenses and Crimes Against Decency, §§ 22–26, 178.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.20[3][a] (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure §§ 12:16, 12:17  
(The Rutter Group).

**1073–1079. Reserved for Future Use**

## (ii) Oral Copulation

### 1080. Oral Copulation With Person Under 14 (Pen. Code, § 287(c)(1))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with oral copulation of a person who was under the age of 14 and at least 10 years younger than the defendant [in violation of Penal Code section 287(c)(1)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant participated in an act of oral copulation with another person;

AND

2. At the time of the act, the other person was under the age of 14 and was at least 10 years younger than the defendant.

*Oral copulation* is any contact, no matter how slight, between the mouth of one person and the sexual organ or anus of another person. Penetration is not required.

[It is not a defense that the other person may have consented to the act.]

[Under the law, a person becomes one year older as soon as the first minute of his or her birthday has begun.]

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*New January 2006; Revised September 2020*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

Give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “It is not a defense that” on request, if there is evidence that the minor consented to the act. (See *People v. Kemp* (1934) 139 Cal.App. 48, 51 [34 P.2d 502].)

Give the bracketed paragraph about calculating age if requested. (Fam. Code, § 6500; *In re Harris* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 849–850 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391].)

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 287(c)(1).
- Oral Copulation Defined. Pen. Code, § 287(a); *People v. Grim* (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1240, 1242–1243 [11 Cal.Rptr.2d 884] [in context of lewd acts with children].

- Minor's Consent Not a Defense. See *People v. Kemp* (1934) 139 Cal.App. 48, 51 [34 P.2d 502] [in context of statutory rape].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Oral Copulation With Minor Under 18. *People v. Culbertson* (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 508, 516 [217 Cal.Rptr. 347]; *People v. Jerome* (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 1087, 1097–1098 [207 Cal.Rptr. 199].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Mistake of Fact Defense Not Available*

In *People v. Olsen* (1984) 36 Cal.3d 638, 649 [205 Cal.Rptr. 492, 685 P.2d 52], the court held that the defendant's mistaken belief that the victim was over 14 was no defense to a charge of lewd and lascivious acts with a child under 14.

#### *Attempted Oral Copulation is Not a Lesser Included Offense*

*People v. Mendoza* (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 72, 84 [191 Cal.Rptr.3d 905].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Sex Offenses and Crimes Against Decency, §§ 35–37, 178.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.20[1][c], [3][b] (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure §§ 12:16, 12:17 (The Rutter Group).

**1081. Oral Copulation With Minor: Defendant 21 or Older (Pen. Code, § 287(b)(2))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with engaging in an act of oral copulation with a person who was under the age of 16 years at a time after the defendant had reached (his/her) 21st birthday [in violation of Penal Code section 287(b)(2)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant participated in an act of oral copulation with another person;
2. The defendant was at least 21 years old at the time of the act;

AND

3. The other person was under the age of 16 years at the time of the act.

*Oral copulation* is any contact, no matter how slight, between the mouth of one person and the sexual organ or anus of another person. Penetration is not required.

[It is not a defense that the other person may have consented to the act.]

[Under the law, a person becomes one year older as soon as the first minute of his or her birthday has begun.]

<Defense: Good Faith Belief 18 or Over>

[The defendant is not guilty of this crime if (he/she) reasonably and actually believed that the other person was age 18 or older. The People must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not reasonably and actually believe that the other person was at least 18 years old. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of this crime.]

---

*New January 2006*

**BENCH NOTES**

***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

Give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “It is not a defense that” on request, if there is evidence that the minor consented to the act. (See *People v. Kemp* (1934) 139 Cal.App. 48, 51 [34 P.2d 502].)

Give the bracketed paragraph about calculating age if requested. (Fam. Code, § 6500; *In re Harris* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 849–850 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391].)

### ***Defenses—Instructional Duty***

If there is sufficient evidence that the defendant reasonably and actually believed that the minor was age 18 or older, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense. (See *People v. Hernandez* (1964) 61 Cal.2d 529, 535–536 [39 Cal.Rptr. 361, 393 P.2d 673]; *People v. Winters* (1966) 242 Cal.App.2d 711, 716 [51 Cal.Rptr. 735].)

## **AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 287(b)(2).
- Oral Copulation Defined. Pen. Code, § 287(a); *People v. Grim* (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1240, 1242–1243 [11 Cal.Rptr.2d 884] [in context of lewd acts with children].
- Minor’s Consent Not a Defense. See *People v. Kemp* (1934) 139 Cal.App. 48, 51 [34 P.2d 502] [in context of statutory rape].

## **LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES**

- Attempted Oral Copulation With Minor When Defendant Over 21. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 288a(b)(2).
- Oral Copulation With Minor Under 18. See *People v. Culbertson* (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 508, 516 [217 Cal.Rptr. 347]; *People v. Jerome* (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 1087, 1097–1098 [207 Cal.Rptr. 199] [both in context of section 288a(c)].

## **RELATED ISSUES**

See the Related Issues section under CALCRIM No. 1070, *Unlawful Sexual Intercourse: Defendant 21 or Older*

## **SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Sex Offenses and Crimes Against Decency, §§ 35–37, 178.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.20[1][c], [3][b] (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, *Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure* §§ 12:16, 12:17 (The Rutter Group).

**1082. Oral Copulation With Person Under 18 (Pen. Code,  
§ 287(b)(1))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with oral copulation with a person who was under the age of 18 [in violation of Penal Code section 287(b)(1)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant participated in an act of oral copulation with another person;

AND

2. The other person was under the age of 18 when the act was committed.

*Oral copulation* is any contact, no matter how slight, between the mouth of one person and the sexual organ or anus of another person. Penetration is not required.

[It is not a defense that the other person may have consented to the act.]

[Under the law, a person becomes one year older as soon as the first minute of his or her birthday has begun.]

<Defense: Good Faith Belief 18 or Over>

[The defendant is not guilty of this crime if (he/she) reasonably and actually believed that the other person was age 18 or older. The People must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not reasonably and actually believe that the other person was at least 18 years old. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of this crime.]

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*New January 2006; Revised March 2017*

**BENCH NOTES**

***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

Give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “It is not a defense that” on request, if there is evidence that the minor consented to the act. (See *People v. Kemp* (1934) 139 Cal.App. 48, 51 [34 P.2d 502].)

Give the final bracketed paragraph about calculating age if requested. (Fam. Code, 818



§ 6500; *In re Harris* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 849–850 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391].)

### ***Defenses—Instructional Duty***

If there is sufficient evidence that the defendant reasonably and actually believed that the minor was age 18 or older, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense. (See *People v. Hernandez* (1964) 61 Cal.2d 529, 535–536 [39 Cal.Rptr. 361, 393 P.2d 673]; *People v. Winters* (1966) 242 Cal.App.2d 711, 716 [51 Cal.Rptr. 735].)

## **AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 287(b)(1).
- Oral Copulation Defined. Pen. Code, § 287(a); *People v. Grim* (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1240, 1242–1243 [11 Cal.Rptr.2d 884] [in context of lewd acts with children].
- Minor’s Consent Not a Defense. See *People v. Kemp* (1934) 139 Cal.App. 48, 51 [34 P.2d 502] [in context of statutory rape].
- Mistake of Fact Regarding Age. *People v. Hernandez* (1964) 61 Cal.2d 529, 535–536 [39 Cal.Rptr. 361, 393 P.2d 673] [in context of statutory rape]; *People v. Peterson* (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 396, 397 [178 Cal.Rptr. 734].

## **LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES**

- A violation of Penal Code section 288.3 is not a lesser included offense of attempted oral copulation, because attempt can be committed without contacting or communicating with the victim under the statutory elements test. (*People v. Medelez* (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 659, 663 [206 Cal.Rptr.3d 402].)

## **RELATED ISSUES**

### ***Minor Perpetrator***

A minor under age 14 may be adjudged responsible for violating Penal Code section 287(b)(1) upon clear proof of the minor’s knowledge of wrongfulness. (Pen. Code, § 26; *In re Paul C.* (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 43, 49 [270 Cal.Rptr. 369].)

See the Related Issues section under CALCRIM No. 1070, *Unlawful Sexual Intercourse: Defendant 21 or Older*.

## **SECONDARY SOURCES**

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Defenses, § 54.

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Sex Offenses and Crimes Against Decency, §§ 35–37, 178.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, §§ 142.20[1][c], [3][b], 142.23[2] (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, *Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure* §§ 12:17, 12:18 (The Rutter Group).

## **1083–1089. Reserved for Future Use**

### (iii) Sodomy

#### 1090. Sodomy With Person Under 14 (Pen. Code, § 286(c)(1))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with sodomy with a person who was under the age of 14 years and at least 10 years younger than the defendant [in violation of Penal Code section 286(c)(1)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant participated in an act of sodomy with another person;

AND

2. At the time of the act, the other person was under the age of 14 years and was at least 10 years younger than the defendant.

*Sodomy* is any penetration, no matter how slight, of the anus of one person by the penis of another person. [Ejaculation is not required.]

[It is not a defense that the other person may have consented to the act.]

[Under the law, a person becomes one year older as soon as the first minute of his or her birthday has begun.]

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*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

Give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “It is not a defense that” on request, if there is evidence that the minor consented to the act. (See *People v. Kemp* (1934) 139 Cal.App. 48, 51 [34 P.2d 502].)

Give the bracketed paragraph about calculating age if requested. (Fam. Code, § 6500; *In re Harris* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 849–850 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391].)

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 286(c)(1).
- Sodomy Defined. Pen. Code, § 286(a); see *People v. Singh* (1928) 62 Cal.App. 450, 452 [217 P. 121] [ejaculation is not required].
- Minor’s Consent Not a Defense. See *People v. Kemp* (1934) 139 Cal.App. 48, 51 [34 P.2d 502] [in context of statutory rape].

**LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES**

- Attempted Sodomy With Minor Under 14. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 286(c)(1).
- Sodomy With Minor Under 18. See *People v. Culbertson* (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 508, 516 [217 Cal.Rptr. 347]; *People v. Jerome* (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 1087, 1097–1098 [207 Cal.Rptr. 199] [both in context of Pen. Code, § 287(c)].

**RELATED ISSUES*****Mistake of Fact Defense Not Available***

In *People v. Olsen* (1984) 36 Cal.3d 638 [205 Cal.Rptr. 492, 685 P.2d 52], the court held that the defendant's mistaken belief that the victim was over 14 was no defense to a charge of lewd and lascivious acts with a child under 14.

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Sex Offenses and Crimes Against Decency, §§ 27–29, 178.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.20[1][b], [3][b] (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, *Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure* §§ 12:16, 12:17 (The Rutter Group).

**1091. Sodomy With Minor: Defendant 21 or Older (Pen. Code,  
§ 286(b)(2))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with engaging in an act of sodomy with a person who was under the age of 16 years at a time after the defendant had reached (his/her) 21st birthday [in violation of Penal Code section 286(b)(2)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant participated in an act of sodomy with another person;
2. The defendant was at least 21 years old at the time of the act;

AND

3. The other person was under the age of 16 years at the time of the act.

*Sodomy* is any penetration, no matter how slight, of the anus of one person by the penis of another person. [Ejaculation is not required.]

[It is not a defense that the other person may have consented to the act.]

[Under the law, a person becomes one year older as soon as the first minute of his or her birthday has begun.]

<Defense: Good Faith Belief 18 or Over>

[The defendant is not guilty of this crime if (he/she) reasonably and actually believed that the other person was age 18 or older. The People must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not reasonably and actually believe that the other person was at least 18 years old. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of this crime.]

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*New January 2006*

**BENCH NOTES**

***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

Give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “It is not a defense that” on request, if there is evidence that the minor consented to the act. (See *People v. Kemp* (1934) 139 Cal.App. 48, 51 [34 P.2d 502].)

Give the bracketed paragraph about calculating age if requested. (Fam. Code,

§ 6500; *In re Harris* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 849–850 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 361, 393 P.2d 673].)

### ***Defenses—Instructional Duty***

If there is sufficient evidence that the defendant reasonably and actually believed that the minor was age 18 or older, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense. (See *People v. Hernandez* (1964) 61 Cal.2d 529, 535–536 [39 Cal.Rptr. 361, 393 P.2d 673]; *People v. Winters* (1966) 242 Cal.App.2d 711, 716 [51 Cal.Rptr. 735].)

## **AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 286(b)(2).
- Sodomy Defined. Pen. Code, § 286(a); see *People v. Singh* (1923) 62 Cal.App. 450, 452 [217 P. 121] [ejaculation is not required].
- Minor’s Consent Not a Defense. See *People v. Kemp* (1934) 139 Cal.App. 48, 51 [34 P.2d 502] [in context of statutory rape].

## **LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES**

- Attempted Sodomy With Minor When Defendant Over 21. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 286(b)(2).
- Sodomy With Minor Under 18. See *People v. Culbertson* (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 508, 516 [217 Cal.Rptr. 347]; *People v. Jerome* (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 1087, 1097–1098 [207 Cal.Rptr. 199] [both in context of Pen. Code, § 287(c)].

## **RELATED ISSUES**

See the Related Issues section under CALCRIM No. 1070, *Unlawful Sexual Intercourse: Defendant 21 or Older*.

## **SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Sex Offenses and Crimes Against Decency, §§ 27–29, 178.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, §§ 142.20[1][b], [3][b], 142.23[2] (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, *Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure* §§ 12:16, 12:17 (The Rutter Group).

## 1092. Sodomy With Person Under 18 (Pen. Code, § 286(b)(1))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with sodomy with a person who was under the age of 18 [in violation of Penal Code section 286(b)(1)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant participated in an act of sodomy with another person;

AND

2. The other person was under the age of 18 years at the time of the act.

*Sodomy* is any penetration, no matter how slight, of the anus of one person by the penis of another person. [Ejaculation is not required.]

[It is not a defense that the other person may have consented to the act.]

[Under the law, a person becomes one year older as soon as the first minute of his or her birthday has begun.]

<Defense: Good Faith Belief 18 or Over>

[The defendant is not guilty of this crime if (he/she) reasonably and actually believed that the other person was age 18 or older. The People must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not reasonably and actually believe that the other person was at least 18 years old. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of this crime.]

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*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

Give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “It is not a defense that” on request, if there is evidence that the minor consented to the act. (See *People v. Kemp* (1934) 139 Cal.App. 48, 51 [34 P.2d 502].)

Give the bracketed paragraph about calculating age if requested. (Fam. Code,

§ 6500; *In re Harris* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 849–850 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391].)

### ***Defenses—Instructional Duty***

If there is sufficient evidence that the defendant reasonably and actually believed that the minor was age 18 or older, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense. (See *People v. Hernandez* (1964) 61 Cal.2d 529, 535–536 [39 Cal.Rptr. 361, 393 P.2d 673]; *People v. Winters* (1966) 242 Cal.App.2d 711, 716 [51 Cal.Rptr. 735].)

## **AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 286(b)(1).
- Sodomy Defined. Pen. Code, § 286(a); see *People v. Singh* (1923) 62 Cal.App. 450, 452 [217 P. 121] [ejaculation is not required].
- Minor’s Consent Not a Defense. See *People v. Kemp* (1934) 139 Cal.App. 48, 51 [34 P.2d 502] [in context of statutory rape].
- Mistake of Fact Regarding Age. See *People v. Scott* (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 784, 800–801 [100 Cal.Rptr.2d 70]; *People v. Hernandez* (1964) 61 Cal.2d 529, 535–536 [39 Cal.Rptr. 361, 393 P.2d 673] [in context of statutory rape]; *People v. Peterson* (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 396, 397 [178 Cal.Rptr. 734] [in context of oral copulation with minor].

## **LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES**

- Attempted Sodomy of Minor. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 286(b)(1).

## **RELATED ISSUES**

See the Related Issues section under CALCRIM No. 1070, *Unlawful Sexual Intercourse: Defendant 21 or Older*, and CALCRIM No. 1071, *Unlawful Sexual Intercourse: Minor More Than Three Years Younger*.

## **SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Sex Offenses and Crimes Against Decency, §§ 27–29, 178.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, §§ 142.20[1][b], [3][d], 142.23[2] (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, *Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure* §§ 12:16, 12:17 (The Rutter Group).

## **1093–1099. Reserved for Future Use**

## (iv) Sexual Penetration

### 1100. Sexual Penetration With Person Under 14 (Pen. Code, § 289(j))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with sexual penetration with a person who was under the age of 14 and at least 10 years younger than the defendant [in violation of Penal Code section 289(j)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant participated in an act of sexual penetration with another person;
2. The penetration was accomplished by using (a/an) (foreign object[,]/ [or] substance[,]/ [or] instrument[,]/ [or] device[,]/ [or] unknown object);

AND

3. At the time of the act, the other person was under the age of 14 years and was at least 10 years younger than the defendant.

*Sexual penetration* means (penetration, however slight, of the genital or anal openings of another person/ [or] causing another person to penetrate, however slightly, the defendant's or someone else's genital or anal opening/ [or] causing the other person to penetrate, no matter how slightly, his or her own genital or anal opening) for the purpose of sexual abuse, arousal, or gratification.

[A *foreign object, substance, instrument, or device* includes any part of the body except a sexual organ.] [An *unknown object* includes any foreign object, substance, instrument, or device, or any part of the body, including a penis, if it is not known what object penetrated the opening.]

[Penetration for *sexual abuse* means penetration for the purpose of causing pain, injury, or discomfort.]

[It is not a defense that the other person may have consented to the act.]

[Under the law, a person becomes one year older as soon as the first minute of his or her birthday has begun.]

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New January 2006

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.



Give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “It is not a defense that” on request, if there is evidence that the minor consented to the act. (See *People v. Kemp* (1934) 139 Cal.App. 48, 51 [34 P.2d 502].)

Give the bracketed paragraph about calculating age if requested. (Fam. Code, § 6500; *In re Harris* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 849–850 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391].)

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 289(j).
- Foreign Object, Substance, Instrument, or Device Defined. Pen. Code, § 289(k)(2); *People v. Wilcox* (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 715, 717 [223 Cal.Rptr. 170] [a finger is a “foreign object”].
- Sexual Penetration Defined. Pen. Code, § 289(k)(1); see *People v. Quintana* (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1362, 1371 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 235] [penetration of genital opening refers to penetration of labia majora, not the vagina].
- Unknown Object Defined. Pen. Code, § 289(k)(3).
- Minor’s Consent Not a Defense. See *People v. Kemp* (1934) 139 Cal.App. 48, 51 [34 P.2d 502] [in context of statutory rape].
- Sexual Abuse Defined. *People v. White* (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 193, 205–206 [224 Cal.Rptr. 467].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Attempted Sexual Penetration With Minor Under 14. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 289(j).
- Sexual Penetration With Minor Under 18. See *People v. Culbertson* (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 508, 516 [217 Cal.Rptr. 347]; *People v. Jerome* (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 1087, 1097–1098 [207 Cal.Rptr. 199] [both in context of oral copulation with minor under 14].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Mistake of Fact Defense Not Available*

In *People v. Olsen* (1984) 36 Cal.3d 638, 649 [205 Cal.Rptr. 492, 685 P.2d 52], the court held that the defendant’s mistaken belief that the victim was over 14 was no defense to a charge of lewd and lascivious acts with a child under 14.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Sex Offenses and Crimes Against Decency, §§ 56–57, 178.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.20[1][d], [3][b] (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure §§ 12:16, 12:17 (The Rutter Group).

**1101. Sexual Penetration With Minor: Defendant 21 or Older (Pen. Code, § 289(i))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with participating in an act of sexual penetration with a person who was under the age of 16 years at a time after the defendant had reached (his/her) 21st birthday [in violation of Penal Code section 289(i)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant participated in an act of sexual penetration with another person;
2. The penetration was accomplished by using (a/an) (foreign object[,]/ [or] substance[,]/ [or] instrument[,]/ [or] device[,]/ [or] unknown object);
3. The defendant was at least 21 years old at the time of the act;

AND

4. The other person was under the age of 16 years at the time of the act.

*Sexual penetration* means (penetration, however slight, of the genital or anal openings of another person/ [or] causing another person to penetrate, however slightly, the defendant's or someone else's genital or anal opening/ [or] causing the other person to penetrate, no matter how slightly, his or her own genital or anal opening) for the purpose of sexual abuse, arousal, or gratification.

[A *foreign object, substance, instrument, or device* includes any part of the body except a sexual organ.] [An *unknown object* includes any foreign object, substance, instrument, or device, or any part of the body, including a penis, if it is not known what object penetrated the opening.]

[Penetration for *sexual abuse* means penetration for the purpose of causing pain, injury, or discomfort.]

[It is not a defense that the other person may have consented to the act.]

[Under the law, a person becomes one year older as soon as the first minute of his or her birthday has begun.]

<Defense: Good Faith Belief 18 or Over>

[The defendant is not guilty of this crime if (he/she) reasonably and actually believed that the other person was age 18 or older. The People must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not reasonably and actually believe that the other person was at least 18

**years old. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of this crime.]**

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*New January 2006*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

Give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “It is not a defense that” on request, if there is evidence that the minor consented to the act. (See *People v. Kemp* (1934) 139 Cal.App. 48, 51 [34 P.2d 502].)

Give the bracketed paragraph about calculating age if requested. (Fam. Code, § 6500; *In re Harris* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 849–850 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391].)

### *Defenses—Instructional Duty*

If there is sufficient evidence that the defendant reasonably and actually believed that the minor was age 18 or older, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense. (See *People v. Hernandez* (1964) 61 Cal.2d 529, 535–536 [39 Cal.Rptr. 361, 393 P.2d 673]; *People v. Winters* (1966) 242 Cal.App.2d 711, 716 [51 Cal.Rptr. 735].)

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 289(i).
- Foreign Object, Substance, Instrument, or Device Defined. Pen. Code, § 289(k)(2); *People v. Wilcox* (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 715, 717 [223 Cal.Rptr. 170] [a finger is a “foreign object”].
- Sexual Penetration Defined. Pen. Code, § 289(k)(1); see *People v. Quintana* (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1362, 1371 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 235] [penetration of genital opening refers to penetration of labia majora, not the vagina].
- Unknown Object Defined. Pen. Code, § 289(k)(3).
- Minor’s Consent Not a Defense. See *People v. Kemp* (1934) 139 Cal.App. 48, 51 [34 P.2d 502] [in context of statutory rape].
- Sexual Abuse Defined. *People v. White* (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 193, 205–206 [224 Cal.Rptr. 467].

## LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Attempted Sexual Penetration With Minor When Defendant Over 21. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 289(i).
- Sexual Penetration With Minor Under 18. See *People v. Culbertson* (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 508, 516 [217 Cal.Rptr. 347]; *People v. Jerome* (1984) 160

Cal.App.3d 1087, 1097–1098 [207 Cal.Rptr. 199] [both in context of Pen. Code, § 287(c)].

### RELATED ISSUES

See the Related Issues section under CALCRIM 1070, *Unlawful Sexual Intercourse: Defendant 21 or Older*.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Sex Offenses and Crimes Against Decency, §§ 56–57, 178.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, §§ 142.20[1][d], [3][b], 142.23[2] (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, *Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure* §§ 12:16, 12:17 (The Rutter Group).

**1102. Sexual Penetration With Person Under 18 (Pen. Code,  
§ 289(h))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with sexual penetration with a person who was under the age of 18 [in violation of Penal Code section 289(h)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant participated in an act of sexual penetration with another person;
2. The penetration was accomplished by using (a/an) (foreign object[,]/ [or] substance[,]/ [or] instrument[,]/ [or] device[,]/ [or] unknown object);

AND

3. The other person was under the age of 18 years at the time of the act.

*Sexual penetration* means (penetration, however slight, of the genital or anal openings of another person/ [or] causing another person to penetrate, however slightly, the defendant's or someone else's genital or anal opening/ [or] causing the other person to penetrate, no matter how slightly, his or her own genital or anal opening) for the purpose of sexual abuse, arousal, or gratification.

[A *foreign object, substance, instrument, or device* includes any part of the body except a sexual organ.] [An *unknown object* includes any foreign object, substance, instrument, or device, or any part of the body, including a penis, if it is not known what object penetrated the opening.]

[Penetration for *sexual abuse* means penetration for the purpose of causing pain, injury, or discomfort.]

[It is not a defense that the other person may have consented to the act.]

[Under the law, a person becomes one year older as soon as the first minute of his or her birthday has begun.]

<Defense: Good Faith Belief 18 or Over>

[The defendant is not guilty of this crime if (he/she) reasonably and actually believed that the other person was age 18 or older. The People must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not reasonably and actually believe that the other person was at least 18 years old. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of this crime.]

New January 2006

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

Give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “It is not a defense that” on request, if there is evidence that the minor consented to the act. (See *People v. Kemp* (1934) 139 Cal.App. 48, 51 [34 P.2d 502].)

Give the bracketed paragraph about calculating age if requested. (Fam. Code, § 6500; *In re Harris* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 849–850 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391].)

### *Defenses—Instructional Duty*

If there is sufficient evidence that the defendant reasonably and actually believed that the minor was age 18 or older, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense. (See *People v. Hernandez* (1964) 61 Cal.2d 529, 535–536 [39 Cal.Rptr. 361, 393 P.2d 673]; *People v. Winters* (1966) 242 Cal.App.2d 711, 716 [51 Cal.Rptr. 735].)

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 289(h).
- Foreign Object, Substance, Instrument, or Device Defined. Pen. Code, § 289(k)(2); *People v. Wilcox* (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 715, 717 [223 Cal.Rptr. 170] [a finger is a “foreign object”].
- Sexual Penetration Defined. Pen. Code, § 289(k)(1); see *People v. Quintana* (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1362, 1371 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 235] [penetration of genital opening refers to penetration of labia majora, not the vagina].
- Unknown Object Defined. Pen. Code, § 289(k)(3).
- Minor’s Consent Not a Defense. *People v. Kemp* (1934) 139 Cal.App. 48, 51 [34 P.2d 502] [in context of statutory rape].
- Mistake of Fact Regarding Age. See *People v. Hernandez* (1964) 61 Cal.2d 529, 535–536 [39 Cal.Rptr. 361, 393 P.2d 673] [in context of statutory rape]; *People v. Peterson* (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 396, 397 [178 Cal.Rptr. 734] [in context of oral copulation with minor].
- Sexual Abuse Defined. *People v. White* (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 193, 205–206 [224 Cal.Rptr. 467].

## LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Attempted Sexual Penetration With Minor. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 289(h).

## RELATED ISSUES

### *Forcible Self-Penetration*

In a prosecution under Penal Code section 289(a), one court has held that forcible self-penetration comes within the ambit of the statute. (*People v. Keeney* (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 886, 889 [29 Cal.Rptr.2d 451].) *Keeney* was construing Penal Code section 289(k)(1). Section 289(h), governing penetration with a minor, requires that the perpetrator “participate in [the] act.” Until this issue is clarified by the appellate courts, the definition of self-penetration in this instruction excludes forcible self-penetration.

See the Related Issues section under CALCRIM No. 1070, *Unlawful Sexual Intercourse: Defendant 21 or Older*, and CALCRIM No. 1071, *Unlawful Sexual Intercourse: Minor More Than Three Years Younger*.

## SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Defenses, § 54.

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Sex Offenses and Crimes Against Decency, §§ 56–57, 178.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, §§ 142.20[1][d], [3][b], 142.23[2] (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure §§ 12:16, 12:17 (The Rutter Group).

**1103–1109. Reserved for Future Use**

## (v) Lewd And Lascivious Act

### 1110. Lewd or Lascivious Act: Child Under 14 Years (Pen. Code, § 288(a))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with committing a lewd or lascivious act on a child under the age of 14 years [in violation of Penal Code section 288(a)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

*<Alternative 1A—defendant touched child>*

[1A. The defendant willfully touched any part of a child’s body either on the bare skin or through the clothing;]

[OR]

*<Alternative 1B—child touched defendant>*

[1B. The defendant willfully caused a child to touch (his/her) own body, the defendant’s body, or the body of someone else, either on the bare skin or through the clothing;]

2. The defendant committed the act with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust, passions, or sexual desires of (himself/herself) or the child;

AND

3. The child was under the age of 14 years at the time of the act.

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose. It is not required that he or she intend to break the law, hurt someone else, or gain any advantage.

[Actually arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust, passions, or sexual desires of the perpetrator or the child is not required.]

[It is not a defense that the child may have consented to the act.]

[Under the law, a person becomes one year older as soon as the first minute of his or her birthday has begun.]

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*New January 2006; Revised April 2011, February 2013, August 2014*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.



If the defendant is charged in a single count with multiple alleged acts, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on unanimity. (*People v. Jones* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 321–322 [270 Cal.Rptr. 611, 792 P.2d 643].) The court must determine whether it is appropriate to give the standard unanimity instruction, CALCRIM No. 3500, *Unanimity*, or the modified unanimity instruction, CALCRIM No. 3501, *Unanimity: When Generic Testimony of Offense Presented*. Review the discussion in the bench notes to these two instructions and *People v. Jones, supra*, 51 Cal.3d at pp. 321–322.

In element 1, give alternative 1A if the prosecution alleges that the defendant touched the child. Give alternative 1B if the prosecution alleges that the defendant caused the child to do the touching.

Give the bracketed sentence that begins, “Actually arousing, appealing to,” on request. (*People v. McCurdy* (1923) 60 Cal.App. 499, 502 [213 P. 59].)

Give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “It is not a defense that” on request, if there is evidence that the minor consented to the act. (*People v. Soto* (2011) 51 Cal.4th 229, 233 [119 Cal.Rptr.3d 775, 245 P.3d 410] [“the victim’s consent is not a defense to the crime of lewd acts on a child under age 14 under any circumstances”].)

Give the final bracketed paragraph about calculating age if requested. (Fam. Code, § 6500; *In re Harris* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 849–850 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391].)

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 288(a).
- Actual Arousal Not Required. *People v. McCurdy* (1923) 60 Cal.App. 499, 502 [213 P. 59].
- Any Touching of Child With Intent to Arouse. *People v. Martinez* (1995) 11 Cal.4th 434, 444, 452 [903 P.2d 1037] [disapproving *People v. Wallace* (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 568, 574–580 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 67] and its progeny]; see *People v. Diaz* (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1424, 1427–1428 [49 Cal.Rptr.2d 252] [list of examples].
- Child’s Consent Not a Defense. See *People v. Cardenas* (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 927, 937, fn. 7 [26 Cal.Rptr.2d 567] [dicta].
- Child Touching Own Body Parts at Defendant’s Instigation. *People v. Meacham* (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 142, 152–153 [199 Cal.Rptr. 586] [“constructive” touching; approving *Austin* instruction]; *People v. Austin* (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 110, 114–115 [168 Cal.Rptr. 401].
- Lewd Defined. *In re Smith* (1972) 7 Cal.3d 362, 365 [102 Cal.Rptr. 335, 497 P.2d 807] [in context of indecent exposure]; see *Pryor v. Municipal Court* (1979) 25 Cal.3d 238, 256–257, fn. 13 [158 Cal.Rptr. 330, 599 P.2d 636].

## LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Attempted Lewd Act With Child Under 14. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 288(a); *People*

*v. Imler* (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1178, 1181–1182 [11 Cal.Rptr.2d 915]; *People v. Herman* (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1369, 1389–1390 [119 Cal.Rptr.2d 199].

- Battery Is *Not* a Lesser Included Offense of This Crime. (*People v. Shockley* (2013) 58 Cal.4th 400, 403, 406 [165 Cal.Rptr.3d 497, 314 P.3d 798].)

Annoying or molesting a child under the age of 18 (Pen. Code, § 647.6) is not a lesser included offense of section 288(a). (*People v. Lopez* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 282, 290, 292 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 195, 965 P.2d 713].)

## RELATED ISSUES

### *Any Act That Constitutes Sexual Assault*

A lewd or lascivious act includes any act that constitutes a crime against the person involving sexual assault as provided in title 9 of part 1 of the Penal Code (Pen. Code, §§ 261–368). (Pen. Code, § 288(a).) For example, unlawful sexual intercourse on the body of a child under 14 can be charged as a lewd act under section 288 and as a separate offense under section 261.5. However, these charges are in the alternative and, in such cases, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give CALCRIM No. 3516, *Multiple Counts: Alternative Charges for One Event—Dual Conviction Prohibited*. (See Pen. Code, § 654(a); *People v. Nicholson* (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 617, 625 [159 Cal.Rptr. 766].)

### *Calculating Age*

The “birthday rule” of former Civil Code section 26 (now see Fam. Code, § 6500) applies so that a person attains a given age as soon as the first minute of his or her birthday has begun, not on the day before the birthday. (See *In re Harris* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 844–845, 849 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391].)

### *Minor Perpetrator*

A minor under age 14 may be convicted for violating Penal Code section 288(a) on clear proof of the minor’s knowledge of wrongfulness and the minor’s intent to arouse his or her own sexual desires. (See Pen. Code, § 26; *In re Randy S.* (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 400, 406–408 [90 Cal.Rptr.2d 423]; see also *In re Paul C.* (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 43, 49 [270 Cal.Rptr. 369] [in context of oral copulation].) The age of the minor is a factor to consider when determining if the conduct was sexually motivated. (*In re Randy S.*, *supra*, 76 Cal.App.4th at pp. 405–406 [90 Cal.Rptr.2d 423].)

### *Solicitation to Violate Section 288*

Asking a minor to engage in lewd conduct with the person making the request is not punishable as solicitation of a minor to commit a violation of Penal Code section 288. (*People v. Herman* (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1369, 1379 [119 Cal.Rptr.2d 199] [conviction for solicitation under Penal Code section 653f(c) reversed].) “[A] minor cannot violate section 288 by engaging in lewd conduct with an adult.” (*Id.* at p. 1379.)

### *Mistaken Belief About Victim’s Age*

A defendant charged with a lewd act on a child under Penal Code section 288(a) is not entitled to a mistake of fact instruction regarding the victim’s age. (*People v.*

*Olsen* (1984) 36 Cal.3d 638, 647 [205 Cal.Rptr. 492, 685 P.2d 52] [adult defendant]; *In re Donald R.* (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1627, 1629–1630 [18 Cal.Rptr.2d 442] [minor defendant].) The mistake of fact defense can apply to *attempted* lewd acts on a child under 14 years of age. (*People v. Hanna* (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 455, 461 [160 Cal.Rptr.3d 210].)

### ***Multiple Lewd Acts***

Each individual act that meets the requirements of section 288 can result in a new and separate statutory violation. (*People v. Scott* (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 346–347 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 627, 885 P.2d 1040]; see *People v. Harrison* (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 329, 334 [256 Cal.Rptr. 401, 768 P.2d 1078] [in context of sexual penetration].) For example, if a defendant fondles one area of a victim’s body with the requisite intent and then moves on to fondle a different area, one offense has ceased and another has begun. There is no requirement that the two be separated by a hiatus or period of reflection. (*People v. Jimenez* (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 450, 456 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d 426].)

## **SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Sex Offenses and Crimes Against Decency, §§ 41–46, 53–55, 178.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.21[1][a][i], [b]–[d] (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, *Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure* §§ 12:16, 12:17 (The Rutter Group).

**1111. Lewd or Lascivious Act: By Force or Fear (Pen. Code,  
§ 288(b)(1))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with a lewd or lascivious act by force or fear on a child under the age of 14 years [in violation of Penal Code section 288(b)(1)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

<Alternative 1A—defendant touched child>

[1A. The defendant willfully touched any part of a child’s body either on the bare skin or through the clothing;]

[OR]

<Alternative 1B—child touched defendant>

[1B. The defendant willfully caused a child to touch (his/her) own body, the defendant’s body, or the body of someone else, either on the bare skin or through the clothing;]

2. In committing the act, the defendant used force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury to the child or someone else;
3. The defendant committed the act with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust, passions, or sexual desires of (himself/herself) or the child;

AND

4. The child was under the age of 14 years at the time of the act.

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose. It is not required that he or she intend to break the law, hurt someone else, or gain any advantage.

[Actually arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust, passions, or sexual desires of the perpetrator or the child is not required.]

The *force* used must be substantially different from or substantially greater than the force needed to accomplish the act itself.

[*Duress* means the use of a direct or implied threat of force, violence, danger, hardship, or retribution sufficient to cause a reasonable person to do [or submit to] something that he or she would not otherwise do [or submit to]. When deciding whether the act was accomplished by duress, consider all the circumstances, including the age of the child and (his/her) relationship to the defendant.]

[*Retribution* is a form of payback or revenge.]

**[Menace means a threat, statement, or act showing an intent to injure someone.]**

**[An act is accomplished by *fear* if the child is actually and reasonably afraid [or (he/she) is actually but unreasonably afraid and the defendant knows of (his/her) fear and takes advantage of it].]**

**[It is not a defense that the child may have consented to the act.]**

**[Under the law, a person becomes one year older as soon as the first minute of his or her birthday has begun.]**

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*New January 2006; Revised April 2011, August 2014, August 2016*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If the defendant is charged in a single count with multiple alleged acts, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on unanimity. (*People v. Jones* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 321–322 [270 Cal.Rptr. 611, 792 P.2d 643].) The court must determine whether it is appropriate to give the standard unanimity instruction, CALCRIM No. 3500, *Unanimity*, or the modified unanimity instruction, CALCRIM No. 3501, *Unanimity: When Generic Testimony of Offense Presented*. Review the discussion in the bench notes to these two instructions and *People v. Jones, supra*, 51 Cal.3d at pp. 321–322.

Give the bracketed sentence that begins, “Actually arousing, appealing to,” on request. (*People v. McCurdy* (1923) 60 Cal.App. 499, 502 [213 P. 59].)

Give the bracketed paragraph about calculating age if requested. (Fam. Code, § 6500; *In re Harris* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 849–850 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391].)

### *Defenses—Instructional Duty*

Lack of consent by a minor is not an element of lewd act or lascivious act against a child under 14 in violation of Penal Code section 288, subdivision (b), whether accomplished by force, duress, or otherwise. Likewise, consent by the child is not an affirmative defense to such a charge. (*People v. Soto* (2011) 51 Cal.4th 229, 232 [119 Cal.Rptr.3d 775, 245 P.3d 410].) The bracketed paragraph that begins “It is not a defense that the child” may be given on request if there is evidence of consent.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 288(b)(1).
- Duress Defined. *People v. Soto* (2011) 51 Cal.4th 229, 232 [119 Cal.Rptr.3d 775, 245 P.3d 410]; *People v. Leal* (2004) 33 Cal.4th 999, 1004–1010 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 869, 94 P.3d 1071]; *People v. Pitmon* (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 38, 50

[216 Cal.Rptr. 221]; *People v. Cochran* (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 8, 13–14 [126 Cal.Rptr.2d 416].

- Menace Defined. Pen. Code, § 261(c) [in context of rape].
- Actual Arousal Not Required. *People v. McCurdy* (1923) 60 Cal.App. 499, 502 [213 P. 59].
- Any Touching of Child With Intent to Arouse. *People v. Martinez* (1995) 11 Cal.4th 434, 444, 452 [45 Cal.Rptr.2d 905, 903 P.2d 1037] [disapproving *People v. Wallace* (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 568, 574–580 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 67] and its progeny]; see *People v. Diaz* (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1424, 1427–1428 [49 Cal.Rptr.2d 252] [list of examples].
- Child Touching Own Body Parts at Defendant’s Instigation. *People v. Meacham* (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 142, 152–153 [199 Cal.Rptr. 586] [“constructive” touching; approving *Austin* instruction]; *People v. Austin* (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 110, 114–115 [168 Cal.Rptr. 401].
- Fear Defined. *People v. Cardenas* (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 927, 939–940 [26 Cal.Rptr.2d 567]; *People v. Iniguez* (1994) 7 Cal.4th 847 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 258, 872 P.2d 1183] [in context of rape].
- Force Defined. *People v. Cicero* (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 465, 474 [204 Cal.Rptr. 582]; *People v. Pitmon* (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 38, 52 [216 Cal.Rptr. 221]; see also *People v. Griffin* (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1015, 1018–1019 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 891, 94 P.3d 1089] [discussing *Cicero* and *Pitmon*].
- Lewd Defined. *In re Smith* (1972) 7 Cal.3d 362, 365 [102 Cal.Rptr. 335, 497 P.2d 807] [in context of indecent exposure]; see *Pryor v. Municipal Court* (1979) 25 Cal.3d 238, 256–257, fn. 13 [158 Cal.Rptr. 330, 599 P.2d 636].

### COMMENTARY

The instruction includes definitions of “force” and “fear” because those terms have meanings in the context of the crime of lewd acts by force that are technical and may not be readily apparent to jurors. (*People v. Pitmon* (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 38, 52 [216 Cal.Rptr. 221] [force]; see *People v. Cardenas* (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 927, 939–940 [26 Cal.Rptr.2d 567] [fear]; *People v. Iniguez* (1994) 7 Cal.4th 847, 856–857 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 258, 872 P.2d 1183] [fear in context of rape].) The definition of “force” as used in Penal Code section 288(b)(1) is different from the meaning of “force” as used in other sex offense statutes. (*People v. Cicero* (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 465, 474 [204 Cal.Rptr. 582].) In other sex offense statutes, such as Penal Code section 261 defining rape, “force” does not have a technical meaning and there is no requirement to define the term. (*People v. Griffin* (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1015, 1018–1019 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 891, 94 P.3d 1089].) In Penal Code section 288(b)(1), on the other hand, “force” means force “*substantially* different from or *substantially* greater than” the physical force normally inherent in the sexual act. (*Id.* at p. 1018 [quoting *People v. Cicero* (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 465, 474 [204 Cal.Rptr. 582]] [emphasis in *Griffin*].) The court is required to instruct **sua sponte** in this special definition of “force.” (*People v. Pitmon, supra*, 170 Cal.App.3d at p.

52; see also *People v. Griffin, supra*, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 1026–1028.)

The court is not required to instruct sua sponte on the definition of “duress” or “menace” and Penal Code section 288 does not define either term. (*People v. Pitmon* (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 38, 52 [216 Cal.Rptr. 221] [duress]). Optional definitions are provided for the court to use at its discretion. The definition of “duress” is based on *People v. Leal* (2004) 33 Cal.4th 999, 1004–1010 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 869, 94 P.3d 1071] and *People v. Pitmon* (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 38, 50 [216 Cal.Rptr. 221]. The definition of “menace” is based on the statutory definitions contained in Penal Code sections 261 and 262 [rape]. (See *People v. Cochran* (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 8, 13–14 [126 Cal.Rptr.2d 416] [using rape definition in case involving forcible lewd acts].) In *People v. Leal, supra*, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1007, the court held that the statutory definition of “duress” contained in Penal Code sections 261 and 262 does not apply to the use of that term in any other statute. The court did not discuss the statutory definition of “menace.” The court should consider the *Leal* opinion before giving the definition of “menace.”

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Attempted Lewd Act by Force With Child Under 14. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 288(b).
- Lewd or Lascivious Act on Child Under 14. Pen. Code, § 288(a).

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Evidence of Duress*

In looking at the totality of the circumstances to determine if duress was used to commit forcible lewd acts on a child, “relevant factors include threats to harm the victim, physically controlling the victim when the victim attempts to resist, and warnings to the victim that revealing the molestation would result in jeopardizing the family. . . . The fact that the victim testifies the defendant did not use force or threats does not require a finding of no duress; the victim’s testimony must be considered in light of her age and her relationship to the defendant.” (*People v. Cochran, supra*, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 14.)

See the Related Issues section of the Bench Notes for CALCRIM No. 1110, *Lewd or Lascivious Act: Child Under 14 Years*.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Sex Offenses and Crimes Against Decency, §§ 41–45, 178.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.21[1][a][ii], [b]–[d] (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, *Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure* §§ 12:16, 12:17 (The Rutter Group).



**1112. Lewd or Lascivious Act: Child 14 or 15 Years (Pen. Code, § 288(c)(1))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with a lewd or lascivious act on a 14- or 15-year-old child who was at least 10 years younger than the defendant [in violation of Penal Code section 288(c)(1)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

*<Alternative 1A—defendant touched child>*

**[1A. The defendant willfully touched any part of a child’s body either on the bare skin or through the clothing;]**

**[OR]**

*<Alternative 1B—child touched defendant>*

**[1B. The defendant willfully caused a child to touch (his/her) own body, the defendant’s body, or the body of someone else, either on the bare skin or through the clothing;]**

- 2. The defendant committed the act with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust, passions, or sexual desires of (himself/herself) or the child;**
- 3. The child was (14/15) years old at the time of the act;**

**AND**

- 4. When the defendant acted, the child was at least 10 years younger than the defendant.**

The touching need not be done in a lewd or sexual manner.

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose. It is not required that he or she intend to break the law, hurt someone else, or gain any advantage.

[Actually arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust, passions, or sexual desires of the perpetrator or the child is not required.]

[It is not a defense that the child may have consented to the act.]

[In determining whether a person is at least 10 years older than a child, measure from the person’s birthdate to the child’s birthdate.]

[Under the law, a person becomes one year older as soon as the first minute of his or her birthday has begun.]



*New January 2006; Revised August 2012, August 2014*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If the defendant is charged in a single count with multiple alleged acts, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on unanimity. (*People v. Jones* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 321–322 [270 Cal.Rptr. 611, 792 P.2d 643].) The court must determine whether it is appropriate to give the standard unanimity instruction, CALCRIM No. 3500, *Unanimity*, or the modified unanimity instruction, CALCRIM No. 3501, *Unanimity: When Generic Testimony of Offense Presented*. Review the discussion in the bench notes to these two instructions and *People v. Jones, supra*, 51 Cal.3d at pp. 321–322.

Give the bracketed sentence that begins, “Actually arousing, appealing to,” on request. (*People v. McCurdy* (1923) 60 Cal.App. 499, 502 [213 P. 59].)

Give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “It is not a defense that the child,” on request, if there is evidence that the minor consented to the act. (See *People v. Kemp* (1934) 139 Cal.App. 48, 51 [34 P.2d 502].)

Give the bracketed paragraphs about calculating age if requested. (Fam. Code, § 6500; *In re Harris* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 849–850 [855 P.2d 391].)

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 288(c)(1).
- Actual Arousal Not Required. *People v. McCurdy* (1923) 60 Cal.App. 499, 502 [213 P. 59].
- Any Touching of Child With Intent to Arouse. *People v. Martinez* (1995) 11 Cal.4th 434, 444, 452 [45 Cal.Rptr.2d 905, 903 P.2d 1037] [disapproving *People v. Wallace* (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 568, 574–580 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 67] and its progeny]; see *People v. Diaz* (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1424, 1427–1428 [49 Cal.Rptr.2d 252] [list of examples].
- Child Touching Own Body Parts at Defendant’s Instigation. *People v. Meacham* (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 142, 152–153 [199 Cal.Rptr. 586] [“constructive” touching; approving *Austin* instruction]; *People v. Austin* (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 110, 114–115 [168 Cal.Rptr. 401].
- Lewd Defined. *In re Smith* (1972) 7 Cal.3d 362, 365 [102 Cal.Rptr. 335, 497 P.2d 807] [in context of indecent exposure]; see *Pryor v. Municipal Court* (1979) 25 Cal.3d 238, 256–257, fn. 13 [158 Cal.Rptr. 330, 599 P.2d 636].
- Minor’s Consent Not a Defense. See *People v. Cardenas* (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 927, 937, fn. 7 [26 Cal.Rptr.2d 567] [dicta].
- Mistaken Belief About Victim’s Age Not a Defense. *People v. Paz* (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 293, 298 [95 Cal.Rptr.2d 166].

- Mistake of Fact Defense May Apply to Attempted Lewd Acts on a Child 14 or 15. *People v. Hanna* (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 455, 461 [160 Cal.Rptr.3d 210].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Attempted Lewd Act on a Child of 14 or 15. *In re Lesansky* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 11, 13].

### RELATED ISSUES

See the Related Issues section of the Bench Notes for CALCRIM No. 1110, *Lewd or Lascivious Act: Child Under 14 Years*.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Sex Offenses and Crimes Against Decency, §§ 41–46, 53–55, 178.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.21[1][a][iii], [b]–[d] (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, *Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure* §§ 12:16, 12:17 (The Rutter Group).

**1113–1119. Reserved for Future Use**

## (vi) Other Offenses

### 1120. Continuous Sexual Abuse (Pen. Code, § 288.5(a))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with continuous sexual abuse of a child under the age of 14 years [in violation of Penal Code section 288.5(a)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant (lived in the same home with/ [or] had recurring access to) a minor child;
2. The defendant engaged in three or more acts of (substantial sexual conduct/ [or] lewd or lascivious conduct) with the child;
3. Three or more months passed between the first and last acts;

AND

4. The child was under the age of 14 years at the time of the acts.

[*Substantial sexual conduct* means oral copulation or masturbation of either the child or the perpetrator, or penetration of the child's or perpetrator's vagina or rectum by (the other person's penis/ [or] any foreign object).]

[*Oral copulation* is any contact, no matter how slight, between the mouth of one person and the sexual organ or anus of another person. Penetration is not required.]

[*Lewd or lascivious conduct* is any willful touching of a child accomplished with the intent to sexually arouse the perpetrator or the child. Contact with the child's bare skin or private parts is not required. Any part of the child's body or the clothes the child is wearing may be touched.] [*Lewd or lascivious conduct* [also] includes causing a child to touch his or her own body or someone else's body at the instigation of a perpetrator who has the required intent.]

[Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose. It is not required that he or she intend to break the law, hurt someone else, or gain any advantage.]

You cannot convict the defendant unless all of you agree that (he/she) committed three or more acts over a period of at least three months, but you do not all need to agree on which three acts were committed.

[Actually arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust, passions, or sexual desires of the perpetrator or child is not required for lewd or lascivious conduct.]

**[It is not a defense that the child may have consented to the act.]**

**[Under the law, a person becomes one year older as soon as the first minute of his or her birthday has begun.]**

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2013*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If the court gives the definition of “lewd and lascivious conduct,” the definition of “willfully” must also be given.

Give the bracketed sentence that begins, “Actually arousing, appealing to,” on request. (*People v. McCurdy* (1923) 60 Cal.App. 499, 502 [213 P. 59].)

Give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “It is not a defense that the child,” on request, if there is evidence that the minor consented to the act. (See *People v. Kemp* (1934) 139 Cal.App. 48, 51 [34 P.2d 502].)

Give the bracketed paragraph about calculating age if requested. (Fam. Code, § 6500; *In re Harris* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 849–850 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391].)

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 288.5(a); *People v. Vasquez* (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1284–1285, 1287 [59 Cal.Rptr.2d 389].
- Substantial Sexual Conduct Defined. Pen. Code, § 1203.066(b).
- Unanimity on Specific Acts Not Required. Pen. Code, § 288.5(b); *People v. Adames* (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 198, 208 [62 Cal.Rptr.2d 631].
- Actual Arousal Not Required. *People v. McCurdy* (1923) 60 Cal.App. 499, 502 [213 P. 59].
- Any Touching of Child With Intent to Arouse. *People v. Martinez* (1995) 11 Cal.4th 434, 444, 452 [45 Cal.Rptr.2d 905, 903 P.2d 1037] [disapproving *People v. Wallace* (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 568, 574–580 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 67] and its progeny]; see *People v. Diaz* (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1424, 1427–1428 [49 Cal.Rptr.2d 252] [list of examples].
- Child Touching Own Body Parts at Defendant’s Instigation. *People v. Meacham* (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 142, 152–153 [199 Cal.Rptr. 586]; *People v. Austin* (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 110, 114–115 [168 Cal.Rptr. 401].
- Minor’s Consent Not a Defense. See *People v. Cardenas* (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 927, 937, fn. 7 [26 Cal.Rptr.2d 567] [dicta in context of lewd or lascivious act].

- Oral Copulation Defined. *People v. Grim* (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1240, 1242–1243 [11 Cal.Rptr.2d 884]; see Pen. Code, § 288a(a).
- “Recurring Access” Is Commonly Understand Term Not Requiring Sua Sponte Definitional Instruction. *People v. Rodriguez* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 543, 550 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 348, 49 P.3d 1085] [disapproving *People v. Gohdes* (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1520, 1529 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 719].
- Necessary Intent in Touching. *People v. Cuellar* (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1067, 1070–1072 [145 Cal.Rptr.3d 898].

### COMMENTARY

Penal Code section 288.5 does not require that the defendant reside with, or have access to, the child continuously for three consecutive months. It only requires that a period of at least three months passes between the first and last acts of molestation. (*People v. Vasquez* (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1284–1285, 1287 [59 Cal.Rptr.2d 389].)

Section 288.5 validly defines a prohibited offense as a continuous course of conduct and does not unconstitutionally deprive a defendant of a unanimous jury verdict. (*People v. Avina* (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1309–1312 [18 Cal.Rptr.2d 511].)

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Simple Assault. Pen. Code, § 240.
- Simple Battery. Pen. Code, § 242.

Since a conviction under Penal Code section 288.5 could be based on a course of substantial sexual conduct without necessarily violating section 288 (lewd or lascivious conduct), the latter is not necessarily included within the former and no sua sponte instruction is required. (*People v. Avina* (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1313–1314 [18 Cal.Rptr.2d 511]; see *People v. Palmer* (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 440, 444–445 [103 Cal.Rptr.2d 301].)

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Alternative Charges*

Under Penal Code section 288.5(c), continuous sexual abuse and specific sexual offenses pertaining to the same victim over the same time period may only be charged in the alternative. In these circumstances, multiple convictions are precluded. (*People v. Johnson* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 240, 245, 248 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d 197, 47 P.3d 1064] [exception to general rule in Pen. Code, § 954 permitting joinder of related charges].) In such cases, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give CALCRIM No. 3516, *Multiple Counts: Alternative Charges for One Event—Dual Conviction Prohibited*. If a defendant is erroneously convicted of both continuous sexual abuse and specific sexual offenses and a greater aggregate sentence is imposed for the specific offenses, the appropriate remedy is to reverse the conviction

for continuous sexual abuse. (*People v. Torres* (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1053, 1060 [126 Cal.Rptr.2d 92].)

***Masturbation***

For a discussion of the term masturbation, see *People v. Chambless* (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 773, 783–784, 786–787 [88 Cal.Rptr.2d 444] [construing term for purposes of finding defendant committed sexually violent offenses under the Sexually Violent Predators Act].

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Sex Offenses and Crimes Against Decency, §§ 62–64, 178.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.21[1][c][ii], [2] (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, *Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure* §§ 12:16, 12:17 (The Rutter Group).

**1121. Annoying or Molesting a Child in a Dwelling (Pen. Code,  
§ 647.6(a)–(c))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with annoying or molesting a child in an inhabited dwelling [in violation of Penal Code section 647.6(b)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant entered an inhabited (dwelling house/part of a building/trailer coach) without consent;
2. After entering the (house/building/trailer coach), the defendant engaged in conduct directed at a child;
3. A normal person, without hesitation, would have been disturbed, irritated, offended, or injured by the defendant's conduct;
4. The defendant's conduct was motivated by an unnatural or abnormal sexual interest in the child;

AND

5. The child was under the age of 18 years at the time of the conduct.

[It is not necessary that the child actually be irritated or disturbed.] [It is [also] not necessary that the child actually be touched.]

[It is not a defense that the child may have consented to the act.]

[A (house/part of a building/trailer coach) is *inhabited* if someone uses it as a dwelling, whether or not someone is inside at the time of the alleged conduct.]

[A (house/part of a building/trailer coach) is *inhabited* if someone used it as a dwelling and left only because a natural or other disaster caused him or her to leave.]

[A (house/part of a building/trailer coach) is not *inhabited* if the former residents have moved out and do not intend to return, even if some personal property remains inside.]

[A *house* includes any (structure/garage/office/\_\_\_\_\_ <insert other description>) that is attached to the house and functionally connected with it.]

[A *trailer coach* is a vehicle without its own mode of power, designed to be pulled by a motor vehicle. It is made for human habitation or human occupancy and for carrying property.]

[A *trailer coach* is [also] a park trailer that is intended for human habitation for recreational or seasonal use only and

- (1) has a floor area of no more than 400 square feet;
- (2) is not more than 14 feet wide;
- (3) is built on a single chassis;

AND

- (4) may be transported on public highways only with a permit.]

[Under the law, a person becomes one year older as soon as the first minute of his or her birthday has begun.]

<Defense: Good Faith Belief Over 18>

[The defendant is not guilty of this crime if (he/she) reasonably and actually believed that the child was at least 18 years of age. The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not reasonably and actually believe the child was at least 18 years of age. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of this crime.]

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2016*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If the defendant is charged in a single count with multiple alleged acts, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on unanimity. (*People v. Jones* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 321–322 [270 Cal.Rptr. 611, 792 P.2d 643]; *People v. Epps* (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 691, 703–704 [176 Cal.Rptr. 332].) However, child annoyance or molestation may be committed by a single act or a repetitive course of conduct. There is no **sua sponte** duty to give a unanimity instruction when a defendant’s conduct clearly constituted a single course of conduct. (*People v. Moore* (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 1005, 1014–1016 [230 Cal.Rptr. 237].) The court must determine if a unanimity instruction is required and whether it is appropriate to give the standard unanimity instruction, CALCRIM No. 3500, *Unanimity*, or the modified unanimity instruction, CALCRIM No. 3501, *Unanimity: When Generic Testimony of Offense Presented*. Review the discussion in the bench notes to these two instructions and *People v. Jones*, *supra*, 51 Cal.3d at pp. 321–322.

**Do not** give CALCRIM No. 370, *Motive*, with this instruction because motive is an element of the crime. (*People v. Valenti* (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1140, 1165 [197 Cal.Rptr.3d 317]; *People v. Maurer* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1121, 1126–1127 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 335].)



If the defendant is charged with a prior conviction for a violation of Penal Code section 647.6 or any other specified sexual offense (see Pen. Code, § 647.6(c)), give CALCRIM No. 3100, *Prior Conviction: Nonbifurcated Trial*, or CALCRIM No. 3101, *Prior Conviction: Bifurcated Trial*, unless the defendant has stipulated to the truth of the prior conviction. (*People v. Merkley* (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 472, 476 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 21]; see *People v. Bouzas* (1991) 53 Cal.3d 467, 477–480 [279 Cal.Rptr. 847, 807 P.2d 1076].)

Give the bracketed sentence that begins, “It is not a defense that,” on request if there is evidence that the minor consented to the act. (See *People v. Kemp* (1934) 139 Cal.App. 48, 51 [34 P.2d 502].)

If appropriate, give any of the bracketed definitions of “inhabited,” “house” or “trailer coach” on request.

Give the bracketed paragraph about calculating age if requested. (Fam. Code, § 6500; *In re Harris* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 849–850 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391].)

If the defendant was charged with simple annoying or molesting a child without any allegations about entering an inhabited house, building, or trailer coach, do not give this instruction. Give CALCRIM No. 1122, *Annoying or Molesting a Child*.

### ***Defenses—Instructional Duty***

If there is sufficient evidence that the defendant reasonably believed that the child was over 18 years of age, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense. (See *People v. Atchison* (1978) 22 Cal.3d 181, 183 [148 Cal.Rptr. 881, 583 P.2d 735]; *People v. Paz* (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 293, 300 [95 Cal.Rptr.2d 166].)

## **AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 647.6(a)–(c).
- Inhabitation Defined. See Pen. Code, § 459 [in context of burglary].
- Trailer Coach Defined. Veh. Code, § 635; Health & Saf. Code, § 18009.3.
- Acts Motivated by Unnatural or Abnormal Sexual Interest. *People v. Maurer* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1121, 1126–1127 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 335]; *In re Gladys R.* (1970) 1 Cal.3d 855, 867 [83 Cal.Rptr. 671, 464 P.2d 127].
- Annoy and Molest Defined; Objective Standard. *People v. Lopez* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 282, 289–290 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 195]; *People v. Kongs* (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 1741, 1749–1750 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d 327]; *People v. Pallares* (1952) 112 Cal.App.2d Supp. 895, 901–902 [246 P.2d 173].
- Lewd Act Not Required. *People v. Thompson* (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 459, 465–466 [253 Cal.Rptr. 564].
- Minor’s Consent Not a Defense. See *People v. Cardenas* (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 927, 937, fn. 7 [26 Cal.Rptr.2d 567] [dicta, in context of lewd act].
- Minor Need Not Actually Be Annoyed. *People v. Lopez* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 282, 290 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 195, 965 P.2d 713].

- Actual Touching Not Required. *People v. Memro* (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 871 [47 Cal.Rptr.2d 219, 905 P.2d 1305]; *People v. Lopez* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 282, 289 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 195].
- House Not Inhabited If Former Residents Not Returning. *People v. Cardona* (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 481, 483 [191 Cal.Rptr. 109].

### COMMENTARY

See the Commentary section of the Bench Notes for CALCRIM No. 1122, *Annoying or Molesting a Child*.

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Attempted Annoying or Molesting of Minor. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 647.6(b).

Annoying or molesting a child without entering an inhabited dwelling is a misdemeanor and lesser included offense. (Pen. Code, § 647.6(a).)

Neither simple assault (*People v. Greene* (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 622, 654–655 [110 Cal.Rptr. 160]) or contributing to the delinquency of a minor (*People v. Romero* (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 752, 757 [121 Cal.Rptr. 800] [construing former versions of Pen. Code, §§ 272 and 647.6]) is a necessarily included lesser offense of annoying or molesting a child.

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *After Entering*

The statute does not require that the defendant engage in the molesting conduct while still in the home. (*People v. Mendoza* (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 571, 575–576 [13 Cal.Rptr.3d 195].) It is sufficient if the defendant engaged in the conduct after entering the home and there is a “nexus between the residential entry and the molesting conduct.” (*Id.* at p. 576.)

See the Related Issues section of the Bench Notes for CALCRIM No. 1122, *Annoying or Molesting a Child*.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, §§ 80, 81.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, §§ 142.21[4], 142.23[2] (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, *Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure* §§ 12:16, 12:17 (The Rutter Group).

## 1122. Annoying or Molesting a Child (Pen. Code, § 647.6(a)–(c))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with annoying or molesting a child [in violation of Penal Code section 647.6].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant engaged in conduct directed at a child;
2. A normal person, without hesitation, would have been disturbed, irritated, offended, or injured by the defendant's conduct;
3. The defendant's conduct was motivated by an unnatural or abnormal sexual interest in the child;

AND

4. The child was under the age of 18 years at the time of the conduct.

[It is not necessary that the child actually be irritated or disturbed.] [It is [also] not necessary that the child actually be touched.]

[It is not a defense that the child may have consented to the act.]

[Under the law, a person becomes one year older as soon as the first minute of his or her birthday has begun.]

<Defense: Good Faith Belief Over 18>

[The defendant is not guilty of this crime if (he/she) actually and reasonably believed that the child was at least 18 years of age. The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not actually and reasonably believe the child was at least 18 years of age. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of this crime.]

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2016*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

**Do not** give CALCRIM No. 370, *Motive*, with this instruction because motive is an element of the crime. (*People v. Valenti* (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1140, 1165 [197 Cal.Rptr.3d 317]; *People v. Maurer* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1121, 1126–1127 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 335].)

If the defendant is charged in a single count with multiple alleged acts, the court has

a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on unanimity. (*People v. Jones* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 321–322 [270 Cal.Rptr. 611, 792 P.2d 643]; *People v. Epps* (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 691, 703–704 [176 Cal.Rptr. 332].) However, child annoyance or molestation may be committed by either a single act or a repetitive course of conduct. There is no sua sponte duty to give a unanimity instruction when a defendant’s conduct clearly constituted a single course of conduct. (*People v. Moore* (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 1005, 1014–1016 [230 Cal.Rptr. 237].) The court must determine if a unanimity instruction is required and whether it is appropriate to give the standard unanimity instruction, CALCRIM No. 3500, *Unanimity*, or the modified unanimity instruction, CALCRIM No. 3501, *Unanimity: When Generic Testimony of Offense Presented*. Review the discussion in the bench notes to these two instructions and *People v. Jones, supra*, 51 Cal.3d at pp. 321–322.

If the defendant is charged with a prior conviction for a violation of Penal Code section 647.6 or any other specified sexual offense (see Pen. Code, § 647.6(c)), give CALCRIM No. 3100, *Prior Conviction: Nonbifurcated Trial*, or CALCRIM No. 3101, *Prior Conviction: Bifurcated Trial*, unless the defendant has stipulated to the truth of the prior conviction. (*People v. Merkley* (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 472, 476 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 21]; see *People v. Bouzas* (1991) 53 Cal.3d 467, 477–480 [279 Cal.Rptr. 847, 807 P.2d 1076].)

Give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “It is not a defense that the child,” on request, if there is evidence that the minor consented to the act. (See *People v. Kemp* (1934) 139 Cal.App. 48, 51 [34 P.2d 502].)

Give the bracketed paragraph about calculating age if requested. (Fam. Code, § 6500; *In re Harris* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 849–850 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391].)

If the defendant was charged with annoying or molesting a child after entering an inhabited house, building, or trailer coach, do not give this instruction. Give CALCRIM No. 1121, *Annoying or Molesting a Child in a Dwelling*.

### ***Defenses—Instructional Duty***

If there is sufficient evidence that the defendant reasonably believed that the child was over 18 years of age, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense. (See *People v. Atchison* (1978) 22 Cal.3d 181, 183 [148 Cal.Rptr. 881, 583 P.2d 735]; *People v. Paz* (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 293, 300 [95 Cal.Rptr.2d 166].)

### **AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 647.6(a)–(c).
- Acts Motivated by Unnatural or Abnormal Sexual Interest. *People v. Maurer* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1121, 1126–1127 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 335]; *In re Gladys R.* (1970) 1 Cal.3d 855, 867 [83 Cal.Rptr. 671, 464 P.2d 127].
- Annoy and Molest Defined; Objective Standard. *People v. Lopez* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 282, 289–290 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 195, 965 P.2d 713]; *People v. Kongs* (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 1741, 1749–1750 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d 327]; *People v. Pallares* (1952) 112 Cal.App.2d Supp. 895, 901–902 [246 P.2d 173].

- Lewd Act Not Required. *People v. Thompson* (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 459, 465–466 [253 Cal.Rptr. 564].
- Minor’s Consent Not a Defense. See *People v. Cardenas* (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 927, 937, fn. 7 [26 Cal.Rptr.2d 567] [dicta, in context of lewd act].
- Minor Need Not Actually Be Annoyed. *People v. Lopez* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 282, 290 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 195, 965 P.2d 713].
- Actual Touching Not Required. *People v. Memro* (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 871 [47 Cal.Rptr.2d 219, 905 P.2d 1305]; *People v. Lopez* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 282, 289 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 195, 965 P.2d 713].

### COMMENTARY

“Annoy” and “molest” are synonymous and generally refer to conduct designed to disturb, irritate, offend, injure, or at least tend to injure, another person. (*People v. Lopez* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 282, 289 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 195, 965 P.2d 713]; *People v. Carskaddon* (1957) 49 Cal.2d 423, 426 [318 P.2d 4].) “Annoy means to disturb or irritate, especially by continued or repeated acts. . . . [¶] ‘[M]olest’ [means] . . . ‘to interfere with or meddle with unwarrantably so as to injure or disturb.’ ” (*People v. Pallares* (1952) 112 Cal.App.2d Supp. 895, 901 [246 P.2d 173].) A photographer can “annoy” a minor by taking the minor’s photograph in a public place in an offensive and irritating manner. (See *Ecker v. Raging Waters Group, Inc.* (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1320, 1325 [105 Cal.Rptr.2d 320].) A lewd act is not required. (*People v. Thompson* (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 459, 465–466 [253 Cal.Rptr. 564].)

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Attempted Annoying or Molesting of Minor. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 647.6(a).

Annoying or Molesting a minor is a misdemeanor unless the defendant is charged with one of the specified prior convictions. (Pen. Code, § 647.6(a).) If the defendant is charged with a felony based on a qualifying prior conviction, the misdemeanor is a lesser included offense.

Neither simple assault (*People v. Greene* (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 622, 654–655 [110 Cal.Rptr. 160]) or contributing to the delinquency of a minor (*People v. Romero* (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 752, 757 [121 Cal.Rptr. 800] [construing former versions of Pen. Code, §§ 272 and 647.6]) is a necessarily included lesser offense of annoying or molesting a child.

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Minor Perpetrator*

A minor under age 14 may be convicted for violating Penal Code section 647.6 on clear proof of the minor’s knowledge of wrongfulness. (See Pen. Code, § 26; *In re Gladys R.* (1970) 1 Cal.3d 855, 862, 869 [83 Cal.Rptr. 671, 464 P.2d 127] [12-year-old may be declared ward of court for annoying or molesting another minor].)

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, §§ 80, 81.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, §§ 142.21[4], 142.23[2] (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure §§ 12:16, 12:17 (The Rutter Group).

**1123. Aggravated Sexual Assault of Child Under 14 Years (Pen. Code, § 269(a))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with aggravated sexual assault of a child who was under the age of 14 years and at least seven years younger than the defendant [in violation of Penal Code section 269(a)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant committed \_\_\_\_\_ <insert sex offense specified in Pen. Code, § 269(a)(1)–(5)> on another person;

AND

2. When the defendant acted, the other person was under the age of 14 years and was at least seven years younger than the defendant.

To decide whether the defendant committed \_\_\_\_\_ <insert sex offense specified in Pen. Code, § 269(a)(1)–(5)>, please refer to the separate instructions that I (will give/have given) you on that crime.

[Under the law, a person becomes one year older as soon as the first minute of his or her birthday has begun.]

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*New January 2006; Revised June 2007*

**BENCH NOTES**

***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

In element 1 and in the sentence following element 2, insert the sex offense specified in Penal Code section 269(a)(1)–(5) that is charged. The sex offenses specified in section 269(a)(1)–(5) and their applicable instructions are:

1. Rape (Pen. Code, § 261(a)(2); see CALCRIM No. 1000, *Rape or Spousal Rape by Force, Fear, or Threats*).
2. Rape or sexual penetration in concert (Pen. Code, § 264.1; see CALCRIM No. 1001, *Rape or Spousal Rape in Concert*, and CALCRIM No. 1046, *Sexual Penetration in Concert*).
3. Sodomy (Pen. Code, § 286(c)(2); see CALCRIM No. 1030, *Sodomy by Force, Fear, or Threats*).
4. Oral copulation (Pen. Code, § 288a(c)(2); see CALCRIM No. 1015, *Oral Copulation by Force, Fear, or Threats*).

5. Sexual penetration (Pen. Code, § 289(a); see CALCRIM No. 1045, *Sexual Penetration by Force, Fear, or Threats*).

Give the bracketed paragraph about calculating age if requested. (Fam. Code, § 6500; *In re Harris* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 849–850 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391].)

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 269(a).

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Simple Assault. Pen. Code, § 240.
- Underlying Sex Offense. Pen. Code, §§ 261(a)(2) [rape], 264.1 [rape or sexual penetration in concert], 286(c)(2) [sodomy], 287(c)(2) [oral copulation], 289(a) [sexual penetration].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Sex Offenses and Crimes Against Decency, §§ 65, 178.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.20[2][a], [c], [7][c] (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, *Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure* §§ 12:16, 12:17 (The Rutter Group).



**1124. Contacting Minor With Intent to Commit Certain Felonies  
(Pen. Code, § 288.3(a))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with (contacting/[or] attempting to contact) a minor with the intent to commit \_\_\_\_\_ <insert enumerated offense from statute> [in violation of Penal Code section 288.3(a)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant (contacted or communicated with/ [or] attempted to contact or communicate with) a minor;
2. When the defendant did so, (he/she) intended to commit \_\_\_\_\_ <insert enumerated offense from statute> involving that minor;

AND

3. [The defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the person was a minor(;/.)]

[OR]

[The defendant believed that the person was a minor.]

A *minor* is a person under the age of 18.

[Under the law, a person becomes one year older as soon as the first minute of his or her birthday has begun.]

*Contacting or communicating* with a minor includes direct and indirect contact or communication. [That contact or communication may take place personally or by using (an agent or agency/ [or] any print medium/ [or] any postal service/ [or] a common carrier/ [or] communication common carrier/ [or] any electronic communications system/ [or] any telecommunications/ [or] wire/ [or] computer/ [or] radio communications [device or system]).]

To decide whether the defendant intended to commit \_\_\_\_\_ <specify sex offense[s] listed in Pen. Code, § 288.3(a)>, please refer to the separate instructions that I (will give/have given) you on (that/those) crime[s].

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*New August 2009; Revised March 2017, September 2020*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to define the elements of the underlying/target sex offense. (See *People v. Hughes* (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 349 [116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401, 39 P.3d 432 and *People v. May* (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 118, 129 [261 Cal.Rptr. 502].)

## AUTHORITY

- Elements and Enumerated Offenses. Pen. Code, § 288.3(a).
- Calculating Age. Fam. Code, § 6500; *In re Harris* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 849–850 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391].
- Attempted Contact or Communication Does Not Require Minor Victim. *People v. Korwin* (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 682, 688 [248 Cal.Rptr.3d 763].

## LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

Attempted oral copulation is not a necessarily included offense of Penal Code section 288.3 under the statutory elements test, because luring can be committed without a direct act. (*People v. Medelez* (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 659, 663 [206 Cal.Rptr.3d 402].)

## SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Sex Offenses and Crimes Against Decency, §§ 67, 178.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.21 (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure §§ 12:17, 12:18 (The Rutter Group).

**1125. Arranging Meeting With Minor for Lewd Purpose (Pen. Code, § 288.4(a)(1))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with arranging a meeting with a minor for a lewd purpose [while having a prior conviction] [in violation of Penal Code section 288.4(a)(1)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant arranged a meeting with (a minor / [or] a person (he/she) believed to be a minor);
2. When the defendant did so, (he/she) was motivated by an unnatural or abnormal sexual interest in children;

[AND]

3. At that meeting, the defendant intended to (expose (his/her) genitals or pubic or rectal area/ [or] have the minor expose (his/her) genitals or pubic or rectal area/ [or] engage in lewd or lascivious behavior).

A *minor* is a person under the age of 18.

[Under the law, a person becomes one year older as soon as the first minute of his or her birthday has begun.]

[*Lewd and lascivious behavior* includes any touching of a person with the intent to sexually arouse the perpetrator or the other person. *Lewd or lascivious behavior* includes touching any part of the person's body, either on the bare skin or through the clothes the person is wearing. [A *lewd or lascivious act* includes causing someone to touch his or her own body or someone else's body at the instigation of the perpetrator who has the required intent.]]

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*New August 2009; Revised April 2010, February 2013, August 2016, March 2017*

**BENCH NOTES**

***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the good faith belief that the victim was not a minor as a defense for certain sex crimes with minors, including statutory rape, when that defense is supported by evidence. Until courts of review clarify whether this defense is available in prosecutions for violations of Pen. Code, § 288.4(a)(1), the court will have to exercise its own discretion. Suitable language

for such an instruction is found in CALCRIM No. 1070, *Unlawful Sexual Intercourse: Defendant 21 or Older*.

**Do not** give CALCRIM No. 370, *Motive*, with this instruction because motive is an element of the crime. (*People v. Valenti* (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1140, 1165 [197 Cal.Rptr.3d 317]; *People v. Maurer* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1121, 1126–1127 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 335].)

Whether the defendant suffered a prior conviction for an offense listed in subsection (c) of section 290 is not an element of the offense and is subject to a severed jury trial. (Pen. Code, § 288.4(a)(2).) See CALCRIM No. 3100, *Prior Conviction: Nonbifurcated Trial*, or CALCRIM No. 3101, *Prior Conviction: Bifurcated Trial*.

There is no sua sponte duty to instruct that the “motivated by” element of the offense must have been a substantial factor in its commission. (*People v. Fromuth* (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 91, 106–109 [206 Cal.Rptr.3d 83].)

### AUTHORITY

- Elements and Enumerated Offenses. Pen. Code, § 288.4.
- Lewd Defined. See *In re Smith* (1972) 7 Cal.3d 362, 365 [102 Cal.Rptr. 335, 497 P.2d 807] [in context of indecent exposure]; see *Pryor v. Municipal Court* (1979) 25 Cal.3d 238, 256–257, fn. 13 [158 Cal.Rptr. 330, 599 P.2d 636].
- Calculating Age. Fam. Code, § 6500; *In re Harris* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 849–850 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Sex Offenses and Crimes Against Decency, §§ 66, 178.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.21 (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, *Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure* §§ 12:17, 12:18 (The Rutter Group).

**1126. Going to Meeting With Minor for Lewd Purpose (Pen. Code, § 288.4(b))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with going to a meeting with a minor for a lewd purpose [in violation of Penal Code section 288.4(b)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant arranged a meeting with (a minor/ [or] a person (he/she) believed to be a minor);
2. When the defendant did so, (he/she) was motivated by an unnatural or abnormal sexual interest in children;
3. At that meeting, the defendant intended to (expose (his/her) genitals or pubic or rectal area/ [or] have the minor expose (his/her) genitals or pubic or rectal area/ [or] engage in lewd or lascivious behavior);

**AND**

4. The defendant went to the arranged meeting place at or about the arranged time.

*<Give the bracketed language at the beginning of the following sentence if instructing on other offenses mentioning children for which the definition given here does not apply.>*

**[For the purposes of this instruction,] (A/a) child or minor is a person under the age of 18.**

**[Under the law, a person becomes one year older as soon as the first minute of his or her birthday has begun.]**

**[Lewd and lascivious behavior includes any touching of a person with the intent to sexually arouse the perpetrator or the other person. Lewd or lascivious behavior includes touching any part of the person's body, either on the bare skin or through the clothes the person is wearing. [A lewd or lascivious act includes causing someone to touch his or her own body or someone else's body at the instigation of the perpetrator who has the required intent.]]**

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*New August 2009; Revised April 2010, February 2013, August 2016, March 2017*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

**Do not** give CALCRIM No. 370, *Motive*, with this instruction because motive is an element of the crime. (*People v. Valenti* (2016) 243 Cal. App. 4th 1140, 1165 [197 Cal. Rptr. 3d 317]; *People v. Maurer* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1121, 1126–1127 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 335].)

It is unclear how violations of Pen. Code, § 288.4(b), which involve actually going to an arranged meeting, correlate to violations of Pen. Code, § 288.4(a) (cf. CALCRIM No. 1125, *Arranging Meeting With Minor for Lewd Purpose*). Violations of section 288.4(a) may be lesser included offenses of violations of section 288.4(b). In the alternative, a violation of section 288.4(b) could be characterized as sentence enhancement of a violation of section 288.4(a). This matter must be left to the trial court’s discretion until courts of review provide guidance.

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the good faith belief that the victim was not a minor as a defense for certain sex crimes with minors, including statutory rape, when that defense is supported by evidence. Until courts of review clarify whether this defense is available in prosecutions for violations of Pen. Code, § 288.4(b), the court will have to exercise its own discretion. Suitable language for such an instruction is found in CALCRIM No. 1070, *Unlawful Sexual Intercourse: Defendant 21 or Older*.

There is no *sua sponte* duty to instruct that the “motivated by” element of the offense must have been a substantial factor in its commission. (*People v. Fromuth* (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 91, 106–109 [206 Cal.Rptr.3d 83].)

## AUTHORITY

- Elements and Enumerated Offenses. Pen. Code, § 288.4.
- Lewd Defined. See *In re Smith* (1972) 7 Cal.3d 362, 365 [102 Cal.Rptr. 335, 497 P.2d 807] [in context of indecent exposure]; see *Pryor v. Municipal Court* (1979) 25 Cal.3d 238, 256–257, fn. 13 [158 Cal.Rptr. 330, 599 P.2d 636].
- Calculating Age. Fam. Code, § 6500; *In re Harris* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 849–850 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391].
- Meaning of Child and Minor. *People v. Yuksel* (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 850, 854–855 [143 Cal.Rptr.3d 823].

## SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Sex Offenses and Crimes Against Decency, §§ 66, 178.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.21 (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure §§ 12:17, 12:18  
(The Rutter Group).

## 1127. Engaging in Sexual Intercourse or Sodomy With Child 10 Years of Age or Younger (Pen. Code, § 288.7(a))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with engaging in (sexual intercourse/ [or] sodomy) with a child 10 years of age or younger [in violation of Penal Code section 288.7(a)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant engaged in an act of (sexual intercourse/ [or] sodomy) with \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of complaining witness>;
2. When the defendant did so, \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of complaining witness> was 10 years of age or younger;
3. At the time of the act, the defendant was at least 18 years old.

[Under the law, a person becomes one year older as soon as the first minute of his or her birthday has begun.]

[*Sexual intercourse* means any penetration, no matter how slight, of the vagina or genitalia by the penis. [Ejaculation is not required.]]

[*Sodomy* is any penetration, no matter how slight, of the anus of one person by the penis of another person. [Ejaculation is not required.]]

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*New August 2009; Revised February 2013, September 2017*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 288.7(a).
- Penetration Defined. Pen. Code, § 263; *People v. Karsai* (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 224, 233–234 [182 Cal.Rptr. 406], disapproved on other grounds by *People v. Jones* (1988) 46 Cal.3d 585, 600 [250 Cal.Rptr. 635, 758 P.2d 1165].
- Sodomy Defined. Pen. Code, § 286(a); see *People v. Singh* (1923) 62 Cal.App. 450, 452 [217 P. 121] [ejaculation is not required].
- Calculating Age. Fam. Code, § 6500; *People v. Cornett* (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1261, 1264, 1275 [139 Cal.Rptr.3d 837, 274 P.3d 456] [“10 years of age or younger” means “under 11 years of age”]; *In re Harris* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 849–850 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE

- Attempts to commit the following crimes are **not** lesser included offenses of the



underlying crime: sexual intercourse with child 10 years of age or younger, sodomy with a child 10 years of age or younger, oral copulation with a child 10 years of age or younger. *People v. Mendoza* (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 72, 83 [191 Cal.Rptr.3d 905].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Sex Offenses and Crimes Against Decency, §§ 23, 29, 178.

Couzens & Bigelow, Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure §§ 12:16, 12:17 (The Rutter Group).

**1128. Engaging in Oral Copulation or Sexual Penetration With Child 10 Years of Age or Younger (Pen. Code, § 288.7(b))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with engaging in (oral copulation/ [or] sexual penetration) with a child 10 years of age or younger [in violation of Penal Code section 288.7(b)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant engaged in an act of (oral copulation/ [or] sexual penetration) with \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of complaining witness>;
2. When the defendant did so, \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of complaining witness> was 10 years of age or younger;
3. At the time of the act, the defendant was at least 18 years old.

[Under the law, a person becomes one year older as soon as the first minute of his or her birthday has begun.]

[*Oral copulation* is any contact, no matter how slight, between the mouth of one person and the sexual organ or anus of another person. Penetration is not required.]

[*Sexual penetration* means (penetration, however slight, of the genital or anal opening of the other person/ [or] causing the other person to penetrate, however slightly, the defendant's or someone else's genital or anal opening/ [or] causing the other person to penetrate, however slightly, his or her own genital or anal opening) by any foreign object, substance, instrument, device, or any unknown object for the purpose of sexual abuse, arousal, or gratification.]

[Penetration for *sexual abuse* means penetration for the purpose of causing pain, injury, or discomfort.]

[An *unknown object* includes any foreign object, substance, instrument, or device, or any part of the body, including a penis, if it is not known what object penetrated the opening.]

[A *foreign object, substance, instrument, or device* includes any part of the body except a sexual organ.]

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*New August 2009; Revised April 2010, February 2013, February 2015, September 2017, September 2019, September 2020*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

When sexual penetration is charged under Penal Code section 288.7(b), instruct that the defendant must have specific intent. *People v. Saavedra* (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 605, 613–615 [234 Cal.Rptr.3d 544].

A conviction for Penal Code section 288.7(b) under an aiding and abetting theory requires that the direct perpetrator be at least 18 years old. *People v. Vital* (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 925, 930 [254 Cal.Rptr.3d 22]. If the defendant is charged under an aiding and abetting theory, substitute the word “perpetrator” instead of “defendant” in elements 1, 2, and 3.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 288.7(b).
- Sexual Penetration Defined. Pen. Code, § 289(k)(1); see *People v. Quintana* (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1362, 1371 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 235] [penetration of genital opening refers to penetration of labia majora, not vagina].
- Unknown Object Defined. Pen. Code, § 289(k)(3).
- Foreign Object, Substance, Instrument, or Device Defined. Pen. Code, § 289(k)(2); *People v. Wilcox* (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 715, 717 [223 Cal.Rptr. 170] [finger is “foreign object”].
- Oral Copulation Defined. *People v. Grim* (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1240, 1242–1243 [11 Cal.Rptr.2d 884].
- Calculating Age. Fam. Code, § 6500; *People v. Cornett* (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1261, 1264, 1275 [139 Cal.Rptr.3d 837, 274 P.3d 456] [“10 years of age or younger” means “under 11 years of age”]; *In re Harris* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 849–850 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391].
- Sexual Abuse Defined. *People v. White* (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 193, 205–206 [224 Cal.Rptr. 467].
- This Instruction Upheld. *People v. Saavedra* (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 605, 615 [234 Cal.Rptr.3d 544].

## LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE

- Attempted Sexual Penetration. *People v. Ngo* (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 126, 158–161 [170 Cal.Rptr.3d 90].
- Attempt to commit oral copulation with a child 10 years of age or younger is **not** a lesser included offense. *People v. Mendoza* (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 72, 83 [191 Cal.Rptr.3d 905].

## SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Sex Offenses and Crimes Against Decency, § 58.

Couzens & Bigelow, *Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure* §§ 12:16, 12:17  
(The Rutter Group).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.20[7] (Matthew Bender).

**1129–1139. Reserved for Future Use**

## C. OTHER SEX RELATED OFFENSES

### (i) Obscene or Harmful Matter

#### 1140. Distributing, Sending, or Exhibiting Harmful Material (Pen. Code, § 288.2(a)(1) & (2))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with (exhibiting[,]/ sending[,]/ distributing[,]/ [or] offering to exhibit or distribute) harmful material to a minor [or to a person the defendant believed was a minor] [in violation of Penal Code section 288.2].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

*<Give alternative paragraph 1A for violations of Penal Code section 288.2(a)(1)>*

1. The defendant (exhibited[,]/ sent[,]/ caused to be sent[,]/ distributed[,]/ [or] offered to exhibit or distribute) harmful material depicting a minor or minors engaging in sexual conduct to another person by any means;

*<Give alternative paragraph 1B for violations of Penal Code section 288.2(a)(2)>*

1. The defendant (exhibited[,]/ sent[,]/ caused to be sent[,]/ distributed[,]/ [or] offered to exhibit or distribute) harmful material to another person by any means;
2. When the defendant acted, (he/she) knew the character of the material;
3. When the defendant acted, (he/she) knew, should have known, or believed that the other person was a minor;
4. When the defendant acted, (he/she) intended to arouse, appeal to, or gratify the lust, passions, or sexual desires of (himself/herself) or of the other person;

**AND**

5. When the defendant acted, (he/she) intended to engage in sexual intercourse, sodomy, or oral copulation with the other person or to have either person touch an intimate body part of the other person.

You must decide whether the material at issue in this case meet[s] the definition of harmful material. Material is *harmful* if, when considered as a whole:

1. It shows or describes sexual conduct in an obviously offensive way;
2. A reasonable person would conclude that it lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for minors;

AND

3. An average adult person, applying contemporary statewide standards, would conclude it appeals to prurient interest.

For the purpose of this instruction, an *intimate body part* includes the sexual organ, anus, groin, or buttocks of any person, or the breasts of a female.

A *prurient interest* is a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion.

*Material*, as used in this instruction, means any (book, magazine, newspaper, video recording, or other printed or written material[;]/ [or] any picture, drawing, photograph, motion picture, or other pictorial representation[;]/ [or] any statue or other figure[;]/ [or] any recording, transcription, or mechanical, chemical, or electrical reproduction[;]/ [or] any other articles, equipment, machines, or materials). [*Material* includes live or recorded telephone messages when transmitted or distributed as part of a commercial transaction.]

*Applying contemporary statewide standards* means using present-day standards and determining the effect of the material on all those whom it is likely to reach within the state, in other words, its impact on the average person in the statewide community. The *average adult person* is a hypothetical person who represents the entire community, including both men and women; religious and nonreligious people; and adults of varying ages, educational and economic levels, races, ethnicities, and points of view. The *contemporary statewide standard* means what is acceptable to the statewide community as a whole, not what some person or persons may believe the community ought to accept. The test you must apply is not what you find offensive based on your own personal, social, or moral views. Instead, you must make an objective determination of what would offend the statewide community as a whole.

[You may consider evidence of local community standards in deciding what the contemporary statewide standard is. However, you may not use the standard of a local community, by itself, to establish the contemporary statewide standard.]

The material is not harmful unless a reasonable person would conclude that, taken as a whole, it lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for minors. When deciding whether the material is harmful, do not weigh its value against its prurient appeal.

**[The depiction of nudity, by itself, does not make material harmful. In order for material containing nudity to be harmful, it must depict sexual activity and it must meet the requirements for harmful material listed above.]**

**[The depiction of sexual activity, by itself, does not make material harmful. In order for material depicting sexual activity to be harmful, it must meet the requirements for harmful material listed above.]**

**The People must prove that the defendant knew the character of the material but do not need to prove that the defendant knew whether the material met the definition of harmful material.**

**A *minor* is anyone under the age of 18. [Under the law, a person becomes one year older as soon as the first minute of his or her birthday has begun.]**

**[If it appears from the nature of the material or the circumstances of its distribution or showing that it is designed for clearly defined deviant sexual groups, the appeal of the material must be judged based on its intended audience.]**

**[In deciding the material's nature and whether it lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value, consider whether the circumstances of its (production[,]/ presentation[,]/ sale[,]/ dissemination[,]/ distribution[,]/ publicity) indicate that the material was being commercially exploited because of its prurient appeal. You must determine the weight, if any, to give this evidence.]**

**[In deciding whether, applying contemporary statewide standards, the material appeals to a prurient interest, you may consider whether similar material is openly shown in the community. You must determine the weight, if any, to give this evidence.]**

**[Harmful material may be sent or distributed by live or recorded telephone messages.]**

**[To *distribute* means to transfer possession, whether or not the transfer is made for money or anything else of value.]**

*<Defense: Parent providing sex education>*

**[A parent or guardian is not guilty of this offense if he or she acted to promote legitimate sex education. The People must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not providing legitimate sex education. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of this crime.]**

*<Defense: Legitimate scientific or educational purpose>*

**[The defendant is not guilty of this crime if (he/she) was engaging in**

**legitimate scientific or educational activities. The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not acting for a legitimate scientific or educational purpose. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of this crime.]**

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2015, March 2021*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

Give the bracketed sentence about calculating age if requested. (Fam. Code, § 6500; *In re Harris* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 849–850 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391].)

Penal Code section 288.2(a) was amended effective January 1, 2014.

Give any of the other bracketed paragraphs on request.

### *Defenses—Instructional Duty*

If there is sufficient evidence that the defendant was “acting in aid of legitimate sex education,” the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on that defense. (See Pen. Code, § 288.2(f).) It is unclear who bears the burden of proof and what standard of proof applies to this defense. In the absence of statutory authority or case law stating that the defendant must prove the defense by a preponderance of the evidence, the committee has drafted the instruction to provide that the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defense does not apply. (See *People v. Mower* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 478–479 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067].)

If there is sufficient evidence that the defendant was engaging in legitimate scientific or educational activities, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on that defense. (See Pen. Code, § 288.2(g).) It is unclear who bears the burden of proof and what standard of proof applies to this defense. In the absence of statutory authority or case law stating that the defendant must prove the defense by a preponderance of the evidence, the committee has drafted the instruction to provide that the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defense does not apply. (See *People v. Mower* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 478–479 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067]; see also *People v. Woodward* (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 821, 840–841 [10 Cal.Rptr.3d 779] [“legitimate” does not require definition and the trial court erred in giving amplifying instruction based on *People v. Marler* (1962) 199 Cal.App.2d Supp. 889 [18 Cal.Rptr. 923]].)

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 288.2(a)(1), (2).
- Harmful Matter Defined. Pen. Code, § 313.
- Know Character of Matter. Pen. Code, § 313(e); see *People v. Kuhns* (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 735, 756–758 [132 Cal.Rptr. 725] [no error in instructing that it was



unnecessary to establish that the accused had knowledge that material was legally obscene].

- Means of Distribution. Pen. Code, § 288.2(a)(1), (2).
- Contemporary Community Standards. See *Roth v. United States* (1957) 354 U.S. 476, 489–490 [77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498] [quoting trial court instruction].
- Prurient Interest Defined. *Bloom v. Municipal Court* (1976) 16 Cal.3d 71, 77 [127 Cal.Rptr. 317, 545 P.2d 229] [quoting former Pen. Code, § 311].
- Taken or Considered as a Whole. *People v. Goulet* (1971) 21 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 3 [98 Cal.Rptr. 782]; *Kois v. Wisconsin* (1972) 408 U.S. 229, 231 [92 S.Ct. 2245, 33 L.Ed.2d 312].
- Matter Designed for Deviant Sexual Group. Pen. Code, § 313(a)(1); see *People v. Young* (1977) 77 Cal.App.3d Supp. 10, 14–15 [143 Cal.Rptr. 604].
- Commercial Exploitation Is Probative of Matter’s Nature. Pen. Code, § 313(a)(2); *People v. Kuhns* (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 735, 748–753 [132 Cal.Rptr. 725].
- Similar Matter Shown in Community. *In re Harris* (1961) 56 Cal.2d 879, 880 [366 P.2d 305]; *People v. Heller* (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 7 [157 Cal.Rptr. 830].
- Obscenity Contrasted With Sex. *Roth v. United States* (1957) 354 U.S. 476, 487 [77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498].
- Obscenity Contrasted With Nudity. *People v. Noroff* (1967) 67 Cal.2d 791, 795–796 [63 Cal.Rptr. 575, 433 P.2d 479]; *In re Panchot* (1968) 70 Cal.2d 105, 108–109 [73 Cal.Rptr. 689, 448 P.2d 385].
- Defense of Sex Education. Pen. Code, § 288.2(f).
- Defense of Legitimate Scientific or Educational Activity. Pen. Code, § 288.2(g).
- Prior Version of This Instruction Was Correct. *People v. Richardson* (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 790, 803 [60 Cal.Rptr.3d 458].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

Under the version of Penal Code section 288.2 effective January 1, 2014, misdemeanor distribution of harmful matter (Pen. Code, § 313.1(a)) is not a lesser included offense. (*People v. Collom* (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 35, 42–44 [265 Cal.Rptr.3d 705].)

Under the prior version of Penal Code section 288.2, in effect until December 31, 2013, the following were held to be lesser included offenses:

- Attempted Distribution of Harmful Matter to Minor. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 288.2; see, e.g., *Hatch v. Superior Court* (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 170, 185 [94 Cal.Rptr.2d 453].
- Misdemeanor Distribution of Harmful Matter. Pen. Code, § 313.1(a); *People v.*

*Jensen* (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 224, 244 [7 Cal.Rptr.3d 609].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Telephone, Cable, or ISPs*

A telephone corporation, a cable television company or its affiliates, an Internet service provider, or commercial online service provider does not violate section 288.2 by carrying, broadcasting, or transmitting harmful matter while providing its services. (Pen. Code, § 288.2(e).)

#### *Expert Testimony Not Required*

Neither the prosecution nor the defense is required to introduce expert witness testimony regarding the harmful nature of the matter. (Pen. Code, § 312.1 [abrogating *In re Giannini* (1968) 69 Cal.2d 563, 574 [72 Cal.Rptr. 655, 446 P.2d 535]].)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Sex Offenses and Crimes Against Decency, § 125.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, §§ 142.21[1][d][iii], [2][c], Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.10[2] (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure §§ 12:16, 12:17 (The Rutter Group).

**1141. Distributing Obscene Matter Showing Sexual Conduct by a Minor (Pen. Code, §§ 311.1(a), 311.2(b))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with distributing obscene matter that shows a minor engaging in sexual conduct [in violation of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert appropriate code section[s]>].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

<Alternative 1A—sent or brought>

1. The defendant (sent/ [or] brought) obscene matter into California [or caused obscene matter to be (sent/ [or] brought) into California];

<Alternative 1B—possessed>

1. The defendant (possessed[,/ [or] prepared[,/ [or] published[,/ [or] produced[,/ [or] developed[,/ [or] duplicated[,/ [or] printed) obscene matter;]

<Alternative 1C—offered to distribute>

1. The defendant offered to distribute obscene matter to someone else;]

<Alternative 1D—distributed>

1. The defendant (distributed/ [or] showed/ [or] exchanged) obscene matter (to/with) someone else;]
2. When the defendant acted, (he/she) knew the character of the matter;

[AND]

3. When the defendant acted, (he/she) knew that the matter showed a person under the age of 18 years who was personally participating in or simulating sexual conduct(;/.)

<Give element 4 when instructing with alternative 1A, 1B or 1C; see Bench Notes>

[AND]

4. When the defendant acted, (he/she) intended to (sell or distribute/ distribute, show, or exchange/distribute) the matter to someone else [for money or other commercial benefit.]

You must decide whether the matter at issue in this case meets the definition of obscene matter. Matter is *obscene* if, when considered as a whole:

1. It shows or describes sexual conduct in an obviously offensive way;
2. A reasonable person would conclude that it lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value;

**AND**

3. An average adult person, applying contemporary statewide standards, would conclude it appeals to a prurient interest.

*A prurient interest* is a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion.

*Matter* means any representation of information, data, or image, including any (film/filmstrip/photograph/negative/slide/photocopy/videotape/video laser disc/computer hardware or software/computer floppy disk/data storage medium/CD-ROM/computer-generated equipment/ [or] computer-generated image that contains any film or filmstrip).

*Applying contemporary statewide standards* means using present-day standards and determining the effect of the matter on all those whom it is likely to reach within the state, in other words, its impact on the average person in the statewide community. The *average adult person* is a hypothetical person who represents the entire community, including both men and women; religious and nonreligious people; and adults of varying ages, educational and economic levels, races, ethnicities, and points of view. The *contemporary statewide standard* means what is acceptable to the statewide community as a whole, not what some person or persons may believe the community ought to accept. The test you must apply is not what you find offensive based on your own personal, social, or moral views. Instead, you must make an objective determination of what would offend the statewide community as a whole.

[You may consider evidence of local community standards in deciding what the contemporary statewide standard is. However, you may not use the standard of a local community, by itself, to establish the contemporary statewide standard.]

The material is not obscene unless a reasonable person would conclude that, taken as a whole, it lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. When deciding whether the material is obscene, do not weigh its value against its prurient appeal.

[Matter is not considered obscene under the law if (all persons under the age of 18 depicted in the matter are legally emancipated/ [or] it only shows lawful conduct between spouses).]

[The depiction of nudity, by itself, does not make matter obscene. In

order for matter containing nudity to be obscene, it must depict sexual activity and it must meet the requirements for obscenity listed above.]

[The depiction of sexual activity, by itself, does not make matter obscene. In order for matter depicting sexual activity to be obscene, it must meet the requirements for obscenity listed above.]

*Sexual conduct* means actual or simulated (sexual intercourse/ [or] oral copulation[,]/ [or] anal intercourse[,]/ [or] anal oral copulation[,]/ [or] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert other sexual conduct as defined in Pen. Code, § 311.4(d)(1)>). An act is simulated when it gives the appearance of being sexual conduct.

The People must prove that the defendant knew the obscene nature of the matter but do not need to prove that the defendant knew whether the matter met the definition of obscene.

[*To distribute* means to transfer possession, whether or not the transfer is made for money or anything else of value.]

[A person accused of committing this crime can be an individual, partnership, firm, association, corporation, limited liability company, or other legal entity.]

[In deciding the matter's nature and whether it lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value, consider whether the circumstances of its (production[,]/ presentation[,]/ sale[,]/ dissemination[,]/ distribution[,]/ publicity) indicate that the matter was being commercially exploited because of its prurient appeal. You must decide the weight, if any, to give this evidence.]

[In deciding whether the matter lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value, you may [also] consider whether the defendant knew that the matter showed persons under the age of 16 years engaging in sexual conduct. You must decide the weight, if any, to give this evidence.]

[In deciding whether, applying contemporary statewide standards, the matter appeals to a prurient interest, you may consider whether similar matter is openly shown in the community. You must decide the weight, if any, to give this evidence.]

[If it appears from the nature of the matter or the circumstances of its distribution or showing that it is designed for clearly defined deviant sexual groups, the appeal of the matter must be judged based on its intended audience.]

[Two or more people may possess something at the same time.]

[A person does not have to actually hold or touch something to possess it. It is enough if the person has (control over it/ [or] the right to control it), either personally or through (another person/other people).]

[A person who possesses obscene matter for his or her own personal use is not guilty of this crime.]

<Defense: Legitimate scientific or educational purpose>

[The defendant is not guilty of this crime if (he/she) was engaging in legitimate medical, scientific, or educational activities. The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not acting for a legitimate medical, scientific, or educational purpose. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of this crime.]

<Defense: Law enforcement agent>

[The defendant is not guilty of this offense if (he/she) was a member [or agent] of a law enforcement or prosecuting agency and was involved in the investigation or prosecution of criminal offenses. The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not acting as a member [or agent] of a law enforcement or prosecuting agency. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of this crime.]

[A person is an *agent* of a law enforcement or prosecuting agency if he or she does something at the request, suggestion, or direction of a law enforcement or prosecuting agency.]]

New January 2006

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

In element 1, give one of the alternatives A–D depending on the charges and evidence in the case. Give element 4 when instructing with alternative 1A, 1B, or 1C. (*People v. Young* (1977) 77 Cal.App.3d Supp. 10, 12 [143 Cal.Rptr. 604]; *People v. Burrows* (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 228, 231 [67 Cal.Rptr. 28]; *In re Klor* (1966) 64 Cal.2d 816, 819 [51 Cal.Rptr. 903, 415 P.2d 791].) When giving alternative 1A, select “sell or distribute” in element 4. When giving alternative 1B, select “distribute, show, or exchange” in element 4. When giving alternative 1C, select “distribute.” Do not give element 4 with alternative 1D. No published case has held that distributing or showing obscene material requires specific intent. Give the bracketed phrase “for money or other commercial benefit” in element 4 if the defendant is charged under Penal Code section 311.2(b).

Give any of the other bracketed paragraphs on request.

### *Defenses—Instructional Duty*

If there is sufficient evidence that the defendant was engaging in legitimate medical, scientific, or educational activities, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on

that defense. (See Pen. Code, §§ 311.2(e); 311.8(a).) It is unclear who bears the burden of proof and what standard of proof applies to this defense. In the absence of statutory authority or case law stating that the defendant must prove the defense by a preponderance of the evidence, the committee has drafted the instruction to provide that the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defense does not apply. (See *People v. Mower* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 478–479 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067]; see also *People v. Woodward* (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 821, 840–841 [10 Cal.Rptr.3d 779] [“legitimate” does not require definition and the trial court erred in giving amplifying instruction based on *People v. Marler* (1962) 199 Cal.App.2d Supp. 889 [18 Cal.Rptr. 923]].)

If there is sufficient evidence that the defendant was acting as a law enforcement agent, the court has a  **sua sponte**  duty to instruct on that defense. (See Pen. Code, § 311.2(e).) It is unclear who bears the burden of proof and what standard of proof applies to this defense. In the absence of statutory authority or case law stating that the defendant must prove the defense by a preponderance of the evidence, the committee has drafted the instruction to provide that the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defense does not apply. (See *People v. Mower* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 478–479 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067].)

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 311.1(a), 311.2(b).
- Specific Intent to Distribute or Exhibit. *People v. Young* (1977) 77 Cal.App.3d Supp. 10, 12 [143 Cal.Rptr. 604] [possession with intent to distribute or exhibit]; see *People v. Burrows* (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 228, 231 [67 Cal.Rptr. 28] [preparation or publication with specific intent to distribute]; *In re Klor* (1966) 64 Cal.2d 816, 819 [51 Cal.Rptr. 903, 415 P.2d 791].
- Obscene Matter Defined. Pen. Code, § 311(a); see *Bloom v. Municipal Court* (1976) 16 Cal.3d 71, 77, 81 [127 Cal.Rptr. 317, 545 P.2d 229]; *Miller v. California* (1973) 413 U.S. 15, 24 [93 S.Ct. 2607, 37 L.Ed.2d 419]; see also *Pope v. Illinois* (1987) 481 U.S. 497, 500–501 [107 S.Ct. 1918, 95 L.Ed.2d 439].
- Contemporary Community Standards. See *Roth v. United States* (1957) 354 U.S. 476, 489–490 [77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498].
- Prurient Interest Defined. *Bloom v. Municipal Court* (1976) 16 Cal.3d 71, 77 [127 Cal.Rptr. 317, 545 P.2d 229].
- Sexual Conduct Defined. Pen. Code, § 311.4(d)(1); see *People v. Spurlock* (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 1122, 1130–1131 [8 Cal.Rptr.3d 372].
- Person Defined. Pen. Code, § 311(c).
- Distribute Defined. Pen. Code, § 311(d).
- Knowingly Defined. Pen. Code, § 311(e); see *People v. Kuhns* (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 735, 756–758 [132 Cal.Rptr. 725].
- Exhibit Defined. Pen. Code, § 311(f).
- Matter Designed for Deviant Sexual Group. Pen. Code, § 311(a)(1); see *People*



- v. Young* (1977) 77 Cal.App.3d Supp. 10, 14–15 [143 Cal.Rptr. 604].
- Commercial Exploitation Is Probative of Matter’s Nature. Pen. Code, § 311(a)(2); *People v. Kuhns* (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 735, 748–753 [132 Cal.Rptr. 725].
  - Knowledge That Matter Depicts Child Under 16 Is Probative of Matter’s Nature. Pen. Code, § 311(a)(3).
  - Similar Matter Shown in Community. *In re Harris* (1961) 56 Cal.2d 879, 880 [16 Cal.Rptr. 889, 366 P.2d 305]; *People v. Heller* (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 7 [157 Cal.Rptr. 830].
  - Exceptions to Statutory Prohibitions. Pen. Code, §§ 311.1(b)–(d), 311.2(e)–(g); Pen. Code, § 311.8.
  - Agent Defined. See *People v. McIntire* (1979) 23 Cal.3d 742, 748 [153 Cal.Rptr. 237, 591 P.2d 527] [in context of entrapment].
  - Taken or Considered as a Whole. *People v. Goulet* (1971) 21 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 3 [98 Cal.Rptr. 782]; *Kois v. Wisconsin* (1972) 408 U.S. 229, 231 [92 S.Ct. 2245, 33 L.Ed.2d 312].
  - Obscenity Contrasted With Sex. *Roth v. United States* (1957) 354 U.S. 476, 487 [77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498].
  - Obscenity Contrasted With Nudity. *People v. Noroff* (1967) 67 Cal.2d 791, 795–796 [63 Cal.Rptr. 575, 433 P.2d 479]; *In re Panchot* (1968) 70 Cal.2d 105, 108–109 [73 Cal.Rptr. 689, 448 P.2d 385].
  - Possessing For Personal Use Not a Crime. *Stanley v. Georgia* (1969) 394 U.S. 557, 568 [89 S.Ct. 1243, 22 L.Ed.2d 542].
  - Constructive vs. Actual Possession. *People v. Barnes* (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 552, 556 [67 Cal.Rptr.2d 162].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Attempted Distribution of Obscene Matter. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 311.1(a).
- Attempted Distribution of Obscene Matter for Commercial Consideration. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 311.2(b).

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Advertising Obscene Matter Involving Minors*

It is a felony to advertise for sale or distribution any obscene matter knowing that it depicts a minor engaged in sexual conduct. (Pen. Code, § 311.10.)

#### *Employing or Using Minor to Pose in Film*

It is a felony to employ, use, or persuade a minor to engage in or assist others in posing or modeling for the purpose of preparing a commercial or noncommercial film or other medium involving sexual conduct by a minor. (See Pen. Code, § 311.4(b), (c).) Producing child pornography and posting it on the Internet to induce others to trade such pornography without making a monetary profit satisfies



the “commercial purposes” requirement of Penal Code section 311.4(b). (*People v. Cochran* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 396, 406–407 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d 595, 48 P.3d 1148].)

### ***Excluded Conduct***

Neither section 311.1 nor 311.2 applies to law enforcement and prosecuting agencies investigating or prosecuting criminal offenses, to legitimate medical, scientific, or educational activities, or to lawful conduct between spouses. (Pen. Code, §§ 311.1(b), 311.2(e); see Pen. Code, § 311.8(a) [“defense” that act committed in aid of legitimate scientific or educational purpose].) Nor do these sections apply to depictions of a minor who is legally emancipated. (Pen. Code, §§ 311.1(c), 311.2(f); see Fam. Code, § 7000 et seq. [emancipation of minors].)

### ***Telephone Services***

A telephone corporation (see Pub. Util. Code, § 234) does not violate section 311.1 or 311.2 by carrying or transmitting messages described in these sections, or by performing related activities in providing telephone services. (Pen. Code, §§ 311.1(d), 311.2(g).)

### ***Expert Testimony Not Required***

Neither the prosecution nor the defense is required to introduce expert witness testimony regarding the obscene nature of the matter. (Pen. Code, § 312.1 [abrogating *In re Giannini* (1968) 69 Cal.2d 563, 574 [72 Cal.Rptr. 655, 446 P.2d 535]].)

## **SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Sex Offenses and Crimes Against Decency, §§ 94–106, 131.

7 Witkin, *Summary of California Law* (11th ed. 2017) Constitutional Law, §§ 486–492.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.12 (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, *Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure* §§ 12:16, 12:17 (The Rutter Group).

**1142. Distributing or Intending to Distribute Obscene Material  
(Pen. Code, § 311.2(a))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with distributing obscene material [in violation of Penal Code section 311.2(a)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

*<Alternative 1A—sent or brought>*

- [1. The defendant (sent/ [or] brought) obscene material into California [or caused obscene material to be (sent/ [or] brought) into California];]**

*<Alternative 1B—possessed>*

- [1. The defendant (possessed[,]/ [or] prepared[,]/ [or] published[,]/ [or] produced[,]/ [or] printed) obscene material in California;]**

*<Alternative 1C—offered to distribute>*

- [1. The defendant offered to distribute obscene material to someone else;]**

*<Alternative 1D—distributed>*

- [1. The defendant (distributed/ [or] showed) obscene material to someone else;]**

**[AND]**

- 2. When the defendant acted, (he/she) knew the character of the material(;/.)**

*<Give element 3 when instructing with alternative 1A, 1B, or 1C; see Bench Notes.>*

**[AND]**

- 3. When the defendant acted, (he/she) intended to (sell or distribute/ distribute or show/distribute) the material to someone else.]**

You must decide whether the material at issue in this case meet[s] the definition of obscene material. Material, when considered as a whole, is *obscene* if:

- 1. It shows or describes sexual conduct in an obviously offensive way;**
- 2. A reasonable person would conclude that it lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value;**

**AND**

3. An average adult person applying contemporary statewide standards would conclude that it appeals to a prurient interest.

*A prurient interest* is a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion.

*Material* means ([a] ((book[,/ [or] magazine[,/ [or] newspaper[,/ [or] [other] printed or written material][(/;)]/ [or] [a picture[,/ [or] drawing[,/ [or] photograph[,/ [or] motion picture[,/ [or] [other] pictorial representation][(/;)]/ [or] [a statue or other figure][(/;)]/ [or] [a (recording[,/ [or] transcription[,/ [or] mechanical, chemical, or electrical reproduction][(/;)]/ [or any other article, equipment, or machine]). [*Material* also means live or recorded telephone messages transmitted, disseminated, or distributed as part of a commercial transaction.]

*Applying contemporary statewide standards* means using present-day standards and determining the effect of the material on all those whom it is likely to reach within the state, in other words, its impact on the average adult person in the statewide community. The *average adult person* is a hypothetical person who represents the entire community, including both men and women, religious and nonreligious people, and adults of varying ages, educational and economic levels, races, ethnicities, and points of view. The term *contemporary statewide standards* means what is acceptable to the statewide community as a whole, not what some person or persons may believe the community should accept. The test you must apply is not what you find offensive based on your own personal, social, or moral views. Instead, you must make an objective determination of what would offend the statewide community as a whole.

[You may consider evidence of local community standards in deciding what the contemporary statewide standards are. However, you may not use the standards of a specific local community, by themselves, to establish the contemporary statewide standards.]

The material is not obscene unless a reasonable person would conclude that, taken as a whole, it lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. When deciding whether the material is obscene, do not weigh its value against its prurient appeal.

[The depiction of nudity, by itself, does not make material obscene. In order for material containing nudity to be obscene, it must depict sexual activity and must meet the requirements for obscenity listed above.]

[The depiction of sexual activity, by itself, does not make material obscene. In order for material depicting sexual activity to be obscene, it must meet the requirements for obscenity listed above.]

[Material is not considered obscene under the law if (all persons under the age of 18 years depicted in the material are legally emancipated/ [or]

it only shows lawful conduct between spouses).]

The People must prove that the defendant knew the character of the material but do not need to prove that the defendant knew whether the material met the definition of obscene.

[*To distribute* means to transfer possession, whether or not the transfer is made for money or anything else of value.]

[A *person* accused of committing this crime can be an individual, partnership, firm, association, corporation, limited liability company, or other legal entity.]

[In deciding the material's character and whether it lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value, consider whether the circumstances of its (production[,]/ [or] presentation[,]/ [or] sale[,]/ [or] dissemination[,]/ [or] distribution[,]/ [or] publicity) indicate that the material was being commercially exploited because of its prurient appeal. You must decide the weight, if any, to give this evidence.]

[In deciding whether the material lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value, you may [also] consider whether the defendant knew that the material showed persons under 16 years old engaging in sexual conduct. You must decide the weight, if any, to give this evidence.]

[In deciding whether, according to contemporary statewide standards, the material appeals to a prurient interest, you may consider whether similar material is openly shown in the statewide community. You must decide the weight, if any, to give this evidence.]

[If it appears from the character of the material or the circumstances of its distribution or showing that it is designed for a clearly defined deviant sexual group, the appeal of the material must be judged based on its intended audience.]

[Two or more people may possess something at the same time.]

[A person does not have to actually hold or touch something to possess it. It is enough if the person has (control over it/ [or] the right to control it), either personally or through (another person/other people).]

[A person who possesses obscene material for his or her own personal use is not guilty of this crime.]

*<Defense: Legitimate Scientific or Educational Purpose>*

[The defendant is not guilty of this crime if (he/she) was engaging in legitimate medical, scientific, or educational activities. The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not acting for a legitimate medical, scientific, or educational purpose. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of this crime.]

<Defense: Law Enforcement Agent>

**[The defendant is not guilty of this crime if (he/she) was a member [or agent] of a law enforcement or prosecuting agency and was involved in the investigation or prosecution of crimes. The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not acting as a member [or agent] of a law enforcement or prosecuting agency. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of this crime.**

**[A person is an *agent* of a law enforcement or prosecuting agency if he or she does something at the request, suggestion, or direction of a law enforcement or prosecuting agency.]**

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*New January 2006*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

In element 1, give one of the alternatives 1A–1D depending on the charges and evidence in the case. Give element 3 when instructing with alternative 1A, 1B, 1C or 1D. (*People v. Young* (1977) 77 Cal.App.3d Supp. 10, 12 [143 Cal.Rptr. 604]; *People v. Burrows* (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 228, 231 [67 Cal.Rptr. 28]; *In re Klor* (1966) 64 Cal.2d 816, 819 [51 Cal.Rptr. 903, 415 P.2d 791].) When giving alternative 1A, select “sell or distribute” in element 3. When giving alternative 1B, select “distribute or show” in element 3. When giving alternative 1C, select “distribute.” Do not give element 3 with alternative 1D. No published case has held that distributing or showing obscene material requires specific intent.

### *Defenses—Instructional Duty*

If there is sufficient evidence that the defendant was engaging in legitimate medical, scientific, or educational activities, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on that defense. (See Pen. Code, §§ 311.2(e), 311.8(a).) It is unclear who bears the burden of proof and what standard of proof applies to this defense. In the absence of statutory authority or case law stating that the defendant must prove the defense by a preponderance of the evidence, the committee has drafted the instruction to provide that the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defense does not apply. (See *People v. Mower* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 478–479 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067]; see also *People v. Woodward* (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 821, 840–841 [10 Cal.Rptr.3d 779] [“legitimate” does not require definition, and the trial court erred in giving amplifying instruction based on *People v. Marler* (1962) 199 Cal.App.2d Supp. 889 [18 Cal.Rptr. 923]].)

If there is sufficient evidence that the defendant was acting as a law enforcement agent, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on that defense. (See Pen. Code,

§ 311.2(e).) It is unclear who bears the burden of proof and what standard of proof applies to this defense. In the absence of statutory authority or case law stating that the defendant must prove the defense by a preponderance of the evidence, the committee has drafted the instruction to provide that the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defense does not apply. (See *People v. Mower* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 478–479 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067].)

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 311.2(a).
- Specific Intent to Distribute or Exhibit. *People v. Young* (1977) 77 Cal.App.3d Supp. 10, 12 [143 Cal.Rptr. 604] [possession with intent to distribute or exhibit]; see *People v. Burrows* (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 228, 231 [67 Cal.Rptr. 28] [preparation or publication with specific intent to distribute]; *In re Klor* (1966) 64 Cal.2d 816, 819 [51 Cal.Rptr. 903, 415 P.2d 791].
- Obscene Matter Defined. Pen. Code, § 311(a); see *Bloom v. Municipal Court* (1976) 16 Cal.3d 71, 77, 81 [127 Cal.Rptr. 317, 545 P.2d 229]; *Miller v. California* (1973) 413 U.S. 15, 24 [93 S.Ct. 2607, 37 L.Ed.2d 419]; see also *Pope v. Illinois* (1987) 481 U.S. 497, 500–501 [107 S.Ct. 1918, 95 L.Ed.2d 439].
- Contemporary Community Standards. See *Roth v. United States* (1957) 354 U.S. 476, 489–490 [77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498].
- Prurient Interest Defined. *Bloom v. Municipal Court* (1976) 16 Cal.3d 71, 77 [127 Cal.Rptr. 317, 545 P.2d 229].
- Person Defined. Pen. Code, § 311(c).
- Distribute Defined. Pen. Code, § 311(d).
- Knowingly Defined. Pen. Code, § 311(e); see *People v. Kuhns* (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 735, 756–758 [132 Cal.Rptr. 725].
- Exhibit Defined. Pen. Code, § 311(f).
- Matter Designed for Deviant Sexual Group. Pen. Code, § 311(a)(1); see *People v. Young* (1977) 77 Cal.App.3d Supp. 10, 14–15 [143 Cal.Rptr. 604].
- Commercial Exploitation Is Probative of Matter’s Nature. Pen. Code, § 311(a)(2); *People v. Kuhns* (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 735, 748–753 [132 Cal.Rptr. 725].
- Knowledge That Matter Depicts Child Under 16 Is Probative of Matter’s Nature. Pen. Code, § 311(a)(3).
- Similar Matter Shown in Community. *In re Harris* (1961) 56 Cal.2d 879, 880 [16 Cal.Rptr. 889, 366 P.2d 305]; *People v. Heller* (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 7 [157 Cal.Rptr. 830].
- Exceptions to Statutory Prohibitions. Pen. Code, §§ 311.1(b)–(d), 311.2(e)–(g); 311.8.
- Agent Defined. See *People v. McIntire* (1979) 23 Cal.3d 742, 748 [153

Cal.Rptr. 237, 591 P.2d 527] [in context of entrapment].

- Taken or Considered as a Whole. *People v. Goulet* (1971) 21 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 3 [98 Cal.Rptr. 782]; *Kois v. Wisconsin* (1972) 408 U.S. 229, 231 [92 S.Ct. 2245, 33 L.Ed.2d 312].
- Obscenity Contrasted With Sex. *Roth v. United States* (1957) 354 U.S. 476, 487 [77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498].
- Obscenity Contrasted With Nudity. *People v. Noroff* (1967) 67 Cal.2d 791, 795–796 [63 Cal.Rptr. 575, 433 P.2d 479]; *In re Panchot* (1968) 70 Cal.2d 105, 108–109 [73 Cal.Rptr. 689, 448 P.2d 385].
- Possessing for Personal Use Not a Crime. *Stanley v. Georgia* (1969) 394 U.S. 557, 568 [89 S.Ct. 1243, 22 L.Ed.2d 542].
- Constructive vs. Actual Possession. *People v. Barnes* (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 552, 556 [67 Cal.Rptr.2d 162].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Attempted Distribution of Obscene Matter. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 311.1(a).

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Definition of “Sexual Conduct”*

“Obscene matter” must depict or describe “sexual conduct in a patently offensive way . . .” (Pen. Code, § 311(a).) The statute does not define “sexual conduct.” Penal Code sections 311.4(d)(1) and 311.3(b) provide definitions of the term “sexual conduct” as used in those sections. If the court determines that a definition of “sexual conduct” is necessary, the court may wish to review those statutes. (See also *People v. Spurlock* (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 1122, 1131 [8 Cal.Rptr.3d 372] [discussing definition of sexual conduct in prosecution for violating Pen. Code, §§ 311.3 and 311.4].)

See the Related Issues section of CALCRIM No. 1141, *Distributing Obscene Matter Showing Sexual Conduct by a Minor*.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Sex Offenses and Crimes Against Decency, §§ 94–106, 131.

7 Witkin, Summary of California Law (11th ed. 2017) Constitutional Law, §§ 486–492.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.12 (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure §§ 12:16, 12:17 (The Rutter Group).



## 1143. Obscene Live Conduct (Pen. Code, § 311.6)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with (engaging or participating in[,]/ [or] managing[,]/ [or] producing[,]/ [or] sponsoring[,]/ [or] presenting or showing) obscene live conduct [in violation of Penal Code section 311.6].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant (engaged or participated in[,]/ [or] managed[,]/ [or] produced[,]/ [or] sponsored[,]/ [or] presented or showed) obscene live conduct;
2. The defendant knew of the character of the conduct;

AND

3. The obscene live conduct occurred in front of an audience of at least one person in (a public place/ [or] a place open to the public[, or a segment of the public,] or to public view).

*Live conduct* means physical activity by a person acting alone or with someone else[, including but not limited to (dancing[,]/ [or] acting[,]/ [or] simulating[,]/ [or] pantomiming[,]/ [or] singing[,]/ [or] speaking)].

You must decide whether the conduct at issue in this case meets the definition of obscene live conduct. Live conduct, when considered as a whole, is *obscene* if:

1. It shows or describes sexual conduct in an obviously offensive way;
2. A reasonable person would conclude that it lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value;

AND

3. An average adult person applying contemporary statewide standards would conclude it appeals to a prurient interest.

A *prurient interest* is a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion.

*Applying contemporary statewide standards* means using present-day standards and determining the effect of the conduct on all those whom it is likely to reach within the state, in other words, its impact on the average adult person in the statewide community. The *average adult person* is a hypothetical person who represents the entire community, including both men and women, religious and nonreligious people, and adults of varying ages, educational and economic levels, races, ethnicities,



and points of view. The term *contemporary statewide standards* means what is acceptable to the statewide community as a whole, not what some person or persons may believe the community should accept. The test you must apply is not what you find offensive based on your own personal, social, or moral views. Instead, you must make an objective determination of what would offend the statewide community as a whole.

[You may consider evidence of local community standards in deciding what the contemporary statewide standards are. However, you may not use the standards of a specific local community, by themselves, to establish the contemporary statewide standards.]

The conduct is not obscene unless a reasonable person would conclude that, taken as a whole, it lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. When deciding whether the conduct is obscene, do not weigh the value of the conduct against its prurient appeal.

[The depiction of nudity, by itself, does not make conduct obscene. In order for conduct involving nudity to be obscene, it must depict sexual activity and must meet the requirements for obscenity listed above.]

[The depiction of sexual activity, by itself, does not make conduct obscene. In order for conduct depicting sexual activity to be obscene, it must meet the requirements for obscenity listed above.]

The People must prove that the defendant knew the character of the conduct but do not need to prove that the defendant knew whether the conduct met the definition of obscene.

[A *person* accused of committing this crime can be an individual, partnership, firm, association, corporation, limited liability company, or other legal entity.]

[In deciding the conduct's character and whether it lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value, consider whether the circumstances of its (production[,]/ [or] presentation[,]/ [or] advertising[,]/ [or] showing) indicate that the conduct was being commercially exploited because of its prurient appeal. You must decide the weight, if any, to give this evidence.]

[In deciding whether the conduct lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value, you may [also] consider whether the defendant knew that the conduct showed persons under 16 years old engaging in sexual activities. You must decide the weight, if any, to give this evidence.]

[In deciding whether, according to contemporary statewide standards, the conduct appeals to a prurient interest, you may consider whether similar conduct is openly shown in the statewide community. You must decide the weight, if any, to give this evidence.]

[If it appears from the character of the conduct or the circumstances of

**its presentation or showing that it is designed for a clearly defined deviant sexual group, the appeal of the conduct must be judged based on its intended audience.]**

*<Defense: Legitimate Scientific or Educational Purpose>*

**[The defendant is not guilty of this crime if (he/she) was engaging in legitimate medical, scientific, or educational activities. The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not acting for a legitimate medical, scientific or educational purpose. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of this crime.]**

*New January 2006*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If there is sufficient evidence that the defendant was engaging in legitimate medical, scientific, or educational activities, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on that defense. (Pen. Code, § 311.8(a).) It is unclear who bears the burden of proof and what standard of proof applies to this defense. In the absence of statutory authority or case law stating that the defendant must prove the defense by a preponderance of the evidence, the committee has drafted the instruction to provide that the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defense does not apply. (See *People v. Mower* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 478–479 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326]; see also *People v. Woodward* (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 821, 840–841 [10 Cal.Rptr.3d 779] [“legitimate” does not require definition, and the trial court erred in giving amplifying instruction based on *People v. Marler* (1962) 199 Cal.App.2d Supp. 889 [18 Cal.Rptr. 923]].)

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 311.6.
- Obscene Live Conduct Defined. Pen. Code, § 311(g); see *In re Giannini* (1968) 69 Cal.2d 563, 575 [72 Cal.Rptr. 655, 446 P.2d 535] [not all topless dancing obscene]; *Miller v. California* (1973) 413 U.S. 15, 24 [93 S.Ct. 2607, 37 L.Ed.2d 419]; *Pope v. Illinois* (1987) 481 U.S. 497, 500–501 [107 S.Ct. 1918, 95 L.Ed.2d 439].
- Contemporary Community Standards. See *Roth v. United States* (1957) 354 U.S. 476, 489–490 [77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498].
- Prurient Interest Defined. *Bloom v. Municipal Court* (1976) 16 Cal.3d 71, 77 [127 Cal.Rptr. 317, 545 P.2d 229].
- Person Defined. Pen. Code, § 311(c).

- Knowingly Defined. Pen. Code, § 311(e); see *People v. Kuhns* (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 735, 756–758 [132 Cal.Rptr. 725].
- Exhibit Defined. Pen. Code, § 311(f).
- Matter Designed for Deviant Sexual Group. Pen. Code, § 311(a)(1); see *People v. Young* (1977) 77 Cal.App.3d Supp. 10, 14–15 [143 Cal.Rptr. 604].
- Commercial Exploitation Is Probative of Matter’s Nature. Pen. Code, § 311(a)(2); *People v. Kuhns* (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 735, 748–753 [132 Cal.Rptr. 725].
- Knowledge That Matter Depicts Child Under 16 Is Probative of Conduct’s Nature. Pen. Code, § 311(g)(3).
- Similar Matter Shown in Community. *In re Harris* (1961) 56 Cal.2d 879, 880 [16 Cal.Rptr. 889, 366 P.2d 305]; *People v. Heller* (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 7 [157 Cal.Rptr. 830].
- Exceptions to Statutory Prohibitions. Pen. Code, § 311.8.
- Taken or Considered as a Whole. *People v. Goulet* (1971) 21 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 3 [98 Cal.Rptr. 782]; *Kois v. Wisconsin* (1972) 408 U.S. 229, 231 [92 S.Ct. 2245, 33 L.Ed.2d 312].
- Obscenity Contrasted With Sex. *Roth v. United States* (1957) 354 U.S. 476, 487 [77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498].
- Obscenity Contrasted With Nudity. *People v. Noroff* (1967) 67 Cal.2d 791, 795–796 [63 Cal.Rptr. 575, 433 P.2d 479]; *In re Panchot* (1968) 70 Cal.2d 105, 108–109 [73 Cal.Rptr. 689, 448 P.2d 385].

### RELATED ISSUES

See the Related Issues section of CALCRIM No. 1141, *Distributing Obscene Matter Showing Sexual Conduct by a Minor*, and CALCRIM No. 1142, *Distributing or Intending to Distribute Obscene Material*.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Sex Offenses and Crimes Against Decency, §§ 94–106, 131.

7 Witkin, *Summary of California Law* (11th ed. 2017) Constitutional Law, §§ 486–492.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.12 (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, *Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure* §§ 12:16, 12:17 (The Rutter Group).

**1144. Using a Minor to Perform Prohibited Acts (Pen. Code,  
§ 311.4(b), (c))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with using a minor to perform prohibited acts [in violation of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert appropriate code section[s]>*].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

*<Alternative 1A>*

- [1. The defendant (promoted/ [or] employed/ [or] used/ [or] persuaded/ [or] induced/ [or] coerced) a minor who was under (18/14) years old at the time to pose or model or assist others to pose or model, alone or with others;**

**The defendant knew that (he/she) was (promoting/ [or] employing/ [or] using/ [or] persuading/ [or] inducing/ [or] coercing) a minor of that age to pose or model or assist others to pose or model;]**

*<Alternative 1B>*

- [1. The defendant was the (parent/ [or] guardian) in control of a minor who was under (18/14) years old at the time and the defendant permitted that minor to pose or model or assist others to pose or model, alone or with others;**

**At the time the defendant gave permission to the minor, (he/she) knew that the minor would pose or model or assist others to pose or model, alone or with others;]**

- 2. The purpose of the posing or modeling was to prepare matter containing [or incorporating] sexual conduct;**
- 3. The minor participated in the sexual conduct alone[, or with other persons][, or with animals];**
- 4. The defendant was aware of the character of the matter or live conduct;**

**[AND]**

- 5. The defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, based on facts of which (he/she) was aware, that the minor was under (18/14) years of age;**

**[AND]**

- 6. When the defendant acted, (he/she) intended that the matter**

would be used for commercial purposes.]

***Matter*** means any representation of information, data, or image, including any (film/filmstrip/photograph/negative/slide/photocopy/videotape/video laser disc/computer hardware or software/computer floppy disk/data storage medium/CD-ROM/computer-generated equipment/ [or] computer-generated image that contains any film or filmstrip). For the purpose of this instruction matter does not include material (in which all of the persons depicted under the age of 18 are legally emancipated/ [or] that only depicts lawful conduct between spouses).

[Under the law, a person becomes one year older as soon as the first minute of his or her birthday has begun.]

***Sexual conduct*** means actual or simulated (sexual intercourse/ [or] oral copulation[,]/ [or] anal intercourse[,]/ [or] anal oral copulation[,]/ [or] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert other sexual conduct as defined in Pen. Code, § 311.4(d)(1)>). An act is simulated when it gives the appearance of being sexual conduct.

[***Use for commercial purposes*** includes intending to trade the matter depicting sexual conduct for a commercial purpose at some point in the future. A commercial purpose does not have to include financial gain.]

[A ***person*** accused of committing this crime can be an individual, partnership, firm, association, corporation, limited liability company, or other legal entity.]

<Defense: Legitimate scientific or educational purpose>

[The defendant is not guilty of this crime if (he/she) was engaging in legitimate medical, scientific, or educational activities. The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not acting for a legitimate medical, scientific, or educational purpose. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of this crime.]

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*New April 2010*

## BENCH NOTES

### ***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

### ***Defenses—Instructional Duty***

If there is sufficient evidence that the defendant was engaging in legitimate medical, scientific, or educational activities, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on

that defense. (See Pen. Code, § 311.8(a).) It is unclear who bears the burden of proof and what standard of proof applies to this defense. In the absence of statutory authority or case law stating that the defendant must prove the defense by a preponderance of the evidence, the committee has drafted the instruction to provide that the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defense does not apply. (See *People v. Mower* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 478–479 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067]; see also *People v. Woodward* (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 821, 840–841 [10 Cal.Rptr.3d 779] [“legitimate” does not require definition and the trial court erred in giving amplifying instruction based on *People v. Marler* (1962) 199 Cal.App.2d Supp. 889 [18 Cal.Rptr. 923]].)

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 311.4(b), (c).
- Sexual Conduct Defined. Pen. Code, § 311.4(d)(1); see *People v. Spurlock* (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 1122, 1130–1131 [8 Cal.Rptr.3d 372].
- Person Defined. Pen. Code, § 311(c).
- Defendant Need Not Directly Engage in Posing or Modeling Victim. *People v. Hobbs* (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1, 5–7 [60 Cal.Rptr.3d 685].
- Minor Under Age of 14. Pen. Code, § 311.4(f).
- Commercial Purposes Defined. *People v. Cochran* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 396, 402–407 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d 595, 48 P.3d 1148].
- Knowingly Defined. Pen. Code, § 311(e); see *People v. Kuhns* (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 735, 756–758 [132 Cal.Rptr. 725].
- Calculating Age. Fam. Code, § 6500; *In re Harris* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 849–850 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Sex Offenses and Crimes Against Decency, §§ 96, 111–112.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.12 (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure §§ 12:16, 12:17 (The Rutter Group).

**1145. Possession of Matter Depicting Minor Engaged in Sexual Conduct (Pen. Code, § 311.11(a))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with possessing matter that shows a minor engaged in or simulating sexual conduct [in violation of Penal Code section 311.11(a)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant possessed or controlled matter that contained [an] image[s] of a minor personally engaging in or simulating sexual conduct;
2. The defendant knew that (he/she) possessed or controlled the matter;

**AND**

3. The defendant knew that the matter contained [an] image[s] of a minor personally engaging in or simulating sexual conduct.

*Matter*, as used in this instruction, means any visual work[s], including any (film/filmstrip/photograph/negative/slide/photocopy/video recording/computer-generated media[,]/[or] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert other item listed in Pen. Code § 311.11(a)>).

[*Matter* does not include drawings, figurines, or statues.]

[*Matter* does not include any film rated by the Motion Picture Association of America.]

[The *matter* does not have to be obscene.] <For a definition of obscene, see CALCRIM 1141>

[A person does not have to actually hold or touch something to possess it. It is enough if the person has (control over it/ [or] the right to control it) either personally or through another person.]

[Two or more people may possess something at the same time.]

A *minor* is anyone under the age of 18. [Under the law, a person becomes one year older as soon as the first minute of his or her birthday has begun.]

*Sexual conduct* means actual or simulated (sexual intercourse/ [or] oral copulation[,]/ [or] anal intercourse[,]/ [or] anal oral copulation[,]/ [or] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert other sexual conduct as defined in Pen. Code, § 311.4(d)(1)>). An act is simulated when it gives the appearance of being sexual conduct.

<Sentencing Factors>



[If you find the defendant guilty of this crime [as charged in Count[s] \_\_\_\_\_], you must then decide whether the People have proved the additional allegation[s].] [You must decide whether the People have proved (this/these) allegation[s] for each crime beyond a reasonable doubt and return a separate finding for each crime.]

<Give the following paragraph if the defendant is charged with the felony enhancement under Penal Code section 311.11(b)>

[To prove the prior conviction allegation, the People must prove that the defendant has at least one prior conviction for violating or attempting to violate Penal Code section 311.11(a) or for committing or attempting to commit (\_\_\_\_\_) <insert description of offense requiring registration pursuant to Penal Code section 290>.]

<Give the following four paragraphs if the defendant is charged with the felony enhancement under Penal Code section 311.11(c)(1)>

[To prove the multiple images allegation, the People must prove that: The *matter* the defendant knowingly possessed or controlled contained more than 600 images all of which the defendant knew showed a minor engaged in or simulating sexual conduct;

**AND**

The *matter* contained at least ten or more images involving a prepubescent minor or a minor under 12 years of age.

Each photograph, picture, computer or computer-generated image, or any similar visual depiction counts as *one image*.

Each video, video-clip, movie, or similar visual depiction counts as *50 images*.]

<Give the following three paragraphs if the defendant is charged under Penal Code section 311.11(c)(2)>

[To prove the sexual sadism or sexual masochism allegation, the People must prove that the *matter* showed sexual sadism or sexual masochism involving a minor.

*Sexual sadism* means intentionally causing pain for purposes of sexual gratification or stimulation.

*Sexual masochism* means intentionally experiencing pain for purposes of sexual gratification or stimulation.]

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*New March 2019*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime. Give the sentencing factors if appropriate.



**AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 311.11(a)–(c).
- Sexual Conduct Defined. Pen. Code, § 311.4(d)(1); see *People v. Spurlock* (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 1122, 1130–1131 [8 Cal.Rptr.3d 372].
- Person Defined. Pen. Code, § 311(c).
- Knowingly Defined. Pen. Code, § 311(e); see *People v. Kuhns* (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 735, 756–758 [132 Cal.Rptr. 725].
- Calculating Age. Fam. Code, § 6500; *In re Harris* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 849–850 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391].
- Personally Defined. *People v. Gerber* (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 368, 386 [126 Cal.Rptr.3d 688].
- Possession or Control of Computer Image. *Tecklenburg v. Appellate Div. of Superior Court* (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1402, 1418–1419 [87 Cal.Rptr.3d 460].
- Simultaneous Possession of Materials at Same Location is One Offense. *People v. Manfredi* (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 622, 624 [86 Cal.Rptr.3d 810].

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Sex Offenses and Crimes Against Decency, §§ 94–106, 131.

7 Witkin, *Summary of California Law* (11th ed. 2017) Constitutional Law, §§ 486–492.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.12 (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, *Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure* §§ 12:16, 12:17 (The Rutter Group).

**1146–1149. Reserved for Future Use**

## (ii) Pimping, Pandering, Prostitution

### 1150. Pimping (Pen. Code, § 266h)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with pimping [in violation of Penal Code section 266h].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of pimping, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant knew that \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name>* was a prostitute;

[AND]

*<Alternative 2A—money earned by prostitute supported defendant>*

- [2. The (money/proceeds) that \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name>* earned as a prostitute supported defendant, in whole or in part(;/.)]

*<Alternative 2B—money loaned by house manager supported defendant>*

- [2. Money that was (loaned to/advanced to/charged against) \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name>* by a person who (kept/managed/was a prostitute at) the house or other place where the prostitution occurred, supported the defendant in whole or in part(;/.)]

*<Alternative 2C—defendant asked for payment>*

- [2. The defendant asked for payment or received payment for soliciting prostitution customers for \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name>*(;/.)]

*<Give element 3 when defendant charged with pimping a minor.>*

[AND]

3. \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name>* was a minor (over the age of 16 years/under the age of 16 years) when (he/she) engaged in the prostitution.]

**A prostitute** is a person who engages in sexual intercourse or any lewd act with another person in exchange for money [or other compensation]. A **lewd act** means physical contact of the genitals, buttocks, or female breast of either the prostitute or customer with some part of the other person's body for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification.

[Under the law, a person becomes one year older as soon as the first minute of his or her birthday has begun.]

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

In element 2, use the appropriate alternative A–C depending on the evidence in the case.

Give element 3 if it is alleged that the prostitute was a minor. Punishment is enhanced if the minor is under the age of 16 years. (Pen. Code, § 266h(b).)

Give the bracketed paragraph about calculating age if requested. (Fam. Code, § 6500; *In re Harris* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 849–850 [855 P.2d 391].)

### *Defenses—Instructional Duty*

If necessary for the jury’s understanding of the case, the court must instruct **sua sponte** on a defense theory in evidence, for example, that nude modeling does not constitute an act of prostitution and that an act of procuring a person solely for the purpose of nude modeling does not violate either the pimping or pandering statute. (*People v. Hill* (1980) 103 Cal.App.3d 525, 536–537 [163 Cal.Rptr. 99].)

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 266h.
- Prostitution Defined. Pen. Code, § 647(b); *People v. Hill* (1980) 103 Cal.App.3d 525, 534–535 [163 Cal.Rptr. 99]; *People v. Romo* (1962) 200 Cal.App.2d 83, 90–91 [19 Cal.Rptr. 179]; *Wooten v. Superior Court* (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 422, 431–433 [113 Cal.Rptr.2d 195] [lewd act requires touching between prostitute and customer].
- General Intent Crime. *People v. McNulty* (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 624, 630–631 [249 Cal.Rptr. 22].
- Proof Person Is a Prostitute. *People v. James* (1969) 274 Cal.App.2d 608, 613 [79 Cal.Rptr. 182].
- Solicitation Defined. *People v. Smith* (1955) 44 Cal.2d 77, 78–80 [279 P.2d 33].
- Good Faith Belief That Minor Is 18 No Defense to Pimping and Pandering. *People v. Branch* (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 516, 521–522 [109 Cal.Rptr.3d 412].

## COMMENTARY

### *Solicitation*

In deciding there was sufficient evidence of solicitation, the court in *People v. Phillips* (1945) 70 Cal.App.2d 449, 453 [160 P.2d 872], quoted the following definitions:

“[S]olicit” is defined as: “To tempt . . . ; to lure on, esp. into evil, . . . to bring about . . . ; to seek to induce or elicit . . . .” (Webster’s New International

Dictionary (2d ed.)). “. . . to ask earnestly; to ask for the purpose of receiving; to endeavor to obtain by asking or pleading; . . . to try to obtain . . . While it does imply a serious request, it requires no particular degree of importunity, entreaty, imploration or supplication.” (58 C.J. 804–805.)

### ***General Intent***

The three ways of violating Penal Code section 266h are all general intent crimes, as held in *People v. McNulty* (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 624, 630–631 [249 Cal.Rptr. 22]:

[D]eriving support with knowledge that the other person is a prostitute is all that is required for violating the section in this manner. No specific intent is required . . . Receiving compensation for soliciting with knowledge that the other person is a prostitute is the only requirement under the first alternative of violating section 266h by solicitation. Under the second alternative to pimping by soliciting (soliciting compensation), . . . if the accused has solicited for the prostitute and has solicited compensation even though he had not intended to receive compensation, he would nevertheless be guilty of pimping. Pimping in all its forms is not a specific intent crime.

## **LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES**

- Attempted Pimping. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 266h; see *People v. Osuna* (1967) 251 Cal.App.2d 528, 531 [59 Cal.Rptr. 559].
- There is no crime of aiding and abetting prostitution. *People v. Gibson* (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 371, 385 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 809].

## **RELATED ISSUES**

### ***House of Prostitution***

One room of a building or other place is sufficient to constitute a house of prostitution, and one person may keep such a place to which others resort for purposes of prostitution. (*People v. Frey* (1964) 228 Cal.App.2d 33, 53 [39 Cal.Rptr. 49]; see *Aguilera v. Superior Court* (1969) 273 Cal.App.2d 848, 852 [78 Cal.Rptr. 736].)

### ***Receiving Support***

A conviction for living or deriving support from a prostitute’s earnings does not require evidence that the defendant received money directly from the prostitute, or that the defendant used money received from the prostitution solely to pay his or her own living expenses. (*People v. Navarro* (1922) 60 Cal.App. 180, 182 [212 P. 403].)

### ***Unanimity Instruction Not Required***

Pimping is a crime “of a continuous ongoing nature and [is] therefore not subject to the requirement that the jury must agree on the specific act or acts constituting the offense.” (*People v. Dell* (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 248, 265–266 [283 Cal.Rptr. 361]; *People v. Lewis* (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 455, 460–462 [143 Cal.Rptr. 587] [living or deriving support from prostitute’s earnings is an ongoing continuing offense].) Proof

of an ongoing relationship between the defendant and the prostitute is not required. (*People v. Jackson* (1980) 114 Cal.App.3d 207, 209–210 [170 Cal.Rptr. 476].)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Sex Offenses and Crimes Against Decency, §§ 82–84.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.11[2] (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure §§ 12:16, 12:17 (The Rutter Group).

## 1151. Pandering (Pen. Code, § 266i)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with pandering [in violation of Penal Code section 266i].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of pandering, the People must prove that:

*<Alternative 1A—persuaded/procured>*

- [1. The defendant successfully (persuaded/procured) \_\_\_\_\_  
*<insert name>* to become a prostitute(;/.)]

*<Alternative 1B—promises/threats/violence used to cause person to become prostitute>*

- [1. The defendant used (promises[,]/ threats[,]/ violence[,]/ [or] any device or scheme) to (cause/persuade/encourage/induce) \_\_\_\_\_  
*<insert name>* to become a prostitute[, although the defendant's efforts need not have been successful](;/.)]

*<Alternative 1C—arranged/procured a position>*

- [1. The defendant (arranged/procured a position) for \_\_\_\_\_  
*<insert name>* to be a prostitute in either a house of prostitution or any other place where prostitution is encouraged or allowed(;/.)]

*<Alternative 1D—promises/threats/violence used to cause person to remain>*

- [1. The defendant used (promises[,]/ threats[,]/ violence[,]/ [or] any device or scheme) to (cause/persuade/encourage/induce) \_\_\_\_\_  
*<insert name>* to remain as a prostitute in a house of prostitution or any other place where prostitution is encouraged or allowed(;/.)]

*<Alternative 1E—used fraud>*

- [1. The defendant used fraud, trickery, or duress [or abused a position of confidence or authority] to (persuade/procure) \_\_\_\_\_  
*<insert name>* to (be a prostitute/enter any place where prostitution is encouraged or allowed/enter or leave California for the purpose of prostitution)(;/.)]

*<Alternative 1F—received money>*

- [1. The defendant (received/gave/agreed to receive/agreed to give) money or something of value in exchange for (persuading/attempting to persuade/procuring/attempting to procure) \_\_\_\_\_  
*<insert name>* to (be a prostitute/enter or

leave California for the purpose of prostitution)(;/.)]

AND

2. The defendant intended to influence \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name> to be a prostitute(;/.)

<Give element 3 when defendant charged with pandering a minor.>

[AND

3. \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name> was (16 years old or older/under the age of 16) at the time the defendant acted.]

[It does not matter whether \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name> was (a prostitute already/ [or] an undercover police officer).]

A *prostitute* is a person who engages in sexual intercourse or any lewd act with another person in exchange for money [or other compensation]. [Pandering requires that an intended act of prostitution be with someone other than the defendant.] A *lewd act* means physical contact of the genitals, buttocks, or female breast of either the prostitute or customer with some part of the other person's body for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification.

[*Duress* means a direct or implied threat of force, violence, danger, hardship, or retribution that would cause a reasonable person to do [or submit to] something that he or she would not do [or submit to] otherwise. When deciding whether the act was accomplished by duress, consider all the circumstances, including the person's age and (her/his) relationship to the defendant.]

[Under the law, a person becomes one year older as soon as the first minute of his or her birthday has begun.]

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*New January 2006; Revised April 2011, February 2012, August 2012, February 2015, April 2020, March 2021*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

In element 1, give the appropriate alternative A–F depending on the evidence in the case. (See *People v. Montgomery* (1941) 47 Cal.App.2d 1, 12, 24, 27–28 [117 P.2d 437] [statutory alternatives are not mutually exclusive], disapproved on other grounds in *People v. Dillon* (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 454 fn. 2 [194 Cal.Rptr. 390, 668 P.2d 697] and *Murgia v. Municipal Court* (1975) 15 Cal.3d 286, 301 fn. 11 [124 Cal.Rptr. 204, 540 P.2d 44].)

The committee included “persuade” and “arrange” as options in element one because the statutory language, “procure,” may be difficult for jurors to understand.

Give bracketed element 3 if it is alleged that the person procured, or otherwise caused to act, by the defendant was a minor “over” or “under” the age of 16 years. (Pen. Code, § 266i(b).)

Give the bracketed paragraph defining duress on request if there is sufficient evidence that duress was used to procure a person for prostitution. (Pen. Code, § 266i(a)(5); see *People v. Leal* (2004) 33 Cal.4th 999, 1004–1010 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 869, 94 P.3d 1071] [definition of “duress”].)

Give the bracketed paragraph about calculating age if requested. (Fam. Code, § 6500; *In re Harris* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 849–850 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391].)

There is a split of authority on whether pandering requires that services be procured for a person other than the defendant. (*People v. Dixon* (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1159–1160 [119 Cal.Rptr.3d 901] [third person required]; *People v. Jacobo* (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 32, 47 [249 Cal.Rptr.3d 236] [no third person required].) If the court concludes that Penal Code section 266i(a)(2) requires a third person, give the bracketed sentence that begins with “Pandering requires.”

### ***Defenses—Instructional Duty***

If necessary for the jury’s understanding of the case, the court must instruct **sua sponte** on a defense theory in evidence, for example, that nude modeling does not constitute an act of prostitution and that an act of procuring a person solely for the purpose of nude modeling does not violate either the pimping or pandering statute. (*People v. Hill* (1980) 103 Cal.App.3d 525, 536–537 [163 Cal.Rptr. 99].)

## **AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 266i.
- Prostitution Defined. Pen. Code, § 647(b); *People v. Hill* (1980) 103 Cal.App.3d 525, 534–535 [163 Cal.Rptr. 99]; *People v. Romo* (1962) 200 Cal.App.2d 83, 90–91 [19 Cal.Rptr. 179]; *Wooten v. Superior Court* (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 422, 431–433 [113 Cal.Rptr.2d 195] [lewd act requires touching between prostitute and customer].
- Procurement Defined. *People v. Montgomery* (1941) 47 Cal.App.2d 1, 12 [117 P.2d 437], disapproved on other grounds in *People v. Dillon* (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 454 fn. 2 [194 Cal.Rptr. 390, 668 P.2d 697] and *Murgia v. Municipal Court* (1975) 15 Cal.3d 286, 301 fn. 11 [124 Cal.Rptr. 204, 540 P.2d 44].
- Proof of Actual Prostitution Not Required. *People v. Osuna* (1967) 251 Cal.App.2d 528, 531–532 [59 Cal.Rptr. 559].
- Duress Defined. *People v. Leal* (2004) 33 Cal.4th 999, 1004–1010 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 869, 94 P.3d 1071]; *People v. Pitmon* (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 38, 50 [216 Cal.Rptr. 221]; *People v. Cochran* (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 8, 13–14 [126 Cal.Rptr.2d 416].



- Good Faith Belief That Minor Is 18 No Defense to Pimping and Pandering. *People v. Branch* (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 516, 521–522 [109 Cal.Rptr.3d 412].
- Specific Intent Crime. *People v. Zambia* (2011) 51 Cal.4th 965, 980 [127 Cal.Rptr.3d 662, 254 P.3d 965].
- Victim May [Appear to] Be a Prostitute Already. *People v. Zambia* (2011) 51 Cal.4th 965, 981 [127 Cal.Rptr.3d 662, 254 P.3d 965].
- Encouraging Person to Become Prostitute Need Not Be Successful. *People v. Zambia* (2011) 51 Cal.4th 965, 980 [127 Cal.Rptr.3d 662, 254 P.3d 965].
- This Instruction Upheld. *People v. Campbell* (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 463, 495–496 [265 Cal.Rptr.3d 136].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Attempted Pandering. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 266i; *People v. Charles* (1963) 218 Cal.App.2d 812, 819 [32 Cal.Rptr. 653]; *People v. Benenato* (1946) 77 Cal.App.2d 350, 366–367 [175 P.2d 296], disapproved on other grounds in *In re Wright* (1967) 65 Cal.2d 650, 654–655, fn. 3 [56 Cal.Rptr. 110, 422 P.2d 998].

There is no crime of aiding and abetting prostitution. (*People v. Gibson* (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 371, 385 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 809].)

### RELATED ISSUES

See Related Issues section to CALCRIM No. 1150, *Pimping*.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Sex Offenses and Crimes Against Decency, § 85.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.11[3] (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure §§ 12:16, 12:17 (The Rutter Group).

## 1152. Child Procurement (Pen. Code, § 266j)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with (providing/causing) a child to engage in a lewd or lascivious act [in violation of Penal Code section 266j].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

*<Alternative 1A—gave/transported a child>*

- [1. The defendant intentionally (gave/transported/provided/made available) a child to someone else so the person could engage in a lewd or lascivious act with that child;]**

*<Alternative 1B—offered to give/transport a child>*

- [1. The defendant offered to (give/transport/provide/make available) a child to someone else so the person could engage in a lewd or lascivious act with that child;]**

*<Alternative 1C—caused child to engage in>*

- [1. The defendant (caused/persuaded/induced) a child to engage in a lewd or lascivious act with someone else;]**

**[AND]**

- 2. When the defendant acted, the child was under the age of 16 years(;/.)**

*<Give element 3 when instructing on “offered.”>*

**[AND]**

- 3. When the defendant made the offer, (he/she) intended to (give/transport/provide/make available) a child to someone else so the person could engage in a lewd or lascivious act with that child.]**

**A lewd or lascivious act is any touching of a child with the intent to sexually arouse either the perpetrator or the child. Contact with the child’s bare skin or private parts is not required. Any part of the child’s body or the clothes the child is wearing may be touched. [A lewd or lascivious act includes causing a child to touch his or her own body or someone else’s body at the instigation of the other person who has the required intent.]**

**[Under the law, a person becomes one year older as soon as the first minute of his or her birthday has begun.]**

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

In element 1, give the appropriate alternative A–C depending on the evidence in the case. When giving alternative 1B, “offered,” give element 3 as well.

Give the bracketed paragraph about calculating age if requested. (Fam. Code, § 6500; *In re Harris* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 849–850 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391].)

### *Related Instructions*

See CALCRIM Nos. 1110–1112, relating to lewd and lascivious acts in violation of Penal Code section 288.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 266j.
- Any Touching of Child With Intent to Arouse. *People v. Martinez* (1995) 11 Cal.4th 434, 443–445, 452 [45 Cal.Rptr.2d 905, 903 P.2d 1037] [in context of Pen. Code, § 288; disapproving *People v. Wallace* (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 568, 574–580 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 67] and its progeny]; see *People v. Diaz* (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1424, 1427–1428 [49 Cal.Rptr.2d 252] [list of examples].
- Child Touching Own Body Parts at Defendant’s Request. *People v. Meacham* (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 142, 152–153 [199 Cal.Rptr. 586] [“constructive” touching; approving *Austin* instruction in context of Pen. Code, § 288]; *People v. Austin* (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 110, 114–115 [168 Cal.Rptr. 401].
- Lewd Defined. *In re Smith* (1972) 7 Cal.3d 362, 365 [102 Cal.Rptr. 335, 497 P.2d 807] [in context of indecent exposure].

## LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Attempted Child Procurement. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 266j.

## RELATED ISSUES

### *Corroboration Not Required*

A minor victim is not an accomplice and the jury need not be instructed that the minor’s testimony requires corroboration. (*People v. Mena* (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 420, 425 [254 Cal.Rptr. 10].)

See CALCRIM Nos. 1110–1112, relating to lewd and lascivious acts in violation of Penal Code section 288.

## SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Sex Offenses and Crimes Against Decency, §§ 46, 54–55.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 144, *Crimes* 909

*Against Order*, § 144.11[3] (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, *Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure* §§ 12:16, 12:17  
(The Rutter Group).

## 1153. Prostitution: Engaging in Act (Pen. Code, § 647(b))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with engaging in an act of prostitution [in violation of Penal Code section 647(b)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that the defendant willfully engaged in sexual intercourse or a lewd act with someone else in exchange for money [or other compensation].

A *lewd act* means touching the genitals, buttocks, or female breast of either the prostitute or customer with some part of the other person's body for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification of either person.

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose.

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*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If the defendant is charged with one or more prior convictions, give CALCRIM No. 3100, *Prior Conviction: Nonbifurcated Trial*, unless the defendant has stipulated to the conviction. If the court has granted a bifurcated trial on the prior conviction, use CALCRIM No. 3101, *Prior Conviction: Bifurcated Trial*.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 647(b).
- Willfully Defined. Pen. Code, § 7(1); *People v. Lara* (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 102, 107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
- Prostitution Defined. Pen. Code, § 647(b); *People v. Hill* (1980) 103 Cal.App.3d 525, 534–535 [163 Cal.Rptr. 99]; *Wooten v. Superior Court* (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 422, 431–433 [113 Cal.Rptr.2d 195] [lewd act requires touching between prostitute and customer].
- Lewd Conduct Defined. *Pryor v. Municipal Court* (1979) 25 Cal.3d 238, 256 [158 Cal.Rptr. 330, 599 P.2d 636].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Payment Does Not Need to Be Made Directly to Person Doing Act*

“[W]e know of no statutory or case law requiring that payment be made to the person actually providing sexual favors.” (*People v. Bell* (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 1396, 1400 [248 Cal.Rptr. 57].)

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Sex Offenses and Crimes Against Decency, §§ 76–78, 178.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.11[1] (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, *Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure* §§ 12:16, 12:17 (The Rutter Group).

## 1154. Prostitution: Soliciting Another (Pen. Code, § 647(b))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with soliciting another person to engage in an act of prostitution [in violation of Penal Code section 647(b)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant requested [or \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert other synonyms for “solicit,” as appropriate>*] that another person engage in an act of prostitution;

[AND]

2. The defendant intended to engage in an act of prostitution with the other person(;/.)

*<Give element 3 when instructing that person solicited must receive message; see Bench Notes.>*

[AND]

3. The other person received the communication containing the request.]

A person *engages in an act of prostitution* if he or she has sexual intercourse or does a lewd act with someone else in exchange for money [or other compensation]. A *lewd act* means touching the genitals, buttocks, or female breast of either the prostitute or customer with some part of the other person’s body for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification. Under the law, when a prostitute and a customer engage in sexual intercourse or lewd acts, both of them are engaged in an act of prostitution.

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*New January 2006; Revised June 2007*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

One court has held that the person solicited must actually receive the solicitous communication. (*People v. Saepanh* (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 451, 458–459 [94 Cal.Rptr.2d 910].) In *Saepanh*, the defendant mailed a letter from prison containing a solicitation to harm the fetus of his girlfriend. (*Id.* at p. 453.) The letter was intercepted by prison authorities and, thus, never received by the intended person. (*Ibid.*) If there is an issue over whether the intended person actually received the communication, give bracketed element 3.

If the defendant is charged with one or more prior convictions, give CALCRIM No. 3100, *Prior Conviction: Nonbifurcated Trial*, unless the defendant has stipulated to the conviction. If the court has granted a bifurcated trial on the prior conviction, use CALCRIM No. 3101, *Prior Conviction: Bifurcated Trial*.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 647(b).
- Prostitution Defined. Pen. Code, § 647(b); *People v. Hill* (1980) 103 Cal.App.3d 525, 534–535 [163 Cal.Rptr. 99]; *Wooten v. Superior Court* (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 422, 431–433 [113 Cal.Rptr.2d 195] [lewd act requires touching between prostitute and customer].
- Lewd Conduct Defined. *Pryor v. Municipal Court* (1979) 25 Cal.3d 238, 256 [158 Cal.Rptr. 330, 599 P.2d 636].
- Solicitation Requires Specific Intent. *People v. Norris* (1978) 88 Cal.App.3d Supp. 32, 38 [152 Cal.Rptr. 134]; *People v. Love* (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 13 [168 Cal.Rptr. 591]; *People v. Dell* (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 248, 264 [283 Cal.Rptr. 361].
- Solicitation Defined. *People v. Superior Court* (1977) 19 Cal.3d 338, 345–346 [138 Cal.Rptr. 66, 562 P.2d 1315].
- Person Solicited Must Receive Communication. *People v. Saephanh* (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 451, 458–459 [94 Cal.Rptr.2d 910].
- Solicitation Applies to Either Prostitute or Customer. *Leffel v. Municipal Court* (1976) 54 Cal.App.3d 569, 575 [126 Cal.Rptr. 773].

### RELATED ISSUES

See the Related Issues section of CALCRIM No. 441, *Solicitation: Elements*.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Sex Offenses and Crimes Against Decency, §§ 76–78, 178.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.11[1] (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, *Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure* §§ 12:16, 12:17 (The Rutter Group).



**1155. Prostitution: Agreeing to Engage in Act (Pen. Code,  
§ 647(b))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with agreeing to engage in an act of prostitution [in violation of Penal Code section 647(b)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant agreed to engage in an act of prostitution with someone else;
2. The defendant intended to engage in an act of prostitution with that person;

AND

3. In addition to agreeing, the defendant did something to further the commission of an act of prostitution.

A person *engages in an act of prostitution* if he or she has sexual intercourse or does a lewd act with someone else in exchange for money [or other compensation]. A *lewd act* means touching the genitals, buttocks, or female breast of either the prostitute or customer with some part of the other person's body for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification.

[The conduct that furthers the commission of the act of prostitution may happen before, after, or at the same time as the agreement to engage in prostitution.]

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*New January 2006*

**BENCH NOTES**

***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If the defendant is charged with one or more prior convictions, give CALCRIM No. 3100, *Prior Conviction: Nonbifurcated Trial*, unless the defendant has stipulated to the conviction. If the court has granted a bifurcated trial on the prior conviction, use CALCRIM No. 3101, *Prior Conviction: Bifurcated Trial*.

**AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 647(b).
- Prostitution Defined. Pen. Code, § 647(b); *People v. Hill* (1980) 103 Cal.App.3d 525, 534–535 [163 Cal.Rptr. 99]; *Wooten v. Superior Court* (2001)

93 Cal.App.4th 422, 431–433 [113 Cal.Rptr.2d 195] [lewd act requires touching between prostitute and customer].

- Lewd Conduct Defined. *Pryor v. Municipal Court* (1979) 25 Cal.3d 238, 256 [158 Cal.Rptr. 330, 599 P.2d 636].
- Specific Intent Required. Pen. Code, § 647(b).
- Act in Furtherance Required. Pen. Code, § 647(b).
- Act in Furtherance May Precede Agreement. *In re Cheri T.* (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1407–1408 [83 Cal.Rptr.2d 397]; contra, *People v. Davis* (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 4–5 [247 Cal.Rptr. 359].
- Act in Furtherance May Consist of Words Alone. *Kim v. Superior Court (People)* (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 937, 945 [39 Cal.Rptr.3d 338].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Sex Offenses and Crimes Against Decency, §§ 76–78, 178.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.11[1] (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure §§ 12:16, 12:17 (The Rutter Group).

## 1156. Loitering: For Prostitution (Pen. Code, § 653.22(a))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with loitering with the intent to commit prostitution [in violation of Penal Code section 653.22(a)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant delayed or lingered in a public place;
2. When the defendant did so, (he/she) did not have a lawful purpose for being there;

AND

3. When the defendant did so, (he/she) intended to commit prostitution.

As used here, a *public place* is (a/an/the) (area open to the public[(,;)]/ [or] alley[(,;)]/ [or] plaza [(,;)]/ [or] park[(,;)]/ [or] driveway[(,;)]/ [or] parking lot[(,;)]/ [or] automobile[(,;)]/ [or] building open to the general public[, including one that serves food or drink or provides entertainment] [(,;)]/ [or] doorway or entrance to a building or dwelling[(,;)]/ [or] grounds enclosing a building or dwelling).

A person *intends to commit prostitution* if he or she intends to engage in sexual conduct with someone else in exchange for money [or other compensation]. *Sexual conduct* means sexual intercourse or touching the genitals, buttocks, or female breast of either the prostitute or customer with some part of the other person's body for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification. [*Prostitution* does not include sexual conduct engaged in as a part of any stage performance, play, or other entertainment open to the public.]

The intent to commit prostitution may be shown by a person acting in a manner and under circumstances that openly demonstrate the intent to induce, entice, or solicit prostitution or to procure someone else to commit prostitution. In deciding whether the defendant acted with intent to commit prostitution, you may consider whether (he/she):

- [Repeatedly beckoned to, stopped, engaged in conversations with, or attempted to stop or engage in conversations with passersby in a way that indicated the solicitation of prostitution (,;)]
- [Repeatedly stopped or attempted to stop vehicles by hailing, waving, or gesturing, or engaged or attempted to engage drivers or passengers in conversation, in a way that indicated the solicitation of prostitution(,;)]

- [Circled an area in a vehicle and repeatedly beckoned to, contacted, or attempted to contact or stop pedestrians or other motorists in a way that indicated the solicitation of prostitution(./;)]
- [Has engaged in any behavior indicative of prostitution activity within the six months before (his/her) arrest in this case(./;)]
- [Has been convicted of this crime or of any other crime relating to or involving prostitution within five years of (his/her) arrest in this case.]

You should also consider whether any of these activities occurred in an area known for prostitution.

This list of factors is not intended to be a complete list of all the factors you may consider on the question of intent. The factors are provided only as examples to assist you in deciding whether the defendant acted with the intent to commit prostitution. Consider all the evidence presented in this case for whatever bearing you conclude it has on the question of the defendant's intent. Give the evidence whatever weight you decide that it deserves.

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*New January 2006*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 653.22(a).
- Factors to Consider to Prove Intent. Pen. Code, § 653.22(a), (b) & (c).
- Prostitution Defined. Pen. Code, § 653.20(a); see also Pen. Code, § 647(b); *People v. Hill* (1980) 103 Cal.App.3d 525, 534–535 [163 Cal.Rptr. 99]; *Wooten v. Superior Court* (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 422, 431–433 [113 Cal.Rptr.2d 195]; *Pryor v. Municipal Court* (1979) 25 Cal.3d 238, 256 [158 Cal.Rptr. 330, 599 P.2d 636].
- Public Place Defined. Pen. Code, § 653.20(b).
- Loiter Defined. Pen. Code, § 653.20(b).
- Statute Constitutional. *People v. Pulliam* (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 1430, 1434–1439 [73 Cal.Rptr.2d 371].

## SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, § 74.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, §§ 144.11[1], 144.20 (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure §§ 12:16, 12:17 (The Rutter Group).

**1157–1159. Reserved for Future Use**

### (iii) Conduct in Public

#### 1160. Indecent Exposure (Pen. Code, § 314)

---

The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with indecent exposure [in violation of Penal Code section 314].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant willfully exposed (his/her) genitals in the presence of another person or persons who might be offended or annoyed by the defendant's actions;

[AND]

2. When the defendant exposed (himself/herself), (he/she) acted lewdly by intending to direct public attention to (his/her) genitals for the purpose of sexually arousing or gratifying (himself/herself) or another person, or sexually offending another person(;/.)

<Give element 3 if defendant charged with entering inhabited dwelling.>

[AND]

3. The willful and lewd exposure occurred after the defendant had entered an inhabited (dwelling house/part of a building/trailer coach) without consent.]

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose. It is not required that he or she intend to break the law, hurt someone else, or gain any advantage.

[It is not required that another person actually see the exposed genitals.]

[A (house/part of a building/trailer coach) is *inhabited* if someone uses it as a dwelling, whether or not someone is inside at the time of the alleged indecent exposure.]

[A (house/part of a building/trailer coach) is *inhabited* if someone used it as a dwelling and left only because a natural or other disaster caused him or her to leave.]

[A (house/part of a building/trailer coach) is not *inhabited* if the former residents have moved out and do not intend to return, even if some personal property remains inside.]

[A *house* includes any (structure/garage/office/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert other description>) that is attached to the house and functionally connected with it.]

[A *trailer coach* is a vehicle without its own mode of power, designed to

**be pulled by a motor vehicle. It is made for human habitation or human occupancy and for carrying property.]**

**[A *trailer coach* is [also] a park trailer that is intended for human habitation for recreational or seasonal use only and**

- 1. has a floor area of no more than 400 square feet;**
- 2. is not more than 14 feet wide;**
- 3. is built on a single chassis;**

**AND**

- 4. may only be transported on public highways with a permit.]**

*New January 2006*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

Give element 3 if the defendant is charged with entering an inhabited dwelling.

If the defendant is charged with a prior conviction for indecent exposure give CALCRIM No. 3100, *Prior Conviction: Nonbifurcated Trial*, or CALCRIM No. 3101, *Prior Conviction: Bifurcated Trial*, unless the defendant has stipulated to the truth of the prior conviction. (See *People v. Merkley* (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 472, 476 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 21]; *People v. Bouzas* (1991) 53 Cal.3d 467, 477–480 [279 Cal.Rptr. 847, 807 P.2d 1076]; *People v. Weathington* (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 69, 90 [282 Cal.Rptr. 170].)

Give the bracketed sentence that begins, “It is not required that another person actually see” on request if the evidence shows that no one actually saw the defendant’s genitals. (*People v. Carbajal* (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 978, 986 [8 Cal.Rptr.3d 206].)

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 314.
- Affront Must Be Sexual. *In re Dallas W.* (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 937, 939 [102 Cal.Rptr.2d 493]; *People v. Archer* (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 402, 406 [119 Cal.Rptr.2d 783] [“sexual affront” means to sexually insult or offend another person].
- Exposing Person Must Have Intent to Expose Genitals. *People v. Massicot* (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 920, 926–928 [118 Cal.Rptr.2d 705].
- Must Expose to Other Person But Other Person Need Not View. *People v. Carbajal* (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 978, 986 [8 Cal.Rptr.3d 206].

- Lewd Intent Defined. *In re Smith* (1972) 7 Cal.3d 362, 365–366 [102 Cal.Rptr. 335, 497 P.2d 807].
- Lewd Intent Does Not Require That Genitals Be Touched. *People v. Rehmeier* (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1758, 1766 [24 Cal.Rptr.2d 321]; see *People v. Meeker* (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 358, 362 [256 Cal.Rptr. 79].
- “Private Parts” Means Genitals. *People v. Massicot* (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 920, 925, fn. 3 [118 Cal.Rptr.2d 705]; see *In re Smith* (1972) 7 Cal.3d 362, 366 [102 Cal.Rptr. 335, 497 P.2d 807].
- Inhabitation Defined. See Pen. Code, § 459 [in context of burglary].
- Trailer Coach Defined. Veh. Code, § 635; Health & Saf. Code, § 18009.3.
- House Not Inhabited is Former Residents Not Returning. *People v. Cardona* (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 481, 483 [191 Cal.Rptr. 109].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Attempted Indecent Exposure. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 314; *People v. Rehmeier* (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1758, 1766–1767 [24 Cal.Rptr.2d 321]; see also *People v. Finley* (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 454, 456–459 [31 Cal.Rptr.2d 288] [attempted misdemeanor indecent exposure is not elevated to felony by recidivist provision of Pen. Code, § 314].

Indecent exposure is a misdemeanor if the defendant does not have qualifying priors and the alleged event did not occur in an inhabited dwelling. (Pen. Code, § 314.) If the defendant is charged with one of the factors that elevates the offense to a felony, then the misdemeanor is a lesser included offense.

Soliciting anyone to engage in lewd or dissolute conduct in any public place (see Pen. Code, § 647(a)) is not a lesser included offense of indecent exposure under Penal Code section 314, subdivision 1. (*People v. Meeker* (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 358, 361–362 [256 Cal.Rptr. 79] [following construction of “lewd or dissolute conduct” in *Pryor v. Municipal Court* (1979) 25 Cal.3d 238, 256 [158 Cal.Rptr. 330, 599 P.2d 636]]; contra, *People v. Curry* (1977) 76 Cal.App.3d 181, 186–187 [142 Cal.Rptr. 649]; *People v. Swearington* (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 935, 944 [140 Cal.Rptr. 5].) Burglary is also not a necessarily included offense of unlawful entry for indecent exposure. (*People v. Rehmeier* (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1758, 1768–1769 [24 Cal.Rptr.2d 321].)

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Presence of Others*

“[A] conviction for indecent exposure under Penal Code section 314, subdivision 1 requires evidence that a defendant actually exposed his or her genitals in the presence of another person, but there is no concomitant requirement that such



person must actually have seen the defendant’s genitals.” (*People v. Carbajal* (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 978, 986 [8 Cal.Rptr.3d 206].)

### ***Burglary***

Felony indecent exposure can be the underlying felony to support a burglary charge. (*People v. Rehmeyer* (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1758, 1767 [24 Cal.Rptr.2d 321].)

### ***After Entering***

The statute does not require that the defendant expose himself or herself while still in the home. (See *People v. Mendoza* (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 571, 575–576 [13 Cal.Rptr.3d 195] [discussing identical language in Pen. Code, § 647.6(a)].) It is sufficient if the defendant engaged in the conduct after entering the home and there is “a clear nexus between the residential entry and the . . . conduct.” (*Id.* at p. 576.)

See the Related Issues section to CALCRIM No. 1701, *Burglary: Degrees*, for additional authority on “inhabited dwelling house.”

## **SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Sex Offenses and Crimes Against Decency, §§ 126–129.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.11[1] (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, *Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure* §§ 12:16, 12:17 (The Rutter Group).

## 1161. Lewd Conduct in Public (Pen. Code, § 647(a))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with engaging in lewd conduct in public [in violation of Penal Code section 647(a)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant willfully engaged in the touching of ((his/her) own/ [or] another person's) (genitals[,]/ [or] buttocks[,]/ [or] female breast);
2. The defendant did so with the intent to sexually arouse or gratify (himself/herself) or another person, or to annoy or offend another person;
3. At the time the defendant engaged in the conduct, (he/she) was in (a public place/ [or] a place open to the public [or to public view]);
4. At the time the defendant engaged in the conduct, someone else who might have been offended was present;

AND

5. The defendant knew or reasonably should have known that another person who might have been offended by (his/her) conduct was present.

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose.

[As used here, a *public place* is a place that is open and accessible to anyone who wishes to go there.]

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*New January 2006; Revised September 2017, March 2019*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 647(a); *Pryor v. Municipal Court* (1979) 25 Cal.3d 238, 256–257 [158 Cal.Rptr. 330, 599 P.2d 636]; *People v. Rylaarsdam* (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 3–4 [181 Cal.Rptr. 723].
- Willfully Defined. Pen. Code, § 7, subd. 1; *People v. Lara* (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 102, 107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].

- “Lewd” and “Dissolute” Synonymous. *Pryor v. Municipal Court* (1979) 25 Cal.3d 238, 256 [158 Cal.Rptr. 330, 599 P.2d 636].
- Lewd Conduct Defined. *Pryor v. Municipal Court* (1979) 25 Cal.3d 238, 256 [158 Cal.Rptr. 330, 599 P.2d 636].
- Public Place Defined. *In re Zorn* (1963) 59 Cal.2d 650, 652 [30 Cal.Rptr. 811, 381 P.2d 635]; *People v. Strider* (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1393, 1401 [100 Cal.Rptr. 3d 66].

## RELATED ISSUES

### *Need Not Prove Someone Was Offended*

“It is not the burden of the prosecution to prove that the observer was in fact offended by the conduct but only that the conduct was such that defendant should know that the observer ‘may be offended.’ ” (*People v. Rylaarsdam* (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 11 [181 Cal.Rptr. 723].)

### *Does Not Apply to Live Theater Performance*

“It seems evident from the foregoing that the vagrancy law, [Penal Code] section 647, subdivision (a), was not intended to apply to live performances in a theater before an audience.” (*Barrows v. Municipal Court* (1970) 1 Cal.3d 821, 827–828 [83 Cal.Rptr. 819, 464 P.2d 483].)

## SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, §§ 67–68.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.20 (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, *Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure* §§ 12:16, 12:17 (The Rutter Group).

## 1162. Soliciting Lewd Conduct in Public (Pen. Code, § 647(a))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with soliciting another person to engage in lewd conduct in public [in violation of Penal Code section 647(a)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant requested [or \_\_\_\_\_ <insert other synonyms for “solicit,” as appropriate>] that another person engage in the touching of ((his/her) own/ [or] another person’s) (genitals[,]/ [or] buttocks[,]/ [or] female breast);
2. The defendant requested that the other person engage in the requested conduct in (a public place/ [or] a place open to the public [or in public view]);
3. When the defendant made the request, (he/she) was in (a public place/ [or] a place open to the public [or in public view]);
4. The defendant intended for the conduct to occur in (a public place/ [or] a place open to the public [or in public view]);
5. When the defendant made the request, (he/she) did so with the intent to sexually arouse or gratify (himself/herself) or another person, or to annoy or offend another person;

[AND]

6. The defendant knew or reasonably should have known that someone was likely to be present who could be offended by the requested conduct(;/.)

<Give element 7 when instructing that person solicited must receive message; see Bench Notes.>

[AND]

7. The other person received the communication containing the request.]

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose.

[As used here, a *public place* is a place that is open and accessible to anyone who wishes to go there.]

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2006, December 2008, September 2017, March 2019*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

One court has held that the person solicited must actually receive the solicitous communication. (*People v. Saephanh* (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 451, 458–459 [94 Cal.Rptr.2d 910].) In *Saephanh*, the defendant mailed a letter from prison containing a solicitation to harm the fetus of his girlfriend. (*Id.* at p. 453.) The letter was intercepted by prison authorities and, thus, never received by the intended person. (*Ibid.*) If there is an issue over whether the intended person actually received the communication, give bracketed element 7.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 647(a); *Pryor v. Municipal Court* (1979) 25 Cal.3d 238, 256–257 [158 Cal.Rptr. 330, 599 P.2d 636]; *People v. Rylaarsdam* (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 8–9 [181 Cal.Rptr. 723].
- Willfully Defined. Pen. Code, § 7(1); *People v. Lara* (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 102, 107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
- Likely Defined. *People v. Lake* (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1 [67 Cal.Rptr.3d 452].
- Solicitation Requires Specific Intent. *People v. Norris* (1978) 88 Cal.App.3d Supp. 32, 38 [152 Cal.Rptr. 134].
- Solicitation Defined. *People v. Superior Court* (1977) 19 Cal.3d 338, 345–346 [138 Cal.Rptr. 66, 562 P.2d 1315].
- Person Solicited Must Receive Communication. *People v. Saephanh* (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 451, 458–459 [94 Cal.Rptr.2d 910].
- “Lewd” and “Dissolute” Synonymous. *Pryor v. Municipal Court* (1979) 25 Cal.3d 238, 256 [158 Cal.Rptr. 330, 599 P.2d 636].
- Lewd Conduct Defined. *Pryor v. Municipal Court* (1979) 25 Cal.3d 238, 256 [158 Cal.Rptr. 330, 599 P.2d 636].
- Public Place Defined. *In re Zorn* (1963) 59 Cal.2d 650, 652 [30 Cal.Rptr. 811, 381 P.2d 635]; *People v. Strider* (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1393, 1401 [100 Cal.Rptr. 3d 66].

## RELATED ISSUES

See the Related Issues sections of CALCRIM No. 1161, *Lewd Conduct in Public* and CALCRIM No. 441, *Solicitation: Elements*.

## SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, §§ 67–68.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 144, *Crimes* 927

*Against Order*, § 144.20 (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure §§ 12:16, 12:17  
(The Rutter Group).

**1163–1169. Reserved for Future Use**

## (iv) Failure to Register

### 1170. Failure to Register as Sex Offender (Pen. Code, § 290(b))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with failing to register as a sex offender [in violation of Penal Code section 290(b)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant was previously (convicted of/found to have committed) \_\_\_\_\_ <specify the offense for which the defendant is allegedly required to register>;
2. The defendant resided (in \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of city>, California/in an unincorporated area or a city with no police department in \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of county> County, California/on the campus or in the facilities of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of university or college> in California);
3. The defendant actually knew (he/she) had a duty under Penal Code section 290 to register as a sex offender [living at \_\_\_\_\_ <insert specific address or addresses in California>] and that (he/she) had to register within five working days of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert triggering event specified in Penal Code section 290(b)>;

**AND**

<Alternative 4A—change of residence>

- [4. The defendant willfully failed to register as a sex offender with the (police chief of that city/sheriff of that county/the police chief of that campus or its facilities) within five working days of (coming into/ [or] changing (his/her) residence within) that (city/ county/campus).]

<Alternative 4B—birthday>

- [4. The defendant willfully failed to annually update (his/her) registration as a sex offender with the (police chief of that city/ sheriff of that county/the police chief of that campus) within five working days of (his/her) birthday.]

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose.

[*Residence* means one or more addresses where someone regularly resides, regardless of the number of days or nights spent there, such as a shelter or structure that can be located by a street address. A *residence*

**may include, but is not limited to, houses, apartment buildings, motels, hotels, homeless shelters, and recreational and other vehicles.]**

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2006, April 2010, October 2010, February 2013, February 2014, August 2014, August 2015*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime. This instruction is based on the language of the statute effective January 1, 2006. The instruction may not be appropriate for offenses that occurred before that date. Note also that this is an area where case law is developing rapidly. The court should review recent decisions on Penal Code section 290 before instructing.

In element 1, if the specific offense triggering the registration requirement is spousal rape, the instruction must include the requirement that the offense involved the use of “force or violence.” (*People v. Mason* (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 818, 822–827 [160 Cal.Rptr.3d 516].)

In element 3, choose the option “living at \_\_\_\_\_ <insert specific address in California> if there is an issue whether the defendant actually knew that a place where he or she spent time was a residence triggering the duty to register. (*People v. Cohens* (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1442, 1451 [101 Cal.Rptr.3d 289]; *People v. LeCorno* (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1058, 1068–1069 [135 Cal.Rptr.2d 775].)

In element 4, give alternative 4A if the defendant is charged with failing to register within five working days of changing his or her residence or becoming homeless. (Pen. Code, § 290(b).) Give alternative 4B if the defendant is charged with failing to update his or her registration within five working days of his or her birthday. (Pen. Code, § 290.012.)

If the defendant is charged with a prior conviction for failing to register, give CALCRIM No. 3100, *Prior Conviction: Nonbifurcated Trial*, or CALCRIM No. 3101, *Prior Conviction: Bifurcated Trial*, unless the defendant has stipulated to the truth of the prior conviction. (See *People v. Merkley* (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 472, 476 [58 Cal.Rptr. 2d 21]; *People v. Bouzas* (1991) 53 Cal.3d 467, 477–480 [279 Cal.Rptr. 847, 807 P.2d 1076]; *People v. Weathington* (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 69, 90 [282 Cal.Rptr. 170].)

For the charge of failure to register, it is error to give an instruction on general criminal intent that informs the jury that a person is “acting with general criminal intent, even though he may not know that his act or conduct is unlawful.” (*People v. Barker* (2004) 34 Cal.4th 345, 360 [18 Cal.Rptr.3d 260, 96 P.3d 507]; *People v. Edgar* (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 210, 219 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 662].) The court should consider whether it is more appropriate to give CALCRIM No. 251, *Union of Act and Intent: Specific Intent or Mental State*, or to give a modified version of CALCRIM No. 250, *Union of Act and Intent: General Intent*, as explained in the



Related Issues section to CALCRIM No. 250.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 290(b) [change in residence], 290.012 [birthday]; *People v. Garcia* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 744, 752 [107 Cal.Rptr.2d 355, 23 P.3d 590].
- Spousal Rape Not Registerable Offense Absent Force or Violence. *People v. Mason* (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 818, 825–826 [160 Cal.Rptr.3d 516].
- Definition of Residence. Pen. Code, § 290.011(g); *People v. Gonzales* (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 24, 35 [107 Cal.Rptr.3d 11].
- Willfully Defined. Pen. Code, § 7(1); see *People v. Barker* (2004) 34 Cal.4th 345, 360 [18 Cal.Rptr.3d 260, 96 P.3d 507].
- Actual Knowledge of Duty Required. *People v. Garcia* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 744, 752 [107 Cal.Rptr.2d 355, 23 P.3d 590].
- Continuing Offense. *Wright v. Superior Court* (1997) 15 Cal.4th 521, 527–528 [63 Cal.Rptr.2d 322, 936 P.2d 101].
- General Intent Crime. *People v. Barker* (2004) 34 Cal.4th 345, 360 [18 Cal.Rptr.3d 260, 96 P.3d 507]; *People v. Johnson* (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 67, 72 [78 Cal.Rptr.2d 795].
- No Duty to Define Residence. *People v. McCleod* (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1219 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 545].
- Registration is Not Punishment. *In re Alva* (2004) 33 Cal.4th 254, 262 [14 Cal.Rptr.3d 811, 92 P.3d 311].
- Jury May Consider Evidence That Significant Involuntary Condition Deprived Defendant of Actual Knowledge. *People v. Sorden* (2005) 36 Cal.4th 65, 72 [29 Cal.Rptr.3d 777, 113 P.3d 565].
- People Must Prove Defendant Was California Resident at Time of Offense. *People v. Wallace* (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1088, 1102–1104 [98 Cal.Rptr.3d 618].
- Defendant Must Have Actual Knowledge That Location is Residence for Purpose of Duty to Register. *People v. Aragon* (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 504, 510 [143 Cal.Rptr.3d 476]; *People v. LeCorno* (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1058, 1067–1070 [135 Cal.Rptr.2d 775].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Other Violations of Section 290*

This instruction applies to violations under Penal Code sections 290(b) and 290.012. Section 290 imposes numerous other duties on persons convicted of sex offenses. For example, a registered sex offender must:

1. Notify the agency where he or she was *last* registered of any new address or location, whether inside or outside California, or any name change. (See Pen. Code, §§ 290.013–290.014; *People v. Smith* (2004) 32 Cal.4th 792, 800–802 [11

Cal.Rptr.3d 290, 86 P.3d 348] [under former Pen. Code, § 290(f), which allowed notice of change of address in writing, there is sufficient notice if defendant mails change of address form even if agency does not receive it]; *People v. Annin* (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 725, 737–740 [10 Cal.Rptr.3d 712] [discussing meaning of “changed” residence]; *People v. Davis* (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 377, 385 [125 Cal.Rptr.2d 519] [must instruct on requirement of actual knowledge of duty to notify law enforcement when moving out of jurisdiction]; see also *People v. Franklin* (1999) 20 Cal.4th 249, 255–256 [84 Cal.Rptr.2d 241, 975 P.2d 30] [construing former Pen. Code, § 290(f), which did not specifically require registration when registrant moved outside California].)

2. Register multiple residences wherever he or she regularly resides. (See Pen. Code, § 290.010; *People v. Edgar* (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 210, 219–222 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 662] [court failed to instruct that jury must find that defendant actually knew of duty to register multiple residences; opinion cites former section 290(a)(1)(B)]; *People v. Vigil* (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 485, 501 [114 Cal.Rptr.2d 331].)
3. Update his or her registration at least once every 30 days if he or she is “a transient.” (See Pen. Code, § 290.011.)

A sexually violent predator who is released from custody must verify his or her address at least once every 90 days and verify any place of employment. (See Pen. Code, § 290.012.) Other special requirements govern:

1. Residents of other states who must register in their home state but are working or attending school in California. (See Pen. Code, § 290.002.)
2. Sex offenders enrolled at, employed by, or carrying on a vocation at any university, college, community college, or other institution of higher learning. (See Pen. Code, § 290.01.)

In addition, providing false information on the registration form is a violation of section 290.018. (See also *People v. Chan* (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 408 [26 Cal.Rptr.3d 878].)

### ***Forgetting to Register***

If a person actually knows of his or her duty to register, “just forgetting” is not a defense. (*People v. Barker* (2004) 34 Cal.4th 345, 356–357 [18 Cal.Rptr.3d 260, 96 P.3d 507].) In reaching this conclusion, the court stated, “[w]e do not here express an opinion as to whether forgetfulness resulting from, for example, an *acute psychological condition*, or a *chronic deficit of memory or intelligence*, might negate the willfulness required for a section 290 violation.” (*Id.* at p. 358 [italics in original].)

### ***Registration Requirement for Consensual Oral Copulation With Minor***

Penal Code section 290 requires lifetime registration for a person convicted of consensual oral copulation with a minor but does not require such registration for a person convicted of consensual sexual intercourse with a minor. (Pen. Code,

§ 290(c).) The mandatory registration requirement for consensual oral copulation with a minor does not deny equal protection of laws. (*Johnson v. Department of Justice* (2015) 60 Cal.4th 871 [183 Cal.Rptr.3d 96, 341 P.3d 1075] [overruling *People v. Hofsheier* (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1185, 1191, 1205–1206 [39 Cal.Rptr.3d 821, 129 P.3d 29]].)

***Moving Between Counties—Failure to Notify County Leaving and County Moving To Can Only Be Punished as One Offense***

A person who changes residences a single time, failing to notify both the jurisdiction he or she is departing from and the jurisdiction he or she is entering, commits two violations of Penal Code section 290 but can only be punished for one. (*People v. Britt* (2004) 32 Cal.4th 944, 953–954 [12 Cal.Rptr.3d 66, 87 P.3d 812].) Further, if the defendant has been prosecuted in one county for the violation, and the prosecutor in the second county is aware of the previous prosecution, the second county cannot subsequently prosecute the defendant. (*Id.* at pp. 955–956.)

***Notice of Duty to Register on Release From Confinement***

No reported case has held that the technical notice requirements are elements of the offense, especially when the jury is told that they must find the defendant had actual knowledge. (See former Pen. Code, § 290(b), after October 13, 2007, section 290.017; *People v. Garcia* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 744, 754, 755–756 [107 Cal.Rptr.2d 355, 23 P.3d 590] [if defendant willfully and knowingly failed to register, *Buford* does not require reversal merely because authorities failed to comply with technical requirements]; see also *People v. Buford* (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 975, 987 [117 Cal.Rptr. 333] [revoking probation for noncompliance with section 290, an abuse of discretion when court and jail officials also failed to comply].) The court in *Garcia* did state, however, that the “court’s instructions on ‘willfulness’ should have required proof that, in addition to being formally notified by the appropriate officers as required by section 290, in order to willfully violate section 290 the defendant must actually know of his duty to register.” (*People v. Garcia, supra*, 25 Cal.4th at p. 754.)

## SECONDARY SOURCES

3 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Punishment §§ 136–149.

5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 93, *Disabilities Flowing From Conviction*, § 93.04[2] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 140, *Challenges to Crimes*, § 140.20[1][a], Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.21 (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure §§ 12:16, 12:17 (The Rutter Group).

### **1171–1179. Reserved for Future Use**

## (v) Other Offenses

### 1180. Incest (Pen. Code, § 285)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with incest [in violation of Penal Code section 285].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant had sexual intercourse with another person;
2. When the defendant did so, (he/she) was at least 14 years old;
3. When the defendant did so, the other person was at least 14 years old;

AND

4. The defendant and the other person are related to each other as \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of relationship from Family Code section 2200>.

*Sexual intercourse* means any penetration, no matter how slight, of the vagina or genitalia by the penis. [Ejaculation is not required.]

[Under the law, a person becomes one year older as soon as the first minute of his or her birthday has begun.]

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*New January 2006; Revised June 2007, October 2010, February 2012, August 2015*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

This instruction focuses on incestuous sexual intercourse with a minor, which is the most likely form of incest to be charged. Incest is also committed by intercourse between adult relatives within the specified degree of consanguinity, or by an incestuous marriage. (See Pen. Code, § 285.)

Give the bracketed paragraph about calculating age if requested. (Fam. Code, § 6500; *In re Harris* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 849–850 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391].)

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 285.
- Incestuous Marriages. Fam. Code, § 2200.
- Sexual Intercourse Defined. See Pen. Code, § 263; *People v. Karsai* (1982) 131

Cal.App.3d 224, 233–234 [182 Cal.Rptr. 406], disapproved on other grounds by *People v. Jones* (1988) 46 Cal.3d 585 [250 Cal.Rptr. 635, 758 P.2d 1165].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Attempted Incest. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 285.

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Accomplice Instructions*

A minor is a victim of, not an accomplice to, incest. Accomplice instructions are not appropriate in a trial for incest involving a minor. (*People v. Tobias* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 327, 334 [106 Cal.Rptr.2d 80, 21 P.3d 758]; see *People v. Stoll* (1927) 84 Cal.App. 99, 101–102 [257 P. 583].) An exception may exist when two minors engage in consensual sexual intercourse, and thus both are victims of the other's crime. (*People v. Tobias, supra*, 25 Cal.4th at p. 334; see *In re T.A.J.* (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1364–1365 [73 Cal.Rptr.2d 331] [minor perpetrator under Pen. Code, § 261.5].) An adult woman who voluntarily engages in the incestuous act is an accomplice, whose testimony must be corroborated. (See *People v. Stratton* (1904) 141 Cal. 604, 609 [75 P. 166].)

#### *Half-Blood Relationship*

Family Code section 2200 prohibits sexual relations between brothers and sisters of half blood, but not between uncles and nieces of half blood. (*People v. Baker* (1968) 69 Cal.2d 44, 50 [69 Cal.Rptr. 595, 442 P.2d 675] [construing former version of § 2200].) However, sexual intercourse between persons the law deems to be related is proscribed. A trial court may properly instruct on the conclusive presumption of legitimacy (see Fam. Code, § 7540) if a defendant uncle asserts that the victim's mother is actually his half sister. The presumption requires the jury to find that if the defendant's mother and her potent husband were living together when the defendant was conceived, the husband was the defendant's father, and thus the defendant was a full brother of the victim's mother. (*People v. Russell* (1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 330, 335 [99 Cal.Rptr. 277].)

#### *Lack of Knowledge as Defense*

No reported cases have held that lack of knowledge of the prohibited relationship is a defense to incest. (But see *People v. Patterson* (1894) 102 Cal. 239, 242–243 [36 P. 436] [dictum that party without knowledge of relationship would not be guilty]; see also *People v. Vogel* (1956) 46 Cal.2d 798, 801, 805 [299 P.2d 850] [good faith belief is defense to bigamy].)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Sex Offenses and Crimes Against Decency §§ 140–143, 178.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.21[3] (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, *Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure* §§ 12:16, 12:17 (The Rutter Group).

## 1181. Sexual Abuse of Animal (Pen. Code, §§ 286.5, 597f)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with sexual abuse of an animal [in violation of Penal Code section 286.5].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant sexually assaulted an animal;
2. The defendant did so with the intent of arousing or gratifying (his/her) own sexual desire;

AND

3. The animal was (abandoned or neglected/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert other description of “animal protected by Pen. Code, § 597f”>).
- 

*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

Penal Code section 286.5 only applies to an “animal protected by Section 597f.” Penal Code section 597f broadly establishes the authority of public officers to take possession of and care for abandoned and neglected animals. Thus, the committee has included element 3.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 286.5; 597f.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Sex Offenses and Crimes Against Decency, § 27.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.12[1] (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure §§ 12:16, 12:17 (The Rutter Group).

### 1182–1189. Reserved for Future Use

## D. EVIDENCE

### 1190. Other Evidence Not Required to Support Testimony in Sex Offense Case

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**Conviction of a sexual assault crime may be based on the testimony of a complaining witness alone.**

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*New January 2006*

#### BENCH NOTES

##### *Instructional Duty*

This instruction may be given on request if a complaining witness testifies in a sex offense case. The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give CALCRIM No. 301, *Single Witness's Testimony*, in every case. (*People v. Rincon-Pineda* (1975) 14 Cal.3d 864, 884–885 [123 Cal.Rptr. 119, 538 P.2d 247].) Because both instructions correctly state the law and each focuses on a different legal point, there is no implication that the victim's testimony is more credible than the defendant's testimony. (*People v. Gammage* (1992) 2 Cal.4th 693, 700–702 [7 Cal.Rptr.2d 541, 828 P.2d 682] [resolving split of authority on whether the two instructions can be given together].)

#### AUTHORITY

- Instructional Requirements. *People v. Blassingill* (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 1413, 1422 [245 Cal.Rptr. 599]; *People v. Akey* (1912) 163 Cal. 54, 55–56 [124 P. 718].
- Conviction of Sex Crime Sustained on Prosecutrix's Uncorroborated Testimony. *People v. Poggi* (1988) 45 Cal.3d 306, 326 [246 Cal.Rptr. 886, 753 P.2d 1082].
- Given Together With Instruction on Single Witness's Testimony. *People v. Gammage* (1992) 2 Cal.4th 693, 701–702 [7 Cal.Rptr.2d 541, 828 P.2d 682]; *People v. Hollis* (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1521, 1525–1526 [1 Cal.Rptr.2d 524].

#### SECONDARY SOURCES

5 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, § 735.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.03[2][b] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.23[3][e][ii] (Matthew Bender).



## 1191A. Evidence of Uncharged Sex Offense

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The People presented evidence that the defendant committed the crime[s] of *<insert description of offense[s]>* \_\_\_\_\_ that (was/were) not charged in this case. (This/These) crime[s] (is/are) defined for you in these instructions.

You may consider this evidence only if the People have proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant in fact committed the uncharged offense[s]. Proof by a preponderance of the evidence is a different burden of proof from proof beyond a reasonable doubt. A fact is proved by a preponderance of the evidence if you conclude that it is more likely than not that the fact is true.

If the People have not met this burden of proof, you must disregard this evidence entirely.

If you decide that the defendant committed the uncharged offense[s], you may, but are not required to, conclude from that evidence that the defendant was disposed or inclined to commit sexual offenses, and based on that decision, also conclude that the defendant was likely to commit [and did commit] *<insert charged sex offense[s]>* \_\_\_\_\_, as charged here. If you conclude that the defendant committed the uncharged offense[s], that conclusion is only one factor to consider along with all the other evidence. It is not sufficient by itself to prove that the defendant is guilty of *<insert charged sex offense[s]>* \_\_\_\_\_. The People must still prove (the/each) \_\_\_\_\_ (charge/ [and] allegation) beyond a reasonable doubt.

[Do not consider this evidence for any other purpose [except for the limited purpose of *<insert other permitted purpose, e.g., determining the defendant's credibility>* \_\_\_\_\_].]

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*New January 2006; Revised April 2008, February 2013, February 2014, March 2017, September 2019*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

Although there is ordinarily no sua sponte duty (*People v. Cottone* (2013) 57 Cal.4th 269, 293, fn. 15 [159 Cal.Rptr.3d 385, 303 P.3d 1163]), the court must give this instruction on request when evidence of other sexual offenses has been introduced. (See *People v. Falsetta* (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 924 [89 Cal.Rptr.2d 847, 986 P.2d 182] [error to refuse limiting instruction on request]; *People v. Jennings* (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1301, 1317–1318 [97 Cal.Rptr.2d 727] [in context of prior acts of domestic violence].)



Evidence Code section 1108(a) provides that “evidence of the defendant’s commission of another sexual offense or offenses is not made inadmissible by Section 1101.” Subdivision (d)(1) defines “sexual offense” as “a crime under the law of a state or of the United States that involved any of the following[,]” listing specific sections of the Penal Code as well as specified sexual conduct. In the first sentence, the court must insert the name of the offense or offenses allegedly shown by the evidence. The court **must** also instruct the jury on elements of the offense or offenses.

In the fourth paragraph, the committee has placed the phrase “and did commit” in brackets. One appellate court has criticized instructing the jury that it may draw an inference about disposition. (*People v. James* (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1343, 1357, fn. 8 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 823].) The court should review the Commentary section below and give the bracketed phrase at its discretion.

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “Do not consider” on request.

### ***Related Instructions***

CALCRIM No. 375, *Evidence of Uncharged Offense to Prove Identity, Intent, Common Plan, etc.*

CALCRIM No. 1191B, *Evidence of Charged Sex Offense.*

CALCRIM No. 852A, *Evidence of Uncharged Domestic Violence.*

CALCRIM No. 852B, *Evidence of Charged Domestic Violence.*

CALCRIM No. 853A, *Evidence of Uncharged Abuse of Elder or Dependent Person.*

CALCRIM No. 853B, *Evidence of Charged Abuse of Elder or Dependent Person.*

## **AUTHORITY**

- Instructional Requirement. Evid. Code, § 1108(a); see *People v. Reliford* (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1007, 1012–1016 [130 Cal.Rptr.2d 254, 62 P.3d 601]; *People v. Frazier* (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 30, 37 [107 Cal.Rptr.2d 100]; *People v. Falsetta, supra*, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 923–924 [dictum].
- Previous Version of CALCRIM No. 1191 Upheld. *People v. Schnabel* (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 83, 87 [57 Cal.Rptr.3d 922]; *People v. Cromp* (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 476, 480 [62 Cal.Rptr.3d 848].
- This Instruction Upheld. *People v. Phea* (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 583, 614 [240 Cal.Rptr.3d 526].
- Sexual Offense Defined. Evid. Code, § 1108(d)(1).
- Other Crimes Proved by Preponderance of Evidence. *People v. Carpenter* (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 382 [63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708]; *People v. James, supra*, 81 Cal.App.4th at p. 1359; *People v. Van Winkle* (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 133, 146 [89 Cal.Rptr.2d 28].
- Propensity Evidence Alone Is Not Sufficient to Support Conviction Beyond a Reasonable Doubt. *People v. Hill* (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 273, 277–278 [103 Cal.Rptr.2d 127]; see *People v. Younger* (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1360, 1382 [101

Cal.Rptr.2d 624] [in context of prior acts of domestic violence]; *People v. James, supra*, 81 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1357–1358, fn. 8 [same].

- Charged Offenses Proved Beyond a Reasonable Doubt May Be Evidence of Propensity. *People v. Cruz* (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 1178, 1186–1186 [206 Cal.Rptr.3d 835]; *People v. Villatoro* (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1152, 1161 [144 Cal.Rptr.3d 401, 281 P.3d 390].

### COMMENTARY

The fourth paragraph of this instruction tells the jury that they may draw an inference of disposition. (See *People v. Hill* (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 273, 275–279 [103 Cal.Rptr.2d 127]; *People v. Brown* (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1324, 1334–1335 [92 Cal.Rptr.2d 433] [in context of prior acts of domestic violence].) One appellate court, however, suggests using more general terms to instruct the jury how they may use evidence of other sexual offenses, “leaving particular inferences for the argument of counsel and the jury’s common sense.” (*People v. James, supra*, 81 Cal.App.4th at p. 1357, fn. 8 [includes suggested instruction].) If the trial court adopts this approach, the fourth paragraph may be replaced with the following:

If you decide that the defendant committed the other sexual offense[s], you may consider that evidence and weigh it together with all the other evidence received during the trial to help you determine whether the defendant committed \_\_\_\_\_ <insert charged sex offense>. Remember, however, that evidence of another sexual offense is not sufficient alone to find the defendant guilty of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert charged sex offense>. The People must still prove (the/ each) \_\_\_\_\_ (charge/ [and] allegation) of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert charged sex offense> beyond a reasonable doubt.

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Constitutional Challenges*

Evidence Code section 1108 does not violate a defendant’s rights to due process (*People v. Falsetta* (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 915–922 [89 Cal.Rptr.2d 847, 986 P.2d 182]; *People v. Branch* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 274, 281 [109 Cal.Rptr.2d 870]; *People v. Fitch* (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 172, 184 [63 Cal.Rptr.2d 753]) or equal protection (*People v. Jennings* (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1301, 1310–1313 [97 Cal.Rptr.2d 727]; *People v. Fitch, supra*, 55 Cal.App.4th at pp. 184–185).

#### *Expert Testimony*

Evidence Code section 1108 does not authorize expert opinion evidence of sexual propensity during the prosecution’s case-in-chief. (*People v. McFarland* (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 489, 495–496 [92 Cal.Rptr.2d 884] [expert testified on ultimate issue of abnormal sexual interest in child].)

#### *Rebuttal Evidence*

When the prosecution has introduced evidence of other sexual offenses under Evidence Code section 1108(a), the defendant may introduce rebuttal character evidence in the form of opinion evidence, reputation evidence, and evidence of

specific incidents of conduct under similar circumstances. (*People v. Callahan* (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 356, 378–379 [87 Cal.Rptr.2d 838].)

***Subsequent Offenses Admissible***

“[E]vidence of subsequently committed sexual offenses may be admitted pursuant to Evidence Code section 1108.” (*People v. Medina* (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 897, 903 [8 Cal.Rptr.3d 158].)

***Evidence of Acquittal***

If the court admits evidence that the defendant committed a sexual offense that the defendant was previously acquitted of, the court must also admit evidence of the acquittal. (*People v. Mullens* (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 648, 663 [14 Cal.Rptr.3d 534].)

See also the Related Issues section of CALCRIM No. 375, *Evidence of Uncharged Offense to Prove Identity, Intent, Common Plan, etc.*

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

1 Witkin, *California Evidence* (5th ed. 2012) Circumstantial Evidence, §§ 98–100.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.23[3][e][ii], [4] (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, *Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure* § 12:9 (The Rutter Group).

## 1191B. Evidence of Charged Sex Offense

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The People presented evidence that the defendant committed the crime[s] of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of offense[s]> charged in Count[s] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert count[s] of sex offense[s] charged in this case >.

If the People have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed one or more of these crimes, you may, but are not required to, conclude from that evidence that the defendant was disposed or inclined to commit sexual offenses, and based on that decision, also conclude that the defendant was likely to commit [and did commit] the other sex offense[s] charged in this case.

If you find that the defendant committed one or more of these crimes, that conclusion is only one factor to consider along with all the other evidence. It is not sufficient by itself to prove that the defendant is guilty of another crime. The People must still prove (the/each) (charge/ [and] allegation) beyond a reasonable doubt.

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*New March 2017; Revised September 2020*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court must give this instruction on request if the People rely on charged offenses as evidence of predisposition to commit similar crimes charged in the same case, Evid. Code section 355.

#### *Related Instructions*

CALCRIM No. 375, *Evidence of Uncharged Offense to Prove Identity, Intent, Common Plan, etc.*

CALCRIM No. 1191A, *Evidence of Uncharged Sex Offense.*

CALCRIM No. 852A, *Evidence of Uncharged Domestic Violence.*

CALCRIM No. 852B, *Evidence of Charged Domestic Violence.*

CALCRIM No. 853A, *Evidence of Uncharged Abuse of Elder or Dependent Person.*

CALCRIM No. 853B, *Evidence of Charged Abuse of Elder or Dependent Person.*

### AUTHORITY

- Charged Offenses Proved Beyond a Reasonable Doubt May Be Evidence of Propensity. *People v. Cruz* (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 1178, 1186–1186 [206 Cal.Rptr.3d 835]; *People v. Villatoro* (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1152, 1161 [144 Cal.Rptr.3d 401, 281 P.3d 390].
- This Instruction Upheld. *People v. Meneses* (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 63, 68 [253 Cal.Rptr.3d 859].

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

1 Witkin, *California Evidence* (5th ed. 2012) Circumstantial Evidence, §§ 98–100.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.23[3][e][ii], [4] (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, *Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure* § 12:9 (The Rutter Group).

## 1192. Testimony on Rape Trauma Syndrome

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You have heard testimony from \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of expert> regarding rape trauma syndrome.

\_\_\_\_\_’s <insert name of expert> testimony about rape trauma syndrome is not evidence that the defendant committed any of the crimes charged against (him/her) [or any conduct or crime[s] with which (he/she) was not charged].

You may consider this evidence only in deciding whether or not \_\_\_\_\_’s <insert name of alleged rape victim> conduct was not inconsistent with the conduct of someone who has been raped, and in evaluating the believability of her testimony.

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*New January 2006; Revised April 2020*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction if an expert testifies on rape trauma syndrome. (See *People v. Housley* (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 947, 958–959 [8 Cal.Rptr.2d 431] [**sua sponte** duty in context of child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome (CSAAS)]; *CJER Mandatory Criminal Jury Instructions Handbook* (CJER 2019) Sua Sponte Instructions, § 2.163; but see *People v. Sanchez* (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 721, 736 [256 Cal.Rptr. 446] [instruction on CSAAS only required on request].)

#### *Related Instructions*

If this instruction is given, also give CALCRIM No. 303, *Limited Purpose Evidence in General*, and CALCRIM No. 332, *Expert Witness Testimony*.

### AUTHORITY

- Rebut Inference That Victim’s Conduct Inconsistent With Claim of Rape. *People v. Bledsoe* (1984) 36 Cal.3d 236, 247–248 [203 Cal.Rptr. 450, 681 P.2d 291].
- Syndrome Evidence Not Admissible to Prove Rape Occurred. *People v. Bledsoe* (1984) 36 Cal.3d 236, 251 [203 Cal.Rptr. 450, 681 P.2d 291].

### COMMENTARY

It is unnecessary and potentially misleading to instruct that the expert testimony assumes that a rape has in fact occurred. (See *People v. Gilbert* (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1372, 1387 [7 Cal.Rptr.2d 660] [in context of child molestation].)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

- 1 Witkin, *California Evidence* (5th ed. 2012) Opinion Evidence, § 53.  
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3 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 71, *Scientific and Expert Evidence*, § 71.04[1][d][v][B] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.23[3][d] (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure § 12:7 (The Rutter Group).

## 1193. Testimony on Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome

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You have heard testimony from \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of expert> regarding child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome.

\_\_\_\_\_’s <insert name of expert> testimony about child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome is not evidence that the defendant committed any of the crimes charged against (him/her) [or any conduct or crime[s] with which (he/she) was not charged].

You may consider this evidence only in deciding whether or not \_\_\_\_\_’s <insert name of alleged victim of abuse> conduct was not inconsistent with the conduct of someone who has been molested, and in evaluating the believability of (his/her) testimony.

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2016, April 2020, March 2021*

### BENCH NOTES

#### ***Instructional Duty***

Several courts of review have concluded there is no sua sponte duty to give this instruction when an expert testifies on child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome. (*People v. Mateo* (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1063, 1073–1074 [197 Cal.Rptr.3d 248]; *People v. Sanchez* (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 721, 736 [256 Cal.Rptr. 446] and *People v. Stark* (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 107, 116 [261 Cal.Rptr. 479] [instruction required only on request].) See also *People v. Humphrey* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073, 1088, fn. 5, 1090–1091, 1100 [56 Cal.Rptr.2d 142, 921 P.2d 1], which concludes that a limiting instruction on battered woman syndrome is required only on request. But see *People v. Housley* (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 947, 958–959 [9 Cal.Rptr.2d 431], which did find a sua sponte duty to give this instruction.

#### ***Related Instructions***

If this instruction is given, also give CALCRIM No. 303, *Limited Purpose Evidence in General*, and CALCRIM No. 332, *Expert Witness*.

### AUTHORITY

- Eliminate Juror Misconceptions or Rebut Attack on Victim’s Credibility. *People v. Bowker* (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 385, 393–394 [249 Cal.Rptr. 886].
- This Instruction Upheld. *People v. Munch* (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 464, 473–474 [266 Cal.Rptr.3d 136]; *People v. Gonzales* (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 494, 504 [224 Cal.Rptr.3d 421].

### COMMENTARY

The jurors must understand that the research on child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome assumes a molestation occurred and seeks to describe and explain



children's common reactions to the experience. (*People v. Bowker* (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 385, 394 [249 Cal.Rptr. 886].) However, it is unnecessary and potentially misleading to instruct that the expert testimony assumes that a molestation has in fact occurred. (See *People v. Gilbert* (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1372, 1387 [7 Cal.Rptr.2d 660].)

The prosecution must identify the myth or misconception the evidence is designed to rebut (*People v. Bowker, supra*, 203 Cal.App.3d at p. 394; *People v. Sanchez* (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 721, 735 [256 Cal.Rptr. 446]; *People v. Harlan* (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 439, 449–450 [271 Cal.Rptr. 653]), or the victim's credibility must have been placed in issue (*People v. Patino* (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1737, 1744–1745 [32 Cal.Rptr.2d 345]).

## RELATED ISSUES

### *Expert Testimony Regarding Parent's Behavior*

An expert may also testify regarding reasons why a parent may delay reporting molestation of his or her child. (*People v. McAlpin* (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1289, 1300–1301 [283 Cal.Rptr. 382, 812 P.2d 563].)

## SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin, California Evidence (5th ed. 2012) Opinion Evidence, §§ 54–56.

3 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 71, *Scientific and Expert Evidence*, § 71.04[1][d][v][B] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.23[3][d] (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure § 12:7 (The Rutter Group).

## 1194. Consent: Prior Sexual Intercourse

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**You have heard evidence that (\_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of complaining witness>/Jane Doe/John Doe) had consensual sexual intercourse with the defendant before the act that is charged in this case. You may consider this evidence only to help you decide (whether the alleged victim consented to the charged act[s]/ [and] whether the defendant reasonably and in good faith believed that (\_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of complaining witness>/Jane Doe/John Doe) consented to the charged act[s]). Do not consider this evidence for any other purpose.**

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*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give a limiting admonition if the defendant is charged with rape or unlawful sexual intercourse or an attempt or assault with intent to commit either crime and evidence of prior sexual intercourse with the alleged victim has been admitted. (Pen. Code, § 1127d.)

If during the trial the court referred to a complaining witness by the name of Jane or John Doe, use that designation in giving this instruction. (See Pen. Code, §§ 293, 293.5.)

### AUTHORITY

- Instructional Requirements. Pen. Code, § 1127d.
- Protecting Identity of Complaining Witness. Pen. Code §§ 293, 293.5.

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Admissibility of Sexual Conduct of Complaining Witness*

Evidence Code section 782 sets out the procedure for admitting evidence of the sexual conduct of the complaining witness.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin, California Evidence (5th ed. 2012) Circumstantial Evidence, § 67.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.23[1][f], [3][a] (Matthew Bender).

### **1195–1199. Reserved for Future Use**

# KIDNAPPING

## A. KIDNAPPING

### (i) Aggravated

- 1200. Kidnapping: For Child Molestation (Pen. Code, §§ 207(b), 288(a))
- 1201. Kidnapping: Child or Person Incapable of Consent (Pen. Code, § 207(a), (e))
- 1202. Kidnapping: For Ransom, Reward, Extortion or to Exact From Another Person (Pen. Code, § 209(a))
- 1203. Kidnapping: For Robbery, Rape, or Other Sex Offenses (Pen. Code, § 209(b))
- 1204. Kidnapping: During Carjacking (Pen. Code, §§ 207(a), 209.5(a), (b), 215(a))
- 1205–1214. Reserved for Future Use

### (ii) Simple Kidnapping

- 1215. Kidnapping (Pen. Code, § 207(a))
- 1216–1224. Reserved for Future Use

## B. DEFENSES

- 1225. Defense to Kidnapping: Protecting Child From Imminent Harm (Pen. Code, § 207(f)(1))
- 1226. Defense to Kidnapping: Citizen's Arrest (Pen. Code, §§ 207(f)(2), 834, 837)
- 1227–1239. Reserved for Future Use

## C. FALSE IMPRISONMENT

- 1240. Felony False Imprisonment (Pen. Code, §§ 236, 237)
- 1241. False Imprisonment: Hostage (Pen. Code, §§ 210.5, 236)
- 1242. Misdemeanor False Imprisonment (Pen. Code, §§ 236, 237(a))
- 1243. Human Trafficking (Pen. Code, § 236.1(a) & (b))
- 1244. Causing Minor to Engage in Commercial Sex Act (Pen. Code, § 236.1(c))
- 1245–1249. Reserved for Future Use

## D. CHILD ABDUCTION

- 1250. Child Abduction: No Right to Custody (Pen. Code, §§ 277, 278)
- 1251. Child Abduction: By Depriving Right to Custody or Visitation (Pen. Code, §§ 277, 278.5)
- 1252. Defense to Child Abduction: Protection From Immediate Injury (Pen. Code, § 278.7(a) and (b))
- 1253–1299. Reserved for Future Use



## A. KIDNAPPING

### (i) Aggravated

#### 1200. Kidnapping: For Child Molestation (Pen. Code, §§ 207(b), 288(a))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with kidnapping for the purpose of child molestation [in violation of Penal Code section 207(b)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant (persuaded/hired/enticed/decoyed/ [or] seduced by false promises or misrepresentations) a child younger than 14 years old to go somewhere;
2. When the defendant did so, (he/she) intended to commit a lewd or lascivious act on the child;

AND

3. As a result of the defendant's conduct, the child then moved or was moved a substantial distance.

As used here, *substantial distance* means more than a slight or trivial distance. The movement must have increased the risk of [physical or psychological] harm to the person beyond that necessarily present in the molestation. In deciding whether the movement was sufficient, consider all the circumstances relating to the movement.

As used here, a *lewd or lascivious act* is any touching of a child with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust, passions, or sexual desires of either the perpetrator or the child. Contact with the child's bare skin or private parts is not required. Any part of the child's body or the clothes the child is wearing may be touched. [A *lewd or lascivious act* includes causing a child to touch his or her own body, the perpetrator's body, or someone else's body at the instigation of a perpetrator who has the required intent.]

[Under the law, a person becomes one year older as soon as the first minute of his or her birthday has begun.]

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2012, February 2013, August 2013, April 2020*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

Give this instruction when the defendant is charged under Penal Code section 207(b) with kidnapping a child without the use of force for the purpose of committing a lewd or lascivious act. Give CALCRIM No. 1201, *Kidnapping: Child or Person Incapable of Consent*, when the defendant is charged under Penal Code section 207(a) with using force to kidnap an unresisting infant or child, or person with a mental impairment, who was incapable of consenting to the movement.

Give the final bracketed paragraph about calculating age if requested. (Fam. Code, § 6500; *In re Harris* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 849–850 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391].)

### *Related Instructions*

Kidnapping with intent to commit a rape or other specified sex crimes is a separate offense under Penal Code section 209(b). (*People v. Rayford* (1994) 9 Cal.4th 1, 8–11 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 317, 884 P.2d 1369].) See CALCRIM No. 1203, *Kidnapping: For Robbery, Rape, or Other Sex Offenses*.

A defendant may be prosecuted for both the crimes of child abduction and kidnapping. Child abduction or stealing is a crime against the parents, while kidnapping is a crime against the child. (*People v. Campos* (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 894, 899 [182 Cal.Rptr. 698].) See CALCRIM No. 1250, *Child Abduction: No Right to Custody*.

For instructions based on violations of Penal Code section 288, see CALCRIM No. 1110, *Lewd or Lascivious Acts: Child Under 14*, and the following instructions in that series.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 207(b), 288(a).
- Increased Prison Term If Victim Under 14 Years of Age. Pen. Code, § 208(b).
- Asportation Requirement. See *People v. Robertson* (2012) 208 Cal. App. 4th 965, 982 [146 Cal.Rptr.3d 66]; *People v. Vines* (2011) 51 Cal.4th 830, 870 & fn. 20 [124 Cal.Rptr.3d 830, 251 P.3d 943]; *People v. Martinez* (1999) 20 Cal.4th 225, 232 & fn. 4 [83 Cal.Rptr.2d 533, 973 P.2d 512]; *People v. Rayford* (1994) 9 Cal.4th 1, 11–14, 20 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 317, 884 P.2d 1369]; *People v. Daniels* (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1119, 1139 [80 Cal.Rptr. 897, 459 P.2d 225].
- Lewd or Lascivious Acts Defined. *People v. Martinez* (1995) 11 Cal.4th 434, 452 [45 Cal.Rptr.2d 905, 903 P.2d 1037] [disapproving *People v. Wallace* (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 568, 574–580 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 67] and its progeny]; *People v. Levesque* (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 530, 538–542 [41 Cal.Rptr.2d 439]; *People v. Marquez* (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1321–1326 [33 Cal.Rptr.2d 821].
- Movement of Victim Need Not Substantially Increase Risk of Harm to

Victim. *People v. Robertson* (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 965, 982 [146 Cal.Rptr.3d 66]; *People v. Vines* (2011) 51 Cal.4th 830, 870 & fn. 20 [124 Cal.Rptr.3d 830, 251 P.3d 943]; *People v. Martinez* (1999) 20 Cal.4th 225, 232 & fn. 4 [83 Cal.Rptr.2d 533, 973 P.2d 512].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Kidnapping. Pen. Code, § 207.

Attempted kidnapping is not a lesser included offense of simple kidnapping under subdivision (a) of section 207. (*People v. Fontenot* (2019) 8 Cal.5th 57, 65–71 [251 Cal.Rptr.3d 341, 447 P.3d 252].)

False imprisonment is a lesser included offense if there is an unlawful restraint of the child. (See Pen. Code, §§ 236, 237; *People v. Magana* (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1117, 1121 [281 Cal.Rptr. 338].)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, §§ 281–282, 291.

5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 91, *Sentencing*, § 91.38[1] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.14[1][a], [3] (Matthew Bender).

**1201. Kidnapping: Child or Person Incapable of Consent (Pen. Code, § 207(a), (e))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with kidnapping (a child/ [or] a person with a mental impairment who was not capable of giving legal consent to the movement) [in violation of Penal Code section 207].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant used (physical force/deception) to take and carry away an unresisting (child/ [or] person with a mental impairment);
2. The defendant moved the (child/ [or] person with a mental impairment) a substantial distance(;/.)

[AND]

<Section 207(e)>

- [3. The defendant moved the child with an illegal intent or for an illegal purpose(;/.)]

[AND]

<Alternative 4A—alleged victim under 14 years.>

- [4. The child was under 14 years old at the time of the movement(;/.)]

<Alternative 4B—alleged victim has mental impairment.>

[(3/4). \_\_\_\_\_ <Insert name of complaining witness> suffered from a mental impairment that made (him/her) incapable of giving legal consent to the movement.]

***Substantial distance*** means more than a slight or trivial distance. In deciding whether the distance was substantial, consider all the circumstances relating to the movement. [Thus, in addition to considering the actual distance moved, you may also consider other factors such as whether the movement increased the risk of [physical or psychological] harm, increased the danger of a foreseeable escape attempt, gave the attacker a greater opportunity to commit additional crimes, or decreased the likelihood of detection.]

A person is incapable of giving legal consent if he or she is unable to understand the act, its nature, and possible consequences.

[***Deception*** includes tricking the (child/mentally impaired person) into accompanying him or her a substantial distance for an illegal purpose.]



**[Under the law, a person becomes one year older as soon as the first minute of his or her birthday has begun.]**

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*New January 2006; Revised April 2008, April 2020, September 2020*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

Give alternative 4A if the defendant is charged with kidnapping a person under 14 years of age. (Pen. Code, § 208(b).) Do not use this bracketed language if a biological parent, a natural father, an adoptive parent, or someone with access to the child by a court order takes the child. (*Ibid.*) Give alternative 4B if the alleged victim has a mental impairment.

In the paragraph defining “substantial distance,” give the bracketed sentence listing factors that the jury may consider, when evidence permits, in evaluating the totality of the circumstances. (*People v. Martinez* (1999) 20 Cal.4th 225, 237 [83 Cal.Rptr.2d 533, 973 P.2d 512].) However, in the case of simple kidnapping, if the movement was for a substantial distance, the jury does not need to consider any other factors. (*People v. Martinez, supra*, 20 Cal.4th at p. 237; see *People v. Stanworth* (1974) 11 Cal.3d 588, 600–601 [114 Cal.Rptr. 250, 522 P.2d 1058].)

Give this instruction when the defendant is charged under Penal Code section 207(a) with using force to kidnap an unresisting infant or child, or person with a mental impairment, who was incapable of consenting to the movement. (See, e.g., *In re Michele D.* (2002) 29 Cal.4th 600, 610 [128 Cal.Rptr.2d 92, 59 P.3d 164]; see also 2003 Amendments to Pen. Code, § 207(e) [codifying holding of *In re Michele D.*].) Give CALCRIM No. 1200, *Kidnapping: For Child Molestation*, when the defendant is charged under Penal Code section 207(b) with kidnapping a child without the use of force for the purpose of committing a lewd or lascivious act.

Give the final bracketed paragraph about calculating age if requested. (Fam. Code, § 6500; *In re Harris* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 849–850 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391].)

### *Related Instructions*

A defendant may be prosecuted for both the crimes of child abduction and kidnapping. Child abduction or stealing is a crime against the parents, while kidnapping is a crime against the child. (*In re Michele D.* (2002) 29 Cal.4th 600, 614 [128 Cal.Rptr.2d 92, 59 P.3d 164]; *People v. Campos* (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 894, 899 [182 Cal.Rptr. 698].) See CALCRIM No. 1250, *Child Abduction: No Right to Custody*.

For instructions relating to defenses to kidnapping, see CALCRIM No. 1225, *Defense to Kidnapping: Protecting Child From Imminent Harm*.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 207(a), (e).
- Punishment If Victim Under 14 Years of Age. Pen. Code, § 208(b); *People v. Magpuso* (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 112, 118 [28 Cal.Rptr.2d 206] [ignorance of victim’s age not defense].
- Asportation Requirement. See *People v. Martinez* (1999) 20 Cal.4th 225, 235–237 [83 Cal.Rptr.2d 533, 973 P.2d 512] [adopting modified two-pronged asportation test from *People v. Rayford* (1994) 9 Cal.4th 1, 12–14 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 317, 884 P.2d 1369] and *People v. Daniels* (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1119, 1139 [80 Cal.Rptr. 897, 459 P.2d 225]].
- Force Required to Kidnap Unresisting Infant or Child. *In re Michele D.* (2002) 29 Cal.4th 600, 610 [128 Cal.Rptr.2d 92, 59 P.3d 164]; Pen. Code, § 207(e).
- Force Required to Kidnap Unconscious and Intoxicated Adult. *People v. Daniels* (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 304, 333 [97 Cal.Rptr.3d 659].
- Movement Must Be for Illegal Purpose or Intent if Victim Incapable of Consent. *In re Michele D.* (2002) 29 Cal.4th 600, 610–611 [128 Cal.Rptr.2d 92, 59 P.3d 164]; *People v. Oliver* (1961) 55 Cal.2d 761, 768 [12 Cal.Rptr. 865, 361 P.2d 593].
- Substantial Distance Requirement. *People v. Daniels* (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 1046, 1053 [22 Cal.Rptr.2d 877]; *People v. Stanworth* (1974) 11 Cal.3d 588, 600–601 [114 Cal.Rptr. 250, 522 P.2d 1058] [since movement must be more than slight or trivial, it must be substantial in character].
- Deceit May Substitute for Force. *People v. Dalerio* (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 775, 783 [50 Cal.Rptr.3d 724] [taking requirement satisfied when defendant relies on deception to obtain child’s consent and through verbal directions and his constant physical presence takes the child substantial distance].
- This Instruction Upheld. *People v. Singh* (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 175, 181–183 [254 Cal.Rptr.3d 871] [no sua sponte duty to define “illegal intent” or “illegal purpose”].

### COMMENTARY

Penal Code section 207(a) uses the term “steals” in defining kidnapping not in the sense of a theft, but in the sense of taking away or forcible carrying away. (*People v. McCullough* (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 169, 176 [160 Cal.Rptr. 831].) The instruction uses “take and carry away” as the more inclusive terms, but the statutory terms “steal,” “hold,” “detain” and “arrest” may be used if any of these more closely matches the evidence.

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

Attempted kidnapping is not a lesser included offense of simple kidnapping under subdivision (a) of section 207. (*People v. Fontenot* (2019) 8 Cal.5th 57, 65–71 [251 Cal.Rptr.3d 341, 447 P.3d 252].)

**RELATED ISSUES*****Victim Must Be Alive***

A victim must be alive when kidnapped. (*People v. Hillhouse* (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 498 [117 Cal.Rptr.2d 45, 40 P.3d 754].)

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, §§ 286–289.

5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 91, *Sentencing*, § 91.38[1] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person* § 142.14[1], [2][a] (Matthew Bender).

**1202. Kidnapping: For Ransom, Reward, Extortion or to Exact From Another Person (Pen. Code, § 209(a))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_ ] with kidnapping (for ransom[,]/ [or] for reward[,]/ [or] to commit extortion[,]/ [or] to get from a different person money or something valuable) [that resulted in (death[,]/ [or] bodily harm[,]/ [or] exposure to a substantial likelihood of death)] [in violation of Penal Code section 209(a)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant (kidnapped[,]/ [or] abducted[,]/ [or] seized[,]/ [or] confined[,]/ [or] concealed[,]/ [or] carried away[,]/ [or] inveigled[,]/ [or] enticed[,]/ [or] decoyed) a person;

*<Alternative 2A—held or detained>*

- [2. The defendant held or detained that person;]

*<Alternative 2B—intended to hold or detain that person>*

- [2. When the defendant acted, (he/she) intended to hold or detain that person;]

3. The defendant did so (for ransom[,]/ [or] for reward[,]/ [or] to commit extortion[,]/ [or] to get from a different person money or something valuable);

[AND]

4. The person did not consent to being (kidnapped[,]/ [or] abducted[,]/ [or] seized[,]/ [or] confined[,]/ [or] concealed[,]/ [or] carried away[,]/ [or] inveigled[,]/ [or] enticed[,]/ [or] decoyed)(;/.)

*<Give element 5 if instructing on reasonable belief in consent>*

[AND]

5. The defendant did not actually and reasonably believe that the person consented to being (kidnapped[,]/ [or] abducted[,]/ [or] seized[,]/ [or] confined[,]/ [or] concealed[,]/ [or] carried away[,]/ [or] inveigled[,]/ [or] enticed[,]/ [or] decoyed).

[It is not necessary that the person be moved for any distance.]

[In order to *consent*, a person must act freely and voluntarily and know the nature of the act.]

*<Defense: Good Faith Belief in Consent>*

[The defendant is not guilty of kidnapping if (he/she) reasonably and

actually believed that the person consented to the movement. The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not reasonably and actually believe that the person consented to the movement. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of this crime.]

<Defense: Consent Given>

[The defendant is not guilty of kidnapping if the person consented to go with the defendant. The person consented if (he/she) (1) freely and voluntarily agreed to go with or be moved by the defendant, (2) was aware of the movement, and (3) had sufficient mental capacity to choose to go with the defendant. The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the person did not consent to go with the defendant. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of this crime.]

[Consent may be withdrawn. If, at first, a person agreed to go with the defendant, that consent ended if the person changed his or her mind and no longer freely and voluntarily agreed to go with or be moved by the defendant. The defendant is guilty of kidnapping if after the person withdrew consent, the defendant committed the crime as I have defined it.]

[Someone intends to commit *extortion* if he or she intends to: (1) obtain a person's property with the person's consent and (2) obtain the person's consent through the use of force or fear.]

[Someone intends to commit *extortion* if he or she: (1) intends to get a public official to do an official act and (2) uses force or fear to make the official do the act.] [An *official act* is an act that a person does in his or her official capacity using the authority of his or her public office.]

<Sentencing Factor>

[If you find the defendant guilty of kidnapping (for ransom [,]/ [or] for reward[,]/ [or] to commit extortion[,]/ [or] to get from a different person money or something valuable), you must then decide whether the People have proved the additional allegation that the defendant (caused the kidnapped person to (die/suffer bodily harm)/ [or] intentionally confined the kidnapped person in a way that created a substantial likelihood of death).

[*Bodily harm* means any substantial physical injury resulting from the use of force that is more than the force necessary to commit kidnapping.]

[The defendant caused \_\_\_\_\_'s <insert name of allegedly kidnapped person> (death/bodily harm) if:

1. A reasonable person in the defendant's position would have

foreseen that the defendant’s use of force or fear could begin a chain of events likely to result in \_\_\_\_\_’s <insert name of allegedly kidnapped person> (death/bodily harm);

2. The defendant’s use of force or fear was a direct and substantial factor in causing \_\_\_\_\_’s <insert name of allegedly kidnapped person> (death/bodily harm);

AND

3. \_\_\_\_\_’s <insert name of allegedly kidnapped person> (death/bodily harm) would not have happened if the defendant had not used force or fear to hold or detain \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of allegedly kidnapped person>.

**A substantial factor is more than a trivial or remote factor. However, it need not have been the only factor that caused \_\_\_\_\_’s <insert name of allegedly kidnapped person> (death/bodily harm).]**

**The People have the burden of proving this allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you must find that the allegation has not been proved.]**

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*New January 2006; Revised April 2011, February 2015, March 2017, September 2020, March 2021*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If the prosecution alleges that the kidnapping resulted in death or bodily harm, or exposed the victim to a substantial likelihood of death (see Pen. Code, § 209(a)), the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the sentencing factor. (See *People v. Schoenfeld* (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 671, 685–686 [168 Cal.Rptr. 762] [bodily harm defined]); see also *People v. Ryan* (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1304, 1318 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 160] [court must instruct on general principles of law relevant to issues raised by the evidence].) The court must also give the jury a verdict form on which the jury can indicate whether this allegation has been proved. If causation is an issue, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give the bracketed section that begins “The defendant caused.” (See Pen. Code, § 209(a); *People v. Monk* (1961) 56 Cal.2d 288, 296 [14 Cal.Rptr. 633, 363 P.2d 865]; *People v. Reed* (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 37, 48–49 [75 Cal.Rptr. 430].)

Give the bracketed definition of “consent” on request.

Give alternative 2A if the evidence supports the conclusion that the defendant actually held or detained the alleged victim. Otherwise, give alternative 2B. (See Pen. Code, § 209(a).)

“Extortion” is defined in Penal Code section 518. If the kidnapping was for purposes of extortion, give one of the bracketed definitions of extortion on request. Give the second definition if the defendant is charged with intending to extort an official act. (*People v. Hill* (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 661, 668 [190 Cal.Rptr. 628]; see *People v. Ordonez* (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1207, 1229–1230 [277 Cal.Rptr. 382]; *People v. Norris* (1985) 40 Cal.3d 51, 55–56 [219 Cal.Rptr. 7, 706 P.2d 1141] [defining “official act”].) Extortion may also be committed by using “the color of official right” to make an official do an act. (Pen. Code, § 518; see *Evans v. United States* (1992) 504 U.S. 255, 258 [112 S.Ct. 1881, 119 L.Ed.2d 57]; *McCormick v. United States* (1990) 500 U.S. 257, 273 [111 S.Ct. 1807, 114 L.Ed.2d 307] [both discussing common law definition].) It appears that this type of extortion rarely occurs in the context of kidnapping, so it is excluded from this instruction.

### ***Defenses—Instructional Duty***

The court has a  **sua sponte**  duty to instruct on the defense of consent if there is sufficient evidence to support the defense. (See *People v. Davis* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 516–518 [41 Cal.Rptr.2d 826, 896 P.2d 119] [approving consent instruction as given]; see also *People v. Sedeno* (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703, 717, fn. 7 [112 Cal.Rptr. 1, 518 P.2d 913], overruled on other grounds in *People v. Breverman* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 165 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094] [when court must instruct on defenses].) Give the bracketed paragraph on the defense of consent. On request, if supported by the evidence, also give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “Consent may be withdrawn.” (See *People v. Camden* (1976) 16 Cal.3d 808, 814 [129 Cal.Rptr. 438, 548 P.2d 1110].)

The defendant’s reasonable and actual belief in the victim’s consent to go with the defendant may be a defense. (See *People v. Greenberger* (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 298, 375 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 61]; *People v. Isitt* (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 23, 28 [127 Cal.Rptr. 279] [reasonable, good faith belief that victim consented to movement is a defense to kidnapping].)

### ***Related Instructions***

For the elements of extortion, see CALCRIM No. 1830, *Extortion by Threat or Force*.

## **AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 209(a).
- Requirement of Lack of Consent. *People v. Eid* (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 859, 878 [114 Cal.Rptr.3d 520].
- Extortion. Pen. Code, § 518; *People v. Hill* (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 661, 668 [190 Cal.Rptr. 628]; see *People v. Ordonez* (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1207, 1229–1230 [277 Cal.Rptr. 382].
- Amount of Physical Force Required. *People v. Chacon* (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 52, 59 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 434]; *People v. Schoenfeld* (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 671, 685–686 [168 Cal.Rptr. 762].
- Bodily Injury Defined. *People v. Chacon* (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 52, 59;



*People v. Schoenfeld* (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 671, 685–686; see *People v. Reed* (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 37, 48–50 [75 Cal.Rptr. 430] [injury reasonably foreseeable from defendant’s act].

- Control Over Victim When Intent Formed. *People v. Martinez* (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 579, 600–602 [198 Cal.Rptr. 565] [disapproved on other ground in *People v. Hayes* (1990) 52 Cal.3d 577, 627–628, fn. 10 [276 Cal.Rptr. 874, 802 P.2d 376].]
- No Asportation Required. *People v. Macinnes* (1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 838, 844 [106 Cal.Rptr. 589]; see *People v. Rayford* (1994) 9 Cal.4th 1, 11–12, fn. 8 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 317, 884 P.2d 1369]; *People v. Ordonez* (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1207, 1227 [277 Cal.Rptr. 382].
- Official Act Defined. *People v. Mayfield* (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 769–773 [60 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 928 P.2d 485]; *People v. Norris* (1985) 40 Cal.3d 51, 55–56 [219 Cal.Rptr. 7, 706 P.2d 1141].
- Kidnapping To Extract From Another Person Any Money or Valuable Thing Requires That The Other Person Not Be The Person Kidnapped. *People v. Harper* (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 172, 192–193 [257 Cal.Rptr.3d 440]; *People v. Stringer* (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 974, 983 [254 Cal.Rptr.3d 678].

### COMMENTARY

A trial court may refuse to define “reward.” There is no need to instruct a jury on the meaning of terms in common usage. Reward means something given in return for good or evil done or received, and especially something that is offered or given for some service or attainment. (*People v. Greenberger* (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 298, 367–368 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 61].) In the absence of a request, there is also no duty to define “ransom.” The word has no statutory definition and is commonly understood by those familiar with the English language. (*People v. Hill* (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 661, 668 [190 Cal.Rptr. 628].)

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- False Imprisonment. Pen. Code, §§ 236, 237; *People v. Chacon* (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 52, 65 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 434]; *People v. Magana* (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1117, 1121 [281 Cal.Rptr. 338]; *People v. Gibbs* (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 526, 547 [90 Cal.Rptr. 866].
- Extortion. Pen. Code, § 518.
- Attempted Extortion. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 518.
- Multiple Convictions of Lesser Included Offenses of Pen. Code, § 209(a) Possible. *People v. Eid* (2014) 59 Cal.4th 650, 655–658 [174 Cal.Rptr.3d 82, 328 P.3d 69].

If the prosecution alleges that the kidnapping resulted in death or bodily harm, or exposed the victim to a substantial likelihood of death (see Pen. Code, § 209(a)), then kidnapping for ransom without death or bodily harm is a lesser included offense. The court must provide the jury with a verdict form on which the jury will indicate if the allegation has been proved.



Simple kidnapping under section 207 of the Penal Code is not a lesser and necessarily included offense of kidnapping for ransom, reward, or extortion. (*People v. Greenberger* (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 298, 368, fn. 56 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 61] [kidnapping for ransom can be accomplished without asportation while simple kidnapping cannot]; see *People v. Macinnes* (1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 838, 843–844 [106 Cal.Rptr. 589]; *People v. Bigelow* (1984) 37 Cal.3d 731, 755, fn. 14 [209 Cal.Rptr. 328, 691 P.2d 994].)

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Extortion Target*

The kidnapped victim may also be the person from whom the defendant wishes to extort something. (*People v. Ibrahim* (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1692, 1696–1698 [24 Cal.Rptr.2d 269].)

#### *No Good-Faith Exception*

A good faith exception to extortion or kidnapping for ransom does not exist. Even actual debts cannot be collected by the reprehensible and dangerous means of abducting and holding a person to be ransomed by payment of the debt. (*People v. Serrano* (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1672, 1677–1678 [15 Cal.Rptr.2d 305].)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, §§ 301–302.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.14 (Matthew Bender).

**1203. Kidnapping: For Robbery, Rape, or Other Sex Offenses  
(Pen. Code, § 209(b))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with kidnapping for the purpose of (robbery/rape/spousal rape/oral copulation/sodomy/sexual penetration) [in violation of Penal Code section 209(b)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant intended to commit (robbery/ [or] rape/ [or] spousal rape/ [or] oral copulation/ [or] sodomy/ [or] sexual penetration/ [or] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert other offense specified in statute>);
2. Acting with that intent, the defendant took, held, or detained another person by using force or by instilling a reasonable fear;
3. Using that force or fear, the defendant moved the other person [or made the other person move] a substantial distance;
4. The other person was moved or made to move a distance beyond that merely incidental to the commission of a (robbery/ [or] rape/ [or] spousal rape/ [or] oral copulation/ [or] sodomy/ [or] sexual penetration/ [or] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert other offense specified in statute>);
5. When that movement began, the defendant already intended to commit (robbery/ [or] rape/ [or] spousal rape/ [or] oral copulation/ [or] sodomy/ [or] sexual penetration/ [or] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert other offense specified in statute>);

[AND]

6. The other person did not consent to the movement(;/.)

<Give element 7 if instructing on reasonable belief in consent.>

[AND]

7. The defendant did not actually and reasonably believe that the other person consented to the movement.]

As used here, *substantial distance* means more than a slight or trivial distance. The movement must have increased the risk of [physical or psychological] harm to the person beyond that necessarily present in the (robbery/ [or] rape/ [or] spousal rape/ [or] oral copulation/ [or] sodomy/ [or] sexual penetration/ [or] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert other offense specified in statute>). In deciding whether the movement was sufficient, consider all the circumstances relating to the movement.

[In order to *consent*, a person must act freely and voluntarily and know the nature of the act.]

[To be guilty of kidnapping for the purpose of (robbery/ [or] rape/ [or] spousal rape/ [or] oral copulation/ [or] sodomy/ [or] sexual penetration), the defendant does not actually have to commit the (robbery/ [or] rape/ [or] spousal rape/ [or] oral copulation/ [or] sodomy/ [or] sexual penetration/ [or] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert other offense specified in statute>).]

To decide whether the defendant intended to commit (robbery/ [or] rape/ [or] spousal rape/ [or] oral copulation/ [or] sodomy/ [or] sexual penetration/ [or] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert other offense specified in statute>), please refer to the separate instructions that I (will give/have given) you on that crime.

<Defense: Good Faith Belief in Consent>

[The defendant is not guilty of kidnapping if (he/she) reasonably and actually believed that the other person consented to the movement. The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not reasonably and actually believe that the other person consented to the movement. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of this crime.]

<Defense: Consent Given>

[The defendant is not guilty of kidnapping if the other person consented to go with the defendant. The other person consented if (he/she) (1) freely and voluntarily agreed to go with or be moved by the defendant, (2) was aware of the movement, and (3) had sufficient mental capacity to choose to go with the defendant. The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the other person did not consent to go with the defendant. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of this crime.]

[Consent may be withdrawn. If, at first, a person agreed to go with the defendant, that consent ended if the person changed his or her mind and no longer freely and voluntarily agreed to go with or be moved by the defendant. The defendant is guilty of kidnapping if after the other person withdrew consent, the defendant committed the crime as I have defined it.]

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*New January 2006; Revised June 2007, April 2008, February 2013, August 2013, April 2020*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

In addition, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the elements of the alleged underlying crime.

Give the bracketed definition of “consent” on request.

### ***Defenses—Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense of consent if there is sufficient evidence to support the defense. (See *People v. Davis* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 516–518 [41 Cal.Rptr.2d 826, 896 P.2d 119] [approving consent instruction as given]; see also *People v. Sedeno* (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703, 717, fn. 7 [112 Cal.Rptr. 1, 518 P.2d 913], overruled on other grounds in *People v. Breverman* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 165 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094] [when court must instruct on defenses].) Give the bracketed paragraph on the defense of consent. On request, if supported by the evidence, also give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “Consent may be withdrawn.” (See *People v. Camden* (1976) 16 Cal.3d 808, 814 [129 Cal.Rptr. 438, 548 P.2d 1110].)

The defendant’s reasonable and actual belief in the victim’s consent to go with the defendant may be a defense. (See *People v. Greenberger* (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 298, 375 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 61]; *People v. Isitt* (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 23, 28 [127 Cal.Rptr. 279] [reasonable, good faith belief that victim consented to movement is a defense to kidnapping].)

### ***Timing of Necessary Intent***

No court has specifically stated whether the necessary intent must precede all movement of the victim, or only one phase of it involving an independently adequate asportation.

### ***Related Instructions***

Kidnapping a child for the purpose of committing a lewd or lascivious act is a separate crime under Penal Code section 207(b). See CALCRIM No. 1200, *Kidnapping: For Child Molestation*.

## **AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 209(b)(1); *People v. Robertson* (2012) 208 Cal. App. 4th 965, 982 [146 Cal.Rptr.3d 66]; *People v. Vines* (2011) 51 Cal.4th 830, 869–870 & fn. 20 [124 Cal.Rptr.3d 830, 251 P.3d 943]; *People v. Martinez* (1999) 20 Cal.4th 225, 232 & fn. 4 [83 Cal.Rptr.2d 533, 973 P.2d 512]; *People v. Rayford* (1994) 9 Cal.4th 1 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 317]; *People v. Daniels* (1969) 71 Cal.2d. 1119 [80 Cal.Rptr. 897, 459 P.2d 225].
- Robbery Defined. Pen. Code, § 211.
- Rape Defined. Pen. Code, § 261.
- Other Sex Offenses Defined. Pen. Code, §§ 262 [spousal rape], 264.1 [acting in concert], 286 [sodomy], 287 [oral copulation], 289 [sexual penetration].
- Intent to Commit Robbery Must Exist at Time of Original Taking. *People v. Tribble* (1971) 4 Cal.3d 826, 830–832 [94 Cal.Rptr. 613, 484 P.2d 589]; *People v. Bailey* (1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 693, 699 [113 Cal.Rptr. 514]; see *People v.*

- Thornton* (1974) 11 Cal.3d 738, 769–770 [114 Cal.Rptr. 467], overruled on other grounds in *People v. Flannel* (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668 [160 Cal.Rptr. 84, 603 P.2d 1].
- Kidnapping to Effect Escape From Robbery. *People v. Laursen* (1972) 8 Cal.3d 192, 199–200 [104 Cal.Rptr. 425, 501 P.2d 1145] [violation of section 209 even though intent to kidnap formed after robbery commenced].
  - Kidnapping Victim Need Not Be Robbery Victim. *People v. Laursen* (1972) 8 Cal.3d 192, 200, fn. 7 [104 Cal.Rptr. 425, 501 P.2d 1145].
  - Use of Force or Fear. See *People v. Martinez* (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 579, 599–600 [198 Cal.Rptr. 565], disapproved on other grounds in *People v. Hayes* (1990) 52 Cal.3d 577, 627–628, fn. 10 [276 Cal.Rptr. 874, 802 P.2d 376]; *People v. Jones* (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 693, 713–714 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 506].
  - Movement of Victim Need Not Substantially Increase Risk of Harm to Victim. *People v. Robertson* (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 965, 982 [146 Cal.Rptr.3d 66]; *People v. Vines* (2011) 51 Cal.4th 830, 870 fn. 20 [124 Cal.Rptr.3d 830, 251 P.3d 943]; *People v. Martinez* (1999) 20 Cal.4th 225, 232 fn. 4 [83 Cal.Rptr.2d 533, 973 P.2d 512].
  - Movement Must Be for Illegal Purpose or Intent if Victim Incapable of Consent. *In re Michele D.* (2002) 29 Cal.4th 600, 610–611 [128 Cal.Rptr.2d 92, 59 P.3d 164]; *People v. Oliver* (1961) 55 Cal.2d 761, 768 [12 Cal.Rptr. 865, 361 P.2d 593].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Kidnapping. Pen. Code, § 207; *People v. Bailey* (1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 693, 699 [113 Cal.Rptr. 514]; see *People v. Jackson* (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 182, 189 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 564].
- False Imprisonment. Pen. Code, §§ 236, 237; *People v. Magana* (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1117, 1121 [281 Cal.Rptr. 338]; *People v. Gibbs* (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 526, 547 [90 Cal.Rptr. 866]; *People v. Shadden* (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 164, 171 [112 Cal.Rptr.2d 826].

Attempted kidnapping is not a lesser included offense of simple kidnapping under subdivision (a) of section 207. (*People v. Fontenot* (2019) 8 Cal.5th 57, 65–71 [251 Cal.Rptr.3d 341, 447 P.3d 252].)

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Psychological Harm*

Psychological harm may be sufficient to support conviction for aggravated kidnapping under Penal Code section 209(b). An increased risk of harm is not limited to a risk of bodily harm. (*People v. Nguyen* (2000) 22 Cal.4th 872, 885–886 [95 Cal.Rptr.2d 178, 997 P.2d 493] [substantial movement of robbery victim that posed substantial increase in risk of psychological trauma beyond that expected from stationary robbery].)

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, §§ 293–300, 310, 311–313.

5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 91, *Sentencing*, § 91.38[1] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.14 (Matthew Bender).

**1204. Kidnapping: During Carjacking (Pen. Code, §§ 207(a),  
209.5(a), (b), 215(a))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with kidnapping during a carjacking [in violation of Penal Code section 209.5].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant committed a carjacking;
2. During the carjacking, the defendant took, held, or detained another person by using force or by instilling reasonable fear;
3. The defendant moved the other person or made that person move a substantial distance from the vicinity of the carjacking;
4. The defendant moved or caused the other person to move with the intent to facilitate the carjacking [or to help (himself/herself) escape/or to prevent the other person from sounding an alarm];
5. The person moved was not one of the carjackers;

[AND]

6. The other person did not consent to the movement(;/)

<Give element 7 when instructing on reasonable belief in consent.>

[AND]

7. The defendant did not actually and reasonably believe that the other person consented to the movement.]

As used here, *substantial distance* means more than a slight or trivial distance. The movement must have been more than merely brief and incidental to the commission of the carjacking. The movement must also have increased the risk of [physical or psychological] harm to the person beyond that necessarily present in the carjacking. In deciding whether the movement was sufficient, consider all the circumstances relating to the movement.

[In order to *consent*, a person must act freely and voluntarily and know the nature of the act.]

<Defense: Good Faith Belief in Consent>

[The defendant is not guilty of kidnapping if (he/she) reasonably and actually believed that the other person consented to the movement. The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not reasonably and actually believe that the other person consented to the movement. If the People have not met this burden, you

must find the defendant not guilty of this crime.]

<Defense: Consent Given>

[The defendant is not guilty of kidnapping if the other person consented to go with the defendant. The other person consented if (he/she) (1) freely and voluntarily agreed to go with or be moved by the defendant, (2) was aware of the movement, and (3) had sufficient maturity and understanding to choose to go with the defendant. The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the other person did not consent to go with the defendant. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of this crime.]

[Consent may be withdrawn. If, at first, a person agreed to go with the defendant, that consent ended if the person changed his or her mind and no longer freely and voluntarily agreed to go with or be moved by the defendant. The defendant is guilty of kidnapping if after the other person withdrew consent, the defendant committed the crime as I have defined it.]

To decide whether the defendant committed carjacking, please refer to the separate instructions that I (will give/have given) you on that crime.

[Fear, as used in this instruction, means fear of injury to the person or injury to the person's family or property.] [It also means fear of immediate injury to another person present during the incident or to that person's property.]

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2013, August 2013*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime. The court also has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the elements of carjacking. Give CALCRIM No. 1650, *Carjacking*.

Give the bracketed definition of "consent" on request.

### *Defenses—Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense of consent if there is sufficient evidence to support the defense. (See *People v. Davis* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 516–518 [41 Cal.Rptr.2d 826, 896 P.2d 119] [approving consent instruction as given]; see also *People v. Sedeno* (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703, 717, fn. 7 [112 Cal.Rptr. 1, 518 P.2d 913], overruled on other grounds in *People v. Breverman* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 165 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094] [when court must instruct on defenses].) An optional paragraph is provided for this purpose, "Defense: Consent Given."

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defendant's reasonable and actual



belief in the victim's consent to go with the defendant, if supported by the evidence. (See *People v. Greenberger* (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 298, 375 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 61]; *People v. Isitt* (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 23, 28 [127 Cal.Rptr. 279] [reasonable, good faith belief that victim consented to movement is a defense to kidnapping].) Give bracketed element 7 and the paragraph "Defense: Good Faith Belief in Consent."

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 207(a), 209.5(a), (b), 215(a).
- Force or Fear Requirement. *People v. Moya* (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 912, 916–917 [6 Cal.Rptr.2d 323]; *People v. Stephenson* (1974) 10 Cal.3d 652, 660 [111 Cal.Rptr. 556, 517 P.2d 820] [fear must be reasonable].
- Incidental Movement. See *People v. Martinez* (1999) 20 Cal.4th 225, 237–238 [83 Cal.Rptr.2d 533, 973 P.2d 512].
- Increased Risk of Harm. *People v. Ortiz* (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 410, 415 [124 Cal.Rptr.2d 92].
- Intent to Facilitate Commission of Carjacking. *People v. Perez* (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 856, 860–861 [101 Cal.Rptr.2d 376].
- Movement Need Not Substantially Increase Risk of Harm. *People v. Robertson* (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 965, 982 [146 Cal.Rptr.3d 66]; *People v. Ortiz* (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 410 [124 Cal.Rptr.2d 92]; Pen. Code, § 209.5(a).
- Vicinity of Carjacking. *People v. Moore* (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 37, 43–46 [88 Cal.Rptr.2d 914].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Carjacking. Pen. Code, § 215(a); *People v. Jones* (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 616, 624–626 [89 Cal.Rptr.2d 485]; *People v. Contreras* (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 760, 765 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 233] [Pen. Code, § 209.5 requires completed offense of carjacking].
- Attempted Carjacking. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 215(a); *People v. Jones* (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 616, 626 [89 Cal.Rptr.2d 485].
- False Imprisonment. Pen. Code, §§ 236, 237; see *People v. Russell* (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1083, 1088–1089 [53 Cal.Rptr.2d 241]; *People v. Gibbs* (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 526, 547 [90 Cal.Rptr. 866].

An unlawful taking or driving of a vehicle with an intent to temporarily deprive the owner of possession (Veh. Code, § 10851(a)) is not a necessarily included lesser offense or a lesser related offense of kidnapping during a carjacking. (*People v. Russell* (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1083, 1088–1091 [53 Cal.Rptr.2d 241] [evidence only supported finding of kidnapping by force or fear; automobile joyriding formerly governed by Pen. Code, § 499b].)

Grand theft is not a necessarily included offense of carjacking. (*People v. Ortega* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 686, 693 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 489, 968 P.2d 48].)

**RELATED ISSUES*****Dominion and Control***

Carjacking can occur when a defendant forcibly takes a victim's car keys, not just when a defendant takes a car from the victim's presence. (*People v. Hoard* (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 599, 608–609 [126 Cal.Rptr.2d 855] [victim was not physically present when defendant drove car away].)

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, §§ 314–315.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, §§ 142.10A, 142.14 (Matthew Bender).

**1205–1214. Reserved for Future Use**

## (ii) Simple Kidnapping

### 1215. Kidnapping (Pen. Code, § 207(a))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with kidnapping [in violation of Penal Code section 207(a)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant took, held, or detained another person by using force or by instilling reasonable fear;
2. Using that force or fear, the defendant moved the other person [or made the other person move] a substantial distance;

[AND]

3. The other person did not consent to the movement(;/.)

<Give element 4 when instructing on reasonable belief in consent.>

[AND]

4. The defendant did not actually and reasonably believe that the other person consented to the movement.]

[In order to *consent*, a person must act freely and voluntarily and know the nature of the act.]

*Substantial distance* means more than a slight or trivial distance. In deciding whether the distance was substantial, you must consider all the circumstances relating to the movement. [Thus, in addition to considering the actual distance moved, you may also consider other factors such as [whether the distance the other person was moved was beyond that merely incidental to the commission of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert associated crime>], whether the movement increased the risk of [physical or psychological] harm, increased the danger of a foreseeable escape attempt, or gave the attacker a greater opportunity to commit additional crimes, or decreased the likelihood of detection.]

<Defense: Good Faith Belief in Consent>

[The defendant is not guilty of kidnapping if (he/she) reasonably and actually believed that the other person consented to the movement. The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not reasonably and actually believe that the other person consented to the movement. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of this crime.]

<Defense: Consent Given>

[The defendant is not guilty of kidnapping if the other person consented

to go with the defendant. The other person consented if (he/she) (1) freely and voluntarily agreed to go with or be moved by the defendant, (2) was aware of the movement, and (3) had sufficient maturity and understanding to choose to go with the defendant. The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the other person did not consent to go with the defendant. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of this crime.

[Consent may be withdrawn. If, at first, a person agreed to go with the defendant, that consent ended if the person changed his or her mind and no longer freely and voluntarily agreed to go with or be moved by the defendant. The defendant is guilty of kidnapping if after the other person withdrew consent, the defendant committed the crime as I have defined it.]

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*New January 2006; Revised October 2010, April 2020*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

In the paragraph defining “substantial distance,” give the bracketed sentence listing factors that the jury may consider, when evidence permits, in evaluating the totality of the circumstances. (*People v. Martinez* (1999) 20 Cal.4th 225, 237 [83 Cal.Rptr.2d 533, 973 P.2d 512].) However, in the case of simple kidnapping, if the movement was for a substantial distance, the jury does not need to consider any other factors. (*People v. Martinez, supra*, 20 Cal.4th at p. 237; see *People v. Stanworth* (1974) 11 Cal.3d 588, 600–601 [114 Cal.Rptr. 250, 522 P.2d 1058].)

The court must give the bracketed language on movement incidental to an associated crime when it is supported by the evidence. (*People v. Martinez, supra*, 20 Cal.4th at p. 237; *People v. Bell* (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 428, 439 [102 Cal.Rptr.3d 300].)

Give the bracketed definition of “consent” on request.

### *Defenses—Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense of consent if there is sufficient evidence to support the defense. (See *People v. Davis* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 516–518 [41 Cal.Rptr.2d 826, 896 P.2d 119] [approving consent instruction as given]; see also *People v. Sedeno* (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703, 717, fn. 7 [112 Cal.Rptr. 1, 518 P.2d 913] overruled on other grounds in *People v. Breverman* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 165 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094] [when court must instruct on defenses].) An optional paragraph is provided for this purpose, “Defense: Consent Given.”

On request, if supported by the evidence, also give the bracketed paragraph that

begins with “Consent may be withdrawn.” (See *People v. Camden* (1976) 16 Cal.3d 808, 814 [129 Cal.Rptr. 438, 548 P.2d 1110].)

The court has a  **sua sponte**  duty to instruct on the defendant’s reasonable and actual belief in the victim’s consent to go with the defendant, if supported by the evidence. (See *People v. Greenberger* (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 298, 375 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 61]; *People v. Isitt* (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 23, 28 [127 Cal.Rptr. 279] [reasonable, good faith belief that victim consented to movement is a defense to kidnapping].) Give bracketed element 4 and the bracketed paragraph on the defense.

### ***Related Instructions***

If the victim is incapable of consent because of immaturity or mental condition, see CALCRIM No. 1201, *Kidnapping: Child or Person Incapable of Consent*.

A defendant may be prosecuted for both the crimes of child abduction and kidnapping. Child abduction or stealing is a crime against the parents, while kidnapping is a crime against the child. (*In re Michele D.* (2002) 29 Cal.4th 600, 614 [128 Cal.Rptr.2d 92, 59 P.3d 164]; *People v. Campos* (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 894, 899 [182 Cal.Rptr. 698].) See CALCRIM No. 1250, *Child Abduction: No Right to Custody*.

For instructions relating to other defenses to kidnapping, see CALCRIM No. 1225, *Defense to Kidnapping: Protecting Child From Imminent Harm*, and CALCRIM No. 1226, *Defense to Kidnapping: Citizen’s Arrest*.

## **AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 207(a).
- Punishment If Victim Under 14 Years of Age. Pen. Code, § 208(b); *People v. Magpuso* (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 112, 118 [28 Cal.Rptr.2d 206] [ignorance of victim’s age not a defense].
- Asportation Requirement. *People v. Martinez* (1999) 20 Cal.4th 225, 235–237 [83 Cal.Rptr.2d 533, 973 P.2d 512] [adopting modified two-pronged asportation test from *People v. Rayford* (1994) 9 Cal.4th 1, 12–14 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 317, 884 P.2d 1369], and *People v. Daniels* (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1119, 1139 [80 Cal.Rptr. 897, 459 P.2d 225]].
- Consent to Physical Movement. See *People v. Davis* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 516–518 [41 Cal.Rptr.2d 826, 896 P.2d 119].
- Force or Fear Requirement. *People v. Moya* (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 912, 916–917 [6 Cal.Rptr.2d 323]; *People v. Stephenson* (1974) 10 Cal.3d 652, 660 [111 Cal.Rptr. 556, 517 P.2d 820]; see *People v. Davis* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 517, fn. 13, 518 [41 Cal.Rptr.2d 826, 896 P.2d 119] [kidnapping requires use of force or fear; consent not vitiated by fraud, deceit, or dissimulation].
- Good Faith Belief in Consent. Pen. Code, § 26(3) [mistake of fact]; *People v. Mayberry* (1975) 15 Cal.3d 143, 153–155 [125 Cal.Rptr. 745, 542 P.2d 1337]; *People v. Isitt* (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 23, 28 [127 Cal.Rptr. 279]; *People v. Patrick* (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 952, 968 [179 Cal.Rptr. 276].

- Incidental Movement Test. *People v. Martinez* (1999) 20 Cal.4th 225, 237–238 [83 Cal.Rptr.2d 533, 973 P.2d 512].
- Intent Requirement. *People v. Thornton* (1974) 11 Cal.3d 738, 765 [114 Cal.Rptr. 467, 523 P.2d 267], disapproved on other grounds in *People v. Flannel* (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668 [160 Cal.Rptr. 84, 603 P.2d 1]; *People v. Davis* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 519 [41 Cal.Rptr.2d 826, 896 P.2d 119]; *People v. Moya* (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 912, 916 [6 Cal.Rptr.2d 323].
- Substantial Distance Requirement. *People v. Derek Daniels* (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 1046, 1053; *People v. Stanworth* (1974) 11 Cal.3d 588, 600–601 [114 Cal.Rptr. 250, 522 P.2d 1058] [since movement must be more than slight or trivial, it must be substantial in character].

### COMMENTARY

Penal Code section 207(a) uses the term “steals” in defining kidnapping not in the sense of a theft, but in the sense of taking away or forcible carrying away. (*People v. McCullough* (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 169, 176 [160 Cal.Rptr. 831].) The instruction uses “take,” “hold,” or “detain” as the more inclusive terms, but includes in brackets the statutory terms “steal” and “arrest” if either one more closely matches the evidence.

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- False Imprisonment. Pen. Code, §§ 236, 237; *People v. Magana* (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1117, 1120–1121 [281 Cal.Rptr. 338]; *People v. Gibbs* (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 526, 547 [90 Cal.Rptr. 866].

Attempted kidnapping is not a lesser included offense of simple kidnapping under subdivision (a) of section 207. (*People v. Fontenot* (2019) 8 Cal.5th 57, 65–71 [251 Cal.Rptr.3d 341, 447 P.3d 252].)

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Victim Must Be Alive*

A victim must be alive when kidnapped. (*People v. Hillhouse* (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 498 [117 Cal.Rptr.2d 45, 40 P.3d 754].)

#### *Threat of Arrest*

“[A]n implicit threat of arrest satisfies the force or fear element of section 207(a) kidnapping if the defendant’s conduct or statements cause the victim to believe that unless the victim accompanies the defendant the victim will be forced to do so, and the victim’s belief is objectively reasonable.” (*People v. Majors* (2004) 33 Cal.4th 321, 331 [14 Cal.Rptr.3d 870, 92 P.3d 360].)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, §§ 281–291, 316.

5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 91, *Sentencing*, § 91.38 (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.14 (Matthew Bender).

**1216–1224. Reserved for Future Use**





## B. DEFENSES

### 1225. Defense to Kidnapping: Protecting Child From Imminent Harm (Pen. Code, § 207(f)(1))

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The defendant is not guilty of kidnapping if (he/she) (took/stole/enticed away/detained/concealed/harbored) a child under the age of 14 years to protect that child from danger of imminent harm.

An *imminent harm* is an immediate and present threat of harm. Belief in future harm is not sufficient, no matter how great or how likely the harm is believed to be. The defendant must have believed that the child was in imminent danger.

[The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act to protect the child from the danger of imminent harm. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of kidnapping.]

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*New January 2006; Revised April 2008*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

An instruction on a defense must be given **sua sponte** if there is substantial evidence supporting the defense and the defendant is relying on the defense or the defense is not inconsistent with the defendant's theory of the case. (*People v. Sedeno* (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703, 716–717 [112 Cal.Rptr. 1, 518 P.2d 913], disapproved on other grounds in *People v. Flannel* (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 684–685, fn. 12 [160 Cal.Rptr. 84, 603 P.2d 1] and in *People v. Breverman* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 163, fn. 10, 164–178 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094]; *People v. Burnham* (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 1134, 1139, fn. 3 [222 Cal.Rptr. 630].)

The prevention of imminent harm may be asserted against the following forms of kidnapping (Pen. Code, § 207(f)(1)):

1. Simple kidnapping by force or fear. (Pen. Code, § 207(a).)
2. Kidnapping for the purpose of committing a lewd or lascivious act with a child. (Pen. Code, § 207(b).)
3. Kidnapping by force or fear for the purpose of selling the victim into slavery or involuntary servitude. (Pen. Code, § 207(c).)

4. Kidnapping by bringing a person unlawfully abducted out of state into California. (Pen. Code, § 207(d).)

***Related Instructions***

CALCRIM No. 3403, *Necessity*.

CALCRIM No. 3402, *Duress or Threats*.

**AUTHORITY**

- Instructional Requirements. Pen. Code, § 207(f)(1).
- Imminent Harm Defined. See *People v. Rodriguez* (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1250, 1269 [62 Cal.Rptr.2d 345] [defining “imminent” for purposes of imperfect self-defense to murder charge]; *In re Eichorn* (1998) 69 Cal.App.4th 382, 389 [81 Cal.Rptr.2d 535] [citing with approval definition of necessity that includes physical harm].
- Defendant’s Burden of Proof on Imminent Harm Defense. *People v. Neidinger* (2006) 40 Cal.4th 67, 79 [51 Cal.Rptr.3d 45, 146 P.3d 502].

**RELATED ISSUES*****Whether Belief Must Be Reasonable***

The language of Penal Code section 207(f)(1) does explicitly require that the defendant “reasonably” believe that the child was in danger of harm. There are no reported cases on this issue.

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, § 281.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.14[2][a] (Matthew Bender).

**1226. Defense to Kidnapping: Citizen’s Arrest (Pen. Code,  
§§ 207(f)(2), 834, 837)**

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**The defendant is not guilty of kidnapping if (he/she) was making a lawful citizen’s arrest. The defendant was making a lawful citizen’s arrest if (he/she) acted because:**

*<Alternative A—person actually committed felony>*

**[The person arrested committed \_\_\_\_\_ <insert specific felony>(;/.)]**

**[OR]**

*<Alternative B—reasonable cause to believe person committed felony>*

**[\_\_\_\_\_ <Insert specific felony> had been committed, and the defendant had reasonable cause to believe the person arrested committed it(;/.)]**

**[OR]**

*<Alternative C—person committed misdemeanor in defendant’s presence>*

**[The person arrested committed or attempted to commit \_\_\_\_\_ <insert specific misdemeanor or infraction> in the defendant’s presence.]**

**[Someone has *reasonable cause* if he or she knows facts that would persuade someone of reasonable caution that the person to be arrested has committed a crime.]**

**The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not making a lawful citizen’s arrest. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of kidnapping.**

---

*New January 2006*

**BENCH NOTES**

***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on making a citizen’s arrest when there is sufficient evidence supporting each of the factors establishing the defense. (See *People v. Barnett* (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1151–1152 [74 Cal.Rptr.2d 121, 954 P.2d 384] [crime occurred before 1990 adoption of Pen. Code, § 207(e)(2); no obligation to instruct sua sponte if insubstantial evidence of defense].)

The three bracketed alternative paragraphs reflect the situations when a private person may make an arrest. (See Pen. Code, § 837.) If the second alternative is

given, also give the bracketed paragraph defining “reasonable cause.”

### AUTHORITY

- Instructional Requirements. Pen. Code, §§ 207(f)(2), 834, 837.
- Arrest by Actual Restraint or Submission to Custody. Pen. Code, § 835.
- Summoning Assistance in Making Arrest. Pen. Code, § 839.
- Burden of Proof. See *People v. Agnew* (1940) 16 Cal.2d 655, 665–666 [107 P.2d 601] [defendant need only raise reasonable doubt regarding lawfulness of arrest as defense to false imprisonment charge]; *People v. Tewksbury* (1976) 15 Cal.3d 953, 963–964 [127 Cal.Rptr. 135, 544 P.2d 1335].
- Presence Defined. *People v. Lee* (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d Supp. 9, 12 [204 Cal.Rptr. 667] [neither physical proximity nor sight is essential].
- Public Offense Defined. Pen. Code, § 15; see *People v. Tuck* (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 639, 644 [142 Cal.Rptr. 362] [public offense includes felony, misdemeanor, or infraction].
- Reasonable Cause Defined. *People v. Wilkins* (1972) 27 Cal.App.3d 763, 767–768 [104 Cal.Rptr. 89] [proof of commission of felony not necessary when reasonable cause exists].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, §§ 281, 291.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.14[2][a] (Matthew Bender).

### 1227–1239. Reserved for Future Use

## C. FALSE IMPRISONMENT

### 1240. Felony False Imprisonment (Pen. Code, §§ 236, 237)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with false imprisonment by violence or menace [in violation of Penal Code section 237(a)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant intentionally [and unlawfully] (restrained[,]/ [or] confined[,]/ [or] detained) someone [or caused that person to be (restrained[,]/ [or] confined[,]/ [or] detained)] by violence or menace;

AND

2. The defendant made the other person stay or go somewhere against that person's will.

*Violence* means using physical force that is greater than the force reasonably necessary to restrain someone.

*Menace* means a verbal or physical threat of harm[, including use of a deadly weapon]. The threat of harm may be express or implied.

[An act is done *against a person's will* if that person does not consent to the act. In order to *consent*, a person must act freely and voluntarily and know the nature of the act.]

[False imprisonment does not require that the person restrained be confined in jail or prison.]

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*New January 2006*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime. (*People v. Haney* (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 308, 312–313 [142 Cal.Rptr. 186] [failure to instruct on elements of violence, menace, fraud, or deceit necessary to establish felony false imprisonment requires reversal].)

Give the bracketed words “and unlawfully” in element 1 on request if there is evidence that the defendant acted lawfully. The court will need to further define for the jury when a restraint, detention, or confinement is legal.

Give the bracketed definition of “against a person's will” on request.

Give the final paragraph on request to inform jurors that false “imprisonment” is not

limited to confinement in jail or prison. (*People v. Agnew* (1940) 16 Cal.2d 655, 659 [107 P.2d 601]; *People v. Haney* (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 308, 313 [142 Cal.Rptr. 186].)

### ***Related Instructions***

CALCRIM No. 1242, *Misdemeanor False Imprisonment*.

If the defendant is charged with false imprisonment for purposes of protection from arrest or use as a shield (Pen. Code, § 210.5), see CALCRIM No. 1241, *False Imprisonment: Hostage*.

## **AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 236, 237; *People v. Agnew* (1940) 16 Cal.2d 655, 659–660 [107 P.2d 601].
- Confinement in Jail or Prison Not Required. *People v. Agnew* (1940) 16 Cal.2d 655, 659 [107 P.2d 601]; *People v. Haney* (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 308, 313 [142 Cal.Rptr. 186].
- General-Intent Crime. *People v. Fernandez* (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 710, 717–718 [31 Cal.Rptr.2d 677]; *People v. Olivencia* (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 1391, 1399–1400 [251 Cal.Rptr. 880]; *People v. Swanson* (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 104, 109 [190 Cal.Rptr. 768].
- Menace Defined. *People v. Matian* (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 480, 484–486 [41 Cal.Rptr.2d 459].
- Violence Defined. *People v. Babich* (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 801, 806 [18 Cal.Rptr.2d 60].

## **COMMENTARY**

The instruction includes a definition of “violence” because it has a specific meaning in the context of felony false imprisonment. In addition, force and violence are separate elements with different meanings that must be made clear to the jury. (*People v. Babich* (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 801, 806–807 [18 Cal.Rptr.2d 60].) Force is required for a finding of both misdemeanor and felony false imprisonment, while violence is only required for the felony. “Violence” is a force greater than that reasonably necessary to effect the restraint. (*People v. Hendrix* (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1458, 1462 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 922].)

A definition of “menace” is also included. Menace has a specific meaning in the context of felony false imprisonment. (*People v. Babich, supra*, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 806.) Two categories of menace include a threat involving either the use of a deadly weapon or verbal threats of harm. (*People v. Matian* (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 480, 485–486 [41 Cal.Rptr.2d 459].) “Menace” is not a mere modifier of “violence.” (*People v. Arvanites* (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 1052, 1060 [95 Cal.Rptr. 493].)

The committee found only one case that involved fraud and deceit. (*People v. Rios* (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 445, 450–451 [222 Cal.Rptr. 913]; see also *Parnell v. Superior Court* (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 392, 409–410 [173 Cal.Rptr. 906].) Thus, this instruction focuses on the use of violence or menace to restrain the victim. If

there is evidence of the use of fraud or deceit, the court must modify the instruction.

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Attempted False Imprisonment. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 236, 237; *People v. Ross* (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1548, 1554–1555 [253 Cal.Rptr. 178] [present ability not prerequisite to attempted false imprisonment].
- Misdemeanor False Imprisonment. Pen. Code, § 236; *People v. Matian* (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 480, 484, fn. 4, 487 [41 Cal.Rptr.2d 459]; *People v. Babich* (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 801, 807 [18 Cal.Rptr.2d 60].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Elder or Dependent Adult Victim*

False imprisonment of an elder or dependent adult by use of violence, menace, fraud, or deceit is punishable by imprisonment for two, three, or four years. (Pen. Code, §§ 237(b), 368(f).) An elder is any person who is 65 years of age or older. (Pen. Code, § 368(g).) A dependent adult is any person between the ages of 18 and 64 with specified physical or mental limitations. (Pen. Code, § 368(h).)

#### *Parent Confining Child*

A parent who confines his or her child with the intent to endanger the health and safety of the child or for an unlawful purpose can be prosecuted for false imprisonment. (*People v. Checketts* (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1190, 1195 [84 Cal.Rptr.2d 491] [unlawful purpose of avoiding prosecution].) A parent asserting the defense of parental authority may introduce evidence of his or her intent in confining or restraining the child and of the reasonableness of the restraint or confinement. (*Id.* at p. 1196.) There is no sua sponte duty to instruct on the defense absent substantial evidence supporting the defense or reliance on it during the trial. (*Id.* at p. 1197.)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, §§ 273–276, 279.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.14[2][a], [b] (Matthew Bender).

## 1241. False Imprisonment: Hostage (Pen. Code, §§ 210.5, 236)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with false imprisonment of a hostage [in violation of Penal Code section 210.5].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant faced a threat or risk of imminent arrest;
2. The defendant (restrained[,]/ [or] confined[,]/ [or] detained) another person by force or by a threat to use force;
3. The defendant intended to protect (himself/herself) against the threat of imminent arrest by restraining the other person;
4. The defendant made the other person stay or go somewhere against that person's will;

AND

5. The defendant either substantially increased the risk of [physical or psychological] harm to the (restrained[,]/ [or] confined[,]/ [or] detained) person or intended to use that person as a shield.

[An act is done *against a person's will* if that person does not consent to the act. In order to *consent*, a person must act freely and voluntarily and know the nature of the act.]

[False imprisonment does not require that the person restrained be confined in jail or prison.]

---

*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

Give the bracketed definition of “against a person’s will” on request.

Give the final paragraph on request to inform jurors that false “imprisonment” is not limited to confinement in jail or prison. (*People v. Agnew* (1940) 16 Cal.2d 655, 659 [107 P.2d 601]; *People v. Haney* (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 308, 313 [142 Cal.Rptr. 186].)

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 210.5, 236.
- Imminent Arrest. *People v. Gomez* (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 819, 825 [3 Cal.Rptr.2d 418] [dicta].



## COMMENTARY

Unlike simple false imprisonment, false imprisonment of a hostage is a specific intent crime. (See Pen. Code, § 210.5 [falsely imprison “for purposes of protection from arrest”]; see also *People v. McDaniel* (1979) 24 Cal.3d 661, 669 [156 Cal.Rptr. 865, 597 P.2d 124] [specific intent crime exists when defendant intends to do some further act or achieve some additional consequence].)

Section 210.5 does not expressly require a threat of arrest when a perpetrator commits false imprisonment “for purposes of using the person as a shield.” Until the appellate courts provide more guidance, this instruction assumes that a threat of imminent arrest is required. (See *People v. Gomez* (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 819, 825 [3 Cal.Rptr.2d 418] [dicta].)

## LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- False Imprisonment. Pen. Code, §§ 236, 237.
- Attempted False Imprisonment of Hostage. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 210.5, 236.

## SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, § 277.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.14[1][c], [2][a], [b] (Matthew Bender).

## 1242. Misdemeanor False Imprisonment (Pen. Code, §§ 236, 237(a))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with false imprisonment [in violation of Penal Code section 237(a)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant intentionally [and unlawfully] (restrained[,]/ [or] detained[,]/ [or] confined) a person;

AND

2. The defendant's act made that person stay or go somewhere against that person's will.

[An act is done *against a person's will* if that person does not consent to the act. In order to *consent*, a person must act freely and voluntarily and know the nature of the act.]

[False imprisonment does not require that the person restrained or detained be confined in jail or prison.]

---

*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

Give the bracketed words “and unlawfully” in element 1 on request if there is evidence that the defendant acted lawfully. The court will need to further define for the jury when a restraint, detention, or confinement is legal.

Give the bracketed definition of “against a person's will” on request.

Give the final paragraph on request to inform jurors that false “imprisonment” is not limited to confinement in jail or prison. (*People v. Agnew* (1940) 16 Cal.2d 655, 659 [107 P.2d 601]; *People v. Haney* (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 308, 313 [142 Cal.Rptr. 186].)

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 236, 237(a); *People v. Agnew* (1940) 16 Cal.2d 655, 659–660 [107 P.2d 601].
- General-Intent Crime. *People v. Fernandez* (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 710, 717–718 [31 Cal.Rptr.2d 677]; *People v. Olivencia* (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 1391, 1399–1400 [251 Cal.Rptr. 880]; *People v. Swanson* (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 104, 109 [190 Cal.Rptr. 768].

- Confinement in Jail or Prison Not Required. *People v. Agnew* (1940) 16 Cal.2d 655, 659 [107 P.2d 601]; *People v. Haney* (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 308, 313 [142 Cal.Rptr. 186].

## RELATED ISSUES

### *General-Intent Crime*

False imprisonment is a general-intent crime. (*People v. Fernandez* (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 710, 716–718 [31 Cal.Rptr.2d 677]; *People v. Olivencia* (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 1391 [251 Cal.Rptr. 880]; *People v. Swanson* (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 104, 109 [190 Cal.Rptr. 768].) Thus, the court is not required to instruct on the joint union of act and specific intent (*People v. Fernandez, supra*, 26 Cal.App.4th at p. 716), on the use of circumstantial evidence to prove specific intent (*People v. Swanson, supra*, 142 Cal.App.3d at pp. 109–110), or that the jury should consider mental illness in deciding whether the defendant acted with specific intent (*People v. Olivencia, supra*, 204 Cal.App.3d at p. 1399).

### *Parent Confining Child*

A parent who confines his or her child with the intent to endanger the health and safety of the child or for an unlawful purpose can be prosecuted for false imprisonment. (*People v. Checketts* (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1190, 1195 [84 Cal.Rptr.2d 491] [unlawful purpose of avoiding prosecution]; see also *People v. Rios* (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 445, 451 [222 Cal.Rptr. 913].) If there is sufficient evidence that the parent's restraint or confinement was a reasonable exercise of parental authority, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on that defense. (*People v. Checketts, supra*, 71 Cal.App.4th at p. 1196.)

## SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, §§ 273, 279.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.14[2][a], [b] (Matthew Bender).

## 1243. Human Trafficking (Pen. Code, § 236.1(a) & (b))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with human trafficking [in violation of Penal Code section 236.1].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant either deprived another person of personal liberty or violated that other person's personal liberty;

**AND**

*<Give Alternative 2A if the defendant is charged with a violation of subsection (a).>*

**[2A. When the defendant acted, (he/she) intended to obtain forced labor or services(./;)]**

**[OR]**

*<Give Alternative 2B if the defendant is charged with a violation of subsection (b).>*

**[2B. When the defendant acted, (he/she) intended to (commit/ [or] maintain) a [felony] violation of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert appropriate code section[s]>.)]**

***Depriving or violating another person's personal liberty*, as used here, includes substantial and sustained restriction of another person's liberty accomplished through \_\_\_\_\_ <insert terms that apply from statutory definition, i.e.: force, fear, fraud, deceit, coercion, violence, duress, menace, or threat of unlawful injury> to the victim or to another person under circumstances in which the person receiving or perceiving the threat reasonably believes that it is likely that the person making the threat would carry it out.**

***Forced labor or services*, as used here, means labor or services that are performed or provided by a person and are obtained or maintained through force, fraud, duress, or coercion, or equivalent conduct that would reasonably overbear the will of the person.]**

***Duress* means a direct or implied threat of force, violence, danger, hardship, or retribution that is enough to cause a reasonable person to do [or submit to] something that he or she would not otherwise do [or submit to].]**

***Duress* includes (a direct or implied threat to destroy, conceal, remove, confiscate, or possess any actual or purported passport or immigration document of the other person/ [or] knowingly destroying, concealing,**

removing, confiscating, or possessing any actual or purported passport or immigration document of the other person).]

[*Violence* means using physical force that is greater than the force reasonably necessary to restrain someone.]

[*Menace* means a verbal or physical threat of harm[, including use of a deadly weapon]. The threat of harm may be express or implied.]

[*Coercion* includes any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause a person to believe that failing to perform an act would result in (serious harm to or physical restraint against someone else/ [or] the abuse or threatened abuse of the legal process/ [or] debt bondage/ [or] providing or facilitating the possession of any controlled substance to impair the other person’s judgment).]

[When you decide whether the defendant (used *duress*/ [or] used *coercion*/ [or] *deprived another person of personal liberty* or *violated that other person’s personal liberty*), consider all of the circumstances, including the age of the other person, (his/her) relationship to the defendant [or defendant’s agent[s]], and the other person’s handicap or disability, if any.]

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*New August 2009; Revised August 2013, February 2014*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If necessary, insert the correct Penal Code section into the blank provided in element 2B and give the corresponding CALCRIM instruction.

Give bracketed element three if the defendant is charged with a violation of Pen. Code, § 236.1(c).

This instruction is based on the language of the statute effective November 7, 2012, and only applies to crimes committed on or after that date.

The court is not required to instruct sua sponte on the definition of “menace” or “violence” and Penal Code section 236.1 does not define these terms. (*People v. Pitmon* (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 38, 52 [216 Cal.Rptr. 221] [duress]). Optional definitions are provided for the court to use at its discretion.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements and Definitions. Pen. Code, § 236.1.
- Menace Defined [in context of false imprisonment]. *People v. Matian* (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 480, 484–486 [41 Cal.Rptr.2d 459].
- Violence Defined [in context of false imprisonment]. *People v. Babich* (1993)

14 Cal.App.4th 801, 806 [18 Cal.Rptr.2d 60].

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, § 278.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.14A (Matthew Bender).

**1244. Causing Minor to Engage in Commercial Sex Act (Pen. Code, § 236.1(c))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with (causing, inducing, or persuading / (and/or) attempting to cause, induce, or persuade) a minor to engage in a commercial sex act [in violation of Penal Code section 236.1(c)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant (caused/ [or] induced/ [or] persuaded) [or] attempted to (cause/ [or] induce/ [or] persuade) another person to engage in a commercial sex act;
2. When the defendant acted, (he/she) intended to (commit/ [or] maintain) a [felony] violation of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert appropriate code section[s]>;

**AND**

3. When the defendant did so, the other person was under 18 years of age.

*A commercial sex act* is sexual conduct that takes place in exchange for anything of value.

When you decide whether the defendant (caused/ [or] induced/ [or] persuaded) the other person to engage in a commercial sex act, consider all of the circumstances, including the age of the other person, (his/her) relationship to the defendant [or defendant's agent[s]], and the other person's handicap or disability, if any.

[Under the law, a person becomes one year older as soon as the first minute of his or her birthday has begun.]

[The other person's consent is not a defense to this crime.]

[Being mistaken about the other person's age is not a defense to this crime.]

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*New February 2014; Revised March 2019*

**BENCH NOTES**

***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

Insert the correct Penal Code section into the blank provided in element 2 and give

the corresponding instruction or instructions.

This instruction is based on the language of the statute effective November 7, 2012, and applies only to crimes committed on or after that date.

If the charged crime is a Penal Code section 21a attempt to violate Penal Code section 236.1(c) (e.g. when the intended victim is an undercover officer), also give CALCRIM No. 460, Attempt Other Than Attempted Murder. If the charged crime includes a violation of the attempt provision of Penal Code section 236.1(c) (e.g., when the victim is a minor), do not give CALCRIM No. 460, Attempt Other Than Attempted Murder. *People v. Shields* (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 1242, 1257 [233 Cal.Rptr.3d 701] [“the attempt prong of the statute is distinct from the separate crime of attempt because a completed violation of the statute requires a person under the age of 18 while an attempt to violate the statute does not.”]

### AUTHORITY

- Elements and Definitions. Pen. Code, § 236.1.
- Menace Defined [in context of false imprisonment]. *People v. Matian* (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 480, 484–486 [41 Cal.Rptr.2d 459].
- Calculating Age. Fam. Code, § 6500; *In re Harris* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 849–850 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391].
- Actual Minor Required. *People v. Shields* (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 1242, 1256–1257 [233 Cal.Rptr.3d 701].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, § 278.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.14A (Matthew Bender).

**1245–1249. Reserved for Future Use**



## D. CHILD ABDUCTION

### 1250. Child Abduction: No Right to Custody (Pen. Code, §§ 277, 278)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with child abduction without a right of custody [in violation of Penal Code section 278].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant maliciously (took[,]/ [or] enticed away[,]/ [or] kept[,]/ [or] withheld[,]/ [or] concealed) a child from (his/her) lawful custodian;
2. The child was under the age of 18;
3. When the defendant acted, (he/she) did not have a right to custody of that child;

AND

4. When the defendant acted, (he/she) intended to detain or conceal the child from the child's lawful custodian.

Someone acts *maliciously* when he or she intentionally does a wrongful act or when he or she acts with the unlawful intent to disturb, defraud, annoy, or injure someone else.

A *lawful custodian* is a person, guardian, or public agency having a right to custody of the child. The *right to custody* means the right to physical care, custody, and control of the child according to the law or because of a court order. [A public agency has the right to custody if it has been given protective custody or jurisdiction of the care, custody, control, or conduct of the child by statute or court order.]

[*Intending to detain* includes delaying or hindering. A person can detain someone without using force.]

[To *entice away* means to lure away by creating hope or desire.]

[The defendant can be guilty of child abduction whether or not the child resisted or objected, and even if the child consented to go with the defendant.]

[A parent has no right to physical custody if his or her parental rights were terminated by court order.]

[A parent loses his or her right to custody if he or she (is unable to take custody of the child[,]/ [or] refuses to take custody of the child[,]/ [or] abandons his or her family).]

[A parent *abandons* a child by actually deserting the child with the intent to cut off the relationship with the child and end all parental obligations. Intent to abandon can be shown in many ways, including, but not limited to:

1. Leaving the child without providing a way for the child to be identified;
2. Leaving the child with the other parent for at least one year without communicating with or supporting the child;

OR

3. Leaving the child with someone other than a parent for at least six months without communicating with or supporting the child.]

[Under the law, a person becomes one year older as soon as the first minute of his or her birthday has begun.]

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*New January 2006*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a  **sua sponte**  duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If requested, give the final bracketed sentence at the end of the paragraph defining “lawful custodian” if a public agency was the lawful custodian at the time of the alleged abduction. (See Pen. Code, § 277(e).)

If requested, give the bracketed sentences defining “intending to detain” (see *People v. Moore* (1945) 67 Cal.App.2d 789, 791 [155 P.2d 403]) or “entice away” (see *People v. Torres* (1920) 48 Cal.App. 606, 609 [192 P. 175]) depending on the evidence in the case.

If requested, give the bracketed paragraph about the child’s consent or lack of resistance if there is evidence the child did not resist or consented to go with the defendant. (*People v. Moore, supra*, 67 Cal.App.2d at p. 792 [child’s consent irrelevant]; *People v. Grever* (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 7 [259 Cal.Rptr. 469].)

Give on request the bracketed paragraph that begins with “A parent loses his or her right to custody . . .” if there is evidence the defendant lost his or her right to custody by being unable or refusing to take custody, or by abandoning his or her family. (See Pen. Code, § 277(f).)

If there is evidence of abandonment, give the bracketed paragraphs defining when a parent “abandons” a child. The trial court must define abandonment  **sua sponte**  when it is closely connected to the evidence presented on the right to custody. (*People v. Ryan* (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1304, 1319 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 160].) If an Indian parent is involved, see Fam. Code, § 7822(e).

Give the final bracketed paragraph about calculating age if requested. (Fam. Code, § 6500; *In re Harris* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 849–850 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391].)

### ***Related Instructions***

A defendant may be prosecuted for both the crimes of child abduction and kidnapping. Child abduction or stealing is a crime against the parents, while kidnapping is a crime against the child. (*In re Michele D.* (2002) 29 Cal.4th 600, 614 [128 Cal.Rptr.2d 92, 59 P.3d 164]; *People v. Campos* (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 894, 899 [182 Cal.Rptr. 698].) See CALCRIM No. 1215, *Kidnapping*.

## **AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 277, 278.
- Abandonment Defined. Fam. Code, § 7822(a), (b); *People v. Ryan* (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1304, 1315–1316, 1320 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 160].
- Court Order or Custody Order Defined. Pen. Code, § 277(b).
- Custody Proceeding Defined. Pen. Code, § 277(c).
- Maliciously Defined. Pen. Code, § 7(4).
- Person Defined. Pen. Code, § 277(i) [includes parent or parent’s agent].
- Child’s Consent Irrelevant. *People v. Moore* (1945) 67 Cal.App.2d 789, 791–792 [155 P.2d 403] [crime against parent]; *People v. Grever* (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 7 [259 Cal.Rptr. 469].
- Detain Defined. *People v. Moore* (1945) 67 Cal.App.2d 789, 791 [155 P.2d 403] [includes delaying, hindering, or retarding but not necessarily the use of force].
- Entice Defined. *People v. Torres* (1920) 48 Cal.App. 606, 609 [192 P. 175].

## **LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES**

- Attempted Child Abduction. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 278.

## **RELATED ISSUES**

### ***Custody Placed With Other Parent***

Penal Code section 278 applies to a parent of a minor child whose custody has been placed with the other parent by court order. (*People v. Hyatt* (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 618, 622 [96 Cal.Rptr. 156].) A parent with bare legal custody does not have a “right of custody” under the statute. (*People v. Irwin* (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 891, 897 [202 Cal.Rptr. 475] [father only had joint legal custody; physical custody was awarded to the mother].)

### ***Intent to Detain or Conceal Not Required***

Proof of violation of section 278 does not require the intent to detain or conceal the child in California. Proof of detention or concealment, however, supports an inference of an intention to detain or conceal. (*People v. Hyatt* (1971) 18

Cal.App.3d 618, 623 [96 Cal.Rptr. 156] [construing former section 278 that required intent to detain “and” conceal].)

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, §§ 318–327.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.14[2][b], [c], [3] (Matthew Bender).

**1251. Child Abduction: By Depriving Right to Custody or  
Visitation (Pen. Code, §§ 277, 278.5)**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with depriving someone else of the right to (custody/ [or] visitation) [in violation of Penal Code section 278.5].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant (took[,]/ [or] enticed away[,]/ [or] kept[,]/ [or] withheld[,]/ [or] concealed) a child;
2. The child was under the age of 18;

AND

3. When the defendant acted, (he/she) maliciously (deprived a lawful custodian of (his/her/its) right to custody/ [or] deprived a person of a lawful right to visitation).

Someone acts *maliciously* when he or she intentionally does a wrongful act or when he or she acts with the unlawful intent to disturb, defraud, annoy, or injure someone else.

A *lawful custodian* is a person, guardian, or public agency that has a right to custody of the child. The *right to custody* means the right to physical care, custody, and control of the child according to the law or because of a court order. [A public agency has the right to custody if it has been given protective custody or jurisdiction of the care, custody, control, or conduct of the child by statute or court order.]

[To *entice away* means to lure away by creating hope or desire.]

[The defendant can be guilty of child abduction whether or not the child resisted or objected, and even if the child consented to go with the defendant.]

[*Visitation* means the time ordered by a court granting someone access to the child.]

[Under the law, a person becomes one year older as soon as the first minute of his or her birthday has begun.]

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*New January 2006*

**BENCH NOTES**

***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If requested, give the final bracketed sentence in the paragraph defining “lawful custodian” if there is evidence that a public agency was the lawful custodian at the time of the alleged abduction. (See Pen. Code, § 277(e).)

If requested, give the bracketed paragraph defining “entice away” (see *People v. Torres* (1920) 48 Cal.App. 606, 609 [192 P. 175]) depending on the evidence in the case.

If requested, give the bracketed paragraph about the child’s consent or lack of resistance if there is evidence the child did not resist or consented to go with the defendant. (*People v. Moore* (1945) 67 Cal.App.2d 789, 792 [155 P.2d 403] [child’s consent irrelevant]; *People v. Grever* (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 7 [259 Cal.Rptr. 469].)

If requested, give the bracketed paragraph regarding visitation if evidence is presented that the defendant deprived another person of his or her right to visitation. (See Pen. Code, §§ 277(h), 278.5(a).)

Give the final bracketed paragraph about calculating age if requested. (Fam. Code, § 6500; *In re Harris* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 849–850 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391].)

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 277, 278.5.
- Court Order or Custody Order Defined. Pen. Code, § 277(b).
- Custody Proceeding Defined. Pen. Code, § 277(c).
- Maliciously Defined. Pen. Code, § 7(4).
- Person Defined. Pen. Code, § 277(i) [includes parent or an agent of a parent].
- Child’s Consent Irrelevant. *People v. Moore* (1945) 67 Cal.App.2d 789, 792 [155 P.2d 403] [crime against parent]; *People v. Grever* (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 7 [259 Cal.Rptr. 469].

### COMMENTARY

A crime under Penal Code section 278.5 is sometimes referred to as “child detention.” (See *People v. Moses* (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 462, 464, fn. 2 [50 Cal.Rptr.2d 665].) This instruction uses the phrase “depriving someone else of the right to (custody/ [or] visitation)” to avoid any confusion with detention under Penal Code section 278, the general child abduction statute.

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Attempted Child Detention. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 278.5.

Section 278.5 does not limit the court’s contempt power. (Pen. Code, § 278.5(b).) Contempt is not a lesser included offense of a crime under section 278.5. There is no sua sponte duty to instruct on contempt. (*People v. Moses* (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 462, 469, 471 [50 Cal.Rptr.2d 665].)

**RELATED ISSUES*****Custody Order After Abduction***

A custody order obtained after the abduction of a child is not a defense to a crime charged under section 278.5. (Pen. Code, § 278.5(c).)

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, §§ 318, 328–329.

5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 91, *Sentencing*, § 91.38[2] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.14[2][b], [c], [3] (Matthew Bender).

**1252. Defense to Child Abduction: Protection From Immediate Injury (Pen. Code, § 278.7(a) and (b))**

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The defendant did not maliciously deprive a (lawful custodian of a right to custody/ [or] person of a right to visitation) if the defendant:

1. Had a right to custody of the child when (he/she) abducted the child;
2. Had a good faith and reasonable belief when abducting the child that the child would suffer immediate bodily injury or emotional harm if left with the other person;
3. Made a report to the district attorney's office in the county where the child lived within a reasonable time after the abduction;
4. Began a custody proceeding in an appropriate court within a reasonable time after the abduction;

AND

5. Informed the district attorney's office of any change of address or telephone number for (himself/herself) and the child.

To *abduct* means to take, entice away, keep, withhold, or conceal.

The *right to custody* means the right to physical care, custody, and control of the child because of a court order or under the law.

[One way a child may suffer *emotional harm* is if he or she has a parent who has committed domestic violence against the parent accused of abducting the child. Acts of "domestic violence" include, but are not limited to (1) sexual assault; (2) causing or attempting to cause bodily injury, either intentionally or recklessly; or (3) causing a person to reasonably fear imminent serious bodily injury to himself or herself or another.]

The report to the district attorney must include the defendant's name, the defendant's or child's current address and telephone number, and the reasons the child was abducted.

A reasonable time within which to make a report to the district attorney's office is at least 10 days from when the defendant took the child.

A reasonable time to begin a custody proceeding is at least 30 days from the time the defendant took the child.

The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant maliciously deprived a (lawful custodian of a right to custody/ [or] person of a right to visitation). If the People have not met



**this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of \_\_\_\_\_**  
 <insert crime charged>.

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2015*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on this defense if the defendant is relying on it, or if there is substantial evidence supporting the defense and the defense is not inconsistent with the defendant’s theory of the case. (See *People v. Neidinger* (2006) 40 Cal.4th 67, 75, 79 [51 Cal.Rptr.3d 45, 146 P.3d 502] [defendant must raise a reasonable doubt]; *People v. Mehaisin* (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 958, 965 [124 Cal.Rptr.2d 683]; *People v. Sedeno* (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703, 715–716 [112 Cal.Rptr. 1, 518 P.2d 913] [duty to instruct on defenses], disapproved on other grounds in *People v. Flannel* (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 684–685, fn. 12 [160 Cal.Rptr. 84, 603 P.2d 1] and in *People v. Breverman* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 163, fn. 10, 164–178 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094].)

*People v. Mehaisin* (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 958, 965 [124 Cal.Rptr.2d 683] holds that the “defendant was not entitled to a section 278.7 defense because he did not report the taking to the Sacramento District Attorney and did not commence a custody proceeding”; *People v. Neidinger* (2006) 40 Cal.4th 67, 73 fn.4, 79 [51 Cal.Rptr.3d 45, 146 P.3d 502] explains that “the section 278.7(a) defense provides a specific example of when the person does not act maliciously.”

Give on request the bracketed paragraph regarding “emotional harm” and “domestic violence” if there is evidence that the defendant had been a victim of domestic violence committed by the other parent. (See Pen. Code, §§ 278.7(b), 277(j); Fam. Code, §§ 6203, 6211.)

## AUTHORITY

- Elements of Defense. Pen. Code, § 278.7.
- Abduct Defined Pen. Code, § 277(k).
- Court Order or Custody Order Defined. Pen. Code, § 277(b).
- Domestic Violence Defined. Pen. Code, § 277(j); see Fam. Code, §§ 6203, 6211.
- Person Defined. Pen. Code, § 277(i) [includes parent or parent’s agent].
- Right to Custody Defined. Pen. Code, § 277(e); see *People v. Mehaisin* (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 958, 964 [124 Cal.Rptr.2d 683] [liberal visitation period does not constitute right to custody].
- Pen. Code § 278.7, subdivision (a), Is Specific Example of Proving Absence of Malice. (*People v. Neidinger* (2006) 40 Cal.4th 67, 79 [51 Cal.Rptr.3d 45, 146 P.3d 502].)

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person § 331.

3 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 73, Defenses and Justifications, § 73.05[2] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.14[2][a] (Matthew Bender).

**1253–1299. Reserved for Future Use**

## **CRIMINAL THREATS AND HATE CRIMES**

### **A. THREATENING, STALKING, OR TERRORIZING**

- 1300. Criminal Threat (Pen. Code, § 422)
- 1301. Stalking (Pen. Code, § 646.9(a), (e)–(h))
- 1302. Terrorizing by Destructive Device, Explosive, or Arson (Pen. Code, § 11413)
- 1303. Terrorism by Symbol (Pen. Code, § 11411(a) & (b))
- 1304. Cross Burning and Religious Symbol Desecration (Pen. Code, § 11411(c))
- 1305. Obstructing Religion by Threat (Pen. Code, § 11412)
- 1306–1349. Reserved for Future Use

### **B. HATE CRIMES**

- 1350. Hate Crime: Misdemeanor Interference With Civil Rights by Force (Pen. Code, § 422.6(a))
- 1351. Hate Crime: Misdemeanor Interference With Civil Rights by Threat (Pen. Code, § 422.6(a) & (c))
- 1352. Hate Crime: Misdemeanor Interference With Civil Rights by Damaging Property (Pen. Code, § 422.6(b))
- 1353. Hate Crime: Disability Defined
- 1354. Hate Crime Allegation: Felony (Pen. Code, § 422.75(a)–(c))
- 1355. Hate Crime Allegation: Misdemeanor (Pen. Code, § 422.7)
- 1356–1399. Reserved for Future Use



## A. THREATENING, STALKING, OR TERRORIZING

### 1300. Criminal Threat (Pen. Code, § 422)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with having made a criminal threat [in violation of Penal Code section 422].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant willfully threatened to unlawfully kill or unlawfully cause great bodily injury to \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of complaining witness or member[s] of complaining witness's immediate family>;
2. The defendant made the threat (orally/in writing/by electronic communication device);
3. The defendant intended that (his/her) statement be understood as a threat [and intended that it be communicated to \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of complaining witness>];
4. The threat was so clear, immediate, unconditional, and specific that it communicated to \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of complaining witness> a serious intention and the immediate prospect that the threat would be carried out;
5. The threat actually caused \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of complaining witness> to be in sustained fear for (his/her) own safety [or for the safety of (his/her) immediate family];

[AND]

6. \_\_\_\_\_'s <insert name of complaining witness> fear was reasonable under the circumstances.

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose.

In deciding whether a threat was sufficiently clear, immediate, unconditional, and specific, consider the words themselves, as well as the surrounding circumstances.

Someone who intends that a statement be understood as a threat does not have to actually intend to carry out the threatened act [or intend to have someone else do so].

*Great bodily injury* means significant or substantial physical injury. It is an injury that is greater than minor or moderate harm.

*Sustained fear* means fear for a period of time that is more than momentary, fleeting, or transitory.

**[An immediate ability to carry out the threat is not required.]**

**[An *electronic communication device* includes, but is not limited to: a telephone, cellular telephone, pager, computer, video recorder, or fax machine.]**

**[*Immediate family* means (a) any spouse, parents, and children; (b) any grandchildren, grandparents, brothers and sisters related by blood or marriage; or (c) any person who regularly lives in the other person’s household [or who regularly lived there within the prior six months].]**

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2006, June 2007, February 2015, February 2016, March 2018, September 2020*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

A specific crime or the elements of any specific Penal Code violation that might be subsumed within the actual words of any threat need not be identified for the jury. (See *People v. Butler* (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 745, 758 [102 Cal.Rptr.2d 269].) The threatened acts or crimes may be described on request depending on the nature of the threats or the need to explain the threats to the jury. (*Id.* at p. 760.)

When the threat is conveyed through a third party, give the appropriate bracketed language in element three. (*People v. Felix* (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 905, 913 [112 Cal.Rptr.2d 311]; *In re Ryan D.* (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 854, 861–862 [123 Cal.Rptr.2d 193] [insufficient evidence minor intended to convey threat to victim].)

Give the bracketed definition of “electronic communication” on request. (Pen. Code, § 422; 18 U.S.C., § 2510(12).)

If there is evidence that the threatened person feared for the safety of members of his or her immediate family, the bracketed phrase in element 5 and the final bracketed paragraph defining “immediate family” should be given on request. (See Pen. Code, § 422; Fam. Code, § 6205; Prob. Code, §§ 6401, 6402.)

If instructing on attempted criminal threat, give the third element in the bench notes of CALCRIM No. 460, *Attempt Other Than Attempted Murder*. (*People v. Chandler* (2014) 60 Cal.4th 508, 525 [176 Cal.Rptr.3d 548, 332 P.3d 538].)

The second sentence of the great bodily injury definition could result in error if the prosecution improperly argues great bodily injury may be shown by greater than minor injury alone. (Compare *People v. Medellin* (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 519, 533–535 [258 Cal.Rptr.3d 867] [the definition was reasonably susceptible to prosecutor’s erroneous argument that the injury need only be greater than minor] with *People v. Quinonez* (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 457, 466 [260 Cal.Rptr.3d 86] [upholding instructions containing great bodily injury definition as written].)

**AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 422; *In re George T.* (2004) 33 Cal.4th 620, 630 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 61, 93 P.3d 1007]; *People v. Melhado* (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1529, 1536 [70 Cal.Rptr.2d 878].
- Great Bodily Injury Defined. Pen. Code, § 12022.7(f).
- Sufficiency of Threat Based on All Surrounding Circumstances. *People v. Mendoza* (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1333, 1340 [69 Cal.Rptr.2d 728]; *People v. Butler* (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 745, 752–753 [102 Cal.Rptr.2d 269]; *People v. Martinez* (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1212, 1218–1221 [62 Cal.Rptr.2d 303]; *In re Ricky T.* (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1132, 1137–1138 [105 Cal.Rptr.2d 165]; *People v. Solis* (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1002, 1013–1014 [109 Cal.Rptr.2d 464]; see *People v. Garrett* (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 962, 966–967 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 33].
- Crime that Will Result in Great Bodily Injury Judged on Objective Standard. *People v. Maciel* (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 679, 685 [6 Cal.Rptr.3d 628].
- Threatening Hand Gestures Not Verbal Threats Under Penal Code Section 422. *People v. Gonzalez* (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1138, 1147 [218 Cal.Rptr.3d 150, 394 P.3d 1074].
- Threat Not Required to Be Unconditional. *People v. Bolin* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 339–340 [75 Cal.Rptr.2d 412, 956 P.2d 374], disapproving *People v. Brown* (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1251, 1256 [25 Cal.Rptr.2d 76]; *People v. Stanfield* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1152, 1162 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 328].
- Conditional Threat May Be True Threat, Depending on Context. *People v. Melhado* (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1529, 1540 [70 Cal.Rptr.2d 878].
- Immediate Ability to Carry Out Threat Not Required. *People v. Lopez* (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 675, 679 [88 Cal.Rptr.2d 252].
- Sustained Fear. *In re Ricky T.* (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1132, 1139–1140 [105 Cal.Rptr.2d 165]; *People v. Solis* (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1002, 1024 [109 Cal.Rptr.2d 464]; *People v. Allen* (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1155–1156 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 7].
- Verbal Statement, Not Mere Conduct, Is Required. *People v. Franz* (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1441–1442 [106 Cal.Rptr.2d 773].
- Statute Not Unconstitutionally Vague. *People v. Maciel* (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 679, 684–686 [6 Cal.Rptr.3d 628].
- Attempted Criminal Threats. *People v. Chandler* (2014) 60 Cal.4th 508, 525 [176 Cal.Rptr.3d 548, 332 P.3d 538].
- Statute Authorizes Only One Conviction and One Punishment Per Victim, Per Threatening Encounter. *People v. Wilson* (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 193, 202 [183 Cal.Rptr.3d 541].

**COMMENTARY**

This instruction uses the current nomenclature “criminal threat,” as recommended by

1009

the Supreme Court in *People v. Toledo* (2001) 26 Cal.4th 221, 224, fn. 1 [109 Cal.Rptr.2d 315, 26 P.3d 1051] [previously called “terrorist threat”]. (See also Stats. 2000, ch. 1001, § 4.)

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Attempted Criminal Threat. See Pen. Code, § 422; *People v. Toledo* (2001) 26 Cal.4th 221, 230–231 [109 Cal.Rptr.2d 315, 26 P.3d 1051].
- Threatening a public officer of an educational institution in violation of Penal Code section 71 may be a lesser included offense of a section 422 criminal threat under the accusatory pleadings test. (*In re Marcus T.* (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 468, 472–473 [107 Cal.Rptr.2d 451].) But see *People v. Chaney* (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 253, 257–258 [31 Cal.Rptr.3d 714], finding that a violation of section 71 is not a lesser included offense of section 422 under the accusatory pleading test when the pleading does not specifically allege the intent to cause (or attempt to cause) a public officer to do (or refrain from doing) an act in the performance of official duty.

### RELATED ISSUES

#### ***Ambiguous and Equivocal Poem Insufficient to Establish Criminal Threat***

In *In re George T.* (2004) 33 Cal.4th 620, 628–629 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 61, 93 P.3d 1007], a minor gave two classmates a poem containing language that referenced school shootings. The court held that “the text of the poem, understood in light of the surrounding circumstances, was not ‘as unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to [the two students] a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat.’ ” (*Id.* at p. 638.)

#### ***Related Statutes***

Other statutes prohibit similar threatening conduct against specified individuals. (See, e.g., Pen. Code, §§ 76 [threatening elected public official, judge, etc., or staff or immediate family], 95.1 [threatening jurors after verdict], 139 [threatening witness or victim after conviction of violent offense], 140 [threatening witness, victim, or informant].)

#### ***Unanimity Instruction***

If the evidence discloses a greater number of threats than those charged, the prosecutor must make an election of the events relied on in the charges. When no election is made, the jury must be given a unanimity instruction. (*People v. Butler* (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 745, 755, fn. 4 [102 Cal.Rptr.2d 269]; *People v. Melhado* (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1529, 1534, 1539 [70 Cal.Rptr.2d 878].)

#### ***Whether Threat Actually Received***

If a threat is intended to and does induce a sustained fear, the person making the threat need not know whether the threat was actually received. (*People v. Teal* (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 277, 281 [71 Cal.Rptr.2d 644].)



**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, §§ 24–30.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.11A[1] (Matthew Bender).

## 1301. Stalking (Pen. Code, § 646.9(a), (e)–(h))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with stalking [in violation of Penal Code section 646.9].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant willfully and maliciously harassed or willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly followed another person;

AND

2. The defendant made a credible threat with the intent to place the other person in reasonable fear for (his/her) safety [or for the safety of (his/her) immediate family].

*<If a court order prohibiting defendant's contact with the threatened person was in effect at the time of the charged conduct, give the following two paragraphs>*

[If you find the defendant guilty of stalking [in Count[s]], you must then decide whether the People have proved that a/an (temporary restraining order/injunction/*<describe other court order>*) \_\_\_\_\_) prohibiting the defendant from engaging in this conduct against the threatened person was in effect at the time of the conduct.

The People have the burden of proving this allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you must find that this allegation has not been proved.]

A *credible threat* is one that causes the target of the threat to reasonably fear for his or her safety [or for the safety of his or her immediate family] and one that the maker of the threat appears to be able to carry out.

A *credible threat* may be made orally, in writing, or electronically or may be implied by a pattern of conduct or a combination of statements and conduct.

*Harassing* means engaging in a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously annoys, alarms, torments, or terrorizes the person and that serves no legitimate purpose.

A course of conduct means two or more acts occurring over a period of time, however short, demonstrating a continuous purpose.

[A person is not guilty of stalking if (his/her) conduct is constitutionally protected activity. \_\_\_\_\_ *<Describe type of activity; see Bench Notes below>* is constitutionally protected activity.]

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose.

Someone acts *maliciously* when he or she intentionally does a wrongful act or when he or she acts with the unlawful intent to disturb, annoy, or injure someone else.

[*Repeatedly* means more than once.]

[The People do not have to prove that a person who makes a threat intends to actually carry it out.]

[Someone who makes a threat while in prison or jail may still be guilty of stalking.]

[A threat may be made electronically by using a telephone, cellular telephone, pager, computer, video recorder, fax machine, or other similar electronic communication device.]

[*Immediate family* means (a) any spouse, parents, and children; (b) any grandchildren, grandparents, brothers, and sisters related by blood or marriage; or (c) any person who regularly lives in the other person's household [or who regularly lived there within the prior six months].]

[The terms and conditions of (a/an) (restraining order/injunction/ \_\_\_\_\_ <describe other court order>) remain enforceable despite the parties' actions, and may only be changed by court order.]

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*New January 2006; Revised April 2010, March 2017*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

Give element 3 if the defendant is charged with stalking in violation of a temporary restraining order, injunction, or any other court order. (See Pen. Code, § 646.9(b).)

If there is substantial evidence that any of the defendant's conduct was constitutionally protected, instruct on the type of constitutionally protected activity involved. (See the optional bracketed paragraph regarding constitutionally protected activity.) Examples of constitutionally protected activity include speech, protest, and assembly. (See Civ. Code, § 1708.7(f) [civil stalking statute].)

The bracketed sentence that begins with "The People do not have to prove that" may be given on request. (See Pen. Code, § 646.9(g).)

The bracketed sentence about the defendant's incarceration may be given on request if the defendant was in prison or jail when the threat was made. (See Pen. Code, § 646.9(g).)

Give the bracketed definition of “electronic communication” on request. (See Pen. Code, § 422; 18 U.S.C., § 2510(12).)

If there is evidence that the threatened person feared for the safety of members of his or her immediate family, give the bracketed paragraph defining “immediate family” on request. (See Pen. Code, § 646.9(l); see Fam. Code, § 6205; Prob. Code, §§ 6401, 6402.)

If the defendant argues that the alleged victim acquiesced to contact with the defendant contrary to a court order, the court may, on request, give the last bracketed paragraph stating that such orders may only be changed by the court. (See Pen. Code, § 13710(b); *People v. Gams* (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 147, 151–152, 154–155 [60 Cal.Rptr.2d 423].)

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 646.9(a), (e)–(h); *People v. Ewing* (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 199, 210 [90 Cal.Rptr.2d 177]; *People v. Norman* (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1239 [89 Cal.Rptr.2d 806].
- Intent to Cause Victim Fear. *People v. Falck* (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 287, 295, 297–298 [60 Cal.Rptr.2d 624]; *People v. Carron* (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1230, 1236, 1238–1240 [44 Cal.Rptr.2d 328]; see *People v. McCray* (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 159, 171–173 [67 Cal.Rptr.2d 872] [evidence of past violence toward victim].
- Repeatedly Defined. *People v. Heilman* (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 391, 399, 400 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 422].
- Safety Defined. *People v. Borrelli* (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 703, 719–720 [91 Cal.Rptr.2d 851]; see *People v. Falck* (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 287, 294–295 [60 Cal.Rptr.2d 624].
- Substantial Emotional Distress Defined. *People v. Ewing* (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 199, 210 [90 Cal.Rptr.2d 177]; see *People v. Carron* (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1230, 1240–1241 [44 Cal.Rptr.2d 328].
- Victim’s Fear Not Contemporaneous With Stalker’s Threats. *People v. Norman* (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1239–1241 [89 Cal.Rptr.2d 806].
- Subsections (b) & (c) of Pen. Code, § 646.9 are Alternate Penalty Provisions. *People v. Muhammad* (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 484, 494 [68 Cal.Rptr.3d 695].
- This Instruction Upheld. *People v. Ibarra* (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1195–1197 [67 Cal.Rptr.3d 871].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Attempted Stalking. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 646.9.

## RELATED ISSUES

### *Harassment Not Contemporaneous With Fear*

The harassment need not be contemporaneous with the fear caused. (See *People v. Norman* (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1239–1241 [89 Cal.Rptr.2d 806].)

### *Constitutionality of Terms*

The term “credible threat” is not unconstitutionally vague. (*People v. Halgren* (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 1223, 1230 [61 Cal.Rptr.2d 176].) The element that the objectionable conduct “serve[] no legitimate purpose” (Pen. Code, § 646.9(e) is also not unconstitutionally vague; “an ordinary person can reasonably understand what conduct is expressly prohibited.” (*People v. Tran* (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 253, 260 [54 Cal.Rptr.2d 650].)

### *Labor Picketing*

Section 646.9 does not apply to conduct that occurs during labor picketing. (Pen. Code, § 646.9(i).)

## SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, §§ 333–336.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.11A[2] (Matthew Bender).

**1302. Terrorizing by Destructive Device, Explosive, or Arson (Pen. Code, § 11413)**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with terrorizing by (use of (a/an) (destructive device/ [or] explosive)/committing arson) [in violation of Penal Code section 11413].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

<Alternative 1A—destructive device or explosive>

- [1. The defendant exploded or ignited [or attempted to explode or ignite] (a/an) (destructive device/ [or] explosive);]

<Alternative 1B—arson>

- [1. The defendant committed arson;]
2. The defendant (used [or attempted to use] the (device/ [or] explosive)/committed the arson) in or around \_\_\_\_\_ <insert one or more of the places listed in Pen. Code, § 11413(b)>;

**AND**

3. The defendant committed these acts with the intent to terrorize someone else or with reckless disregard of terrorizing someone else.

*To terrorize* means to cause a person of ordinary emotions and sensibilities to fear for his or her personal safety.

A person acts with *reckless disregard* when (1) he or she is aware that his or her actions present a substantial and unjustifiable risk, (2) he or she ignores that risk, and (3) the person's behavior is grossly different from what a reasonable person would have done in the same situation.

To decide whether the defendant (exploded or ignited [or attempted to explode or ignite] (a/an) (destructive device/ [or] explosive)/committed arson), please refer to the separate instructions that I (will give/have given) you on (that/those) crime[s].

[An *explosive* is any substance, or combination of substances, (1) whose main or common purpose is to detonate or rapidly combust and (2) which is capable of a relatively instantaneous or rapid release of gas and heat.]

[An *explosive* is also any substance whose main purpose is to be combined with other substances to create a new substance that can release gas and heat rapidly or relatively instantaneously.]

[\_\_\_\_\_ <insert type of explosive from Health & Saf. Code, § 12000> is an *explosive*.]

[A *destructive device* is \_\_\_\_\_ <insert definition from Pen. Code, § 16460>.]

[\_\_\_\_\_ <insert type of destructive device from Pen. Code, § 16460> is a *destructive device*.]

[The term[s] (*explosive*/ [and] *destructive device*) (is/are) defined in another instruction.]

[*Judicial officer* means a magistrate, judge, justice, commissioner, or referee of a state or federal court located in this state, or a person appointed by a court to serve in one of these capacities.]

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2012*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

Give alternative 1A or 1B depending on whether the defendant is charged with exploding or igniting a destructive device or explosive, or with committing arson. Give all relevant instructions on the offense alleged. (For arson, see CALCRIM No. 1500, et seq.; for exploding or igniting destructive devices and explosives, see CALCRIM No. 2500, et seq.)

In element 2, insert one or more of the places specifically protected against terrorizing. (See Pen. Code, § 11413(b).) These places are:

1. Any health facility licensed under Health and Safety Code section 1250 et seq., or any place where medical care is provided by a licensed health care professional.
2. Any church, temple, synagogue, or other place of worship.
3. The buildings, offices, and meeting sites of organizations that counsel for or against abortion or among whose major activities are lobbying, publicizing, or organizing with respect to public or private issues relating to abortion.
4. Any place at which a lecture, film-showing, or other private meeting or presentation that educates or propagates with respect to abortion practices or policies, whether on private property or at a meeting site authorized for specific use by a private group on public property, is taking place.
5. Any bookstore or public or private library.
6. Any building or facility designated as a courthouse.
7. The home or office of a judicial officer.
8. Any building or facility regularly occupied by county probation department personnel in which the employees perform official duties of the probation department.

9. Any private property, if the property was targeted because of the race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, gender, or sexual orientation of the owner or occupant of the property.
10. Any public or private school providing instruction in kindergarten or grades 1 to 12, inclusive.

Depending on the device or substance used, give the bracketed definitions of “explosive” or “destructive device,” inserting the appropriate definition from Penal Code section 16460 or 16510, unless the court has already given the definition in other instructions. In such cases, the court may give the bracketed sentence stating that the term is defined elsewhere. If the case involves a specific device listed in Health and Safety Code section 12000 or Penal Code section 16460, the court may instead give the bracketed sentence stating that the listed item “is an explosive” or “is a destructive device.” For example, “A grenade is a destructive device.” However, the court may not instruct the jury that the defendant used a destructive device. For example, the court may not state that “the defendant used a destructive device, a grenade,” or “the device used by the defendant, a grenade, was a destructive device.” (*People v. Dimitrov* (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 18, 25–26 [39 Cal.Rptr.2d 257].)

If the device used is a bomb, the court may insert the word “bomb” in the bracketed definition of destructive device without further definition. (*People v. Dimitrov, supra*, 33 Cal.App.4th at p. 25.) Appellate courts have held that the term “bomb” is not vague and is understood in its “common, accepted, and popular sense.” (*People v. Quinn* (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 251, 258 [129 Cal.Rptr. 139]; *People v. Dimitrov, supra*, 33 Cal.App.4th at p.25 [39 Cal.Rptr.2d 257].) If the court wishes to define the term “bomb,” the court may use the following definition: “A bomb is a device carrying an explosive charge fused to blow up or detonate under certain conditions.” (See *People v. Morse* (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 620, 647, fn. 8 [3 Cal.Rptr.2d 343].)

If it is alleged in element 2 that the home or office of a judicial officer was attacked (Pen. Code, § 11413(b)(7)), the final bracketed paragraph defining “judicial officer” (see Pen. Code, § 11413(c)) may be given on request.

### ***Related Instructions***

Penal Code section 11413 does not prohibit prosecution under Penal Code section 18740 or any other provision of law. (Pen. Code, § 11413(e).) Section 18740 prohibits the possession or explosion of any destructive device or explosive with the intent to injure or terrify any person, or with the intent to injure or destroy property. For instructions relating to the wrongful possession or explosion of destructive devices or explosives, see series 2500, Weapons, Destructive Devices, and Explosives.

### **AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 11413.
- Destructive Device Defined. Pen. Code, § 16460.
- Explosive Defined. Health & Saf. Code, § 12000.



- Definition of Reckless Disregard per Pen. Code, § 11411(c). *People v. Carr* (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 837, 845–846 [97 Cal.Rptr.2d 143] [noting that voluntary intoxication is not a defense to violations of Pen. Code, § 11411].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Arson and Attempted Arson. Pen. Code, §§ 451, 455 [when arson is charged conduct].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, §§ 19, 22.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 143, *Crimes Against Property*, § 143.11[3][a][i] (Matthew Bender).

### 1303. Terrorism by Symbol (Pen. Code, § 11411(a) & (b))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with terrorizing by use of a symbol [in violation of Penal Code section 11411].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant placed or displayed a sign, mark, symbol, emblem, or physical impression on the private property of another person;
2. The defendant did not have authorization to place or display the sign, symbol, emblem or physical impression on the property;

[AND]

3. The defendant committed (this/these) act[s] with the intent to terrorize the owner or occupant of the property [or with reckless disregard of the risk of terrorizing the owner or occupant of the property].

<Include the fourth element in Penal Code section 11411(b) prosecutions.>

[AND]

4. The defendant committed these acts on two or more occasions.]

*To terrorize* means to cause a person of ordinary emotions and sensibilities to fear for his or her personal safety.

<Alternative A—Reckless Disregard: General Definition>

[A person acts with *reckless disregard* when (1) he or she knows there is a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his or her act will terrorize the owner or occupant, (2) he or she ignores that risk, and (3) ignoring the risk is a gross deviation from what a reasonable person would have done in the same situation.]

<Alternative B—Reckless Disregard: Voluntary Intoxication>

[A person acts with *reckless disregard* when (1) he or she does an act that presents a substantial and unjustifiable risk of terrorizing the owner or occupant, and (2) he or she is unaware of the risk because he or she is voluntarily intoxicated. Intoxication is voluntary if the defendant willingly used any intoxicating drink, drug, or other substance knowing that it could produce an intoxicating effect.]

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

Give alternative A or B depending on whether or not there is evidence that the defendant was voluntary intoxicated.

The legislature included the Nazi swastika as an example of a prohibited symbol.

Although Pen. Code, § 11411 states that reckless disregard may provide the necessary mental state for committing this crime, this provision may run counter to the Supreme Court's holding in *Virginia v. Black* (2003) 538 U.S. 343, 365–366 [123 S.Ct. 1536, 155 L.Ed.2d 535] [without specific intent requirement, statute prohibiting cross burning was unconstitutional.]

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 11411(a) & (b).
- Definition of Reckless Disregard per Pen. Code, § 11411(c). *People v. Carr* (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 837, 845–846 [97 Cal.Rptr.2d 143] [noting that voluntary intoxication is not a defense to violations of Pen. Code, § 11411].
- Requirement of Specific Intent. *Virginia v. Black* (2003) 538 U.S. 343, 365–366 [123 S.Ct. 1536, 155 L.Ed.2d 535].

## SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, § 20.

**1304. Cross Burning and Religious Symbol Desecration (Pen. Code, § 11411(c))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with (terrorism by cross burning/terrorism by religious symbol desecration) [in violation of Penal Code section 11411(c)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

*<Alternative A—Private Property>*

1. The defendant burned or desecrated a religious symbol on the private property of another person;
2. The defendant knew the object that he or she burned or desecrated was a religious symbol;
3. The defendant did not have authorization to burn or desecrate the religious symbol on the property; and
4. The defendant committed (this/these) act[s] with the intent to terrorize the owner or occupant of the property [or with reckless disregard of the risk of terrorizing the owner or occupant of the property].

*<Alternative B—School Grounds>*

1. The defendant burned or desecrated a religious symbol on the property of a primary school, junior high school, middle school, or high school;
2. The defendant knew the object that he or she burned or desecrated was a religious symbol; and
3. The defendant committed (this/these) act[s] with the intent to terrorize someone who attends the school, works at the school or is associated with the school.

*To terrorize* means to cause a person of ordinary emotions and sensibilities to fear for his or her personal safety.

*<Alternative A—Reckless Disregard: General Definition>*

[A person acts with *reckless disregard* when (1) he or she knows there is a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his or her act will terrorize the owner or occupant, (2) he or she ignores that risk, and (3) ignoring the risk is a gross deviation from what a reasonable person would have done in the same situation.]

*<Alternative B—Reckless Disregard: Voluntary Intoxication>*

[A person acts with *reckless disregard* when (1) he or she does an act that

**presents a substantial and unjustifiable risk of terrorizing the owner or occupant, but (2) he or she is unaware of the risk because he or she is voluntarily intoxicated. Intoxication is voluntary if the defendant willingly used any intoxicating drink, drug, or other substance knowing that it could produce an intoxicating effect.]**

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*New August 2006*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

Give alternative A or B regarding reckless disregard depending on whether or not there is evidence that the defendant was voluntary intoxicated.

Although Pen. Code, § 11411 states that reckless disregard may provide the necessary mental state for committing this crime, this provision may run counter to the Supreme Court's holding in *Virginia v. Black* (2003) 538 U.S. 343, 365–366 [123 S.Ct. 1536, 155 L.Ed.2d 535] [without specific intent requirement, statute prohibiting cross burning was unconstitutional.]

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 11411(c).
- Definition of Reckless Disregard per Pen. Code, § 11411(c). *People v. Carr* (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 837, 845–846 [97 Cal.Rptr.2d 143] [noting that voluntary intoxication is not a defense to violations of Pen. Code, § 11411].
- Requirement of Specific Intent. *Virginia v. Black* (2003) 538 U.S. 343, 365–366 [123 S.Ct. 1536, 155 L.Ed.2d 535].

## SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, § 20.

## 1305. Obstructing Religion by Threat (Pen. Code, § 11412)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with obstructing religion by threat [in violation of Penal Code section 11412].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant caused or attempted to cause a person to refrain from (exercising his or her religion/engaging in a religious service) by threatening to inflict an unlawful injury upon that person or upon property;
2. The defendant directly communicated the threat to that person;
3. The person reasonably believed the threat could be carried out; and

*<Alternative A—Exercising religion>*

4. At the time the defendant made the threat, (he/she) intended to cause the person to refrain from exercising his or her religion.

*<Alternative B—Religious service>*

4. At the time the defendant made the threat, (he/she) intended to cause the person to refrain from engaging in a religious service.
- 

*New August 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

Give alternative A or B depending on the alleged intent of the defendant.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 11412.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, § 21.

**1306–1349. Reserved for Future Use**

## B. HATE CRIMES

### 1350. Hate Crime: Misdemeanor Interference With Civil Rights by Force (Pen. Code, § 422.6(a))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with interfering with another person's civil rights by the use of force [in violation of Penal Code section 422.6(a)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant used force to willfully interfere with[, or injure, intimidate, or oppress,] another person's free exercise or enjoyment of the right [or privilege] to \_\_\_\_\_ <describe the right allegedly infringed, e.g., "be free from violence or bodily harm">, established by the law or Constitution of California or the United States;
2. The defendant did so in whole or in part because of the other person's actual or perceived (disability[,]/ [or] gender[,]/ [or] nationality[,]/ [or] race or ethnicity[,]/ [or] religion[,]/ [or] sexual orientation[,]/ [or] association with a person or group having (this/one or more of these) actual or perceived characteristic[s]);

AND

3. The defendant intended to interfere with the other person's legally protected right [or privilege].

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose.

The defendant acted *in whole or in part because of* the actual or perceived characteristic[s] of the other person if:

1. The defendant was biased against the other person based on the other person's actual or perceived (disability[,]/ [or] gender[,]/ [or] nationality[,]/ [or] race or ethnicity[,]/ [or] religion[,]/ [or] sexual orientation[,]/ [or] association with a person or group having (this/one or more of these) actual or perceived characteristic[s]);

AND

2. The bias motivation caused the defendant to commit the alleged acts.

If you find that the defendant had more than one reason to commit the

alleged acts, the bias described here must have been a substantial motivating factor. A *substantial factor* is more than a trivial or remote factor. However, it does not need to be the only factor that motivated the conduct.

[The term *disability* is explained in Instruction 1353, to which you should refer.]

[*Gender*, as used here, means sex and includes a person’s gender identity and gender-related appearance and behavior whether or not stereotypically associated with the person’s assigned sex at birth.]

[*Nationality* includes citizenship, country of origin, and national origin.]

[*Race or ethnicity* includes ancestry, color, and ethnic background.]

[*Religion*, as used here, includes all aspects of religious belief, observance, and practice and includes agnosticism and atheism.]

[*Sexual orientation* means heterosexuality, homosexuality, or bisexuality.]

[*Association with a person or group having (this/one or more of these) actual or perceived characteristic[s]* includes (advocacy for[,/ [or] identification with[,/ [or] being on the ground owned or rented by[, or adjacent to,]) a (person[,/ [or] group[,/ [or] family[,/ [or] community center[,/ [or] educational facility[,/ [or] office[,/ [or] meeting hall[,/ [or] place of worship[,/ [or] private institution[,/ [or] public agency[,/ [or] library[,/ [or] other entity) that has, or is identified with people who have, (that/one or more of those) characteristic[s].]

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*New January 2006; Revised March 2017*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime. This statute was substantially revised, effective January 1, 2005.

If the prosecution is based on the defendant’s speech alone, do not give this instruction. (Pen. Code, § 422.6(c); *In re M.S.* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 698, 711–716 [42 Cal.Rptr.2d 355, 896 P.2d 1365].) Give CALCRIM No. 1351, *Hate Crime: Misdemeanor Interference With Civil Rights by Threat*.

In element 1, insert a description of the specific right or rights allegedly infringed, for example, the right to be free from violence or the threat of violence or the right to be protected from bodily harm. (See Civil Code, §§ 43, 51.7; *People v. Lashley* (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 938, 950–951 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 629]; *People v. MacKenzie* (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1256, 1277–1278 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 793].)

Give all relevant bracketed definitions. If the term “disability” is used, give CALCRIM No. 1353, *Hate Crime: Disability Defined*.



**Do not** give CALCRIM No. 370, *Motive*, with this instruction because motive is an element of this crime. (See *People v. Valenti* (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1140, 1165 [197 Cal.Rptr.3d 317]; *People v. Maurer* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1121, 1126–1127 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 335].)

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 422.6(a).
- Willfully Defined. Pen. Code, § 7(1); *People v. Lara* (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 102, 107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
- Hate Crime Defined. Pen. Code, § 422.55.
- “In Whole or in Part Because of” Defined. Pen. Code, § 422.56(d); *In re M.S.* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 698, 719–720 [42 Cal.Rptr.2d 355, 896 P.2d 1365]; *People v. Superior Court (Aishman)* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 735, 741 [42 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 896 P.2d 1387].
- Disability Defined. Pen. Code, § 422.56(b); Gov. Code, § 12926(i)–(l).
- Gender Defined. Pen. Code, §§ 422.56(c), 422.57.
- Nationality Defined. Pen. Code, § 422.56(e).
- Race or Ethnicity Defined. Pen. Code, § 422.56(f).
- Religion Defined. Pen. Code, § 422.56(g).
- Sexual Orientation Defined. Pen. Code, § 422.56(h).
- Association With Defined. Pen. Code, § 422.56(a).
- Specific Intent to Deprive Individual of Protected Right Required. *In re M.S.* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 698, 713 [42 Cal.Rptr.2d 355, 896 P.2d 1365]; *People v. Lashley* (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 938, 947–949 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 629].
- Not Limited to “Significant Constitutional Rights.” *People v. MacKenzie* (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1256, 1277–1278 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 793].
- Statute Constitutional. *In re M.S.* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 698, 715–717, 724 [42 Cal.Rptr.2d 355, 896 P.2d 1365].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### ***Defendant Need Not Know He or She Is Violating the Law***

“‘[S]pecific intent’ under the statute does not require an actual awareness on the part of the defendant that he is violating another’s constitutional rights. It is enough that he engages in activity that interferes with rights clearly and specifically protected by the laws of the United States.” (*People v. Lashley* (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 938, 948 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 629].) “It is sufficient if the right is clearly defined and that the defendant intended to invade interests protected by constitutional or statutory authority.” (*Id.* at p. 949.)

#### ***Penal Code Section 654***

In *In re M.S.* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 698, 727 [42 Cal.Rptr.2d 355, 896 P.2d 1365], the court rejected the argument that Penal Code section 654 does not apply to

convictions under Penal Code section 422.6. In 2004, the Legislature amended the statute to add subdivision (d), which specifically states that Penal Code section 654 applies to convictions under Penal Code section 422.6.

### **SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, §§ 505, 506.

5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 91, *Sentencing*, § 91.44 (Matthew Bender).

### 1351. Hate Crime: Misdemeanor Interference With Civil Rights by Threat (Pen. Code, § 422.6(a) & (c))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with interfering with another person's civil rights by threatening violence [in violation of Penal Code section 422.6].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant threatened physical violence against a specific person [or a specific group of people];
2. The threat would have caused a reasonable person to be afraid because the defendant appeared able to carry out the threat;
3. The defendant used the threat to willfully interfere with[, or injure, intimidate, or oppress,] another person's free exercise or enjoyment of the right [or privilege] to \_\_\_\_\_ <describe the right allegedly infringed, e.g., "be free from violence or bodily harm">, established by the law or Constitution of California or the United States;
4. The defendant did so in whole or in part because of the other person's actual or perceived (disability[,]/ [or] gender[,]/ [or] nationality[,]/ [or] race or ethnicity[,]/ [or] religion[,]/ [or] sexual orientation[,]/ [or] association with a person or group having (this/one or more of these) actual or perceived characteristic[s]);

AND

5. The defendant intended to interfere with the other person's legally protected right [or privilege].

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose.

The defendant acted *in whole or in part because of* the actual or perceived characteristic[s] of the other person if:

1. The defendant was biased against the other person based on the other person's actual or perceived (disability[,]/ [or] gender[,]/ [or] nationality[,]/ [or] race or ethnicity[,]/ [or] religion[,]/ [or] sexual orientation[,]/ [or] association with a person or group having (this/one or more of these) actual or perceived characteristic[s]);

AND

2. The bias motivation caused the defendant to commit the alleged acts.

If you find that the defendant had more than one reason to commit the alleged acts, the bias described here must have been a substantial motivating factor. A *substantial factor* is more than a trivial or remote factor. However, it does not need to be the only factor that motivated the conduct.

[The term *disability* is explained in Instruction 1353, to which you should refer.]

[*Gender*, as used here, means sex and includes a person’s gender identity and gender-related appearance and behavior whether or not stereotypically associated with the person’s assigned sex at birth.]

[*Nationality* includes citizenship, country of origin, and national origin.]

[*Race or ethnicity* includes ancestry, color, and ethnic background.]

[*Religion*, as used here, includes all aspects of religious belief, observance, and practice and includes agnosticism and atheism.]

[*Sexual orientation* means heterosexuality, homosexuality, or bisexuality.]

[*Association with a person or group having (this/one or more of these) actual or perceived characteristic[s]* includes (advocacy for[,/ [or] identification with[,/ [or] being on the ground owned or rented by[, or adjacent to,]) a (person[,/ [or] group[,/ [or] family[,/ [or] community center[,/ [or] educational facility[,/ [or] office[,/ [or] meeting hall[,/ [or] place of worship[,/ [or] private institution[,/ [or] public agency[,/ [or] library[,/ [or] other entity) that has, or is identified with people who have, (that/one or more of those) characteristic[s].]

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*New January 2006; Revised March 2017*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime. This statute was substantially revised, effective January 1, 2005.

Give this instruction if the prosecution is based on the defendant’s speech alone. (Pen. Code, § 422.6(c); *In re M.S.* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 698, 711–716 [42 Cal.Rptr.2d 355, 896 P.2d 1365].)

In element 3, insert a description of the specific right or rights allegedly infringed, for example, the right to be free from violence or the threat of violence or the right to be protected from bodily harm. (See Civil Code, §§ 43, 51.7; *People v. Lashley* (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 938, 950–951 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 629]; *People v. MacKenzie* (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1256, 1277–1278 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 793].)

Give all relevant bracketed definitions. If the term “disability” is used, give CALCRIM No. 1353, *Hate Crime: Disability Defined*.

**Do not** give CALCRIM No. 370, *Motive*, with this instruction because motive is an element of this crime. (See *People v. Valenti* (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1140, 1165 [197 Cal.Rptr.3d 317]; *People v. Maurer* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1121, 1126–1127 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 335].)

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 422.6(a) & (c).
- Willfully Defined. Pen. Code, § 7(1); *People v. Lara* (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 102, 107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
- Hate Crime Defined. Pen. Code, § 422.55.
- “In Whole or in Part Because of” Defined. Pen. Code, § 422.56(d); *In re M.S.* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 698, 719–720 [42 Cal.Rptr.2d 355, 896 P.2d 1365]; *People v. Superior Court (Aishman)* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 735, 741 [42 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 896 P.2d 1387].
- Disability Defined. Pen. Code, § 422.56(b); Gov. Code, § 12926(i)–(l).
- Gender Defined. Pen. Code, §§ 422.56(c), 422.57.
- Nationality Defined. Pen. Code, § 422.56(e).
- Race or Ethnicity Defined. Pen. Code, § 422.56(f).
- Religion Defined. Pen. Code, § 422.56(g).
- Sexual Orientation Defined. Pen. Code, § 422.56(h).
- Association With Defined. Pen. Code, § 422.56(a).
- Specific Intent to Deprive Individual of Protected Right Required. *In re M.S.* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 698, 713 [42 Cal.Rptr.2d 355, 896 P.2d 1365]; *People v. Lashley* (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 938, 947–949 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 629].
- Requirements for Threat of Violence. Pen. Code, § 422.6(c); *In re M.S.* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 698, 711–716 [42 Cal.Rptr.2d 355, 896 P.2d 1365].
- Not Limited to “Significant Constitutional Rights.” *People v. MacKenzie* (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1256, 1277–1278 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 793].
- Statute Constitutional. *In re M.S.* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 698, 715–717, 724 [42 Cal.Rptr.2d 355, 896 P.2d 1365].

### RELATED ISSUES

See the Related Issues section of CALCRIM No. 1350, *Hate Crime: Misdemeanor Interference With Civil Rights by Force*.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, §§ 505, 506.

5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 91, *Sentencing*, § 91.44 (Matthew Bender).

**1352. Hate Crime: Misdemeanor Interference With Civil Rights by Damaging Property (Pen. Code, § 422.6(b))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with interfering with another person's civil rights by damaging property [in violation of Penal Code section 422.6(b)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant (defaced[,]/ [or] damaged[,]/ [or] destroyed) (real/[or] personal) property (owned[,]/ [or] used[,]/ [or] possessed[,]/ [or] occupied) by another person;
2. The defendant knew that (he/she) was (defacing[,]/ [or] damaging[,]/ [or] destroying) property that was (owned[,]/ [or] used[,]/ [or] possessed[,]/ [or] occupied) by that person;
3. The defendant did so for the purpose of interfering with [or intimidating] that person's free exercise or enjoyment of the right [or privilege] to \_\_\_\_\_ <describe the right allegedly infringed, e.g., "be free from violence or bodily harm">, established by the law or Constitution of California or the United States;
4. The defendant did so in whole or in part because of the other person's actual or perceived (disability[,]/ [or] gender[,]/ [or] nationality[,]/ [or] race or ethnicity[,]/ [or] religion[,]/ [or] sexual orientation[,]/ [or] association with a person or group having (this/one or more of these) actual or perceived characteristic[s]);

AND

5. The defendant intended to interfere with the other person's legally protected right [or privilege].

The defendant acted *in whole or in part because of* the actual or perceived characteristic[s] of the other person if:

1. The defendant was biased against the other person based on the other person's actual or perceived (disability[,]/ [or] gender[,]/ [or] nationality[,]/ [or] race or ethnicity[,]/ [or] religion[,]/ [or] sexual orientation[,]/ [or] association with a person or group having (this/one or more of these) actual or perceived characteristic[s]);

AND

2. The bias motivation caused the defendant to commit the alleged acts.

If you find that the defendant had more than one reason to commit the

alleged acts, the bias described here must have been a substantial motivating factor. A *substantial factor* is more than a trivial or remote factor. However, it does not need to be the only factor that motivated the conduct.

[The term *disability* is explained in Instruction 1353, to which you should refer.]

[*Gender*, as used here, means sex and includes a person’s gender identity and gender-related appearance and behavior whether or not stereotypically associated with the person’s assigned sex at birth.]

[*Nationality* includes citizenship, country of origin, and national origin.]

[*Race or ethnicity* includes ancestry, color, and ethnic background.]

[*Religion*, as used here, includes all aspects of religious belief, observance, and practice and includes agnosticism and atheism.]

[*Sexual orientation* means heterosexuality, homosexuality, or bisexuality.]

[*Association with a person or group having (this/one or more of these) actual or perceived characteristic[s]* includes (advocacy for[,]/ [or] identification with[,]/ [or] being on the ground owned or rented by[, or adjacent to,]) a (person[,]/ [or] group[,]/ [or] family[,]/ [or] community center[,]/ [or] educational facility[,]/ [or] office[,]/ [or] meeting hall[,]/ [or] place of worship[,]/ [or] private institution[,]/ [or] public agency[,]/ [or] library[,]/ [or] other entity) that has, or is identified with people who have, (that/one or more of those) characteristic[s].]

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*New January 2006; Revised March 2017*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime. This statute was substantially revised, effective January 1, 2005.

In element 3, insert a description of the specific right or rights allegedly infringed, for example, the right to be free from violence or the threat of violence or the right to be protected from bodily harm. (See Civil Code, §§ 43, 51.7; *People v. Lashley* (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 938, 950–951 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 629]; *People v. MacKenzie* (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1256, 1277–1278 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 793].)

Give all relevant bracketed definitions. If the term “disability” is used, give CALCRIM No. 1353, *Hate Crime: Disability Defined*.

**Do not** give CALCRIM No. 370, *Motive*, with this instruction because motive is an element of this crime. (See *People v. Valenti* (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1140, 1165 [197 Cal.Rptr.3d 317]; *People v. Maurer* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1121, 1126–1127 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 335].)



## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 422.6(b).
- Hate Crime Defined. Pen. Code, § 422.55.
- “In Whole or in Part Because of” Defined. Pen. Code, § 422.56(d); *In re M.S.* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 698, 719–720 [42 Cal.Rptr.2d 355, 896 P.2d 1365]; *People v. Superior Court (Aishman)* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 735, 741 [42 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 896 P.2d 1387].
- Disability Defined. Pen. Code, § 422.56(b); Gov. Code, § 12926(i)–(l).
- Gender Defined. Pen. Code, §§ 422.56(c), 422.57.
- Nationality Defined. Pen. Code, § 422.56(e).
- Race or Ethnicity Defined. Pen. Code, § 422.56(f).
- Religion Defined. Pen. Code, § 422.56(g).
- Sexual Orientation Defined. Pen. Code, § 422.56(h).
- Association With Defined. Pen. Code, § 422.56(a).
- Specific Intent to Deprive Individual of Protected Right Required. *In re M.S.* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 698, 713 [42 Cal.Rptr.2d 355, 896 P.2d 1365]; *People v. Lashley* (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 938, 947–949 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 629].
- Not Limited to “Significant Constitutional Rights.” *People v. MacKenzie* (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1256, 1277–1278 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 793].
- Statute Constitutional. *In re M.S.* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 698, 715–717, 724 [42 Cal.Rptr.2d 355, 896 P.2d 1365].
- Victim Need Not Own Property. *In re Michael M.* (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 718, 724–726 [104 Cal.Rptr.2d 10].

## RELATED ISSUES

### *Target of Intimidation Need Not Own Property*

“[T]he phrase ‘property of any other person’ in section 422.6, subdivision (b) does not require that the victim own the property. As long as the property is regularly and openly used, possessed, or occupied by the victim so that it is readily identifiable with him or her, it falls within the statutory scope.” (*In re Michael M.* (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 718, 724–726 [104 Cal.Rptr.2d 10] [classroom was the “property of” the students whose class met there].)

See the Related Issues section of CALCRIM No. 1350, *Hate Crime: Misdemeanor Interference With Civil Rights by Force*.

## SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, §§ 505, 506.

5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 91, *Sentencing*, § 91.44 (Matthew Bender).



## 1353. Hate Crime: Disability Defined

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The term *disability* includes a (mental/ [or] physical) disability.

<Alternative A—mental disability>

[A person has a *mental disability* if he or she has a mental or psychological condition that limits a major life activity. The term *mental disability* includes (mental retardation[,]/ [and] organic brain syndrome[,]/ [and] emotional or mental illness[,]/ [and] specific learning disabilities).]

<Alternative B—physical disability>

[A person has a *physical disability* if he or she has (a physiological (disease[,]/ [or] disorder[,]/ [or] condition)[;]/ [or] a cosmetic disfigurement[;]/ [or] an anatomical loss) that:

1. Affects one or more of the following body systems:  
(neurological[(,;)]/ immunological[(,;)]/ musculoskeletal[(,;)]/ sensory, primarily the special sense organs[(,;)]/ respiratory, including speech organs[(,;)]/ cardiovascular[(,;)]/ reproductive[(,;)]/ digestive[(,;)]/ genitourinary[(,;)]/ hemic and lymphatic[(,;)]/ skin[(,;)]/ [or] endocrine);

AND

2. Limits a major life activity.]

*Major life activities* include physical, mental, and social activities, including but not limited to working.

A (disease[,]/ [or] disorder[,]/ [or] condition) *limits* a major life activity if it makes participation in the major life activity difficult.

[In deciding whether a (disease[,]/ [or] disorder[,]/ [or] condition) *limits* a major life activity, do not consider whether the limitation can be overcome with medications, assistive devices, reasonable accommodations, or other mitigating measures. [However, if a mitigating measure itself limits a major life activity, you may consider this as evidence that the (disease[,]/ [or] disorder[,]/ [or] condition) *limits* a major life activity.]]

[A person has a *disability* if he or she has a (mental or psychological condition/ [or] health impairment) that requires special education or related services.]

[A person has a *disability* if \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of other condition not covered by the foregoing but included in Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990>.]

**[Disability does not include (sexual behavior disorders[,]/ [or] compulsive gambling[,]/ [or] kleptomania[,]/ [or] pyromania[,]/ [or] psychoactive substance—use disorders resulting from the current unlawful use of controlled substances or other drugs).]**

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*New January 2006*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

Give this instruction when using the term “disability” in any other instruction.

If the case involves a person with a mental disability, give alternative A. If the case involves a person with a physical disability, give alternative B.

Give any of the bracketed paragraphs on request.

## AUTHORITY

- Disability Defined. Pen. Code, § 422.56(b); Gov. Code, § 12926(i)–(l).
- Mental Disability. Gov. Code, § 12926(i).
- Physical Disability. Gov. Code, § 12926(k).
- Disability Includes Anything Covered by ADA. Gov. Code, § 12926(l).

## SECONDARY SOURCES

5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 91, *Sentencing*, § 91.44 (Matthew Bender).

## 1354. Hate Crime Allegation: Felony (Pen. Code, § 422.75(a)–(c))

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If you find the defendant guilty of the crime[s] charged in Count[s] \_\_\_\_\_ [,] [or of attempting to commit (that/those) crime[s]] [or the lesser crime[s] of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] of alleged lesser offense[s]>], you must then decide whether[, for each crime,] the People have proved the additional allegation that the crime[s] committed by the defendant (was a/were) hate crime[s]. [You must decide whether the People have proved this allegation for each crime and return a separate finding for each crime.]

To prove this allegation [for each crime] the People must prove that the defendant committed that crime in whole or in part because of the alleged victim's actual or perceived (disability[,]/ gender[,]/ nationality[,]/ race or ethnicity[,]/ religion[,]/ sexual orientation[,]/ [or] association with a person or group having (this/one or more of these) actual or perceived characteristic[s]).

As used here, *victim* includes, but is not limited to, a (person[,]/ [or] individual[,]/ [or] family[,]/ [or] group[,]/ [or] community center[,]/ [or] educational facility[,]/ [or] entity[,]/ [or] office[,]/ [or] meeting hall[,]/ [or] place of worship[,]/ [or] private institution[,]/ [or] public agency[,]/ [or] library[,]/ [or] other victim or intended victim of the crime).

The defendant acted *in whole or in part because of* the actual or perceived characteristic[s] of the victim if:

1. The defendant was biased against the victim based on the victim's actual or perceived (disability[,]/ gender[,]/ nationality[,]/ race or ethnicity[,]/ religion[,]/ sexual orientation[,]/ [or] association with a person or group with (this/one or more of these) actual or perceived characteristic[s]);

AND

2. The bias motivation caused the defendant to commit the alleged acts.

If you find that the defendant had more than one reason to commit the alleged acts, the bias described here must have been a substantial motivating factor. A *substantial factor* is more than a trivial or remote factor. However, it does not need to be the only factor that motivated the conduct.

[The term *disability* is explained in Instruction 1353, to which you should refer.]

[*Gender*, as used here, means sex and includes a person's gender identity and gender-related appearance and behavior whether or not

stereotypically associated with the person's assigned sex at birth.]

[*Nationality* includes citizenship, country of origin, and national origin.]

[*Race or ethnicity* includes ancestry, color, and ethnic background.]

[*Religion*, as used here, includes all aspects of religious belief, observance, and practice and includes agnosticism and atheism.]

[*Sexual orientation* means heterosexuality, homosexuality, or bisexuality.]

[*Association with a person or group having (this/one or more of these) actual or perceived characteristic[s]* includes (advocacy for[,]/ identification with[,]/ [or] being on the ground owned or rented by[, or adjacent to,]) a (person[,]/ group[,]/ family[,]/ community center[,]/ educational facility[,]/ office[,]/ meeting hall[,]/ place of worship[,]/ private institution[,]/ public agency[,]/ library[,]/ [or] other entity) that has, or is identified with people who have, (that/one or more of those) characteristic[s].]

[If you conclude that the People have proved that the crime[s] committed by the defendant (was a/were) hate crime[s], you must also decide whether the defendant voluntarily acted together with another person by either personally committing the crime or by aiding and abetting another person in committing the crime.]

The People have the burden of proving each allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you must find that this allegation has not been proved.

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*New January 2006; Revised March 2017*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the sentencing enhancement. (*Apprendi v. New Jersey* (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 490 [120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435].) This statute was substantially revised, effective January 1, 2005.

Give all relevant bracketed definitions. If the term “disability” is used, give CALCRIM No. 1353, *Hate Crimes: Disability Defined*.

If the prosecution alleges that the defendant acted in concert with another, pursuant to Penal Code section 422.75(b), give the bracketed sentence that begins with “If you conclude that the People have proved.” Give all relevant instructions on aiding and abetting. The jury must be provided with a verdict form on which it may indicate whether this factor has also been proved.

If the prosecution alleges that the defendant has a qualifying prior conviction under Penal Code section 422.75(d), then, in addition to this instruction, also give

CALCRIM No. 3100, *Prior Conviction: Nonbifurcated Trial*, or CALCRIM No. 3101, *Prior Conviction: Bifurcated Trial*, unless the defendant has stipulated to the truth of the prior conviction.

**Do not** give CALCRIM No. 370, *Motive*, with this instruction because motive is an element of this crime. (See *People v. Valenti* (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1140, 1165 [197 Cal.Rptr.3d 317]; *People v. Maurer* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1121, 1126–1127 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 335].)

***Related Instructions***

CALCRIM No. 1350, *Hate Crime: Misdemeanor Interference With Civil Rights by Force*.

CALCRIM No. 1351, *Hate Crime: Misdemeanor Interference With Civil Rights by Threat*.

CALCRIM No. 1352, *Hate Crime: Misdemeanor Interference With Civil Rights by Damage to Property*.

CALCRIM No. 1355, *Hate Crime Allegation: Misdemeanor*.

**AUTHORITY**

- Enhancement. Pen. Code, § 422.75(a)–(c).
- Hate Crime Defined. Pen. Code, § 422.55.
- “In Whole or in Part Because of” Defined. Pen. Code, § 422.56(d); *In re M.S.* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 698, 719–720 [42 Cal.Rptr.2d 355, 896 P.2d 1365]; *People v. Superior Court (Aishman)* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 735, 741 [42 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 896 P.2d 1387].
- Victim Defined. Pen. Code, § 422.56(i).
- Disability Defined. Pen. Code, § 422.56(b); Gov. Code, § 12926(i)–(l).
- Gender Defined. Pen. Code, §§ 422.56(c) & 422.57.
- Nationality Defined. Pen. Code, § 422.56(e).
- Race or Ethnicity Defined. Pen. Code, § 422.56(f).
- Religion Defined. Pen. Code, § 422.56(g).
- Sexual Orientation Defined. Pen. Code, § 422.56(h).
- Association With Defined. Pen. Code, § 422.56(a).
- Enhancement, Not Substantive Offense. See *People v. Wallace* (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1699, 1702 [1 Cal.Rptr.3d 324].
- Aiding and Abetting. *People v. Beeman* (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 560–561 [199 Cal.Rptr. 60, 674 P.2d 1318].
- Acting in Concert. See *People v. Calimee* (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 337, 341 [122 Cal.Rptr. 658] [construing sodomy-in-concert statute]; *People v. Lopez* (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 882, 886 [172 Cal.Rptr. 374] [construing rape-in-concert statute].
- No Specific Intent Required. *People v. Superior Court (Aishman)* (1995) 10

Cal.4th 735, 740–741 [42 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 896 P.2d 1387].

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

3 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, § 373.

5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 91, *Sentencing*, § 91.44 (Matthew Bender).

## 1355. Hate Crime Allegation: Misdemeanor (Pen. Code, § 422.7)

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If you find the defendant guilty of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert offense[s]>* [as charged in Count[s] \_\_\_\_\_], you must then decide whether the People have proved the additional allegation that the crime[s] committed by the defendant (was a/were) hate crime[s]. [You must decide whether the People have proved this allegation for each crime and return a separate finding for each crime.]

To prove this allegation [for each crime], the People must prove that:

1. When committing that crime, the defendant intended to interfere with [or intimidate] another person's free exercise or enjoyment of the right [or privilege] to \_\_\_\_\_ *<describe the right raised by the evidence>*, established by the law or Constitution of California or the United States;

[AND]

2. The defendant acted in whole or in part because of the other person's actual or perceived (disability[,]/ gender[,]/ nationality[,]/ race or ethnicity[,]/ religion[,]/ sexual orientation[,]/ [or] association with a person or group having (this/one or more of these) actual or perceived characteristic[s])(;/.)

[AND]

*<Alternative 3A—caused physical injury>*

3. When committing that crime, the defendant caused an actual physical injury or had the ability at that time to cause a violent injury.]

*<Alternative 3B—caused property damage>*

3. The defendant caused property damage in excess of \$950.]]

The defendant acted *in whole or in part because of* the actual or perceived characteristic[s] of the other person if:

1. The defendant was biased against the other person based on the other person's actual or perceived (disability[,]/ [or] gender[,]/ [or] nationality[,]/ [or] race or ethnicity[,]/ [or] religion[,]/ [or] sexual orientation[,]/ [or] association with a person or group having (this/one or more of these) actual or perceived characteristic[s]);

AND

2. The bias motivation caused the defendant to commit the alleged acts.

If you find that the defendant had more than one reason to commit the alleged acts, the bias described here must have been a substantial motivating factor. A *substantial factor* is more than a trivial or remote factor. However, it does not need to be the only factor that motivated the conduct.

[The term *disability* is explained in Instruction 1353, to which you should refer.]

[*Gender*, as used here, means sex and includes a person’s gender identity and gender-related appearance and behavior whether or not stereotypically associated with the person’s assigned sex at birth.]

[*Nationality* includes citizenship, country of origin, and national origin.]

[*Race or ethnicity* includes ancestry, color, and ethnic background.]

[*Religion*, as used here, includes all aspects of religious belief, observance, and practice and includes agnosticism and atheism.]

[*Sexual orientation* means heterosexuality, homosexuality, or bisexuality.]

[*Association with a person or group having (this/one or more of these) actual or perceived characteristic[s]* includes (advocacy for[,]/ identification with[,]/ [or] being on the ground owned or rented by[, or adjacent to,]) a (person[,]/ group[,]/ family[,]/ community center[,]/ educational facility[,]/ office[,]/ meeting hall[,]/ place of worship[,]/ private institution[,]/ public agency[,]/ library[,]/ [or] other entity) that has, or is identified with people who have, (that/one or more of those) characteristic[s].]

The People have the burden of proving each allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you must find that this allegation has not been proved.

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2012, March 2017*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the enhancement. (*People v. Wallace* (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1699, 1702 [1 Cal.Rptr.3d 324] [statute defines enhancement, not separate offense].) This enhancement makes a crime “committed against the person or property of another” that would otherwise be a misdemeanor into a misdemeanor-felony “wobbler.” (Pen. Code, § 422.7.) This statute was substantially revised, effective January 1, 2005.

In element 1, insert a description of the specific right or rights allegedly infringed, for example, the right to be free from violence or the threat of violence or the right to be protected from bodily harm. (See Civil Code, §§ 43 & 51.7; *People v. Lashley*



(1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 938, 950–951 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 629]; *People v. MacKenzie* (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1256, 1277–1278 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 793].)

Give element 3A if the prosecution alleges that the crime was committed “against a person” and caused injury or included “the present ability to commit a violent injury.” (Pen. Code, § 422.7(a)). Give element 3B if the prosecution alleges property damage exceeding \$950. (Pen. Code, § 422.7(b).) If the prosecution alleges that the defendant has a qualifying prior conviction under Penal Code section 422.7(c), then, in addition to this instruction, also give CALCRIM No. 3100, *Prior Conviction: Nonbifurcated Trial*, or CALCRIM No. 3101, *Prior Conviction: Bifurcated Trial*, unless the defendant has stipulated to the truth of the prior conviction.

Give all relevant bracketed definitions. If the term “disability” is used, give CALCRIM No. 1353, *Hate Crimes: Disability Defined*.

**Do not** give CALCRIM No. 370, *Motive*, with this instruction because motive is an element of this crime. (See *People v. Valenti* (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1140, 1165 [197 Cal.Rptr.3d 317]; *People v. Maurer* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1121, 1126–1127 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 335].)

#### ***Related Instructions***

CALCRIM No. 1350, *Hate Crime: Misdemeanor Interference With Civil Rights by Force*.

CALCRIM No. 1351, *Hate Crime: Misdemeanor Interference With Civil Rights by Threat*.

CALCRIM No. 1352, *Hate Crime: Misdemeanor Interference With Civil Rights by Damaging Property*.

CALCRIM No. 1354, *Hate Crime Allegation: Felony*.

### **AUTHORITY**

- Enhancement. Pen. Code, § 422.7.
- Hate Crime Defined. Pen. Code, § 422.55.
- “In Whole or in Part Because of” Defined. Pen. Code, § 422.56(d); *In re M.S.* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 698, 719–720 [42 Cal.Rptr.2d 355, 896 P.2d 1365]; *People v. Superior Court (Aishman)* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 735, 741 [896 P.2d 1387].
- Disability Defined. Pen. Code, § 422.56(b); Gov. Code, § 12926(i)–(l).
- Gender Defined. Pen. Code, §§ 422.56(c) & 422.57.
- Nationality Defined. Pen. Code, § 422.56(e).
- Race or Ethnicity Defined. Pen. Code, § 422.56(f).
- Religion Defined. Pen. Code, § 422.56(g).
- Sexual Orientation Defined. Pen. Code, § 422.56(h).
- Association With Defined. Pen. Code, § 422.56(a).
- Enhancement, Not Substantive Offense. *People v. Wallace* (2003) 109

Cal.App.4th 1699, 1702 [1 Cal.Rptr.3d 324].

- Intent to Deprive Individual of Protected Rights. *In re M.S.* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 698, 713 [42 Cal.Rptr.2d 355, 896 P.2d 1365]; *People v. Lashley* (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 938, 947–949 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 629]; *People v. MacKenzie* (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1256, 1268 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 793]; *In re Joshua H.* (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1734, 1742 [17 Cal.Rptr.2d 291].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- The underlying misdemeanor, and the attempt of the underlying misdemeanor (see Pen. Code, § 664), are lesser included offenses of a violation of Penal Code section 422.7.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, §§ 505, 506.

5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 91, *Sentencing*, § 91.44 (Matthew Bender).

**1356–1399. Reserved for Future Use**

## **CRIMINAL STREET GANGS**

- 1400. Active Participation in Criminal Street Gang (Pen. Code, § 186.22(a))
- 1401. Felony or Misdemeanor Committed for Benefit of Criminal Street Gang (Pen. Code, § 186.22(b)(1) (Felony) and § 186.22(d) (Felony or Misdemeanor))
- 1402. Gang-Related Firearm Enhancement (Pen. Code, § 12022.53)
- 1403. Limited Purpose of Evidence of Gang Activity
- 1404–1499. Reserved for Future Use

**1400. Active Participation in Criminal Street Gang (Pen. Code,  
§ 186.22(a))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with participating in a criminal street gang [in violation of Penal Code section 186.22(a)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant actively participated in a criminal street gang;
2. When the defendant participated in the gang, (he/she) knew that members of the gang engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity;

AND

3. The defendant willfully assisted, furthered, or promoted felonious criminal conduct by members of the gang either by:
  - a. directly and actively committing a felony offense;

OR

- b. aiding and abetting a felony offense.

At least two members of that same gang must have participated in committing the felony offense. The defendant may count as one of those members if you find that the defendant was a member of the gang.

*Active participation* means involvement with a criminal street gang in a way that is more than passive or in name only.

[The People do not have to prove that the defendant devoted all or a substantial part of (his/her) time or efforts to the gang, or that (he/she) was an actual member of the gang.]

*<If criminal street gang has already been defined.>*

[A *criminal street gang* is defined in another instruction to which you should refer.]

*<If criminal street gang has not already been defined in another instruction.>*

[A *criminal street gang* is any ongoing organization, association, or group of three or more persons, whether formal or informal:

1. That has a common name or common identifying sign or symbol;
2. That has, as one or more of its primary activities, the commission of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert one or more crimes listed in Pen. Code, § 186.22(e)(1)–(25), (31)–(33)>*;

**AND**

- 3. Whose members, whether acting alone or together, engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity.**

**In order to qualify as a *primary* activity, the crime must be one of the group's chief or principal activities rather than an occasional act committed by one or more persons who happen to be members of the group.**

*<Give this paragraph only when the conduct that establishes the pattern of criminal gang activity, i.e., predicate offenses, has not resulted in a conviction or sustained juvenile petition.>*

**[To decide whether the organization, association, or group has, as one of its primary activities, the commission of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert felony or felonies from Pen. Code, § 186.22(e)(1)–(25), (31)–(33)>* please refer to the separate instructions that I (will give/have given) you on (that/those) crime[s].]**

**A *pattern of criminal gang activity*, as used here, means:**

- 1. [The] (commission of[,]/ [or] attempted commission of[,]/ [or] conspiracy to commit[,]/ [or] solicitation to commit[,]/ [or] conviction of[,]/ [or] (Having/having) a juvenile petition sustained for commission of):**

*<Give Alternative 1A if the crime or crimes are in Pen. Code, § 186.22(e)(1)–(25), (31)–(33).>*

**1A. (any combination of two or more of the following crimes/[,][or] two or more occurrences of [one or more of the following crimes]:) \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert one or more crimes listed in Pen. Code, § 186.22(e)(1)–(25), (31)–(33)>*;**

**[OR]**

*<Give Alternative 1B if one or more of the crimes are in Pen. Code, § 186.22(e)(26)–(30).>*

**1B. [at least one of the following crimes:] \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert one or more crimes from Pen. Code, § 186.22(e)(1)–(25), (31)–(33)>*;**

**AND**

**[at least one of the following crimes:] \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert one or more crimes in Pen. Code, § 186.22(e)(26)–(30)>*;**

- 2. At least one of those crimes was committed after September 26, 1988;**
- 3. The most recent crime occurred within three years of one of the earlier crimes;**

**AND**

**4. The crimes were committed on separate occasions or were personally committed by two or more persons.]**

*<Give this paragraph only when the conduct that establishes the pattern of criminal gang activity, i.e., predicate offenses, has not resulted in a conviction or sustained juvenile petition.>*

**[To decide whether a member of the gang [or the defendant] committed \_\_\_\_\_ <insert felony or felonies from Pen. Code, § 186.22(e)(1)–(33)> please refer to the separate instructions that I (will give/have given) you on (that/those) crime[s].]**

**The People need not prove that every perpetrator involved in the pattern of criminal gang activity, if any, was a member of the alleged criminal street gang at the time when such activity was taking place.**

**[The crimes, if any, that establish a pattern of criminal gang activity, need not be gang-related.]**

**[If you find the defendant guilty of a crime in this case, you may consider that crime in deciding whether one of the group’s primary activities was commission of that crime and whether a pattern of criminal gang activity has been proved.]**

**[You may not find that there was a pattern of criminal gang activity unless all of you agree that two or more crimes that satisfy these requirements were committed, but you do not have to all agree on which crimes were committed.]**

**As the term is used here, a *willful act* is one done willingly or on purpose.**

***Felonious criminal conduct* means committing or attempting to commit [any of] the following crime[s]: \_\_\_\_\_ <insert felony or felonies by gang members that the defendant is alleged to have furthered, assisted, promoted or directly committed>.**

**[To decide whether a member of the gang [or the defendant] committed \_\_\_\_\_ <insert felony or felonies listed immediately above>, please refer to the separate instructions that I (will give/have given) you on (that/those) crime[s].]**

**To prove that the defendant aided and abetted felonious criminal conduct by a member of the gang, the People must prove that:**

- 1. A member of the gang committed the crime;**
- 2. The defendant knew that the gang member intended to commit the crime;**
- 3. Before or during the commission of the crime, the defendant**

intended to aid and abet the gang member in committing the crime;

AND

4. The defendant's words or conduct did in fact aid and abet the commission of the crime.

Someone *aids and abets* a crime if he or she knows of the perpetrator's unlawful purpose and he or she specifically intends to, and does in fact, aid, facilitate, promote, encourage, or instigate the perpetrator's commission of that crime.

[If all of these requirements are proved, the defendant does not need to actually have been present when the crime was committed to be guilty as an aider and abettor.]

[If you conclude that defendant was present at the scene of the crime or failed to prevent the crime, you may consider that fact in determining whether the defendant was an aider and abettor. However, the fact that a person is present at the scene of a crime or fails to prevent the crime does not, by itself, make him or her an aider and abettor.]

[A person who aids and abets a crime is not guilty of that crime if he or she withdraws before the crime is committed. To withdraw, a person must do two things:

1. He or she must notify everyone else he or she knows is involved in the commission of the crime that he or she is no longer participating. The notification must be made early enough to prevent the commission of the crime;

AND

2. He or she must do everything reasonably within his or her power to prevent the crime from being committed. He or she does not have to actually prevent the crime.

The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not withdraw. If the People have not met this burden, you may not find the defendant guilty under an aiding and abetting theory.]

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2006, June 2007, December 2008, August 2012, February 2013, August 2013, February 2014, August 2014, February 2016*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

In element 2 of the paragraph defining a “criminal street gang,” insert one or more of the crimes listed in Penal Code section 186.22(e)(1)–(25), (31)–(33) that are alleged to be the primary activities of the gang. (See *People v. Sengpadychith* (2001) 26 Cal.4th 316, 323–324 [109 Cal.Rptr.2d 851, 27 P.3d 739].)

In element 1A of the paragraph defining a “pattern of criminal gang activity,” insert one or more of the crimes listed in Penal Code section 186.22(e) that have been committed, attempted, or solicited two or more times (See *In re Nathaniel C.* (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 990, 1002–1003 [279 Cal.Rptr. 236] [two instances of same offense, or single incident with multiple participants committing one or more specified offenses, are sufficient]) if the alleged crime or crimes are listed in Penal Code section 186.22(e)(1)–(25), (31)–(33). Give on request the bracketed phrase “any combination of” if two or more different crimes are inserted in the blank. If one or more of the alleged crimes are listed in Penal Code section 186.22(e)(26)–(30), give element 1B and insert that crime or crimes and one or more of the crimes listed in Penal Code section 186.22(e)(1)–(25), (31)–(33). (See Pen. Code, § 186.22(j) [“A pattern of gang activity cannot be established solely by proof of commission of offenses enumerated in paragraphs (26) to (30), inclusive, of subdivision (e), alone.”].)

In the definition of “felonious criminal conduct,” insert the felony or felonies the defendant allegedly aided and abetted. (See *People v. Green* (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 692, 704 [278 Cal.Rptr. 140].) Note that a defendant’s misdemeanor conduct in the charged case, which is elevated to a felony by operation of Penal Code section 186.22(a), is not sufficient to satisfy the felonious criminal conduct requirement of an active gang participation offense charged under subdivision (a) of section 186.22 or of active gang participation charged as an element of felony firearm charges under section 12025(b)(3) or 12031(a)(2)(C). *People v. Lamas* (2007) 42 Cal.4th 516, 524 [67 Cal.Rptr.3d 179, 169 P.3d 102].

The court should also give the appropriate instructions defining the elements of crimes inserted in the list of alleged “primary activities,” or the definition of “pattern of criminal gang activity” that have not been established by prior convictions or sustained juvenile petitions. The court should also give the appropriate instructions defining the elements of all crimes inserted in the definition of “felonious criminal conduct.”

On request, give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “The People do not need to prove that the defendant devoted all or a substantial part of . . .” (See Pen. Code, § 186.22(i).)

On request, give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “If you find the defendant guilty of a crime in this case.” (*People v. Sengpadychith, supra*, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 322–323; *People v. Duran* (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1448, 1464–1465 [119 Cal.Rptr.2d 272].)

On request, give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “You may not find that there was a pattern of criminal gang activity.” (*People v. Funes* (1994) 23



Cal.App.4th 1506, 1527–1528 [28 Cal.Rptr.2d 758]; see also Related Issues section below on Unanimity.)

On request, the court must give a limiting instruction on the gang evidence. (*People v. Hernandez* (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1040, 1051–1052 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 880, 94 P.3d 1080].) If requested, give CALCRIM No. 1403, *Limited Purpose of Evidence of Gang Activity*.

### ***Defenses—Instructional Duty***

If there is evidence that the defendant was merely present at the scene or only had knowledge that a crime was being committed, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “If you conclude that defendant was present.” (*People v. Boyd* (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 541, 557 fn. 14 [271 Cal.Rptr. 738]; *In re Michael T.* (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 907, 911 [149 Cal.Rptr. 87].)

If there is sufficient evidence that the defendant withdrew, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give the final bracketed section on the defense of withdrawal.

### ***Related Instructions***

This instruction should be used when a defendant is charged with a violation of Penal Code section 186.22(a) as a substantive offense. If the defendant is charged with an enhancement under 186.22(b), use CALCRIM No. 1401, *Felony or Misdemeanor Committed for Benefit of Criminal Street Gang (Pen. Code, § 186.22(b)(1) (Felony) and § 186.22(d) (Felony or Misdemeanor))*.

For additional instructions relating to liability as an aider and abettor, see the Aiding and Abetting series (CALCRIM No. 400 et seq.).

## **AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 186.22(a); *People v. Herrera* (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1456, 1468 [83 Cal.Rptr.2d 307].
- Active Participation Defined. Pen. Code, § 186.22(i); *People v. Castenada* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 743, 747 [97 Cal.Rptr.2d 906, 3 P.3d 278].
- Criminal Street Gang Defined. Pen. Code, § 186.22(f); see *People v. Duran*, *supra*, 97 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1464–1465.
- Pattern of Criminal Gang Activity Defined. Pen. Code, § 186.22(e), (j); *People v. Gardeley* (1996) 14 Cal.4th 605, 624–625 [59 Cal.Rptr.2d 356, 927 P.2d 713]; *In re Nathaniel C.* (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 990, 1002–1003 [279 Cal.Rptr. 236].
- Willful Defined. Pen. Code, § 7(1).
- Applies to Both Perpetrator and Aider and Abettor. *People v. Ngoun* (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 432, 436 [105 Cal.Rptr.2d 837]; *People v. Castenada* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 743, 749–750 [97 Cal.Rptr.2d 906, 3 P.3d 278].
- Felonious Criminal Conduct Defined. *People v. Albillar* (2010) 51 Cal.4th 47, 54–59 [119 Cal.Rptr.3d 415, 244 P.3d 1062]; *People v. Green* (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 692, 704 [278 Cal.Rptr. 140].
- Separate Intent From Underlying Felony. *People v. Herrera* (1999) 70

Cal.App.4th 1456, 1467–1468 [83 Cal.Rptr.2d 307].

- Willfully Assisted, Furthered, or Promoted Felonious Criminal Conduct. *People v. Rodriguez* (2012) 55 Cal.4th 1125, 1132–1138 [150 Cal.Rptr.3d 533]; *People v. Salcido* (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 356 [56 Cal.Rptr.3d 912].
- Temporal Connection Between Active Participation and Felonious Criminal Conduct. *People v. Garcia* (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1499, 1509 [64 Cal.Rptr.3d 104].
- Crimes Committed After Charged Offense Not Predicates. *People v. Duran*, *supra*, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 1458.
- Conspiracy to Commit This Crime. *People v. Johnson* (2013) 57 Cal.4th 250, 255, 266–267 [159 Cal.Rptr.3d 70, 303 P.3d 379].
- Proof of Sufficient Connection Among Gang “Subsets” and Umbrella Gang Required. *People v. Prunty* (2015) 62 Cal. 4th 59, 81–85 [192 Cal.Rptr.3d 309, 355 P.3d 480].

### COMMENTARY

The jury may consider past offenses as well as circumstances of the charged crime. (*People v. Duran*, 97 Cal.App.4th 1448, 1464–1465 [119 Cal.Rptr.2d 272]; *People v. Sengpadychith*, 26 Cal.4th 316, 322–323 [109 Cal.Rptr.2d 851, 27 P.3d 739], disapproving *In re Elodio O.* (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1175, 1181 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 95], to the extent it only allowed evidence of past offenses.) A “pattern of criminal gang activity” requires two or more “predicate offenses” during a statutory time period. The charged crime may serve as a predicate offense (*People v. Gardeley* (1996) 14 Cal.4th 605, 624–625 [59 Cal.Rptr.2d 356, 927 P.2d 713]), as can another offense committed on the same occasion by a fellow gang member. (*People v. Loeun* (1997) 17 Cal.4th 1, 9–10 [69 Cal.Rptr.2d 776, 947 P.2d 1313]; see also *In re Nathaniel C.* (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 990, 1002–1003 [279 Cal.Rptr. 236] [two incidents each with single perpetrator, or single incident with multiple participants committing one or more specified offenses, are sufficient]; *People v. Ortiz* (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 480, 484 [67 Cal.Rptr.2d 126].) However, convictions of a perpetrator and an aider and abettor for a single crime establish only one predicate offense (*People v. Zermeno* (1999) 21 Cal.4th 927, 931–932 [89 Cal.Rptr.2d 863, 986 P.2d 196]), and “[c]rimes occurring *after* the charged offense cannot serve as predicate offenses to prove a pattern of criminal gang activity.” (*People v. Duran*, *supra*, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 1458 [original italics].) The “felonious criminal conduct” need not be gang-related. (*People v. Albillar* (2010) 51 Cal.4th 47, 54–59 [119 Cal.Rptr.3d 415, 244 P.3d 1062].)

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

#### *Predicate Offenses Not Lesser Included Offenses*

The predicate offenses that establish a pattern of criminal gang activity are not lesser included offenses of active participation in a criminal street gang. (*People v. Burnell* (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 938, 944–945 [34 Cal.Rptr.3d 40].)

## RELATED ISSUES

### *Conspiracy*

Anyone who actively participates in a criminal street gang with knowledge that its members engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity, and who willfully promotes, furthers, assists, or benefits from any felonious criminal conduct by the members, is guilty of conspiracy to commit that felony. (Pen. Code, § 182.5; see Pen. Code, § 182; CALCRIM No. 415, *Conspiracy*.)

### *Labor Organizations or Mutual Aid Activities*

The California Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act does not apply to labor organization activities or to employees engaged in activities for their mutual aid and protection. (Pen. Code, § 186.23.)

### *Related Gang Crimes*

Soliciting or recruiting others to participate in a criminal street gang, or threatening someone to coerce them to join or prevent them from leaving a gang, are separate crimes. (Pen. Code, § 186.26.) It is also a crime to supply a firearm to someone who commits a specified felony while participating in a criminal street gang. (Pen. Code, § 186.28.)

### *Unanimity*

The “continuous-course-of-conduct exception” applies to the “pattern of criminal gang activity” element of Penal Code section 186.22(a). Thus the jury is not required to unanimously agree on which two or more crimes constitute a pattern of criminal activity. (*People v. Funes, supra*, 23 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1527–1528.)

## SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, §§ 31–46.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.03 (Matthew Bender).

**1401. Felony or Misdemeanor Committed for Benefit of Criminal Street Gang (Pen. Code, § 186.22(b)(1) (Felony) and § 186.22(d) (Felony or Misdemeanor))**

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If you find the defendant guilty of the crime[s] charged in Count[s] \_\_\_\_\_ [,] [or of attempting to commit (that/those crime[s])] [,][or the lesser offense[s] of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert lesser offense[s]>], you must then decide whether[, for each crime,] the People have proved the additional allegation that the defendant committed that crime (for the benefit of[,]/ at the direction of[,]/ [or] in association with) a criminal street gang. [You must decide whether the People have proved this allegation for each crime and return a separate finding for each crime.]

[You must also decide whether the crime[s] charged in Count[s] \_\_\_\_\_ (was/were) committed on the grounds of, or within 1,000 feet of a public or private (elementary/ [or] vocational/ [or] junior high/ [or] middle school/ [or] high) school open to or being used by minors for classes or school-related programs at the time.]

To prove this allegation, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant (committed/ [or] attempted to commit) the crime (for the benefit of[,]/ at the direction of[,]/ [or] in association with) a criminal street gang;

AND

2. The defendant intended to assist, further, or promote criminal conduct by gang members.

<If criminal street gang has already been defined.>

[A criminal street gang is defined in another instruction to which you should refer.]

<If criminal street gang has not already been defined in another instruction.>

[A *criminal street gang* is any ongoing organization, association, or group of three or more persons, whether formal or informal:

1. That has a common name or common identifying sign or symbol;
2. That has, as one or more of its primary activities, the commission of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert one or more crimes listed in Pen. Code, § 186.22(e)(1)–(25), (31)–(33)>;

AND

3. Whose members, whether acting alone or together, engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity.

In order to qualify as a *primary* activity, the crime must be one of the group's chief or principal activities rather than an occasional act committed by one or more persons who happen to be members of the group.

*<Give this paragraph only when the conduct that establishes the pattern of criminal gang activity, i.e., predicate offenses, has not resulted in a conviction or sustained juvenile petition.>*

[To decide whether the organization, association, or group has, as one of its primary activities, the commission of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert felony or felonies from Pen. Code, § 186.22(e)(1)–(25), (31)–(33)>* please refer to the separate instructions that I (will give/have given) you on (that/those) crime[s].]

*A pattern of criminal gang activity, as used here, means:*

1. [The] (commission of[,]/ [or] attempted commission of[,]/ [or] conspiracy to commit[,]/ [or] solicitation to commit[,]/ [or] conviction of[,]/ [or] (Having/having) a juvenile petition sustained for commission of):

*<Give Alternative 1A if the crime or crimes are in Pen. Code, § 186.22(e)(1)–(25), (31)–(33).>*

**1A. (any combination of two or more of the following crimes/[,][or] two or more occurrences of [one or more of the following crimes]:) \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert one or more crimes listed in Pen. Code, § 186.22(e)(1)–(25), (31)–(33)>*;**

**[OR]**

*<Give Alternative 1B if one or more of the crimes are in Pen. Code, § 186.22(e)(26)–(30).>*

**1B. [at least one of the following crimes:] \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert one or more crimes from Pen. Code, § 186.22(e)(1)–(25), (31)–(33)>*;**

**AND**

**[at least one of the following crimes:] \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert one or more crimes in Pen. Code, § 186.22(e)(26)–(30)>*;**

2. At least one of those crimes was committed after September 26, 1988;
3. The most recent crime occurred within three years of one of the earlier crimes;

**AND**

4. The crimes were committed on separate occasions or were personally committed by two or more persons.]

*<Give this paragraph only when the conduct that establishes the pattern of criminal gang activity, i.e., predicate offenses, has not resulted in a conviction or sustained juvenile petition.>*

**[To decide whether a member of the gang [or the defendant] committed \_\_\_\_\_ <insert felony or felonies from Pen. Code, § 186.22(e)(1)–(33)> please refer to the separate instructions that I (will give/have given) you on (that/those) crime[s].]**

**[The crimes, if any, that establish a pattern of criminal gang activity, need not be gang-related.]**

**[The People need not prove that the defendant is an active or current member of the alleged criminal street gang.]**

**[If you find the defendant guilty of a crime in this case, you may consider that crime in deciding whether one of the group’s primary activities was commission of that crime and whether a pattern of criminal gang activity has been proved.]**

**[You may not find that there was a pattern of criminal gang activity unless all of you agree that two or more crimes that satisfy these requirements were committed, but you do not have to all agree on which crimes were committed.]**

*<Give this paragraph only when the conduct that establishes the pattern of criminal gang activity, i.e., predicate offenses, has not resulted in a conviction or sustained juvenile petition>*

**[To decide whether a member of the gang [or the defendant] committed \_\_\_\_\_ <insert felony or felonies from Pen. Code, § 186.22(e)(1)–(25), (31–33)>, please refer to the separate instructions that I (will give/have given) you on (that/those) crime[s].]**

**The People have the burden of proving each allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you must find that the allegation has not been proved.**

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2006, June 2007, April 2008, December 2008, August 2012, February 2013, August 2013, February 2014, February 2016*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the sentencing enhancement. (*People v. Sengpadychith* (2001) 26 Cal.4th 316, 327 [109 Cal.Rptr.2d 851, 27 P.3d 739]; *Apprendi v. New Jersey* (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 475–476, 490 [120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435].)

In element 2 of the paragraph defining a “criminal street gang,” insert one or more

of the crimes listed in Penal Code section 186.22(e)(1)–(25), (31)–(33) that are alleged to be the primary activities of the gang. (See *People v. Sengpadychith, supra*, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 323–324.)

In element 1A of the paragraph defining a “pattern of criminal gang activity,” insert one or more of the crimes listed in Penal Code section 186.22(e) that have been committed, attempted, or solicited two or more times (See *In re Nathaniel C.* (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 990, 1002–1003 [279 Cal.Rptr. 236] [two instances of same offense, or single incident with multiple participants committing one or more specified offenses, are sufficient]) if the alleged crime or crimes are listed in Penal Code section 186.22(e)(1)–(25), (31)–(33). Give on request the bracketed phrase “any combination of” if two or more different crimes are inserted in the blank. If one or more of the alleged crimes are listed in Penal Code section 186.22(e)(26)–(30), give element 1B and insert that crime or crimes and one or more of the crimes listed in Penal Code section 186.22(e)(1)–(25), (31)–(33). (See Pen. Code, § 186.22(j) [“A pattern of gang activity cannot be established solely by proof of commission of offenses enumerated in paragraphs (26) to (30), inclusive, of subdivision (e), alone.”].)

The court should also give the appropriate instructions defining the elements of crimes inserted in the list of alleged “primary activities,” or the definition of “pattern of criminal gang activity” that have not been established by prior convictions or sustained juvenile petitions.

On request, give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “If you find the defendant guilty of a crime in this case.” (*People v. Sengpadychith, supra*, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 322–323; *People v. Duran* (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1448, 1464–1465 [119 Cal.Rptr.2d 272].)

On request, give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “You may not find that there was a pattern of criminal gang activity.” (*People v. Funes* (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1506, 1527–1528 [28 Cal.Rptr.2d 758]; see also Related Issues section below on Unanimity.)

On request, the court must give a limiting instruction on the gang evidence. (*People v. Hernandez* (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1040, 1051–1052 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 880, 94 P.3d 1080].) If requested, give CALCRIM No. 1403, *Limited Purpose of Gang Evidence*. The court may bifurcate the trial on the gang enhancement, at its discretion. (*People v. Hernandez, supra*, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1048.)

### ***Related Instructions***

CALCRIM No. 1400, *Active Participation in Criminal Street Gang*.

## **AUTHORITY**

- Enhancement. Pen. Code, § 186.22(b)(1).
- “For the Benefit of, at the Direction of, or in Association With Any Criminal Street Gang” Defined. *People v. Albillar* (2010) 51 Cal.4th 47, 59–64 [119 Cal.Rptr.3d 415, 244 P.3d 1062].



- Specific Intent Defined. *People v. Albillar* (2010) 51 Cal.4th 47, 64–68 [119 Cal.Rptr.3d 415, 244 P.3d 1062].
- Criminal Street Gang Defined. Pen. Code, § 186.22(f); see *People v. Duran*, 97 Cal.App.4th 1448, 1464–1465 [119 Cal.Rptr.2d 272].
- Pattern of Criminal Gang Activity Defined. Pen. Code, § 186.22(e), (j); *People v. Gardeley* (1996) 14 Cal.4th 605, 624–625 [59 Cal.Rptr.2d 356, 927 P.2d 713]; *In re Nathaniel C.* (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 990, 1002–1003 [279 Cal.Rptr. 236]; see *People v. Zermeno* (1999) 21 Cal.4th 927, 931–932 [89 Cal.Rptr.2d 863, 986 P.2d 196] [conviction of perpetrator and aider and abettor for single crime establishes only single predicate offense].
- Active or Current Participation in Gang Not Required. *In re Ramon T.* (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 201, 207 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 816].
- Primary Activities Defined. *People v. Sengpadychith, supra*, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 323–324.
- Defendant Need Not Act With Another Gang Member. *People v. Rodriguez* (2012) 55 Cal.4th 1125, 1138–1139 [150 Cal.Rptr.3d 533].
- Crimes Committed After Charged Offense Not Predicates. *People v. Duran*, 97 Cal.App.4th 1448, 1464–1465 [119 Cal.Rptr.2d 272].
- Proof of Sufficient Connection Among Gang “Subsets” and Umbrella Gang Required. *People v. Prunty* (2015) 62 Cal.4th 59, 81–85 [192 Cal.Rptr.3d 309, 355 P.3d 480].

## RELATED ISSUES

### *Commission On or Near School Grounds*

In imposing a sentence under Penal Code section 186.22(b)(1), it is a circumstance in aggravation if the defendant’s underlying felony was committed on or within 1,000 feet of specified schools. (Pen. Code, § 186.22(b)(2).)

### *Enhancements for Multiple Gang Crimes*

Separate criminal street gang enhancements may be applied to gang crimes committed against separate victims at different times and places, with multiple criminal intents. (*People v. Akins* (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 331, 339–340 [65 Cal.Rptr.2d 338].)

### *Wobblers*

Specific punishments apply to any person convicted of an offense punishable as a felony or a misdemeanor that is committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang and with the intent to promote criminal conduct by gang members. (See Pen. Code, § 186.22(d); see also *Robert L. v. Superior Court* (2003) 30 Cal.4th 894, 909 [135 Cal.Rptr.2d 30, 69 P.3d 951].) However, the felony enhancement provided by Penal Code section 186.22(b)(1) cannot be applied to a misdemeanor offense made a



felony pursuant to section 186.22(d). (*People v. Arroyas* (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1439, 1449 [118 Cal.Rptr.2d 380].)

***Murder—Enhancements Under Penal Code section 186.22(b)(1) May Not Apply at Sentencing***

The enhancements provided by Penal Code section 186.22(b)(1) do not apply to crimes “punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for life . . .” (Pen. Code, § 186.22(b)(5); *People v. Lopez* (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1002, 1004 [22 Cal.Rptr.3d 869, 103 P.3d 270].) Thus, the 10-year enhancement provided by Penal Code section 186.22(b)(1)(C) for a violent felony committed for the benefit of the street gang may not apply in some sentencing situations involving the crime of murder.

See also the Related Issues section to CALCRIM No. 1400, *Active Participation in Criminal Street Gang*.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, § 40.

5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 91, *Sentencing*, § 91.43 (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.03 (Matthew Bender).

## 1402. Gang-Related Firearm Enhancement (Pen. Code, § 12022.53)

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If you find the defendant guilty of the crime[s] charged in Count[s] \_\_\_\_\_[, ] [or of attempting to commit (that/those) crime[s]] [or the lesser crime[s] of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] of alleged lesser offense[s]>] and you find that the defendant committed (that/those) crime[s] for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang with the intent to promote, further, or assist in any criminal conduct by gang members, you must then decide whether[, for each crime,] the People have proved the additional allegation that one of the principals (personally used/personally and intentionally discharged) a firearm during that crime [and caused (great bodily injury/ [or] death)]. [You must decide whether the People have proved this allegation for each crime and return a separate finding for each crime.]

To prove this allegation, the People must prove that:

[1.] Someone who was a principal in the crime personally (used/ discharged) a firearm during the commission [or attempted commission] of the \_\_\_\_\_ <insert appropriate crime listed in Penal Code section 12022.53(a)>(./;)

[AND]

[2. That person intended to discharge the firearm(./;)]

[AND]

3. That person's act caused (great bodily injury to/ [or] the death of) another person [who was not an accomplice to the crime].]

A person is a *principal* in a crime if he or she directly commits [or attempts to commit] the crime or if he or she aids and abets someone else who commits [or attempts to commit] the crime.

[A *firearm* is any device designed to be used as a weapon, from which a projectile is discharged or expelled through a barrel by the force of an explosion or other form of combustion.]

[The term *firearm* is defined in another instruction.]

[A firearm does not need to be in working order if it was designed to shoot and appears capable of shooting.] [A firearm does not need to be loaded.]

[A principal *personally uses* a firearm if he or she intentionally does any of the following:

1. Displays the firearm in a menacing manner.
2. Hits someone with the firearm.

OR

**3. Fires the firearm.]**

[*Great bodily injury* means significant or substantial physical injury. It is an injury that is greater than minor or moderate harm.]

[An act causes (great bodily injury/ [or] death) if the (injury/ [or] death) is the direct, natural, and probable consequence of the act and the (injury/ [or] death) would not have happened without the act. A *natural and probable consequence* is one that a reasonable person would know is likely to happen if nothing unusual intervenes. In deciding whether a consequence is natural and probable, consider all the circumstances established by the evidence.]

[There may be more than one cause of (great bodily injury/ [or] death). An act causes (injury/ [or] death) only if it is a substantial factor in causing the (injury/ [or] death). A *substantial factor* is more than a trivial or remote factor. However, it does not need to be the only factor that causes the (injury/ [or] death).]

[A person is an *accomplice* if he or she is subject to prosecution for the identical crime charged against the defendant. A person is subject to prosecution if he or she committed the crime or if:

1. He or she knew of the criminal purpose of the person who committed the crime;

AND

2. He or she intended to, and did in fact, (aid, facilitate, promote, encourage, or instigate the commission of the crime/ [or] participate in a criminal conspiracy to commit the crime).]

<If there is an issue in the case over whether the defendant used the firearm “during the commission of” the offense, see Bench Notes.>

**The People have the burden of proving each allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you must find that the allegation has not been proved.**

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*New January 2006; Revised June 2007, April 2010, February 2012, September 2020*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the enhancement. (*Apprendi v. New Jersey* (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 490 [120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435].)

In order for the defendant to receive an enhancement under Penal Code section 1061

12022.53(e), the jury must find both that the defendant committed a felony for the benefit of a street gang and that a principal used or intentionally discharged a firearm in the offense. Thus, the court **must give** CALCRIM No. 1401, *Felony or Misdemeanor Committed for Benefit of Criminal Street Gang*, with this instruction and the jury must find both allegations have been proved before the enhancement may be applied.

In this instruction, the court **must** select the appropriate options based on whether the prosecution alleges that the principal used the firearm, intentionally discharged the firearm, and/or intentionally discharged the firearm causing great bodily injury or death. The court should review CALCRIM Nos. 3146, 3148, and 3149 for guidance. Give the bracketed definition of “personally used” only if the prosecution specifically alleges that the principal “personally used” the firearm. Do not give the bracketed definition of “personally used” if the prosecution alleges intentional discharge or intentional discharge causing great bodily injury or death.

If causation is at issue, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on proximate cause (*People v. Jomo K. Bland* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 313, 335 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d 546, 48 P.3d 1107]); give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “An act causes . . . .” If there is evidence of multiple potential causes, the court should also give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “There may be more than one cause . . . .” (*Id.* at pp. 335–338.)

The court should give the bracketed definition of “firearm” unless the court has already given the definition in other instructions. In such cases, the court may give the bracketed sentence stating that the term is defined elsewhere.

If the case involves an issue of whether the principal used the weapon “during the commission of” the offense, the court may give CALCRIM No. 3261, *While Committing a Felony: Defined-Escape Rule*. (See *People v. Jones* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 98, 109 [104 Cal.Rptr.2d 753, 18 P.3d 674]; *People v. Masbruch* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1001, 1014 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 760, 920 P.2d 705]; *People v. Taylor* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 578, 582 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 127].)

If, in the elements, the court gives the bracketed phrase “who was not an accomplice to the crime,” the court should also give the bracketed definition of “accomplice.” (*People v. Verlinde* (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1167–1168 [123 Cal.Rptr.2d 322].) Additional paragraphs providing further explanation of the definition of “accomplice” are contained in CALCRIM No. 334, *Accomplice Testimony Must Be Corroborated: Dispute Whether Witness Is Accomplice*. The court should review that instruction and determine whether any of these additional paragraphs should be given.

The second sentence of the great bodily injury definition could result in error if the prosecution improperly argues great bodily injury may be shown by greater than minor injury alone. (Compare *People v. Medellin* (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 519, 533–535 [258 Cal.Rptr.3d 867] [the definition was reasonably susceptible to prosecutor’s erroneous argument that the injury need only be greater than minor] with *People v. Quinonez* (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 457, 466 [260 Cal.Rptr.3d 86]

[upholding instructions containing great bodily injury definition as written.]

### AUTHORITY

- Enhancement. Pen. Code, § 12022.53(e).
- Vicarious Liability Under Subdivision (e). *People v. Garcia* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1166, 1171 [124 Cal.Rptr.2d 464, 52 P.3d 648]; *People v. Gonzales* (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1, 12 [104 Cal.Rptr.2d 247].
- Principal Defined. Pen. Code, § 31.
- Firearm Defined. Pen. Code, § 16520.
- Personally Uses. *People v. Marvin Bland* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 991, 997 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 77, 898 P.2d 391]; *People v. Johnson* (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1319–1320 [45 Cal.Rptr.2d 602]; see also Pen. Code, § 1203.06(b)(2).
- “In Commission of” Felony. *People v. Jones* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 98, 109–110 [104 Cal.Rptr.2d 753, 18 P.3d 674]; *People v. Masbruch* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1001, 1014 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 760, 920 P.2d 705]; *People v. Taylor* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 578, 582 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 127].
- Proximate Cause. *People v. Jomo K. Bland* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 313, 335–338 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d 546, 48 P.3d 1107].
- Accomplice Defined. See Pen. Code, § 1111; *People v. Verlinde* (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1167–1168 [123 Cal.Rptr.2d 322]; *People v. Stankewitz* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 72, 90–91 [270 Cal.Rptr. 817, 793 P.2d 23].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Principal Need Not Be Convicted*

It is not necessary that the principal who actually used or discharged the firearm be convicted. (*People v. Garcia* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1166, 1176 [124 Cal.Rptr.2d 464, 52 P.3d 648].)

#### *Defendant Need Not Know Principal Armed*

For an enhancement charged under Penal Code section 12022.53(e) where the prosecution is pursuing vicarious liability, it is not necessary for the prosecution to prove that the defendant knew that the principal intended to use or discharge a firearm. (*People v. Gonzales* (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1, 14–15 [104 Cal.Rptr.2d 247].)

See the Related Issues sections of CALCRIM Nos. 3146–3149.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

3 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, §§ 359–360.

5 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, § 727.

5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 91, *Sentencing*, § 91.30[5] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.03[4] (Matthew Bender).

## 1403. Limited Purpose of Evidence of Gang Activity

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You may consider evidence of gang activity only for the limited purpose of deciding whether:

- [The defendant acted with the intent, purpose, and knowledge that are required to prove the gang-related (crime[s]/ [and] enhancement[s]/ [and] special circumstance allegations) charged(;/.)]

[OR]

- [The defendant had a motive to commit the crime[s] charged(;/.)]

[OR]

- [The defendant actually believed in the need to defend (himself/ herself)(;/.)]

[OR]

- [The defendant acted in the heat of passion(;/.)]

[OR]

- [\_\_\_\_\_ <insert other reason court admitted gang evidence>.]

[You may also consider this evidence when you evaluate the credibility or believability of a witness and when you consider the facts and information relied on by an expert witness in reaching his or her opinion.]

You may not consider this evidence for any other purpose. You may not conclude from this evidence that the defendant is a person of bad character or that (he/she) has a disposition to commit crime.

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*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

On request, the court must give a limiting instruction when evidence of gang activity has been admitted. (*People v. Hernandez* (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1040, 1051–1052 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 880, 94 P.3d 1080].) There is, however, no sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on this issue.

### AUTHORITY

- Instruction Must Be Given on Request. *People v. Hernandez* (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1040, 1051–1052 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 880, 94 P.3d 1080].
- This Instruction Upheld. *People v. Samaniego* (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1148, 1170 [91 Cal.Rptr.3d 874].

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.03[2] (Matthew Bender).

**1404–1499. Reserved for Future Use**



# ARSON

## A. ARSON

### (i) Aggravated

- 1500. Aggravated Arson (Pen. Code, § 451.5)
- 1501. Arson: Great Bodily Injury (Pen. Code, § 451)
- 1502. Arson: Inhabited Structure or Property (Pen. Code, § 451(b))
- 1503–1514. Reserved for Future Use

### (ii) Simple Arson

- 1515. Arson (Pen. Code, § 451(c–d))
- 1516–1519. Reserved for Future Use

### (iii) Attempted Arson

- 1520. Attempted Arson (Pen. Code, § 455)
- 1521–1529. Reserved for Future Use

## B. UNLAWFULLY CAUSING A FIRE

- 1530. Unlawfully Causing a Fire: Great Bodily Injury (Pen. Code, § 452)
- 1531. Unlawfully Causing a Fire: Inhabited Structure (Pen. Code, § 452)
- 1532. Unlawfully Causing a Fire (Pen. Code, § 452)
- 1533–1549. Reserved for Future Use

## C. OTHER RELATED INSTRUCTIONS

- 1550. Possession of Incendiary Device (Pen. Code, § 453)
- 1551. Arson Enhancements (Pen. Code, §§ 451.1, 456(b))
- 1552–1599. Reserved for Future Use



## A. ARSON

### (i) Aggravated

#### 1500. Aggravated Arson (Pen. Code, § 451.5)

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If you find the defendant guilty of arson [as charged in Count[s] \_\_\_\_\_], you must then decide whether[, for each crime of arson,] the People have proved the additional allegation that the arson was aggravated. [You must decide whether the People have proved this allegation for each crime of arson and return a separate finding for each crime of arson.]

To prove this allegation, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant acted willfully, maliciously, deliberately, and with premeditation;

[AND]

2. The defendant acted with intent to injure one or more persons, or to damage property under circumstances likely to injure one or more persons, or to damage one or more structures or inhabited dwellings(;/.)

[AND]

<Alternative 3A—loss exceeding \$8.3 million>

- [3A. The fire caused property damage and other losses exceeding \$8.3 million[, including the cost of fire suppression].]

[OR]

<Alternative 3B—destroyed five or more inhabited structures>

- [3B. The fire damaged or destroyed five or more inhabited structures.]]

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose.

Someone acts *maliciously* when he or she intentionally does a wrongful act or when he or she acts with the unlawful intent to disturb, defraud, annoy, or injure someone else.

The defendant acted *deliberately* if (he/she) carefully weighed the considerations for and against (his/her) choice and, knowing the consequences, decided to commit the arson. The defendant acted with *premeditation* if (he/she) decided to commit the arson before committing the act that caused the arson.

[The length of time the person spends considering whether to commit arson does not alone determine whether the arson is deliberate and premeditated. The amount of time required for deliberation and premeditation may vary from person to person and according to the circumstances. A decision to commit arson made rashly, impulsively, or without careful consideration of the choice and its consequences is not deliberate and premeditated. On the other hand, a cold, calculated decision to commit arson can be reached quickly. The test is the extent of the reflection, not the length of time.]

[A (dwelling/ [or] structure) is *inhabited* if someone lives there and either is present or has left but intends to return.]

[A (dwelling/ [or] structure) is *inhabited* if someone used it as a dwelling and left only because a natural or other disaster caused him or her to leave.]

[A (dwelling/ [or] structure) is not *inhabited* if the former residents have moved out and do not intend to return, even if some personal property remains inside.]

[A *dwelling* includes any (structure/garage/office/\_\_\_\_\_) that is attached to the house and functionally connected with it.]

**The People have the burden of proving each allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you must find that the allegation has not been proved.**

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2015, April 2020*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the sentencing factor if the defendant is charged with aggravated arson.

If the prosecution alleges that the fire caused more than 8.3 million dollars in damage, give alternative A in element 3. If the prosecution alleges that the fire damaged five or more inhabited structures, give alternative B in element 3.

If the prosecution alleges that the defendant was previously convicted of arson within ten years of the current offense, give elements 1 and 2 only. The court must also give either CALCRIM No. 3100, *Prior Conviction: Nonbifurcated Trial*, or CALCRIM No. 3101, *Prior Conviction: Bifurcated Trial*, unless the defendant has stipulated to the truth of the prior conviction.

The definitions of “deliberation” and “premeditation” and the bracketed paragraph that begins with “The length of time” are derived from the first degree murder instruction because no recorded case construes their meaning in the context of Penal Code section 451.5. (See CALCRIM No. 521, *Murder: Degrees.*)

Give the bracketed definitions of inhabited dwelling or structure if relevant.

If there is an issue as to whether the fire *caused* the property damage, give CALCRIM No. 240, *Causation*.

### **AUTHORITY**

- Enhancement. Pen. Code, § 451.5.
- Inhabitation Defined. Pen. Code, § 459.
- House Not Inhabited Means Former Residents Not Returning. *People v. Cardona* (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 481, 483 [191 Cal.Rptr. 109].

### **LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES**

Arson under section 451 is not a lesser included offense of aggravated arson. (*People v. Shiga* (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 466, 483 [246 Cal.Rptr.3d 198].)

### **RELATED ISSUES**

See the Related Issues section to CALCRIM No. 1515, *Arson*.

### **SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property §§ 268–273.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 143, *Crimes Against Property*, § 143.11 (Matthew Bender).

## 1501. Arson: Great Bodily Injury (Pen. Code, § 451)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with arson that caused great bodily injury [in violation of Penal Code section 451].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant set fire to or burned [or (counseled[,]/ [or] helped[,]/ [or] caused) the burning of] (a structure/forest land/property);
2. (He/She) acted willfully and maliciously;

AND

3. The fire caused great bodily injury to another person.

To *set fire to or burn* means to damage or destroy with fire either all or part of something, no matter how small the part.

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose.

Someone acts *maliciously* when he or she intentionally does a wrongful act or when he or she acts with the unlawful intent to defraud, annoy, or injure someone else.

*Great bodily injury* means significant or substantial physical injury. It is an injury that is greater than minor or moderate harm.

[A *structure* is any (building/bridge/tunnel/power plant/commercial or public tent).]

[*Forest land* means brush-covered land, cut-over land, forest, grasslands, or woods.]

[*Property* means personal property or land other than forest land.]

[A person does not commit arson if the only thing burned is his or her own personal property, unless he or she acts with the intent to defraud, or the fire also injures someone else or someone else's structure, forest land, or property.]

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2013, April 2020, September 2020*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

The second sentence of the great bodily injury definition could result in error if the prosecution improperly argues great bodily injury may be shown by greater than minor injury alone. (Compare *People v. Medellin* (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 519, 533–535 [258 Cal.Rptr.3d 867] [the definition was reasonably susceptible to prosecutor’s erroneous argument that the injury need only be greater than minor] with *People v. Quinonez* (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 457, 466 [260 Cal.Rptr.3d 86] [upholding instructions containing great bodily injury definition as written].)

### ***Related Instructions***

If attempted arson is charged, do not instruct generally on attempts but give CALCRIM No. 1520, *Attempted Arson*. (Pen. Code, § 455.)

## **AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 451.
- Great Bodily Injury. Pen. Code, § 12022.7(f).
- Structure, Forest Land, and Maliciously Defined. Pen. Code, § 450.
- To Burn Defined. *People v. Haggerty* (1873) 46 Cal. 354, 355; *In re Jesse L.* (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 161, 166–167 [270 Cal.Rptr. 389].

## **LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES**

- Arson. Pen. Code, § 451.
- Attempted Arson. Pen. Code, § 455.
- Unlawfully Causing a Fire. *People v. Hooper* (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 1174, 1182 [226 Cal.Rptr. 810], disapproved of in *People v. Barton* (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186 [47 Cal.Rptr.2d 569, 906 P.2d 531] on its holding that failure to instruct on this crime as a lesser included offense of arson was invited error because defense counsel objected to such instruction; *People v. Schwartz* (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1319, 1324 [3 Cal.Rptr.2d 816].

## **RELATED ISSUES**

See the Related Issues section under CALCRIM No. 1515, *Arson*.

### ***Dual Convictions Prohibited***

A single act of arson cannot result in convictions under different subdivisions of Penal Code section 451. (*People v. Shiga* (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 466, 475 [246 Cal.Rptr.3d 198].)

## **SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property, §§ 268–276.

5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 91, *Sentencing*, § 91.47[1] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 143, *Crimes Against Property*, § 143.11 (Matthew Bender).

## 1502. Arson: Inhabited Structure or Property (Pen. Code, § 451(b))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with arson that burned an (inhabited structure/[or] inhabited property) [in violation of Penal Code section 451(b)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant set fire to or burned [or (counseled[,]/ [or] helped[,]/ [or] caused) the burning of] (a structure/ [or] property);
2. (He/She) acted willfully and maliciously;

AND

3. The fire burned an (inhabited structure/[or] inhabited property).

To *set fire to or burn* means to damage or destroy with fire either all or part of something, no matter how small the part.

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose.

Someone acts *maliciously* when he or she intentionally does a wrongful act or when he or she acts with the unlawful intent to defraud, annoy, or injure someone else.

A *structure* is any (building/bridge/tunnel/power plant/commercial or public tent.)

A (structure/[or] property) is *inhabited* if someone uses it as a dwelling, whether or not someone is inside at the time of the fire. An (inhabited structure/[or] inhabited property) does not include the land on which it is located.

[*Property* means personal property or land other than forest land.]

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2013, August 2016, March 2017, September 2019, April 2020*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

#### *Related Instructions*

If attempted arson is charged, do not instruct generally on attempts but give CALCRIM No. 1520, *Attempted Arson*. (Pen. Code, § 455.)



## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 451(b).
- Inhabited Defined. Pen. Code, § 450; *People v. Jones* (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 543 [245 Cal.Rptr. 85].
- Inhabitant Must Be Alive at Time of Arson. *People v. Vang* (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 377, 382–387 [204 Cal.Rptr.3d 455].
- Structure and Maliciously Defined. Pen. Code, § 450.
- To Burn Defined. *People v. Haggerty* (1873) 46 Cal. 354, 355; *In re Jesse L.* (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 161, 166–167 [270 Cal.Rptr. 389].

## LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Arson. Pen. Code, § 451.
- Attempted Arson. Pen. Code, § 455.
- Unlawfully Causing a Fire. *People v. Hooper* (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 1174, 1182 [226 Cal.Rptr. 810], disapproved of in *People v. Barton* (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186 [47 Cal.Rptr.2d 569, 906 P.2d 531] on its holding that failure to instruct on this crime as a lesser included offense of arson was invited error because defense counsel objected to such instruction; *People v. Schwartz* (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1319, 1324 [3 Cal.Rptr.2d 816].

## RELATED ISSUES

### *Inhabited Apartment*

Defendant's conviction for arson of an inhabited structure was proper where he set fire to his estranged wife's apartment several days after she had vacated it. Although his wife's apartment was not occupied, it was in a large apartment building where many people lived; it was, therefore, occupied for purposes of the arson statute. (*People v. Green* (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 369, 378–379 [194 Cal.Rptr. 128].)

### *Dual Convictions Prohibited*

A single act of arson cannot result in convictions under different subdivisions of Penal Code section 451. (*People v. Shiga* (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 466, 475 [246 Cal.Rptr.3d 198].)

## SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property, §§ 268–276.

5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 91, *Sentencing*, § 91.47[1] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 143, *Crimes Against Property*, § 143.11 (Matthew Bender).

## **1503–1514. Reserved for Future Use**

## (ii) Simple Arson

### 1515. Arson (Pen. Code, § 451(c–d))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with arson [in violation of Penal Code section 451(c/d)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant set fire to or burned [or (counseled[,]/ [or] helped[,]/ [or] caused) the burning of] (a structure/forest land/property);

AND

2. (He/She) acted willfully and maliciously.

To *set fire to or burn* means to damage or destroy with fire either all or part of something, no matter how small the part.

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose.

Someone acts *maliciously* when he or she intentionally does a wrongful act or when he or she acts with the unlawful intent to defraud, annoy, or injure someone else.

[A *structure* is any (building/bridge/tunnel/power plant/commercial or public tent).]

[*Forest land* means brush-covered land, cut-over land, forest, grasslands, or woods.]

[*Property* means personal property or land other than forest land.]

[A person does not commit arson if the only thing burned is his or her own personal property, unless he or she acts with the intent to defraud, or the fire also injures someone else or someone else's structure, forest land, or property.]

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2013, August 2016, April 2020*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

#### *Related Instructions*

If it is also alleged that the fire caused great bodily injury or burned an inhabited

structure or property, see CALCRIM No. 1501, *Arson: Great Bodily Injury* and CALCRIM No. 1502, *Arson: Inhabited Structure*.

If attempted arson is charged, do not instruct generally on attempts but give CALCRIM No. 1520, *Attempted Arson*. (Pen. Code, § 455.)

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 451(c–d).
- Structure, Forest Land, and Maliciously Defined. Pen. Code, § 450; see *People v. Lubaer* (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 289, 293–294 [105 Cal.Rptr.2d 629] [“structure” does not require finished or completed building].
- General Intent Crime. *People v. Atkins* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 76, 83–84, 86 [104 Cal.Rptr.2d 738, 18 P.3d 660] [evidence of voluntary intoxication not admissible to negate mental state].
- Property Defined. *In re L.T.* (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 262, 264–265 [126 Cal.Rptr.2d 778].
- To Burn Defined. *People v. Haggerty* (1873) 46 Cal. 354, 355; *In re Jesse L.* (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 161, 166–167 [270 Cal.Rptr. 389].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Attempted Arson. Pen. Code, § 455.
- Unlawfully Causing a Fire. *People v. Hooper* (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 1174, 1182 [226 Cal.Rptr. 810], disapproved of in *People v. Barton* (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186 [47 Cal.Rptr.2d 569, 906 P.2d 531] on its holding that failure to instruct on this crime as a lesser included offense of arson was invited error because defense counsel objected to such instruction; *People v. Schwartz* (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1319, 1324 [3 Cal.Rptr.2d 816].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Fixtures*

Fire damage to fixtures within a building may satisfy the burning requirement if the fixtures are an integral part of the structure. (*In re Jesse L.* (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 161, 167–168 [270 Cal.Rptr. 389]; *People v. Lee* (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1773, 1778

[30 Cal.Rptr.2d 224] [whether wall-to-wall carpeting is a fixture is question of fact for jury.]

***Property: Clothing***

Arson includes burning a victim's clothing. (*People v. Reese* (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 737, 739–740 [227 Cal.Rptr. 526].)

***Property: Trash***

Burning trash that does not belong to the defendant is arson. There is no requirement for arson that the property belong to anyone. (*In re L.T.* (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 262, 264 [126 Cal.Rptr.2d 778].)

***Dual Convictions Prohibited***

A single act of arson cannot result in convictions under different subdivisions of Penal Code section 451. (*People v. Shiga* (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 466, 475 [246 Cal.Rptr.3d 198].)

## SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property, §§ 268–276.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 143, *Crimes Against Property*, § 143.11 (Matthew Bender).

**1516–1519. Reserved for Future Use**

### (iii) Attempted Arson

#### 1520. Attempted Arson (Pen. Code, § 455)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with the crime of attempted arson [in violation of Penal Code section 455].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant attempted to set fire to or burn [or counseled, helped, or caused the attempted burning of] (a structure/forest land/property);

AND

2. (He/She) acted willfully and maliciously.

A person *attempts to set fire to or burn* (a structure/forest land/property) when he or she places any flammable, explosive, or combustible material or device in or around it with the intent to set fire to it.

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose.

Someone acts *maliciously* when he or she intentionally does a wrongful act or when he or she acts with the unlawful intent to defraud, annoy, or injure someone else.

[A *structure* is any (building/bridge/tunnel/power plant/commercial or public tent).]

[*Forest land* is any brush-covered land, cut-over land, forest, grasslands, or woods.]

[*Property* means personal property or land other than forest land.]

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*New January 2006; Revised September 2018*

#### BENCH NOTES

##### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime. Attempted arson is governed by Penal Code section 455, not the general attempt statute found in section 664. (*People v. Alberts* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1424, 1427–1428 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d 401] [defendant was convicted under §§ 451 and 664; the higher sentence was reversed because § 455 governs attempted arson].)

#### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 455.

- Structure, Forest Land, and Maliciously Defined. Pen. Code, § 450.
- This Instruction Upheld. *People v. Rubino* (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 407, 412–413 [227 Cal.Rptr.3d 75].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

5 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property, §§ 268–276.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 143, *Crimes Against Property*, § 143.11 (Matthew Bender).

**1521–1529. Reserved for Future Use**

## B. UNLAWFULLY CAUSING A FIRE

### 1530. Unlawfully Causing a Fire: Great Bodily Injury (Pen. Code, § 452)

---

The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with unlawfully causing a fire that caused great bodily injury [in violation of Penal Code section 452].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant set fire to[,] [or] burned[,] [or caused the burning of] (a structure/forest land/property);
2. The defendant did so recklessly;

AND

3. The fire caused great bodily injury to another person.

*<Alternative A—Recklessness: General Definition>*

[A person acts recklessly when (1) he or she is aware that his or her actions present a substantial and unjustifiable risk of causing a fire, (2) he or she ignores that risk, and (3) ignoring the risk is a gross deviation from what a reasonable person would have done in the same situation.]

*<Alternative B—Recklessness: Voluntary Intoxication>*

[A person acts recklessly when (1) he or she does an act that presents a substantial and unjustifiable risk of causing a fire but (2) he or she is unaware of the risk because he or she is voluntarily intoxicated. Intoxication is voluntary if the defendant willingly used any intoxicating drink, drug, or other substance knowing that it could produce an intoxicating effect.]

*To set fire to or burn* means to damage or destroy with fire either all or part of something, no matter how small the part.

*Great bodily injury* means significant or substantial physical injury. It is an injury that is greater than minor or moderate harm.

[A *structure* is any (building/bridge/tunnel/power plant/commercial or public tent).]

[*Forest land* means brush-covered land, cut-over land, forest, grasslands, or woods.]

[*Property* means personal property or land other than forest land.]

[A person does not unlawfully cause a fire if the only thing burned is his or her own personal property, unless he or she acts with the intent to defraud, or the fire also injures someone else or someone else's structure, forest land, or property.]

[Arson and unlawfully causing a fire require different mental states. For arson, a person must act willfully and maliciously. For unlawfully causing a fire, a person must act recklessly.]

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*New January 2006; Revised September 2020*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If the prosecution's theory is that the defendant did not set the fire but "caused" the fire, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on aiding and abetting. (*People v. Sarkis* (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 23, 28 [272 Cal.Rptr. 34].) See CALCRIM Nos. 400–403.

Depending upon the theory of recklessness the prosecutor is alleging, the court should instruct with alternative A or B.

If the defendant is also charged with arson, the court may wish to give the last bracketed paragraph, which explains the difference in intent between unlawfully causing a fire and arson. (*People v. Hooper* (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 1174, 1182 [226 Cal.Rptr. 810], disapproved of in *People v. Barton* (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186 [47 Cal.Rptr.2d 569, 906 P.2d 531] on the point that defense counsel's objection to instruction on lesser included offense constituted invited error; *People v. Schwartz* (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1319, 1324 [3 Cal.Rptr.2d 816].)

The second sentence of the great bodily injury definition could result in error if the prosecution improperly argues great bodily injury may be shown by greater than minor injury alone. (Compare *People v. Medellin* (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 519, 533–535 [258 Cal.Rptr.3d 867] [the definition was reasonably susceptible to prosecutor's erroneous argument that the injury need only be greater than minor] with *People v. Quinonez* (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 457, 466 [260 Cal.Rptr.3d 86] [upholding instructions containing great bodily injury definition as written].)

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 452.
- Great Bodily Injury. Pen. Code, § 12022.7(f).
- Structure, Forest Land Defined. Pen. Code, § 450.
- Difference Between This Crime and Arson. *People v. Hooper* (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 1174, 1182 [226 Cal.Rptr. 810].
- To Burn Defined. *People v. Haggerty* (1873) 46 Cal. 354, 355; *In re Jesse L.* 1082



(1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 161, 166–167 [270 Cal.Rptr. 389].

### **LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES**

- Unlawfully Causing a Fire. Pen. Code, § 452.

### **RELATED ISSUES**

See the Related Issues sections under CALCRIM No. 1515, *Arson*, and CALCRIM No. 1532, *Unlawfully Causing a Fire*.

### **SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property, §§ 268–276.

5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 91, *Sentencing*, § 91.47[2] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 143, *Crimes Against Property*, § 143.11 (Matthew Bender).

**1531. Unlawfully Causing a Fire: Inhabited Structure (Pen. Code, § 452)**

---

The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with unlawfully causing a fire that burned an inhabited structure [in violation of Penal Code section 452].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant set fire to[,] [or] burned[,] [or caused the burning of] (a structure/forest land/property);
2. The defendant did so recklessly;

AND

3. The fire burned an inhabited structure.

<Alternative A—Recklessness: General Definition>

[A person acts recklessly when (1) he or she is aware that his or her actions present a substantial and unjustifiable risk of causing a fire, (2) he or she ignores that risk, and (3) ignoring the risk is a gross deviation from what a reasonable person would have done in the same situation.]

<Alternative B—Recklessness: Voluntary Intoxication>

[A person acts recklessly when (1) he or she does an act that presents a substantial and unjustifiable risk of causing a fire but (2) he or she is unaware of the risk because he or she is voluntarily intoxicated. Intoxication is voluntary if the defendant willingly used any intoxicating drink, drug, or other substance knowing that it could produce an intoxicating effect.]

To *set fire to or burn* means to damage or destroy with fire either all or part of something, no matter how small the part.

A *structure* is a (building/bridge/tunnel/power plant/commercial or public tent).

A structure is *inhabited* if someone lives there and either (a) is present or (b) has left but intends to return.

[*Forest land* means brush-covered land, cut-over land, forest, grasslands, or woods.]

[*Property* means personal property or land other than forest land.]

[A person does not unlawfully cause a fire if the only thing burned is his or her own personal property, unless he or she acts with the intent to

**defraud, or the fire also injures another person or another person's structure, forest land, or property.]**

**[Arson and unlawfully causing a fire require different mental states. For arson, a person must act willfully and maliciously. For unlawfully causing a fire, a person must act recklessly.]**

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*New January 2006*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If the prosecution's theory is that the defendant did not set the fire but rather "aided, counseled or procured" the fire, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on aiding and abetting. (*People v. Sarkis* (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 23, 28 [272 Cal.Rptr. 34].) See CALCRIM Nos. 400–403.

Depending upon the theory of recklessness the prosecutor is alleging, the court should instruct with alternative A or B.

If the defendant is also charged with arson, the court may wish to give the last bracketed paragraph, which explains the difference in intent between unlawfully causing a fire and arson. (*People v. Hooper* (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 1174, 1182 [226 Cal.Rptr. 810], disapproved of in *People v. Barton* (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186 [47 Cal.Rptr.2d 569, 906 P.2d 531] on the point that defense counsel's objection to instruction on lesser included offense constituted invited error); *People v. Schwartz* (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1319, 1324 [3 Cal.Rptr.2d 816].)

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 452.
- Inhabited Defined. Pen. Code, § 450; *People v. Guthrie* (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 832, 838, 848 [193 Cal.Rptr. 54]; *People v. Jones* (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 543 [245 Cal.Rptr. 85].
- Structure, Forest Land Defined. Pen. Code, § 450.
- Difference Between This Crime and Arson. *People v. Hooper* (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 1174, 1182 [226 Cal.Rptr. 810].
- To Burn Defined. *People v. Haggerty* (1873) 46 Cal. 354, 355; *In re Jesse L.* (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 161, 166–167 [270 Cal.Rptr. 389].

## LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Unlawfully Causing a Fire. Pen. Code, § 452.

## RELATED ISSUES

See the Related Issues sections under CALCRIM No. 1515, *Arson* and CALCRIM No. 1532, *Unlawfully Causing a Fire*.

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property, §§ 268–276.

5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 91, *Sentencing*, § 91.47[2] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 143, *Crimes Against Property*, § 143.11 (Matthew Bender).

## 1532. Unlawfully Causing a Fire (Pen. Code, § 452)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with unlawfully causing a fire [in violation of Penal Code section 452].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant set fire to[,] [or] burned[,] [or caused the burning of] (a structure/forest land/property);

**AND**

2. The defendant did so recklessly.

*<Alternative A—Recklessness: General Definition>*

[A person acts recklessly when (1) he or she is aware that his or her actions present a substantial and unjustifiable risk of causing a fire, (2) he or she ignores that risk, and (3) ignoring the risk is a gross deviation from what a reasonable person would have done in the same situation.]

*<Alternative B—Recklessness: Voluntary Intoxication>*

[A person acts recklessly when (1) he or she does an act that presents a substantial and unjustifiable risk of causing a fire but (2) he or she is unaware of the risk because he or she is voluntarily intoxicated. Intoxication is voluntary if the person willingly used any intoxicating drink, drug, or other substance knowing that it could produce an intoxicating effect.]

To *set fire to or burn* means to damage or destroy with fire either all or part of something, no matter how small the part.

[A *structure* is any (building/bridge/tunnel/power plant/commercial or public tent).]

[*Forest land* means brush-covered land, cut-over land, forest, grasslands, or woods.]

[*Property* means personal property or land other than forest land.]

[A person does not unlawfully cause a fire if the only thing burned is his or her own personal property, unless he or she acts with the intent to defraud, or the fire also injures someone else or someone else's structure, forest land, or property.]

[Arson and unlawfully causing a fire require different mental states. For arson, a person must act willfully and maliciously. For unlawfully causing a fire, a person must act recklessly.]

New January 2006

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If the prosecution's theory is that the defendant did not set the fire but "caused" the fire, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on aiding and abetting. (*People v. Sarkis* (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 23, 28 [272 Cal.Rptr. 34].) See CALCRIM Nos. 400–403.

Depending upon the theory of recklessness the prosecutor is alleging, the court should instruct with alternative A or B.

If the defendant is also charged with arson, the court may wish to give the last bracketed paragraph, which explains the difference in intent between unlawfully causing a fire and arson. (*People v. Hooper* (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 1174, 1182 [226 Cal.Rptr. 810], disapproved of in *People v. Barton* (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186 [47 Cal.Rptr.2d 569, 906 P.2d 531] on the point that defense counsel's objection to instruction on lesser included offense constituted invited error; *People v. Schwartz* (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1319, 1324 [3 Cal.Rptr.2d 816].)

### *Related Instructions*

If it is also alleged that the fire caused great bodily injury or burned an inhabited structure or property, see CALCRIM No. 1530, *Unlawfully Causing a Fire: Great Bodily Injury*, and CALCRIM No. 1531, *Unlawfully Causing a Fire: Inhabited Structure*.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 452.
- Structure, Forest Land Defined. Pen. Code, § 450.
- Difference Between This Crime and Arson. *People v. Hooper* (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 1174, 1182 [226 Cal.Rptr. 810].
- To Burn Defined. *People v. Haggerty* (1873) 46 Cal. 354, 355; *In re Jesse L.* (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 161, 166–167 [270 Cal.Rptr. 389].

## RELATED ISSUES

See the Related Issues section under CALCRIM No. 1515, *Arson*.

## SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property, §§ 268–276.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 143, *Crimes Against Property*, § 143.11 (Matthew Bender).

**1533–1549. Reserved for Future Use**





## C. OTHER RELATED INSTRUCTIONS

### 1550. Possession of Incendiary Device (Pen. Code, § 453)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with possessing an incendiary device or flammable material [in violation of Penal Code section 453].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant (possessed/made/manufactured/disposed of) flammable or combustible material or an incendiary device in an arrangement or preparation;

AND

2. The defendant willfully and maliciously intended to use the material or device to set fire to or burn (a structure/forest land/property).

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose.

Someone acts *maliciously* when he or she intentionally does a wrongful act or when he or she acts with the unlawful intent to defraud, annoy, or injure someone else.

*Incendiary device* means a device constructed or designed to start an incendiary fire by instant, remote or delayed means. [It is not a device commercially manufactured primarily for illumination.]

*Incendiary fire* means a fire deliberately ignited under circumstances in which a person knows that the fire should not be ignited.

[*Dispose of* means to give, give away, offer, offer for sale, sell, transfer, or loan.]

[A *structure* means any (building/bridge/tunnel/power plant/commercial or public tent).]

[*Forest land* means any brush-covered land, cut-over land, forest, grasslands, or woods.]

[*Property* means personal property or land other than forest land.]

[Two or more people may possess something at the same time.]

[A person does not have to actually hold or touch something to possess it. It is enough if the person has (control over it/ [or] the right to control

it), either personally or through another person.]

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2012*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 453.
- Structure and Forest Land Defined. Pen. Code, § 450.
- Manufacture Defined. *People v. Combs* (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 422, 427 [211 Cal.Rptr. 617].
- Includes Intent to Damage Own Property. *People v. Morse* (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1160, 1166 [11 Cal.Rptr.3d 9].
- Constructive vs. Actual Possession. *People v. Barnes* (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 552, 556 [67 Cal.Rptr.2d 162].

## SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property, §§ 268–276.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 143, *Crimes Against Property*, § 143.11 (Matthew Bender).

## 1551. Arson Enhancements (Pen. Code, §§ 451.1, 456(b))

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If you find the defendant guilty of arson [as charged in Count[s] \_\_\_\_\_], you must then decide whether[, for each crime of arson,] the People have proved (the additional allegation that/one or more of the following additional allegations):

*<Alternative A—monetary gain>*

- [The defendant intended to obtain monetary gain when (he/she) committed the arson.]

*<Alternative B—injury to firefighter, peace officer, or EMT>*

- [(A/An) (firefighter[,]/ peace officer[,]/ [or] emergency worker) suffered great bodily injury as a result of the arson.]

*<Alternative C—great bodily injury to more than one person>*

- [The defendant caused great bodily injury to more than one person during the commission of the arson.]

*<Alternative D—multiple structures burned>*

- [The defendant caused multiple structures to burn during the commission of the arson.]

*<Alternative E—device designed to accelerate fire>*

- [The arson (caused great bodily injury[,]/ [or] caused an inhabited structure or inhabited property to burn[,]/ [or] burned a structure or forest land), and was caused by use of a device designed to accelerate the fire or delay ignition.]

[A person who is employed as a police officer by \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of agency that employs police officer>* is a **peace officer**.]

[A person employed by \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of agency that employs peace officer, e.g., “the Department of Fish and Wildlife”>* is a **peace officer** if \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert description of facts necessary to make employee a peace officer, e.g., “designated by the director of the agency as a peace officer”>*.]

[A **firefighter** includes anyone who is an officer, employee, or member of a (governmentally operated (fire department/fire protection or firefighting agency) in this state/federal fire department/federal fire protection or firefighting agency), whether or not he or she is paid for his or her services.]

[An **emergency worker** includes an emergency medical technician. An **emergency medical technician** is someone who holds a valid certificate

under the Health and Safety Code as an emergency medical technician.]

[*Great bodily injury* means significant or substantial physical injury. It is an injury that is greater than minor or moderate harm.]

[A (structure/ [or] property) is *inhabited* if someone lives there and either is present or has left but intends to return.]

[A (structure/ [or] property) is *inhabited* if someone used it as a dwelling and left only because a natural or other disaster caused him or her to leave.]

[A (structure/ [or] property) is not *inhabited* if the former residents have moved out and do not intend to return, even if some personal property remains inside.]

[A *device designed to accelerate the fire* means a piece of equipment or a mechanism intended, or devised, to hasten or increase the fire's progress.]

[In order to prove that the defendant *caused* (great bodily injury to more than one person/ [or] more than one structure to burn), the People must prove that:

1. A reasonable person in the defendant's position would have foreseen that committing arson could begin a chain of events likely to result in (great bodily injury to more than one person/ [or] the burning of more than one structure);
2. The commission of arson was a direct and substantial factor in causing (great bodily injury to more than one person/ [or] the burning of more than one structure);

AND

3. The (great bodily injury to more than one person/ [or the] burning of more than one structure) would not have happened if the defendant had not committed arson.]

[You must decide whether the People have proved this allegation for each crime of arson and return a separate finding for each crime of arson.]

The People have the burden of proving (this/each) allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you must find that the allegation has not been proved.

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the sentencing enhancement.

The reference to “arson” in the first paragraph refers to all crimes charged under Penal Code section 451, including arson of a structure, forest land, or property (see CALCRIM No. 1515), arson causing great bodily injury (see CALCRIM No. 1501), and arson of an inhabited structure (see CALCRIM No. 1502). It does not refer to aggravated arson under Penal Code section 451.5 (see CALCRIM No. 1500).

Give one of the bracketed alternatives, A–E, depending on the enhancement alleged.

If the defendant is charged with a qualifying prior conviction under Penal Code section 451.1(a)(1), give either CALCRIM No. 3100, *Prior Conviction*, or CALCRIM No. 3101, *Prior Conviction: Bifurcated Trial*, unless the defendant has stipulated to the truth of the prior conviction.

Give all relevant bracketed definitions, based on the enhancement alleged.

The jury must determine whether the alleged victim is a peace officer. (*People v. Brown* (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 444–445 [250 Cal.Rptr. 604, 758 P.2d 1135].) The court may instruct the jury on the appropriate definition of “peace officer” from the statute (e.g., “a Garden Grove Regular Police Officer and a Garden Grove Reserve Police Officer are peace officers”). (*Ibid.*) However, the court may not instruct the jury that the alleged victim was a peace officer as a matter of law (e.g., “Officer Reed was a peace officer”). (*Ibid.*) If the alleged victim is a police officer, give the bracketed sentence that begins with “A person employed as a police officer.” If the alleged victim is another type of peace officer, give the bracketed sentence that begins with “A person employed by.”

Give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “In order to prove that the defendant *caused*” if the prosecution alleges that the defendant caused great bodily injury to multiple people or caused multiple structures to burn. (Pen. Code, § 451.1(a)(5); see Pen. Code, § 451(a)–(c).)

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “You must decide whether the People have proved” if the same enhancement is alleged for multiple counts of arson.

The second sentence of the great bodily injury definition could result in error if the prosecution improperly argues great bodily injury may be shown by greater than minor injury alone. (Compare *People v. Medellin* (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 519, 533–535 [258 Cal.Rptr.3d 867] [the definition was reasonably susceptible to prosecutor’s erroneous argument that the injury need only be greater than minor] with *People v. Quinonez* (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 457, 466 [260 Cal.Rptr.3d 86] [upholding instructions containing great bodily injury definition as written].)

## AUTHORITY

- Enhancements. Pen. Code, §§ 451.1, 456(b).
- Device Designed to Accelerate Fire Defined. *People v. Andrade* (2000) 85 1095

Cal.App.4th 579, 587 [102 Cal.Rptr.2d 254].

- Peace Officer Defined. Pen. Code, § 830 et seq.
- Firefighter Defined. Pen. Code, § 245.1.
- Emergency Medical Technician Defined. Health & Saf. Code, §§ 1797.80–1797.84.
- Duty to Define Proximate Cause. See *People v. Bland* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 313, 334–335 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d 546, 48 P.3d 1107] [in context of firearm enhancement].

## RELATED ISSUES

### *Discretion to Strike Enhancement*

The trial court retains discretion under Penal Code section 1385 to strike an arson sentence enhancement. (*People v. Wilson* (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 198, 203 [115 Cal.Rptr.2d 355] [enhancement for use of an accelerant under Pen. Code, § 451.1(a)(5)].)

## SECONDARY SOURCES

3 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, § 372.

5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 91, *Sentencing*, § 91.47 (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 143, *Crimes Against Property*, § 143.11[3] (Matthew Bender).

**1552–1599. Reserved for Future Use**

# ROBBERY AND CARJACKING

## A. ROBBERY

1600. Robbery (Pen. Code, § 211)

1601. Robbery in Concert (Pen. Code, § 213(a)(1)(A))

1602. Robbery: Degrees (Pen. Code, § 212.5)

1603. Robbery: Intent of Aider and Abettor

1604–1649. Reserved for Future Use

## B. CARJACKING

1650. Carjacking (Pen. Code, § 215)

1651–1699. Reserved for Future Use





## A. ROBBERY

### 1600. Robbery (Pen. Code, § 211)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with robbery [in violation of Penal Code section 211].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant took property that was not (his/her) own;
2. The property was in the possession of another person;
3. The property was taken from the other person or (his/her) immediate presence;
4. The property was taken against that person's will;
5. The defendant used force or fear to take the property or to prevent the person from resisting;

AND

6. When the defendant used force or fear, (he/she) intended (to deprive the owner of the property permanently/ [or] to remove the property from the owner's possession for so extended a period of time that the owner would be deprived of a major portion of the value or enjoyment of the property).

The defendant's intent to take the property must have been formed before or during the time (he/she) used force or fear. If the defendant did not form this required intent until after using the force or fear, then (he/she) did not commit robbery.

*<Give the following bracketed paragraph if the second degree is the only possible degree of the charged crime for which the jury may return a verdict.>*

**[If you find the defendant guilty of robbery, it is robbery of the second degree.]**

**[A person *takes* something when he or she gains possession of it and moves it some distance. The distance moved may be short.]**

**[The property taken can be of any value, however slight.] [Two or more people may possess something at the same time.]**

**[A person does not have to actually hold or touch something to possess it. It is enough if the person has (control over it/ [or] the right to control it), either personally or through another person.]**

[A (store/ [or] business) (employee/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description>) who is on duty has possession of the (store/ [or] business) owner’s property.]

[*Fear*, as used here, means fear of (injury to the person himself or herself[,]/ [or] injury to the person’s family or property[,]/ [or] immediate injury to someone else present during the incident or to that person’s property).]

[Property is within a person’s *immediate presence* if it is sufficiently within his or her physical control that he or she could keep possession of it if not prevented by force or fear.]

[An act is done *against a person’s will* if that person does not consent to the act. In order to *consent*, a person must act freely and voluntarily and know the nature of the act.]

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2009, October 2010, April 2011, August 2013, August 2014, March 2017, September 2018*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

To have the requisite intent for theft, the defendant must either intend to deprive the owner permanently or to deprive the owner of a major portion of the property’s value or enjoyment. (See *People v. Avery* (2002) 27 Cal.4th 49, 57–58 [115 Cal.Rptr.2d 403, 38 P.3d 1].) Select the appropriate language in element 5.

There is no sua sponte duty to define the terms “possession,” “fear,” and “immediate presence.” (*People v. Anderson* (1966) 64 Cal.2d 633, 639 [51 Cal.Rptr. 238, 414 P.2d 366] [fear]; *People v. Mungia* (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1703, 1708 [286 Cal.Rptr. 394] [fear].) These definitions are discussed in the Commentary below.

If second degree robbery is the only possible degree of robbery that the jury may return as their verdict, do not give CALCRIM No. 1602, *Robbery: Degrees*.

Give the bracketed definition of “against a person’s will” on request.

If there is an issue as to whether the defendant used force or fear during the commission of the robbery, the court may need to instruct on this point. (See *People v. Estes* (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 23, 28 [194 Cal.Rptr. 909].) See CALCRIM No. 3261, *While Committing a Felony: Defined—Escape Rule*.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 211.
- Fear Defined. Pen. Code, § 212; see *People v. Cuevas* (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 689, 698 [107 Cal.Rptr.2d 529] [victim must actually be afraid].

- Immediate Presence Defined. *People v. Hayes* (1990) 52 Cal.3d 577, 626–627 [276 Cal.Rptr. 874, 802 P.2d 376].
- Intent. *People v. Green* (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 52–53 [164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468], overruled on other grounds in *People v. Hall* (1986) 41 Cal.3d 826, 834, fn. 3 [226 Cal.Rptr. 112, 718 P.2d 99]; see *Rodriguez v. Superior Court* (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 821, 826 [205 Cal.Rptr. 750] [same intent as theft].
- Intent to Deprive Owner of Main Value. See *People v. Avery* (2002) 27 Cal.4th 49, 57–58 [115 Cal.Rptr.2d 403, 38 P.3d 1] [in context of theft]; *People v. Zangari* (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1436, 1447 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 250] [same].
- Possession Defined. *People v. Bekele* (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1461 [39 Cal.Rptr.2d 797], disapproved on other grounds in *People v. Rodriguez* (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 13–14 [82 Cal.Rptr.2d 413, 971 P.2d 618].
- Robbery of Store Employee or Contractor. *People v. Frazer* (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1115–1117 [131 Cal.Rptr.2d 319]; *People v. Gilbeaux* (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 515, 521–522 [3 Cal.Rptr.3d 835].
- Constructive Possession by Employee. *People v. Scott* (2009) 45 Cal.4th 743, 751 [89 Cal.Rptr.3d 213, 200 P.3d 837].
- Constructive Possession by Subcontractor/Janitor. *People v. Gilbeaux* (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 515, 523 [3 Cal.Rptr.3d 835].
- Constructive Possession by Person With Special Relationship. *People v. Weddles* (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1365, 1369–1370 [109 Cal.Rptr.3d 479].
- Felonious Taking Not Satisfied by Theft by False Pretense. *People v. Williams* (2013) 57 Cal.4th 776, 784–789 [161 Cal.Rptr.3d 81, 305 P.3d 1241].
- Constructive Possession and Immediate Presence of Funds in Account of Robbery Victims Using ATM. *People v. Mullins* (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 594, 603 [228 Cal.Rptr.3d 198].

### COMMENTARY

The instruction includes definitions of “possession,” “fear,” and “immediate presence” because those terms have meanings in the context of robbery that are technical and may not be readily apparent to jurors. (See *People v. McElheny* (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 396, 403 [187 Cal.Rptr. 39]; *People v. Pitmon* (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 38, 52 [216 Cal.Rptr. 221].)

Possession was defined in the instruction because either actual or constructive possession of property will satisfy this element, and this definition may not be readily apparent to jurors. (*People v. Bekele* (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1461 [39 Cal.Rptr.2d 797] [defining possession], disapproved on other grounds in *People v. Rodriguez* (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 13–14 [82 Cal.Rptr.2d 413, 971 P.2d 618]; see also *People v. Nguyen* (2000) 24 Cal.4th 756, 761, 763 [102 Cal.Rptr.2d 548, 14 P.3d 221] [robbery victim must have actual or constructive possession of property taken; disapproving *People v. Mai* (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 117, 129 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 141]].)

Fear was defined in the instruction because the statutory definition includes fear of

injury to third parties, and this concept is not encompassed within the common understanding of fear. Force was not defined because its definition in the context of robbery is commonly understood. (See *People v. Mungia* (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1703, 1709 [286 Cal.Rptr. 394] [“force is a factual question to be determined by the jury using its own common sense”].)

Immediate presence was defined in the instruction because its definition is related to the use of force and fear and to the victim’s ability to control the property. This definition may not be readily apparent to jurors.

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Attempted Robbery. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 211; *People v. Webster* (1991) 54 Cal.3d 411, 443 [285 Cal.Rptr. 31, 814 P.2d 1273].
- Grand Theft. Pen. Code, §§ 484, 487g; *People v. Webster, supra*, at p. 443; *People v. Ortega* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 686, 694, 699 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 489, 968 P.2d 48]; see *People v. Cooksey* (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1407, 1411–1413 [Cal.Rptr.2d 1] [insufficient evidence to require instruction].
- Grand Theft Automobile. Pen. Code, § 487(d); *People v. Gamble* (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 446, 450 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 451] [construing former Pen. Code, § 487h]; *People v. Escobar* (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 477, 482 [53 Cal.Rptr.2d 9] [same].
- Petty Theft. Pen. Code, §§ 484, 488; *People v. Covington* (1934) 1 Cal.2d 316, 320 [34 P.2d 1019].
- Petty Theft With Prior. Pen. Code, § 666; *People v. Villa* (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1429, 1433–1434 [69 Cal.Rptr.3d 282].

When there is evidence that the defendant formed the intent to steal after the application of force or fear, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on any relevant lesser included offenses. (*People v. Bradford* (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1055–1057 [60 Cal.Rptr.2d 225, 929 P.2d 544] [error not to instruct on lesser included offense of theft]; *People v. Ramkeesoon* (1985) 39 Cal.3d 346, 350–352 [216 Cal.Rptr. 455, 702 P.2d 613] [same].)

On occasion, robbery and false imprisonment may share some elements (e.g., the use of force or fear of harm to commit the offense). Nevertheless, false imprisonment is not a lesser included offense, and thus the same conduct can result in convictions for both offenses. (*People v. Reed* (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 274, 281–282 [92 Cal.Rptr.2d 781].)

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Asportation—Felonious Taking*

To constitute a taking, the property need only be moved a small distance. It does not have to be under the robber’s actual physical control. If a person acting under the robber’s direction, including the victim, moves the property, the element of

taking is satisfied. (*People v. Martinez* (1969) 274 Cal.App.2d 170, 174 [79 Cal.Rptr. 18]; *People v. Price* (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d 576, 578 [102 Cal.Rptr. 71].)

### ***Claim of Right***

If a person honestly believes that he or she has a right to the property even if that belief is mistaken or unreasonable, such belief is a defense to robbery. (*People v. Butler* (1967) 65 Cal.2d 569, 573 [55 Cal.Rptr. 511, 421 P.2d 703]; *People v. Romo* (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 514, 518 [269 Cal.Rptr. 440] [discussing defense in context of theft]; see CALCRIM No. 1863, *Defense to Theft or Robbery: Claim of Right*.) This defense is only available for robberies when a specific piece of property is reclaimed; it is not a defense to robberies perpetrated to settle a debt, liquidated or unliquidated. (*People v. Tufunga* (1999) 21 Cal.4th 935, 945–950 [90 Cal.Rptr.2d 143, 987 P.2d 168].)

### ***Fear***

A victim's fear may be shown by circumstantial evidence. (*People v. Davison* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 206, 212 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 438].) Even when the victim testifies that he or she is not afraid, circumstantial evidence may satisfy the element of fear. (*People v. Renteria* (1964) 61 Cal.2d 497, 498–499 [39 Cal.Rptr. 213, 393 P.2d 413].)

### ***Force—Amount***

The force required for robbery must be more than the incidental touching necessary to take the property. (*People v. Garcia* (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1246 [53 Cal.Rptr.2d 256] [noting that force employed by pickpocket would be insufficient], disapproved on other grounds in *People v. Mosby* (2004) 33 Cal.4th 353, 365, fns. 2, 3 [15 Cal.Rptr.3d 262, 92 P.3d 841].) Administering an intoxicating substance or poison to the victim in order to take property constitutes force. (*People v. Dreas* (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 623, 628–629 [200 Cal.Rptr. 586]; see also *People v. Wright* (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 203, 209–210 [59 Cal.Rptr.2d 316] [explaining force for purposes of robbery and contrasting it with force required for assault].)

### ***Force—When Applied***

The application of force or fear may be used when taking the property or when carrying it away. (*People v. Cooper* (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1158, 1165, fn. 8 [282 Cal.Rptr. 450, 811 P.2d 742]; *People v. Pham* (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 61, 65–67 [18 Cal.Rptr.2d 636]; *People v. Estes* (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 23, 27–28 [194 Cal.Rptr. 909].)

### ***Immediate Presence***

Property that is 80 feet away or around the corner of the same block from a forcibly held victim is not too far away, as a matter of law, to be outside the victim's immediate presence. (*People v. Harris* (1994) 9 Cal.4th 407, 415–419 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d 200, 886 P.2d 1193]; see also *People v. Prieto* (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 210, 214 [18 Cal.Rptr.2d 761] [reviewing cases where victim is distance away from property taken].) Property has been found to be within a person's immediate presence when the victim is lured away from his or her property and force is

subsequently used to accomplish the theft or escape (*People v. Webster* (1991) 54 Cal.3d 411, 440–442 [285 Cal.Rptr. 31, 814 P.2d 1273]) or when the victim abandons the property out of fear (*People v. Dominguez* (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1342, 1348–1349 [15 Cal.Rptr.2d 46].)

### ***Multiple Victims***

Multiple counts of robbery are permissible when there are multiple victims even if only one taking occurred. (*People v. Ramos* (1982) 30 Cal.3d 553, 589 [180 Cal.Rptr. 266, 639 P.2d 908], reversed on other grounds *California v. Ramos* (1983) 463 U.S. 992 [103 S.Ct. 3446, 77 L.Ed.2d 1171]; *People v. Miles* (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 364, 369, fn. 5 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 87] [multiple punishment permitted].) Conversely, a defendant commits only one robbery, no matter how many items are taken from a single victim pursuant to a single plan. (*People v. Brito* (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 316, 325–326, fn. 8 [283 Cal.Rptr. 441].)

### ***Value***

The property taken can be of small or minimal value. (*People v. Simmons* (1946) 28 Cal.2d 699, 705 [172 P.2d 18]; *People v. Thomas* (1941) 45 Cal.App.2d 128, 134–135 [113 P.2d 706].) The property does not have to be taken for material gain. All that is necessary is that the defendant intended to permanently deprive the person of the property. (*People v. Green* (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 57 [164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468], disapproved on other grounds in *People v. Hall* (1986) 41 Cal.3d 826, 834, fn. 3 [226 Cal.Rptr. 112, 718 P.2d 99].)

## **SECONDARY SOURCES**

5 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property, § 85.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.10 (Matthew Bender).

## 1601. Robbery in Concert (Pen. Code, § 213(a)(1)(A))

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The defendant[s] [\_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] if not all defendants in trial charged with this count>] (is/are) charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with robbery by acting in concert [with \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] or description[s] of uncharged participant[s]>] [in violation of Penal Code section 213(a)(1)(A)].

To prove that a defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant personally committed or aided and abetted a robbery;
2. When (he/ [or] she) did so, the defendant voluntarily acted with two or more other people who also committed or aided and abetted the commission of the robbery;

AND

3. The robbery was committed in an inhabited (dwelling/vessel/floating home/trailer coach/part of a building).

A (dwelling/vessel/floating home/trailer coach/part of a building) is *inhabited* if someone lives there and either is present or has left but intends to return.

[A *dwelling* includes any (structure/garage/office/ \_\_\_\_\_) that is attached to the house and functionally connected with it.]

To decide whether the defendant[s] [or \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] or description[s] of uncharged participant[s]>] committed robbery, please refer to the separate instructions that I (will give/have given) you on that crime. To decide whether the defendant[s] [or \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] or description[s] of uncharged participant[s]>] aided and abetted robbery, please refer to the separate instructions that I (will give/have given) you on aiding and abetting. You must apply those instructions when you decide whether the People have proved robbery in concert.

<MAKE CERTAIN THAT ALL APPROPRIATE INSTRUCTIONS ON ROBBERY AND AIDING AND ABETTING ARE GIVEN.>

[To prove the crime of robbery in concert, the People do not have to prove a prearranged plan or scheme to commit robbery.]

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New January 2006



**BENCH NOTES*****Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

The court **must** also give CALCRIM No. 1600, *Robbery*, and all necessary instructions on aiding and abetting (see CALCRIM Nos. 400–404).

If supported by the evidence, give on request the final bracketed paragraph regarding the lack of a prearranged plan. (See *People v. Calimee* (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 337, 341–342 [122 Cal.Rptr. 658].)

**AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 213(a)(1)(A).
- Acting in Concert. *People v. Adams* (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 412, 429, 444–446 [23 Cal.Rptr.2d 512]; *People v. Caldwell* (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 947, 951–952 [200 Cal.Rptr. 508]; *People v. Calimee* (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 337, 341–342 [122 Cal.Rptr. 658] [in context of sodomy in concert].
- Inhabited. See Pen. Code, § 459; *People v. Jackson* (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1185, 1188 [8 Cal.Rptr.2d 239].

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property, § 85.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.10[3] (Matthew Bender).



## 1602. Robbery: Degrees (Pen. Code, § 212.5)

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**Robbery is divided into two degrees. If you conclude that the defendant committed a robbery, you must then decide the degree.**

**To prove that the defendant is guilty of first degree robbery, the People must prove that:**

**[The robbery was committed in an inhabited (dwelling/vessel/floating home/trailer coach/part of a building). A (dwelling/vessel/floating home/trailer coach/part of a building) is inhabited if someone lives there and either is present or has left but intends to return.]**

**[The robbery was committed while the person robbed was using or had just used an ATM machine and was still near the machine.]**

**[The robbery was committed while the person robbed was performing (his/her) duties as the driver of or was a passenger on (a/an) (bus/taxi/cable car/streetcar/trackless trolley/ \_\_\_\_\_ <other kind of vehicle used to transport people>).]**

**All other robberies are of the second degree.**

**The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the robbery was first degree rather than a lesser crime. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of first degree robbery.**

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2015*

### **BENCH NOTES**

#### ***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction if first degree robbery has been charged, or if the prosecution is seeking a first degree conviction based on the facts. Give one of the three bracketed paragraphs defining the elements of first degree robbery.

### **AUTHORITY**

- Determination of Degrees. Pen. Code, § 212.5.
- Floating Home Defined. Health & Saf. Code, § 18075.55(d).
- Trailer Coach Defined. Veh. Code, § 635; Health & Saf. Code, § 18009.3.
- Vessel Defined. Harb. & Nav. Code, § 21.
- Inhabitation. *People v. Jackson* (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1185, 1188 [8 Cal.Rptr.2d 239].
- Inhabited Jail Cell. *People v. McDade* (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 118, 127–128 [280 Cal.Rptr. 912].

**RELATED ISSUES*****Hotel Room***

A hotel room is an “inhabited dwelling house” for purposes of first degree robbery. (*People v. Fleetwood* (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 982, 987–988 [217 Cal.Rptr. 612].)

***Robbery in One’s Own Residence***

A robbery committed in one’s own residence is still first degree robbery. (Pen. Code, § 212.5; *People v. Alvarado* (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 1165, 1169 [274 Cal.Rptr. 452] [defendant robbed two salesmen after bringing them back to his hotel room]; *People v. McCullough* (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1298, 1300 [12 Cal.Rptr.2d 341].)

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property, § 86.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.10[1][a][i], [3] (Matthew Bender).

## 1603. Robbery: Intent of Aider and Abettor

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**To be guilty of robbery as an aider and abettor, the defendant must have formed the intent to aid and abet the commission of the robbery before or while a perpetrator carried away the property to a place of temporary safety.**

**A perpetrator has reached a place of temporary safety with the property if he or she has successfully escaped from the scene, is no longer being pursued, and has unchallenged possession of the property.**

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*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction when the defendant is charged with aiding and abetting a robbery and an issue exists about when the defendant allegedly formed the intent to aid and abet. (*People v. Cooper* (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1158, 1165–1166 [282 Cal.Rptr. 450, 811 P.2d 742] [defendant who drove get-away car asserted he did not intend to aid and abet at time of robbery].)

This instruction **must** be given with CALCRIM No. 401, *Aiding and Abetting: Intended Crimes*.

**Do not** give this instruction if the defendant is charged with felony murder.

**Do not** give CALCRIM No. 3261, *While Committing a Felony: Defined-Escape Rule* as a substitute for this instruction.

### AUTHORITY

- Aider and Abettor to Robbery—When Intent Formed. *People v. Cooper* (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1158, 1165–1166 [282 Cal.Rptr. 450, 811 P.2d 742].
- Place of Temporary Safety. *People v. Fields* (1983) 35 Cal.3d 329, 364–368 [197 Cal.Rptr. 803, 673 P.2d 680]; *People v. Johnson* (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 552, 560 [7 Cal.Rptr.2d 23].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Place of Temporary Safety Based on Objective Standard*

Whether the defendant had reached a place of temporary safety is judged on an objective standard. The “issue to be resolved is whether a robber had actually reached a place of temporary safety, not whether the defendant thought that he or she had reached such a location.” (*People v. Johnson* (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 552, 560 [7 Cal.Rptr.2d 23].)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 140, 1109

*Challenges to Crimes*, § 140.10, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*,  
§ 142.10[1][b], [e] (Matthew Bender).

**1604–1649. Reserved for Future Use**

## B. CARJACKING

### 1650. Carjacking (Pen. Code, § 215)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with carjacking [in violation of Penal Code section 215].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant took a motor vehicle;
2. The vehicle was taken from the immediate presence of a person who possessed the vehicle or was its passenger;
3. The vehicle was taken against that person's will;
4. The defendant used force or fear to take the vehicle or to prevent that person from resisting;

AND

5. When the defendant used force or fear to take the vehicle, (he/she) intended to deprive the other person of possession of the vehicle either temporarily or permanently.

The defendant's intent to take the vehicle must have been formed before or during the time (he/she) used force or fear. If the defendant did not form this required intent until after using the force or fear, then (he/she) did not commit carjacking.

[A *motor vehicle* includes a (passenger vehicle/motorcycle/motor scooter/bus/school bus/commercial vehicle/truck tractor and trailer/\_\_\_\_\_ <insert other type of motor vehicle>).]

[The term *motor vehicle* is defined in another instruction to which you should refer.]

A person *takes* something when he or she gains possession of it and moves it some distance. The distance moved may be short.

[An act is done *against a person's will* if that person does not consent to the act. In order to *consent*, a person must act freely and voluntarily and know the nature of the act.]

[Two or more people may possess something at the same time.]

[A person does not have to actually hold or touch something to possess it. It is enough if the person has (control over it/ [or] the right to control it), either personally or through another person.]

[*Fear*, as used here, means fear of (injury to the person himself or

herself[,] [or] injury to the person’s family or property[,] [or] immediate injury to someone else present during the incident or to that person’s property.)]

[A vehicle is within a person’s *immediate presence* if it is sufficiently within his or her control so that he or she could keep possession of it if not prevented by force or fear.]

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*New January 2006; Revised March 2017, March 2019*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

There is no sua sponte duty to define the terms “possession,” “fear,” and “immediate presence.” (*People v. Anderson* (1966) 64 Cal.2d 633, 639 [51 Cal.Rptr. 238, 414 P.2d 366] [fear]; *People v. Mungia* (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1703, 1708 [286 Cal.Rptr. 394] [fear].) These definitions are discussed in the Commentary to CALCRIM No. 1600, *Robbery*.

Give the bracketed definition of “against a person’s will” on request.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 215.
- Fear Defined. Pen. Code, § 212.
- Motor Vehicle Defined. Veh. Code, § 415.
- Immediate Presence Defined. *People v. Hayes* (1990) 52 Cal.3d 577, 626–627 [276 Cal.Rptr. 874, 802 P.2d 376]; *People v. Medina* (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 643, 650 [46 Cal.Rptr.2d 112].
- Possession Defined. *People v. Bekele* (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1461 [39 Cal.Rptr.2d 797], disapproved on other grounds in *People v. Rodriguez* (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 13–14 [82 Cal.Rptr.2d 413, 971 P.2d 618]; see *People v. Hamilton* (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1143–1144 [47 Cal.Rptr.2d 343].
- Carjacking Crime Against Possession, not Ownership, of Vehicle. *People v. Cabrera* (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 695, 701–702 [61 Cal.Rptr.3d 373].
- Sufficient Force. *People v. Hudson* (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 831, 837 [217 Cal.Rptr.3d 775]; *People v. Lopez* (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 1230, 1237 [214 Cal.Rptr.3d 618].

## LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Attempted Carjacking. Pen. Code, §§ 663, 215; see *People v. Jones* (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 616, 628 [89 Cal.Rptr.2d 485].

Neither theft or robbery is a necessarily included offense of carjacking. (*People v.*

*Ortega* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 686, 693 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 489, 968 P.2d 48] [theft]; *People v. Dominguez* (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 410, 419 [45 Cal.Rptr.2d 153] [robbery].) Vehicle theft (Veh. Code, § 10851(a)) is not a lesser included offense of carjacking. (*People v. Montoya* (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1031, 1035 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 902, 94 P.3d 1098].)

Attempted grand theft auto is not a lesser included offense of attempted carjacking. *People v. Marquez* (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1064, 1066 [62 Cal.Rptr.3d 31].

## RELATED ISSUES

### *Force—Timing*

Force or fear must be used against the victim to gain possession of the vehicle. The timing, however, “in no way depends on whether the confrontation and use of force or fear occurs before, while, or after the defendant initially takes possession of the vehicle.” (*People v. O’Neil* (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1126, 1133 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 72].)

### *Asportation—Felonious Taking*

“Felonious taking” has the same meaning in carjacking as in robbery. (*People v. Lopez* (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1051, 1062 [6 Cal.Rptr.3d 432, 79 P.3d 548].) “To satisfy the asportation requirement for robbery, no great movement is required, and it is not necessary that the property be taken out of the physical presence of the victim. [S]light movement is enough to satisfy the asportation requirement.” (*Id.* at p. 1061 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted].) The taking can occur whether or not the victim remains with the car. (*People v. Duran* (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1371, 1375–1377 [106 Cal.Rptr.2d 812].) Carjacking can also occur when a defendant forcibly takes a victim’s car keys, not just when a defendant takes a car from the victim’s presence. (*People v. Hoard* (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 599, 608–609 [126 Cal.Rptr.2d 855] [although victim was not physically present in the parking lot when defendant drove the car away, she had been forced to relinquish her car keys].)

## SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Property, §§ 114–117.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, §§ 142.10[2][b], 142.10A (Matthew Bender).

**1651–1699. Reserved for Future Use**





# **BURGLARY AND RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY**

## **A. BURGLARY**

- 1700. Burglary (Pen. Code, § 459)
- 1701. Burglary: Degrees (Pen. Code, § 460)
- 1702. Burglary: Intent of Aider and Abettor
- 1703. Shoplifting (Pen. Code, § 459.5)
- 1704–1749. Reserved for Future Use

## **B. RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY AND RELATED INSTRUCTIONS**

- 1750. Receiving Stolen Property (Pen. Code, § 496(a))
- 1751. Defense to Receiving Stolen Property: Innocent Intent
- 1752. Owning or Operating a Chop Shop (Veh. Code, § 10801)
- 1753–1799. Reserved for Future Use



## A. BURGLARY

### 1700. Burglary (Pen. Code, § 459)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with burglary [in violation of Penal Code section 459].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant entered (a/an) (building/room within a building/locked vehicle/structure/\_\_\_\_\_ <insert other statutory target>);

[AND]

2. When (he/she) entered (a/an) (building/room within the building/locked vehicle/structure/ <insert other statutory target>), (he/she) intended to commit (theft/ [or] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert one or more felonies>).

<If the evidence supports a defense theory that the crime was shoplifting as defined by Penal Code section 459.5, give paragraph 3A and the appropriate following optional paragraphs>

[AND]

- [3A. The value of the property taken or intended to be taken was more than \$950.00](;/.)]

[OR]

- [3B. The structure that the defendant entered was a noncommercial establishment(;/.)]

[OR]

- [3C. The structure was a commercial establishment that the defendant entered during non-business hours.]]

To decide whether the defendant intended to commit (theft/ [or] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert one or more felonies>), please refer to the separate instructions that I (will give/have given) you on (that/those) crime[s].

<Give the following bracketed paragraph if the second degree is the only possible degree of the charged crime for which the jury may return a verdict.>

[If you find the defendant guilty of burglary, it is burglary of the second degree.]

A burglary was committed if the defendant entered with the intent to

commit (theft/ [or] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert one or more felonies>). The defendant does not need to have actually committed (theft/ [or] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert one or more felonies>) as long as (he/she) entered with the intent to do so. [The People do not have to prove that the defendant actually committed (theft/ [or] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert one or more felonies>).]

[Under the law of burglary, a person *enters a building* if some part of his or her body [or some object under his or her control] penetrates the area inside the building's outer boundary.]

[A building's *outer boundary* includes the area inside a window screen.]

[An attached balcony designed to be entered only from inside of a private, residential apartment on the second or higher floor of a building is inside a building's *outer boundary*.]

[The People allege that the defendant intended to commit (theft/ [or] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert one or more felonies>). You may not find the defendant guilty of burglary unless you all agree that (he/she) intended to commit one of those crimes at the time of the entry. You do not all have to agree on which one of those crimes (he/she) intended.]

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*New January 2006; Revised October 2010, February 2012, February 2013, August 2015*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If the crime charged is shoplifting, give CALCRIM No. 1703, Shoplifting, instead of this instruction.

When the People allege the defendant has a prior conviction for an offense listed in Penal Code section 667(e)(2)(C)(iv) or for an offense requiring registration pursuant to subdivision (c) of section 290, give CALCRIM No. 3100, *Prior Conviction: Nonbifurcated Trial* or CALCRIM No. 3101, *Prior Conviction: Bifurcated Trial*.

If second degree burglary is the only possible degree of burglary that the jury may return as their verdict, do not give CALCRIM No. 1701, *Burglary: Degrees*.

Although actual commission of the underlying theft or felony is not an element of burglary (*People v. Montoya* (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1027, 1041–1042 [31 Cal.Rptr.2d 128, 874 P.2d 903]), the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct that the defendant must have intended to commit a felony and has a **sua sponte** duty to define the elements of the underlying felony. (*People v. Smith* (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 698, 706 [144 Cal.Rptr. 330]; see also *People v. Hughes* (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 349 [116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401, 39 P.3d 432].) Give all appropriate instructions on theft or the felony alleged.

If the area alleged to have been entered is something other than a building or locked vehicle, insert the appropriate statutory target in the blanks in elements 1 and 2. Penal Code section 459 specifies the structures and places that may be the targets of burglary. The list includes a house, room, apartment, tenement, shop, warehouse, store, mill, barn, stable, outhouse or other building, tent, vessel, floating home as defined in Health and Safety Code section 18075.55(d), railroad car, locked or sealed cargo container whether or not mounted on a vehicle, trailer coach as defined in Vehicle Code section 635, house car as defined in Vehicle Code section 362, inhabited camper as defined in Vehicle Code section 243, locked vehicle as defined by the Vehicle Code, aircraft as defined in Public Utilities Code section 21012, or mine or any underground portion thereof. (See Pen. Code, § 459.)

On request, give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “Under the law of burglary,” if there is evidence that only a portion of the defendant’s body, or an instrument, tool, or other object under his or control, entered the building. (See *People v. Valencia* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1, 7–8 [120 Cal.Rptr.2d 131, 46 P.3d 920]; *People v. Davis* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 712, 717–722 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 958 P.2d 1083].)

On request, give the bracketed sentence defining “outer boundary” if there is evidence that the outer boundary of a building for purposes of burglary was a window screen. (See *People v. Valencia* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1, 12–13 [120 Cal.Rptr.2d 131, 46 P.3d 920].)

Whenever a private, residential apartment and its balcony are on the second or higher floor of a building, and the balcony is designed to be entered only from inside the apartment, that balcony is part of the apartment and its railing constitutes the apartment’s “outer boundary.” (*People v. Yarbrough* (2012) 54 Cal.4th 889, 894 [144 Cal.Rptr.3d 164, 281 P.3d 68].)

If multiple underlying felonies are charged, give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “The People allege that the defendant intended to commit either.” (*People v. Failla* (1966) 64 Cal.2d 560, 569 [51 Cal.Rptr. 103, 414 P.2d 39]; *People v. Griffin* (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 741, 750 [109 Cal.Rptr.2d 273].)

If the defendant is charged with first degree burglary, give CALCRIM No. 1701, *Burglary: Degrees*.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 459, 459.5.
- Instructional Requirements. *People v. Failla* (1966) 64 Cal.2d 560, 564, 568–569 [51 Cal.Rptr. 103, 414 P.2d 39]; *People v. Smith* (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 698, 706–711 [144 Cal.Rptr. 330]; *People v. Montoya* (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1027, 1041–1042 [31 Cal.Rptr.2d 128, 874 P.2d 903].
- Burden for Consent Defense Is to Raise Reasonable Doubt. *People v. Sherow* (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1296, 1308–1309 [128 Cal.Rptr.3d 255].

## LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Attempted Burglary. Pen. Code, §§ 663, 459.
- Tampering With a Vehicle. Veh. Code, § 10852; *People v. Mooney* (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 502, 504–507 [193 Cal.Rptr. 381] [if burglary of automobile charged].

## RELATED ISSUES

### ***Auto Burglary—Entry of Locked Vehicle***

Under Penal Code section 459, forced entry of a locked vehicle constitutes burglary. (*People v. Young K.* (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 861, 863 [57 Cal.Rptr.2d 12].) However, there must be evidence of forced entry. (See *People v. Woods* (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 226, 228–231 [169 Cal.Rptr. 179] [if entry occurs through window deliberately left open, some evidence of forced entry must exist for burglary conviction]; *People v. Malcolm* (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 217, 220–223 [120 Cal.Rptr. 667] [pushing open broken wing lock on window, reaching one’s arm inside vehicle, and unlocking car door evidence of forced entry].) Opening an unlocked passenger door and lifting a trunk latch to gain access to the trunk is not an auto burglary. (*People v. Allen* (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 909, 917–918 [103 Cal.Rptr.2d 626].)

### ***Auto Burglary—Definition of Locked***

To lock, for purposes of auto burglary, is “to make fast by interlinking or interlacing of parts . . . [such that] some force [is] required to break the seal to permit entry . . . .” (*In re Lamont R.* (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 244, 247 [245 Cal.Rptr. 870], quoting *People v. Massie* (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 812, 817 [51 Cal.Rptr. 18] [vehicle was not locked where chains were wrapped around the doors and hooked together]; compare *People v. Malcolm* (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 217, 220–223 [120 Cal.Rptr. 667] [vehicle with locked doors but broken wing lock that prevented window from being locked, was for all intents and purposes a locked vehicle].)

### ***Auto Burglary—Intent to Steal***

Breaking into a locked car with the intent to steal the vehicle constitutes auto burglary. (*People v. Teamer* (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1454, 1457–1461 [25 Cal.Rptr.2d 296]; see also *People v. Blalock* (1971) 20 Cal.App.3d 1078, 1082 [98 Cal.Rptr. 231] [auto burglary includes entry into locked trunk of vehicle].) However, breaking into the headlamp housings of an automobile with the intent to steal the headlamps is not auto burglary. (*People v. Young K.* (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 861, 864 [57 Cal.Rptr.2d 12] [stealing headlamps, windshield wipers, or hubcaps are thefts, or attempted thefts, auto tampering, or acts of vandalism, not burglaries].)

### ***Building***

A building has been defined for purposes of burglary as “any structure which has walls on all sides and is covered by a roof.” (*In re Amber S.* (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 185, 187 [39 Cal.Rptr.2d 672].) Courts have construed “building” broadly and found the following structures sufficient for purposes of burglary: a telephone booth, a popcorn stand on wheels, a powder magazine dug out of a hillside, a wire chicken coop, and a loading dock constructed of chain link fence. (*People v. Brooks* (1982)

133 Cal.App.3d 200, 204–205 [183 Cal.Rptr. 773].) However, the definition of building is not without limits and courts have focused on “whether the nature of a structure’s composition is such that a reasonable person would expect some protection from unauthorized intrusions.” (*In re Amber S.* (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 185, 187 [39 Cal.Rptr.2d 672] [open pole barn is not a building]; see *People v. Knight* (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 1420, 1423–1424 [252 Cal.Rptr. 17] [electric company’s “gang box,” a container large enough to hold people, is not a building; such property is protected by Penal Code sections governing theft].)

### ***Outer Boundary***

A building’s outer boundary includes any element that encloses an area into which a reasonable person would believe that a member of the general public could not pass without authorization. Under this test, a window screen is part of the outer boundary of a building for purposes of burglary. (*People v. Valencia* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1, 12–13 [120 Cal.Rptr.2d 131, 46 P.3d 920].) Whether penetration into an area behind a window screen amounts to an entry of a building within the meaning of the burglary statute is a question of law. The instructions must resolve such a legal issue for the jury. (*Id.* at p. 16.)

### ***Attached Residential Balconies***

An attached residential balcony is part of an inhabited dwelling. (*People v. Jackson* (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 918, 924–925 [118 Cal.Rptr.3d 623] [balcony was “functionally interconnected to and immediately contiguous to . . . [part of] the apartment . . . used for ‘residential activities’ ”]; but see dictum in *People v. Valencia* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1, 11, fn. 5 [120 Cal.Rptr.2d 131, 46 P.3d 920] [“unenclosed balcony” is not structure satisfying “reasonable belief test”].)

### ***Theft***

Any one of the different theories of theft will satisfy the larcenous intent required for burglary. (*People v. Dingle* (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 21, 29–30 [219 Cal.Rptr. 707] [entry into building to use person’s telephone fraudulently]; *People v. Nguyen* (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 28, 30–31 [46 Cal.Rptr.2d 840].)

### ***Burglarizing One’s Own Home—Possessory Interest***

A person cannot burglarize his or her own home as long as he or she has an unconditional possessory right of entry. (*People v. Gauze* (1975) 15 Cal.3d 709, 714 [125 Cal.Rptr. 773, 542 P.2d 1365].) However, a family member who has moved out of the family home commits burglary if he or she makes an unauthorized entry with a felonious intent, since he or she has no claim of a right to enter that residence. (*In re Richard M.* (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 7, 15–16 [252 Cal.Rptr. 36] [defendant, who lived at youth rehabilitation center, properly convicted of burglary for entering his parent’s home and taking property]; *People v. Davenport* (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 885, 889–893 [268 Cal.Rptr. 501] [defendant convicted of burglarizing cabin owned and occupied by his estranged wife and her parents]; *People v. Sears* (1965) 62 Cal.2d 737, 746 [44 Cal.Rptr. 330, 401 P.2d 938], overruled on other grounds by *People v. Cahill* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 478, 494, 510 [20 Cal.Rptr.2d 582, 853 P.2d 1037] [burglary conviction proper where husband had moved out of family home three

weeks before and had no right to enter without permission]; compare *Fortes v. Municipal Court* (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 704, 712–714 [170 Cal.Rptr. 292] [husband had unconditional possessory interest in jointly owned home; his access to the house was not limited and strictly permissive, as in *Sears*.])

### ***Consent***

While lack of consent is not an element of burglary, consent by the owner or occupant of property may constitute a defense to burglary. (*People v. Sherow* (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1296, 1302 [128 Cal.Rptr.3d 255]; *People v. Felix* (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1385, 1397–1398 [28 Cal.Rptr.2d 860]; *People v. Superior Court (Granillo)* (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1478, 1485 [253 Cal.Rptr. 316] [when an undercover officer invites a potential buyer of stolen property into his warehouse of stolen goods, in order to catch would-be buyers, no burglary occurred].) The consent must be express and clear; the owner/occupant must both expressly permit the person to enter and know of the felonious or larcenous intent of the invitee. (*People v. Felix* (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1385, 1397–1398 [28 Cal.Rptr.2d 860].) A person who enters for a felonious purpose, however, may be found guilty of burglary even if he or she enters with the owner’s or occupant’s consent. (*People v. Frye* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 954 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183] [no evidence of unconditional possessory right to enter].) A joint property owner/occupant cannot give consent to a third party to enter and commit a felony on the other owner/occupant. (*People v. Clayton* (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 418, 420–423 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 536] [husband’s consent did not preclude a burglary conviction based upon defendant’s entry of premises with the intent to murder wife].) The defense of consent is established when the evidence raises a reasonable doubt of consent by the owner or occupant. (*People v. Sherow* (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1296, 1309 [128 Cal.Rptr.3d 255]).

### ***Entry by Instrument***

When an entry is made by an instrument, a burglary occurs if the instrument passes the boundary of the building and if the entry is the type that the burglary statute intended to prohibit. (*People v. Davis* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 712, 717–722 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 958 P.2d 1083] [placing forged check in chute of walk-up window of check-cashing facility was not entry for purposes of burglary] disapproving of *People v. Ravenscroft* (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 639, 643–644 [243 Cal.Rptr. 827] [insertion of ATM card into machine was burglary].)

### ***Multiple Convictions***

Courts have adopted different tests for multi-entry burglary cases. In *In re William S.* (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 313, 316–318 [256 Cal.Rptr. 64], the court analogized burglary to sex crimes and adopted the following test formulated in *People v. Hammon* (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 1084, 1099 [236 Cal.Rptr. 822] [multiple penetration case]: “ ‘[W]hen there is a pause . . . sufficient to give defendant a reasonable opportunity to reflect upon his conduct, and the [action by the defendant] is nevertheless renewed, a new and separate crime is committed.’ ” (*In re William S.*, *supra*, 208 Cal.App.3d at p. 317.) The court in *In re William S.* adopted this test



because it was concerned that under certain circumstances, allowing separate convictions for every entry could produce “absurd results.” The court gave this example: where “a thief reaches into a window twice attempting, unsuccessfully, to steal the same potted geranium, he could potentially be convicted of two separate counts.” (*Ibid.*) The *In re William S.* test has been called into serious doubt by *People v. Harrison* (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 332–334 [256 Cal.Rptr. 401, 768 P.2d 1078], which disapproved of *Hammon*. *Harrison* held that for sex crimes each penetration equals a new offense. (*People v. Harrison, supra*, 48 Cal.3d at p. 329.)

The court in *People v. Washington* (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 568 [57 Cal.Rptr.2d 774], a burglary case, agreed with *In re William S.* to the extent that burglary is analogous to crimes of sexual penetration. Following *Harrison*, the court held that each separate entry into a building or structure with the requisite intent is a burglary even if multiple entries are made into the same building or as part of the same plan. (*People v. Washington, supra*, 50 Cal.App.4th at pp. 574–579; see also 2 Witkin and Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (2d. ed. 1999 Supp.) “Multiple Entries,” § 662A, p. 38.) The court further stated that any “concern about absurd results are [sic] better resolved under [Penal Code] section 654, which limits the punishment for separate offenses committed during a single transaction, than by [adopting] a rule that, in effect, creates the new crime of continuous burglary.” (*People v. Washington, supra*, 50 Cal.App.4th at p. 578.)

### **Room**

Penal Code section 459 includes “room” as one of the areas that may be entered for purposes of burglary. (Pen. Code, § 459.) An area within a building or structure is considered a room if there is some designated boundary, such as a partition or counter, separating it from the rest of the building. It is not necessary for the walls or partition to touch the ceiling of the building. (*People v. Mackabee* (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 1250, 1257–1258 [263 Cal.Rptr. 183] [office area set off by counters was a room for purposes of burglary].) Each unit within a structure may constitute a separate “room” for which a defendant can be convicted on separate counts of burglary. (*People v. O’Keefe* (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 517, 521 [271 Cal.Rptr. 769] [individual dormitory rooms]; *People v. Church* (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1151, 1159 [264 Cal.Rptr. 49] [separate business offices in same building].)

Entry into a bedroom within a single-family house with the requisite intent can support a burglary conviction if that intent was formed only after entry into the house. (*People v. Sparks* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 71, 86–87 [120 Cal.Rptr.2d 508, 47 P.3d 289] [“the unadorned word ‘room’ in section 459 reasonably must be given its ordinary meaning”]; see *People v. McCormack* (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 253, 255–257 [285 Cal.Rptr. 504]; *People v. Young* (1884) 65 Cal. 225, 226 [3 P. 813].) However, entry into multiple rooms within one apartment or house cannot support multiple burglary convictions unless it is established that each room is a separate dwelling space, whose occupant has a separate, reasonable expectation of privacy. (*People v.*

*Richardson* (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 570, 575 [11 Cal.Rptr.3d 802]; see also *People v. Thomas* (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 899, 906, fn. 2 [1 Cal.Rptr.2d 434].)

***Temporal or Physical Proximity—Intent to Commit the Felony***

According to some cases, a burglary occurs “if the intent at the time of entry is to commit the offense in the immediate vicinity of the place entered by defendant; if the entry is made as a means of facilitating the commission of the theft or felony; and if the two places are so closely connected that intent and consummation of the crime would constitute a single and practically continuous transaction.” (*People v. Wright* (1962) 206 Cal.App.2d 184, 191 [23 Cal.Rptr. 734] [defendant entered office with intent to steal tires from attached open-air shed].) This test was followed in *People v. Nance* (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d 925, 931–932 [102 Cal.Rptr. 266] [defendant entered a gas station to turn on outside pumps in order to steal gas]; *People v. Nunley* (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 225, 230–232 [214 Cal.Rptr. 82] [defendant entered lobby of apartment building, intending to burglarize one of the units]; and *People v. Ortega* (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 691, 695–696 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 246] [defendant entered a home to facilitate the crime of extortion].

However, in *People v. Kwok* (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1236 [75 Cal.Rptr.2d 40], the court applied a less restrictive test, focusing on just the facilitation factor. A burglary is committed if the defendant enters a building in order to facilitate commission of theft or a felony. The defendant need not intend to commit the target crime in the same building or on the same occasion as the entry. (*People v. Kwok, supra*, 63 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1246–1248 [defendant entered building to copy a key in order to facilitate later assault on victim].) The court commented that “the ‘continuous transaction test’ and the ‘immediate vicinity test’ . . . are artifacts of the particular factual contexts of *Wright*, *Nance*, and *Nunley*.” (*Id.* at p. 1247.) With regards to the *Ortega* case, the *Kwok* court noted that even though the *Ortega* court “purported to rely on the ‘continuous transaction’ factor of *Wright*, [the decision] rested principally on the ‘facilitation’ factor.” (*Id.* at pp. 1247–1248.) While *Kwok* and *Ortega* dispensed with the elemental requirements of spatial and temporal proximity, they did so only where the subject entry is “closely connected” with, and is made in order to facilitate, the intended crime. (*People v. Griffin* (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 741, 749 [109 Cal.Rptr.2d 273].)

## SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property, §§ 128–129.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 143, *Crimes Against Property*, § 143.10 (Matthew Bender).

## 1701. Burglary: Degrees (Pen. Code, § 460)

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Burglary is divided into two degrees. If you conclude that the defendant committed a burglary, you must then decide the degree.

First degree burglary is the burglary of an inhabited (house [or a room within an inhabited house]/vessel/floating home/trailer coach/part of a building).

A (house/vessel/floating home/trailer coach/part of a building) is *inhabited* if someone uses it as a dwelling, whether or not someone is inside at the time of the alleged entry.

[A (house/vessel/floating home/trailer coach/part of a building) is *inhabited* if someone used it as a dwelling and left only because a natural or other disaster caused him or her to leave.]

[A (house/vessel/floating home/trailer coach/part of a building) is not *inhabited* if the former residents have moved out and do not intend to return, even if some personal property remains inside.]

[A *house* includes any (structure/garage/office/ \_\_\_\_\_) that is attached to the house and functionally connected with it.]

[A *vessel* includes ships of all kinds, steamboats, steamships, canal boats, barges, sailing vessels, and any structure intended to transport people or merchandise over water.]

[A *floating home* is a floating structure that:

- (1) is intended to be used as a stationary waterborne residence;
- (2) does not have its own mode of power;
- (3) is dependent on a continuous utility link originating on shore;

AND

- (4) has a permanent continuous hookup to a sewage system on shore.]

[A *trailer coach* is a vehicle without its own mode of power, designed to be pulled by a motor vehicle. It is made for human habitation or human occupancy and for carrying property.]

[A *trailer coach* is also a park trailer that is intended for human habitation for recreational or seasonal use only and:

- (1) has a floor area of no more than 400 square feet;
- (2) is not more than 14 feet wide;
- (3) is built on a single chassis;

AND

(4) may only be transported on public highways with a permit.]

All other burglaries are second degree.

The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the burglary was first degree burglary. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of first degree burglary.

New January 2006

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction if there is evidence supporting first degree burglary.

## AUTHORITY

- Determination of Degrees. Pen. Code, § 460.
- Floating Home Defined. Health & Saf. Code, § 18075.55(d).
- Inhabitation Defined. Pen. Code, § 459.
- Definition of “Inhabited” Properly Excludes Word “Currently.” *People v. Meredith* (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1257, 1264–1265 [95 Cal.Rptr.3d 297].
- Trailer Coach Defined. Veh. Code, § 635; Health & Saf. Code, § 18009.3.
- Vessel Defined. Harb. & Nav. Code, § 21.
- Room Within Inhabited House. *People v. Sparks* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 71, 86–87 [120 Cal.Rptr.2d 508, 47 P.3d 289].
- House Not Inhabited if Former Residents Not Returning. *People v. Cardona* (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 481, 483 [191 Cal.Rptr. 109].

## RELATED ISSUES

### *Dwelling Houses for Purposes of First Degree Burglary*

A “house” has been broadly defined as “any structure which has walls on all sides and is covered by a roof.” (*People v. Wilson* (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1483, 1487–1489 [15 Cal.Rptr.2d 77], citing *People v. Buyle* (1937) 22 Cal.App.2d 143, 148 [70 P.2d 955].) In determining whether a structure is part of an inhabited dwelling, the essential inquiry is whether the structure is “functionally interconnected with and immediately contiguous to other portions of the house.” (*People v. Ingram* (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1397, 1404 [48 Cal.Rptr.2d 256], disapproved on another ground in *People v. Dotson* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 547, 559 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 423, 941 P.2d 56]; *People v. Rodriguez* (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1101, 1107, 1113 [92 Cal.Rptr.2d 236].) The following structures have each been held to be a dwelling house or part of a dwelling house for purposes of first degree burglary:

- a. A hospital room to which a patient was assigned overnight. (*People v. Fond* (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 127, 131–132 [83 Cal.Rptr.2d 660].)
- b. An occupied hotel room. (*People v. Fleetwood* (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 982, 988 [217 Cal.Rptr. 612].)
- c. A tent. (*Wilson, supra*, 11 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1487–1489.)
- d. A common-area laundry room located under the same roof as and contiguous to occupied apartments. (*People v. Woods* (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 345, 348–350 [75 Cal.Rptr.2d 917].)
- e. An attached garage. (*People v. Fox* (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1041, 1046–1047 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 424]; *People v. Moreno* (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 109, 112 [204 Cal.Rptr. 17].)
- f. A home office sharing a common wall and roof with the living quarters. (*People v. Rodriguez* (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1101, 1107–1112 [92 Cal.Rptr.2d 236].)
- g. A storeroom connected to a house by a breezeway. (*People v. Coutu* (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 192, 193 [217 Cal.Rptr. 191].)
- h. An unoccupied but occasionally used guest house. (*People v. Hines* (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 945, 949–951 [259 Cal.Rptr. 128], disapproved of on other grounds in *People v. Allen* (1999) 21 Cal.4th 846, 862–866 [89 Cal.Rptr.2d 279, 984 P.2d 486].)

### ***Mistake Concerning Residential Nature of Building***

A reasonable but mistaken belief that a dwelling house is not inhabited is not a defense to first degree burglary. (*People v. Parker* (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 818, 821–824 [223 Cal.Rptr. 284].) The Penal Code does not make knowledge that a “dwelling house” is “inhabited” an element of first degree burglary. (See Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460; *People v. Guthrie* (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 832, 843–848 [193 Cal.Rptr. 54].)

## **SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property, §§ 129–133.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 140, *Challenges to Crimes*, § 140.10, Ch. 143, *Crimes Against Property*, § 143.10[1][b], [d] (Matthew Bender).

## 1702. Burglary: Intent of Aider and Abettor

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**To be guilty of burglary as an aider and abettor, the defendant must have known of the perpetrator's unlawful purpose and must have formed the intent to aid, facilitate, promote, instigate, or encourage commission of the burglary before the perpetrator finally left the structure.**

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*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction when the defendant is charged with aiding and abetting a burglary and there is an issue about when the defendant allegedly formed the intent to aid and abet.

This instruction **must** be given with CALCRIM No. 401, *Aiding and Abetting: Intended Crimes*.

**Do not** give this instruction if the defendant is charged with felony murder.

### AUTHORITY

- Aider and Abettor to Burglary—When Intent Formed. *People v. Montoya* (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1027, 1044–1046 [31 Cal.Rptr.2d 128, 874 P.2d 903].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property, § 128.

## 1703. Shoplifting (Pen. Code, § 459.5)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with shoplifting [in violation of Penal Code section 459.5].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant entered a commercial establishment;
2. When the defendant entered the commercial establishment, it was open during regular business hours;

AND

3. When (he/she) entered the commercial establishment, (he/she) intended to commit theft.

To decide whether the defendant intended to commit theft, please refer to the separate instructions that I (will give/have given) you on that crime.

The defendant does not need to have actually committed theft as long as (he/she) entered with the intent to do so.

[A person *enters a structure* if some part of his or her body [or some object under his or her control] penetrates the area inside the structure's outer boundary.]

[A structure's *outer boundary* includes the area inside a window screen.]

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*New August 2015*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

To instruct on the necessary intent to commit theft, see CALCRIM No. 1800, *Theft by Larceny*.

When the People allege the defendant has a prior conviction for an offense listed in Penal Code section 667(e)(2)(C)(iv) or for an offense requiring registration pursuant to subdivision (c) of section 290, give CALCRIM No. 3100, *Prior Conviction: Nonbifurcated Trial* or CALCRIM No. 3101, *Prior Conviction: Bifurcated Trial*.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 459.5.
- Burden for Consent Defense Is to Raise Reasonable Doubt. *People v. Sherow*

(2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1296, 1308–1309 [128 Cal.Rptr.3d 255].

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2015 Supp.) Crimes Against Property, § 15.

**1704–1749. Reserved for Future Use**



## B. RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY AND RELATED INSTRUCTIONS

### 1750. Receiving Stolen Property (Pen. Code, § 496(a))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with receiving stolen property [in violation of Penal Code section 496(a)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant (bought/received/sold/aided in selling/concealed or withheld from its owner/aided in concealing or withholding from its owner) property that had been (stolen/obtained by extortion);

[AND]

2. When the defendant (bought/received/sold/aided in selling/concealed or withheld/aided in concealing or withholding) the property, (he/she) knew that the property had been (stolen/obtained by extortion)(;/.)

<Give element 3 when instructing on knowledge of presence of property; see Bench Notes.>

[AND]

3. The defendant actually knew of the presence of the property.]

[Property is *stolen* if it was obtained by any type of theft, or by burglary or robbery. [Theft includes obtaining property by larceny, embezzlement, false pretense, or trick.]]

[Property is *obtained by extortion* if: (1) the property was obtained from another person with that person's consent, and (2) that person's consent was obtained through the use of force or fear.]

[To *receive property* means to take possession and control of it. Mere presence near or access to the property is not enough.] [Two or more people can possess the property at the same time.] [A person does not have to actually hold or touch something to possess it. It is enough if the person has [control over it] [or] [the right to control it], either personally or through another person.]

[If you find the defendant guilty of receiving stolen property, you must then decide whether the value of the property received was more than \$950. If you have a reasonable doubt whether the property received has a value of more than \$950, you must find this allegation has not been proved.]

*New January 2006; Revised August 2006, June 2007, October 2010, August 2014, August 2015*

## BENCH NOTES

### ***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If the defendant is also charged with a theft crime, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct that the defendant may not be convicted of receiving stolen property if he is convicted of the theft of the same property. (CALCRIM No. 3516, *Multiple Counts: Alternative Charges for One Event—Dual Conviction Prohibited*; see Pen. Code, § 496(a); *People v. Ceja* (2010) 49 Cal.4th 1, 6–7 [108 Cal.Rptr.3d 568, 229 P.3d 995]; *People v. Garza* (2005) 35 Cal.4th 866, 881–882 [28 Cal.Rptr.3d 335, 111 P.3d 310] [upholding dual convictions for receiving stolen property and a violation of Vehicle Code section 10851(a) as a nontheft conviction for post-theft driving].)

If there are factual issues regarding whether the received stolen property was taken with the intent to permanently deprive the owner of possession, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the complete definitions of theft. *People v. MacArthur* (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 275 [47 Cal.Rptr.3d 736]. For instructions defining extortion and the different forms of theft, see Series 1800, Theft and Extortion. On request, the court should give the complete instruction on the elements of theft or extortion.

If substantial evidence exists, a specific instruction must be given on request that the defendant must have knowledge of the presence of the stolen goods. (*People v. Speaks* (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 36, 39–40 [174 Cal.Rptr. 65]; see *People v. Gory* (1946) 28 Cal.2d 450, 455–456, 458–459 [170 P.2d 433] [possession of narcotics requires knowledge of presence]; see also discussion of voluntary intoxication in Related Issues, below.) Give bracketed element 3 when supported by the evidence.

When the People allege the defendant has a prior conviction for an offense listed in Penal Code section 667(e)(2)(C)(iv) or for an offense requiring registration pursuant to subdivision (c) of section 290, give CALCRIM No. 3100, *Prior Conviction: Nonbifurcated Trial* or CALCRIM No. 3101, *Prior Conviction: Bifurcated Trial*.

### ***Related Instructions***

For an instruction about when guilt may be inferred from possession of recently stolen property, see CALCRIM No. 376, *Possession of Recently Stolen Property as Evidence of a Crime*.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 496(a); *People v. Land* (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 220, 223 [35 Cal.Rptr.2d 544].
- Extortion Defined. Pen. Code, § 518.
- Theft Defined. Pen. Code, §§ 484, 490a.

- Concealment. *Williams v. Superior Court* (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 330, 343–344 [146 Cal.Rptr. 311].
- General Intent Required. *People v. Wielograf* (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 488, 494 [161 Cal.Rptr. 680] [general intent crime]; but see *People v. Reyes* (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 975, 985 [61 Cal.Rptr.2d 39] [knowledge element is a “specific mental state”].
- Knowledge Element. *People v. Reyes* (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 975, 985 [61 Cal.Rptr.2d 39].
- Possession and Control. *People v. Land* (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 220, 223–224 [35 Cal.Rptr.2d 544]; *People v. Zyduck* (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 334, 336 [75 Cal.Rptr. 616]; see *People v. Gatlin* (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 31, 44–45 [257 Cal.Rptr. 171] [constructive possession means knowingly having the right of control over the property directly or through another]; *People v. Scott* (1951) 108 Cal.App.2d 231, 234 [238 P.2d 659] [two or more persons may jointly possess property].
- Stolen Property. *People v. Kunkin* (1973) 9 Cal.3d 245, 250 [107 Cal.Rptr. 184, 507 P.2d 1392] [theft]; see, e.g., *People v. Candiotta* (1960) 183 Cal.App.2d 348, 349 [6 Cal.Rptr. 876] [burglary]; *People v. Siegfried* (1967) 249 Cal.App.2d 489, 493 [57 Cal.Rptr. 423] [robbery].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Attempted Receiving Stolen Property. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 496(d); *People v. Rojas* (1961) 55 Cal.2d 252, 258 [10 Cal.Rptr. 465, 358 P.2d 921] [stolen goods recovered by police were no longer “stolen”]; *People v. Moss* (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 179, 183 [127 Cal.Rptr. 454] [antecedent theft not a necessary element].

Theft by appropriation of lost property (Pen. Code, § 485) is not a necessarily included offense of receiving stolen property. (*In re Greg F.* (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 466, 469 [205 Cal.Rptr. 614].)

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Defense of Voluntary Intoxication or Mental Disease*

Though receiving stolen property is a general intent crime, one element of the offense is knowledge that the property was stolen, a specific mental state. With regard to the element of knowledge, receiving stolen property is a “specific intent crime” as that term is used in Penal Code sections 29.4(b) and 28(a). (*People v. Reyes* (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 975, 985 [61 Cal.Rptr.2d 39].) Therefore, the defendant should have the opportunity to introduce evidence and request instructions regarding the lack of requisite knowledge. (*Id.* at p. 986; see *People v. Mendoza* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1114, 1131 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 428, 959 P.2d 735]; but see *People v. Atkins* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 76, 96–97 [104 Cal.Rptr.2d 738, 18 P.3d 660] (conc. opn. of Brown, J.) [criticizing *Mendoza* and *Reyes* as wrongly transmuted a knowledge

requirement into a specific intent].) See CALCRIM No. 3426, *Voluntary Intoxication*.

### ***Dual Convictions Prohibited***

A person may not be convicted of stealing and of receiving the same property. (*People v. Jaramillo* (1976) 16 Cal.3d 752, 757 [129 Cal.Rptr. 306, 548 P.2d 706] superseded by statute on related grounds, as stated in *People v. Hinks* (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1157 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 440]; see *People v. Tatum* (1962) 209 Cal.App.2d 179, 183 [25 Cal.Rptr. 832].) See CALCRIM No. 3516, *Multiple Counts: Alternative Charges For One Event—Dual Conviction Prohibited*.

### ***Receiving Multiple Items on Single Occasion***

A defendant who receives more than one item of stolen property on a single occasion commits one offense of receiving stolen property. (See *People v. Lyons* (1958) 50 Cal.2d 245, 275 [324 P.2d 556].)

### ***Specific Vendors***

The Penal Code establishes separate crimes for specific persons buying or receiving particular types of stolen property, including the following:

1. Swap meet vendors and persons dealing in or collecting merchandise or personal property. (Pen. Code, § 496(b).)
2. Dealers or collectors of junk metals or secondhand materials who buy or receive particular metals used in providing telephone, transportation, or public utility services. (Pen. Code, § 496a(a).)
3. Dealers or collectors of secondhand books or other literary materials. (Pen. Code, § 496b [misdemeanors].)
4. Persons buying or receiving motor vehicles, trailers, special construction equipment, or vessels. (Pen. Code, § 496d(a).)
5. Persons buying, selling, receiving, etc., specific personal property, including integrated computer chips or panels, electronic equipment, or appliances, from which serial numbers or identifying marks have been removed or altered. (Pen. Code, § 537e(a).)

## **SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property, § 72.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 143, *Crimes Against Property*, §§ 143.01[2][c], 143.03, 143.10[2][c], [d] (Matthew Bender).

## 1751. Defense to Receiving Stolen Property: Innocent Intent

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**The defendant is not guilty of receiving (stolen/extorted) property if (he/she) intended to (return the property to its owner/ [or] deliver the property to law enforcement) when (he/she) (bought/received/concealed/withheld) the property.**

**If you have a reasonable doubt about whether the defendant intended to (return the property to its owner/ [or] deliver the property to law enforcement) when (he/she) (bought/received/concealed/withheld) the property, you must find (him/her) not guilty of receiving (stolen/extorted) property.**

**[This defense does not apply if the defendant decided to (return the property to its owner/ [or] deliver the property to law enforcement) only after (he/she) wrongfully (bought/received/concealed/withheld) the property.] [The defense [also] does not apply if the defendant intended to (return the property to its owner/ [or] deliver the property to law enforcement) when (he/she) (bought/received/concealed/withheld) it, but later decided to (sell/conceal/withhold) the property.]**

---

*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### ***Instructional Duty***

The court has a  **sua sponte**  duty to instruct on this defense if there is substantial evidence supporting the defense and the defendant is relying on the defense or the defense is not inconsistent with the defendant's theory of the case. (*People v. Osborne* (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 472, 477 [143 Cal.Rptr. 582]; see *People v. Sedeno* (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703, 716–717 [112 Cal.Rptr. 1, 518 P.2d 913], disapproved on other grounds in *People v. Flannel* (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 684–685, fn. 12 [160 Cal. Rptr. 84, 603 P.2d 1] and in *People v. Breverman* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 163, fn. 10, 164–178 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094]; *People v. Burnham* (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 1134, 1139, fn. 3 [222 Cal.Rptr. 630].)

#### ***Related Instructions***

For the general requirement of a union between an act and intent (Pen. Code, § 20), see CALCRIM No. 250, *Union of Act and Intent: General Intent*.

### AUTHORITY

- Instructional Requirements. *People v. Osborne* (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 472, 476 [143 Cal.Rptr. 582].
- Burden of Proof. *People v. Dishman* (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 717, 721–722 [180 Cal.Rptr. 467]; *People v. Wielograf* (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 488, 494 [161 Cal.Rptr. 680].

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property, § 72.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 143, *Crimes Against Property*, § 143.03[1][d], [2][a] (Matthew Bender).

## 1752. Owning or Operating a Chop Shop (Veh. Code, § 10801)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with owning or operating a chop shop [in violation of Vehicle Code section 10801].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant knew that (he/she) (owned/ [or] operated) a chop shop;

AND

2. The defendant intentionally (owned/ [or] operated) the chop shop.

A *chop shop* is a building, lot, or other place where:

1. A person alters, destroys, takes apart, reassembles, or stores a motor vehicle or motor vehicle part;
2. That person knows that the vehicle or part has been obtained by theft, fraud, or conspiracy to defraud;

AND

3. That person knows that the vehicle or part was obtained in order to either:
  - a. Sell or dispose of the vehicle or part;

OR

- b. Alter, counterfeit, deface, destroy, disguise, falsify, forge, obliterate, or remove the identity, including an identification number, of the vehicle or part, in order to misrepresent its identity or prevent its identification.

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*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Veh. Code, § 10801.
- Chop Shop Defined. Veh. Code, § 250.
- Meaning of “Operate.” *People v. Ramirez* (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 408, 414–415 [94 Cal.Rptr.2d 76].

**LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES**

- Receiving Stolen Property. Pen. Code, § 496. There is a split in authority on this issue. *People v. Sanchez* (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 325, 333–334 [6 Cal.Rptr.3d 271] concluded that receiving stolen property is a lesser included offense, but a defendant may be convicted of both offenses when different property is involved in the two convictions. However, *People v. Strohman* (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1313, 1316 [101 Cal.Rptr.2d 520], reached the opposite conclusion.

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property, § 309.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 143, *Crimes Against Property*, § 143.03[2][c] (Matthew Bender).

**1753–1799. Reserved for Future Use**



# **THEFT AND EXTORTION**

## **A. THEFT**

- 1800. Theft by Larceny (Pen. Code, § 484)
- 1801. Grand and Petty Theft (Pen. Code, §§ 486, 487–488, 490.2, 491)
- 1802. Theft: As Part of Overall Plan
- 1803. Theft: By Employee or Agent (Pen. Code, § 487(b)(3))
- 1804. Theft by False Pretense (Pen. Code, § 484)
- 1805. Theft by Trick (Pen. Code, § 484)
- 1806. Theft by Embezzlement (Pen. Code, §§ 484, 503)
- 1807. Theft From Elder or Dependent Adult (Pen. Code, § 368(d), (e))
- 1808–1819. Reserved for Future Use

## **B. TAKING OR TAMPERING WITH VEHICLE**

- 1820. Felony Unlawful Taking or Driving of Vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851(a), (b))
- 1821. Tampering With a Vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10852)
- 1822. Unlawful Taking of Bicycle or Vessel (Pen. Code, § 499b)
- 1823–1829. Reserved for Future Use

## **C. EXTORTION**

- 1830. Extortion by Threat or Force (Pen. Code, §§ 518, 519)
- 1831. Extortion by Threatening Letter (Pen. Code, § 523)
- 1832. Extortion of Signature (Pen. Code, § 522)
- 1833–1849. Reserved for Future Use

## **D. PETTY THEFT WITH A PRIOR**

- 1850. Petty Theft With Prior Conviction (Pen. Code, § 666)
- 1851–1859. Reserved for Future Use

## **E. THEFT RELATED INSTRUCTIONS**

- 1860. Owner’s Opinion of Value
- 1861. Jury Does Not Need to Agree on Form of Theft
- 1862. Return of Property Not a Defense to Theft (Pen. Code, §§ 512, 513)
- 1863. Defense to Theft or Robbery: Claim of Right (Pen. Code, § 511)
- 1864–1899. Reserved for Future Use



## A. THEFT

### 1800. Theft by Larceny (Pen. Code, § 484)

---

The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with [grand/petty] theft [by larceny] [in violation of Penal Code section 484].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant took possession of property owned by someone else;
2. The defendant took the property without the owner's [or owner's agent's] consent;
3. When the defendant took the property (he/she) intended (to deprive the owner of it permanently/ [or] to remove it from the owner's [or owner's agent's] possession for so extended a period of time that the owner would be deprived of a major portion of the value or enjoyment of the property);

AND

4. The defendant moved the property, even a small distance, and kept it for any period of time, however brief.

[An *agent* is someone to whom the owner has given complete or partial authority and control over the owner's property.]

[For petty theft, the property taken can be of any value, no matter how slight.]

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2016*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

To have the requisite intent for theft, the defendant must either intend to deprive the owner permanently or to deprive the owner of a major portion of the property's value or enjoyment. (See *People v. Avery* (2002) 27 Cal.4th 49, 57–58 [115 Cal.Rptr.2d 403, 38 P.3d 1].) Select the appropriate language in element 3.

#### *Related Instructions*

If the defendant is also charged with grand theft, give CALCRIM No. 1801, *Theft: Degrees*. If the defendant is charged with petty theft, no other instruction is

required, and the jury should receive a petty theft verdict form.

If the defendant is charged with petty theft with a prior conviction, give CALCRIM No. 1850, *Petty Theft With Prior Conviction*.

If a different theory of theft is presented, see CALCRIM No. 1804, *Theft by False Pretense*, CALCRIM No. 1805, *Theft by Trick*, CALCRIM No. 1806, *Theft by Embezzlement*. See also CALCRIM No. 1861, *Jury Does Not Need to Agree on Form of Theft*. The court may also wish to instruct with the bracketed “[by larceny]” in the first sentence to distinguish this theory of theft from the others.

For theft of real property, use CALCRIM No. 1804, *Theft by False Pretense*. (See *People v. Sanders* (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1413–1417 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 806].)

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 484; *People v. Williams* (1946) 73 Cal.App.2d 154, 157 [166 P.2d 63]; *People v. Edwards* (1925) 72 Cal.App. 102, 112–117 [236 P. 944], disapproved on other grounds in *In re Estrada* (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 748 [48 Cal.Rptr. 172, 408 P.2d 948].
- Intent to Deprive Owner of Main Value. *People v. Avery* (2002) 27 Cal.4th 49, 57–59 [115 Cal.Rptr.2d 403, 38 P.3d 1], disapproving, to extent it is inconsistent, *People v. Marquez* (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 115, 123 [20 Cal.Rptr.2d 365]; *People v. Zangari* (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1436, 1447 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 250].

### COMMENTARY

#### *Asportation*

To constitute a completed theft, the property must be asported or carried away. (*People v. Shannon* (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 649, 654 [78 Cal.Rptr.2d 177].)

Asportation requires three things: (1) the goods are severed from the possession or custody of the owner, (2) the goods are in the complete possession of the thief or thieves, and (3) the property is moved, however slightly. (*Ibid.*; *People v. Edwards* (1925) 72 Cal.App. 102, 114–115 [236 P. 944], disapproved on other grounds in *In re Estrada* (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 [48 Cal.Rptr. 172, 408 P.2d 948]; *People v. Collins* (1959) 172 Cal.App.2d 295, 299 [342 P.2d 370] [joint possession of property by more than one thief].) Asportation is fulfilled by wrongful removal of property from the owner or possessor, against his or her will with the intent to steal it, even though the property is retained by the thief but a moment. (*People v. Quiel* (1945) 68 Cal.App.2d 674, 679 [157 P.2d 446].) Paragraph 4 sets forth the asportation element.

#### *Value*

The property taken must have some intrinsic value, however slight. (*People v. Franco* (1970) 4 Cal.App.3d 535, 542 [84 Cal.Rptr. 513]; *People v. Martinez* (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 581, 585 [115 Cal.Rptr.2d 574].) The final bracketed paragraph may be given on request if the property in question was of slight value.

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Petty Theft. Pen. Code, § 486.

- Attempted Theft. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 484.
- Taking an Automobile Without Consent. Veh. Code, § 10851; *People v. Pater* (1968) 267 Cal.App.2d 921, 926 [73 Cal.Rptr. 823].
- Auto Tampering. Veh. Code, § 10852; *People v. Anderson* (1975) 15 Cal.3d 806, 810–811 [126 Cal.Rptr. 235, 543 P.2d 603].
- Misdemeanor Joyriding. Pen. Code, § 499b [of bicycle, motorboat, or vessel].

Petty theft is a not lesser-included offense of grand theft when the charge of grand theft is based on the type of property taken. (*People v. Thomas* (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 862, 870 [118 Cal.Rptr. 226].)

## RELATED ISSUES

### *Claim of Right*

If a person actually believes that he or she has a right to the property even if that belief is mistaken or unreasonable, such belief is a defense to theft. (*People v. Romo* (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 514, 518 [269 Cal.Rptr. 440]; see also *People v. Devine* (1892) 95 Cal. 227, 229 [30 P. 378] [“[i]t is clear that a charge of larceny, which requires an intent to steal, could not be founded on a mere careless taking away of another’s goods”]; *In re Bayles* (1920) 47 Cal.App. 517, 519–521 [190 P. 1034] [larceny conviction reversed where landlady actually believed she was entitled to take tenant’s property for cleaning fees incurred even if her belief was unreasonable]; *People v. Navarro* (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 4–6, 10–11 [160 Cal.Rptr. 692]; see CALCRIM No. 1863, *Defense to Theft or Robbery: Claim of Right*.)

### *Community Property*

A person may be found guilty of theft of community property, but only if he or she has the intent to deprive the other owner of the property permanently. (*People v. Llamas* (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1729, 1738–1740 [60 Cal.Rptr.2d 357].)

### *Fraudulent Refunds*

A person who takes property while in a store and presents it for a refund is guilty of theft. (*People v. Davis* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 301 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 295, 965 P.2d 1165].) The Supreme Court held that taking with the intent to fraudulently obtain a refund constitutes both an intent to permanently deprive the store of property and a trespassory taking within the meaning of larceny. (*Id.* at pp. 317–318; see also *People v. Shannon* (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 649 [78 Cal.Rptr.2d 177].)

### *Multiple or Single Conviction of Theft-Overall Plan or Scheme*

If multiple items are stolen from a single victim over a period of time and the takings are part of one intent, plan, or impulse, only one theft occurs and the value of the items is aggregated when determining the degree of theft. (*People v. Bailey* (1961) 55 Cal.2d 514, 518–519 [11 Cal.Rptr. 543, 360 P.2d 39]; accord *People v. Sullivan* (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 16, 19–21 [145 Cal.Rptr. 313]; see CALCRIM No. 1802, *Theft: As Part of Overall Plan*.)

A serial thief “may be convicted of multiple counts of grand theft based on separate

and distinct acts of theft, even if committed pursuant to a single overarching scheme.” [disapproving any interpretation of *People v. Bailey* (1961) 55 Cal.2d 514 [11 Cal.Rptr. 543, 360 P.2d 39] inconsistent with this conclusion.] *People v. Whitmer* (2014) 59 Cal.4th 733, 740–741 [174 Cal.Rptr.3d 594, 329 P.3d 154].

### ***No Need to Use or Benefit From the Property Taken***

It does not matter that the person taking the property does not intend to use the property or benefit from it; he or she is guilty of theft if there is intent to permanently deprive the other person of the property. (*People v. Kunkin* (1973) 9 Cal.3d 245, 251 [107 Cal.Rptr. 184, 507 P.2d 1392]; *People v. Green* (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 57–58 [164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468] [defendant intended to destroy the property], disapproved on other grounds in *People v. Hall* (1986) 41 Cal.3d 826, 834, fn. 3 [226 Cal.Rptr. 112, 718 P.2d 99]; *People v. Pierce* (1952) 110 Cal.App.2d 598, 609 [243 P.2d 585] [irrelevant that defendant did not personally benefit from embezzled funds]; see also *People v. Avery* (2002) 27 Cal.4th 49, 57–58 [115 Cal.Rptr.2d 403, 38 P.3d 1] [intent to deprive owner of major value or enjoyment].)

### ***Possession***

The victim of a theft does not have to be the owner of property, only in possession of it. (*People v. Edwards* (1925) 72 Cal.App. 102, 116 [236 P. 944], disapproved on other grounds in *In re Estrada* (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 748 [48 Cal.Rptr. 172, 408 P.2d 948].) “Considered as an element of larceny, ‘ownership’ and ‘possession’ may be regarded as synonymous terms; for one who has the right of possession as against the thief is, so far as the latter is concerned, the owner.” (*Ibid*; see also *People v. Davis* (1893) 97 Cal. 194, 195 [31 P. 1109] [fact that property in possession of victim sufficient to show ownership].)

### ***Unanimity of Theft Theory Not Required***

If multiple theories of theft have been presented, the jury does not need to agree on which form of theft was committed. All the jury must agree on is that an unlawful taking of property occurred. (*People v. Counts* (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 785, 792–793 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d 425]; *People v. Failla* (1966) 64 Cal.2d 560, 567–569 [51 Cal.Rptr. 103, 414 P.2d 39] [burglary case]; *People v. Nor Woods* (1951) 37 Cal.2d 584, 586 [233 P.2d 897] [addressing the issue for theft].) See CALCRIM No. 1861, *Jury Does Not Need to Agree on Form of Theft*.

## **SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property, §§ 14–17.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 143, *Crimes Against Property*, § 143.01 (Matthew Bender).

**1801. Grand and Petty Theft (Pen. Code, §§ 486, 487–488, 490.2, 491)**

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If you conclude that the defendant committed a theft, you must decide whether the crime was grand theft or petty theft.

[The defendant committed petty theft if (he/she) stole property [or services] worth \$950 or less.]

[The defendant committed grand theft if the value of the property [or services] is more than \$950.]

[Theft of property from the person is grand theft if the value of the property is more than \$950. Theft is *from the person* if the property taken was in the clothing of, on the body of, or in a container held or carried by, that person.]

[Theft of (an automobile/a horse/\_\_\_\_\_ <insert other item listed in statute>) is grand theft if the value of the property is more than \$950.]

[Theft of a firearm is grand theft.]

[Theft of (fruit/nuts/\_\_\_\_\_ <insert other item listed in statute>) worth more than \$950 is grand theft.]

[Theft of (fish/shellfish/aquacultural products/\_\_\_\_\_ <insert other item listed in statute>) worth more than \$950 is grand theft if (it/they) (is/are) taken from a (commercial fishery/research operation).]

[The value of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert relevant item enumerated in Pen. Code, § 487(b)(1)(B)> may be established by evidence proving that on the day of the theft, the same items of the same variety and weight as those stolen had a wholesale value of more than \$950.]

[The value of (property/services) is the fair (market value of the property/market wage for the services performed).]

<Fair Market Value—Generally>

[Fair market value is the highest price the property would reasonably have been sold for in the open market at the time of, and in the general location of, the theft.]

<Fair Market Value—Urgent Sale>

[Fair market value is the price a reasonable buyer and seller would agree on if the buyer wanted to buy the property and the seller wanted to sell it, but neither was under an urgent need to buy or sell.]

The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the theft was grand theft rather than a lesser crime. If the People have

**not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of grand theft.**

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2012, August 2015, April 2020*

## BENCH NOTES

### ***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction if grand theft has been charged.

When the People allege the defendant has a prior conviction for an offense listed in Penal Code section 667(e)(2)(C)(iv) or for an offense requiring registration pursuant to subdivision (c) of section 290, give CALCRIM No. 3100, *Prior Conviction: Nonbifurcated Trial* or CALCRIM No. 3101, *Prior Conviction: Bifurcated Trial*.

If the evidence raises an issue that the value of the property may be inflated or deflated because of some urgency on the part of either the buyer or seller, the second bracketed paragraph on fair market value should be given.

## AUTHORITY

- Determination of Grand vs. Petty Theft. Pen. Code, §§ 486, 487–488, 490.2, 491.
- Value/Nature of Property/Theft from the Person. Pen. Code, §§ 487(b)–(d), 487a.
- Theft of a firearm is grand theft. Pen. Code, §§ 487(d)(2), 490.2(c).

## RELATED ISSUES

### ***Proposition 47 (Penal Code Section 490.2)***

After the passage of Proposition 47 in 2014, theft is defined in Penal Code section 487 as a misdemeanor unless the value of the property taken exceeds \$950. Pen. Code, § 490.2. This represents a change from the way grand theft was defined under Penal Code section 487(b)–(d) before the enactment of Proposition 47. In 2016, Proposition 63 added subdivision (c) to Pen. Code, § 490.2 (excepting theft of a firearm).

### ***Taking From the Person***

To constitute a taking from the person, the property must, in some way, be physically attached to the person. (*People v. Williams* (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1465, 1472 [12 Cal.Rptr.2d 243].) Applying this rule, the court in *Williams* held that a purse taken from the passenger seat next to the driver was not a taking from the person. (*Ibid.* [see generally for court's discussion of origins of this rule].) *Williams* was distinguished by the court in *People v. Huggins* (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1654, 1656–1657 [60 Cal.Rptr.2d 177], where evidence that the defendant took a purse placed on the floor next to and touching the victim's foot was held sufficient to establish a taking from the person. The victim intentionally placed her foot next to



her purse, physically touching it and thereby maintaining dominion and control over it.

***Theft of Fish, Shellfish, or Aquacultural Products***

Fish taken from public waters are not “property of another” within the meaning of Penal Code section 484 and 487; only the Fish and Game Code applies to such takings. (*People v. Brady* (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 954, 959, 961–962 [286 Cal.Rptr. 19]; see, e.g., Fish & Game Code, § 12006.6 [unlawful taking of abalone].)

***Value of Written Instrument***

If the thing stolen is evidence of a debt or some other written instrument, its value is (1) the amount due or secured that is unpaid, or that might be collected in any contingency, (2) the value of the property, title to which is shown in the instrument, or (3) or the sum that might be recovered in the instrument’s absence. (Pen. Code, § 492; see *Buck v. Superior Court* (1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 431, 438 [54 Cal.Rptr. 282] [trust deed securing debt]; *People v. Frankfort* (1952) 114 Cal.App.2d 680, 703 [251 P.2d 401] [promissory notes and contracts securing debt]; *People v. Quiel* (1945) 68 Cal.App.2d 674, 678 [157 P.2d 446] [unpaid bank checks]; see also Pen. Code, §§ 493 [value of stolen passage tickets], 494 [completed written instrument need not be issued or delivered].) If evidence of a debt or right of action is embezzled, its value is the sum due on or secured by the instrument. (Pen. Code, § 514.) Section 492 only applies if the written instrument has value and is taken from a victim. (See *People v. Sanders* (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1414, fn. 16 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 806].)

## SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property §§ 4, 8.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 143, *Crimes Against Property*, § 143.01 (Matthew Bender).

## 1802. Theft: As Part of Overall Plan

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If you conclude that the defendant committed more than one theft, you must then decide if the defendant committed multiple petty thefts or a single grand theft. To prove that the defendant is guilty of a single grand theft, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant committed theft of property from the same owner or possessor on more than one occasion;
2. The combined value of the property was over \$950;

AND

3. The defendant obtained the property as part of a single, overall plan or objective.

If you conclude that the People have failed to prove grand theft, any multiple thefts you have found proven are petty thefts.

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2012, August 2015, August 2016*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on aggregating the value of the property or services taken if grand theft is charged on that theory.

The total value of the property taken must exceed \$950 to be grand theft. (See Pen. Code, § 490.2.)

When the People allege the defendant has a prior conviction for an offense listed in Penal Code section 667(e)(2)(C)(iv) or for an offense requiring registration pursuant to subdivision (c) of section 290, give CALCRIM No. 3100, *Prior Conviction: Nonbifurcated Trial* or CALCRIM No. 3101, *Prior Conviction: Bifurcated Trial*.

### AUTHORITY

- Aggregating Value of Property Taken According to Overall Plan or General Intent. *People v. Bailey* (1961) 55 Cal.2d 514, 518–519 [11 Cal.Rptr. 543, 360 P.2d 39].
- Grand Theft of Property or Services. Pen. Code, § 487(a) [property or services exceeding \$950 in value].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Multiple Victims*

Where multiple victims are involved, there is disagreement about applying the *Bailey* doctrine and cumulating the charges even if a single plan or intent is demonstrated. (See *People v. Brooks* (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 24, 30 [210 Cal.Rptr.

90] [auctioneer stole proceeds from property belonging to several people during a single auction; conviction for multiple counts of theft was error]; *People v. Columbia Research Corp.* (1980) 103 Cal.App.3d Supp. 33 [163 Cal.Rptr. 455] [series of petty thefts from numerous victims occurring over 10-month period properly consolidated into single grand theft conviction where defendant employed same scheme to defraud victims of money]; but see *People v. Garcia* (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 297, 307–309 [273 Cal.Rptr. 666] [defendant filed fraudulent bonds at different times involving different victims; multiple convictions proper]; *In re David D.* (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 304, 309 [60 Cal.Rptr.2d 552] [stating that *Garcia* “articulately criticized” *Brooks* and *Columbia Research*; declined to apply *Bailey* to multiple acts of vandalism].)

### ***Combining Grand Thefts***

The *Bailey* doctrine can be asserted by the *defendant* to combine multiple grand thefts committed as part of an overall scheme into a single offense. (See *People v. Brooks* (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 24, 31 [210 Cal.Rptr. 90] [multiple grand thefts from single auction fund]; *People v. Gardner* (1979) 90 Cal.App.3d 42, 47–48 [153 Cal.Rptr. 160] [multiple grand theft of hog carcasses]; *People v. Richardson* (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 853, 866 [148 Cal.Rptr. 120] [multiple attempted grand thefts], disapproved on other grounds in *People v. Saddler* (1979) 24 Cal.3d 671, 682, fn. 8 [156 Cal.Rptr. 871, 597 P.2d 130]; see also *People v. Sullivan* (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 16, 19 [145 Cal.Rptr. 313] [error to refuse defense instruction about aggregating thefts].)

A serial thief “may be convicted of multiple counts of grand theft based on separate and distinct acts of theft, even if committed pursuant to a single overarching scheme.” [disapproving any interpretation of *People v. Bailey* (1961) 55 Cal.2d 514 [11 Cal.Rptr. 543, 360 P.2d 39] inconsistent with this conclusion.] *People v. Whitmer* (2014) 59 Cal.4th 733, 740–741 [174 Cal.Rptr.3d 594, 329 P.3d 154].

### ***Theft Enhancement***

If there are multiple charges of theft, whether grand or petty theft, the aggregate loss exceeds any of the statutory minimums in Penal Code section 12022.6(a), and the thefts arise from a common scheme or plan, an additional prison term may be imposed. (Pen. Code, § 12022.6(b).) If the aggregate loss exceeds statutory amounts ranging from \$50,000 to \$2.5 million, an additional term of one to four years may be imposed. (Pen. Code, § 12022.6(a)(1)–(4); see *People v. Daniel* (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 168, 174–175 [193 Cal.Rptr. 277] [no error in refusing to give unanimity instruction].)

## **SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property, §§ 12, 13.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 143, *Crimes Against Property*, § 143.01[1][i] (Matthew Bender).

## 1803. Theft: By Employee or Agent (Pen. Code, § 487(b)(3))

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If you conclude that the defendant committed more than one theft, you must decide whether the defendant committed multiple petty thefts or a single grand theft. To prove that the defendant is guilty of a single grand theft, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant was an (employee/agent) of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of employer/principal>;
2. The defendant committed theft of property [or services] from \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of employer/principal>;

AND

3. The combined value of the property [or services] that the defendant obtained during a period of 12 consecutive months was \$950 or more.

If you conclude that the People have failed to prove grand theft, any multiple thefts you have found proven are petty thefts.

[An *agent* is a person who represents someone else in dealing with other people, corporations, or entities.]

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2012*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on aggregating the value of the property or services taken by an employee or agent if grand theft is charged on that theory.

### AUTHORITY

- Aggregating Value of Property Taken by Employee or Agent. Pen. Code, § 487(b)(3); *People v. Packard* (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 622, 626–627 [182 Cal.Rptr. 576].
- Agent Defined. Civ. Code, § 2295.
- Employee Defined. Lab. Code, § 2750.

### COMMENTARY

Penal Code section 487(b)(3) allows the prosecutor, under specified conditions, to cumulate a series of petty thefts into a grand theft, without having to prove a single intent or scheme. (*People v. Packard* (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 622, 626 [182 Cal.Rptr. 576].) Therefore, this instruction does not include a single intent or scheme as an element. (Compare *People v. Daniel* (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 168, 175 [193 Cal.Rptr. 277] [theft pursuant to overall plan and single fraudulent intent], and CALCRIM

No. 1802, *Theft: As Part of Overall Plan.*) Under the appropriate circumstances, however, a *defendant* may assert that grand thefts committed against his or her employer over a period greater than 12 consecutive months should be combined into a single grand theft in the absence of evidence of separate intents or plans. (See *People v. Packard, supra*, 131 Cal.App.3d at pp. 626–627 [thefts over three-year period].)

### RELATED ISSUES

See the Related Issues section to CALCRIM No. 1802, *Theft: As Part of Overall Plan.*

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property, §§ 12–13.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 143, *Crimes Against Property*, § 143.01[1][a] (Matthew Bender).

## 1804. Theft by False Pretense (Pen. Code, § 484)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with [grand/petty] theft by false pretense [in violation of Penal Code section 484].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant knowingly and intentionally deceived a property owner [or the owner's agent] by false or fraudulent representation or pretense;
2. The defendant did so intending to persuade the owner [or the owner's agent] to let the defendant [or another person] take possession and ownership of the property;

AND

3. The owner [or the owner's agent] let the defendant [or another person] take possession and ownership of the property because the owner [or the owner's agent] relied on the representation or pretense.

You may not find the defendant guilty of this crime unless the People have proved that:

[A. The false pretense was accompanied by either a false writing or false token(;/.)]

[OR]

[(A/B). There was a note or memorandum of the pretense signed or handwritten by the defendant(;/.)]

[OR]

[(A/B/C). Testimony from two witnesses or testimony from a single witness along with other evidence supports the conclusion that the defendant made the pretense.]

[*Property* includes money, labor, and real or personal property.]

A *false pretense* is any act, word, symbol, or token the purpose of which is to deceive.

[Someone makes a false pretense if, intending to deceive, he or she does [one or more of] the following:

[1. Gives information he or she knows is false(;/);]

[OR]

2. Makes a misrepresentation recklessly without information that

justifies a reasonable belief in its truth(./;)]

[OR

3. Does not give information when he or she has an obligation to do so(./;)]

[OR

4. Makes a promise not intending to do what he or she promises.]]

[Proof that the representation or pretense was false is not enough by itself to prove that the defendant intended to deceive.]

[Proof that the defendant did not perform as promised is not enough by itself to prove that the defendant did not intend to perform as promised.]

[A false token is a document or object that is not authentic, but appears to be, and is used to deceive.]

[For petty theft, the property taken can be of any value, no matter how slight.]

[An owner [or an owner's agent] relies on false pretense, if the falsehood is an important part of the reason the owner [or agent] decides to give up the property. The false pretense must be an important factor, but it does not have to be the only factor the owner [or agent] considers in making the decision. [If the owner [or agent] gives up property some time after the pretense is made, the owner [or agent] must do so because he or she relies on the pretense.]]

[An *agent* is someone to whom the owner has given complete or partial authority and control over the owner's property.]

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2006, December 2008, April 2010*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the elements of this crime, including the corroboration requirements stated in Penal Code section 532(b). (*People v. Mason* (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 281, 286 [109 Cal.Rptr. 867] [error not to instruct on corroboration requirements].)

### *Related Instructions*

If the defendant is also charged with grand theft, give CALCRIM No. 1801, *Theft: Degrees*. If the defendant is charged with petty theft, no other instruction is required, and the jury should receive a petty theft verdict form.

If the defendant is charged with petty theft with a prior conviction, give CALCRIM No. 1850, *Petty Theft With Prior Conviction*.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code § 484; *People v. Wooten* (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1834, 1842 [52 Cal.Rptr.2d 765]; see *People v. Webb* (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 688, 693–694 [88 Cal.Rptr.2d 259] [false statement of opinion].
- Corroboration Requirements. Pen. Code § 532(b); *People v. Gentry* (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 131, 139 [285 Cal.Rptr. 591]; *People v. Fujita* (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 454, 470–471 [117 Cal.Rptr. 757].
- Agent. *People v. Britz* (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 743, 753 [95 Cal.Rptr. 303].
- Reckless Misrepresentation. *People v. Schmitt* (1957) 155 Cal.App.2d 87, 110 [317 P.2d 673]; *People v. Ryan* (1951) 103 Cal.App.2d 904, 908–909 [230 P.2d 359].
- Defendant Need Not Be Beneficiary of Theft. *People v. Cheeley* (1951) 106 Cal.App.2d 748, 753 [236 P.2d 22].
- Reliance. *People v. Wooten* (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1834, 1842–1843 [52 Cal.Rptr.2d 765] [defining reliance]; *People v. Sanders* (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1413 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 806] [reversible error to fail to instruct on reliance]; *People v. Whight* (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1143, 1152–1153 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 163] [no reliance if victim relies solely on own investigation].
- Theft of Real Property by False Pretenses. *People v. Sanders* (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1413–1417 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 806].
- Theft by False Pretenses Includes Obtaining Loan by False Pretenses. *Perry v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County* (1962) 57 Cal.2d 276, 282–283 [19 Cal.Rptr.1, 368 P.2d 529].
- Either Token or Writing Must Be False. *People v. Henning* (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 632, 641–642 [92 Cal.Rptr.3d 775].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Petty Theft. Pen. Code, § 486.
- Attempted Theft. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 484.

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Attempted Theft by False Pretense*

Reliance on the false pretense need not be proved for a person to be guilty of attempted theft by false pretense. (*People v. Fujita* (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 454, 467 [117 Cal.Rptr. 757].)

#### *Continuing Nature of False Pretense*

Penal Code section 484 recognizes that theft by false pretense is a crime of a continuing nature and covers any “property or service received as a result thereof, and the complaint, information or indictment may charge that the crime was



committed on any date during the particular period in question.” (Pen. Code, § 484(a).)

***Corroboration—Defined/Multiple Witnesses***

“Corroborating evidence is sufficient if it tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime in such a way so as to reasonably satisfy the jury that the complaining witness is telling the truth.” (*People v. Fujita* (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 454, 470 [117 Cal.Rptr. 757].) When considering if the pretense is corroborated the jury may consider “the entire conduct of the defendant, and his declarations to other persons.” (*People v. Wymer* (1921) 53 Cal.App. 204, 206 [199 P. 815].) The test for corroboration of false pretense is the same as the test for corroborating the testimony of an accomplice in Penal Code section 1111. (*Ibid.*; see also *People v. MacEwing* (1955) 45 Cal.2d 218, 224 [288 P.2d 257].) To establish corroboration by multiple witnesses, the witnesses do not have to testify to the same false pretense. The requirement is satisfied as long as they testify to the same scheme or type of false pretense. (*People v. Gentry* (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 131, 139 [285 Cal.Rptr. 591]; *People v. Ashley* (1954) 42 Cal.2d 246, 268 [267 P.2d 271].)

***Distinguished from Theft by Trick***

Although fraud is used to obtain the property in both theft by trick and theft by false pretense, in theft by false pretense, the thief obtains *both* possession and title to the property. For theft by trick, the thief gains only possession of the property. (*People v. Ashley* (1954) 42 Cal.2d 246, 258 [267 P.2d 271]; *People v. Randon* (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 164, 172 [108 Cal.Rptr. 326].) False pretenses does not require that the title pass perfectly and the victim may even retain a security interest in the property transferred to the defendant. (*People v. Counts* (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 785, 789–792 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d 425].)

***Fraudulent Checks***

If a check is the basis for the theft by false pretense, it cannot also supply the written corroboration required by statute. (*People v. Mason* (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 281, 288 [109 Cal.Rptr. 867].)

***Genuine Writings***

A genuine writing that is falsely used is not a false token. (*People v. Beilfuss* (1943) 59 Cal.App.2d 83, 91 [138 P.2d 332] [valid check obtained by fraud not object of theft by false pretense].)

***Implicit Misrepresentations***

The misrepresentation does not have to be made in an express statement; it may be implied from behavior or other circumstances. (*People v. Mace* (1925) 71 Cal.App. 10, 21 [234 P. 841]; *People v. Randon* (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 164, 174–175 [108 Cal.Rptr. 326] [analogizing to the law of implied contracts].)

***Non-Performance of a Promise Is Insufficient to Prove a False Pretense***

The pretense may be made about a past or present fact or about a promise to do something in the future. (*People v. Ashley* (1954) 42 Cal.2d 246, 259–265 [267 P.2d 271].) If the pretense relates to future actions, evidence of non-performance of the

promise is not enough to establish the falsity of a promise. (*People v. Fujita* (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 454, 469 [117 Cal.Rptr. 757].) The intent to defraud at the time the promise is made must be demonstrated. As the court in *Ashley* stated, “[w]hether the pretense is a false promise or a misrepresentation of fact, the defendant’s intent must be proved in both instances by something more than mere proof of non-performance or actual falsity.” (*People v. Ashley, supra*, 42 Cal.2d at p. 264 [court also stated that defendant is entitled to instruction on this point but did not characterize duty as sua sponte].)

See the Related Issues section under CALCRIM No. 1800, *Theft by Larceny*.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property, §§ 13, 70.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 143, *Crimes Against Property*, § 143.01 (Matthew Bender).

## 1805. Theft by Trick (Pen. Code, § 484)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with [grand/petty] theft by trick [in violation of Penal Code section 484].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant obtained property that (he/she) knew was owned by someone else;
2. The property owner [or the owner's agent] consented to the defendant's possession of the property because the defendant used fraud or deceit;
3. When the defendant obtained the property, (he/she) intended (to deprive the owner of it permanently/ [or] to remove it from the owner's [or owner's agent's] possession for so extended a period of time that the owner would be deprived of a major portion of the value or enjoyment of the property);
4. The defendant kept the property for any length of time;

AND

5. The owner [or the owner's agent] did not intend to transfer ownership of the property.

[Obtaining the owner's [or the owner's agent's] consent to use the property for a specified purpose while intending to use it in a different way constitutes fraud or deceit.]

[An *agent* is someone to whom the owner has given complete or partial authority and control over the owner's property.]

[For petty theft, the property taken can be of any value, no matter how slight.]

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*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

To have the requisite intent for theft, the thief must either intend to deprive the owner permanently or to deprive the owner of a major portion of the property's

value or enjoyment. (See *People v. Avery* (2002) 27 Cal.4th 49, 57–58 [115 Cal.Rptr.2d 403].) Select the appropriate language in element 3.

### ***Related Instructions***

If the defendant is also charged with grand theft, give CALCRIM No. 1801, *Theft: Degrees*. If the defendant is charged with petty theft, no other instruction is required, and the jury should receive a petty theft verdict form.

If the defendant is charged with petty theft with a prior conviction, give CALCRIM No. 1850, *Petty Theft With Prior Conviction*.

## **AUTHORITY**

- Elements of Theft. Pen. Code, § 484.
- Intent to Deprive Owner of Main Value. *People v. Avery* (2002) 27 Cal.4th 49, 57–59 [115 Cal.Rptr.2d 403, 38 P.3d 1], disapproving, to extent it is inconsistent, *People v. Marquez* (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 115, 123 [20 Cal.Rptr.2d 365].

## **LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES**

- Petty Theft. Pen. Code, § 486.
- Attempted Theft. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 484.

## **RELATED ISSUES**

### ***Distinguished From Theft by False Pretense***

Although fraud is used to obtain the property in both theft by trick and theft by false pretense, in theft by false pretense, the thief obtains *both* possession and title to the property. For theft by trick, the thief gains only possession of the property. (*People v. Ashley* (1954) 42 Cal.2d 246, 258 [267 P.2d 271]; *People v. Randon* (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 164, 172 [108 Cal.Rptr. 326]; *People v. Traster* (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1377, 1387 [4 Cal.Rptr.3d 680].)

## **SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property, § 15.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 143, *Crimes Against Property*, § 143.01 (Matthew Bender).

## 1806. Theft by Embezzlement (Pen. Code, §§ 484, 503)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with [grand/petty] theft by embezzlement [in violation of Penal Code section 503].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. An owner [or the owner's agent] entrusted (his/her) property to the defendant;
2. The owner [or owner's agent] did so because (he/she) trusted the defendant;
3. The defendant fraudulently (converted/used) that property for (his/her) own benefit;

AND

4. When the defendant (converted/used) the property, (he/she) intended to deprive the owner of (it/its use).

A person acts *fraudulently* when he or she takes undue advantage of another person or causes a loss to that person by breaching a duty, trust or confidence.

[A good faith belief in acting with authorization to use the property is a defense.]

[In deciding whether the defendant believed that (he/she) had a right to the property and whether (he/she) held that belief in good faith, consider all the facts known to (him/her) at the time (he/she) obtained the property, along with all the other evidence in the case. The defendant may hold a belief in good faith even if the belief is mistaken or unreasonable. But if the defendant was aware of facts that made that belief completely unreasonable, you may conclude that the belief was not held in good faith.]

[An intent to deprive the owner of property, even temporarily, is enough.]

[Intent to restore the property to its owner is not a defense.]

[An *agent* is someone to whom the owner has given complete or partial authority and control over the owner's property.]

[For petty theft, the property taken can be of any value, no matter how slight.]

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If the evidence supports it, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct that a good faith belief in acting with authorization to use the property is a defense. *People v. Stewart* (1976) 16 Cal.3d 133, 140 [127 Cal.Rptr. 117, 544 P.2d 1317].

Intent to return the property at the time of the taking is not a defense to embezzlement under Pen. Code, § 512 unless the property was returned before the person was charged. *People v. Sisuphan* (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 800, 812 [104 Cal.Rptr.3d 654].

### *Related Instructions*

If the defendant is charged with grand theft, give CALCRIM No. 1801 *Theft: Degrees*. If the defendant is charged with petty theft, no other instruction is required, and the jury should receive a petty theft verdict form.

If the defendant is charged with petty theft with a prior conviction, give CALCRIM No. 1850, *Petty Theft With Prior Conviction*.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 484, 503–515; *In re Basinger* (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1348, 1362–1363 [249 Cal.Rptr. 110, 756 P.2d 833]; *People v. Wooten* (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1834, 1845 [52 Cal. Rptr.2d 765]; *People v. Kronemyer* (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 314, 361 [234 Cal.Rptr. 442].
- Fraud Defined. *People v. Talbot* (1934) 220 Cal. 3, 15 [28 P.2d 1057]; *People v. Stein* (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 235, 241 [156 Cal.Rptr. 299].
- Intent to Temporarily Deprive Owner of Property Sufficient. *People v. Casas* (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1246–1247 [109 Cal.Rptr.3d 811] [acknowledging general rule for larceny requires intent to permanently deprive owner of property, citing *People v. Davis* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 301, 305 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 295, 965 P.2d 1165]].

## LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Petty Theft. Pen. Code, § 486.
- Attempted Theft. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 484.

## RELATED ISSUES

### *Alter Ego Defense*

A partner can be guilty of embezzling from his own partnership. “[T]hough [the Penal Code] requir[es] that the property be ‘of another’ for larceny, [it] does not require that the property be ‘of another’ for embezzlement . . . . It is both illogical and unreasonable to hold that a partner cannot steal from his partners merely because he has an undivided interest in the partnership property. Fundamentally,

stealing that portion of the partners' shares which does not belong to the thief is no different from stealing the property of any other person." (*People v. Sobiek* (1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 458, 464, 468 [106 Cal.Rptr. 519]; see Pen. Code, § 484.)

***Fiduciary Relationships***

Courts have held that creditor/debtor and employer/employee relationships are not presumed to be fiduciary relationships in the absence of other evidence of trust or confidence. (*People v. Wooten* (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1834, 1846 [52 Cal.Rptr.2d 765] [creditor/debtor]; *People v. Threestar* (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 747, 759 [213 Cal.Rptr. 510] [employer/employee].)

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property, § 29.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 143, *Crimes Against Property*, § 143.01 (Matthew Bender).

**1807. Theft From Elder or Dependent Adult (Pen. Code, § 368(d),  
(e))**

---

The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with theft of property from (an elder/a dependent adult) [in violation of Penal Code section 368].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant committed (theft[,]/ embezzlement[,]/ forgery[,]/ fraud[,]/ [or] identity theft);
2. The (property taken/ [or] personal identifying information used) was (owned by/that of) (an elder/a dependent adult);

*<Do not give element 3 in misdemeanor cases where the value is \$950 or less.>*

3. [The property, goods, or services obtained was worth more than \$950;]

**AND**

*<Alternative 4A—defendant not caretaker>*

4. The defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the (owner of the property/person to whom the identifying information belonged) was (an elder/a dependent adult).]

**[OR]**

*<Alternative 4B—defendant caretaker>*

4. The defendant was a caretaker of the (elder/dependent adult).]

To decide whether the defendant committed (theft[,]/ embezzlement[,]/ forgery[,]/ fraud[,]/ [or] identity theft), please refer to the separate instructions that I (will give/have given) you on (that/those) crime[s].

[An *elder* is someone who is at least 65 years old.]

[A *dependent adult* is someone who is between 18 and 64 years old and has physical or mental limitations that restrict his or her ability to carry out normal activities or to protect his or her rights.] [This definition includes an adult who has physical or developmental disabilities or whose physical or mental abilities have decreased because of age.] [A *dependent adult* is also someone between 18 and 64 years old who is an inpatient in a [psychiatric] health facility [or chemical dependency recovery hospital/ or \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert relevant type of health facility from Health & Safety Code, § 1250>*] that provides 24-hour inpatient care.]



**[A *caretaker* is someone who has the care, custody, or control of (a/an) (elder/dependent adult), or is someone who stands in a position of trust with (a/an) (elder/dependent adult).]**

**[*Property* includes money, labor, or real or personal property.]**

**[Under the law, a person becomes one year older as soon as the first minute of his or her birthday has begun.]**

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2012, February 2013*

## **BENCH NOTES**

### ***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime. The court also has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the elements of the underlying theft offense.

If the defendant is charged with taking property valued at more than \$950 (see Pen. Code, § 368(d), (e)), give element 3.

If the person charged is not alleged to be a caretaker (see Pen. Code, § 368(i)), give alternative 4A. If the person charged stipulated to be a caretaker, give alternative 4B. If it is in dispute whether the person charged is a caretaker, give both alternatives 4A and 4B and the bracketed paragraph defining caretaker.

Give the bracketed definition of “elder” or “dependent adult” (see Pen. Code, § 368(g), (h)) on request depending on the evidence in the case. Give the second and/or third bracketed sentences of the definition of “dependent adult” if a further definition is requested.

The definition of “property” may be given on request. (See Pen. Code, § 368(d), (e).)

Give the final bracketed paragraph about calculating age if requested. (Fam. Code, § 6500; *In re Harris* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 849–850 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391].)

## **AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 368(d), (e).
- Caretaker Defined. Pen. Code, § 368(i).
- Dependent Adult Defined. Pen. Code, § 368(h).
- Elder Defined. Pen. Code, § 368(g).
- 24-Hour Health Facility. Health & Saf. Code, §§ 1250, 1250.2, 1250.3.

## **LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES**

- Attempted Theft From Elder or Dependent Adult. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 368(d), (e).

- Theft. Pen. Code, § 484.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Sex Offenses and Crimes Against Decency, §§ 179–184.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 143, *Crimes Against Property*, § 143.01[1], [4][h] (Matthew Bender).

**1808–1819. Reserved for Future Use**

## B. TAKING OR TAMPERING WITH VEHICLE

### 1820. Felony Unlawful Taking or Driving of Vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851(a), (b))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with unlawfully taking or driving a vehicle [in violation of Vehicle Code section 10851].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

*<Alternative A—taking with intent to deprive>*

1. The defendant took someone else's vehicle without the owner's consent;
2. When the defendant took the vehicle, (he/she) intended to deprive the owner of possession or ownership of the vehicle for any period of time;

AND

3. The vehicle was worth more than \$950.]

[OR]

*<Alternative B—posttheft driving>*

1. The defendant drove someone else's vehicle without the owner's consent;

AND

2. When the defendant drove the vehicle, (he/she) intended to deprive the owner of possession or ownership of the vehicle for any period of time.]

[Even if you conclude that the owner had allowed the defendant or someone else to take or drive the vehicle before, you may not conclude that the owner consented to the driving or taking on \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert date of alleged crime>* based on that previous consent alone.]

[A *taking* requires that the vehicle be moved for any distance, no matter how small.]

[A *vehicle* includes a (passenger vehicle/motorcycle/motor scooter/bus/schoolbus/commercial vehicle/truck tractor/ [and] trailer/ [and] semitrailer/ \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert other type of vehicle>*.)]

*<Sentencing Factor: Ambulance, Police Vehicle, Fire Dept. Vehicle>*

[If you find the defendant guilty of unlawfully taking or driving a

vehicle, you must then decide whether the People have proved the additional allegation that the defendant took or drove an emergency vehicle on call. To prove this allegation, the People must prove that:

1. The vehicle was (an ambulance/a distinctively marked law enforcement vehicle/a distinctively marked fire department vehicle);
2. The vehicle was on an emergency call when it was taken;

AND

3. The defendant knew that the vehicle was on an emergency call.

The People have the burden of proving this allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you must find that the allegation has not been proved.]

*<Sentencing Factor: Modified for Disabled Person>*

[If you find the defendant guilty of unlawfully taking or driving a vehicle, you must then decide whether the People have proved the additional allegation that the defendant took or drove a vehicle modified for a disabled person. To prove this allegation, the People must prove that:

1. The vehicle was modified for the use of a disabled person;
2. The vehicle displayed a distinguishing license plate or placard issued to disabled persons;

AND

3. The defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the vehicle was so modified and displayed the distinguishing plate or placard.

The People have the burden of proving this allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you must find that the allegation has not been proved.]

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*New January 2006; Revised September 2018, March 2021*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If the prosecution alleges that the vehicle was an emergency vehicle or was modified for a disabled person, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the sentencing factor. (Veh. Code, § 10851(b); see Veh. Code, § 10851(d) [fact issues for jury].)

If the defendant is charged with unlawfully driving or taking an automobile and with receiving the vehicle as stolen property, and there is evidence of only one act or transaction, the trial court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct the jury that the defendant cannot be convicted of both stealing the vehicle and receiving a stolen vehicle. (*People v. Black* (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 523, 525 [271 Cal.Rptr. 771]; *People v. Strong* (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 366, 376 [35 Cal.Rptr.2d 494].) In such cases, give CALCRIM No. 3516, *Multiple Counts: Alternative Charges for One Event—Dual Conviction Prohibited*.

Similarly, a defendant cannot be convicted of grand theft of a vehicle and unlawfully taking the vehicle in the absence of any evidence showing a substantial break between the taking and the use of the vehicle. (*People v. Kehoe* (1949) 33 Cal.2d 711, 715 [204 P.2d 321]; see *People v. Malamut* (1971) 16 Cal.App.3d 237, 242 [93 Cal.Rptr. 782] [finding substantial lapse between theft and driving].) In such cases, give CALCRIM No. 3516, *Multiple Counts: Alternative Charges for One Event—Dual Conviction Prohibited*.

The bracketed paragraph that begins with “Even if you conclude that” may be given on request if there is evidence that the owner of the vehicle previously agreed to let the defendant or another person drive or take the vehicle. (Veh. Code, § 10851(c).)

The bracketed sentence defining “taking” may be given on request if there is a question whether a vehicle that was taken was moved any distance. (*People v. White* (1945) 71 Cal.App.2d 524, 525 [162 P.2d 862].)

The definition of “vehicle” may be given on request. (See Veh. Code, § 670 [“vehicle” defined].)

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Veh. Code, § 10851(a), (b); *De Mond v. Superior Court* (1962) 57 Cal.2d 340, 344 [368 P.2d 865].
- Ambulance Defined. Veh. Code, § 165(a).
- Owner Defined. Veh. Code, § 460.
- Application to Trolley Coaches. Veh. Code, § 21051.
- Expiration of Owner’s Consent to Drive. *People v. Hutchings* (1966) 242 Cal.App.2d 294, 295 [51 Cal.Rptr. 415].
- Taking Defined. *People v. White* (1945) 71 Cal.App.2d 524, 525 [162 P.2d 862] [any removal, however slight, constitutes taking]; *People v. Frye* (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1080, 1088 [34 Cal.Rptr.2d 180] [taking is limited to removing vehicle from owner’s possession].
- Vehicle Value Must Exceed \$950 for Felony Taking With Intent to Temporarily or Permanently Deprive. *People v. Bullard* (2020) 9 Cal.5th 94, 109 [260 Cal.Rptr.3d 153, 460 P.3d 262]; *People v. Page* (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1175, 1183–1187 [225 Cal.Rptr.3d 786, 406 P.3d 319].

**LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES**

- Attempted Unlawful Driving or Taking of Vehicle. Pen. Code, § 664; Veh. Code, § 10851(a), (b).

**RELATED ISSUES*****Other Modes of Transportation***

The “joyriding” statute, Penal Code section 499b, now only prohibits the unlawful taking of bicycles, motorboats, or vessels. The unlawful taking or operation of an aircraft is a felony, as prohibited by Penal Code section 499d.

***Community Property***

A spouse who takes a community property vehicle with the intent to temporarily, not permanently, deprive the other spouse of its use is not guilty of violating Vehicle Code section 10851. (*People v. Llamas* (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1729, 1739–1740 [60 Cal.Rptr.2d 357].)

***Consent Not Vitiating by Fraud***

The fact that an owner’s consent was obtained by fraud or misrepresentation does not supply the element of nonconsent. (*People v. Cook* (1964) 228 Cal.App.2d 716, 719 [39 Cal.Rptr. 802].)

***Theft-Related Convictions***

A person cannot be convicted of taking a vehicle and receiving it as stolen property unless the jury finds that the defendant unlawfully drove the vehicle, as opposed to unlawfully taking it, and there is other evidence that establishes the elements of receiving stolen property. (*People v. Jaramillo* (1976) 16 Cal.3d 752, 757–759 [129 Cal.Rptr. 306, 548 P.2d 706]; *People v. Cratty* (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 98, 102–103 [91 Cal.Rptr.2d 370]; *People v. Strong* (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 366, 372–374 [35 Cal.Rptr.2d 494].)

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

5 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property, §§ 107–113.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.10A, Ch. 143, *Crimes Against Property*, § 143.01[1][j], [2][c], [4][c] (Matthew Bender).

## 1821. Tampering With a Vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10852)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with (damaging/ [or] tampering with) a vehicle [in violation of Vehicle Code section 10852].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

<Alternative 1A—damaged or tampered with>

1. The defendant willfully (damaged/ [or] tampered with) someone else's vehicle [or the contents of that vehicle];]

<Alternative 1B—broke or removed part of>

1. The defendant willfully (broke/ [or] removed) part of someone else's vehicle;]

[AND]

2. The defendant did not have the owner's consent to do that act(;/.)

<Give element 3 when instructing on "in association with" others.>

[AND]

3. The defendant acted in association with one or more other persons.]

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose. It is not required that he or she intend to break the law, hurt someone else, or gain any advantage.

[A *vehicle* is a device by which people or things may be moved on a road or highway. A vehicle does not include a device that is moved only by human power or used only on stationary rails or tracks.]

[A person acts *in association with one or more other people*, when he or she joins with another to accomplish a common unlawful purpose.]

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*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a *sua sponte* duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If the prosecution alleges that the defendant did not personally commit the act of tampering but acted "in association with" others, give bracketed element 3 and the paragraph that begins with "A person acts *in association . . .*" (*People v. Farina*

(1963) 220 Cal.App.2d 291, 294 [33 Cal.Rptr. 794].) The court has a **sua sponte** duty to also give CALCRIM No. 416, *Evidence of Uncharged Conspiracy*.

The statute uses the term “injure.” (Veh. Code, § 10852.) The committee has replaced the word “injure” with the word “damage” because the word “injure” generally refers to harm to a person rather than to property.

Give the bracketed definition of vehicle on request.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Veh. Code, § 10852.
- Willfully Defined. Pen. Code, § 7(1); *People v. Lara* (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 102, 107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
- Vehicle Defined. Veh. Code, § 670.
- “In Association With” Means to Conspire With. *People v. Farina* (1963) 220 Cal.App.2d 291, 294 [33 Cal.Rptr. 794].
- Tamper Defined. *People v. Anderson* (1975) 15 Cal.3d 806, 810–811 [126 Cal.Rptr. 235, 543 P.2d 603]; *People v. Mooney* (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 502, 505 [193 Cal.Rptr. 381].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property, § 308.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 143, *Crimes Against Property*, § 143.10[1][b], [2][c] (Matthew Bender).



## 1822. Unlawful Taking of Bicycle or Vessel (Pen. Code, § 499b)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with unlawfully taking a (bicycle/vessel) [in violation of Penal Code section 499b].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this charge, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant took someone else's (bicycle/vessel) without the owner's consent;

AND

2. When the defendant acted, (he/she) intended to use [or operate] the (bicycle/vessel) for any period of time.

[A *taking* requires that the (bicycle/vessel) be moved for any distance, no matter how slight.]

[A *vessel* includes ships of all kinds, steamboats, steamships, canal boats, barges, sailing vessels, and any structure intended to transport people or merchandise over water.]

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*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

The defendant cannot be convicted of both unlawfully taking a bicycle or vessel and receiving the same item as stolen property where there is evidence of only one act or transaction. (See *People v. Black* (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 523, 525 [271 Cal.Rptr. 771]; *People v. Strong* (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 366, 376 [35 Cal.Rptr.2d 494].)

Similarly, a defendant cannot be convicted of both an unlawful taking and theft of the same item in the absence of evidence showing a substantial break between the theft and the use of the property. (See *People v. Kehoe* (1949) 33 Cal.2d 711, 715 [204 P.2d 321]; *People v. Malamut* (1971) 16 Cal.App.3d 237, 242 [93 Cal.Rptr. 782].) In such cases, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct the jury that the defendant cannot be convicted of both offenses. Give CALCRIM No. 3516, *Multiple Counts: Alternative Charges for One Event—Dual Conviction Prohibited*.

On request, give the bracketed definition of “taking.” (*People v. White* (1945) 71 Cal.App.2d 524, 525 [162 P.2d 862].)

If the defendant is charged with a felony based on a qualifying prior conviction under Penal Code section 499, the court must give either CALCRIM No. 3100, *Prior Conviction: Nonbifurcated Trial* or CALCRIM No. 3101, *Prior Conviction:*

*Bifurcated Trial*, unless the defendant stipulates to the truth of the conviction.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 499b.
- Felony Offense If Qualifying Prior Conviction. Pen. Code, § 499.
- Vessel Defined. Harb. & Nav. Code, § 21.
- Taking Defined. *People v. White* (1945) 71 Cal.App.2d 524, 525 [162 P.2d 862]; *People v. Frye* (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1080, 1088 [34 Cal.Rptr.2d 180].
- Expiration of Owner’s Consent. *People v. Hutchings* (1966) 242 Cal.App.2d 294, 295 [51 Cal.Rptr. 415].

### COMMENTARY

Prior to 1997, this statute also applied to the taking of vehicles. (See *People v. Howard* (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 323, 326, fn. 2 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 849].) The Legislature determined that the previous statute was duplicative of Vehicle Code section 10851 and, therefore, restricted the scope of the statute to only bicycles and, later, vessels. (Stats. 1996, ch. 660, § 3; see *People v. Howard, supra*, 57 Cal.App.4th at p. 326, fn. 2.)

Prior to this amendment, a split in authority developed over whether this is a specific-intent crime. The statute requires that the defendant take the item “for the purpose of temporarily using or operating” it. (Pen. Code, § 499b(a) & (b).) Analyzing the statute when it still applied to vehicles, the majority of cases held that this required the specific intent to use or operate the vehicle. (*People v. Howard* (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 323, 327–328 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 849]; *People v. Ivans* (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1654, 1663–1664 [4 Cal.Rptr.2d 66]; *People v. Diaz* (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 745, 749–751 [260 Cal.Rptr. 806].) One case, however, held that this was a general-intent crime requiring only that the vehicle be taken by an act of driving or operating. (*People v. Frye* (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1080, 1090–1091 [34 Cal.Rptr.2d 180].) The reasoning of the court in *People v. Frye, supra*, is based on the premise that one “takes” a vehicle by driving or operating it. (*Id.* at p. 1091 [“the ‘taking’ proscribed by Penal Code section 499b is an act of taking possession through driving . . .”].) As discussed in *People v. Howard, supra*, however, one may “take” a vehicle without driving or operating it, such as by towing it. This distinction is even more apparent in the context of bicycles and vessels, the only items now covered by the statute. One can “take” a bicycle without using or operating it by simply carrying it away. Similarly, if a vessel is on land, one can “take” it without using or operating it by towing it away. In such circumstances, it would appear that the person has not violated Penal Code section 499b unless there is some evidence that he or she also intends to use or operate the bicycle or vessel. Thus, in light of the amendments to the statute, the committee believes that the reasoning of *Howard* and *Diaz, supra*, finding this to be a specific-intent crime, is more persuasive.

**LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES**

- Attempted Unlawful Taking of Bicycle or Vessel. Pen. Code, § 664; Pen. Code, § 499b.

If the defendant is charged with a felony based on a prior conviction, then the misdemeanor offense is a lesser included offense. The court must provide the jury with a verdict form on which the jury will indicate if the prior conviction has been proved. If the jury finds that the prior conviction has not been proved, then the offense should be set at a misdemeanor.

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property, § 113.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 143, *Crimes Against Property*, § 143.01[1][j], [4][e] (Matthew Bender).

**1823–1829. Reserved for Future Use**



## C. EXTORTION

### 1830. Extortion by Threat or Force (Pen. Code, §§ 518, 519)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with extortion by (threat/ [or] force) [in violation of Penal Code section 518].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

*<Alternative 1A—threatened to injure or used force>*

1. The defendant (threatened to unlawfully injure/ [or] used force against) (another person or a third person/ [or] the property of another person or a third person);]

*<Alternative 1B—threatened to accuse of crime>*

1. The defendant threatened to accuse another person[, or that person's relative or family member,] of a crime;]

*<Alternative 1C—threatened to expose secret>*

1. The defendant threatened to expose a secret about another person[, or that person's relative or family member,] [or to expose or connect (him/her/any of them) with a (disgrace[,]/ [or] crime[,]/ [or] deformity)];]
2. When (making the threat/ [or] using force), the defendant intended to use that (fear/ [or] force) to obtain the other person's consent (to give the defendant money [or property]/ [or] to do an official act);
3. As a result of the (threat/ [or] use of force), the other person consented (to give the defendant money [or property]/ [or] to do an official act);

AND

4. As a result of the (threat/ [or] use of force), the other person then (gave the defendant money [or property]/ [or] did an official act).

The term *consent* has a special meaning here. Consent for extortion can be coerced or unwilling, as long as it is given as a result of the wrongful use of force or fear.

The (threat/use of force) must be the controlling reason that the other person consented. If the person consented because of some other controlling reason, the defendant is not guilty of extortion.

[Threatening to do something that a person has a legal right to do is not

a threat to commit an unlawful injury.]

[The threat may involve harm to be inflicted by the defendant or by someone else.]

[An *official act* is an act that a person does in his or her official capacity, using the authority of his or her public office.]

[A *secret* is a fact that:

1. Is unknown to the general public or to someone who might be interested in knowing the fact;

AND

2. Harms the threatened person's reputation or other interest so greatly that he or she would be likely to (give the defendant money[or property]/[or] do an official act) to prevent the fact from being revealed.]

*New January 2006*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime. (See *People v. Hesslink* (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 781, 788–790 [213 Cal.Rptr. 465].)

Depending on the evidence, in element 1, give the appropriate alternative A–C describing the threat. (Pen. Code, § 519.)

### *Related Instructions*

For an instruction on the crime of kidnapping for ransom, reward, or extortion, see CALCRIM No. 1202, *Kidnapping: For Ransom, Reward, or Extortion*.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 518, 519; *People v. Hesslink* (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 781, 789 [213 Cal.Rptr. 465].
- Specific Intent Required. *People v. Hesslink* (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 781, 789–790 [213 Cal.Rptr. 465].
- Felony Punishment. Pen. Code, § 520.
- Property Defined. Pen. Code, § 7(10) and (12); see *People v. Baker* (1978) 88 Cal.App.3d 115, 119 [151 Cal.Rptr. 362] [includes right to file administrative protest]; *People v. Cadman* (1881) 57 Cal. 562, 564 [includes right to prosecute appeal]; *People v. Kozlowski* (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 853, 869 [117 Cal.Rptr.2d 504] [includes PIN code].
- Coerced Consent. *People v. Goodman* (1958) 159 Cal.App.2d 54, 61 [323 P.2d

536]; *People v. Peck* (1919) 43 Cal.App. 638, 645 [185 P. 881].

- Force or Fear Must Be Controlling Cause. *People v. Goodman* (1958) 159 Cal.App.2d 54, 61 [323 P.2d 536].
- Official Act Defined. See *People v. Mayfield* (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 769–773 [60 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 928 P.2d 485] [kidnapping for extortion]; *People v. Norris* (1985) 40 Cal.3d 51, 55–56 [219 Cal.Rptr. 7, 706 P.2d 1141] [same].
- Secret Defined. *People v. Lavine* (1931) 115 Cal.App. 289, 295 [1 P.2d 496].
- Threat of Harm by Third Person. *People v. Hopkins* (1951) 105 Cal.App.2d 708, 709–710 [233 P.2d 948].
- Unlawful Injury Defined. *People v. Schmitz* (1908) 7 Cal.App. 330, 369–370 [94 P. 407].
- Wrongful Defined. *People v. Beggs* (1918) 178 Cal. 79, 83–84 [172 P. 152].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Attempted Extortion. Pen. Code, § 524; see *People v. Sales* (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 741, 748–749 [10 Cal.Rptr.3d 527]; *People v. Franquelin* (1952) 109 Cal.App.2d 777, 783–784 [241 P.2d 651]; *Isaac v. Superior Court* (1978) 79 Cal.App.3d 260, 263 [146 Cal.Rptr. 396]; *People v. Lavine* (1931) 115 Cal.App. 289, 297 [1 P.2d 496].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *No Defense of Good Faith*

A good faith belief in the right to property does not negate the specific intent required for extortion. A debt cannot be collected by extortion. (*People v. Beggs* (1918) 178 Cal. 79, 84 [172 P. 152]; see *People v. Serrano* (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1672, 1677–1678 [15 Cal.Rptr.2d 305] [kidnapping for ransom].)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property, §§ 119–124.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 143, *Crimes Against Property*, § 143.02 (Matthew Bender).

## 1831. Extortion by Threatening Letter (Pen. Code, § 523)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with sending a threatening letter with the intent to extort [in violation of Penal Code section 523].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant sent or delivered a threatening letter [or other writing] to another person;

*<Alternative 2A—threatened to injure>*

- [2. In the letter [or writing], the defendant threatened to unlawfully injure (the other person or someone else/ [or] the property of the other person or someone else);]

*<Alternative 2B—threatened to accuse of crime>*

- [2. In the letter [or writing], the defendant threatened to accuse the other person[, or that person’s relative or family member,] of a crime;]

*<Alternative 2C—threatened to expose secret>*

- [2. In the letter [or writing], the defendant threatened to expose a secret about the other person[, or that person’s relative or family member,] [or to expose or connect (him/her/any of them) with a (disgrace[,/ [or] crime[,/ [or] deformity)];]

**AND**

3. When sending or delivering the letter [or writing], the defendant intended to use fear to obtain (money [or property]/[or] the performance of an official act) with the other person’s consent.

The term *consent* has a special meaning here. Consent for extortion can be coerced or unwilling, as long as it is given as a result of the wrongful use of force or fear.

[The threat can be directly stated in the letter [or writing] or can be implied by the contents of the letter [or writing] and the surrounding circumstances or can be intended by the sender to be understood as a threat by the recipient.]

[Threatening to do something that a person has a legal right to do is not a threat to commit an unlawful injury.]

[The letter [or writing] does not need to be signed and does not need to have been (written/dictated/composed) by the defendant.]

[The crime is complete when the letter [or writing] is either delivered to



someone or deposited in a post office or any other place, with the intent that the letter [or writing] be forwarded to the intended recipient. It is not required that the intended recipient actually receive the letter [or writing].]

[It is not required that the intended recipient actually (give the defendant money [or property]/ [or] do an official act).]

[An *official act* is an act that a person does in his or her official capacity, using the authority of his or her public office.]

[A *secret* is a fact that:

1. Is unknown to the general public or to someone who might be interested in knowing the fact;

AND

2. Harms the threatened person's reputation or other interest so greatly that he or she would be likely to (give the defendant money[or property]/ [or] do an official act) to prevent the fact from being revealed.]

---

*New January 2006*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

Depending on the evidence, in element 2, give the appropriate alternative A–C describing the threat. (Pen. Code, § 519.)

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 523.
- Crime Complete When Mailed. Pen. Code, § 660.
- Felony Punishment. Pen. Code, § 520.
- Threats. Pen. Code, § 519.
- Coerced Consent. *People v. Goodman* (1958) 159 Cal.App.2d 54, 61 [323 P.2d 536]; *People v. Peck* (1919) 43 Cal.App. 638, 645 [185 P. 881] [extortion under Pen. Code, §§ 518, 519].
- Official Act Defined. See *People v. Mayfield* (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 769–773 [60 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 928 P.2d 485] [kidnapping for extortion]; *People v. Norris* (1985) 40 Cal.3d 51, 55–56 [219 Cal.Rptr. 7, 706 P.2d 1141] [same].
- Secret Defined. *People v. Lavine* (1931) 115 Cal.App. 289, 295 [1 P.2d 496] [extortion under Pen. Code, §§ 518, 519].

- Unlawful Injury Defined. *People v. Schmitz* (1908) 7 Cal.App. 330, 369–370 [94 P. 407] [extortion under Pen. Code, §§ 518, 519].
- Threat to Accuse of Crime Includes Threat to Continue Pursuit of Criminal Charge. *People v. Umana* (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 625, 640–641 [41 Cal.Rptr.3d 573].

### COMMENTARY

Adding “official act” to section 518 expanded the definition of extortion in the related code sections, including section 523, to include extortion of an official act. (*Isaac v. Superior Court* (1978) 79 Cal.App.3d 260, 263–264 [146 Cal.Rptr. 396].)

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Attempted Extortion. Pen. Code, § 524.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property, § 125.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 143, &it;*Crimes Against Property*, § 143.02 (Matthew Bender).

## 1832. Extortion of Signature (Pen. Code, § 522)

The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with obtaining a signature by extortion [in violation of Penal Code section 522].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

*<Alternative 1A—threatened to injure or used force>*

1. The defendant (threatened to unlawfully injure/ [or] used force against) (another person or someone else/ [or] the property of another person or someone else);]

*<Alternative 1B—threatened to accuse of crime>*

1. The defendant threatened to accuse another person[, or that person's relative or family member,] of a crime;]

*<Alternative 1C—threatened to expose secret>*

1. The defendant threatened to expose a secret about another person[, or that person's relative or family member,] [or to expose or connect (him/her/any of them) with a (disgrace[,]/ [or] crime[,]/ [or] deformity)];]
2. When (making the threat/ [or] using force), the defendant intended to use that (fear/ [or] force) to obtain the other person's signature on (a/an) (document/check/ \_\_\_\_\_ *<specify other paper or instrument>*) that, if voluntarily signed, would transfer property or create a (debt/demand/charge/right of legal action);

**AND**

3. As a result of the (threat/ [or] use of force), the other person signed the (document/check/ \_\_\_\_\_ *<specify other paper or instrument>*).

[Threatening to do something that a person has a legal right to do is not a threat to commit an unlawful injury.]

[The fear caused by the threat must be the controlling reason that the other person signed the document. If the person signed the document because of some other controlling reason, the defendant is not guilty of extortion.]

[A *secret* is a fact that:

1. Is unknown to the general public or to someone who might be interested in knowing the fact;

**AND**

2. **Harms the threatened person’s reputation or other interest so greatly that he or she would be likely to sign (a/an) (document/ check/ \_\_\_\_\_ <specify other paper or instrument>) to prevent the fact from being revealed.]**

*New January 2006*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

Depending on the evidence, in element 1, give the appropriate alternative A–C describing the threat. (See Pen. Code, § 519.)

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 522.
- Coerced Consent. *People v. Goodman* (1958) 159 Cal.App.2d 54, 61 [323 P.2d 536]; *People v. Peck* (1919) 43 Cal.App. 638, 645 [185 P. 881] [extortion under Pen. Code, §§ 518, 519].
- Crime Complete When Document Signed. *People v. Massengale* (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 689, 692 [89 Cal.Rptr. 237].
- Fear Must Be Controlling Cause. *People v. Goodman* (1958) 159 Cal.App.2d 54, 61 [323 P.2d 536] [extortion under Pen. Code, §§ 518, 519].
- Secret Defined. *People v. Lavine* (1931) 115 Cal.App. 289, 295 [1 P.2d 496] [extortion under Pen. Code, §§ 518, 519].
- Unlawful Injury Defined. *People v. Schmitz* (1908) 7 Cal.App. 330, 369–370 [94 P. 407] [extortion under Pen. Code, §§ 518, 519].

## LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Attempted Extortion. Pen. Code, § 524.
- Threat to Accuse of Crime Includes Threat to Continue Pursuit of Criminal Charge. *People v. Umana* (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 625, 640–641 [41 Cal.Rptr.3d 573].

## SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property, § 126.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 143, *Crimes Against Property*, § 143.02 (Matthew Bender).

**1833–1849. Reserved for Future Use**

## D. PETTY THEFT WITH A PRIOR

### 1850. Petty Theft With Prior Conviction (Pen. Code, § 666)

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If you find the defendant guilty of petty theft, you must then decide whether the People have proved the additional allegation that the defendant has been convicted of a theft offense before and served a term in a penal institution as a result of that conviction. It has already been determined that the defendant is the person named in exhibits \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert numbers or descriptions of exhibits>*. You must decide whether the evidence proves that the defendant was previously convicted of the alleged crime[s].

To prove this allegation, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant was previously convicted of a theft offense;

AND

2. The defendant served a term in a penal institution for that conviction.

The People allege that the defendant was previously convicted of:

[1.] A violation of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert code section violated>*, on \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert date of conviction>*, in the \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of court>*, in Case Number \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert docket or case number>*(;/.)

[AND *<Repeat for each prior conviction alleged>*.]

[\_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of penal institution>* is a *penal institution*.]

[A *penal institution* includes [a] (city jail/county jail/state prison/any facility, camp, hospital, or institution operated to confine, treat, employ, train, and discipline persons in the legal custody of the Department of Corrections/federal prison/\_\_\_\_\_ *<specify other institution>*).]

[Consider the evidence presented on this allegation only when deciding whether the defendant was previously convicted of the crime[s] alleged [or for the limited purpose of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert other permitted purpose, e.g., assessing credibility of the defendant>*]. Do not consider this evidence for any other purpose.]

[You must consider each alleged conviction separately.] The People have the burden of proving this allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you must find that the allegation has not been proved.

*New January 2006; Revised August 2015, March 2018*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a  **sua sponte**  duty to instruct on proof of the alleged prior conviction. (See Pen. Code, § 1025 [on defendant's denial, jury must decide issue of prior convictions]; *People v. Barre* (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 961, 965 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 307].)

Do  **not**  give this instruction if the court has bifurcated the trial.

The enhancement allegation under Penal Code section 666 applies only if the defendant has been previously convicted of a crime listed in Penal Code sections 368(d) or (e) or 667(e)(2)(C)(iv) or is required to register under the Sex Offender Registration Act. If applicable, give CALCRIM No. 3100, *Prior Conviction: NonBifurcated Trial*.

If the court grants a bifurcated trial, on either of the offenses described in the paragraph above or a qualifying prior theft conviction, give CALCRIM No. 3101, *Prior Conviction: Bifurcated Trial*.

## AUTHORITY

- Enhancement. Pen. Code, § 666; *People v. Bruno* (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 1102, 1105 [237 Cal.Rptr. 31]; *People v. Bean* (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 639, 642 [261 Cal.Rptr. 784].
- Convictions From Other States. Pen. Code, § 668; *People v. Perry* (1962) 204 Cal.App.2d 201, 204 [22 Cal.Rptr. 54].
- Prior Incarceration Requirement. *People v. James* (1957) 155 Cal.App.2d 604, 612 [318 P.2d 175] [service of partial term is sufficient]; *People v. Valenzuela* (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 798, 803 [172 Cal.Rptr. 284] [custody resulting from credit for time served is sufficient]; but see *People v. Cortez* (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 510, 513–514 [29 Cal.Rptr.2d 445] [participation in work release program alone is insufficient].
- Penal Institution Defined. *Ex parte Wolfson* (1947) 30 Cal.2d 20, 26 [180 P.2d 326] [includes county jail]; *People v. Valenzuela* (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 798, 803, 804, 807–808 [172 Cal.Rptr. 284] [includes California Rehabilitation Center]; see Pen. Code, §§ 667.5(h) [defining state prison or federal penal institution for purposes of prior prison term enhancement], 969b [prima facie evidence of prior conviction and term served in any state or federal penitentiary, reformatory, or county or city jail], 6081, 6082 [prison defined]; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 851 [excludes juvenile hall].

## LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

If the defendant is charged with felony petty theft based on a prior conviction, then the misdemeanor offense is a lesser included offense. The court must provide the jury with a verdict form on which the jury will indicate if the prior conviction has been proved. If the jury finds that the prior conviction has not been proved, then the offense should be set at a misdemeanor.

There is no crime of attempted petty theft with a prior conviction. None of the elements of Penal Code section 666 may be attempted. (*People v. Bean* (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 639, 642, fn. 4 [261 Cal.Rptr. 784].)

## RELATED ISSUES

### *Jury Findings on Prior Convictions*

The jury must determine the truth of the prior conviction unless jury trial is waived or the defendant admits to the prior conviction. If more than one prior conviction is charged, the jury must make a separate finding on each charged prior. (Pen. Code, § 1158; *People v. Barre* (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 961, 965–966 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 307].)

### *Judicial Notice of Prior Conviction*

It is error for a trial court to take judicial notice of a defendant's alleged prior conviction when a reasonable juror could only understand the notice to mean that the court conclusively determined the prior-conviction allegation to be true. (*People v. Barre* (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 961, 965–966 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 307].)

### *Defense Stipulation to Prior Convictions*

The prior conviction and incarceration requirement of Penal Code section 666 is a sentencing factor for the trial court and not an element of a section 666 offense. (*People v. Bouzas* (1991) 53 Cal.3d 467, 478–480 [279 Cal.Rptr. 847, 807 P.2d 1076]; *People v. Stevens* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 982, 987 [56 Cal.Rptr.2d 13].) Thus, the defendant may stipulate to the convictions. (*People v. Bouzas, supra*, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 478–480; *People v. Stevens, supra*, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 987; *People v. Weathington* (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 69, 90 [282 Cal.Rptr. 170].)

If the defendant stipulates, the prior convictions should not be disclosed to the jury unless the court admits them as otherwise relevant. (See Pen. Code, §§ 1025, 1093; *People v. Bouzas, supra*, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 471–472, 480; *People v. Hall* (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 128, 135 [79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 690].)

### *Motion for Bifurcated Trial*

Either the defendant or the prosecution may move for a bifurcated trial. (*People v. Calderon* (1994) 9 Cal.4th 69, 77–78 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 333]; *People v. Cline* (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1327, 1334–1336 [71 Cal.Rptr.2d 41]; *People v. Weathington, supra*, 231 Cal.App.3d at p. 90.)

## SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property, § 9.

3 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, § 417.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 143, *Crimes Against Property*, § 143.01[3] (Matthew Bender).

## **1851–1859. Reserved for Future Use**





## E. THEFT RELATED INSTRUCTIONS

### 1860. Owner's Opinion of Value

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**A witness gave (his/her) opinion of the value of the property (he/she) [allegedly] owned. In considering the opinion, you may but are not required to accept it as true or correct. Consider the reasons the witness gave for any opinion, the facts or information on which (he/she) relied in forming that opinion, and whether the information on which the witness relied was true and accurate. You may disregard all or any part of an opinion that you find unbelievable or unreasonable. You may give the opinion whatever weight, if any, you believe it deserves.**

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*New January 2006*

#### BENCH NOTES

##### *Instructional Duty*

When the owner of property testifies about his or her opinion of the value of the property, give this instruction on request.

If an expert witness testified about its value, give CALCRIM No. 332, *Expert Witness Testimony*.

#### AUTHORITY

- Owner May Testify to Value. *People v. Coleman* (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 358, 361 [35 Cal.Rptr. 141].
- Jury Must Decide What Weight to Give Owner Opinion. *People v. Pena* (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 100, 102–103 [135 Cal.Rptr. 602].

#### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property, § 10.

1 Witkin, California Evidence (5th ed. 2012) Opinion Evidence, §§ 18, 103.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 143, *Crimes Against Property*, § 143.01[1][i] (Matthew Bender).

## 1861. Jury Does Not Need to Agree on Form of Theft

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with theft.

The defendant has been prosecuted for theft under (two/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert number>) theories: \_\_\_\_\_ <insert theories, e.g., theft by trick, theft by larceny, etc.>.

Each theory of theft has different requirements, and I have instructed you on (both/all).

You may not find the defendant guilty of theft unless all of you agree that the People have proved that the defendant committed theft under at least one theory. But all of you do not have to agree on the same theory.

---

*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

Give this instruction when instructing on multiple forms of theft.

#### AUTHORITY

- Unanimity on Theft Theory Not Required. *People v. McLemore* (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 601, 605 [32 Cal.Rptr.2d 687]; *People v. Counts* (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 785, 792–793 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d 425]; *People v. Failla* (1966) 64 Cal.2d 560, 567–569 [51 Cal.Rptr. 103, 414 P.2d 39] [burglary case]; *People v. Nor Woods* (1951) 37 Cal.2d 584, 586 [233 P.2d 897] [addressing the issue for theft.]

#### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property, §§ 2–3.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.02[2][a][i] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 143, *Crimes Against Property*, § 143.01 (Matthew Bender).

## 1862. Return of Property Not a Defense to Theft (Pen. Code, §§ 512, 513)

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**If you conclude that the People have proved that the defendant committed \_\_\_\_\_ <insert charged theft crime>, the return or offer to return (some/all) of the property wrongfully obtained is not a defense to that charge.**

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*New January 2006; Revised October 2010*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

An instruction that restoration of wrongfully obtained property is no defense to a charge of theft may be given on request. (See *People v. Pond* (1955) 44 Cal.2d 665, 674–675 [284 P.2d 793]; see also *People v. Jenkins* (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 287, 297 [34 Cal.Rptr.2d 483] [court need not instruct on its own motion on specific points developed at trial]; *People v. Hood* (1969) 1 Cal.3d 444, 449 [82 Cal.Rptr. 618, 462 P.2d 370].)

### AUTHORITY

- Instructional Requirements. Pen. Code, §§ 512, 513; see *People v. Pond* (1955) 44 Cal.2d 665, 674–675 [284 P.2d 793].
- Intent to Return Embezzled Property At Time of Taking Not a Defense Under Pen. Code, § 512 Unless the Property was Returned Before the Person was Charged. *People v. Sisuphan* (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 800, 812 [104 Cal.Rptr.3d 654].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Exception to Show Evidence of Intent*

This instruction relates to wrongfully obtained property. However, a defendant may present evidence that he or she restored or improved property to show that his or her intent at the time of the taking was not larcenous. But there must be a relevant and probative link in the defendant's subsequent actions from which an original, innocent intent might be inferred. (*People v. Edwards* (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1092, 1100–1101 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 821].)

#### *Embezzlement of Public Funds*

In a case of alleged embezzlement of public funds, it is error to instruct that restoration may be used to mitigate punishment. (*People v. Smith* (1929) 206 Cal. 235, 237 [273 P. 789]; *People v. Marquis* (1957) 153 Cal.App.2d 553, 558–559 [315 P.2d 57]; see Pen. Code, § 1203(e)(7) [probation prohibited for embezzlement of public funds].)

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property, §§ 40, 42.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 143, *Crimes Against Property*, § 143.01[1][e] (Matthew Bender).

## 1863. Defense to Theft or Robbery: Claim of Right (Pen. Code, § 511)

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If the defendant obtained property under a claim of right, (he/she) did not have the intent required for the crime of (theft/ [or] robbery).

The defendant obtained property under a claim of right if (he/she) believed in good faith that (he/she) had a right to the specific property or a specific amount of money, and (he/she) openly took it.

In deciding whether the defendant believed that (he/she) had a right to the property and whether (he/she) held that belief in good faith, consider all the facts known to (him/her) at the time (he/she) obtained the property, along with all the other evidence in the case. The defendant may hold a belief in good faith even if the belief is mistaken or unreasonable. But if the defendant was aware of facts that made that belief completely unreasonable, you may conclude that the belief was not held in good faith.

[The claim-of-right defense does not apply if the defendant attempted to conceal the taking at the time it occurred or after the taking was discovered.]

[The claim-of-right defense does not apply to offset or pay claims against the property owner of an undetermined or disputed amount.]

[The claim-of-right defense does not apply if the claim arose from an activity commonly known to be illegal or known by the defendant to be illegal.]

If you have a reasonable doubt about whether the defendant had the intent required for (theft/ [or] robbery), you must find (him/her) not guilty of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert specific theft crime>.

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*New January 2006; Revised October 2010, August 2015, February 2016*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

There is a split in authority about whether the trial court must instruct **sua sponte** on the defense of claim of right. (See *People v. Russell* (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1429 [51 Cal.Rptr.3d 263] [**sua sponte** duty when claim of right supported]; but see *People v. Hussain* (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 261, 268–269 [179 Cal.Rptr.3d 679] [no **sua sponte** duty to instruct on claim of right], following *People v. Anderson* (2011) 51 Cal.4th 989, 998 [125 Cal.Rptr.3d 408, 252 P.3d 968] [no **sua sponte** duty to instruct on accident].)

### AUTHORITY

- Defense. Pen. Code, § 511; *People v. Tufunga* (1999) 21 Cal.4th 935, 952, fn. 4  
1191

[90 Cal.Rptr.2d 143, 987 P.2d 168]; *People v. Anderson* (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 93, 102 [185 Cal.Rptr.3d 128][third parties]; *People v. Romo* (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 514, 517, 518 [269 Cal.Rptr. 440].

- Good Faith Belief. *People v. Stewart* (1976) 16 Cal.3d 133, 139–140 [127 Cal.Rptr. 117, 544 P.2d 1317]; *People v. Navarro* (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 4, 10–11 [160 Cal.Rptr. 692].
- No Concealment of Taking. *People v. Wooten* (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1834, 1848–1849 [52 Cal.Rptr.2d 765].
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6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.10[1][b], Ch. 143, *Crimes Against Property*, §§ 143.01[1][d], 143.10[1][d] (Matthew Bender).

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# Judicial Council of California Criminal Jury Instructions

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## CALCRIM 2021

2  
Series 1900–3500



**Judicial Council of California  
Advisory Committee on Criminal Jury Instructions**

Hon. Peter J. Siggins, *Chair*

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- 966. Shooting at Uninhabited House or Unoccupied Motor Vehicle (Pen. Code, § 247(b))
- 967. Shooting at Unoccupied Aircraft (Pen. Code, § 247(a))
- 968. Shooting From Motor Vehicle (Pen. Code, § 26100(c) & (d))
- 969. Permitting Someone to Shoot From Vehicle (Pen. Code, § 26100(b))
- 970. Shooting Firearm or BB Device in Grossly Negligent Manner (Pen. Code, § 246.3)
- 971–979. Reserved for Future Use

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- 980. Brandishing Firearm in Presence of Occupant of Motor Vehicle (Pen. Code, § 417.3)
- 981. Brandishing Firearm in Presence of Peace Officer (Pen. Code, § 417(c) & (e))
- 982. Brandishing Firearm or Deadly Weapon to Resist Arrest (Pen. Code, § 417.8)
- 983. Brandishing Firearm or Deadly Weapon: Misdemeanor (Pen. Code, § 417(a)(1) & (2))
- 984. Brandishing Firearm: Misdemeanor—Public Place (Pen. Code, § 417(a)(2)(A))
- 985. Brandishing Imitation Firearm (Pen. Code, § 417.4)
- 986–999. Reserved for Future Use

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**A. AGAINST ADULT OR MINOR**

**(i) Rape**

- 1000. Rape or Spousal Rape by Force, Fear, or Threats (Pen. Code, § 261(a)(2), (6) & (7))
- 1001. Rape or Spousal Rape in Concert (Pen. Code, § 264.1)
- 1002. Rape of Intoxicated Woman or Spouse (Pen. Code, §§ 261(a)(3), 262(a)(2))
- 1003. Rape of Unconscious Woman or Spouse (Pen. Code, §§ 261(a)(4), 262(a)(3))
- 1004. Rape of a Disabled Woman (Pen. Code, § 261(a)(1))
- 1005. Rape by Fraud (Pen. Code, § 261(a)(5))



1006–1014. Reserved for Future Use

**(ii) Oral Copulation**

- 1015. Oral Copulation by Force, Fear, or Threats (Pen. Code, § 287(c)(2) & (3), (k))
  - 1016. Oral Copulation in Concert (Pen. Code, § 287(d))
  - 1017. Oral Copulation of an Intoxicated Person (Pen. Code, § 287(a), (i))
  - 1018. Oral Copulation of an Unconscious Person (Pen. Code, § 287(a), (f))
  - 1019. Oral Copulation of a Disabled Person (Pen. Code, § 287(a), (g))
  - 1020. Oral Copulation of a Disabled Person in a Mental Hospital (Pen. Code, § 287(a), (h))
  - 1021. Oral Copulation by Fraud (Pen. Code, § 287(a), (j))
  - 1022. Oral Copulation While in Custody (Pen. Code, § 287(a), (e))
- 1023–1029. Reserved for Future Use

**(iii) Sodomy**

- 1030. Sodomy by Force, Fear, or Threats (Pen. Code, § 286(c)(2), (3), (k))
  - 1031. Sodomy in Concert (Pen. Code, § 286(d))
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**(iv) Sexual Penetration**

- 1045. Sexual Penetration by Force, Fear, or Threats (Pen. Code, § 289(a)(1), (2), (g))
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## **B. AGAINST MINORS ONLY**

### **(i) Unlawful Sexual Intercourse**

- 1070. Unlawful Sexual Intercourse: Defendant 21 or Older (Pen. Code, § 261.5(a) & (d))
- 1071. Unlawful Sexual Intercourse: Minor More Than Three Years Younger (Pen. Code, § 261.5(a) & (c))
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### **(ii) Oral Copulation**

- 1080. Oral Copulation With Person Under 14 (Pen. Code, § 287(c)(1))
- 1081. Oral Copulation With Minor: Defendant 21 or Older (Pen. Code, § 287(b)(2))
- 1082. Oral Copulation With Person Under 18 (Pen. Code, § 287(b)(1))
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### **(iii) Sodomy**

- 1090. Sodomy With Person Under 14 (Pen. Code, § 286(c)(1))
- 1091. Sodomy With Minor: Defendant 21 or Older (Pen. Code, § 286(b)(2))
- 1092. Sodomy With Person Under 18 (Pen. Code, § 286(b)(1))
- 1093–1099. Reserved for Future Use

### **(iv) Sexual Penetration**

- 1100. Sexual Penetration With Person Under 14 (Pen. Code, § 289(j))
- 1101. Sexual Penetration With Minor: Defendant 21 or Older (Pen. Code, § 289(i))
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### **(v) Lewd And Lascivious Act**

- 1110. Lewd or Lascivious Act: Child Under 14 Years (Pen. Code, § 288(a))
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- 2302. Possession for Sale of Controlled Substance (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11351, 11351.5, 11378, 11378.5)
- 2303. Possession of Controlled Substance While Armed With Firearm (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.1)
- 2304. Simple Possession of Controlled Substance (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11350, 11377)
- 2305. Defense: Momentary Possession of Controlled Substance
- 2306. Possession of Controlled Substance with Intent to Commit Sexual Assault (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11350.5, 11377.5)
- 2307–2314. Reserved for Future Use

### **B.    SUBSTITUTE SUBSTANCE**

- 2315. Sale of Substitute Substance (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11355, 11382)
- 2316. Offer to Sell Substitute Substance (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11355, 11382)
- 2317–2319. Reserved for Future Use

### **C.    FORGED SUBSTANCE**

- 2320. Forged Prescription for Narcotic (Health & Saf. Code, § 11368)
- 2321. Forged Prescription for Narcotic: With Possession of Drug (Health & Saf. Code, § 11368)
- 2322–2329. Reserved for Future Use

### **D.    MANUFACTURING**

#### **(i)    Manufacturing and Offering**

- 2330. Manufacturing a Controlled Substance (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11379.6(a), 11362.3)
- 2331. Offering to Manufacture a Controlled Substance (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11379.6(a) & (c))
- 2332–2334. Reserved for Future Use

#### **(ii)    Possession of Materials**

- 2335. Possession With Intent to Manufacture Methamphetamine or N-ethylamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11383.5(a))
- 2336. Possession With Intent to Manufacture PCP (Health & Saf. Code, § 11383(a))
- 2337. Possession With Intent to Manufacture Methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11383.5(b)(1))

2338. Possession of Isomers or Precursors With Intent to Manufacture Controlled Substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11383.5(c)–(f))

2339–2349. Reserved for Future Use

## **E. CANNABIS**

### **(i) Sale, Offering to Sell, Possession for Sale**

2350. Sale, Furnishing, Administering or Importing of Cannabis (Health & Saf. Code, § 11360(a))

2351. Offering to Sell, Furnish, etc., Cannabis (Health & Saf. Code, § 11360)

2352. Possession for Sale of Cannabis (Health & Saf. Code, § 11359)

2353–2359. Reserved for Future Use

### **(ii) Transportation or Offering to Transport**

2360. Transporting or Giving Away Marijuana: Not More Than 28.5 Grams—Misdemeanor (Health & Saf. Code, § 11360(b))

2361. Transporting for Sale or Giving Away Cannabis: More Than 28.5 Grams (Health & Saf. Code, § 11360(a))

2362. Offering to Transport or Give Away Marijuana: Not More Than 28.5 Grams—Misdemeanor (Health & Saf. Code, § 11360(b))

2363. Offering or Attempting to Transport for Sale or Offering to Give Away Cannabis: More Than 28.5 Grams (Health & Saf. Code, § 11360(a))

2364. Felony Cannabis Penalty Allegations (Health & Saf. Code, § 11360(a)(3))

2365–2369. Reserved for Future Use

### **(iii) Planting**

2370. Planting, etc., Cannabis (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11358(c)–(d))

2371–2374. Reserved for Future Use

### **(iv) Simple Possession**

2375. Simple Possession of Cannabis or Concentrated Cannabis: Misdemeanor (Health & Saf. Code, § 11357(b))

2376. Simple Possession of Cannabis or Concentrated Cannabis on School Grounds: Misdemeanor (Health & Saf. Code, § 11357(c))

2377. Simple Possession of Concentrated Cannabis (Health & Saf. Code, § 11357(a))

2378–2379. Reserved for Future Use

## **F. OFFENSES INVOLVING MINORS**

### **(i) Controlled Substances**

2380. Sale, Furnishing, etc., of Controlled Substance to Minor (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11353, 11354, 11380(a))

2381. Offering to Sell, Furnish, etc., Controlled Substance to Minor (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11353, 11354, 11380(a))

- 2382. Employment of Minor to Sell Controlled Substance (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11353, 11354)
- 2383. Use of Minor as Agent to Violate Controlled Substance Law (Health & Saf. Code, § 11380(a))
- 2384. Inducing Minor to Violate Controlled Substance Laws (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11353, 11354, 11380(a))
- 2385–2389. Reserved for Future Use

**(ii) Marijuana**

- 2390. Sale, Furnishing, etc., of Cannabis to Minor (Health & Saf. Code, § 11361)
- 2391. Offering to Sell, Furnish, etc., Cannabis to Minor (Health & Saf. Code, § 11361)
- 2392. Employment of Minor to Sell, etc., Cannabis (Health & Saf. Code, § 11361(a))
- 2393. Inducing Minor to Use Cannabis (Health & Saf. Code, § 11361(a))
- 2394–2399. Reserved for Future Use

**G. USE AND POSSESSION OF PARAPHERNALIA**

**(i) Use**

- 2400. Using or Being Under the Influence of Controlled Substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11550)
- 2401. Aiding and Abetting Unlawful Use of Controlled Substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11365)
- 2402–2409. Reserved for Future Use

**(ii) Possession of Paraphernalia**

- 2410. Possession of Controlled Substance Paraphernalia (Health & Saf. Code, § 11364)
- 2411. Possession of Hypodermic Needle or Syringe (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 4140)
- 2412. Fraudulently Obtaining a Hypodermic Needle or Syringe (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 4326(a))
- 2413. Using or Permitting Improper Use of a Hypodermic Needle or Syringe (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 4326(b))
- 2414–2429. Reserved for Future Use

**H. MONEY FROM CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES**

- 2430. Possession of More Than \$100,000 Related to Transaction Involving Controlled Substance: Proceeds (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.6)
- 2431. Possession of More Than \$100,000 Related to Transaction Involving Controlled Substance: Money to Purchase (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.6)
- 2432. Attorney’s Possession of More Than \$100,000 Related to Transaction Involving Controlled Substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.6(b))
- 2433–2439. Reserved for Future Use

**I. OTHER RELATED OFFENSES**

- 2440. Maintaining a Place for Controlled Substance Sale or Use (Health & Saf. Code, § 11366)
- 2441. Use of False Compartment to Conceal Controlled Substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11366.8)
- 2442–2499. Reserved for Future Use

**SERIES 2500 WEAPONS**

**A. POSSESSION OF ILLEGAL OR DEADLY WEAPON**

- 2500. Illegal Possession, etc., of Weapon
- 2501. Carrying Concealed Explosive or Dirk or Dagger (Pen. Code, §§ 21310, 16470)
- 2502. Possession, etc., of Switchblade Knife (Pen. Code, § 21510)
- 2503. Possession of Deadly Weapon With Intent to Assault (Pen. Code, § 17500)
- 2504–2509. Reserved for Future Use

**B. POSSESSION OF FIREARM BY PERSON PROHIBITED**

- 2510. Possession of Firearm by Person Prohibited Due to Conviction—No Stipulation to Conviction (Pen. Code, §§ 29800, 29805, 29820, 29900)
- 2511. Possession of Firearm by Person Prohibited Due to Conviction—Stipulation to Conviction (Pen. Code, §§ 29800, 29805, 29820, 29900)
- 2512. Possession of Firearm by Person Prohibited by Court Order (Pen. Code, §§ 29815, 29825)
- 2513. Possession of Firearm by Person Addicted to a Narcotic Drug (Pen. Code, § 29800)
- 2514. Possession of Firearm by Person Prohibited by Statute: Self-Defense
- 2515–2519. Reserved for Future Use

**C. CARRYING A FIREARM**

**(i) Concealed**

- 2520. Carrying Concealed Firearm on Person (Pen. Code, § 25400(a)(2))
- 2521. Carrying Concealed Firearm Within Vehicle (Pen. Code, § 25400(a)(1))
- 2522. Carrying Concealed Firearm: Caused to Be Carried Within Vehicle (Pen. Code, § 25400(a)(3))
- 2523–2529. Reserved for Future Use

**(ii) Loaded**

- 2530. Carrying Loaded Firearm (Pen. Code, § 25850(a))
- 2531–2539. Reserved for Future Use

**(iii) Sentencing Factors**

- 2540. Carrying Firearm: Specified Convictions (Pen. Code, §§ 25400(a), 25850(c))
- 2541. Carrying Firearm: Stolen Firearm (Pen. Code, §§ 25400(c)(2), 25850(c)(2))



- 2542. Carrying Firearm: Active Participant in Criminal Street Gang (Pen. Code, §§ 25400(c)(3), 25850(c)(3))
- 2543. Carrying Firearm: Not in Lawful Possession (Pen. Code, §§ 25400(c)(4), 25850(c)(4))
- 2544. Carrying Firearm: Possession of Firearm Prohibited Due to Conviction, Court Order, or Mental Illness (Pen. Code, §§ 25400(c)(4), 25850(c)(4))
- 2545. Carrying Loaded Firearm: Not Registered Owner (Pen. Code, § 25850(c)(6))
- 2546. Carrying Concealed Firearm: Not Registered Owner and Weapon Loaded (Pen. Code, § 25400(c)(6))
- 2547–2559. Reserved for Future Use

#### **D. ASSAULT WEAPONS**

- 2560. Possession, etc., of Assault Weapon or .50 BMG Rifle (Pen. Code, §§ 30605, 30600)
- 2561. Possession, etc., of Assault Weapon or .50 BMG Rifle While Committing Other Offense—Charged as Separate Count and as Enhancement (Pen. Code, § 30615)
- 2562. Possession, etc., of Assault Weapon or .50 BMG Rifle While Committing Other Offense—Charged Only as Enhancement (Pen. Code, § 30615)
- 2563–2569. Reserved for Future Use

#### **E. EXPLOSIVES AND DESTRUCTIVE DEVICES**

- 2570. Possession of Destructive Device (Pen. Code, § 18710)
- 2571. Carrying or Placing Explosive or Destructive Device on Common Carrier (Pen. Code, § 18725)
- 2572. Possession of Explosive or Destructive Device in Specified Place (Pen. Code, § 18715)
- 2573. Possession, Explosion, etc., of Explosive or Destructive Device With Intent to Injure or Damage (Pen. Code, § 18740)
- 2574. Sale or Transportation of Destructive Device (Pen. Code, § 18730)
- 2575. Offer to Sell Destructive Device (Pen. Code, § 18730)
- 2576. Explosion of Explosive or Destructive Device With Intent to Murder (Pen. Code, § 18745)
- 2577. Explosion of Explosive or Destructive Device Causing Bodily Injury (Pen. Code, § 18750)
- 2578. Explosion of Explosive or Destructive Device Causing Death, Mayhem, or Great Bodily Injury (Pen. Code, § 18755)
- 2579. Possession of Materials to Make Destructive Device or Explosive (Pen. Code, § 18720)
- 2580–2589. Reserved for Future Use

#### **F. OTHER WEAPONS OFFENSES**

- 2590. Armed Criminal Action (Pen. Code, § 25800)
- 2591. Possession of Ammunition by Person Prohibited From Possessing Firearm Due to Conviction or Mental Illness (Pen. Code, § 30305(a))

2592. Possession of Ammunition by Person Prohibited From Possessing Firearm Due to Court Order (Pen. Code, § 30305(a))

2593–2599. Reserved for Future Use

## **SERIES 2600        CRIMES AGAINST GOVERNMENT**

### **A. BRIBERY OF OFFICIAL**

2600. Giving or Offering a Bribe to an Executive Officer (Pen. Code, § 67)

2601. Giving or Offering a Bribe to a Ministerial Officer (Pen. Code, § 67.5)

2602. Giving or Offering a Bribe to a Ministerial Officer: Value of Thing Offered (Pen. Code, § 67.5(b))

2603. Requesting or Taking a Bribe (Pen. Code, §§ 68, 86, 93)

2604–2609. Reserved for Future Use

### **B. BRIBERY OR INTIMIDATION OF WITNESS**

#### **(i) Bribery**

2610. Giving or Offering a Bribe to a Witness (Pen. Code, § 137(a))

2611. Giving or Offering a Bribe to a Witness Not to Testify (Pen. Code, § 138(a))

2612. Witness Receiving a Bribe (Pen. Code, § 138(b))

2613–2619. Reserved for Future Use

#### **(ii) Threatening or Intimidating**

2620. Using Force or Threatening a Witness Before Testimony or Information Given (Pen. Code, § 137(b))

2621. Influencing a Witness by Fraud (Pen. Code, § 137(b))

2622. Intimidating a Witness (Pen. Code, § 136.1(a) & (b))

2623. Intimidating a Witness: Sentencing Factors (Pen. Code, § 136.1(c))

2624. Threatening a Witness After Testimony or Information Given (Pen. Code, § 140(a))

2625–2629. Reserved for Future Use

### **C. EVIDENCE TAMPERING**

2630. Evidence Tampering by Peace Officer or Other Person (Pen. Code, § 141)

2631–2639. Reserved for Future Use

### **D. PERJURY**

2640. Perjury (Pen. Code, § 118)

2641. Perjury by False Affidavit (Pen. Code, § 118a)

2642–2649. Reserved for Future Use

### **E. THREATENING OR RESISTING OFFICER**

2650. Threatening a Public Official (Pen. Code, § 76)

- 2651. Trying to Prevent an Executive Officer From Performing Duty (Pen. Code, § 69)
- 2652. Resisting an Executive Officer in Performance of Duty (Pen. Code, § 69)
- 2653. Taking Firearm or Weapon While Resisting Peace Officer or Public Officer (Pen. Code, § 148(b) & (c))
- 2654. Intentionally Taking or Attempting to Take Firearm From Peace Officer or Public Officer (Pen. Code, § 148(d))
- 2655. Causing Death or Serious Bodily Injury While Resisting Peace Officer (Pen. Code, § 148.10(a) & (b))
- 2656. Resisting Peace Officer, Public Officer, or EMT (Pen. Code, § 148(a))
- 2657–2669. Reserved for Future Use

**F. LAWFUL PERFORMANCE**

- 2670. Lawful Performance: Peace Officer
- 2671. Lawful Performance: Custodial Officer
- 2672. Lawful Performance: Resisting Unlawful Arrest With Force
- 2673. Pat-Down Search
- 2674–2679. Reserved for Future Use

**G. UNLAWFUL ASSEMBLY AND DISTURBING THE PEACE**

- 2680. Courthouse Picketing (Pen. Code, § 169)
- 2681. Disturbance of Public Meeting (Pen. Code, § 403)
- 2682. Inciting a Riot (Pen. Code, § 404.6(a))
- 2683. Participating in a Riot (Pen. Code, §§ 404, 405)
- 2684. Participating in a Rout (Pen. Code, §§ 406, 408)
- 2685. Participating in an Unlawful Assembly (Pen. Code, §§ 407, 408)
- 2686. Refusal to Disperse: Riot, Rout, or Unlawful Assembly (Pen. Code, §§ 407, 409)
- 2687. Refusal to Disperse: Intent to Commit Unlawful Act (Pen. Code, § 416(a))
- 2688. Disturbing the Peace: Fighting or Challenging Someone to Fight (Pen. Code, §§ 415(1), 415.5(a)(1))
- 2689. Disturbing the Peace: Loud and Unreasonable Noise (Pen. Code, §§ 415(2), 415.5(a)(2))
- 2690. Disturbing the Peace: Offensive Words (Pen. Code, §§ 415(3), 415.5(a)(3))
- 2691–2699. Reserved for Future Use

**H. VIOLATION OF COURT ORDER**

- 2700. Violation of Court Order (Pen. Code, § 166(a)(4) & (b)(1))
- 2701. Violation of Court Order: Protective Order or Stay Away (Pen. Code, §§ 166(c)(1), 273.6)
- 2702. Violation of Court Order: Protective Order or Stay Away—Physical Injury (Pen. Code, §§ 166(c)(2), 273.6(b))

2703. Violation of Court Order: Protective Order or Stay Away—Act of Violence (Pen. Code, §§ 166(c)(4), 273.6(d))

2704–2719. Reserved for Future Use

## **I. CRIMES INVOLVING PRISONERS**

### **(i) Assault and Battery**

2720. Assault by Prisoner Serving Life Sentence (Pen. Code, § 4500)

2721. Assault by Prisoner (Pen. Code, § 4501)

2722. Battery by Gassing (Pen. Code, §§ 243.9, 4501.1)

2723. Battery by Prisoner on Nonprisoner (Pen. Code, § 4501.5)

2724–2734. Reserved for Future Use

### **(ii) Hostage Taking and Rioting**

2735. Holding a Hostage (Pen. Code, § 4503)

2736. Inciting a Riot in a Prison or Jail (Pen. Code, § 404.6(c))

2737–2744. Reserved for Future Use

### **(iii) Possession of Contraband**

2745. Possession or Manufacture of Weapon in Penal Institution (Pen. Code, § 4502)

2746. Possession of Firearm, Deadly Weapon, or Explosive in a Jail or County Road Camp (Pen. Code, § 4574(a))

2747. Bringing or Sending Firearm, Deadly Weapon, or Explosive Into Penal Institution (Pen. Code, § 4574(a)–(c))

2748. Possession of Controlled Substance or Paraphernalia in Penal Institution (Pen. Code, § 4573.6)

2749–2759. Reserved for Future Use

### **(iv) Escape**

2760. Escape (Pen. Code, § 4532(a)(1) & (b)(1))

2761. Escape by Force or Violence (Pen. Code, § 4532(a)(2) & (b)(2))

2762. Escape After Remand or Arrest (Pen. Code, § 836.6)

2763. Escape After Remand or Arrest: Force or Violence (Pen. Code, § 836.6)

2764. Escape: Necessity Defense

## **J. MISAPPROPRIATION OF PUBLIC MONEY**

2765. Misappropriation of Public Money (Pen. Code § 424(a)(1–7))

2766–2799. Reserved for Future Use

## **SERIES 2800 TAX CRIMES**

### **A. FAILURE TO FILE**

2800. Failure to File Tax Return (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19701(a))

2801. Willful Failure to File Tax Return (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19706)

2802–2809. Reserved for Future Use

**B. FALSE RETURN**

2810. False Tax Return (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19701(a))

2811. Willfully Filing False Tax Return: Statement Made Under Penalty of Perjury (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19705(a)(1))

2812. Willfully Filing False Tax Return: Intent to Evade Tax (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19706)

2813–2824. Reserved for Future Use

**C. OTHER TAX OFFENSES**

2825. Aiding in Preparation of False Tax Return (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19705(a)(2))

2826. Willful Failure to Pay Tax (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19701(c))

2827. Concealing Property With Intent to Evade Tax (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19705(a)(4))

2828. Failure to Withhold Tax (Rev. & Tax. Code, §§ 19708, 19709)

2829–2839. Reserved for Future Use

**D. EVIDENCE**

2840. Evidence of Uncharged Tax Offense: Failed to File Previous Returns

2841. No Deductions on Gross Income From Illegal Conduct (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 17282(a))

2842. Determining Income: Net Worth Method

2843. Determining Income: Bank Deposits Method

2844. Determining Income: Cash Expenditures Method

2845. Determining Income: Specific Items Method

2846. Proof of Unreported Taxable Income: Must Still Prove Elements of Offense

2847–2859. Reserved for Future Use

**E. DEFENSES**

2860. Defense: Good Faith Belief Conduct Legal

2861. Defense: Reliance on Professional Advice

2862–2899. Reserved for Future Use

**SERIES 2900 VANDALISM, LOITERING, TRESPASS, AND OTHER MISCELLANEOUS OFFENSES**

**A. VANDALISM**

2900. Vandalism (Pen. Code, § 594)

2901. Vandalism: Amount of Damage (Pen. Code, § 594(b)(1))

2902. Damaging Phone or Electrical Line (Pen. Code, § 591)

2903–2914. Reserved for Future Use

## **B. LOITERING**

- 2915. Loitering (Pen. Code, § 647(h))
- 2916. Loitering: Peeking (Pen. Code, § 647(i))
- 2917. Loitering: About School (Pen. Code, § 653b)
- 2918–2928. Reserved for Future Use

## **C. TRESPASS**

- 2929. Trespass After Making Credible Threat (Pen. Code, § 601(a))
- 2930. Trespass: To Interfere With Business (Pen. Code, § 602(k))
- 2931. Trespass: Unlawfully Occupying Property (Pen. Code, § 602(m))
- 2932. Trespass: Entry Into Dwelling (Pen. Code, § 602.5(a) & (b))
- 2933. Trespass: Person Present (Pen. Code, § 602.5(b))
- 2934–2949. Reserved for Future Use

## **D. ANIMALS**

- 2950. Failing to Maintain Control of a Dangerous Animal (Pen. Code, § 399)
- 2951. Negligent Control of Attack Dog (Pen. Code, § 399.5)
- 2952. Defenses: Negligent Control of Attack Dog (Pen. Code, § 399.5(c))
- 2953. Cruelty to Animals (Pen. Code, § 597(a))
- 2954–2959. Reserved for Future Use

## **E. ALCOHOL RELATED OFFENSES (NON-DRIVING)**

- 2960. Possession of Alcoholic Beverage by Person Under 21 (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 25662(a))
- 2961. Purchase of Alcoholic Beverage by Person Under 21 (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 25658(b))
- 2962. Selling or Furnishing Alcoholic Beverage to Person Under 21 (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 25658(a))
- 2963. Permitting Person Under 21 to Consume Alcoholic Beverage (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 25658(d))
- 2964. Purchasing Alcoholic Beverage for Person Under 21: Resulting in Death or Great Bodily Injury (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 25658(a) & (c))
- 2965. Parent Permitting Child to Consume Alcoholic Beverage: Causing Traffic Collision (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 25658.2)
- 2966. Disorderly Conduct: Under the Influence in Public (Pen. Code, § 647(f))
- 2967–2979. Reserved for Future Use

## **F. OFFENSES INVOLVING CARE OF MINOR**

- 2980. Contributing to Delinquency of Minor (Pen. Code, § 272)
- 2981. Failure to Provide (Pen. Code, § 270)
- 2982. Persuading, Luring, or Transporting a Minor Under 14 Years of Age (Pen. Code, § 272(b)(1))

2983–2989. Reserved for Future Use

### **G. BETTING**

- 2990. Bookmaking (Pen. Code, § 337a(a)(1))
- 2991. Pool Selling (Pen. Code, § 337a(a)(1))
- 2992. Keeping a Place for Recording Bets (Pen. Code, § 337a(a)(2))
- 2993. Receiving or Holding Bets (Pen. Code, § 337a(a)(3))
- 2994. Recording Bets (Pen. Code, § 337a(a)(4))
- 2995. Permitting Place to Be Used for Betting Activities (Pen. Code, § 337a(a)(5))
- 2996. Betting or Wagering (Pen. Code, § 337a(a)(6))

### **H. MONEY LAUNDERING**

- 2997. Money Laundering (Pen. Code, § 186.10)
- 2998–3000. Reserved for Future Use

### **I. FAILURE TO APPEAR**

- 3001. Failure to Appear While on Bail (Pen. Code, § 1320.5)
- 3002. Failure to Appear While on Own Recognizance Release (Pen. Code, § 1320)
- 3003–3099. Reserved for Future Use

## **SERIES 3100        ENHANCEMENTS AND SENTENCING FACTORS**

### **A. PRIOR CONVICTION**

- 3100. Prior Conviction: Nonbifurcated Trial (Pen. Code, §§ 1025, 1158)
- 3101. Prior Conviction: Bifurcated Trial (Pen. Code, §§ 1025, 1158)
- 3102. Prior Conviction: Prison Prior
- 3103. Prior Conviction: Factual Issue for Jury (Pen. Code, §§ 1025, 1158)
- 3104–3114. Reserved for Future Use

### **B. ARMED WITH FIREARM**

- 3115. Armed With Firearm (Pen. Code, § 12022(a)(1))
- 3116. Armed With Firearm: Assault Weapon, Machine Gun, or .50 BMG Rifle (Pen. Code, § 12022(a)(2))
- 3117. Armed With Firearm: Knowledge That Coparticipant Armed (Pen. Code, § 12022(d))
- 3118–3129. Reserved for Future Use

### **C. PERSONALLY ARMED WITH DEADLY WEAPON OR FIREARM**

- 3130. Personally Armed With Deadly Weapon (Pen. Code, § 12022.3)
- 3131. Personally Armed With Firearm (Pen. Code, §§ 1203.06(b)(3), 12022(c), 12022.3(b))
- 3132. Personally Armed With Firearm: Unlawfully Armed When Arrested (Pen. Code, § 1203.06(a)(3))

3133–3144. Reserved for Future Use

**D. PERSONALLY USED DEADLY WEAPON OR FIREARM**

- 3145. Personally Used Deadly Weapon (Pen. Code, §§ 667.61(e)(3), 1192.7(c)(23), 12022(b)(1) & (2), 12022.3)
- 3146. Personally Used Firearm (Pen. Code, §§ 667.5(c)(8), 667.61(e)(4), 1203.06, 1192.7(c)(8), 12022.3, 12022.5, 12022.53(b))
- 3147. Personally Used Firearm: Assault Weapon, Machine Gun, or .50 BMG Rifle (Pen. Code, § 12022.5(b))
- 3148. Personally Used Firearm: Intentional Discharge (Pen. Code, § 12022.53(c))
- 3149. Personally Used Firearm: Intentional Discharge Causing Injury or Death (Pen. Code, §§ 667.61(e)(3), 12022.53(d))
- 3150. Personally Used Firearm: Intentional Discharge and Discharge Causing Injury or Death—Both Charged (Pen. Code, §§ 667.61(e)(3), 12022.53(d))
- 3151–3159. Reserved for Future Use

**E. GREAT BODILY INJURY**

- 3160. Great Bodily Injury (Pen. Code, §§ 667.5(c)(8), 667.61(d)(6), 1192.7(c)(8), 12022.7, 12022.8)
- 3161. Great Bodily Injury: Causing Victim to Become Comatose or Paralyzed (Pen. Code, § 12022.7(b))
- 3162. Great Bodily Injury: Age of Victim (Pen. Code, § 12022.7(c) & (d))
- 3163. Great Bodily Injury: Domestic Violence (Pen. Code, § 12022.7(e))
- 3164–3174. Reserved for Future Use

**F. SEX OFFENSES**

- 3175. Sex Offenses: Sentencing Factors—Aggravated Kidnapping (Pen. Code, § 667.61(d)(2))
- 3176. Sex Offenses: Sentencing Factors—Aggravated Mayhem (Pen. Code, § 667.61(d)(3))
- 3177. Sex Offenses: Sentencing Factors—Torture (Pen. Code, § 667.61(d)(3))
- 3178. Sex Offenses: Sentencing Factors—Burglary With Intent to Commit Sex Offense (Pen. Code, § 667.61(d)(4))
- 3179. Sex Offenses: Sentencing Factors—Kidnapping (Pen. Code, § 667.61(e)(1))
- 3180. Sex Offenses: Sentencing Factors—Burglary (Pen. Code, § 667.61(e)(2))
- 3181. Sex Offenses: Sentencing Factors—Multiple Victims (Pen. Code, § 667.61(e)(4))
- 3182. Sex Offenses: Sentencing Factors—Tying or Binding (Pen. Code, § 667.61(e)(5))
- 3183. Sex Offenses: Sentencing Factors—Administered Controlled Substance (Pen. Code, § 667.61(e)(6))
- 3184. Sex Offenses: Sentencing Factors—Using Force or Fear to Cause Minor to Engage in Commercial Sex Act (Pen. Code, § 236.1(c)(2))
- 3185–3199. Reserved for Future Use



## **G. CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES**

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## A. FORGERY

### (i) Forging or Passing Document

#### 1900. Forgery by False Signature (Pen. Code, § 470(a))

---

The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with forgery committed by signing a false signature [in violation of Penal Code section 470(a)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant signed (someone else's name/ [or] a false name) to [a/an] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert type[s] of document[s] from Pen. Code, § 470(d)>;
2. The defendant did not have authority to sign that name;
3. The defendant knew that (he/she) did not have that authority;

AND

4. When the defendant signed the document, (he/she) intended to defraud.

Someone *intends to defraud* if he or she intends to deceive another person either to cause a loss of (money[,]/ [or] goods[,]/ [or] services[,]/ [or] something [else] of value), or to cause damage to, a legal, financial, or property right.

[For the purpose of this instruction, a *person* includes (a governmental agency/a corporation/a business/an association/the body politic).]

[It is not necessary that anyone actually be defrauded or actually suffer a financial, legal, or property loss as a result of the defendant's acts.]

[The People allege that the defendant forged the following documents: \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of each document when multiple items alleged>. You may not find the defendant guilty unless all of you agree that the People have proved that the defendant forged at least one of these documents and you all agree on which document (he/she) forged.]

<Sentencing factor for instruments specified in Penal Code section 473(b)>

[If you find the defendant guilty of forgery by false signature, you must then decide whether the value of the \_\_\_\_\_ (check/bond/bank bill/note/cashier's check/traveler's check/money order) was more than \$950. If you have a reasonable doubt whether the value of the \_\_\_\_\_ (check/bond/bank bill/note/cashier's check/traveler's check/money order)

**has a value of more than \$950, you must find this allegation has not been proved.]**

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2015, March 2019*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If the prosecution alleges under a single count that the defendant forged multiple documents, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on unanimity. (See *People v. Sutherland* (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 602, 619, fn. 6 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 752].) Give the last bracketed paragraph, inserting the items alleged. (See also Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 3500, *Unanimity*, discussing when instruction on unanimity is and is not required.)

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “For the purpose of this instruction” if the evidence shows an intent to defraud an entity or association rather than a natural person. (Pen. Code, § 8.)

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “It is not necessary” if the evidence shows that the defendant did not succeed in defrauding anyone. (*People v. Morgan* (1956) 140 Cal.App.2d 796, 801 [296 P.2d 75].)

If the prosecution also alleges that the defendant passed or attempted to pass the same document, give CALCRIM No. 1906, *Forging and Passing or Attempting to Pass: Two Theories in One Count*.

If the charged crime involves an instrument listed in Penal Code section 473(b), use the bracketed language beginning “If you find the defendant guilty . . .”

When the People allege the defendant has a prior conviction for an offense listed in Penal Code section 667(e)(2)(C)(iv) or for an offense requiring registration pursuant to subdivision (c) of section 290, give CALCRIM No. 3100, *Prior Conviction: Nonbifurcated Trial* or CALCRIM No. 3101, *Prior Conviction: Bifurcated Trial*.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 470(a).
- Signature Not Authorized—Element of Offense. *People v. Hidalgo* (1933) 128 Cal.App. 703, 707 [18 P.2d 391]; *People v. Maioli* (1933) 135 Cal.App. 205, 207 [26 P.2d 871].
- Intent to Defraud. *People v. Pugh* (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 66, 72 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 770]; *People v. Gaul-Alexander* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 735, 745 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 176].
- Intent to Defraud Entity. Pen. Code, § 8.
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- Required Additional Findings. Pen. Code, § 473(b).
- Scope of Pen. Code, §473(b). *People v. Gonzales* (2018) 6 Cal.5th 44 [237 Cal.Rptr.3d 193, 424 P.3d 280].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

Attempted Forgery. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 470.

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Documents Not Specifically Listed in Penal Code Section 470(d)*

A document not specifically listed in Penal Code section 470(d) may still come within the scope of the forgery statute if the defendant “forges the . . . handwriting of another.” (Pen. Code, § 470(b).) “[A] writing not within those listed may fall under the part of section 470 covering a person who ‘counterfeits or forges the . . . handwriting of another’ if, on its face, the writing could possibly defraud anyone. [Citations.] The false writing must be something which will have the effect of defrauding one who acts upon it as genuine.” (*People v. Gaul-Alexander* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 735, 741–742 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 176].) The document must affect an identifiable legal, monetary, or property right. (*Id.* at p. 743; *Lewis v. Superior Court* (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 379, 398–399 [265 Cal.Rptr. 855] [campaign letter with false signature of President Reagan could not be basis of forgery charge].) See CALCRIM No. 1902, *Forgery of Handwriting or Seal*.

#### *Check Fraud*

A defendant who forges the name of another on a check may be charged under either Penal Code section 470 or section 476, or both. (*People v. Hawkins* (1961) 196 Cal.App.2d 832, 838 [17 Cal.Rptr. 66]; *People v. Pearson* (1957) 151 Cal.App.2d 583, 586 [311 P.2d 927].) However, the defendant may not be convicted of and sentenced on both charges for the same conduct. (Pen. Code, § 654; *People v. Hawkins, supra*, 196 Cal.App.2d at pp. 839–840 [one count ordered dismissed]; see also CALCRIM No. 3516, *Multiple Counts: Alternative Charges for One Event—Dual Conviction Prohibited*.)

#### *Credit Card Fraud*

A defendant who forges the name of another on a credit card sales slip may be charged under either Penal Code section 470 or section 484f, or both. (*People v. Cobb* (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 1, 4.) However, the defendant may not be convicted and sentenced on both charges for the same conduct. (Pen. Code, § 654; see also CALCRIM No. 3516, *Multiple Counts: Alternative Charges for One Event—Dual Conviction Prohibited*.)

#### *Return of Property*

Two cases have held that the defendant may present evidence that he or she returned some or all of the property in an effort to demonstrate that he or she did not originally intend to defraud. (*People v. Katzman* (1968) 258 Cal.App.2d 777, 790 [66 Cal.Rptr. 319], disapproved on other grounds in *Rhinehart v. Municipal*

*Court* (1984) 35 Cal.3d 772, 780 fn. 11 [200 Cal.Rptr. 916, 677 P.2d 1206]; *People v. Braver* (1964) 229 Cal.App.2d 303, 307–308 [40 Cal.Rptr. 142].) However, other cases have held, based on the particular facts of the cases, that such evidence was not admissible. (*People v. Parker* (1970) 11 Cal.App.3d 500, 510 [89 Cal.Rptr. 815] [evidence that the defendant made full restitution following arrest not relevant]; *People v. Wing* (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 197, 202 [107 Cal.Rptr. 836] [evidence of restitution not relevant where defendant falsely signed the name of another to a check knowing he had no authority to do so].) If such evidence is presented, the court may give CALCRIM No. 1862, *Return of Property Not a Defense to Theft*. (*People v. Katzman, supra*, 258 Cal.App.2d at p. 791.) In addition, in *People v. Katzman, supra*, 258 Cal.App.2d at p. 792, the court held that, on request, the defense may be entitled to a pinpoint instruction that evidence of restitution may be relevant to determining if the defendant intended to defraud. If the court concludes that such an instruction is appropriate, the court may add the following language to the beginning of CALCRIM No. 1862, *Return of Property Not a Defense to Theft*:

If the defendant returned or offered to return [some or all of the] property obtained, that conduct may show (he/she) did not intend to defraud. If you conclude that the defendant returned or offered to return [some or all of the] property, it is up to you to decide the meaning and importance of that conduct.

#### ***Inducing Mentally Ill Person to Sign Document***

In *People v. Looney* (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 242, 248 [22 Cal.Rptr.3d 502], the court held that the defendants could not be prosecuted for forgery where the evidence showed that the defendants induced a mentally ill person to sign legal documents transferring property to them. The court concluded that, because the defendants had accurately represented the nature of the documents to the mentally ill person and had not altered the documents after he signed, they did not commit forgery. (*Ibid.*)

### **SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property §§ 165, 168–177.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.02[2][a][i] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 143, *Crimes Against Property*, § 143.04[1][a], [d][2][a] (Matthew Bender).

## 1901. Forgery by Endorsement (Pen. Code, § 470(a))

---

The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with forgery committed by endorsement [in violation of Penal Code section 470(a)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant signed (the back of a check/(a/an) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert type of negotiable instrument>) with (the name of the payee of that (check/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert type of negotiable instrument>)/ [or] the name of another person whose signature was required to (cash that check/negotiate that instrument));
2. The defendant did not have authority to sign that name;
3. The defendant knew that (he/she) did not have that authority;

AND

4. When the defendant signed the document, (he/she) intended to defraud.

Someone *intends to defraud* if he or she intends to deceive another person either to cause a loss of (money[,]/ [or] goods[,]/ [or] services[,]/ [or] something [else] of value), or to cause damage to, a legal, financial, or property right.

[For the purpose of this instruction, a *person* includes (a governmental agency/a corporation/a business/an association/the body politic).]

[It is not necessary that anyone actually be defrauded or actually suffer a financial, legal, or property loss as a result of the defendant's acts.]

[The People allege that the defendant forged the following documents:  
\_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of each document when multiple items alleged>.

You may not find the defendant guilty unless all of you agree that the People have proved that the defendant forged at least one of these documents and you all agree on which document (he/she) forged.]

<Sentencing factor for instruments specified in Penal Code section 473(b)>

[If you find the defendant guilty of forgery by endorsement, you must then decide whether the value of the \_\_\_\_\_ (check/bond/bank bill/note/cashier's check/traveler's check/money order) was more than \$950. If you have a reasonable doubt whether the value of the \_\_\_\_\_ (check/bond/bank bill/note/cashier's check/traveler's check/money order) has a value of more than \$950, you must find this allegation has not been proved.]

*New January 2006; Revised March 2019*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If the prosecution alleges under a single count that the defendant forged multiple documents, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on unanimity. (See *People v. Sutherland* (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 602, 619, fn. 6 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 752].) Give the last bracketed paragraph, inserting the items alleged. (See also Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 3500, *Unanimity*, discussing when instruction on unanimity is and is not required.)

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “For the purpose of this instruction” if the evidence shows an intent to defraud an entity or association rather than a natural person. (Pen. Code, § 8.)

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “It is not necessary” if the evidence shows that the defendant did not succeed in defrauding anyone. (*People v. Morgan* (1956) 140 Cal.App.2d 796, 801 [296 P.2d 75].)

If the prosecution also alleges that the defendant passed or attempted to pass the same document, give CALCRIM No. 1906, *Forging and Passing or Attempting to Pass: Two Theories in One Count*.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 470(a).
- Signature Not Authorized—Element of Offense. *People v. Hidalgo* (1933) 128 Cal.App. 703, 707 [18 P.2d 391]; *People v. Maioli* (1933) 135 Cal.App. 205, 207 [26 P.2d 871].
- Intent to Defraud. *People v. Pugh* (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 66, 72 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 770]; *People v. Gaul-Alexander* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 735, 745 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 176].
- Intent to Defraud Entity. Pen. Code, § 8.
- Forgery by Endorsement. *People v. Maldonado* (1963) 221 Cal.App.2d 128, 133–134 [34 Cal.Rptr. 168]; *In re Valencia* (1927) 84 Cal.App. 26, 26 [259 P. 116].
- Unanimity Instruction If Multiple Documents. *People v. Sutherland* (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 602, 619, fn. 6 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 752].
- Required Additional Findings. Pen. Code, § 473(b).
- Scope of Pen. Code, § 473(b). *People v. Gonzales* (2018) 6 Cal.5th 44 [237 Cal.Rptr.3d 193, 424 P.3d 280].

## LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Attempted Forgery. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 470.

**RELATED ISSUES**

See the Related Issues section of the Bench Notes for CALCRIM No. 1900, *Forgery by False Signature*.

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property, §§ 165, 168–177.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.02[2][a][i] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 143, *Crimes Against Property*, § 143.04[1][b], [c], [d] (Matthew Bender).

## 1902. Forgery of Handwriting or Seal (Pen. Code, § 470(b))

---

The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with forging [or counterfeiting] the (handwriting/seal) of another person [in violation of Penal Code section 470(b)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant forged [or counterfeited] the (handwriting/seal) of another person on \_\_\_\_\_ <insert type[s] of document[s] that could defraud; see discussion in Related Issues>;

AND

2. When the defendant did that act, (he/she) intended to defraud.

Someone *intends to defraud* if he or she intends to deceive another person either to cause a loss of (money[,]/ [or] goods[,]/ [or] services[,]/ [or] something [else] of value), or to cause damage to, a legal, financial, or property right.

[For the purpose of this instruction, a *person* includes (a governmental agency/a corporation/a business/an association/the body politic).]

[It is not necessary that anyone actually be defrauded or actually suffer a financial, legal, or property loss as a result of the defendant's acts.]

[The People allege that the defendant forged [or counterfeited] the following documents: \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of each document when multiple items alleged>. You may not find the defendant guilty unless all of you agree that the People have proved that the defendant forged [or counterfeited] at least one of these documents and you all agree on which document (he/she) forged [or counterfeited].]

<Sentencing factor for instruments specified in Penal Code section 473(b)>

[If you find the defendant guilty of forging [or counterfeiting] the (handwriting/seal) of another person, you must then decide whether the value of the \_\_\_\_\_ (check/bond/bank bill/note/cashier's check/traveler's check/money order) was more than \$950. If you have a reasonable doubt whether the value of the \_\_\_\_\_ (check/bond/bank bill/note/cashier's check/traveler's check/money order) has a value of more than \$950, you must find this allegation has not been proved.]



## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If the prosecution alleges under a single count that the defendant forged multiple documents, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on unanimity. (See *People v. Sutherland* (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 602, 619, fn. 6 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 752].) Give the last bracketed paragraph, inserting the items alleged. (See also Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 3500, *Unanimity*, discussing when instruction on unanimity is and is not required.)

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “For the purpose of this instruction” if the evidence shows an intent to defraud an entity or association rather than a natural person. (Pen. Code, § 8.)

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “It is not necessary” if the evidence shows that the defendant did not succeed in defrauding anyone. (*People v. Morgan* (1956) 140 Cal.App.2d 796, 801 [296 P.2d 75].)

If the prosecution also alleges that the defendant passed or attempted to pass the same document, give CALCRIM No. 1906, *Forging and Passing or Attempting to Pass: Two Theories in One Count*.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 470(b).
- Applies to Document Not Listed in Penal Code Section 470(d). *People v. Gaul-Alexander* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 735, 741–742 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 176].
- Intent to Defraud. *People v. Pugh* (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 66, 72 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 770]; *People v. Gaul-Alexander* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 735, 745 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 176].
- Intent to Defraud Entity. Pen. Code, § 8.
- Unanimity Instruction If Multiple Documents. *People v. Sutherland* (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 602, 619, fn. 6 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 752].
- Required Additional Findings. Pen. Code, § 473(b).
- Scope of Pen. Code, § 473(b). *People v. Gonzales* (2018) 6 Cal.5th 44 [237 Cal.Rptr.3d 193, 424 P.3d 280].

## LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Attempted Forgery. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 470.

## RELATED ISSUES

### *Documents Not Specifically Listed in Penal Code Section 470(d)*

A document not specifically listed in Penal Code section 470(d) may still come within the scope of the statute if the defendant “forges the . . . handwriting of

another.” (Pen. Code, 470(b).) However, not all writings are included within the scope of this provision. (*Lewis v. Superior Court* (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 379, 398–399 [265 Cal.Rptr. 855] [campaign letter with false signature of President Reagan could not be basis of forgery charge].) “[A] writing not within those listed may fall under the part of section 470 covering a person who ‘counterfeits or forges the . . . handwriting of another’ if, on its face, the writing could possibly defraud anyone. [Citations.] The false writing must be something which will have the effect of defrauding one who acts upon it as genuine.” (*People v. Gaul-Alexander* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 735, 741–742 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 176].) The document must affect an identifiable legal, monetary, or property right. (*Id.* at p. 743; see also *Lewis v. Superior Court, supra*, 217 Cal.App.3d at pp. 398–399.)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property, §§ 165, 168–177.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.02[2][a][i] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 143, *Crimes Against Property*, § 143.04[1] (Matthew Bender).

**1903. Forgery by Altering or Falsifying Will or Other Legal Document (Pen. Code, § 470(c))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with forgery committed by (altering[,]/ corrupting[,]/ [or] falsifying) a legal document [in violation of Penal Code section 470(c)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant (altered[,]/ corrupted[,]/ [or] falsified) a document;
2. That document was [a record of] (a/an) (will[,]/ codicil[,]/ conveyance[,]/ [or] court judgment[,]/ [or] officer's return to a court's process/ [or other] legal writing that the law accepts as evidence);

AND

3. When the defendant (altered[,]/ [or] corrupted[,]/ [or] falsified) the document, (he/she) intended to defraud.

Someone *intends to defraud* if he or she intends to deceive another person either to cause a loss of (money[,]/ [or] goods[,]/ [or] services[,]/ [or] something [else] of value), or to cause damage to, a legal, financial, or property right.

[For the purpose of this instruction, a *person* includes (a governmental agency/a corporation/a business/an association/the body politic).]

[It is not necessary that anyone actually be defrauded or actually suffer a financial, legal, or property loss as a result of the defendant's acts.]

[Someone *alters* a document if he or she adds to, erases, or changes a part of the document that affects a legal, financial, or property right.]

[The People allege that the defendant (altered[,]/ [or] corrupted[,]/ [or] falsified) the following documents: \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of each document when multiple items alleged>. You may not find the defendant guilty unless all of you agree that the People have proved that the defendant (altered[,]/ [or] corrupted[,]/ [or] falsified) at least one of these documents and you all agree on which document (he/she) (altered[,]/ [or] corrupted[,]/ [or] falsified).]

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*New January 2006*

**BENCH NOTES**

***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If the prosecution alleges under a single count that the defendant forged multiple documents, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on unanimity. (See *People v. Sutherland* (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 602, 619, fn. 6 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 752].) Give the last bracketed paragraph, inserting the items alleged. (See also Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 3500, *Unanimity*, discussing when instruction on unanimity is and is not required.)

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “For the purpose of this instruction” if the evidence shows an intent to defraud an entity or association rather than a natural person. (Pen. Code, § 8.)

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “It is not necessary” if the evidence shows that the defendant did not succeed in defrauding anyone. (*People v. Morgan* (1956) 140 Cal.App.2d 796, 801 [296 P.2d 75].)

If the prosecution also alleges that the defendant passed or attempted to pass the same document, give CALCRIM No. 1906, *Forging and Passing or Attempting to Pass: Two Theories in One Count*.

If the prosecution alleges that the document was “corrupted,” the court may need to draft a definition of this term based on the evidence.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 470(c).
- Intent to Defraud. *People v. Pugh* (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 66, 72 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 770]; *People v. Gaul-Alexander* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 735, 745 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 176].
- Intent to Defraud Entity. Pen. Code, § 8.
- Alteration Defined. *People v. Nesseth* (1954) 127 Cal.App.2d 712, 718–720 [274 P.2d 479]; *People v. Hall* (1942) 55 Cal.App.2d 343, 352 [130 P.2d 733].
- Unanimity Instruction If Multiple Documents. *People v. Sutherland* (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 602, 619, fn. 6 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 752].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Attempted Forgery. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 470.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* 4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property, §§ 165, 168–177.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.02[2][a][i] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 143, *Crimes Against Property*, § 143.04[1] (Matthew Bender).

## 1904. Forgery by Falsifying, Altering, or Counterfeiting Document (Pen. Code, § 470(d))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with forgery committed by (falsely making[,]/ [or] altering[,]/ [or] forging[,]/ [or] counterfeiting) a document [in violation of Penal Code section 470(d)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant (falsely made[,]/ [or] altered[,]/ [or] forged[,]/ [or] counterfeited) (a/an) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert type[s] of document[s] from Pen. Code, § 470(d)>;

AND

2. When the defendant did that act, (he/she) intended to defraud.

Someone *intends to defraud* if he or she intends to deceive another person either to cause a loss of (money[,]/ [or] goods[,]/ [or] services[,]/ [or] something [else] of value), or to cause damage to, a legal, financial, or property right.

[For the purpose of this instruction, a *person* includes (a governmental agency/a corporation/a business/an association/the body politic).]

[It is not necessary that anyone actually be defrauded or actually suffer a financial, legal, or property loss as a result of the defendant's acts.]

[A person *alters* a document if he or she adds to, erases, or changes a part of the document that affects a legal, financial, or property right.]

[The People allege that the defendant (falsely made[,]/ [or] altered[,]/ [or] forged[,]/ [or] counterfeited) the following documents: \_\_\_\_\_

<insert description of each document when multiple items alleged>. You may not find the defendant guilty unless you all agree that the People have proved that the defendant (falsely made[,]/ [or] altered[,]/ [or] forged[,]/ [or] counterfeited) at least one of these documents and you all agree on which document (he/she) (falsely made[,]/ [or] altered[,]/ [or] forged[,]/ [or] counterfeited).]

<Sentencing factor for instruments specified in Penal Code section 473(b)>

[If you find the defendant guilty of forgery by (falsifying[,]/[or] altering[,]/[or] counterfeiting), you must then decide whether the value of the \_\_\_\_\_ (check/bond/bank bill/note/cashier's check/traveler's check/money order) was more than \$950. If you have a reasonable doubt whether the value of the \_\_\_\_\_ (check/bond/bank bill/note/cashier's check/traveler's check/money order) has a value of more than \$950, you must find this allegation has not been proved.]

*New January 2006; Revised March 2019*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If the prosecution alleges under a single count that the defendant forged multiple documents, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on unanimity. (See *People v. Sutherland* (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 602, 619, fn. 6 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 752].) Give the last bracketed paragraph, inserting the items alleged. (See also Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 3500, *Unanimity*, discussing when instruction on unanimity is and is not required.)

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “For the purpose of this instruction” if the evidence shows an intent to defraud an entity or association rather than a natural person. (Pen. Code, § 8.)

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “It is not necessary” if the evidence shows that the defendant did not succeed in defrauding anyone. (*People v. Morgan* (1956) 140 Cal.App.2d 796, 801 [296 P.2d 75].)

If the prosecution also alleges that the defendant passed or attempted to pass the same document, give CALCRIM No. 1906, *Forging and Passing or Attempting to Pass: Two Theories in One Count*.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 470(d).
- Intent to Defraud. *People v. Pugh* (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 66, 72 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 770]; *People v. Gaul-Alexander* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 735, 745 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 176].
- Intent to Defraud Entity. Pen. Code, § 8.
- Alteration Defined. *People v. Nesseth* (1954) 127 Cal.App.2d 712, 718–720 [274 P.2d 479]; *People v. Hall* (1942) 55 Cal.App.2d 343, 352 [130 P.2d 733].
- Unanimity Instruction If Multiple Documents. *People v. Sutherland* (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 602, 619, fn. 6 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 752].
- Required Additional Findings. Pen. Code, § 473(b).
- Scope of Pen. Code, § 473(b). *People v. Gonzales* (2018) 6 Cal.5th 44 [237 Cal.Rptr.3d 193, 424 P.3d 280].

## LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Attempted Forgery. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 470.

## COMMENTARY

Penal Code section 470(d) provides that every person who, with the intent to defraud, falsely makes, alters, forges, or counterfeits, utters, publishes, passes or

attempts or offers to pass, as true and genuine, any of the items specified in subdivision (d), knowing the same to be false, altered, forged, or counterfeited, is guilty of forgery. Penal Code section 470(d), as amended by Statutes 2005, ch. 295 (A.B. 361), became effective January 1, 2006. The amendment added “or falsifies the acknowledgment of any notary public or any notary public who issues an acknowledgment knowing it to be false” after the list of specified items. The committee believes that the added language has introduced ambiguities. The phrase “falsifies the acknowledgment of any notary public” seems to refer back to “person” at the beginning of subdivision (d), but it’s not clear whether this falsification must also be done with the intent to defraud in order to be forgery. If so, why was “acknowledgement of a notary public,” which is parallel in kind to the other documents and instruments listed in subdivision (d), not simply added to the list of items in subdivision (d)? With respect to the provisions regarding a notary public who issues an acknowledgment knowing it to be false, it could be that the Legislature intended the meaning to be that “[e]very person who . . . falsifies the acknowledgment of . . . any notary public who issues an acknowledgment knowing it to be false” is guilty of forgery. However, this interpretation makes the provision superfluous, as the amendment separately makes it forgery to falsify the acknowledgment of any notary public. Also, if a notary issues a false acknowledgment, it seems unlikely that it would be further falsified by a defendant who is not the notary, but who presumably sought and obtained the false acknowledgement. Alternatively, the Legislature could have intended to make a notary’s issuance of false acknowledgment an act of forgery on the part of the notary. The Legislative Counsel’s Digest of Assembly Bill 361 states that the bill makes it a “misdemeanor for a notary public to willfully fail to perform the required duties of a notary public” and makes “other related changes.” The bill amended a number of sections of the Civil Code and the Government Code as well as Penal Code section 470. The committee awaits clarification by the Legislature or the courts to enable judges to better interpret the newly-added provisions to Penal Code section 470(d).

## SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property, §§ 165, 168–177.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.02[2][a][i] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 143, *Crimes Against Property*, § 143.04[1], [2] (Matthew Bender).



**1905. Forgery by Passing or Attempting to Use Forged Document  
(Pen. Code, § 470(d))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with forgery committed by (passing[,]/ [or] using[,]/ [or] (attempting/ [or] offering) to use) a forged document [in violation of Penal Code section 470(d)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant (passed[,]/ [or] used[,]/ [or] (attempted/ [or] offered) to use) [a/an] (false[,]/ [or] altered[,]/ [or] forged[,]/ [or] counterfeited) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert type[s] of document[s] from Pen. Code, § 470(d)>;
2. The defendant knew that the \_\_\_\_\_ <insert type[s] of document[s] from Pen. Code, § 470(d)>(was/were) (false[,]/ altered[,]/ [or] forged[,]/ [or] counterfeited);

**AND**

3. When the defendant (passed[,]/ [or] used[,]/ [or] (attempted/ [or] offered) to use) the \_\_\_\_\_ <insert type[s] of document[s] from Pen. Code, § 470(d)>, (he/she) intended that (it/they) be accepted as genuine and (he/she) intended to defraud.

Someone *intends to defraud* if he or she intends to deceive another person either to cause a loss of (money[,]/ [or] goods[,]/ [or] services[,]/ [or] something [else] of value), or to cause damage to, a legal, financial, or property right.

[For the purpose of this instruction, a *person* includes (a governmental agency/a corporation/a business/an association/the body politic).]

[It is not necessary that anyone actually be defrauded or actually suffer a financial, legal, or property loss as a result of the defendant's acts.]

A person (*passes*[,]/ [or] *uses*[,]/ [or] (*attempts*/ [or] *offers*) to use) a document if he or she represents to someone that the document is genuine. The representation may be made by words or conduct and may be either direct or indirect.

[A person *alters* a document if he or she adds to, erases, or changes a part of the document that affects a legal, financial, or property right.]

[The People allege that the defendant (passed[,]/ [or] used[,]/ [or] (attempted/ [or] offered) to use) the following documents: \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of each document when multiple items alleged>. You may not find the defendant guilty unless you all agree that the People have proved that the defendant (passed[,]/ [or] used[,]/ [or] (attempted/



[or] offered) to use) at least one document that was (false[,]/ [or] altered[,]/ [or] forged[,]/ [or] counterfeited) and you all agree on which document (he/she) (passed[,]/ [or] used[,]/ [or] (attempted/ [or] offered) to use).]

<Sentencing factor for instruments specified in Penal Code section 473(b)>

[If you find the defendant guilty of forgery by (passing[,]/[or] using[,]/ [or] attempting[,]/[or] offering to use) a forged document, you must then decide whether the value of the \_\_\_\_\_ (check/bond/bank bill/note/cashier's check/traveler's check/money order) was more than \$950. If you have a reasonable doubt whether the value of the \_\_\_\_\_ (check/bond/bank bill/note/cashier's check/traveler's check/money order) has a value of more than \$950, you must find this allegation has not been proved.]

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*New January 2006; Revised March 2019*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If the prosecution alleges under a single count that the defendant passed or attempted to use multiple forged documents, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on unanimity. (See *People v. Sutherland* (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 602, 619, fn. 6 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 752].) Give the last bracketed paragraph, inserting the items alleged. (See also Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 3500, *Unanimity*, discussing when instruction on unanimity is and is not required.)

*People v. Pugh* (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 66, 72 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 770], defines the term “utter” as to “use” or “attempt to use” an instrument. The committee has omitted the unfamiliar term “utter” in favor of the more familiar terms “use” and “attempt to use.”

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “For the purpose of this instruction” if the evidence shows an intent to defraud an entity or association rather than a natural person. (Pen. Code, § 8.)

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “It is not necessary” if the evidence shows that the defendant did not succeed in defrauding anyone. (*People v. Morgan* (1956) 140 Cal.App.2d 796, 801 [296 P.2d 75].)

If the prosecution also alleges that the defendant forged the same document, give CALCRIM No. 1906, *Forging and Passing or Attempting to Pass: Two Theories in One Count*.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 470(d).

- Intent to Defraud. *People v. Pugh* (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 66, 72 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 770]; *People v. Gaul-Alexander* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 735, 745 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 176].
- Intent to Defraud Entity. Pen. Code, § 8.
- Pass or Attempt to Use Defined. *People v. Tomlinson* (1868) 35 Cal. 503, 509; *People v. Jackson* (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 556, 561 [155 Cal.Rptr. 89], overruled on other grounds in *People v. Anderson* (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1122 [240 Cal.Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306].
- Unanimity Instruction If Multiple Documents. *People v. Sutherland* (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 602, 619, fn. 6 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 752].
- Required Additional Findings. Pen.Code, § 473(b).
- Scope of Pen. Code, § 473(b). *People v. Gonzales* (2018) 6 Cal.5th 44 [237 Cal.Rptr.3d 193, 424 P.3d 280].

### COMMENTARY

The committee was unable to locate any authority for what constitutes “offering to pass” a forged document. In *People v. Compton* (1899) 123 Cal. 403, 409–411 [56 P. 44], the court held that attempting to pass a forged document requires, at a minimum, that the defendant present the document to an innocent party, with an assertion that the document is genuine. (*Ibid.*; see also *People v. Fork* (1965) 233 Cal.App.2d 725, 730–731 [43 Cal.Rptr. 804] [discussing sufficiency of the evidence for attempting to pass].) In light of this holding, it is unclear if any act less than this would be sufficient for a conviction for “offering to pass.” The committee urges caution when considering whether to instruct the jury with the phrase “offering to pass.”

Penal Code section 470(d) provides that every person who, with the intent to defraud, falsely makes, alters, forges, or counterfeits, utters, publishes, passes or attempts or offers to pass, as true and genuine, any of the items specified in subdivision (d), knowing the same to be false, altered, forged, or counterfeited, is guilty of forgery. Penal Code section 470(d), as amended by Statutes 2005, ch. 295 (A.B. 361), became effective January 1, 2006. The amendment added “or falsifies the acknowledgment of any notary public or any notary public who issues an acknowledgment knowing it to be false” after the list of specified items. The committee believes that the added language has introduced ambiguities. The phrase “falsifies the acknowledgment of any notary public” seems to refer back to “person” at the beginning of subdivision (d), but it’s not clear whether this falsification must also be done with the intent to defraud in order to be forgery. If so, why was “acknowledgement of a notary public,” which is parallel in kind to the other documents and instruments listed in subdivision (d), not simply added to the list of items in subdivision (d)? With respect to the provisions regarding a notary public who issues an acknowledgment knowing it to be false, it could be that the Legislature intended the meaning to be that “[e]very person who . . . falsifies the acknowledgment of . . . any notary public who issues an acknowledgment knowing

it to be false” is guilty of forgery. However, this interpretation makes the provision superfluous, as the amendment separately makes it forgery to falsify the acknowledgment of any notary public. Also, if a notary issues a false acknowledgment, it seems unlikely that it would be further falsified by a defendant who is not the notary, but who presumably sought and obtained the false acknowledgement. Alternatively, the Legislature could have intended to make a notary’s issuance of false acknowledgment an act of forgery on the part of the notary. The Legislative Counsel’s Digest of Assembly Bill 361 states that the bill makes it a “misdemeanor for a notary public to willfully fail to perform the required duties of a notary public” and makes “other related changes.” The bill amended a number of sections of the Civil Code and the Government Code as well as Penal Code section 470. The committee awaits clarification by the Legislature or the courts to enable judges to better interpret the newly-added provisions to Penal Code section 470(d).

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property, § 178.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.02[2][a][i] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 143, *Crimes Against Property*, § 143.04[1], [2] (Matthew Bender).

## 1906. Forging and Passing or Attempting to Pass: Two Theories in One Count

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with forgery of [a/an] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert type[s] of document[s] from Pen. Code, § 470(d)>.

The defendant is being prosecuted for forgery under two theories: (1) that the defendant forged the document; and (2) that the defendant (passed[,]/ used[,]/ [or] (attempted/ [or] offered) to use) the forged document.

Each theory of forgery has different requirements, and I have instructed you on both.

You may not find the defendant guilty of forgery unless all of you agree that the People have proved that the defendant committed forgery under at least one theory. But all of you do not have to agree on the same theory.

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New January 2006

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

This instruction is to be given when the prosecution pursues the two theories of forgery of a single document in one count. (See *People v. Sutherland* (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 602, 618–619 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 752].)

### AUTHORITY

- Unanimity on Theory Not Required. *People v. Sutherland* (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 602, 618–619 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 752].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property, § 178.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.02[2][a][i] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 143, *Crimes Against Property*, § 143.04[1], [2] (Matthew Bender).

### 1907–1919. Reserved for Future Use

## (ii) Counterfeit Driver's License

### 1920. Falsifying, Altering, or Counterfeiting a Driver's License (Pen. Code, § 470a)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with (altering[,]/ [or] falsifying[,]/ [or] forging[,]/ [or] duplicating[,]/ [or] reproducing[,]/ [or] counterfeiting) a (driver's license/ [or] government-issued identification card) [in violation of Penal Code section 470a].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant (altered[,]/ [or] falsified[,]/ [or] forged[,]/ [or] duplicated[,]/ [or] reproduced[,]/ [or] counterfeited) a (driver's license/ [or] government-issued identification card);

AND

2. When the defendant did that act, (he/she) intended that the (driver's license/ [or] identification card) be used to help commit forgery.

Someone *intends to commit forgery* if he or she intends to use a forged, counterfeit, altered, falsified, duplicated, or reproduced document to deceive another person in order to cause a loss of, or damage to, a legal, financial, or property right.

[For the purpose of this instruction, a *person* includes (a governmental agency/a corporation/a business/an association/the body politic).]

[A person *alters* a document if he or she adds to, erases, or changes a part of the document that affects a legal, financial, or property right.]

[It is not necessary that anyone actually be defrauded or actually suffer a financial, legal, or property loss as a result of the defendant's acts.]

[The People allege that the defendant (altered[,]/ [or] falsified[,]/ [or] forged[,]/ [or] duplicated[,]/ [or] reproduced[,]/ [or] counterfeited) the following documents: \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of each document when multiple items alleged>. You may not find the defendant guilty unless you all agree that the People have proved that the defendant (altered[,]/ [or] falsified[,]/ [or] forged[,]/ [or] duplicated[,]/ [or] reproduced[,]/ [or] counterfeited) at least one of these documents and you all agree on which document (he/she) (altered[,]/ [or] falsified[,]/ [or] forged[,]/ [or] duplicated[,]/ [or] reproduced[,]/ [or] counterfeited).]

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If the prosecution alleges under a single count that the defendant forged multiple items, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on unanimity. (See *People v. Sutherland* (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 602, 619, fn. 6 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 752].) Give the last bracketed paragraph, inserting the items alleged. (See also Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 3500, *Unanimity*, discussing when instruction on unanimity is and is not required.)

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “For the purpose of this instruction” if the evidence shows an intent to defraud an entity or association rather than a natural person. (Pen. Code, § 8.)

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “It is not necessary” if the evidence shows that the defendant did not succeed in defrauding anyone. (*People v. Morgan* (1956) 140 Cal.App.2d 796, 801 [296 P.2d 75].)

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 470a.
- Alteration Defined. *People v. Nesseth* (1954) 127 Cal.App.2d 712, 718–720 [274 P.2d 479]; *People v. Hall* (1942) 55 Cal.App.2d 343, 352 [130 P.2d 733].
- Unanimity Instruction If Multiple Items. *People v. Sutherland* (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 602, 619, fn. 6 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 752].

## LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Possession of Altered Driver’s License. Veh. Code, § 14610.

## SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property, §§ 199–200.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.02[2][a][i] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 143, *Crimes Against Property*, § 143.04[1] (Matthew Bender).

**1921. Possessing or Displaying False, Altered, or Counterfeit  
Driver's License (Pen. Code, § 470b)**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with (possessing[,]/ [or] displaying[,]/ [or] causing [or permitting] to be displayed) (an/a) (altered[,]/ [or] falsified[,]/ [or] forged[,]/ [or] duplicated[,]/ [or] reproduced[,]/ [or] counterfeited) (driver's license/ [or] government-issued identification card) [in violation of Penal Code section 470b].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant (possessed[,]/ [or] displayed[,]/ [or] caused [or permitted] to be displayed) a (driver's license/ [or] government-issued identification card);
2. The (driver's license/ [or] government-issued identification card) was (altered[,]/ [or] falsified[,]/ [or] forged[,]/ [or] duplicated[,]/ [or] reproduced[,]/ [or] counterfeited);
3. The defendant knew that the (driver's license/ [or] government-issued identification card) had been (altered[,]/ [or] falsified[,]/ [or] forged[,]/ [or] duplicated[,]/ [or] reproduced[,]/ [or] counterfeited);

**AND**

4. When the defendant (possessed[,]/ [or] displayed[,]/ [or] caused [or permitted] to be displayed) the (driver's license/ [or] government-issued identification card), (he/she) intended that the document be used to commit forgery.

Someone *intends to commit forgery* if he or she intends to use a forged, counterfeit, altered, falsified, duplicated, or reproduced document to deceive another person in order to cause a loss of, or damage to, a legal, financial, or property right.

[For the purpose of this instruction, a *person* includes (a governmental agency/a corporation/a business/an association/the body politic).]

[A person *alters* a document if he or she adds to, erases, or changes a part of the document that affects a legal, financial, or property right.]

[It is not necessary that anyone actually be defrauded or actually suffer a financial, legal, or property loss as a result of the defendant's acts.]

[Two or more people may possess something at the same time.]

[A person does not have to actually hold or touch something to possess it. It is enough if the person has (control over it/ [or] the right to control

it), either personally or through another person.]

[The People allege that the defendant (possessed[,]/ [or] displayed[,]/ [or] caused [or permitted] to be displayed) the following documents:

\_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of each documents when multiple items alleged>.

**You may not find the defendant guilty unless you all agree that the People have proved that the defendant (possessed[,]/ [or] displayed[,]/ [or] caused [or permitted] to be displayed) at least one of these documents and you all agree on which document (he/she) (possessed[,]/ [or] displayed[,]/ [or] caused [or permitted] to be displayed).**

*New January 2006*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If the prosecution alleges under a single count that the defendant forged multiple items, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on unanimity. (See *People v. Sutherland* (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 602, 619, fn. 6 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 752].) Give the last bracketed paragraph, inserting the items alleged. (See also Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 3500, *Unanimity*, discussing when instruction on unanimity is and is not required.)

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “For the purpose of this instruction” if the evidence shows an intent to defraud an entity or association rather than a natural person. (Pen. Code, § 8.)

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “It is not necessary” if the evidence shows that the defendant did not succeed in defrauding anyone. (*People v. Morgan* (1956) 140 Cal.App.2d 796, 801 [296 P.2d 75].)

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 470b.
- Alteration Defined. *People v. Nesseth* (1954) 127 Cal.App.2d 712, 718–720 [274 P.2d 479]; *People v. Hall* (1942) 55 Cal.App.2d 343, 352 [130 P.2d 733].
- Unanimity Instruction If Multiple Items. *People v. Sutherland* (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 602, 619, fn. 6 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 752].

## LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Possession of Altered Driver’s License. Veh. Code, § 14610.

## SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property, §§ 199–200.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 85,



*Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.02[2][a][i] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 143, *Crimes Against Property*, § 143.04[1] (Matthew Bender).

**1922–1924. Reserved for Future Use**

### (iii) Counterfeit Seal

#### 1925. Forgery of Government, Public, or Corporate Seal (Pen. Code, § 472)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with (forging/ [or] counterfeiting) a (government/public/corporate) seal [or (falsely making[,]/ [or] forging[,]/ [or] counterfeiting) an impression representing a seal] [in violation of Penal Code section 472].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant (forged/ [or] counterfeited) a seal [or (falsely made[,]/ [or] forged[,]/ [or] counterfeited) an impression representing a seal] of (this state[,]/ [or] a legally authorized public officer[,]/ [or] a court of record[,]/ [or] a corporation[,]/ [or] a public seal legally authorized or recognized by any state, government, or country);

AND

2. When the defendant did that act, (he/she) intended to defraud.

Someone *intends to defraud* if he or she intends to deceive another person either to cause a loss of (money[,]/ [or] goods[,]/ [or] services[,]/ [or] something [else] of value), or to cause damage to, a legal, financial, or property right.

[For the purpose of this instruction, a *person* includes (a governmental agency/a corporation/a business/an association/the body politic).]

[It is not necessary that anyone actually be defrauded or actually suffer a financial, legal, or property loss as a result of the defendant's acts.]

[The People allege that the defendant (forged[,]/ [or] counterfeited[,]/ [or] falsely made) the following items: \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of each seal or impression when multiple items alleged>. You may not find the defendant guilty unless you all agree that the People have proved that the defendant (forged[,]/ [or] counterfeited[,]/ [or] falsely made) at least one of these items and you all agree on which item (he/she) (forged[,]/ [or] counterfeited[,]/ [or] falsely made).]

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*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If the prosecution alleges under a single count that the defendant forged multiple items, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on unanimity. (See *People v. Sutherland* (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 602, 619, fn. 6 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 752].) Give the last bracketed paragraph, inserting the items alleged. (See also Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 3500, *Unanimity*, discussing when instruction on unanimity is and is not required.)

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “For the purpose of this instruction” if the evidence shows an intent to defraud an entity or association rather than a natural person. (Pen. Code, § 8.)

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “It is not necessary” if the evidence shows that the defendant did not succeed in defrauding anyone. (*People v. Morgan* (1956) 140 Cal.App.2d 796, 801 [296 P.2d 75].)

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 472.
- Intent to Defraud. *People v. Pugh* (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 66, 72 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 770]; *People v. Gaul-Alexander* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 735, 745 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 176].
- Intent to Defraud Entity. Pen. Code, § 8.
- Unanimity Instruction If Multiple Items. *People v. Sutherland* (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 602, 619, fn. 6 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 752].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Attempted Forgery of Seal. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 472.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property, §§ 199–200.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.02[2][a][i] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 143, *Crimes Against Property*, § 143.04[1] (Matthew Bender).

**1926. Possession of Counterfeit Government, Public, or  
Corporate Seal (Pen. Code, § 472)**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with possessing a counterfeit (government/public/corporate) seal [or an impression of a counterfeit (government/public/corporate) seal] [in violation of Penal Code section 472].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant possessed a counterfeit seal [or an impression of a counterfeit seal] of (this state[,]/ [or] a legally authorized public officer[,]/ [or] a court of record[,]/ [or] a corporation[,]/ [or] a public seal legally authorized or recognized by any state, government, or country);
2. The defendant knew that the seal [or impression of the seal] was counterfeit;
3. The defendant willfully concealed the fact that the seal [or impression of the seal] was counterfeit;

AND

4. When the defendant possessed the seal [or impression of the seal], (he/she) intended to defraud.

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose.

Someone *intends to defraud* if he or she intends to deceive another person either to cause a loss of (money[,]/ [or] goods[,]/ [or] services[,]/ [or] something [else] of value), or to cause damage to, a legal, financial, or property right.

[For the purpose of this instruction, a *person* includes (a governmental agency/a corporation/a business/an association/the body politic).]

[It is not necessary that anyone actually be defrauded or actually suffer a financial, legal, or property loss as a result of the defendant's acts.]

[Two or more people may possess something at the same time.]

[A person does not have to actually hold or touch something to possess it. It is enough if the person has (control over it/ [or] the right to control it), either personally or through another person.]

[The People allege that the defendant possessed the following items:

\_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of each seal or impression when multiple items alleged>. You may not find the defendant guilty unless you all

**agree that the People have proved that the defendant possessed at least one of these items and you all agree on which item (he/she) possessed.]**

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*New January 2006*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If the prosecution alleges under a single count that the defendant possessed multiple forged items, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on unanimity. (See *People v. Sutherland* (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 602, 619, fn. 6 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 752].) Give the last bracketed paragraph, inserting the items alleged. (See also Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 3500, *Unanimity*, discussing when instruction on unanimity is and is not required.)

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “For the purpose of this instruction” if the evidence shows an intent to defraud an entity or association rather than a natural person. (Pen. Code, § 8.)

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “It is not necessary” if the evidence shows that the defendant did not succeed in defrauding anyone. (*People v. Morgan* (1956) 140 Cal.App.2d 796, 801 [296 P.2d 75].)

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 472.
- Intent to Defraud. *People v. Pugh* (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 66, 72 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 770]; *People v. Gaul-Alexander* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 735, 745 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 176].
- Intent to Defraud Entity. Pen. Code, § 8.
- Unanimity Instruction If Multiple Items. *People v. Sutherland* (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 602, 619, fn. 6 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 752].

## LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Attempted Possession of Counterfeit Seal. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 472.

## SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property, §§ 199–200.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.02[2][a][i] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 143, *Crimes Against Property*, § 143.04[1] (Matthew Bender).

**1927–1929. Reserved for Future Use**

## (iv) Possession With Intent to Defraud

### 1930. Possession of Forged Document (Pen. Code, § 475(a))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with (possessing/ [or] receiving) (a/an) (forged[,]/ [or] altered[,]/ [or] counterfeit) document [in violation of Penal Code section 475(a)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant (possessed/ [or] received) (a/an) (forged[,]/ [or] altered[,]/ [or] counterfeit) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert type[s] of document[s] from Pen. Code, § 470(d)>;
2. The defendant knew that the document was (forged[,]/ [or] altered[,]/ [or] counterfeit);
3. The defendant intended to (pass[,]/ [or] use[,]/ [or] aid the passage or use of) the document as genuine;

AND

4. When the defendant (possessed/ [or] received) the document, (he/ she) intended to defraud.

Someone *intends to defraud* if he or she intends to deceive another person either to cause a loss of (money[,]/ [or] goods[,]/ [or] services[,]/ [or] something [else] of value), or to cause damage to, a legal, financial, or property right.

[For the purpose of this instruction, a *person* includes (a governmental agency/a corporation/a business/an association/the body politic).]

[It is not necessary that anyone actually be defrauded or actually suffer a financial, legal, or property loss as a result of the defendant's acts.]

A person (*passes/ [or] uses*) a document if he or she represents to someone that the document is genuine. The representation may be made by words or conduct and may be either direct or indirect.

[A person *alters* a document if he or she adds to, erases, or changes a part of the document that affects a legal, financial, or property right.]

[The People allege that the defendant possessed the following documents: \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of each document when multiple items alleged>. You may not find the defendant guilty unless you all agree that the People have proved that the defendant possessed at least one of these documents and you all agree on which document (he/she) possessed.]

<Sentencing factor for instruments specified in Penal Code section 473(b)>

**[If you find the defendant guilty of (possessing/ [or] receiving) (a/an) (forged[,]/ [or] altered[,]/[or] counterfeit) document, you must then decide whether the value of the \_\_\_\_\_ (check/bond/bank bill/note/cashier's check/traveler's check/money order) was more than \$950. If you have a reasonable doubt whether the value of the \_\_\_\_\_ (check/bond/bank bill/note/cashier's check/traveler's check/money order) has a value of more than \$950, you must find this allegation has not been proved.**

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*New January 2006; Revised March 2019*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If the prosecution alleges under a single count that the defendant possessed multiple forged items, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on unanimity. (See *People v. Sutherland* (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 602, 619, fn. 6 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 752].) Give the last bracketed paragraph, inserting the items alleged. (See also Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 3500, *Unanimity*, discussing when instruction on unanimity is and is not required.)

*People v. Pugh* (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 66, 72 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 770], defines the term “utter” as to “use” or “attempt to use” an instrument. The committee has omitted the unfamiliar term “utter” in favor of the more familiar terms “use” and “attempt to use.”

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “For the purpose of this instruction” if the evidence shows an intent to defraud an entity or association rather than a natural person. (Pen. Code, § 8.)

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “It is not necessary” if the evidence shows that the defendant did not succeed in defrauding anyone. (*People v. Morgan* (1956) 140 Cal.App.2d 796, 801 [296 P.2d 75].)

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 475(a).
- Intent to Defraud. *People v. Pugh* (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 66, 72 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 770]; *People v. Gaul-Alexander* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 735, 745 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 176].
- Intent to Defraud Entity. Pen. Code, § 8.
- Pass or Attempt to Use Defined. *People v. Tomlinson* (1868) 35 Cal. 503, 509; *People v. Jackson* (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 556, 562 [155 Cal.Rptr. 89], disapproved on other grounds in *People v. Anderson* (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1123 [240 Cal.Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306].

- Alteration Defined. *People v. Nesseth* (1954) 127 Cal.App.2d 712, 718–720 [274 P.2d 479]; *People v. Hall* (1942) 55 Cal.App.2d 343, 352 [130 P.2d 733].
- Unanimity Instruction If Multiple Items. *People v. Sutherland* (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 602, 619, fn. 6 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 752].
- Required Additional Findings. Pen. Code, § 473(b).
- Scope of Pen. Code, § 473(b). *People v. Gonzales* (2018) 6 Cal.5th 44 [237 Cal.Rptr.3d 193, 424 P.3d 280].

## RELATED ISSUES

### *Possession and Uttering*

The defendant cannot be convicted of possessing and uttering the same document. (*People v. Reisdorff* (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 675, 679 [95 Cal.Rptr. 224].)

### *Possession of Multiple Documents Only One Offense*

Even if the defendant possessed multiple forged documents at the same time, only one violation of Penal Code section 475 may be charged. (*People v. Bowie* (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 143, 156–157 [140 Cal.Rptr. 49] [11 checks supported 1 count, not 11].)

## SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property, § 192.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.02[2][a][i] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 143, *Crimes Against Property*, § 143.04[1], [2] (Matthew Bender).



**1931. Possession of Blank Check: With Intent to Defraud (Pen. Code, § 475(b))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with possessing a (blank/ [or] unfinished) (check[,]/ [or] note[,]/ [or] money order[,]/ [or] traveler's check[,]/ [or] bank bill) with intent to defraud [in violation of Penal Code section 475(b)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant possessed a (blank/ [or] unfinished) (check[,]/ [or] note[,]/ [or] money order[,]/ [or] traveler's check[,]/ [or] bank bill);

AND

2. When the defendant possessed the document, (he/she) intended to complete [or aid the completion of] the document in order to defraud.

Someone *intends to defraud* if he or she intends to deceive another person either to cause a loss of (money[,]/ [or] goods[,]/ [or] services[,]/ [or] something [else] of value), or to cause damage to, a legal, financial, or property right.

[For the purpose of this instruction, a *person* includes (a governmental agency/a corporation/a business/an association/the body politic).]

[It is not necessary that anyone actually be defrauded or actually suffer a financial, legal, or property loss as a result of the defendant's acts.]

[The (check[,]/ [or] note[,]/ [or] money order[,]/ [or] traveler's check[,]/ [or] bank bill) may be real or fictitious.]

[The People allege that the defendant possessed the following documents: \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of each document when multiple items alleged>. You may not find the defendant guilty unless you all agree that the People have proved that the defendant possessed at least one of these documents and you all agree on which document (he/she) possessed.]

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*New January 2006*

**BENCH NOTES**

***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If the prosecution alleges under a single count that the defendant possessed multiple

items, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on unanimity. (See *People v. Sutherland* (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 602, 619, fn. 6 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 752].) Give the last bracketed paragraph, inserting the items alleged. (See also Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 3500, *Unanimity*, discussing when instruction on unanimity is and is not required.)

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “For the purpose of this instruction” if the evidence shows an intent to defraud an entity or association rather than a natural person. (Pen. Code, § 8.)

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “It is not necessary” if the evidence shows that the defendant did not succeed in defrauding anyone. (*People v. Morgan* (1956) 140 Cal.App.2d 796, 801 [296 P.2d 75].)

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 475(b).
- Intent to Defraud. *People v. Pugh* (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 66, 72 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 770]; *People v. Gaul-Alexander* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 735, 745 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 176].
- Intent to Defraud Entity. Pen. Code, § 8.
- Unanimity Instruction If Multiple Items. *People v. Sutherland* (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 602, 619, fn. 6 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 752].

### RELATED ISSUES

See the Related Issues section to CALCRIM No. 1930, *Possession of Forged Document*.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property, § 192.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.02[2][a][i] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 143, *Crimes Against Property*, § 143.04[1], [2] (Matthew Bender).

**1932. Possession of Completed Check: With Intent to Defraud  
(Pen. Code, § 475(c))**

---

The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with possessing a completed (check[,]/ [or] money order[,]/ [or] traveler's check[,]/ [or] warrant or county order) with intent to defraud [in violation of Penal Code section 475(c)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant possessed a completed (check[,]/ [or] money order[,]/ [or] traveler's check[,]/ [or] warrant or county order);

AND

2. When the defendant possessed the document, (he/she) intended to (pass[,]/ [or] use[,]/ [or] aid the passage or use of) the document in order to defraud.

Someone *intends to defraud* if he or she intends to deceive another person either to cause a loss of (money[,]/ [or] goods[,]/ [or] services[,]/ [or] something [else] of value), or to cause damage to, a legal, financial, or property right.

[For the purpose of this instruction, a *person* includes (a governmental agency/a corporation/a business/an association/the body politic).]

A person (*passes/* [or] *uses*) a document if he or she represents to someone that the document is genuine. The representation may be made by words or conduct and may be either direct or indirect.

[It is not necessary that anyone actually be defrauded or actually suffer a financial, legal, or property loss as a result of the defendant's acts.]

[The (check[,]/ [or] money order[,]/ [or] traveler's check[,]/ [or] warrant or county order) may be real or false.]

[The People allege that the defendant possessed the following documents: \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of each document when multiple items alleged>. You may not find the defendant guilty unless you all agree that the People have proved that the defendant possessed at least one of these documents and you all agree on which document (he/she) possessed.]

<Sentencing factor for instruments specified in Penal Code section 473(b)>

[If you find the defendant guilty of possessing a completed (check[,]/ [or] money order[,]/ [or] traveler's check) with intent to defraud, you must then decide whether the value of the \_\_\_\_\_ (check[,]/ [or] money order[,]/ [or] traveler's check) was more than \$950. If you have a

reasonable doubt whether the value of the \_\_\_\_\_ (check[,]/ [or] money order[,]/ [or] traveler’s check) has a value of more than \$950, you must find this allegation has not been proved.]

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*New January 2006; Revised March 2019*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If the prosecution alleges under a single count that the defendant possessed multiple items, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on unanimity. (See *People v. Sutherland* (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 602, 619, fn. 6 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 752].) Give the last bracketed paragraph, inserting the items alleged. (See also Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 3500, *Unanimity*, discussing when instruction on unanimity is and is not required.)

*People v. Pugh* (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 66, 72 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 770], defines the term “utter” as to “use” or “attempt to use” an instrument. The committee has omitted the unfamiliar term “utter” in favor of the more familiar terms “use” and “attempt to use.”

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “For the purpose of this instruction” if the evidence shows an intent to defraud an entity or association rather than a natural person. (Pen. Code, § 8.)

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “It is not necessary” if the evidence shows that the defendant did not succeed in defrauding anyone. (*People v. Morgan* (1956) 140 Cal.App.2d 796, 801 [296 P.2d 75].)

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 475(c).
- Intent to Defraud. *People v. Pugh* (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 66, 72 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 770]; *People v. Gaul-Alexander* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 735, 745 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 176].
- Intent to Defraud Entity. Pen. Code, § 8.
- Unanimity Instruction If Multiple Items. *People v. Sutherland* (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 602, 619, fn. 6 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 752].
- Required Additional Findings. Pen. Code, § 473(b).
- Scope of Pen. Code, § 473(b). *People v. Gonzales* (2018) 6 Cal.5th 44 [237 Cal.Rptr.3d 193, 424 P.3d 280].

## RELATED ISSUES

See the Related Issues section to CALCRIM No. 1930, *Possession of Forged Document*.

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property, § 192.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.02[2][a][i] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 143, *Crimes Against Property*, § 143.04[1], [2] (Matthew Bender).

### 1933. Possession of Counterfeiting Equipment (Pen. Code, § 480)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_ ] with making or possessing counterfeiting equipment [in violation of Penal Code section 480].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant [made] [or] [possessed] (a/an) (die/ [or] plate/ [or] apparatus/ [or] paper/ [or] metal/ [or] machine/ [or] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert other item>);
- [2. The defendant knew of the equipment's presence;]

AND

- (2/3). The defendant knew that the (die/ [or] plate/ [or] apparatus/ [or] paper/ [or] metal/ [or] machine/ [or] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert other item>) had been or would be used to counterfeit (coin/gold dust/ gold or silver (bars/bullion/lumps/pieces/nuggets)/bank notes or bills).

[Two or more people may possess something at the same time.]

[A person does not have to actually hold or touch something to possess it. It is enough if the person has (control over it/ [or] the right to control it), either personally or through another person.]

[The People allege that the defendant possessed the following items:  
\_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of each item when multiple items alleged>.

**You may not find the defendant guilty unless you all agree that the People have proved that the defendant possessed at least one of these items and you all agree on which item (he/she) possessed.]**

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*New March 2021*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “The defendant knew” if the defendant is charged with possessing the equipment. Do not give this bracketed sentence if the defendant is only charged with making the equipment.

If the prosecution alleges under a single count that the defendant possessed multiple counterfeiting equipment, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on unanimity. (See *People v. Sutherland* (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 602, 619, fn. 6 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d

752].) Give the last bracketed paragraph, inserting the items alleged. (See also Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 3500, *Unanimity*, discussing when instruction on unanimity is and is not required.)

### AUTHORITY

- Elements Pen. Code, § 480; *People v. Seo* (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 1081, 1084–1085 [262 Cal.Rptr.3d 497].
- Statute Constitutional *Ex parte Dixon* (1953) 41 Cal.2d 756, 763–764 [264 P.2d 513].
- Possession of the Means for Counterfeiting Does Not Include Possession of Completed Counterfeit Items *People v. Clark* (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1259, 1267 [13 Cal.Rptr.2d 209].
- Bills Include Federal and Foreign Currency *People v. McDonnell* (1889) 80 Cal. 285, 287 [22 P. 190]; *People v. Ray* (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1718, 1723 [50 Cal.Rptr.2d 612].
- Unanimity Instruction If Multiple Items *People v. Sutherland* (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 602, 619, fn. 6 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 752].

### 1934. Reserved for Future Use

## (v) Check Fraud

### 1935. Making, Passing, etc., Fictitious Check or Bill (Pen. Code, § 476)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with (possessing[,]/ [or] making[,]/ [or] passing[,]/ [or] using[,]/ [or] attempting to pass or use) (a/an) (false/ [or] altered) (check[,]/ [or] bill[,]/ [or] note[,]/ [or] other) legal writing for the payment of money or property) [in violation of Penal Code section 476].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant (possessed[,]/ [or] made[,]/ [or] passed[,]/ [or] used[,]/ [or] attempted to pass or use) (a/an) (false/ [or] altered) (check[,]/ [or] bill[,]/ [or] note[,]/ [or] other) legal writing for the payment of money or property);

2. The defendant knew that the document was (false/ [or] altered);

[AND]

3. When the defendant (possessed[,]/ [or] made[,]/ [or] passed[,]/ [or] used[,]/ [or] attempted to pass or use) the document, (he/she) intended to defraud(;/.)

<Give element 4 only when possession charged.>

[AND]

4. When the defendant possessed the document, (he/she) intended to pass or use the document as genuine.]

Someone *intends to defraud* if he or she intends to deceive another person either to cause a loss of (money[,]/ [or] goods[,]/ [or] services[,]/ [or] something [else] of value), or to cause damage to, a legal, financial, or property right.

[For the purpose of this instruction, a *person* includes (a governmental agency/a corporation/a business/an association/the body politic).]

[It is not necessary that anyone actually be defrauded or actually suffer a financial, legal, or property loss as a result of the defendant's acts.]

[A person *alters* a document if he or she adds to, erases, or changes a part of the document that affects a legal, financial, or property right.]

A person (*passes*[,]/ [or] *uses*[,]/ [or] *attempts to pass or use*) a document if he or she represents to someone that the document is genuine. The representation may be made by words or conduct and may be either direct or indirect.



[The People allege that the defendant (possessed[,]/ [or] made[,]/ [or] passed[,]/ [or] used[,]/ [or] attempted to pass or use) the following documents: \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of each document when multiple items alleged>. You may not find the defendant guilty unless you all agree that the People have proved that the defendant (possessed[,]/ [or] made[,]/ [or] passed[,]/ [or] used[,]/ [or] attempted to pass or use) at least one document that was (fictitious/ [or] altered) and you all agree on which document (he/she) (possessed[,]/ [or] made[,]/ [or] passed[,]/ [or] used[,]/ [or] attempted to pass or use).]

<Sentencing factor for instruments specified in Penal Code section 473(b)>

[If you find the defendant guilty of (possessing[,]/[or] making[,]/ [or] passing [,]/ [or] using[,]/ [or] attempting to pass or use) a fictitious (check/bill/note/legal writing), you must then decide whether the value of the \_\_\_\_\_ (check/bond/bank bill/note/cashier’s check/traveler’s check/money order) was more than \$950. If you have a reasonable doubt whether the value of the \_\_\_\_\_ (check/bond/bank bill/note/cashier’s check/traveler’s check/money order) has a value of more than \$950, you must find this allegation has not been proved.]

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*New January 2006; Revised April 2011, March 2019*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If the prosecution alleges under a single count that the defendant passed or possessed multiple forged documents, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on unanimity. (See *People v. Sutherland* (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 602, 619, fn. 6 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 752].) Give the last bracketed paragraph, inserting the items alleged. (See also Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 3500, *Unanimity*, discussing when instruction on unanimity is and is not required.)

*People v. Pugh* (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 66, 72 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 770], defines the term “utter” as to “use” or “attempt to use” an instrument. The committee has omitted the unfamiliar term “utter” in favor of the more familiar terms “use” and “attempt to use.”

If the prosecution alleges that the defendant possessed the document, give element 4. Do not give element 4 if the prosecution alleges that the defendant made, passed, used, or attempted to pass or use the document.

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “For the purpose of this instruction” if the evidence shows an intent to defraud an entity or association rather than a natural person. (Pen. Code, § 8.)

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “It is not necessary” if the evidence

shows that the defendant did not succeed in defrauding anyone. (*People v. Morgan* (1956) 140 Cal.App.2d 796, 801 [296 P.2d 75].)

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 476.
- Intent to Defraud. *People v. Pugh* (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 66, 72 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 770]; *People v. Gaul-Alexander* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 735, 745 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 176].
- Intent to Defraud Entity. Pen. Code, § 8.
- Pass or Attempt to Use Defined. *People v. Tomlinson* (1868) 35 Cal. 503, 509; *People v. Jackson* (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 556, 561 [155 Cal.Rptr. 89], overruled on other grounds in *People v. Anderson* (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1122 [240 Cal.Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306].
- Alteration Defined. *People v. Nesseth* (1954) 127 Cal.App.2d 712, 718–720 [274 P.2d 479]; *People v. Hall* (1942) 55 Cal.App.2d 343, 352 [130 P.2d 733].
- Unanimity Instruction If Multiple Documents. *People v. Sutherland* (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 602, 619, fn. 6 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 752].
- Explanation of “Fictitious.” *People v. Mathers* (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1464, 1467–1468 [108 Cal.Rptr.3d 720].
- Required Additional Findings. Pen. Code, § 473(b).
- Scope of Pen. Code, § 473(b). *People v. Gonzales* (2018) 6 Cal.5th 44 [237 Cal.Rptr.3d 193, 424 P.3d 280].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Attempted Making, etc., of Fictitious Check. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 476.

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Check Fraud*

A defendant who forges the name of another on a check may be charged under either Penal Code section 470 or section 476. (*People v. Hawkins* (1961) 196 Cal.App.2d 832, 838 [17 Cal.Rptr. 66]; *People v. Pearson* (1957) 151 Cal.App.2d 583, 586 [311 P.2d 927].) However, the defendant may not be convicted of and sentenced on both charges for the same conduct. (Pen. Code, § 654; *People v. Hawkins, supra*, 196 Cal.App.2d at pp. 839–840; see also CALCRIM No. 3516, *Multiple Counts—Alternative Charges for One Event—Dual Conviction Prohibited.*)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property, §§ 178, 192, 195.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.02[2][a][i] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 143, *Crimes Against Property*, § 143.04[1], [2] (Matthew Bender).

**1936–1944. Reserved for Future Use**

## (vi) Filing False Document

### 1945. Procuring Filing of False Document or Offering False Document for Filing (Pen. Code, § 115)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with (offering a (false/ [or] forged) document for (filing[,]/ [or] recording[,]/ [or] registration)/having a (false/ [or] forged) document (filed[,]/ [or] recorded[,]/ [or] registered)) [in violation of Penal Code section 115].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

<Alternative 1A—offering>

1. The defendant offered a (false/ [or] forged) document for (filing[,]/ [or] recording[,]/ [or] registration) in a public office in California;

<Alternative 1B—procuring>

1. The defendant caused a (false/ [or] forged) document to be (filed[,]/ [or] recorded[,]/ [or] registered) in a public office in California;
2. When the defendant did that act, (he/she) knew that the document was (false/ [or] forged);

AND

3. The document was one that, if genuine, could be legally (filed[,]/ [or] recorded[,]/ [or] registered).

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*New January 2006; Revised September 2020*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 115.
- Materiality of Alteration Not Element. *People v. Feinberg* (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1566, 1578–1579 [60 Cal.Rptr.2d 323].
- Meaning of Instrument as Used in Penal Code section 115. *People v. Parks* (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 883, 886–887 [9 Cal.Rptr.2d 450]; *Generes v. Justice Court* (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 678, 682–684 [165 Cal.Rptr. 222]; *People v.*

*Powers* (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 291, 295–297 [11 Cal.Rptr.3d 619].

## RELATED ISSUES

### *Meaning of Instrument*

Penal Code section 115 applies to any “instrument” that, “if genuine, might be filed, registered, or recorded under any law of this state or of the United States . . .” (Pen. Code, § 115(a).) Modern cases have interpreted the term “instrument” expansively, including any type of document that is filed or recorded with a public agency that, if acted on as genuine, would have the effect of deceiving someone. (See *People v. Parks* (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 883, 886–887 [9 Cal.Rptr.2d 450]; *Generes v. Justice Court* (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 678, 682–684 [165 Cal.Rptr. 222].) Thus, the courts have held that “instrument” includes a modified restraining order (*People v. Parks, supra*, 7 Cal.App.4th at p. 886), false bail bonds (*People v. Garcia* (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 297, 306–307 [273 Cal.Rptr. 666]), and falsified probation work referrals (*People v. Tate* (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 663, 667 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 206]). In *People v. Powers* (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 291, 297 [11 Cal.Rptr.3d 619], the court held that fishing records were “instruments” under Penal Code section 115. The court stated that “California courts have shown reluctance to interpret section 115 so broadly that it encompasses any writing that may be filed in a public office.” (*Id.* at p. 295.) The court adopted the following analysis for whether a document is an “instrument,” quoting the Washington Supreme Court:

(1) the claimed falsity relates to a material fact represented in the instrument; and (2a) the information contained in the document is of such a nature that the government is required or permitted by law, statute or valid regulation to act in reliance thereon; or (2b) the information contained in the document materially affects significant rights or duties of third persons, when this effect is reasonably contemplated by the express or implied intent of the statute or valid regulation which requires the filing, registration, or recording of the document.

(*Id.* at p. 297 [quoting *State v. Price* (1980) 94 Wash.2d 810, 819 [620 P.2d 994].)

### *Each Document Constitutes a Separate Offense*

Penal Code section 115 provides that each fraudulent instrument filed or offered for filing constitutes a separate violation (subdivision (b)) and may be punished separately (subdivision (d)). “Thus, the Legislature has unmistakably authorized the imposition of separate penalties for each prohibited act even though they may be part of a continuous course of conduct and have the same objective.” (*People v. Gangemi* (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1790, 1800 [17 Cal.Rptr.2d 462].)

### *Meaning of False*

Unlawful procurement of a deed does not make it a false or forged document. (*People v. Schmidt* (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 1042, 1056–1058 [254 Cal.Rptr.3d 694].)

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property, §§ 188–189.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 143, *Crimes Against Property*, § 143.04[1][b] (Matthew Bender).

**1946–1949. Reserved for Future Use**

## B. ACCESS CARD FRAUD

### 1950. Sale or Transfer of Access Card or Account Number (Pen. Code, § 484e(a))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with (selling[,]/ [or] transferring[,]/ [or] conveying) an access card [in violation of Penal Code section 484e(a)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant (sold[,]/ [or] transferred[,]/ [or] conveyed) an access card;
2. The defendant did so without the consent of the cardholder or the issuer of the card;

AND

3. When the defendant (sold[,]/ [or] transferred[,]/ [or] conveyed) the access card, (he/she) intended to defraud.

An *access card* is a card, plate, code, account number, or other means of account access that can be used, alone or with another access card, to obtain (money[,]/ [or] goods[,]/ [or] services[,]/ [or] anything of value), or that can be used to begin a transfer of funds[, other than a transfer originated solely by a paper document].

[(A/An) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description, e.g., ATM card, credit card> is an access card.]

A *cardholder* is someone who has been issued an access card [or who has agreed with a card issuer to pay debts arising from the issuance of an access card to someone else].

A *card issuer* is a company [or person] [or the agent of a company or person] that issues an access card to a cardholder.

[*Selling* means exchanging something for money, services, or anything of value.]

Someone *intends to defraud* if he or she intends to deceive another person either to cause a loss of (money[,]/ [or] goods[,]/ [or] services[,]/ [or] something [else] of value), or to cause damage to, a legal, financial, or property right.

[For the purpose of this instruction, a *person* includes (a governmental agency/a corporation/a business/an association/the body politic).]

[It is not necessary that anyone actually be defrauded or actually suffer a financial, legal, or property loss as a result of the defendant's acts.]

[The People allege that the defendant (sold[,]/ [or] transferred[,]/ [or] conveyed) the following access cards: \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of each card when multiple items alleged>. You may not find the defendant guilty unless you all agree that the People have proved that the defendant (sold[,]/ [or] transferred[,]/ [or] conveyed) at least one of these cards and you all agree on which card (he/she) (sold[,]/ [or] transferred[,]/ [or] conveyed).]

[If you find the defendant guilty of (selling[,]/ [or] transferring[,]/ [or] conveying) an access card, you must then decide whether the value of the access card was more than \$950. If you have a reasonable doubt whether the value of the access card was more than \$950, you must find this allegation has not been proved.]

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*New January 2006; Revised September 2020*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If the prosecution alleges under a single count that the defendant sold or transferred multiple cards, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on unanimity. (See *People v. Sutherland* (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 602, 619, fn. 6 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 752].) Give the last bracketed paragraph, inserting the items alleged. (See also Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 3500, *Unanimity*, discussing when instruction on unanimity is and is not required.)

In the definition of “access card,” the court may give the bracketed portion that begins with “other than a transfer” at its discretion. This statement is included in the statutory definition of access card. (Pen. Code, § 484d(2).) However, the committee believes it would rarely be relevant.

The court may also give the bracketed sentence stating “(A/An) \_\_\_\_\_ is an access card” if the parties agree on that point.

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “For the purpose of this instruction” if the evidence shows an intent to defraud an entity or association rather than a natural person. (Pen. Code, § 8.)

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “It is not necessary” if the evidence shows that the defendant did not succeed in defrauding anyone. (*People v. Morgan* (1956) 140 Cal.App.2d 796, 801 [296 P.2d 75].)

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 484e(a).



- Definitions. Pen. Code, § 484d.
- Intent to Defraud. *People v. Pugh* (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 66, 72 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 770]; *People v. Gaul-Alexander* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 735, 745 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 176].
- Intent to Defraud Entity. Pen. Code, § 8.
- Unanimity Instruction If Multiple Items. *People v. Sutherland* (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 602, 619].
- Value Must Exceed \$950 For Felony. *People v. Romanowski* (2017) 2 Cal.5th 903, 908–910 [215 Cal.Rptr.3d 758, 391 P.3d 633].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

Possession of Access Card With Intent to Sell (Pen. Code, § 484e(c)) may be a lesser included offense. (But see *People v. Butler* (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1224, 1245–1246 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 150].)

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Multiple Charges Based on Single Act*

Prosecution under Penal Code section 484d et seq. does not preclude simultaneous prosecution under other statutes for the same conduct. (*People v. Braz* (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1, 8 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 553]; *People v. Butler* (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1224, 1243–1244 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 150].) Thus, the defendant may also be charged with such offenses as burglary (Pen. Code, § 459), forgery (Pen. Code, § 470), grand theft (Pen. Code, § 487), or telephone fraud (Pen. Code, § 502.7). (*People v. Braz, supra*, 57 Cal.App.4th at p. 8; *People v. Butler, supra*, 43 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1243–1244.) However, Penal Code section 654 may preclude punishment for multiple offenses. (*People v. Butler, supra*, 43 Cal.App.4th at p. 1248.)

#### *Cloned Cellular Phone*

“[T]he Legislature intended that the definition of access card be broad enough to cover future technologies, the only limitation being on purely paper transactions. As the evidence disclosed here, a cloned cellular phone is a sophisticated and unlawful ‘means of account access’ to the account of a legitimate telephone subscriber.” (*People v. Butler* (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1224, 1244 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 150].)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property, §§ 215–216.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.02[2][a][i] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 143, *Crimes Against Property*, § 143.04[1], [2] (Matthew Bender).

**1951. Acquiring or Retaining an Access Card or Account Number  
(Pen. Code, § 484e(c))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with unlawfully (acquiring/ [or] retaining) an access card [in violation of Penal Code section 484e(c)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant (acquired/ [or] retained) an access card;
2. The defendant did so without the consent of the cardholder or the issuer of the card;

AND

3. When the defendant (acquired/ [or] retained) the access card, (he/ she) intended to defraud by (using it[,]/ [or] selling or transferring it to someone other than the cardholder or issuer).

An *access card* is a card, plate, code, account number, or other means of account access that can be used, alone or with another access card, to obtain (money[,]/ [or] goods[,]/ [or] services[,]/ [or] anything of value), or that can be used to begin a transfer of funds[, other than a transfer originated solely by a paper document].

[(A/An) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description, e.g., ATM card, credit card> is an access card.]

A *cardholder* is someone who has been issued an access card [or who has agreed with a card issuer to pay debts arising from the issuance of an access card to someone else].

A *card issuer* is a company [or person] [or the agent of a company or person] that issues an access card to a cardholder.

[*Selling* means exchanging something for money, services, or anything of value.]

Someone *intends to defraud* if he or she intends to deceive another person either to cause a loss of (money[,]/ [or] goods[,]/ [or] services[,]/ [or] something [else] of value), or to cause damage to, a legal, financial, or property right.

[For the purpose of this instruction, a *person* includes (a governmental agency/a corporation/a business/an association/the body politic).]

[It is not necessary that anyone actually be defrauded or actually suffer a financial, legal, or property loss as a result of the defendant's acts.]

[The People allege that the defendant (acquired/ [or] retained) the

**following access cards:** \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of each card when multiple items alleged>. **You may not find the defendant guilty unless you all agree that the People have proved that the defendant (acquired/ [or] retained) at least one of these cards and you all agree on which card (he/she) (acquired/ [or] retained).**]

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New January 2006

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If the prosecution alleges under a single count that the defendant acquired or retained multiple cards, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on unanimity. (See *People v. Sutherland* (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 602, 619, fn. 6 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 752].) Give the last bracketed paragraph, inserting the items alleged. (See also Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 3500, *Unanimity*, discussing when instruction on unanimity is and is not required.)

In the definition of “access card,” the court may give the bracketed portion that begins with “other than a transfer” at its discretion. This statement is included in the statutory definition of access card. (Pen. Code, § 484d(2).) However, the committee believes it would rarely be relevant.

The court may also give the bracketed sentence stating “(A/An) \_\_\_\_\_ is an access card” if the parties agree on that point.

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “For the purpose of this instruction” if the evidence shows an intent to defraud an entity or association rather than a natural person. (Pen. Code, § 8.)

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “It is not necessary” if the evidence shows that the defendant did not succeed in defrauding anyone. (*People v. Morgan* (1956) 140 Cal.App.2d 796, 801 [296 P.2d 75].)

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 484e(c).
- Definitions. Pen. Code, § 484d.
- Intent to Defraud. *People v. Pugh* (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 66, 72 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 770]; *People v. Gaul-Alexander* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 735, 745 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 176].
- Intent to Defraud Entity. Pen. Code, § 8.
- Unanimity Instruction If Multiple Items. *People v. Sutherland* (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 602, 619, fn. 6 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 752].

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property, §§ 215–216.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.02[2][a][i] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 143, *Crimes Against Property*, § 143.04[1], [2] (Matthew Bender).

**1952. Acquiring or Retaining Account Information (Pen. Code,  
§ 484e(d))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with (acquiring/ [or] retaining) the account information of an access card [in violation of Penal Code section 484e(d)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant (acquired/ [or] retained) the account information of an access card that was validly issued to someone else;
2. The defendant did so without the consent of the cardholder or the issuer of the card;

**AND**

3. When the defendant (acquired/ [or] retained) the account information, (he/she) intended to use that information fraudulently.

An *access card* is a card, plate, code, account number, or other means of account access that can be used, alone or with another access card, to obtain (money[,]/ [or] goods[,]/ [or] services[,]/ [or] anything of value), or that can be used to begin a transfer of funds[, other than a transfer originated solely by a paper document].

[(A/An) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description, e.g., ATM card, credit card> is an access card.]

A *cardholder* is someone who has been issued an access card [or who has agreed with a card issuer to pay debts arising from the issuance of an access card to someone else].

A *card issuer* is a company [or person] [or the agent of a company or person] that issues an access card to a cardholder.

Someone *intends to defraud* if he or she intends to deceive another person either to cause a loss of (money[,]/ [or] goods[,]/ [or] services[,]/ [or] something [else] of value), or to cause damage to, a legal, financial, or property right.

[For the purpose of this instruction, a *person* includes (a governmental agency/a corporation/a business/an association/the body politic).]

[It is not necessary that anyone actually be defrauded or actually suffer a financial, legal, or property loss as a result of the defendant's acts.]

[The People allege that the defendant (acquired/ [or] retained) the account information of the following access cards: \_\_\_\_\_ <insert

*description of each card when multiple items alleged*>. **You may not find the defendant guilty unless you all agree that the People have proved that the defendant (acquired/ [or] retained) the account information of at least one of these cards and you all agree on which card’s account information (he/she) (acquired/ [or] retained).**]

**[If you find the defendant guilty of (acquiring/ [or] retaining) the account information of an access card, you must then decide whether the value of the account information was more than \$950. If you have a reasonable doubt whether the value of the account information was more than \$950, you must find this allegation has not been proved.]**

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*New January 2006; Revised September 2020*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If the prosecution alleges under a single count that the defendant possessed the account information of multiple cards, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on unanimity. (See *People v. Sutherland* (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 602, 619, fn. 6 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 752].) Give the last bracketed paragraph, inserting the items alleged. (See also Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 3500, *Unanimity*, discussing when instruction on unanimity is and is not required.)

In the definition of “access card,” the court may give the bracketed portion that begins with “other than a transfer” at its discretion. This statement is included in the statutory definition of access card. (Pen. Code, § 484d(2).) However, the committee believes it would rarely be relevant.

The court may also give the bracketed sentence stating “(A/An) \_\_\_\_\_ is an access card” if the parties agree on that point.

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “For the purpose of this instruction” if the evidence shows an intent to defraud an entity or association rather than a natural person. (Pen. Code, § 8.)

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “It is not necessary” if the evidence shows that the defendant did not succeed in defrauding anyone. (*People v. Morgan* (1956) 140 Cal.App.2d 796, 801 [296 P.2d 75].)

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 484e(d).
- Definitions. Pen. Code, § 484d.
- Intent to Defraud. *People v. Pugh* (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 66, 72 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 770]; *People v. Gaul-Alexander* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 735, 745 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 176].

- Intent to Defraud Entity. Pen. Code, § 8.
- Unanimity Instruction If Multiple Items. *People v. Sutherland* (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 602, 619, fn. 6 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 752].
- Value Must Exceed \$950 for Felony. *People v. Romanowski* (2017) 2 Cal.5th 903, 908–910 [215 Cal.Rptr.3d 758, 391 P.3d 633].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Acquires*

“If appellant is arguing that only the person who *first* acquires this information with the requisite intent is guilty of the crime, we disagree. We interpret the crime to apply to any person who acquires that information with the intent to use it fraudulently.” (*People v. Smith* (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1458, 1470 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 75].)

#### *Includes Possession of Cancelled Card*

In *People v. Molina* (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 507, 511 [15 Cal.Rptr.3d 493], the defendant possessed a cancelled access card that had been issued to someone else. The court held that this constituted a violation of Penal Code section 484e(d). (*Id.* at pp. 514–515.) The court further held that, although the defendant’s conduct also violated Penal Code section 484e(c), a misdemeanor, the defendant’s right to equal protection was not violated by being prosecuted for the felony offense. (*Id.* at pp. 517–518.)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property, §§ 215–216.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.02[2][a][i] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 143, *Crimes Against Property*, § 143.04[1], [2] (Matthew Bender).

**1953. Making Counterfeit Access Card or Account Number (Pen. Code, § 484f(a))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with (designing[,]/ [or] making[,]/ [or] altering[,]/ [or] embossing) a counterfeit access card [in violation of Penal Code section 484f(a)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant (designed[,]/ [or] made[,]/ [or] altered[,]/ [or] embossed) a counterfeit access card;

AND

2. When the defendant did that act, (he/she) intended to defraud.

An *access card* is a card, plate, code, account number, or other means of account access that can be used, alone or with another access card, to obtain (money[,]/ [or] goods[,]/ [or] services[,]/ [or] anything of value), or that can be used to begin a transfer of funds[, other than a transfer originated solely by a paper document].

[(A/An) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description, e.g., ATM card, credit card> is an access card.]

A *counterfeit access card* is a counterfeit, fictitious, altered, or forged access card or a false representation or depiction of an access card or any part of such a card.

Someone *intends to defraud* if he or she intends to deceive another person either to cause a loss of (money[,]/ [or] goods[,]/ [or] services[,]/ [or] something [else] of value), or to cause damage to, a legal, financial, or property right.

[For the purpose of this instruction, a *person* includes (a governmental agency/a corporation/a business/an association/the body politic).]

[It is not necessary that anyone actually be defrauded or actually suffer a financial, legal, or property loss as a result of the defendant's acts.]

[A person *alters* an access card if he or she adds to, erases, or changes a part of the card that affects a legal, financial, or property right.]

[The People allege that the defendant (designed[,]/ [or] made[,]/ [or] altered[,]/ [or] embossed) the following counterfeit access cards:  
\_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of each card when multiple items alleged>.

You may not find the defendant guilty unless you all agree that the People have proved that the defendant (designed[,]/ [or] made[,]/ [or] altered[,]/ [or] embossed) at least one of these cards and you all agree on



**which card (he/she) (designed[,]/ [or] made[,]/ [or] altered[,]/ [or] embossed).]**

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*New January 2006*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If the prosecution alleges under a single count that the defendant made multiple cards, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on unanimity. (See *People v. Sutherland* (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 602, 619, fn. 6 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 752].) Give the last bracketed paragraph, inserting the items alleged. (See also Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 3500, *Unanimity*, discussing when instruction on unanimity is and is not required.)

In the definition of “access card,” the court may give the bracketed portion that begins with “other than a transfer” at its discretion. This statement is included in the statutory definition of access card. (Pen. Code, § 484d(2).) However, the committee believes it would rarely be relevant.

The court may also give the bracketed sentence stating “(A/An) \_\_\_\_\_ is an access card” if the parties agree on that point.

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “For the purpose of this instruction” if the evidence shows an intent to defraud an entity or association rather than a natural person. (Pen. Code, § 8.)

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “It is not necessary” if the evidence shows that the defendant did not succeed in defrauding anyone. (*People v. Morgan* (1956) 140 Cal.App.2d 796, 801 [296 P.2d 75].)

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 484f(a).
- Definitions. Pen. Code, § 484d.
- Intent to Defraud. *People v. Pugh* (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 66, 72 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 770]; *People v. Gaul-Alexander* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 735, 745 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 176].
- Intent to Defraud Entity. Pen. Code, § 8.
- Alteration Defined. *People v. Nesseth* (1954) 127 Cal.App.2d 712, 718–720 [274 P.2d 479]; *People v. Hall* (1942) 55 Cal.App.2d 343, 352 [130 P.2d 733].
- Unanimity Instruction If Multiple Items. *People v. Sutherland* (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 602, 619, fn. 6 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 752].

## LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Attempted Forgery of Access Card. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 484f.

**RELATED ISSUES**

See the Related Issues sections in CALCRIM No. 1900, *Forgery by False Signature*, and CALCRIM No. 1950, *Sale or Transfer of Access Card or Account Number*.

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property, § 217.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.02[2][a][i] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 143, *Crimes Against Property*, § 143.04[1], [2] (Matthew Bender).

**1954. Using or Attempting to Use Counterfeit Access Card (Pen. Code, § 484f(a))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with (using/ [or] attempting to use) a counterfeit access card [in violation of Penal Code section 484f(a)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant (used/ [or] attempted to use) a counterfeit access card;

**AND**

2. When the defendant did that act, (he/she) intended to defraud.

An *access card* is a card, plate, code, account number, or other means of account access that can be used, alone or with another access card, to obtain (money[,]/ [or] goods[,]/ [or] services[,]/ [or] anything of value), or that can be used to begin a transfer of funds[, other than a transfer originated solely by a paper document].

[(A/An) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description, e.g., ATM card, credit card> is an access card.]

A *counterfeit access card* is a counterfeit, fictitious, altered, or forged access card or a false representation or depiction of an access card or any part of such a card.

Someone *intends to defraud* if he or she intends to deceive another person either to cause a loss of (money[,]/ [or] goods[,]/ [or] services[,]/ [or] something [else] of value), or to cause damage to, a legal, financial, or property right.

[For the purpose of this instruction, a *person* includes (a governmental agency/a corporation/an unincorporated business/an association/the body politic).]

[It is not necessary that anyone actually be defrauded or actually suffer a financial, legal, or property loss as a result of the defendant's acts.]

A person *alters* an access card if he or she adds to, erases, or changes a part of the card that affects a legal, financial, or property right.

A person (*uses/ [or] attempts to use*) a counterfeit access card if he or she represents to someone that the card is genuine. The representation may be made by words or conduct and may be either direct or indirect.

[The People allege that the defendant (used/ [or] attempted to use) the

**following counterfeit access cards:** \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of each card when multiple items alleged>. **You may not find the defendant guilty unless you all agree that the People have proved that the defendant (used/ [or] attempted to use) at least one of these cards and you all agree on which card (he/she) (used/ [or] attempted to use).**

*New January 2006*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If the prosecution alleges under a single count that the defendant used multiple cards, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on unanimity. (See *People v. Sutherland* (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 602, 619, fn. 6 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 752].) Give the last bracketed paragraph, inserting the items alleged. (See also Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 3500, *Unanimity*, discussing when instruction on unanimity is and is not required.)

*People v. Pugh* (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 66, 72 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 770], defines the term “utter” as to “use” or “attempt to use” an instrument. The committee has omitted the unfamiliar term “utter” in favor of the more familiar terms “use” and “attempt to use.”

In the definition of “access card,” the court may give the bracketed portion that begins with “other than a transfer” at its discretion. This statement is included in the statutory definition of access card. (Pen. Code, § 484d(2).) However, the committee believes it would rarely be relevant.

The court may also give the bracketed sentence stating “(A/An) \_\_\_\_\_ is an access card” if the parties agree on that point.

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “For the purpose of this instruction” if the evidence shows an intent to defraud an entity or association rather than a natural person. (Pen. Code, § 8.)

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “It is not necessary” if the evidence shows that the defendant did not succeed in defrauding anyone. (*People v. Morgan* (1956) 140 Cal.App.2d 796, 801 [296 P.2d 75].)

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 484f(a).
- Definitions. Pen. Code, § 484d.
- Intent to Defraud. *People v. Pugh* (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 66, 72 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 770]; *People v. Gaul-Alexander* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 735, 745 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 176].
- Intent to Defraud Entity. Pen. Code, § 8.

- Alteration Defined. *People v. Nesseth* (1954) 127 Cal.App.2d 712, 718–720 [274 P.2d 479]; *People v. Hall* (1942) 55 Cal.App.2d 343, 352 [130 P.2d 733].
- Pass or Attempt to Use Defined. *People v. Tomlinson* (1868) 35 Cal. 503, 509; *People v. Jackson* (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 556, 561 [155 Cal.Rptr. 89], overruled on other grounds in *People v. Anderson* (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1122 [240 Cal.Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306].
- Unanimity Instruction If Multiple Items. *People v. Sutherland* (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 602, 619, fn. 6 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 752].

### RELATED ISSUES

See the Related Issues sections in CALCRIM No. 1900, *Forgery by False Signature*, and CALCRIM No. 1950, *Sale or Transfer of Access Card or Account Number*.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property, § 217.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.02[2][a][i] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 143, *Crimes Against Property*, §§ 143.01[2][c], 143.04[1], [2] (Matthew Bender).

**1955. False Signature on Access Card or Receipt (Pen. Code,  
§ 484f(b))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with forgery committed by signing a false signature on (an access card/ [or] a document authorizing payment by an access card) [in violation of Penal Code section 484f(b)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant signed (someone else's name/ [or] a false name) on [an access card] [or] [a (sales slip[,]/ [or] sales draft[,]/ [or] document for the payment of money) to complete an access card transaction];
2. The defendant was not the cardholder and did not have the authority of the cardholder to sign that name;
3. The defendant knew that (he/she) did not have authority to sign that name;

AND

4. When the defendant signed the name, (he/she) intended to defraud.

An *access card* is a card, plate, code, account number, or other means of account access that can be used, alone or with another access card, to obtain (money[,]/ [or] goods[,]/ [or] services[,]/ [or] anything of value), or that can be used to begin a transfer of funds[, other than a transfer originated solely by a paper document].

[(A/An) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description, e.g., ATM card, credit card> is an access card.]

A *cardholder* is someone who has been issued an access card [or who has agreed with a card issuer to pay debts arising from the issuance of an access card to someone else].

A *card issuer* is a company [or person] [or the agent of a company or person] that issues an access card to a cardholder.

Someone *intends to defraud* if he or she intends to deceive another person either to cause a loss of (money[,]/ [or] goods[,]/ [or] services[,]/ [or] something [else] of value), or to cause damage to, a legal, financial, or property right.

[For the purpose of this instruction, a *person* includes (a governmental agency/a corporation/a business/an association/the body politic).]

[It is not necessary that anyone actually be defrauded or actually suffer

**a financial, legal, or property loss as a result of the defendant's acts.]**

**[The People allege that the defendant forged the following (access cards/ [or] documents authorizing payment by an access card): \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of each item when multiple items alleged>. You may not find the defendant guilty unless you all agree that the People have proved that the defendant forged at least one of these (cards/documents) and you all agree on which (card/document) (he/she) forged.]**

*New January 2006*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If the prosecution alleges under a single count that the defendant forged multiple cards or transactions, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on unanimity. (See *People v. Sutherland* (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 602, 619, fn. 6 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 752].) Give the last bracketed paragraph, inserting the items alleged. (See also Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 3500, *Unanimity*, discussing when instruction on unanimity is and is not required.)

In the definition of “access card,” the court may give the bracketed portion that begins with “other than a transfer” at its discretion. This statement is included in the statutory definition of access card. (Pen. Code, § 484d(2).) However, the committee believes it would rarely be relevant.

The court may also give the bracketed sentence stating “(A/An) \_\_\_\_\_ is an access card” if the parties agree on that point.

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “For the purpose of this instruction” if the evidence shows an intent to defraud an entity or association rather than a natural person. (Pen. Code, § 8.)

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “It is not necessary” if the evidence shows that the defendant did not succeed in defrauding anyone. (*People v. Morgan* (1956) 140 Cal.App.2d 796, 801 [296 P.2d 75].)

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 484f(b).
- Definitions. Pen. Code, § 484d.
- Intent to Defraud. *People v. Pugh* (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 66, 72 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 770]; *People v. Gaul-Alexander* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 735, 745 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 176].
- Intent to Defraud Entity. Pen. Code, § 8.
- Signature Not Authorized—Element of Offense. *People v. Hidalgo* (1933) 128

Cal.App. 703, 707 [18 P.2d 391]; *People v. Maioli* (1933) 135 Cal.App. 205, 207 [26 P.2d 871].

- Unanimity Instruction If Multiple Items. *People v. Sutherland* (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 602, 619, fn. 6 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 752].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Attempted Forgery of Access Card. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 484f.

### RELATED ISSUES

See the Related Issues sections in CALCRIM No. 1900, *Forgery by False Signature*, and CALCRIM No. 1950, *Sale or Transfer of Access Card or Account Number*.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property, § 217.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.02[2][a][i] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 143, *Crimes Against Property*, § 143.04[1], [2] (Matthew Bender).



## 1956. Use of Forged, etc., Access Card (Pen. Code, § 484g(a))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with using (an access card/ [or] account information for an access card) that had [been] (altered[,]/ [or] forged[,]/ [or] expired[,]/ [or] revoked[,]/ [or] acquired or retained without permission of the cardholder or card issuer[,]/ [or] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert other description of card obtained or retained in violation of Pen. Code, §§ 484e or 484f>) [in violation of Penal Code section 484g(a)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant used (an access card/ [or] account information for an access card) that had [been] (altered[,]/ [or] forged[,]/ [or] expired[,]/ [or] revoked[,]/ [or] acquired or retained without permission of the cardholder or card issuer[,]/ [or] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert other description of card obtained or retained in violation of Pen. Code, §§ 484e or 484f>);
2. The defendant knew that the (access card/ [or] account information) had [been] (altered[,]/ [or] forged[,]/ [or] expired[,]/ [or] revoked[,]/ [or] acquired or retained without permission of the cardholder or card issuer[,]/ [or] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert other description of card obtained or retained in violation of Pen. Code, §§ 484e or 484f>);
3. When the defendant used the (card/ [or] information), (he/she) intended to obtain money, goods, services, or anything of value;

AND

4. When the defendant used the (card/ [or] information), (he/she) intended to defraud.

An *access card* is a card, plate, code, account number, or other means of account access that can be used, alone or with another access card, to obtain (money[,]/ [or] goods[,]/ [or] services[,]/ [or] anything of value), or that can be used to begin a transfer of funds[, other than a transfer originated solely by a paper document].

[(A/An) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description, e.g., ATM card, credit card> is an access card.]

[An *expired access card* is one that shows on its face an expiration date that has passed.]

[A *revoked access card* is one that the card issuer no longer authorizes for use by the cardholder who has been given written notice of the revocation.]

[A *cardholder* is anyone who has been issued an access card [or who has agreed with a card issuer to pay debts arising from the issuance of an access card to someone else].]

[A *card issuer* is a company [or person] [or the agent of a company or person] that issues an access card to a cardholder.]

Someone *intends to defraud* if he or she intends to deceive another person either to cause a loss of (money[,]/ [or] goods[,]/ [or] services[,]/ [or] something [else] of value), or to cause damage to, a legal, financial, or property right.

[For the purpose of this instruction, a *person* includes (a governmental agency/a corporation/a business/an association/the body politic).]

[It is not necessary that anyone actually be defrauded or actually suffer a financial, legal, or property loss as a result of the defendant's acts.]

[A person *alters* an access card if he or she adds to, erases, or changes a part of the card that affects a legal, financial, or property right.]

[The People allege that the defendant used the following (access cards/ [or] access card account information): \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of each card when multiple items alleged>. You may not find the defendant guilty unless you all agree that the People have proved that the defendant used at least one of these (cards/ [or] card's account information) and you all agree on which (card/ [or] card account information) (he/she) used.]

*New January 2006*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If the prosecution alleges under a single count that the defendant forged multiple cards or transactions, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on unanimity. (See *People v. Sutherland* (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 602, 619, fn. 6 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 752].) Give the last bracketed paragraph, inserting the items alleged. (See also Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 3500, *Unanimity*, discussing when instruction on unanimity is and is not required.)

If the prosecution alleges that the card was “obtained or retained in violation of Penal Code section 484e or 484f,” the court may use the phrase “acquired or retained without permission of the cardholder or card issuer,” if appropriate based on the facts. (See Pen. Code, § 484e(d).) Alternatively, the court may insert an appropriate description of a card “obtained or retained in violation of Penal Code section 484e or 484f” where indicated. If the court inserts another description, the

court should also give the jury an instruction explaining when a card is “obtained or retained” in violation of the applicable section, defining any necessary terms.

In the definition of “access card,” the court may give the bracketed portion that begins with “other than a transfer” at its discretion. This statement is included in the statutory definition of access card. (Pen. Code, § 484d(2).) However, the committee believes it would rarely be relevant.

The court may also give the bracketed sentence stating “(A/An) \_\_\_\_\_ is an access card” if the parties agree on that point.

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “For the purpose of this instruction” if the evidence shows an intent to defraud an entity or association rather than a natural person. (Pen. Code, § 8.)

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “It is not necessary” if the evidence shows that the defendant did not succeed in defrauding anyone. (*People v. Morgan* (1956) 140 Cal.App.2d 796, 801 [296 P.2d 75].)

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 484g(a).
- Definitions. Pen. Code, § 484d.
- Intent to Defraud. *People v. Pugh* (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 66, 72 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 770]; *People v. Gaul-Alexander* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 735, 745 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 176].
- Intent to Defraud Entity. Pen. Code, § 8.
- Alteration Defined. *People v. Nesseth* (1954) 127 Cal.App.2d 712, 718–720 [274 P.2d 479]; *People v. Hall* (1942) 55 Cal.App.2d 343, 352 [130 P.2d 733].
- Unanimity Instruction If Multiple Items. *People v. Sutherland* (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 602, 619, fn. 6 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 752].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Attempted Use of Access Card. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 484g.

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Revoked Access Card*

To prove that the defendant used a “revoked” access card, the prosecution must prove that written notice of the revocation was sent to the cardholder. (*People v. Whight* (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1143, 1150 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 163].)

See the Related Issues sections in CALCRIM No. 1900, *Forgery by False Signature*, and CALCRIM No. 1950, *Sale or Transfer of Access Card or Account Number*.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property, § 218.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.02[2][a][i] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 143, *Crimes Against Property*, §§ 143.01[2][c], 143.04[1], [2] (Matthew Bender).

**1957. Obtaining Money, etc., by Representing Self as Holder of  
Access Card (Pen. Code, § 484g(b))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with obtaining something of value by fraudulently representing (himself/herself) as the holder of an access card [in violation of Penal Code section 484g(b)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant obtained (money[,]/ [or] goods[,]/ [or] services[,]/ [or] something [else] of value) by representing that (he/she) was the holder of an access card;
2. The access card had not, in fact, been issued;
3. The defendant obtained (money[,]/ [or] goods[,]/ [or] services[,]/ [or] something [else] of value) without the consent of the cardholder;

AND

4. When the defendant obtained (money[,]/ [or] goods[,]/ [or] services[,]/ [or] something [else] of value), (he/she) intended to defraud.

An *access card* is a card, plate, code, account number, or other means of account access that can be used, alone or with another access card, to obtain (money[,]/ [or] goods[,]/ [or] services[,]/ [or] anything of value), or that can be used to begin a transfer of funds[, other than a transfer originated solely by a paper document].

[(A/An) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description, e.g., ATM card, credit card> is an access card.]

A *cardholder* is someone who has been issued an access card [or who has agreed with a card issuer to pay debts arising from the issuance of an access card to someone else].

A *card issuer* is a company [or person] [or the agent of a company or person] that issues an access card to a cardholder.

Someone *intends to defraud* if he or she intends to deceive another person either to cause a loss of (money[,]/ [or] goods[,]/ [or] services[,]/ [or] something [else] of value), or to cause damage to, a legal, financial, or property right.

[For the purpose of this instruction, a *person* includes (a governmental agency/a corporation/a business/an association/the body politic).]

[It is not necessary that anyone actually be defrauded or actually suffer

**a financial, legal, or property loss as a result of the defendant’s acts.]**

**[If you find the defendant guilty of obtaining money by access card, you must then decide whether the value of the (money[,]/ [or] goods[,]/ [or] services[,]/ [or] something [else] of value) obtained in any 6-month period was more than \$950. If you have a reasonable doubt whether the value of the (money[,]/ [or] goods[,]/ [or] services[,]/ [or] something [else] of value) was more than \$950, you must find this allegation has not been proved.]**

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2015*

## **BENCH NOTES**

### ***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

In the definition of “access card,” the court may give the bracketed portion that begins with “other than a transfer” at its discretion. This statement is included in the statutory definition of access card. (Pen. Code, § 484d(2).) However, the committee believes it would rarely be relevant.

The court may also give the bracketed sentence stating “(A/An) \_\_\_\_\_ is an access card” if the parties agree on that point.

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “For the purpose of this instruction” if the evidence shows an intent to defraud an entity or association rather than a natural person. (Pen. Code, § 8.)

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “It is not necessary” if the evidence shows that the defendant did not succeed in defrauding anyone. (*People v. Morgan* (1956) 140 Cal.App.2d 796, 801 [296 P.2d 75].)

When the People allege the defendant has a prior conviction for an offense listed in Penal Code section 667(e)(2)(C)(iv) or for an offense requiring registration pursuant to subdivision (c) of section 290, give CALCRIM No. 3100, *Prior Conviction: Nonbifurcated Trial* or CALCRIM No. 3101, *Prior Conviction: Bifurcated Trial*.

## **AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 484g(b).
- Definitions. Pen. Code, § 484d.
- Intent to Defraud. *People v. Pugh* (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 66, 72 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 770]; *People v. Gaul-Alexander* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 735, 745 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 176].
- Intent to Defraud Entity. Pen. Code, § 8.

## **COMMENTARY**

The committee has written this instruction based on the language of the statute,

Penal Code section 484g(b). However, the committee notes that the requirements of the statute appear to be internally inconsistent.

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Attempted Use of Access Card. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 484g.

### RELATED ISSUES

See the Related Issues sections in CALCRIM No. 1900, *Forgery by False Signature*, and CALCRIM No. 1950, *Sale or Transfer of Access Card or Account Number*.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property, § 218.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 143, *Crimes Against Property*, § 143.01[2][c] (Matthew Bender).

**1958–1969. Reserved for Future Use**





## C. CHECK WITH INSUFFICIENT FUNDS

### 1970. Making, Using, etc., Check Knowing Funds Insufficient (Pen. Code, § 476a)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with (making[,]/ [or] drawing[,]/ [or] delivering[,]/ [or] using[,]/ [or] attempting to use) (a/an) (check[,]/ [or] draft[,]/ [or] order) knowing that there were insufficient funds for payment of the (check[,]/ [or] draft[,]/ [or] order) [in violation of Penal Code section 476a].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant willfully (made[,]/ [or] drew[,]/ [or] delivered[,]/ [or] used[,]/ [or] attempted to use) (a/an) (check[,]/ [or] draft[,]/ [or] order) on a (bank or depository[,]/ [or] person[,]/ [or] firm[,]/ [or] corporation) for the payment of money;
2. The defendant acted (for (himself/herself)[,]/ [or] as an agent or representative of someone else[,]/ [or] as an officer of a corporation);
3. When the defendant (made[,]/ [or] drew[,]/ [or] delivered[,]/ [or] used[,]/ [or] attempted to use) the (check[,]/ [or] draft[,]/ [or] order), there (were/was) insufficient (funds in/ [or] credit with) the (bank or depository[,]/ [or] person[,]/ [or] firm[,]/ [or] corporation) to cover full payment of the (check[,]/ [or] draft[,]/ [or] order) and all other outstanding (checks[,]/ [or] drafts[,]/ [or] orders) on that account;
4. The defendant knew that there (were/was) insufficient (funds/ [or] credit) available in that account;

AND

5. When the defendant (made[,]/ [or] drew[,]/ [or] delivered[,]/ [or] used[,]/ [or] attempted to use) the (check[,]/ [or] draft[,]/ [or] order), (he/she) intended to defraud.

(A/An) (*check[,]/ [or] draft[,]/ [or] order*) is a written document directing a (bank or depository[,]/ [or] person[,]/ [or] firm[,]/ [or] corporation) to pay the indicated amount to a person named as payee or to someone designated by that person.

A person *makes or draws* (a/an) (check[,]/ [or] draft[,]/ [or] order) when he or she writes it [or causes it to be written] and signs it to authorize payment.

[*Credit*, as used here, is an arrangement or understanding with a (bank or depository[,]/ [or] person[,]/ [or] firm[,]/ [or] corporation) for payment of money authorized by (check[,]/ [or] draft[,]/ [or] order).]

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose.

Someone *intends to defraud* if he or she intends to deceive another person either to cause a loss of (money[,]/ [or] goods[,]/ [or] services[,]/ [or] something [else] of value), or to cause damage to, a legal, financial, or property right.

[For the purpose of this instruction, a *person* includes (a governmental agency/a corporation/a business/an association/the body politic).]

[It is not necessary that anyone actually be defrauded or actually suffer a financial, legal, or property loss as a result of the defendant's acts.]

[A person (*uses/ [or] attempts to use*) (a/an) (check[,]/ [or] draft[,]/ [or] order) if he or she represents to someone that the instrument is genuine. The representation may be made by words or conduct and may be either direct or indirect.]

[The People allege that the defendant (made[,]/ [or] drew[,]/ [or] delivered[,]/ [or] used[,]/ [or] attempted to use) the following items:  
\_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of each instrument when multiple items alleged>.

You may not find the defendant guilty unless you all agree that the People have proved that the defendant (made[,]/ [or] drew[,]/ [or] delivered[,]/ [or] used[,]/ [or] attempted to use) at least one of these items and you all agree on which item (he/she) (made[,]/ [or] drew[,]/ [or] delivered[,]/ [or] used[,]/ [or] attempted to use).]

[If you find the defendant guilty of (making[,]/ [or] drawing[,]/ [or] delivering[,]/ [or] using[,]/ [or] attempting to use) (a/an) (check[,]/ [or] draft[,]/ [or] order) knowing that there were insufficient funds for payment of the (check[,]/ [or] draft[,]/ [or] order) you must also determine whether the defendant was previously convicted of \_\_\_\_\_  
<insert at least three theft crimes specified in Penal Code section 476a(b)>.]

<Defense: Reasonable Expectation of Payment>

[Even if the defendant (made[,]/ [or] drew[,]/ [or] delivered[,]/ [or] used[,]/ [or] attempted to use) (a/an) (check[,]/ draft[,]/ [or] order) knowing that there were insufficient funds for payment of the (check[,]/ draft[,]/ [or] order), the defendant did not intend to defraud if, at the time (he/she) acted, (he/she) reasonably and actually believed that the (check[,]/ draft[,]/ [or] order) would be paid by the (bank or depository[,]/ [or] person[,]/ [or] firm[,]/ [or] corporation) when presented for payment.

The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that

**the defendant intended to defraud. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of this crime.]**

*<Defense: Defendant Informed Payee About Insufficient Funds>*

**[If, when the defendant (made[,]/ [or] drew[,]/ [or] delivered[,]/ [or] used[,]/ [or] attempted to use) the (check[,]/ draft[,]/ [or] order), (he/she) told the person designated to receive payment on the (check[,]/ draft[,]/ [or] order) that there were insufficient funds to allow the (check[,]/ draft[,]/ [or] order) to be paid, then the defendant is not guilty of this crime.**

**The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that when the defendant (made[,]/ [or] drew[,]/ [or] delivered[,]/ [or] used[,]/ [or] attempted to use) the (check[,]/ draft[,]/ [or] order), (he/she) did not tell the person designated to receive payment that there were insufficient funds to allow the (check[,]/ draft[,]/ [or] order) to be paid. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of this crime.]**

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2015*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If the prosecution alleges under a single count that the defendant made or used multiple checks, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on unanimity. (See *People v. Sutherland* (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 602, 619, fn. 6 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 752].) Give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “The People allege that the defendant,” inserting the items alleged. (See also Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 3500, *Unanimity*, discussing when instruction on unanimity is and is not required.)

*People v. Pugh* (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 66, 72 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 770], defines the term “utter” as to “use” or “attempt to use” an instrument. The committee has omitted the unfamiliar term “utter” in favor of the more familiar terms “use” and “attempt to use.”

If the prosecution alleges that the defendant made or attempted to use, etc., more than \$950 in checks, give CALCRIM No. 1971, *Making, Using, etc., Check Knowing Funds Insufficient: Total Value of Checks*. If the prosecution alleges that the defendant has a prior forgery-related conviction, give CALCRIM No. 3100, *Prior Conviction: Nonbifurcated Trial*.

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “For the purpose of this instruction” if the evidence shows an intent to defraud an entity or association rather than a natural person. (Pen. Code, § 8.)

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “It is not necessary” if the evidence

shows that the defendant did not succeed in defrauding anyone. (*People v. Morgan* (1956) 140 Cal.App.2d 796, 801 [296 P.2d 75].)

When the People allege the defendant has a prior conviction for an offense listed in Penal Code section 667(e)(2)(C)(iv) or for an offense requiring registration pursuant to subdivision (c) of section 290, give CALCRIM No. 3100, *Prior Conviction: Nonbifurcated Trial* or CALCRIM No. 3101, *Prior Conviction: Bifurcated Trial*.

### ***Defenses—Instructional Duty***

If there is sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt that the defendant expected the check to be paid, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give the bracketed option headed “Defense: Reasonable Expectation of Payment.” (*People v. Pugh* (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 66, 73 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 770].)

If there is sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt that the defendant informed the payee that there were insufficient funds to cash the check, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give the bracketed option headed “Defense: Defendant Informed Payee About Insufficient Funds.” (*People v. Poyet* (1972) 6 Cal.3d 530, 535–537 [99 Cal.Rptr. 758, 492 P.2d 1150]; *People v. Pugh, supra*, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 73.)

## **AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 476a.
- Intent to Defraud. *People v. Pugh* (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 66, 72 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 770]; *People v. Gaul-Alexander* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 735, 745 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 176].
- Intent to Defraud Entity. Pen. Code, § 8.
- Use or Attempt to Use. *People v. Pugh* (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 66, 73 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 770]; *People v. Jackson* (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 556, 561 [155 Cal.Rptr. 89], overruled on other grounds in *People v. Anderson* (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1122 [240 Cal.Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306].
- Informed Payee About Insufficient Funds. *People v. Poyet* (1972) 6 Cal.3d 530, 535–537 [99 Cal.Rptr. 758, 492 P.2d 1150]; *People v. Pugh* (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 66, 73 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 770].
- Reasonable Expectation of Payment. *People v. Pugh* (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 66, 73 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 770].
- Unanimity Instruction If Multiple Documents. *People v. Sutherland* (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 602, 619, fn. 6 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 752].

## **LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES**

This offense is a misdemeanor if the total amount of the checks does not exceed \$950, unless the defendant has been previously convicted of three specified theft offenses. (Pen. Code, § 476a(b).) If the defendant is charged with a felony, then the misdemeanor offense is a lesser included offense. The court must provide the jury with a verdict form on which the jury will indicate if the total amount of the checks exceeds \$950 or if the prior convictions have or have not been proved. If the jury

finds that the amount did not exceed \$950 or the prior convictions were not proved, then the offense should be set at a misdemeanor.

## RELATED ISSUES

### *Multiple Checks Totaling Over \$950—Number of Counts*

Under Penal Code section 476a(b), the offense is a felony-misdemeanor if the total amount of the checks made or issued exceeds \$950. In general, the prosecution may charge a separate count for each check. However, if the individual checks do not meet the statutory amount and the offense is charged as a felony based only on the aggregate value, the prosecution can only charge a single felony count covering all of the checks that total more than \$950. (*In re Watkins* (1966) 64 Cal.2d 866, 868–869 [51 Cal.Rptr. 917, 415 P.2d 805].) If, on the other hand, the defendant is charged with felony offenses based on a prior forgery-related conviction, the prosecution may charge each check as a separate felony count. (*People v. Pettit* (1964) 230 Cal.App.2d 397, 398 [41 Cal.Rptr. 42].)

### *Grand Theft*

A defendant who uses a check with insufficient funds to obtain property may be charged under either Penal Code section 476a or section 487, or both. (*People v. Martin* (1962) 208 Cal.App.2d 867, 876–878 [25 Cal.Rptr. 610].) However, the defendant may not be sentenced on both charges for the same conduct. (*Ibid.*; Pen. Code, § 654.)

### *Return of Property*

Two cases have held that the defendant may present evidence that he or she returned some or all of the property in an effort to demonstrate that he or she did not originally intend to defraud. (*People v. Katzman* (1968) 258 Cal.App.2d 777, 790 [66 Cal.Rptr. 319], disapproved on other grounds in *Rhinehart v. Municipal Court* (1984) 35 Cal.3d 772, 780, fn. 11 [200 Cal.Rptr.916, 677 P.2d 1206]; *People v. Braver* (1964) 229 Cal.App.2d 303, 307–308 [40 Cal.Rptr. 142].) However, other cases have held that, based on the facts of the particular cases, such evidence was not admissible. (*People v. Parker* (1970) 11 Cal.App.3d 500, 510 [89 Cal.Rptr. 815] [evidence of defendant's offer to repay following arrest not relevant]; *People v. Wing* (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 197, 202 [107 Cal.Rptr. 836] [evidence of restitution not relevant where defendant falsely signed the name of another to a check knowing he had no authority to do so].) If such evidence is presented, the court may give CALCRIM No. 1862, *Return of Property Not a Defense to Theft*. (*People v. Katzman, supra*, 258 Cal.App.2d at p. 791.) In addition, in *People v. Katzman, supra*, 258 Cal.App.2d at p. 792, the court held that, on request, the defense may be entitled to a pinpoint instruction that evidence of restitution may be relevant to determining if the defendant intended to defraud. If the court concludes that such an instruction is appropriate, the court may add the following to the beginning of CALCRIM No. 1862:

If the defendant returned or offered to return [some or all of] the property obtained, that conduct may show (he/she) did not intend to defraud. If you conclude that the defendant returned or offered to return [some or all of] the

property, it is up to you to decide the meaning and importance of that conduct.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property, §§ 180–187.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.02[2][a][i] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 143, *Crimes Against Property*, § 143.01[1], [3] (Matthew Bender).

**1971. Making, Using, etc., Check Knowing Funds Insufficient:  
Total Value of Checks (Pen. Code, § 476a(b))**

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**If you find the defendant guilty of (making[,]/ [or] drawing[,]/ [or] delivering[,]/ [or] using[,]/ [or] attempting to use) (a/an) (check[,]/ draft[,]/ [or] order) knowing that there were insufficient funds to cover it, you must then decide whether the People have proved either of the following:**

- 1. That at least one (check[,]/ draft[,]/ [or] order) that the defendant (made[,]/ [or] drew[,]/ [or] delivered[,]/ [or] used[,]/ [or] attempted to use) knowing that there were insufficient funds to cover it was for more than \$950;**

**OR**

- 2. That the total value of the (checks[,]/ [or] drafts[,]/ [or] orders) charged in Count \_\_\_\_\_ that the defendant (made[,]/ [or] drew[,]/ [or] delivered[,]/ [or] used[,]/ [or] attempted to use) knowing that there were insufficient funds to cover them was more than \$950.**

**The People have the burden of proving this allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you must find that this allegation has not been proved.**

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2015*

**BENCH NOTES**

***Instructional Duty***

If the defendant is charged with a felony based on the value of the checks, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on this sentencing factor.

This instruction **must** be given with the appropriate instruction on the other elements of the offense, CALCRIM No. 1970, *Making, Using, etc., Check Knowing Funds Insufficient*.

The court must provide the jury with a verdict form on which the jury will indicate whether the prosecution has or has not been proved that the value of the checks exceeds \$950. (See Penal Code § 476a(b).)

**AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 476a(b).

## RELATED ISSUES

### *Multiple Checks Totaling Over \$950—Number of Counts*

Under Penal Code section 476a(b), the offense is a felony-misdemeanor if the total amount of the checks made or issued exceeds \$950. In general, the prosecution may charge a separate count for each check. However, if the individual checks do not meet the statutory amount and the offense is charged as a felony based only on the aggregate value, the prosecution can only charge a single felony count covering all of the checks that total more than \$950. (*In re Watkins* (1966) 64 Cal.2d 866, 868–869 [51 Cal.Rptr. 917, 415 P.2d 805].) If, on the other hand, the defendant is charged with felony offenses based on a prior forgery-related conviction, the prosecution may charge each separate check as a separate felony count. (*People v. Pettit* (1964) 230 Cal.App.2d 397, 398 [41 Cal.Rptr. 42].)

## SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property, § 180.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 143, *Crimes Against Property*, § 143.04[3] (Matthew Bender).

**1972–1999. Reserved for Future Use**



## D. INSURANCE FRAUD

### 2000. Insurance Fraud: Fraudulent Claims (Pen. Code, § 550(a)(1), (4)–(7) & (9))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with insurance fraud committed by fraudulent claim [in violation of Penal Code section 550(a)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that the defendant knowingly committed the following crime[s] [[or] [aided and abetted] [or] [solicited] [or] [conspired with someone else] to commit (it/them)]:

*<Alternative 1A—presented fraudulent claim>*

- [1. The defendant (presented/ [or] caused to be presented) a false or fraudulent claim for payment for a loss or injury;]

*<Alternative 1B—presented fraudulent claim for vehicle theft or damage>*

- [1. The defendant falsely or fraudulently claimed payment for a loss due to (theft[,]/ [or] destruction[,]/ [or] damage[,]/ [or] conversion) of (a motor vehicle[,]/ [or] a motor vehicle part[,]/ [or] contents of a motor vehicle);]

*<Alternative 1C—writing to be used for fraudulent claim>*

- [1. The defendant (prepared[,]/ [or] made[,]/ [or] signed or subscribed) a document with the intent to (present or use it/ [or] allow it to be presented) to support a false or fraudulent claim;]

*<Alternative 1D—made fraudulent claim for health-care benefits>*

- [1. The defendant (made/ [or] caused to be made) a false or fraudulent claim for payment of a health-care benefit;]

*<Alternative 1E—submitted claim for health-care benefit not used>*

- [1. The defendant presented a claim for a health-care benefit that was not used by [or on behalf of] the person named in the claim;]

*<Alternative 1F—presented claim for health-care benefit undercharges>*

- [1. The defendant claimed payment for undercharges for health-care benefits for a specific person without presenting for reconciliation, at that same time, any known overcharges for benefits for the same person;]

2. The defendant knew that the claim was false or fraudulent;

AND

3. When the defendant did that act, (he/she) intended to defraud.

Someone *intends to defraud* if he or she intends to deceive another person either to cause a loss of (money[,]/ [or] goods[,]/ [or] services[,]/ [or] something [else] of value), or to cause damage to, a legal, financial, or property right.

[For the purpose of this instruction, a *person* includes (a governmental agency/a corporation/a business/an association/the body politic).]

[It is not necessary that anyone actually be defrauded or actually suffer a financial, legal, or property loss as a result of the defendant's acts.]

A person *claims, makes, or presents a claim for payment* by requesting payment under a contract of insurance for (a/an) ((loss/ [or] injury)/ health-care benefit).

[A *claim for payment of a health-care benefit* includes a claim submitted by or on behalf of the provider of a workers' compensation health benefit defined in the Labor Code.]

[*Conversion of property* means interfering with someone else's property, without authorization or justification, and depriving the owner of use and possession of the property.]

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2012, August 2016*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If the prosecution alleges under a single count that the defendant presented or caused to be presented multiple claims or made multiple documents in support of a fraudulent claim, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on unanimity. (See *People v. Dieguez* (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 266, 274–275 [107 Cal.Rptr.2d 160].) However, where the evidence shows a “continuous course of conduct,” a unanimity instruction is not required. (*Id.* at p. 275.) If the court concludes that a unanimity instruction is required, give CALCRIM No. 3500, *Unanimity*.

If the prosecution proceeds on a theory of aiding and abetting, soliciting, or conspiracy, give appropriate instructions for those theories.

In element 1, give alternative 1A if the prosecution alleges a violation of Penal Code section 550(a)(1). Give alternative 1B if the prosecution alleges a violation of Penal Code section 550(a)(4). Give alternative 1C if the prosecution alleges a

violation of Penal Code section 550(a)(5). Give alternative 1D if the prosecution alleges a violation of Penal Code section 550(a)(6). Give alternative 1E if the prosecution alleges a violation of Penal Code section 550(a)(7). Give alternative 1F if the prosecution alleges a violation of Penal Code section 550(a)(9).

If a violation of Penal Code section 550(a)(2) or (8) is alleged, give CALCRIM No. 2001, *Insurance Fraud: Multiple Claims*. If a violation of Penal Code section 550(a)(3) is alleged, give CALCRIM No. 2002, *Insurance Fraud: Vehicle Accident*.

If the defendant is charged with a felony violation of Penal Code section 550(a)(6), (7), or (9), give CALCRIM No. 2003, *Insurance Fraud: Health-Care Claims—Total Value*.

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “For the purpose of this instruction” if the evidence shows an intent to defraud an entity or association rather than a natural person. (Pen. Code, § 8.)

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “It is not necessary” if the evidence shows that the defendant did not succeed in defrauding anyone.

### ***Related Instructions***

See generally CALCRIM No. 400, *Aiding and Abetting: General Principles* and CALCRIM No. 401, *Aiding and Abetting: Intended Crimes*.

CALCRIM No. 415, *Conspiracy*

CALCRIM No. 441, *Solicitation: Elements*

CALCRIM No. 2001, *Insurance Fraud: Multiple Claims*.

CALCRIM No. 2002, *Insurance Fraud: Vehicle Accident*.

CALCRIM No. 2003, *Insurance Fraud: Health-Care Claims—Total Value*.

## **AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 550(a)(1), (4), (5), (6), (7) & (9).
- Intent to Defraud Element of Offense. *People v. Scofield* (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 1018, 1025–1026 [95 Cal.Rptr. 405]; *People v. Benson* (1962) 206 Cal.App.2d 519, 529 [23 Cal.Rptr. 908], overruled on other grounds in *People v. Perez* (1965) 62 Cal.2d 769, 776, fn. 2 [44 Cal.Rptr. 326, 401 P.2d 934].
- Intent to Defraud—Defined. *People v. Pugh* (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 66, 72 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 770]; *People v. Gaul-Alexander* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 735, 745 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 176].
- Intent to Defraud Entity. Pen. Code, § 8.
- Unanimity Instruction. *People v. Dieguez* (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 266, 274–275 [107 Cal.Rptr.2d 160].

## **LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES**

Fraudulent claims for health-care benefits, under Penal Code section 550(a)(6) to (9), are misdemeanors if the total amount of the claims does not exceed \$950. (Pen. Code, § 550(c)(2).) If the defendant is charged with a felony, then the misdemeanor

offense is a lesser included offense. The court must provide the jury with a verdict form on which the jury will indicate if the total amount of the claims exceeds \$950. If the jury finds that the amount does not exceed \$950, then the offense should be set at a misdemeanor.

## RELATED ISSUES

### *Writing to Be Used for Fraudulent Claim*

Penal Code section 550(a)(5) makes it a felony to “[k]nowingly prepare, make, or subscribe any writing, with the intent to present or use it, or to allow it to be presented, in support of any false or fraudulent claim.” “Under this section, the writing required need not be false or fraudulent as long as it is intended to be presented or used in support of any false or fraudulent claim.” (*People v. Zelver* (1955) 135 Cal.App.2d 226, 235 [287 P.2d 183].) In addition, “[i]t need not be shown that defendant himself executed the false instrument if there is proof that he procured its execution or aided and abetted another in doing so.” (*People v. Singh* (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1343, 1376 [44 Cal.Rptr.2d 644].)

### *Liability of Care Provider*

A doctor or other care provider who prepares false documents for a fraudulent insurance claim may be prosecuted under Penal Code section 550(a)(1) for “causing the presentation of a fraudulent claim,” even though another person actually presents the claim. (*People v. Singh* (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1343, 1369–1370 [44 Cal.Rptr.2d 644].) Alternatively, the care provider may be prosecuted under Penal Code section 550(a)(5), discussed above. (*Ibid.*)

## SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property, §§ 222, 224.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 143, *Crimes Against Property*, § 143.01[1][f] (Matthew Bender).

**2001. Insurance Fraud: Multiple Claims (Pen. Code, § 550(a)(2) & (8))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with submitting multiple insurance claims with intent to defraud [in violation of Penal Code section 550(a)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant presented two or more claims for (the same (loss/ [or] injury)/payment of the same health-care benefit) to (the same/ [or] more than one) insurer;
2. The defendant knew that (he/she) was submitting two or more claims for the same ((loss/ [or] injury)/health-care benefit);

**AND**

3. When the defendant presented the claims, (he/she) intended to defraud.

Someone *intends to defraud* if he or she intends to deceive another person either to cause a loss of (money[,]/ [or] goods[,]/ [or] services[,]/ [or] something [else] of value), or to cause damage to, a legal, financial, or property right.

[For the purpose of this instruction, a *person* includes (a governmental agency/a corporation/a business/an association/the body politic).]

[It is not necessary that anyone actually be defrauded or actually suffer a financial, legal, or property loss as a result of the defendant's acts.]

A person *presents a claim for payment* by demanding payment under a contract of insurance for (a/an) ((loss/ [or] injury)/ health-care benefit).

[A *claim for payment of a health-care benefit* includes a claim submitted by or on behalf of the provider of a workers' compensation health benefit defined in the Labor Code.]

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2012*

**BENCH NOTES**

***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime. Use this instruction if a violation of Penal Code section 550(a)(2) or (8) is alleged.

If the defendant is charged with a felony violation of Penal Code section 550(a)(8),

give CALCRIM No. 2003, *Insurance Fraud: Health-Care Claims—Total Value*, with this instruction.

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “For the purpose of this instruction” if the evidence shows an intent to defraud an entity or association rather than a natural person. (Pen. Code, § 8.)

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “It is not necessary” if the evidence shows that the defendant did not succeed in defrauding anyone.

### ***Related Instructions***

CALCRIM No. 2000, *Insurance Fraud: Fraudulent Claims*.

CALCRIM No. 2002, *Insurance Fraud: Vehicle Accident*.

CALCRIM No. 2003, *Insurance Fraud: Health-Care Claims—Total Value*.

## **AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 550(a)(2) & (8).
- Intent to Defraud Element of Offense. *People v. Scofield* (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 1018, 1025–1026 [95 Cal.Rptr. 405]; *People v. Benson* (1962) 206 Cal.App.2d 519, 529 [23 Cal.Rptr. 908], overruled on other grounds in *People v. Perez* (1965) 62 Cal.2d 769, 776, fn. 2 [44 Cal.Rptr. 326, 401 P.2d 934].
- Intent to Defraud—Defined. *People v. Pugh* (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 66, 72 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 770]; *People v. Gaul-Alexander* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 735, 745 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 176].
- Intent to Defraud Entity. Pen. Code, § 8.

## **LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES**

Fraudulent claims for health-care benefits, under Penal Code section 550(a)(6) to (9), are misdemeanors if the total amount of the claims does not exceed \$950. (Pen. Code, § 550(c)(2).) If the defendant is charged with a felony, then the misdemeanor offense is a lesser included offense. The court must provide the jury with a verdict form on which the jury will indicate if the total amount of the claims exceeds \$950. If the jury finds that the amount does not exceed \$950, then the offense should be set at a misdemeanor.

## **SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property, §§ 222, 224.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 143, *Crimes Against Property*, § 143.01[1][f] (Matthew Bender).

## 2002. Insurance Fraud: Vehicle Accident (Pen. Code, § 550(a)(3))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with insurance fraud in connection with a vehicle accident [in violation of Penal Code section 550(a)(3)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant caused or participated in a vehicle accident;
2. The defendant knew that the purpose of the accident was to present a false or fraudulent insurance claim;

AND

3. When the defendant caused or participated in the accident, (he/ she) intended to defraud.

Someone *intends to defraud* if he or she intends to deceive another person either to cause a loss of (money[,]/ [or] goods[,]/ [or] services[,]/ [or] something [else] of value), or to cause damage to, a legal, financial, or property right.

[For the purpose of this instruction, a *person* includes (a governmental agency/a corporation/a business/an association/the body politic).]

[It is not necessary that anyone actually be defrauded or actually suffer a financial, legal, or property loss as a result of the defendant's acts.]

A person *presents a claim* by demanding payment under a contract of insurance for (a/an) ((loss/ [or] injury)/health-care benefit).

[A person *causes an accident* if the accident is the direct, natural, and probable consequence of the person's action and the accident would not have happened without the act. A *natural and probable consequence* is one that a reasonable person would know is likely to happen if nothing unusual intervenes. In deciding whether a consequence is natural and probable, consider all the circumstances established by the evidence.]

[There may be more than one cause of an accident. An act causes an accident only if it is a substantial factor in causing the accident. A *substantial factor* is more than a trivial or remote factor. However, it need not be the only factor that causes the accident.]

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*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime. Use this instruction if a violation of Penal Code section 550(a)(3) is alleged.

If causation is at issue, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on proximate cause. (*People v. Bernhardt* (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 567, 590–591 [35 Cal.Rptr. 401].) If the evidence indicates that there was only one cause of the accident, the court should give the “direct, natural, and probable” language in the first bracketed paragraph on causation. If there is evidence of multiple causes of the accident, the court should also give the “substantial factor” instruction in the second bracketed paragraph on causation. (See *People v. Autry* (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 363 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 135]; *People v. Pike* (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 732, 746–747 [243 Cal.Rptr. 54].)

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “For the purpose of this instruction” if the evidence shows an intent to defraud an entity or association rather than a natural person. (Pen. Code, § 8.)

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “It is not necessary” if the evidence shows that the defendant did not succeed in defrauding anyone.

### ***Related Instructions***

CALCRIM No. 2000, *Insurance Fraud: Fraudulent Claims*.

CALCRIM No. 2001, *Insurance Fraud: Multiple Claims*.

CALCRIM No. 2003, *Insurance Fraud: Health-Care Claims—Total Value*.

## **AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 550(a)(3).
- Intent to Defraud Element of Offense. *People v. Scofield* (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 1018, 1025–1026 [95 Cal.Rptr. 405]; *People v. Benson* (1962) 206 Cal.App.2d 519, 529 [23 Cal.Rptr. 908], overruled on other grounds in *People v. Perez* (1965) 62 Cal.2d 769, 776, fn. 2 [44 Cal.Rptr. 326, 401 P.2d 934].
- Intent to Defraud—Defined. *People v. Pugh* (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 66, 72 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 770]; *People v. Gaul-Alexander* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 735, 745 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 176].
- Intent to Defraud Entity. Pen. Code, § 8.

## **SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property, § 222.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 140, *Challenges to Crimes*, § 140.04, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.02[2][c], Ch. 143, *Crimes Against Property*, § 143.01[1][f] (Matthew Bender).



## 2003. Insurance Fraud: Health-Care Claims—Total Value (Pen. Code, § 550(c)(2))

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**If you find the defendant guilty of insurance fraud in connection with health-care claims, you must then decide whether the People have proved that the total value of the (claim[s] involved/ [or] amount at issue) was more than \$950 [within a period of 12 consecutive months].**

**The People have the burden of proving this allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you must find that this allegation has not been proved.**

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2012*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

If the defendant is charged with a felony based on the total value of the claims, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on this element.

This instruction **must** be given with the appropriate instruction on the other elements of the offense, CALCRIM No. 2000, *Insurance Fraud: Fraudulent Claims*, CALCRIM No. 2001, *Insurance Fraud: Multiple Claims*, or CALCRIM No. 2002, *Insurance Fraud: Vehicle Accident*.

The court must provide the jury with a verdict form on which the jury will indicate if the prosecution has or has not proved that the total value of the claims exceeded \$950.

Give the bracketed “within a period of 12 consecutive months” if the facts show several claims filed over a period of time.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 550(c)(2).

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property, § 224.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 143, *Crimes Against Property*, § 143.01[1][a], [f], [i] (Matthew Bender).

## 2004. Insurance Fraud: Destruction of Insured Property (Pen. Code, § 548(a))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with (injuring[,]/ [or] destroying[,]/ [or] hiding[,]/ [or] abandoning[,]/ [or] disposing of) insured property with intent to defraud [in violation of Penal Code section 548(a)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant (injured[,]/ [or] destroyed[,]/ [or] hid[,]/ [or] abandoned[,]/ [or] disposed of) property that was insured against loss or damage from (theft[,]/ [or] embezzlement[,]/ [or] any casualty other than fire);

AND

2. When the defendant did that act, (he/she) intended to (defraud/ [or] prejudice) the insurer.

Someone *intends to defraud* if he or she intends to deceive another person either to cause a loss of (money[,]/ [or] goods[,]/ [or] services[,]/ [or] something [else] of value), or to cause damage to, a legal, financial, or property right.

[For the purpose of this instruction, a *person* includes (a governmental agency/a corporation/a business/an association/the body politic).]

[It is not necessary that anyone actually be defrauded or actually suffer a financial, legal, or property loss as a result of the defendant's acts.]

[It does not matter whether the defendant or someone else owned or possessed the property.]

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*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “For the purpose of this instruction” if the evidence shows an intent to defraud an entity or association rather than a natural person. (Pen. Code, § 8.)

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “It is not necessary” if the evidence shows that the defendant did not succeed in defrauding anyone.

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “It does not matter” if there is

evidence that someone else owned or possessed the property.

For arson, see the Arson series, CALCRIM No. 1500 et seq.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 548(a).
- Intent to Defraud. *People v. Pugh* (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 66, 72 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 770]; *People v. Gaul-Alexander* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 735, 745 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 176].
- Intent to Defraud Entity. Pen. Code, § 8.

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE

- Attempted Destruction or Disposal of Property. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 548; *People v. Splawn* (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 553, 559 [211 Cal.Rptr. 638].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Disposes Of*

“ ‘[D]isposes of’ in Penal Code section 548 requires a definite change of control [of the property].” (*People v. Splawn* (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 553, 558 [211 Cal.Rptr. 638].)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property, § 226.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 143, *Crimes Against Property*, §§ 143.01[1], 143.11[2] (Matthew Bender).

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## E. FALSE FINANCIAL STATEMENT

### 2020. False Financial Statement: Making False Statement (Pen. Code, § 532a(1))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with (making/ [or] causing to be made) a false written statement about (his/her/another person's/a corporation's) (financial condition[,]/ [or] means[,]/ [or] ability to pay) [in violation of Penal Code section 532a(1)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

*<Alternative 1A—statement made about defendant himself/herself>*

1. The defendant (made/ [or] caused to be made) a false written statement about (his/her) (financial condition[,]/ [or] means[,]/ [or] ability to pay);]

*<Alternative 1B—statement made about someone else or a corporation>*

1. The defendant (made/ [or] caused to be made) a false written statement about the (financial condition[,]/ [or] means[,]/ [or] ability to pay) of (another person/a firm or corporation (in which the defendant had an interest/ [or] for which the defendant was acting));]
2. The defendant knew that the statement was false;
3. When the defendant (made the statement/ [or] caused the statement to be made), (he/she) intended that the statement be relied on;

**AND**

4. The defendant (made the statement/ [or] caused the statement to be made) to obtain the (delivery of personal property[,]/ [or] payment of cash[,]/ [or] making of a loan[,]/ [or] extension of credit[,]/ [or] execution of a contract of guaranty or suretyship[,]/ [or] discount of an account receivable[,]/ [or] making, acceptance, discount, sale, or endorsement of a bill of exchange or promissory note) for ((his/her) benefit/the benefit of the (other person/ corporation)).

[A person may (make a false statement/ [or] cause a false statement to be made) either directly or indirectly, or through his or her agent. An *agent* is someone authorized by the defendant to act for (him/her) in dealings with third parties.]

[The People allege that the defendant (made/ [or] caused to be made) the

**following statements:** \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of each statement when multiple statements alleged>. **You may not find the defendant guilty unless you all agree that the People have proved that the defendant (made/ [or] caused to be made) at least one of these statements and that the statement was false. You must all agree on which false statement (he/ she) (made/ [or] caused to be made).**]

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*New January 2006*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If the prosecution alleges under a single count that the defendant made multiple false statements, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on unanimity. (See *People v. Sutherland* (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 602, 619, fn. 6 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 752]; *People v. Dieguez* (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 266, 274–275 [107 Cal.Rptr.2d 160].) However, where the evidence shows a “continuous course of conduct,” a unanimity instruction is not required. (*People v. Dieguez, supra*, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 275.) If the court concludes that a unanimity instruction is required, give the last bracketed paragraph, inserting the items alleged. (See also Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 3500, *Unanimity*, discussing when instruction on unanimity is and is not required.)

If the defendant is charged with a felony violation of Penal Code section 532a(1), give CALCRIM No. 2023, *False Financial Statement: Use of False Identifying Information*.

Give the penultimate bracketed paragraph if there is evidence that the defendant made or caused any statements to be made indirectly or through an agent.

### *Related Instructions*

CALCRIM No. 2021, *False Financial Statement: Obtaining Benefit*.

CALCRIM No. 2022, *False Financial Statement: Reaffirming Statement*.

CALCRIM No. 2023, *False Financial Statement: Use of False Identifying Information*.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 532a(1).
- Agent. Civ. Code, § 2295.
- Unanimity Instruction If Multiple Items. See *People v. Sutherland* (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 602, 619, fn. 6 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 752]; *People v. Dieguez* (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 266, 274–275 [107 Cal.Rptr.2d 160].

## LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

A violation of Penal Code section 532a is a misdemeanor unless the defendant used

“a fictitious name, social security number, business name, or business address, or . . . falsely represent[ed] himself or herself to be another person or another business.” (Pen. Code, § 532a(4).) If the defendant is charged with a felony, then the misdemeanor offense is a lesser included offense. The court must provide the jury with a verdict form on which the jury will indicate if this allegation has or has not been proved. If the jury finds that the allegation has not been proved, then the offense should be set at a misdemeanor.

## RELATED ISSUES

### *Misrepresentation of Identity Insufficient*

Penal Code section 532a “require[s] a false statement respecting ‘financial condition, or means or ability to pay.’ ” (*People v. Vincent* (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 696, 702–703 [23 Cal.Rptr.2d 714].) A statement in which the defendant misrepresents his or her identity or social security number is insufficient. (*Ibid.*)

### *Application for Credit Does Not Include Apartment Rental*

In *People v. Maguire* (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1022, 1029–1030 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 573], the court held that an application to rent an apartment containing false information was not covered by Penal Code section 532a.

## SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property, §§ 48–49.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.02[2][a][i] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 143, *Crimes Against Property*, § 143.01[1] (Matthew Bender).

**2021. False Financial Statement: Obtaining Benefit (Pen. Code, § 532a(2))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with obtaining a benefit using a false written statement about (his/her/another person's/a corporation's) (financial condition[,]/ [or] means[,]/ [or] ability to pay) [in violation of Penal Code section 532a(2)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

*<Alternative 1A—statement made about defendant himself/herself>*

- [1. The defendant knew that a false written statement had been made about (his/her) (financial condition[,]/ [or] means[,]/ [or] ability to pay);]

*<Alternative 1B—statement made about someone else or a corporation>*

- [1. The defendant knew that a false written statement had been made about the (financial condition[,]/ [or] means[,]/ [or] ability to pay) of (another person/a firm or corporation (in which the defendant had an interest/ [or] for which the defendant was acting));]

**AND**

2. The defendant obtained, for ((his/her) benefit/the benefit of the (other person/corporation)), the (delivery of personal property[,]/ [or] payment of cash[,]/ [or] making of a loan[,]/ [or] extension of credit[,]/ [or] execution of a contract of guaranty or suretyship[,]/ [or] discount of an account receivable[,]/ [or] making, acceptance, discount, sale, or endorsement of a bill of exchange or promissory note) by using the false written statement.

[The People allege that the defendant obtained the following benefits:

\_\_\_\_\_ *<insert description of each benefit when multiple benefits alleged>*. You may not find the defendant guilty unless you all agree that the People have proved that the defendant obtained at least one of these benefits and you all agree on which benefit (he/she) obtained.]

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*New January 2006*

**BENCH NOTES**

***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.



If the prosecution alleges under a single count that the defendant received multiple benefits, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on unanimity. (See *People v. Sutherland* (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 602, 619, fn. 6 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 752]; *People v. Dieguez* (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 266, 274–275 [107 Cal.Rptr.2d 160].) However, where the evidence shows a “continuous course of conduct,” a unanimity instruction is not required. (*People v. Dieguez, supra*, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 275.) If the court concludes that a unanimity instruction is required, give the last bracketed paragraph, inserting the items alleged. (See also Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 3500, *Unanimity*, discussing when instruction on unanimity is and is not required.)

If the defendant is charged with a felony violation of Penal Code section 532a(1), give CALCRIM No. 2023, *False Financial Statement: Use of False Identifying Information*.

### ***Related Instructions***

CALCRIM No. 2020, *False Financial Statement: Making False Statement*.

CALCRIM No. 2022, *False Financial Statement: Reaffirming Statement*.

CALCRIM No. 2023, *False Financial Statement: Use of False Identifying Information*.

## **AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 532a(2).
- Unanimity Instruction If Multiple Items. See *People v. Sutherland* (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 602, 619, fn. 6 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 752]; *People v. Dieguez* (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 266, 274–275 [107 Cal.Rptr.2d 160].

## **LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES**

A violation of Penal Code section 532a is a misdemeanor unless the defendant used “a fictitious name, social security number, business name, or business address, or . . . falsely represent[ed] himself or herself to be another person or another business.” (Pen. Code, § 532a(4).) If the defendant is charged with a felony, then the misdemeanor offense is a lesser included offense. The court must provide the jury with a verdict form on which the jury will indicate if this allegation has or has not been proved. If the jury finds that the allegation has not been proved, then the offense should be set at a misdemeanor.

## **RELATED ISSUES**

See the Related Issues section of the Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 2020, *False Financial Statement: Making False Statement*.

## **SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property, §§ 48–49.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.02[2][a][i] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 143, *Crimes Against Property*, § 143.01[1] (Matthew Bender).

**2022. False Financial Statement: Reaffirming Statement (Pen. Code, § 532a(3))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with representing in writing that a false written statement about (his/her/another person's/a corporation's) (financial condition[,]/ [or] means[,]/ [or] ability to pay) was true [in violation of Penal Code section 532a(3)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

*<Alternative 1A—statement made about defendant himself/herself>*

- [1. The defendant knew a written statement had been made about (his/her) (financial condition[,]/ [or] means[,]/ [or] ability to pay);]**

*<Alternative 1B—statement made about someone else or a corporation>*

- [1. The defendant knew a written statement had been made about the (financial condition[,]/ [or] means[,]/ [or] ability to pay) of (another person/a firm or corporation (in which the defendant had an interest/ [or] for which the defendant was acting));]**
- 2. After that first written statement had been made, the defendant made a second written statement representing that the contents of the first statement were true at the time of the second statement;**
- 3. The defendant knew that the contents of the first statement were not true at the time (he/she) made the second statement;**

**AND**

- 4. Based on the second statement, the defendant obtained the (delivery of personal property[,]/ [or] payment of cash[,]/ [or] making of a loan[,]/ [or] extension of credit[,]/ [or] execution of a contract of guaranty or suretyship[,]/ [or] discount of an account receivable[,]/ [or] making, acceptance, discount, sale, or endorsement of a bill of exchange or promissory note) for ((his/her) benefit/the benefit of the (other person/corporation)).**

**[The People allege that the defendant represented that the following statements were true: \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert descriptions when multiple statements alleged>*. You may not find the defendant guilty unless you all agree that the People have proved that the defendant represented that at least one of these statements was true while knowing that the statement was false. You must all agree on which false statement (he/she) represented to be true.]**

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If the prosecution alleges under a single count that the defendant represented as true multiple false statements, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on unanimity. (See *People v. Sutherland* (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 602, 619, fn. 6 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 752]; *People v. Dieguez* (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 266, 274–275 [107 Cal.Rptr.2d 160].) However, where the evidence shows a “continuous course of conduct,” a unanimity instruction is not required. (*People v. Dieguez, supra*, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 275.) If the court concludes that a unanimity instruction is required, give the last bracketed paragraph, inserting the items alleged. (See also Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 3500, *Unanimity*, discussing when instruction on unanimity is and is not required.)

If the defendant is charged with a felony violation of Penal Code section 532a(1), give CALCRIM No. 2023, *False Financial Statement: Use of False Identifying Information*.

### *Related Instructions*

CALCRIM No. 2020, *False Financial Statement: Making False Statement*.

CALCRIM No. 2021, *False Financial Statement: Obtaining Benefit*.

CALCRIM No. 2023, *False Financial Statement: Use of False Identifying Information*.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 532a(3).
- Unanimity Instruction If Multiple Items. See *People v. Sutherland* (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 602, 619, fn. 6 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 752].

## LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

A violation of Penal Code section 532a is a misdemeanor unless the defendant used “a fictitious name, social security number, business name, or business address, or . . . falsely represent[ed] himself or herself to be another person or another business.” (Pen. Code, § 532a(4).) If the defendant is charged with a felony, then the misdemeanor offense is a lesser included offense. The court must provide the jury with a verdict form on which the jury will indicate if this allegation has or has not been proved. If the jury finds that the allegation has not been proved, then the offense should be set at a misdemeanor.

## RELATED ISSUES

See the Related Issues section of the Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 2020, *False Financial Statement: Making False Statement*.

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property, §§ 8–49.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.02[2][a][i] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 143, *Crimes Against Property*, § 143.01[1] (Matthew Bender).

## 2023. False Financial Statement: Use of False Identifying Information (Pen. Code, § 532a(4))

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If you find the defendant guilty of ((making/ [or] causing to be made) a false written statement as charged in Count \_\_\_\_\_[,]/ [or] obtaining a benefit using a false written statement as charged in Count \_\_\_\_\_[,]/ [or] representing as true a false written statement as charged in Count \_\_\_\_\_), you must then decide whether the People have proved that the defendant used false identifying information.

<Alternative A—fictitious information>

[To prove this allegation, the People must prove that the defendant used a fictitious (name[,]/ [or] social security number[,]/ [or] business name[,]/ [or] business address).]

<Alternative B—represented self as someone else>

[To prove this allegation, the People must prove that the defendant falsely (represented that (he/she) was someone else/ [or] claimed that (he/she) represented a business when (he/she) did not).]

**The People have the burden of proving this allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you must find that this allegation has not been proved.**

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*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

If the defendant is charged with a felony based on using false identifying information, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on this sentencing factor.

This instruction **must** be given with the appropriate instruction on the other elements of the offense, CALCRIM Nos. 2020 to 2022.

The court must provide the jury with a verdict form on which the jury will indicate if the prosecution has or has not been proved that the defendant used false identifying information.

#### *Related Instructions*

CALCRIM No. 2020, *False Financial Statement: Making False Statement.*

CALCRIM No. 2021, *False Financial Statement: Obtaining Benefit.*

CALCRIM No. 2022, *False Financial Statement: Reaffirming Statement.*

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 532a(4).

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property, §§ 48–49.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 143, *Crimes Against Property*, § 143.01[1] (Matthew Bender).

**2024–2039. Reserved for Future Use**





## F. IDENTITY THEFT

### 2040. Unauthorized Use of Personal Identifying Information (Pen. Code, § 530.5(a))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with the unauthorized use of someone else's personal identifying information [in violation of Penal Code section 530.5(a)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant willfully obtained someone else's personal identifying information;
2. The defendant willfully used that information for an unlawful purpose;

AND

3. The defendant used the information without the consent of the person whose identifying information (he/she) was using.

*Personal identifying information* means \_\_\_\_\_ <insert relevant items from Pen. Code, § 530.55(b)> or an equivalent form of identification.

[As used here, *person* means a human being, whether living or dead, or a firm, association, organization, partnership, business trust, company, corporation, limited liability company, or public entity, or any other legal entity.]

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose.

An *unlawful purpose* includes unlawfully (obtaining/[or] attempting to obtain) (credit[,]/[or] goods[,]/[or] services[,]/[or] real property[,]/ [or] medical information)/ [or] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert other unlawful purpose>) without the consent of the other person.

It is not necessary that anyone actually be defrauded or actually suffer a financial, legal, or property loss as a result of the defendant's acts.

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2006, June 2007, August 2009, April 2010, August 2012, August 2013*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

In the definition of personal identifying information, give the relevant items based on the evidence presented.

The definition of unlawful purpose is not limited to acquiring information for financial motives, and may include any unlawful purpose for which the defendant may have acquired the personal identifying information, such as using the information to facilitate violation of a restraining order. (*See, e.g., People v. Tillotson* (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 517, 533 [69 Cal.Rptr.3d 42].)

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 530.5(a).
- Personal Identifying Information Defined. Pen. Code, § 530.55(b).
- Person Defined. Pen. Code, § 530.55(a).
- No Personation Requirement. *People v. Barba* (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 214, 223–224 [149 Cal.Rptr.3d 371].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property, §§ 210, 212.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 143, *Crimes Against Property*, § 143.01[1], [4][h] (Matthew Bender).

**2041. Fraudulent Possession of Personal Identifying Information  
(Pen. Code, § 530.5(c)(1), (2), or (3))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with the fraudulent possession of personal identifying information [with a prior conviction for the same offense][in violation of Penal Code section 530.5(c)((1)/(2)/(3))].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant acquired or kept the personal identifying information of (another person/ten or more other persons);

[AND]

2. The defendant did so with the intent to defraud another person(;

*<Give paragraph 3 if defendant is charged with having a prior conviction and has not stipulated to that conviction.>*

[AND]

3. The defendant has a prior conviction for \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert prior conviction suffered pursuant to Penal Code section 530.5>.*

A person intends to *defraud* if he or she intends to deceive another person in order to cause a loss of (money[,]/ [or] goods[,]/ [or] services[,], [or] something [else] of value), or to cause damage to a legal, financial, or property right.

*Personal identifying information* means \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert relevant items from Pen. Code, § 530.55(b)>* or an equivalent form of identification.

[As used here, *person* means a human being, whether living or dead, or a firm, association, organization, partnership, business trust, company, corporation, limited liability company, public entity or any other legal entity.]

It is not necessary that anyone actually be defrauded or actually suffer a financial, legal, or property loss as a result of the defendant's acts.

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*New August 2009; Revised April 2010*

**BENCH NOTES**

***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “As used here” if the evidence shows an intent to defraud an entity or association rather than a natural person. (Pen. Code, § 8.)

In the definition of personal identifying information, give the relevant items based on the evidence presented.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 530.5(c).
- Personal Identifying Information Defined. Pen. Code, § 530.55(b).
- Person Defined. Pen. Code, § 530.55(a).
- Intent to Defraud—Defined. *People v. Pugh* (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 66, 72 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 770]; *People v. Gaul-Alexander* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 735, 745 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 176].
- Intent to Defraud Entity. Pen. Code, § 8.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property, §§ 212–214.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 143, *Crimes Against Property*, § 143.01 (Matthew Bender).

## 2042. Fraudulent Sale, Transfer or Conveyance of Personal Identifying Information (Pen. Code, § 530.5(d)(1))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with the fraudulent (sale/ [or] transfer/ [or] conveyance) of personal identifying information [in violation of Penal Code section 530.5(d)(1)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant (sold/ [or] transferred/ [or] conveyed) the personal identifying information of another person;

AND

2. The defendant did so with the intent to defraud.

A person intends to *defraud* if he or she intends to deceive another person either to cause a loss of (money[,]/ [or] goods[,]/ [or] services[,]) [or] something [else] of value), or to cause damage to a legal, financial, or property right.

*Personal identifying information* means \_\_\_\_\_ <insert relevant items from Pen. Code, § 530.55(b)> or an equivalent form of identification.

[As used here, *person* means a human being, whether living or dead, or a firm, association, organization, partnership, business trust, company, corporation, limited liability company, public entity or any other legal entity.]

It is not necessary that anyone actually be defrauded or actually suffer a financial, legal, or property loss as a result of the defendant's acts.

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*New August 2009; Revised April 2010*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with "As used here" if the evidence shows an intent to defraud an entity or association rather than a natural person. (Pen. Code, § 8.)

In the definition of personal identifying information, give the relevant items based on the evidence presented.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 530.5(d).

- Personal Identifying Information Defined. Pen. Code, § 530.55(b).
- Person Defined. Pen. Code, § 530.55(a).
- Intent to Defraud—Defined. *People v. Pugh* (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 66, 72 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 770]; *People v. Gaul-Alexander* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 735, 745 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 176].
- Intent to Defraud Entity. Pen. Code, § 8.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property, §§ 212–214.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 143, *Crimes Against Property*, § 143.01 (Matthew Bender).

**2043. Knowing Sale, Transfer, or Conveyance of Personal Identifying Information to Facilitate Its Unauthorized Use (Pen. Code, § 530.5(d)(2))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with the knowing (sale/ [or] transfer [or] conveyance) of personal identifying information [in violation of Penal Code section 530.5(d)(2)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant (sold/ [or] transferred/ [or] conveyed) the personal identifying information of (a specific person/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of victim>);

**AND**

2. When the defendant did so, (he/she) knew that the personal identifying information would be used to obtain or attempt to obtain (credit/ [or] goods/ [or] services/ [or] real property/ [or] medical information) [[or] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert other unlawful purpose>] without the consent of that specific person.

*Personal identifying information* means \_\_\_\_\_ <insert relevant items from Pen. Code, § 530.55(b)> or an equivalent form of identification.

[As used here, *person* means a human being, whether living or dead, or a firm, association, organization, partnership, business trust, company, corporation, limited liability company, public entity or any other legal entity.]

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*New August 2009; Revised April 2010*

**BENCH NOTES**

***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “As used here” if the evidence shows an intent to defraud an entity or association rather than a natural person. (Pen. Code, § 8.)

In the definition of personal identifying information, give the relevant items based on the evidence presented.

The definition of unlawful purpose is not limited to acquiring information for financial motives, and may include any unlawful purpose for which the defendant may have acquired the personal identifying information, such as using the

information to facilitate violation of a restraining order. (*See, e.g., People v. Tillotson* (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 517, 533 [69 Cal.Rptr.3d 42].)

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 530.5(d)(2).
- Personal Identifying Information Defined. Pen. Code, § 530.55(b).
- Person Defined. Pen. Code, § 530.55(a).

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property, §§ 212–214.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 143, *Crimes Against Property*, § 143.01 (Matthew Bender).



## 2044. False Personation (Pen. Code, § 529(a))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with falsely impersonating another person in that person's private or official capacity and performing certain acts [in violation of Penal Code section 529(a)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant falsely impersonated another person in the other person's private or official capacity;

AND

2. While falsely impersonating that person, the defendant:

[A. Posted bail or acted as surety for anyone in any proceeding, before any judge or officer authorized to take that bail or surety(;/.)]

[OR]

[B(1). Verified, published, acknowledged, or proved, in the name of that person, any written document;

AND

B(2). When the defendant did so, (he/she) intended that the written document be recorded, delivered, or used as though it were an authentic document(/;)]

[OR]

[C. Did any act that, if done by the person being falsely impersonated, might cause (that person to be liable in a lawsuit or criminal prosecution/ [or] that person to pay any amount of money/ [or] that person to be subject to any charge, forfeiture, or penalty/ [or] the defendant or anyone else to receive a benefit as a result).]

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*New February 2015; Revised March 2021*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 529(a).

- Additional Act Requirement *People v. Guion* (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1431–1432 [153 Cal.Rptr.3d 395].

### RELATED ISSUES

Penal Code section 529(a)(3) does not require any specific mental state beyond intentionally falsely impersonating another. *People v. Rathert* (2000) 24 Cal.4th 200, 205–206 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 779, 6 P.3d 700].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property, § 202.

1 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 10, *Investigative Detention*, § 10.05[2] (Matthew Bender).

**2045–2099. Reserved for Future Use**

## VEHICLE OFFENSES

### A. DUI

#### (i) Causing Injury

- 2100. Driving a Vehicle or Operating a Vessel Under the Influence Causing Injury (Veh. Code, § 23153(a), (f), (g))
- 2101. Driving With 0.08 Percent Blood Alcohol Causing Injury (Veh. Code, § 23153(b))
- 2102. Driving With 0.04 Percent Blood Alcohol Causing Injury With a Passenger for Hire (Veh. Code, § 23153(e))
- 2103–2109. Reserved for Future Use

#### (ii) Without Injury

- 2110. Driving Under the Influence (Veh. Code, § 23152(a), (f), (g))
- 2111. Driving With 0.08 Percent Blood Alcohol (Veh. Code, § 23152(b))
- 2112. Driving While Addicted to a Drug (Veh. Code, § 23152(c))
- 2113. Driving With 0.05 Percent Blood Alcohol When Under 21 (Veh. Code, § 23140(a))
- 2114. Driving With 0.04 Percent Blood Alcohol With a Passenger for Hire (Veh. Code, § 23152(e))
- 2115–2124. Reserved for Future Use

#### (iii) Prior Conviction

- 2125. Driving Under the Influence or With 0.08 or 0.04 Percent Blood Alcohol: Prior Convictions (Veh. Code, §§ 23550, 23550.5 & 23566)
- 2126. Driving Under the Influence or With 0.08 or 0.04 Percent Blood Alcohol: Prior Convictions—Bifurcated Trial (Veh. Code, §§ 23550, 23550.5 & 23566)
- 2127–2129. Reserved for Future Use

#### (iv) Refusal

- 2130. Refusal—Consciousness of Guilt (Veh. Code, § 23612)
- 2131. Refusal—Enhancement (Veh. Code, §§ 23577, 23612)
- 2132–2139. Reserved for Future Use

### B. FAILURE TO PERFORM DUTY FOLLOWING ACCIDENT

#### (i) Death or Injury

- 2140. Failure to Perform Duty Following Accident: Death or Injury—Defendant Driver (Veh. Code, §§ 20001, 20003 & 20004)
- 2141. Failure to Perform Duty Following Accident: Death or Injury—Defendant Nondriving Owner or Passenger in Control (Veh. Code, §§ 20001, 20003 & 20004)

2142. Failure to Perform Duty Following Accident: Lesser Included Offense (Veh. Code, §§ 20001, 20003 & 20004)

2143–2149. Reserved for Future Use

**(ii) Property Damage**

2150. Failure to Perform Duty Following Accident: Property Damage—Defendant Driver (Veh. Code, § 20002)

2151. Failure to Perform Duty Following Accident: Property Damage—Defendant Nondriving Owner or Passenger in Control (Veh. Code, § 20002)

2152–2159. Reserved for Future Use

**(iii) Enhancement**

2160. Fleeing the Scene Following Accident: Enhancement for Vehicular Manslaughter (Veh. Code, § 20001(c))

2161–2179. Reserved for Future Use

**C. EVADING**

2180. Evading Peace Officer: Death or Serious Bodily Injury (Veh. Code, §§ 2800.1(a), 2800.3(a), (b))

2181. Evading Peace Officer (Veh. Code, §§ 2800.1(a), 2800.2)

2182. Evading Peace Officer: Misdemeanor (Veh. Code, § 2800.1(a))

2183–2199. Reserved for Future Use

**D. RECKLESS DRIVING AND SPEED CONTEST**

2200. Reckless Driving (Veh. Code, § 23103(a) & (b))

2201. Speed Contest (Veh. Code, § 23109(c), (e)(2), (f)(1)–(3))

2202. Exhibition of Speed (Veh. Code, § 23109(c))

2203–2219. Reserved for Future Use

**E. LICENSING OFFENSES**

2220. Driving With Suspended or Revoked Driving Privilege (Veh. Code, §§ 13106, 14601, 14601.1, 14601.2, 14601.5)

2221. Driving Without a License (Veh. Code, § 12500(a))

2222. Failing to Present Driver’s License (Veh. Code, § 12951(b))

2223–2239. Reserved for Future Use

**F. OTHER VEHICLE OFFENSES**

2240. Failure to Appear (Veh. Code, § 40508(a))

2241. Driver and Driving Defined (Veh. Code, § 305)

2242–2299. Reserved for Future Use

## A. DUI

### (i) Causing Injury

#### 2100. Driving a Vehicle or Operating a Vessel Under the Influence Causing Injury (Veh. Code, § 23153(a), (f), (g))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with causing injury to another person while (driving a vehicle/operating a vessel) under the [combined] influence of (an alcoholic beverage/ [or] a drug/ [or] an alcoholic beverage and a drug) [in violation of Vehicle Code section 23153(a)/(f)/(g)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant (drove a vehicle/operated a vessel);
2. When (he/she) (drove a vehicle/operated a vessel), the defendant was under the [combined] influence of (an alcoholic beverage/ [or] a drug/ [or] an alcoholic beverage and a drug);
3. While (driving a vehicle/operating a vessel) under the influence, the defendant also (committed an illegal act/ [or] neglected to perform a legal duty);

AND

4. The defendant's (illegal act/ [or] failure to perform a legal duty) caused bodily injury to another person.

A person is *under the influence* if, as a result of (drinking [or consuming] an alcoholic beverage/ [and/or] taking a drug), his or her mental or physical abilities are so impaired that he or she is no longer able to (drive a vehicle/operate a vessel) with the caution of a sober person, using ordinary care, under similar circumstances.

[An *alcoholic beverage* is a liquid or solid material intended to be consumed that contains ethanol. Ethanol is also known as ethyl alcohol, drinking alcohol, or alcohol. [An *alcoholic beverage* includes \_\_\_\_\_ <insert type[s] of beverage[s] from Veh. Code, § 109 or Bus. & Prof. Code, § 23004, e.g., wine, beer>.]

[A *drug* is a substance or combination of substances, other than alcohol, that could so affect the nervous system, brain, or muscles of a person that it would appreciably impair his or her ability to (drive a vehicle/operate a vessel) as an ordinarily cautious person, in full possession of his or her faculties and using reasonable care, would (drive a vehicle/

operate a vessel) under similar circumstances.]

[If the People have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's blood alcohol level was 0.08 percent or more at the time of the chemical analysis, you may, but are not required to, conclude that the defendant was under the influence of an alcoholic beverage at the time of the alleged offense.]

[In evaluating any test results in this case, you may consider whether or not the person administering the test or the agency maintaining the testing device followed the regulations of the California Department of Public Health.]

[The People allege that the defendant committed the following illegal act[s]: \_\_\_\_\_ <list name[s] of offense[s]>.

To decide whether the defendant committed \_\_\_\_\_ <list name[s] of offense[s]>, please refer to the separate instructions that I (will give/have given) you on (that/those) crime[s].]

[The People [also] allege that the defendant failed to perform the following legal (duty/duties) while (driving the vehicle/operating the vessel): (the duty to exercise ordinary care at all times and to maintain proper control of the (vehicle/vessel)/\_\_\_\_\_ <insert other duty or duties alleged>).]

[You may not find the defendant guilty unless all of you agree that the People have proved that the defendant (committed [at least] one illegal act/[or] failed to perform [at least] one duty).

<Alternative A—unanimity required; see Bench Notes>

[You must all agree on which (act the defendant committed/ [or] duty the defendant failed to perform).]

<Alternative B—unanimity not required; see Bench Notes>

[But you do not have to all agree on which (act the defendant committed/ [or] duty the defendant failed to perform).]

[Using *ordinary care* means using reasonable care to prevent reasonably foreseeable harm to someone else. A person fails to exercise ordinary care if he or she (does something that a reasonably careful person would not do in the same situation/ [or] fails to do something that a reasonably careful person would do in the same situation).]

[An act causes bodily injury to another person if the injury is the direct, natural, and probable consequence of the act and the injury would not have happened without the act. A *natural and probable consequence* is one that a reasonable person would know is likely to happen if nothing unusual intervenes. In deciding whether a consequence is natural and

**probable, consider all the circumstances established by the evidence.]**

**[There may be more than one cause of injury. An act causes bodily injury to another person only if it is a substantial factor in causing the injury. A *substantial factor* is more than a trivial or remote factor. However, it need not be the only factor that causes the injury.]**

**[It is not a defense that the defendant was legally entitled to use the drug.]**

**[If the defendant was under the influence of (an alcoholic beverage/ [and/ or] a drug), then it is not a defense that something else also impaired (his/her) ability to (drive a vehicle/operate a vessel).]**

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*New January 2006; Revised June 2007, April 2008, December 2008, August 2015, September 2017, March 2018, September 2019*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If the prosecution alleges under element 3 that the defendant committed an act forbidden by law, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to specify the predicate offense alleged and to instruct on the elements of that offense. (*People v. Minor* (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 431, 438–439 [33 Cal.Rptr.2d 641]; *People v. Ellis* (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1339 [82 Cal.Rptr.2d 409].)

If the prosecution alleges under element 3 that the defendant neglected to perform a duty imposed by law, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the duty allegedly neglected. (See *People v. Minor, supra*, 28 Cal.App.4th at pp. 438–439.) If the prosecution alleges that the defendant neglected the general duty of every driver to exercise ordinary care (see *People v. Oyaas* (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 663, 669 [219 Cal.Rptr. 243]), the court should give the bracketed definition of “ordinary care.”

If causation is at issue, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on proximate cause. (*People v. Bernhardt* (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 567, 590–591 [35 Cal.Rptr. 401].) If the evidence indicates that there was only one cause of injury, the court should give the first bracketed paragraph on causation, which includes the “direct, natural, and probable” language. If there is evidence of multiple causes of injury, the court should also give the second bracketed paragraph on causation, which includes the “substantial factor” definition. (See *People v. Autry* (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 363 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 135]; *People v. Pike* (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 732, 746–747 [243 Cal.Rptr. 54].)

There is a split in authority over whether there is a **sua sponte** duty to give a unanimity instruction when multiple predicate offenses are alleged. (*People v. Gary* (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1212, 1218 [235 Cal.Rptr. 30] [unanimity instruction required], overruled on other grounds in *People v. Flood* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 481

[76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180, 957 P.2d 869]; *People v. Durkin* (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d Supp. 9, 13 [252 Cal.Rptr. 735] [unanimity instruction not required but preferable]; *People v. Mitchell* (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 216, 222 [232 Cal.Rptr. 438] [unanimity instruction not required]; *People v. Leffel* (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 575, 586–587 [249 Cal.Rptr. 906] [unanimity instruction not required, failure to give harmless error if was required].) If the court concludes that a unanimity instruction is appropriate, give the unanimity alternative A. If the court concludes that unanimity is not required, give the unanimity alternative B.

The bracketed paragraph that begins with “If the People have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s blood alcohol level was 0.08 percent” explains a rebuttable presumption created by statute. (See Veh. Code, § 23610; Evid. Code, §§ 600–607.) The California Supreme Court has held that a jury instruction phrased as a rebuttable presumption in a criminal case creates an unconstitutional mandatory presumption. (*People v. Roder* (1983) 33 Cal.3d 491, 497–505 [189 Cal.Rptr. 501, 658 P.2d 1302].) In accordance with *Roder*, the instructions have been written as permissive inferences.

The court **must not** give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “If the People have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s blood alcohol level was 0.08 percent” if there is no substantial evidence that the defendant’s blood alcohol level was at or above 0.08 percent at the time of the test. In addition, if the test falls within the range in which no presumption applies, 0.05 percent to just below 0.08 percent, do not give this bracketed sentence. (*People v. Wood* (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d Supp. 11, 15 [255 Cal.Rptr. 537].) The court should also consider whether there is sufficient evidence to establish that the test result exceeds the margin of error before giving this instruction for test results of 0.08 percent. (Compare *People v. Campos* (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 4–5 [188 Cal.Rptr. 366], with *People v. Randolph* (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 11 [262 Cal.Rptr. 378].)

The statute also creates a rebuttable presumption that the defendant was not under the influence if his or her blood alcohol level was less than 0.05 percent. (*People v. Gallardo* (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 489, 496 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 502].) Depending on the facts of the case, the defendant may be entitled to a pinpoint instruction on this presumption. It is not error to refuse an instruction on this presumption if the prosecution’s theory is that the defendant was under the combined influence of drugs and alcohol. (*People v. Andersen* (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1250 [32 Cal.Rptr.2d 442].)

If the evidence demonstrates that the person administering the test or agency maintaining the testing device failed to follow the title 17 regulations, give the bracketed sentence that begins with “In evaluating any test results in this case.” (*People v. Adams* (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 559, 567 [131 Cal.Rptr. 190] [failure to follow regulations in administering breath test goes to weight, not admissibility, of the evidence]; *People v. Williams* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 408, 417 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d 854, 49 P.3d 203] [same]; *People v. Esayan* (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1039 [5



Cal.Rptr.3d 542] [results of blood test admissible even though phlebotomist who drew blood not authorized under title 17].)

Give the bracketed sentence stating that “it is not a defense that something else also impaired (his/her) ability to drive” if there is evidence of an additional source of impairment such as an epileptic seizure, inattention, or falling asleep.

If the defendant is charged with one or more prior convictions for driving under the influence, the defendant may stipulate to the convictions. (*People v. Weathington* (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 69, 90 [282 Cal.Rptr. 170].) In addition, either the defendant or the prosecution may move for a bifurcated trial. (*People v. Calderon* (1994) 9 Cal.4th 69, 77–78 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 333, 885 P.2d 83]; *People v. Cline* (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1327, 1334–1336 [71 Cal.Rptr.2d 41]; *People v. Weathington, supra*, 231 Cal.App.3d at p. 90.) If the defendant does not stipulate and the court does not grant a bifurcated trial, give CALCRIM No. 2125, *Driving Under the Influence or With 0.08 or 0.04 Percent Blood Alcohol: Prior Convictions*. If the court grants a bifurcated trial, give CALCRIM No. 2126, *Driving Under the Influence or With 0.08 or 0.04 Percent Blood Alcohol: Prior Convictions—Bifurcated Trial*. If the defendant stipulates to the truth of the convictions, the prior convictions should not be disclosed to the jury unless the court admits them as otherwise relevant. (See *People v. Hall* (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 128, 135 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 690].)

On request, give CALCRIM No. 2241, *Driver and Driving Defined*.

#### ***Defenses—Instructional Duty***

On request, if supported by the evidence, the court must instruct on the “imminent peril/sudden emergency” doctrine. (*People v. Boulware* (1940) 41 Cal.App.2d 268, 269–270 [106 P.2d 436].) The court may use the bracketed instruction on sudden emergency in CALCRIM No. 590, *Gross Vehicular Manslaughter While Intoxicated*.

#### ***Related Instructions***

CALCRIM No. 2101, *Driving With 0.08 Percent Blood Alcohol Causing Injury*.

CALCRIM No. 2125, *Driving Under the Influence or With 0.08 or 0.04 Percent Blood Alcohol: Prior Convictions*.

CALCRIM No. 2126, *Driving Under the Influence or With 0.08 or 0.04 Percent Blood Alcohol: Prior Convictions—Bifurcated Trial*.

CALCRIM No. 595, *Vehicular Manslaughter: Speeding Laws Defined*.

### **AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Veh. Code, § 23153(a), (f), (g); *People v. Minor* (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 431, 438 [33 Cal.Rptr.2d 641].
- Alcoholic Beverage Defined. Veh. Code, § 109, Bus. & Prof. Code, § 23004.
- Drug Defined. Veh. Code, § 312.
- Presumptions. Veh. Code, § 23610; Evid. Code, § 607; *People v. Milham* (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 487, 503–505 [205 Cal.Rptr. 688].
- Under the Influence Defined. *People v. Schoonover* (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 101,

105–107 [85 Cal.Rptr. 69]; *People v. Enriquez* (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 661, 665–666 [49 Cal.Rptr.2d 710].

- Must Instruct on Elements of Predicate Offense. *People v. Minor* (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 431, 438–439 [33 Cal.Rptr.2d 641]; *People v. Ellis* (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1339 [82 Cal.Rptr.2d 409].
- Negligence—Ordinary Care. Pen. Code, § 7, subd. 2; Restatement Second of Torts, § 282; *People v. Oyaas* (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 663, 669 [219 Cal.Rptr. 243] [ordinary negligence standard applies to driving under the influence causing injury].
- Causation. *People v. Rodriguez* (1960) 186 Cal.App.2d 433, 440 [8 Cal.Rptr. 863].
- Legal Entitlement to Use Drug Not a Defense. Veh. Code, § 23630.
- Unanimity Instruction. *People v. Gary* (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1212, 1218 [235 Cal.Rptr. 30], overruled on other grounds in *People v. Flood* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 481 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180, 957 P.2d 869]; *People v. Durkin* (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d Supp. 9, 13 [252 Cal.Rptr. 735]; *People v. Mitchell* (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 216, 222 [232 Cal.Rptr. 438]; *People v. Leffel* (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 575, 586–587 [249 Cal.Rptr. 906].
- Prior Convictions. *People v. Weathington* (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 69, 90 [282 Cal.Rptr. 170].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Misdemeanor Driving Under the Influence or With 0.08 Percent. Veh. Code, § 23152(a) & (b); *People v. Capetillo* (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 211, 220 [269 Cal.Rptr. 250].
- Driving Under the Influence Causing Injury is not a lesser included offense of vehicular manslaughter without gross negligence. *People v. Binkerd* (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1143, 1148–1149 [66 Cal.Rptr.3d 675].
- Violations of Vehicle Code section 23153(a), are not lesser included offenses of Vehicle Code section 23153(f) [now 23153(g)]. *People v. Cady* (2016) 7 Cal.App.5th 134, 145–146 [212 Cal.Rptr.3d 319].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *DUI Cannot Serve as Predicate Unlawful Act*

“[T]he evidence must show an unlawful act or neglect of duty *in addition* to driving under the influence.” (*People v. Minor* (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 431, 438 [33 Cal.Rptr.2d 641] [italics in original]; *People v. Oyaas* (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 663, 668 [219 Cal.Rptr. 243].)

#### *Act Forbidden by Law*

The term “ ‘any act forbidden by law’ . . . refers to acts forbidden by the Vehicle Code . . . .” (*People v. Clenney* (1958) 165 Cal.App.2d 241, 253 [331 P.2d 696].) The defendant must commit the act when driving the vehicle. (*People v. Capetillo*

(1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 211, 217 [269 Cal.Rptr. 250] [violation of Veh. Code, § 10851 not sufficient because offense not committed “when” defendant was driving the vehicle but by mere fact that defendant was driving the vehicle].)

### ***Neglect of Duty Imposed by Law***

“In proving the person neglected any duty imposed by law in driving the vehicle, it is not necessary to prove that any specific section of [the Vehicle Code] was violated.” (Veh. Code, § 23153(c); *People v. Oyaas* (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 663, 669 [219 Cal.Rptr. 243].) “[The] neglect of duty element . . . is satisfied by evidence which establishes that the defendant’s conduct amounts to no more than ordinary negligence.” (*People v. Oyaas, supra*, 173 Cal.App.3d at p. 669.) “[T]he law imposes on any driver [the duty] to exercise ordinary care at all times and to maintain a proper control of his or her vehicle.” (*Id.* at p. 670.)

### ***Multiple Victims to One Drunk Driving Accident***

“In *Wilkoff v. Superior Court* [(1985) 38 Cal.3d 345, 352 [211 Cal.Rptr. 742, 696 P.2d 134]] we held that a defendant cannot be charged with multiple counts of felony drunk driving under Vehicle Code section 23153, subdivision (a), where injuries to several people result from one act of drunk driving.” (*People v. McFarland* (1989) 47 Cal.3d 798, 802 [254 Cal.Rptr. 331, 765 P.2d 493].) However, when “a defendant commits vehicular manslaughter with gross negligence[,] . . . he may properly be punished for [both the vehicular manslaughter and] injury to a separate individual that results from the same incident.” (*Id.* at p. 804.) The prosecution may also charge an enhancement for multiple victims under Vehicle Code section 23558.

See also the Related Issues section in CALCRIM No. 2110, *Driving Under the Influence*.

## **SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, §§ 272–277.

2 Witkin, *California Evidence* (5th ed. 2012) Demonstrative, Experimental, and Scientific Evidence, § 56.

5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 91, *Sentencing*, § 91.36 (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 145, *Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses*, § 145.02 (Matthew Bender).

**2101. Driving With 0.08 Percent Blood Alcohol Causing Injury  
(Veh. Code, § 23153(b))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with causing injury to another person while driving with a blood alcohol level of 0.08 percent or more [in violation of Vehicle Code section 23153(b)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant drove a vehicle;
2. When (he/she) drove, the defendant's blood alcohol level was 0.08 percent or more by weight;
3. When the defendant was driving with that blood alcohol level, (he/she) also (committed an illegal act/ [or] neglected to perform a legal duty);

AND

4. The defendant's (illegal act/ [or] failure to perform a legal duty) caused bodily injury to another person.

[If the People have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that a sample of the defendant's (blood/breath) was taken within three hours of the defendant's [alleged] driving and that a chemical analysis of the sample showed a blood alcohol level of 0.08 percent or more, you may, but are not required to, conclude that the defendant's blood alcohol level was 0.08 percent or more at the time of the alleged offense.]

[In evaluating any test results in this case, you may consider whether or not the person administering the test or the agency maintaining the testing device followed the regulations of the California Department of Public Health.]

[The People allege that the defendant committed the following illegal act[s]: \_\_\_\_\_ <list name[s] of offense[s]>.

To decide whether the defendant committed \_\_\_\_\_ <list name[s] of offense[s]>, please refer to the separate instructions that I (will give/have given) you on (that/those) crime[s].]

[The People [also] allege that the defendant failed to perform the following legal (duty/duties) while driving the vehicle: (the duty to exercise ordinary care at all times and to maintain proper control of the vehicle/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert other duty or duties alleged>).]

[You may not find the defendant guilty unless all of you agree that the People have proved that the defendant (committed [at least] one illegal

act/[or] failed to perform [at least] one duty).

<Alternative A—unanimity required; see Bench Notes>

[You must all agree on which (act the defendant committed/ [or] duty the defendant failed to perform).]

<Alternative B—unanimity not required; see Bench Notes>

[But you do not have to all agree on which (act the defendant committed/ [or] duty the defendant failed to perform).]

[Using *ordinary care* means using reasonable care to prevent reasonably foreseeable harm to someone else. A person fails to exercise ordinary care if he or she (does something that a reasonably careful person would not do in the same situation/ [or] fails to do something that a reasonably careful person would do in the same situation).]

[An act causes bodily injury to another person if the injury is the direct, natural, and probable consequence of the act and the injury would not have happened without the act. A *natural and probable consequence* is one that a reasonable person would know is likely to happen if nothing unusual intervenes. In deciding whether a consequence is natural and probable, consider all of the circumstances established by the evidence.]

[There may be more than one cause of injury. An act causes bodily injury to another person only if it is a substantial factor in causing the injury. A *substantial factor* is more than a trivial or remote factor. However, it need not be the only factor that causes the injury.]

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2006, April 2008, August 2015, March 2018, September 2019*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If the prosecution alleges under element 3 that the defendant committed an act forbidden by law, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to specify the predicate offense alleged and to instruct on the elements of that offense. (*People v. Minor* (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 431, 438–439 [33 Cal.Rptr.2d 641]; *People v. Ellis* (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1339 [82 Cal.Rptr.2d 409].)

If the prosecution alleges under element 3 that the defendant neglected to perform a duty imposed by law, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the duty allegedly neglected. (See *People v. Minor, supra*, 28 Cal.App.4th at pp. 438–439.) If the prosecution alleges that the defendant neglected the general duty of every driver to exercise ordinary care (see *People v. Oyass* (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 663, 669 [219

Cal.Rptr. 243]), the court should give the bracketed definition of “ordinary care.”

If causation is at issue, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on proximate cause. (*People v. Bernhardt* (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 567, 590–591 [35 Cal.Rptr. 401].) If the evidence indicates that there was only one cause of injury, the court should give the first bracketed paragraph on causation, which includes the “direct, natural, and probable” language. If there is evidence of multiple causes of injury, the court should also give the second bracketed paragraph on causation, which includes the “substantial factor” definition. (See *People v. Autry* (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 363 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 135]; *People v. Pike* (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 732, 746–747 [243 Cal.Rptr. 54].)

There is a split in authority over whether there is a **sua sponte** duty to give a unanimity instruction when multiple predicate offenses are alleged. (*People v. Gary* (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1212, 1218 [235 Cal.Rptr. 30] [unanimity instruction required], overruled on other grounds in *People v. Flood* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 481 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180, 957 P.2d 869]; *People v. Durkin* (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d Supp. 9, 13 [252 Cal.Rptr. 735] [unanimity instruction not required but preferable]; *People v. Mitchell* (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 216, 222 [232 Cal.Rptr. 438] [unanimity instruction not required]; *People v. Leffel* (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 575, 586–587 [249 Cal.Rptr. 906] [unanimity instruction not required, failure to give harmless error if was required].) If the court concludes that a unanimity instruction is appropriate, give the unanimity alternative A. If the court concludes that unanimity is not required, give the unanimity alternative B.

The bracketed paragraph that begins with “If the People have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that a sample of” explains a rebuttable presumption created by statute. (See Veh. Code, § 23152(b); Evid. Code, §§ 600–607.) The California Supreme Court has held that a jury instruction phrased as a rebuttable presumption in a criminal case creates an unconstitutional mandatory presumption. (*People v. Roder* (1983) 33 Cal.3d 491, 497–505 [189 Cal.Rptr. 501, 658 P.2d 1302].) In accordance with *Roder*, the instructions have been written as permissive inferences.

The court **must not** give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “If the People have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that a sample of” if there is no substantial evidence that the defendant’s blood alcohol level was at or above 0.08 percent at the time of the test.

If the evidence demonstrates that the person administering the test or agency maintaining the testing device failed to follow the title 17 regulations, give the bracketed sentence that begins with “In evaluating any test results in this case.” (*People v. Adams* (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 559, 567 [131 Cal.Rptr. 190] [failure to follow regulations in administering breath test goes to weight, not admissibility, of the evidence]; *People v. Williams* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 408, 417 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d 854, 49 P.3d 203] [same]; *People v. Esayian* (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1039 [5 Cal.Rptr.3d 542] [results of blood test admissible even though phlebotomist who drew blood not authorized under title 17].)

If the defendant is charged with one or more prior convictions for driving under the



influence, the defendant may stipulate to the convictions. (*People v. Weathington* (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 69, 90 [282 Cal.Rptr. 170].) In addition, either the defendant or the prosecution may move for a bifurcated trial. (*People v. Calderon* (1994) 9 Cal.4th 69, 77–78 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 333, 885 P.2d 83]; *People v. Cline* (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1327, 1334–1336 [71 Cal.Rptr.2d 41]; *People v. Weathington, supra*, 231 Cal.App.3d at p. 90.) If the defendant does not stipulate and the court does not grant a bifurcated trial, give CALCRIM No. 2125, *Driving Under the Influence or With 0.08 or 0.04 Percent Blood Alcohol: Prior Convictions*. If the court grants a bifurcated trial, give CALCRIM No. 2126, *Driving Under the Influence or With 0.08 or 0.04 Percent Blood Alcohol: Prior Convictions—Bifurcated Trial*. If the defendant stipulates to the truth of the convictions, the prior convictions should not be disclosed to the jury unless the court admits them as otherwise relevant. (See *People v. Hall* (1998) 67 Cal. App. 4th 128, 135 [79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 690].)

On request, give CALCRIM No. 2241, *Driver and Driving Defined*.

#### ***Defenses—Instructional Duty***

On request, if supported by the evidence, the court must instruct on the “imminent peril/sudden emergency” doctrine. (*People v. Boulware* (1940) 41 Cal.App.2d 268, 269–270 [106 P.2d 436].) The court may use the bracketed instruction on sudden emergency in CALCRIM No. 590, *Gross Vehicular Manslaughter While Intoxicated*.

#### ***Related Instructions***

CALCRIM No. 2100, *Driving a Vehicle or Operating a Vessel Under the Influence Causing Injury*.

CALCRIM No. 2125, *Driving Under the Influence or With 0.08 or 0.04 Percent Blood Alcohol: Prior Convictions*.

CALCRIM No. 2126, *Driving Under the Influence or With 0.08 or 0.04 Percent Blood Alcohol: Prior Convictions—Bifurcated Trial*.

CALCRIM No. 595, *Vehicular Manslaughter: Speeding Laws Defined*.

### **AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Veh. Code, § 23153(b); *Burg v. Municipal Court* (1983) 35 Cal. 3d 257, 265–266 [198 Cal. Rptr. 145, 673 P.2d 732].
- Partition Ratio. Veh. Code, § 23152(b); *People v. Bransford* (1994) 8 Cal.4th 885, 890 [35 Cal.Rptr.2d 613, 884 P.2d 70].
- Presumptions. Veh. Code, § 23153(b); Evid. Code, § 607; *People v. Milham* (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 487, 503–505 [205 Cal.Rptr. 688].
- Must Instruct on Elements of Predicate Offense. *People v. Minor* (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 431, 438–439 [33 Cal.Rptr.2d 641]; *People v. Ellis* (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1339 [82 Cal.Rptr.2d 409].
- Negligence—Ordinary Care. Pen. Code, § 7(2); Restatement Second of Torts, § 282.
- Causation. *People v. Rodriguez* (1960) 186 Cal.App.2d 433, 440 [8 Cal.Rptr. 863].

- Unanimity Instruction. *People v. Gary* (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1212, 1218 [235 Cal.Rptr. 30], overruled on other grounds in *People v. Flood* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 481 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180, 957 P.2d 869]; *People v. Durkin* (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d Supp. 9, 13 [252 Cal.Rptr. 735]; *People v. Mitchell* (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 216, 222 [232 Cal.Rptr. 438]; *People v. Leffel* (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 575, 586–587 [249 Cal.Rptr. 906].
- Statute Constitutional. *Burg v. Municipal Court* (1983) 35 Cal.3d 257, 273 [198 Cal.Rptr. 145, 673 P.2d 732].
- Prior Convictions. *People v. Weathington* (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 69, 90 [282 Cal.Rptr. 170].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Misdemeanor Driving Under the Influence or With 0.08 Percent. Veh. Code, § 23152(a) & (b); *People v. Capetillo* (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 211, 220 [269 Cal.Rptr. 250].

### RELATED ISSUES

See the Related Issues section in CALCRIM No. 2111, *Driving With 0.08 Percent Blood Alcohol* and CALCRIM No. 2100, *Driving a Vehicle or Operating a Vessel Under the Influence Causing Injury*.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, §§ 272–277.

5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 91, *Sentencing*, § 91.36 (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 145, *Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses*, § 145.02[1] (Matthew Bender).



**2102. Driving With 0.04 Percent Blood Alcohol Causing Injury  
With a Passenger for Hire (Veh. Code, § 23153(e))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with causing injury to another person while driving with a blood-alcohol level of 0.04 percent or more [in violation of Vehicle Code section 23153(e)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant drove a vehicle;
2. When (he/she) drove, the defendant's blood-alcohol level was 0.04 percent or more by weight;
3. When (he/she) drove with that blood-alcohol level, (he/she) also (committed an illegal act/ [or] neglected to perform a legal duty);
4. When (he/she) drove, there was a passenger for hire in the vehicle;

**AND**

5. The defendant's (illegal act/ [or] failure to perform a legal duty) caused bodily injury to another person.

A person is a *passenger for hire* when the person or someone else pays, or is expected to pay, for the ride, the payment is or will be with money or something else of value, and the payment is made to, or expected to be made to, the owner, operator, agent or any other person with an interest in the vehicle.

[If the People have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that a sample of the defendant's (blood/breath) was taken within three hours of the defendant's [alleged] driving and that a chemical analysis of the sample showed a blood-alcohol level of 0.04 percent or more, you may, but are not required to, conclude that the defendant's blood-alcohol level was 0.04 percent or more at the time of the alleged offense.]

[In evaluating any test results in this case, you may consider whether or not the person administering the test or the agency maintaining the testing device followed the regulations of the California Department of Public Health.]

[The People allege that the defendant committed the following illegal act[s]: \_\_\_\_\_ <list name[s] of offense[s]>.

To decide whether the defendant committed \_\_\_\_\_ <list name[s] of offense[s]>, please refer to the separate instructions that I (will give/have given) you on (that/those) crime[s].]

[The People [also] allege that the defendant failed to perform the following legal (duty/duties) while driving the vehicle: (the duty to exercise ordinary care at all times and to maintain proper control of the vehicle/\_\_\_\_\_ <insert other duty or duties alleged>).]

[You may not find the defendant guilty unless all of you agree that the People have proved that the defendant (committed [at least] one illegal act/[or] failed to perform [at least] one duty).]

<Alternative A—unanimity required; see Bench Notes>

[You must all agree on which (act the defendant committed/ [or] duty the defendant failed to perform).]

<Alternative B—unanimity not required; see Bench Notes>

[But you do not have to all agree on which (act the defendant committed/ [or] duty the defendant failed to perform).]

[Using *ordinary care* means using reasonable care to prevent reasonably foreseeable harm to someone else. A person fails to exercise ordinary care if he or she (does something that a reasonably careful person would not do in the same situation/ [or] fails to do something that a reasonably careful person would do in the same situation).]

[An act causes bodily injury to another person if the injury is the direct, natural, and probable consequence of the act and the injury would not have happened without the act. A *natural and probable consequence* is one that a reasonable person would know is likely to happen if nothing unusual intervenes. In deciding whether a consequence is natural and probable, consider all of the circumstances established by the evidence.]

[There may be more than one cause of injury. An act causes bodily injury to another person only if it is a substantial factor in causing the injury. A *substantial factor* is more than a trivial or remote factor. However, it need not be the only factor that causes the injury.]

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*New March 2018, effective July 2018; Revised September 2019*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If the prosecution alleges under element 3 that the defendant committed an act forbidden by law, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to specify the predicate offense alleged and to instruct on the elements of that offense. (*People v. Minor* (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 431, 438–439 [33 Cal.Rptr.2d 641]; *People v. Ellis* (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1339 [82 Cal.Rptr.2d 409].)

If the prosecution alleges under element 3 that the defendant neglected to perform a duty imposed by law, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the duty allegedly neglected. (See *People v. Minor, supra*, 28 Cal.App.4th at pp. 438–439.) If the prosecution alleges that the defendant neglected the general duty of every driver to exercise ordinary care (see *People v. Oyass* (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 663, 669 [219 Cal.Rptr. 243]), the court should give the bracketed definition of “ordinary care.”

If causation is at issue, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on proximate cause. (*People v. Bernhardt* (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 567, 590–591 [35 Cal.Rptr. 401].) If the evidence indicates that there was only one cause of injury, the court should give the first bracketed paragraph on causation, which includes the “direct, natural, and probable” language. If there is evidence of multiple causes of injury, the court should also give the second bracketed paragraph on causation, which includes the “substantial factor” definition. (See *People v. Autry* (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 363 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 135]; *People v. Pike* (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 732, 746–747 [243 Cal.Rptr. 54].)

There is a split in authority over whether there is a **sua sponte** duty to give a unanimity instruction when multiple predicate offenses are alleged. (*People v. Gary* (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1212, 1218 [235 Cal.Rptr. 30] [unanimity instruction required], overruled on other grounds in *People v. Flood* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 481 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180, 957 P.2d 869]; *People v. Durkin* (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d Supp. 9, 13 [252 Cal.Rptr. 735] [unanimity instruction not required but preferable]; *People v. Mitchell* (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 216, 222 [232 Cal.Rptr. 438] [unanimity instruction not required]; *People v. Leffel* (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 575, 586–587 [249 Cal.Rptr. 906] [unanimity instruction not required, failure to give harmless error if was required].) If the court concludes that a unanimity instruction is appropriate, give the unanimity alternative A. If the court concludes that unanimity is not required, give the unanimity alternative B.

The bracketed paragraph that begins with “If the People have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that a sample of” explains a rebuttable presumption created by statute. (See Veh. Code, § 23153(e); Evid. Code, §§ 600–607.) The California Supreme Court has held that a jury instruction phrased as a rebuttable presumption in a criminal case creates an unconstitutional mandatory presumption. (*People v. Roder* (1983) 33 Cal.3d 491, 497–505 [189 Cal.Rptr. 501, 658 P.2d 1302].) In accordance with *Roder*, the instructions have been written as permissive inferences.

The court **must not** give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “If the People have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that a sample of” if there is no substantial evidence that the defendant’s blood-alcohol level was at or above 0.04 percent at the time of the test.

If the evidence demonstrates that the person administering the test or agency maintaining the testing device failed to follow the title 17 regulations, give the bracketed sentence that begins with “In evaluating any test results in this case.” (*People v. Adams* (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 559, 567 [131 Cal.Rptr. 190] [failure to follow regulations in administering breath test goes to weight, not admissibility, of

the evidence]; *People v. Williams* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 408, 417 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d 854, 49 P.3d 203] [same]; *People v. Esayian* (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1039 [5 Cal.Rptr.3d 542] [results of blood test admissible even though phlebotomist who drew blood not authorized under title 17].)

Do **not** give this instruction if the court has bifurcated the trial. Instead, give CALCRIM No. 2126, *Driving Under the Influence or With 0.08 or 0.04 Percent Blood Alcohol: Prior Convictions—Bifurcated Trial*. See the Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 3100, *Prior Conviction: Nonbifurcated Trial*, for an extensive discussion of bifurcation. If the court does not grant a bifurcated trial, give CALCRIM No. 2125, *Driving Under the Influence or With 0.08 or 0.04 Percent Blood Alcohol: Prior Convictions*.

On request, give CALCRIM No. 2241, *Driver and Driving Defined*.

### ***Defenses—Instructional Duty***

On request, if supported by the evidence, the court must instruct on the “imminent peril/sudden emergency” doctrine. (*People v. Boulware* (1940) 41 Cal.App.2d 268, 269–270 [106 P.2d 436].) The court may use the bracketed instruction on sudden emergency in CALCRIM No. 590, *Gross Vehicular Manslaughter While Intoxicated*.

### ***Related Instructions***

CALCRIM No. 2100, *Driving a Vehicle or Operating a Vessel Under the Influence Causing Injury*.

CALCRIM No. 2125, *Driving Under the Influence or With 0.08 or 0.04 Percent Blood Alcohol: Prior Convictions*.

CALCRIM No. 2126, *Driving Under the Influence or With 0.08 or 0.04 Percent Blood Alcohol: Prior Convictions—Bifurcated Trial*.

CALCRIM No. 595, *Vehicular Manslaughter: Speeding Laws Defined*.

## **AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Veh. Code, § 23153(e); *Burg v. Municipal Court* (1983) 35 Cal.3d 257, 265–266 [198 Cal.Rptr. 145, 673 P.2d 732].
- Partition Ratio. Veh. Code, § 23152; *People v. Bransford* (1994) 8 Cal.4th 885, 890 [35 Cal.Rptr.2d 613, 884 P.2d 70].
- Presumptions. Veh. Code, § 23153(e); Evid. Code, § 607; *People v. Milham* (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 487, 503–505 [205 Cal.Rptr. 688].
- Must Instruct on Elements of Predicate Offense. *People v. Minor* (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 431, 438–439 [33 Cal.Rptr.2d 641]; *People v. Ellis* (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1339 [82 Cal.Rptr.2d 409].
- Negligence—Ordinary Care. Pen. Code, § 7(2); Restatement Second of Torts, § 282.
- Causation. *People v. Rodriguez* (1960) 186 Cal.App.2d 433, 440 [8 Cal.Rptr. 863].
- Unanimity Instruction. *People v. Gary* (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1212, 1218 [235

Cal.Rptr. 30], overruled on other grounds in *People v. Flood* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 481 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180, 957 P.2d 869]; *People v. Durkin* (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d Supp. 9, 13 [252 Cal.Rptr. 735]; *People v. Mitchell* (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 216, 222 [232 Cal.Rptr. 438]; *People v. Leffel* (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 575, 586–587 [249 Cal.Rptr. 906].

- Statute Constitutional. *Burg v. Municipal Court* (1983) 35 Cal.3d 257, 273 [198 Cal.Rptr. 145, 673 P.2d 732].
- Prior Convictions. *People v. Weathington* (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 69, 90 [282 Cal.Rptr. 170].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Driving With 0.04 Percent Blood Alcohol With a Passenger for Hire. Veh. Code, § 23152(e).

### RELATED ISSUES

See the Related Issues section in CALCRIM No. 2111, *Driving a Vehicle or Operating a Vessel Under the Influence Causing Injury* (Veh. Code, § 23153)(a), (f), (g) and CALCRIM No. 2100, *Driving With 0.08 Percent Blood Alcohol* (Veh. Code, § 23152(b)).

**2103–2109. Reserved for Future Use**

## (ii) Without Injury

### 2110. Driving Under the Influence (Veh. Code, § 23152(a), (f), (g))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with driving under the [combined] influence of (an alcoholic beverage/ [or] a drug/ [or] an alcoholic beverage and a drug) [in violation of Vehicle Code section 23152(a)/(f)/(g)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant drove a vehicle;

AND

2. When (he/she) drove, the defendant was under the [combined] influence of (an alcoholic beverage/ [or] a drug/ [or] an alcoholic beverage and a drug).

A person is *under the influence* if, as a result of (drinking [or consuming] an alcoholic beverage/ [and/or] taking a drug), his or her mental or physical abilities are so impaired that he or she is no longer able to drive a vehicle with the caution of a sober person, using ordinary care, under similar circumstances.

The manner in which a person drives is not enough by itself to establish whether the person is or is not under the influence of (an alcoholic beverage/ [or] a drug) [or under the combined influence of an alcoholic beverage and a drug]. However, it is a factor to be considered, in light of all the surrounding circumstances, in deciding whether the person was under the influence.

[An *alcoholic beverage* is a liquid or solid material intended to be consumed that contains ethanol. Ethanol is also known as ethyl alcohol, drinking alcohol, or alcohol. [An *alcoholic beverage* includes \_\_\_\_\_ <insert type[s] of beverage[s] from Veh. Code, § 109 or Bus. & Prof. Code, § 23004, e.g., wine, beer>.]

[A *drug* is a substance or combination of substances, other than alcohol, that could so affect the nervous system, brain, or muscles of a person that it would appreciably impair his or her ability to drive as an ordinarily cautious person, in full possession of his or her faculties and using reasonable care, would drive under similar circumstances.]

[If the People have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's blood alcohol level was 0.08 percent or more at the time of the chemical analysis, you may, but are not required to, conclude that the defendant was under the influence of an alcoholic beverage at the time of the alleged offense.]

**[In evaluating any test results in this case, you may consider whether or not the person administering the test or the agency maintaining the testing device followed the regulations of the California Department of Public Health.]**

**[It is not a defense that the defendant was legally entitled to use the drug.]**

**[If the defendant was under the influence of (an alcoholic beverage/ [and/ or] a drug), then it is not a defense that something else also impaired (his/her) ability to drive.]**

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*New January 2006; Revised June 2007, April 2008, August 2015, September 2017, March 2018*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime. Give this instruction if the defendant is charged with a misdemeanor or a felony based on prior convictions.

If the defendant is charged with one or more prior convictions for driving under the influence, the defendant may stipulate to the convictions. (*People v. Weathington* (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 69, 90 [282 Cal.Rptr. 170].) In addition, either the defendant or the prosecution may move for a bifurcated trial. (*People v. Calderon* (1994) 9 Cal.4th 69, 77–78 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 333, 885 P.2d 83]; *People v. Cline* (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1327, 1334–1336 [71 Cal.Rptr.2d 41]; *People v. Weathington, supra*, 231 Cal.App.3d at p. 90.) If the defendant does not stipulate and the court does not grant a bifurcated trial, give CALCRIM No. 2125, *Driving Under the Influence or With 0.08 or 0.04 Percent Blood Alcohol: Prior Convictions*. If the court grants a bifurcated trial, give CALCRIM No. 2126, *Driving Under the Influence or With 0.08 or 0.04 Percent Blood Alcohol: Prior Convictions—Bifurcated Trial*. If the defendant stipulates to the truth of the convictions, the prior convictions should not be disclosed to the jury unless the court admits them as otherwise relevant. (See *People v. Hall* (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 128, 135 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 690].)

The bracketed paragraph that begins with “If the People have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s blood alcohol level was 0.08 percent” explains a rebuttable presumption created by statute. (See Veh. Code, § 23610; Evid. Code, §§ 600–607.) The California Supreme Court has held that a jury instruction phrased as a rebuttable presumption in a criminal case creates an unconstitutional mandatory presumption. (*People v. Roder* (1983) 33 Cal.3d 491, 497–505 [189 Cal.Rptr. 501, 658 P.2d 1302].) In accordance with *Roder*, the instructions have been written as permissive inferences.

The court **must not** give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “If the People have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s blood alcohol level was



0.08 percent” if there is no substantial evidence that the defendant’s blood alcohol level was at or above 0.08 percent at the time of the test. In addition, if the test falls within the range in which no presumption applies, 0.05 percent to just below 0.08 percent, do not give this bracketed sentence. (*People v. Wood* (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d Supp. 11, 15 [255 Cal.Rptr. 537].) The court should also consider whether there is sufficient evidence to establish that the test result exceeds the margin of error before giving this instruction for test results of 0.08 percent. (Compare *People v. Campos* (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 4–5 [188 Cal.Rptr. 366], with *People v. Randolph* (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 11 [262 Cal.Rptr. 378].)

The statute also creates a rebuttable presumption that the defendant was not under the influence if his or her blood alcohol level was less than 0.05 percent. (*People v. Gallardo* (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 489, 496 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 502].) Depending on the facts of the case, the defendant may be entitled to a pinpoint instruction on this presumption. It is not error to refuse an instruction on this presumption if the prosecution’s theory is that the defendant was under the combined influence of drugs and alcohol. (*People v. Andersen* (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1250 [32 Cal.Rptr.2d 442].)

If the evidence demonstrates that the person administering the test or agency maintaining the testing device failed to follow the title 17 regulations, give the bracketed sentence that begins with “In evaluating any test results in this case.” (*People v. Adams* (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 559, 567 [131 Cal.Rptr. 190] [failure to follow regulations in administering breath test goes to weight, not admissibility, of the evidence]; *People v. Williams* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 408, 417 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d 854, 49 P.3d 203] [same]; *People v. Esayian* (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1039 [5 Cal.Rptr.3d 542] [results of blood test admissible even though phlebotomist who drew blood not authorized under title 17].)

Give the bracketed sentence stating that “it is not a defense that something else also impaired (his/her) ability to drive” if there is evidence of an additional source of impairment such as an epileptic seizure, inattention, or falling asleep.

On request, give CALCRIM No. 2241, *Driver and Driving Defined*.

### ***Related Instructions***

CALCRIM No. 2111, *Driving With 0.08 Percent Blood Alcohol*.

CALCRIM No. 2125, *Driving Under the Influence or With 0.08 or 0.04 Percent Blood Alcohol: Prior Convictions*.

CALCRIM No. 2126, *Driving Under the Influence or With 0.08 or 0.04 Percent Blood Alcohol: Prior Convictions—Bifurcated Trial*.

### **AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Veh. Code, § 23152(a), (f), (g).
- Alcoholic Beverage Defined. Veh. Code, § 109; Bus. & Prof. Code, § 23004.
- Drug Defined. Veh. Code, § 312.



- Driving. *Mercer v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles* (1991) 53 Cal.3d 753, 768 [280 Cal.Rptr. 745, 809 P.2d 404].
- Presumptions. Veh. Code, § 23610; Evid. Code, § 607; *People v. Milham* (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 487, 503–505 [205 Cal.Rptr. 688].
- Mandatory Presumption Unconstitutional Unless Instructed as Permissive Inference. *People v. Roder* (1983) 33 Cal.3d 491, 497–505 [189 Cal.Rptr. 501, 658 P.2d 1302].
- Under the Influence Defined. *People v. Schoonover* (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 101, 105–107 [85 Cal.Rptr. 69]; *People v. Enriquez* (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 661, 665–666 [49 Cal.Rptr.2d 710].
- Manner of Driving. *People v. Weathington* (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 69, 84 [282 Cal.Rptr. 170]; *People v. McGrath* (1928) 94 Cal.App. 520, 524 [271 P. 549].
- Legal Entitlement to Use Drug Not a Defense. Veh. Code, § 23630.
- Prior Convictions. *People v. Weathington* (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 69, 90 [282 Cal.Rptr. 170].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

If the defendant is charged with felony driving under the influence based on prior convictions, then the misdemeanor offense is a lesser included offense. The court must provide the jury with a verdict form on which the jury will indicate if the prior convictions have been proved. If the jury finds that the prior convictions have not been proved, then the offense should be set at a misdemeanor.

- Attempted Driving Under the Influence. Pen. Code, § 664; Veh. Code, § 23152(a); *People v. Garcia* (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 3–4 [262 Cal.Rptr. 915].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Driving*

“[S]ection 23152 requires proof of volitional movement of a vehicle.” (*Mercer v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles* (1991) 53 Cal.3d 753, 768 [280 Cal.Rptr. 745, 809 P.2d 404].) However, the movement may be slight. (*Padilla v. Meese* (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 1022, 1029 [229 Cal.Rptr. 310]; *Henslee v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles* (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 445, 450–453 [214 Cal.Rptr. 249].) Further, driving may be established through circumstantial evidence. (*Mercer, supra*, 53 Cal.3d at p. 770; *People v. Wilson* (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 9 [222 Cal.Rptr. 540] [sufficient evidence of driving where the vehicle was parked on the freeway, over a mile from the on-ramp, and the defendant, the sole occupant of the vehicle, was found in the driver’s seat with the vehicle’s engine running].) See CALCRIM No. 2241, *Driver and Driving Defined*.

#### *PAS Test Results*

The results of a preliminary alcohol screening (PAS) test “are admissible upon a showing of either compliance with title 17 or the foundational elements of (1)

properly functioning equipment, (2) a properly administered test, and (3) a qualified operator . . .” (*People v. Williams* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 408, 417 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d 854, 49 P.3d 203].)

***Presumption Arising From Test Results—Timing***

Unlike the statute on driving with a blood alcohol level of 0.08 percent or more, the statute permitting the jury to presume that the defendant was under the influence if he or she had a blood alcohol level of 0.08 percent or more does not contain a time limit for administering the test. (Veh. Code, § 23610; *People v. Schrieber* (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 917, 922 [119 Cal.Rptr. 812].) However, the court in *Schrieber, supra*, noted that the mandatory testing statute provides that “the test must be incidental to both the offense and to the arrest and . . . no substantial time [should] elapse . . . between the offense and the arrest.” (*Id.* at p. 921.)

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, §§ 272–277.

2 Witkin, *California Evidence* (5th ed. 2012) Demonstrative, Experimental, and Scientific Evidence, § 56.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 145, *Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses*, § 145.02[1] (Matthew Bender).

**2111. Driving With 0.08 Percent Blood Alcohol (Veh. Code,  
§ 23152(b))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with driving with a blood alcohol level of 0.08 percent or more [in violation of Vehicle Code section 23152(b)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant drove a vehicle;

AND

2. When (he/she) drove, the defendant's blood alcohol level was 0.08 percent or more by weight.

[If the People have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that a sample of the defendant's (blood/breath) was taken within three hours of the defendant's [alleged] driving and that a chemical analysis of the sample showed a blood alcohol level of 0.08 percent or more, you may, but are not required to, conclude that the defendant's blood alcohol level was 0.08 percent or more at the time of the alleged offense.]

[In evaluating any test results in this case, you may consider whether or not the person administering the test or the agency maintaining the testing device followed the regulations of the California Department of Public Health.]

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2006, June 2007, April 2008, August 2015, March 2018*

**BENCH NOTES**

***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime. Give this instruction if the defendant is charged with a misdemeanor or a felony based on prior convictions.

If the defendant is charged with one or more prior convictions for driving under the influence, the defendant may stipulate to the convictions. (*People v. Weathington* (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 69, 90 [282 Cal.Rptr. 170].) In addition, either the defendant or the prosecution may move for a bifurcated trial. (*People v. Calderon* (1994) 9 Cal.4th 69, 77–78 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 333, 885 P.2d 83]; *People v. Cline* (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1327, 1334–1336 [71 Cal.Rptr.2d 41]; *People v. Weathington, supra*, 231 Cal.App.3d at p. 90.) If the defendant does not stipulate and the court does not grant a bifurcated trial, give CALCRIM No. 2125, *Driving Under the Influence or With 0.08 or 0.04 Percent Blood Alcohol: Prior Convictions*. If the court grants a

bifurcated trial, give CALCRIM No. 2126, *Driving Under the Influence or With 0.08 or 0.04 Percent Blood Alcohol: Prior Convictions—Bifurcated Trial*. If the defendant stipulates to the truth of the convictions, the prior convictions should not be disclosed to the jury unless the court admits them as otherwise relevant. (See *People v. Hall* (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 128, 135 [79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 690].)

The bracketed paragraph that begins with “If the People have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that a sample of” explains a rebuttable presumption created by statute. (See Veh. Code, § 23152(b); Evid. Code, §§ 600–607.) The California Supreme Court has held that a jury instruction phrased as a rebuttable presumption in a criminal case creates an unconstitutional mandatory presumption. (*People v. Roder* (1983) 33 Cal.3d 491, 497–505 [189 Cal.Rptr. 501, 658 P.2d 1302].) In accordance with *Roder*, the instructions have been written as permissive inferences.

The court **must not** give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “If the People have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that a sample of” if there is no substantial evidence that the defendant’s blood alcohol level was at or above 0.08 percent at the time of the test.

If the evidence demonstrates that the person administering the test or agency maintaining the testing device failed to follow the title 17 regulations, give the bracketed sentence that begins with “In evaluating any test results in this case.” (*People v. Adams* (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 559, 567 [131 Cal.Rptr. 190] [failure to follow regulations in administering breath test goes to weight, not admissibility, of the evidence]; *People v. Williams* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 408, 417 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d 854, 49 P.3d 203] [same]; *People v. Esayian* (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1039 [5 Cal.Rptr.3d 542] [results of blood test admissible even though phlebotomist who drew blood not authorized under title 17].)

On request, give CALCRIM No. 2241, *Driver and Driving Defined*.

### **Related Instructions**

CALCRIM No. 2110, *Driving Under the Influence*.

CALCRIM No. 2125, *Driving Under the Influence or With 0.08 or 0.04 Percent Blood Alcohol: Prior Convictions*.

CALCRIM No. 2126, *Driving Under the Influence or With 0.08 or 0.04 Percent Blood Alcohol: Prior Convictions—Bifurcated Trial*.

### **AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Veh. Code, § 23152(b); *Burg v. Municipal Court* (1983) 35 Cal.3d 257, 265–266 [198 Cal.Rptr. 145, 673 P.2d 732].
- Partition Ratio. Veh. Code, § 23152(b); *People v. Bransford* (1994) 8 Cal.4th 885, 890 [35 Cal.Rptr.2d 613, 884 P.2d 70].
- Presumptions. Veh. Code, §§ 23152(b), 23610; Evid. Code, § 607; *People v. Milham* (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 487, 503–505 [205 Cal.Rptr. 688].
- Statute Constitutional. *Burg v. Municipal Court* (1983) 35 Cal.3d 257, 273 [198 Cal.Rptr. 145, 673 P.2d 732].

- Prior Convictions. *People v. Weathington* (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 69, 90 [282 Cal.Rptr. 170].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

If the defendant is charged with felony driving under the influence based on prior convictions, then the misdemeanor offense is a lesser included offense. The court must provide the jury with a verdict form on which the jury will indicate if the prior convictions have been proved. If the jury finds that the prior convictions have not been proved, then the offense should be set at a misdemeanor.

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Partition Ratio*

In 1990, the Legislature amended Vehicle Code section 23152(b) to state that the “percent, by weight, of alcohol in a person’s blood is based upon grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood or grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath.” Following this amendment, the Supreme Court held that evidence of variability of breath-alcohol partition ratios was not relevant and properly excluded. (*People v. Bransford* (1994) 8 Cal.4th 885, 890–893 [35 Cal.Rptr.2d 613, 884 P.2d 70].)

See the Related Issues section in CALCRIM No. 2110, *Driving Under the Influence*.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, §§ 272–277.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 145, *Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses*, § 145.02[1] (Matthew Bender).

## 2112. Driving While Addicted to a Drug (Veh. Code, § 23152(c))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with driving while addicted to a drug [in violation of Vehicle Code section 23152(c)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant drove a vehicle;

AND

2. When (he/she) drove, the defendant was addicted to a drug.

A *drug* is a substance or combination of substances, other than alcohol, that could so affect the nervous system, brain, or muscles of a person that it would appreciably impair his or her ability to drive as an ordinarily cautious person, in full possession of his or her faculties and using reasonable care, would drive under similar circumstances.

A person is *addicted* to a drug if he or she:

1. Has become physically dependent on the drug, suffering withdrawal symptoms if he or she is deprived of it;
2. Has developed a tolerance to the drug's effects and therefore requires larger and more potent doses;

AND

3. Has become emotionally dependent on the drug, experiencing a compulsive need to continue its use.

[It is not a defense that the defendant was legally entitled to use the drug.]

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*New January 2006; Revised March 2018*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime. Give this instruction if the defendant is charged with a misdemeanor or a felony based on prior convictions.

If the defendant is charged with one or more prior convictions for driving under the influence, the defendant may stipulate to the convictions. (*People v. Weathington* (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 69, 90 [282 Cal.Rptr. 170].) In addition, either the defendant or the prosecution may move for a bifurcated trial. (*People v. Calderon* (1994) 9 Cal.4th 69, 77–78 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 333]; *People v. Cline* (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1327, 1334–1336; *People v. Weathington, supra*, 231 Cal.App.3d at p. 90.) If the

defendant does not stipulate and the court does not grant a bifurcated trial, give CALCRIM No. 2125, *Driving Under the Influence or With 0.08 or 0.04 Percent Blood Alcohol: Prior Convictions*. If the court grants a bifurcated trial, give CALCRIM No. 2126, *Driving Under the Influence or With 0.08 or 0.04 Percent Blood Alcohol: Prior Convictions—Bifurcated Trial*. If the defendant stipulates to the truth of the convictions, the prior convictions should not be disclosed to the jury unless the court admits them as otherwise relevant. (See *People v. Hall* (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 128, 135 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 690].)

Vehicle Code section 23630 states that the fact that the defendant was legally entitled to use the drug is not a defense to a charge of driving under the influence. (Veh. Code, § 23630.) It is unclear whether this provision applies to the charge of driving while addicted. If the court concludes that the statute does apply, the court may add the bracketed sentence at the end of the instruction: “It is not a defense that the defendant was legally entitled to use the drug.”

In addition, Vehicle Code section 23152(c) states “[t]his subdivision shall not apply to a person who is participating in a narcotic treatment program approved pursuant to Article 3 (commencing with Section 11875) of Chapter 1 of Part 3 of Division 10.5 of the Health and Safety Code.” If there is evidence that the defendant is participating in an approved treatment program, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on this defense.

On request, give CALCRIM No. 2241, *Driver and Driving Defined*.

### ***Related Instructions***

CALCRIM No. 2125, *Driving Under the Influence or With 0.08 or 0.04 Percent Blood Alcohol: Prior Convictions*.

CALCRIM No. 2126, *Driving Under the Influence or With 0.08 or 0.04 Percent Blood Alcohol: Prior Convictions—Bifurcated Trial*.

## **AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Veh. Code, § 23152(c).
- Drug Defined. Veh. Code, § 312.
- Addict Defined. *People v. O’Neil* (1965) 62 Cal.2d 748, 754 [44 Cal.Rptr. 320, 401 P.2d 928].
- Prior Convictions. *People v. Weathington* (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 69, 90 [282 Cal.Rptr. 170].

## **SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, §§ 272–277.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 145, *Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses*, § 145.02[1][a] (Matthew Bender).

**2113. Driving With 0.05 Percent Blood Alcohol When Under 21  
(Veh. Code, § 23140(a))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with driving when under the age of 21 years with a blood alcohol level of 0.05 percent or more [in violation of Vehicle Code section 23140(a)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant drove a vehicle;
2. When (he/she) drove, the defendant's blood alcohol level was 0.05 percent or more by weight;

AND

3. At that time, the defendant was under 21 years old.

[In evaluating any test results in this case, you may consider whether or not the person administering the test or the agency maintaining the testing device followed the regulations of the California Department of Public Health.]

[Under the law, a person becomes one year older as soon as the first minute of his or her birthday has begun.]

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2015*

**BENCH NOTES**

***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime. Note that this offense is an infraction. (Veh. Code, §§ 40000.1, 40000.15.) However, this instruction has been included because this offense may serve as a predicate offense for gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated or vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated. (Pen. Code, §§ 191.5, 192(c)(3); see *People v. Goslar* (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 270, 275–276 [82 Cal.Rptr.2d 558].)

If the evidence demonstrates that the person administering the test or agency maintaining the testing device failed to follow the title 17 regulations, give the bracketed sentence that begins with “In evaluating any test results in this case.” (*People v. Adams* (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 559, 567 [131 Cal.Rptr. 190] [failure to follow regulations in administering breath test goes to weight, not admissibility, of the evidence]; *People v. Williams* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 408, 417 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d 854, 49 P.3d 203] [same]; *People v. Esayian* (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1039 [5 Cal.Rptr.3d 542] [results of blood test admissible even though phlebotomist who drew blood not authorized under title 17].)



Give the bracketed paragraph about calculating age if requested. (Fam. Code, § 6500; *In re Harris* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 849–850 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391].)

On request, give CALCRIM No. 2241, *Driver and Driving Defined*.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Veh. Code, § 23140(a); *Burg v. Municipal Court* (1983) 35 Cal.3d 257, 265–266 [198 Cal.Rptr. 145, 673 P.2d 732].
- Statute Constitutional. See *Burg v. Municipal Court* (1983) 35 Cal.3d 257, 273 [198 Cal.Rptr. 145, 673 P.2d 732]; *People v. Goslar* (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 270, 275–276 [82 Cal.Rptr.2d 558].

### RELATED ISSUES

See the Related Issues section in CALCRIM No. 2111, *Driving With 0.08 Percent Blood Alcohol*.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare §§ 272–277.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 145, *Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses*, § 145.02[1A][a] (Matthew Bender).

**2114. Driving With 0.04 Percent Blood Alcohol With a Passenger  
for Hire (Veh. Code, § 23152(e))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with driving with a blood-alcohol level of 0.04 percent or more with a passenger for hire [in violation of Vehicle Code section 23152(e)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant drove a vehicle;
2. When (he/she) drove, the defendant's blood-alcohol level was 0.04 percent or more by weight;

AND

3. When (he/she) drove, there was a passenger for hire in the vehicle.

A person is a *passenger for hire* when the person or someone else pays, or is expected to pay, for the ride, the payment is or will be with money or something else of value, and the payment is made to, or expected to be made to, the owner, operator, agent or any other person with an interest in the vehicle.

[If the People have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that a sample of the defendant's (blood/breath) was taken within three hours of the defendant's [alleged] driving and that a chemical analysis of the sample showed a blood alcohol level of 0.04 percent or more, you may, but are not required to, conclude that the defendant's blood alcohol level was 0.04 percent or more at the time of the alleged offense.]

[In evaluating any test results in this case, you may consider whether or not the person administering the test or the agency maintaining the testing device followed the regulations of the California Department of Public Health.]

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*New March 2018, effective July 2018*

**BENCH NOTES**

***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime. Give this instruction if the defendant is charged with a misdemeanor or a felony based on prior convictions.

Do **not** give this instruction if the court has bifurcated the trial. Instead, give CALCRIM No. 2126, *Driving Under the Influence or With 0.08 or 0.04 Percent*

*Blood Alcohol: Prior Convictions—Bifurcated Trial.* See the Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 3100, *Prior Conviction: Nonbifurcated Trial*, for an extensive discussion of bifurcation.

The bracketed paragraph that begins with “If the People have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that a sample of” explains a rebuttable presumption created by statute. (See Veh. Code, § 23152(e); Evid. Code, §§ 600–607.) The California Supreme Court has held that a jury instruction phrased as a rebuttable presumption in a criminal case creates an unconstitutional mandatory presumption. (*People v. Roder* (1983) 33 Cal.3d 491, 497–505 [189 Cal.Rptr. 501, 658 P.2d 1302].) In accordance with *Roder*, the instructions have been written as permissive inferences.

The court **must not** give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “If the People have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that a sample of” if there is no substantial evidence that the defendant’s blood alcohol level was at or above 0.4 percent at the time of the test.

If the evidence demonstrates that the person administering the test or agency maintaining the testing device failed to follow the title 17 regulations, give the bracketed sentence that begins with “In evaluating any test results in this case.” (*People v. Adams* (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 559, 567 [131 Cal.Rptr. 190] [failure to follow regulations in administering breath test goes to weight, not admissibility, of the evidence]; *People v. Williams* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 408, 417 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d 854, 49 P.3d 203] [same]; *People v. Esayian* (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1039 [5 Cal.Rptr.3d 542] [results of blood test admissible even though phlebotomist who drew blood not authorized under title 17].)

On request, give CALCRIM No. 2241, *Driver and Driving Defined*.

### ***Related Instructions***

CALCRIM No. 2110, *Driving Under the Influence*.

CALCRIM No. 2125, *Driving Under the Influence or With 0.08 or 0.04 Percent Blood Alcohol: Prior Convictions*.

CALCRIM No. 2126, *Driving Under the Influence or With 0.08 or 0.04 Percent Blood Alcohol: Prior Convictions—Bifurcated Trial*.

## **AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Veh. Code, § 23152(e).
- Partition Ratio. Veh. Code, § 23152; *People v. Bransford* (1994) 8 Cal.4th 885, 890 [35 Cal.Rptr.2d 613, 884 P.2d 70].
- Presumptions. Veh. Code, §§ 23152(e), 23610; Evid. Code, § 607; *People v. Milham* (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 487, 503–505 [205 Cal.Rptr. 688].
- Prior Convictions. *People v. Weathington* (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 69, 90 [282 Cal.Rptr. 170].

## RELATED ISSUES

### *Defense Stipulation to Prior Convictions*

The defendant may stipulate to the truth of the prior convictions. (*People v. Weathington* (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 69, 90 [282 Cal.Rptr. 170].) If the defendant stipulates, the prior convictions should not be disclosed to the jury unless the court admits them as otherwise relevant. (See *People v. Hall* (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 128, 135 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 690].)

### *Motion for Bifurcated Trial*

Either the defendant or the prosecution may move for a bifurcated trial. (*People v. Calderon* (1994) 9 Cal.4th 69, 77–78 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 333]; *People v. Cline* (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1327, 1334–1336 [71 Cal.Rptr.2d 41]; *People v. Weathington, supra*, 231 Cal.App.3d at p. 90.)

## SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare §§ 272–277.

**2115–2124. Reserved for Future Use**

### (iii) Prior Conviction

#### 2125. Driving Under the Influence or With 0.08 or 0.04 Percent Blood Alcohol: Prior Convictions (Veh. Code, §§ 23550, 23550.5 & 23566)

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If you find the defendant guilty of ([causing injury while] driving under the influence/ [or] [causing injury while] driving with a blood alcohol level of (0.08/0.04) percent or more), [or the lesser offense of driving under the influence [or driving with a blood alcohol level of (0.08/0.04) percent or more]], you must then determine whether the People have proved the additional allegation that the defendant has been convicted of (another/other) driving under the influence offense[s] before. It has already been determined that the defendant is the person named in exhibits \_\_\_\_\_ <insert numbers or descriptions of exhibits>. You must decide whether the evidence proves that the defendant was convicted of the alleged crime[s].

The People allege that the defendant has been convicted of:

[1.] A violation of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert Veh. Code section violated>, on \_\_\_\_\_ <insert date of conviction>, in the \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of court>, in Case Number \_\_\_\_\_ <insert docket or case number>(;/.)

[AND <Repeat for each prior conviction alleged>.]

[Consider the evidence presented on this allegation only when deciding whether the defendant was previously convicted of the crime[s] alleged [or for the limited purpose of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert other permitted purpose, e.g., assessing credibility of the defendant>]. Do not consider this evidence for any other purpose.]

[You must consider each alleged conviction separately.] The People have the burden of proving (the/each) alleged conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden [for any alleged conviction], you must find that the alleged conviction has not been proved.

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*New January 2006; Revised March 2018*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on proof of the alleged prior convictions.

Any prior convictions are a sentencing factor for the trial court and not an element

of the offense. (*People v. Burris* (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1012, 1016, fn. 3 [22 Cal.Rptr.3d 876, 103 P.3d 276].)

Do **not** give this instruction if the court has bifurcated the trial. Instead, give CALCRIM No. 2126, *Driving Under the Influence or With 0.08 or 0.04 Percent Blood Alcohol: Prior Convictions—Bifurcated Trial*. See the Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 3100, *Prior Conviction: Nonbifurcated Trial*, for an extensive discussion of bifurcation.

This instruction **must** be given with the appropriate instruction defining the elements of the driving under the influence offense charged, CALCRIM Nos. 2100, 2101, 2110, 2111.

On request, the court should give the bracketed limiting instruction regarding the evidence of the prior convictions. (See *People v. Valentine* (1986) 42 Cal.3d 170, 182, fn. 7 [228 Cal.Rptr. 25, 720 P.2d 913].) There is no sua sponte duty to give the limiting instruction and the defense may prefer that no limiting instruction be given. (See *People v. Griggs* (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1139 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 380].)

The court must provide the jury with a verdict form on which the jury will indicate if the prior convictions have or have not been proved.

### AUTHORITY

- Enhancements. Veh. Code, §§ 23550, 23550.5 & 23566.
- Prior Convictions. *People v. Weathington* (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 69, 90 [282 Cal.Rptr. 170].
- Judge Determines if Defendant Person Named in Documents. Pen. Code, § 1025(b); *People v. Garcia* (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1165 [132 Cal.Rptr.2d 694].
- Limiting Instruction on Prior Conviction. *People v. Valentine* (1986) 42 Cal.3d 170, 182, fn. 7 [228 Cal.Rptr. 25, 720 P.2d 913]; *People v. Griggs* (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1139 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 380].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### ***Ten-Year “Washout” Period***

Effective January 1, 2005, prior convictions for driving under the influence within ten years of the current offense may be used for enhancement purposes. (See Veh. Code, §§ 23550, 23550.5 & 23566.)

#### ***Order of Convictions, Not Offenses Relevant***

In order for the sentencing enhancements for multiple driving under the influence offenses to apply, the conviction for the other offense or offenses must predate the current offense. (*People v. Snook* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1210, 1216 [69 Cal.Rptr.2d 615, 947 P.2d 808].) The date on which the other offenses occurred is not relevant. (*Ibid.*)

#### ***All Offenses Must Occur Within Time Period***

“[F]or a fourth DUI offense to be charged as a felony, the offense must be committed within [. . . ten] years of three or more separate DUI violations resulting

in convictions, and all four must occur within a period of [. . . ten] years.” (*People v. Munoz* (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 12, 20 [125 Cal.Rptr.2d 182].)

***Prior Felony Reduced to Misdemeanor***

In *People v. Camarillo* (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1386, 1389 [101 Cal.Rptr.2d 618], the defendant had been previously convicted of a felony driving under the influence offense. After successful completion of probation, that felony was reduced to a misdemeanor under Penal Code section 17(b). (*Ibid.*) The court held that that conviction could not later be used as a prior *felony* conviction to enhance the defendant’s sentence. (*Ibid.*)

***Defense Stipulation to Prior Convictions***

The defendant may stipulate to the truth of the prior convictions. (*People v. Weathington* (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 69, 90 [282 Cal.Rptr. 170].) If the defendant stipulates, the prior convictions should not be disclosed to the jury unless the court admits them as otherwise relevant. (See *People v. Hall* (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 128, 135 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 690].)

***Motion for Bifurcated Trial***

Either the defendant or the prosecution may move for a bifurcated trial. (*People v. Calderon* (1994) 9 Cal.4th 69, 77–78 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 333]; *People v. Cline* (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1327, 1334–1336 [71 Cal.Rptr.2d 41]; *People v. Weathington, supra*, 231 Cal.App.3d at p. 90.)

See also the Related Issues section and Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 3100, *Prior Conviction: Nonbifurcated Trial*.

## SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, §§ 289–292.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 145, *Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses*, § 145.02[3][d] (Matthew Bender).

**2126. Driving Under the Influence or With 0.08 or 0.04 Percent Blood Alcohol: Prior Convictions—Bifurcated Trial (Veh. Code, §§ 23550, 23550.5 & 23566)**

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The People have alleged that the defendant was previously convicted of (another/other) driving under the influence offense[s]. It has already been determined that the defendant is the person named in exhibits \_\_\_\_\_ <insert numbers or descriptions of exhibits>. You must decide whether the evidence proves that the defendant was convicted of the alleged crime[s].

The People allege that the defendant has been convicted of:

[1.] A violation of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert Veh. Code section violated>, on \_\_\_\_\_ <insert date of conviction>, in the \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of court>, in Case Number \_\_\_\_\_ <insert docket or case number>(;/.)

[AND <Repeat for each prior conviction alleged>.]

[In deciding whether the People have proved the allegation[s], consider only the evidence presented in this proceeding. Do not consider your verdict or any evidence from the earlier part of the trial.]

You may not return a finding that (the/any) alleged conviction has or has not been proved unless all 12 of you agree on that finding.

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*New January 2006; Revised March 2018*

## **BENCH NOTES**

### ***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on proof of the alleged prior convictions. Give this instruction if the court has granted a bifurcated trial. The court **must also give** CALCRIM No. 221, *Reasonable Doubt: Bifurcated Trial*.

Give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “In deciding whether the People have proved” on request.

The court must provide the jury with a verdict form on which the jury will indicate if the prior conviction has been proved. (Pen. Code, § 1158.)

## **AUTHORITY**

- Enhancements. Veh. Code, §§ 23550, 23550.5 & 23566.
- Prior Convictions. *People v. Weathington* (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 69, 90 [282 Cal.Rptr. 170].
- Bifurcation. *People v. Calderon* (1994) 9 Cal.4th 69, 77–79 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 333]; *People v. Cline* (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1327, 1334–1336 [71 Cal.Rptr.2d 41].



- Judge Determines if Defendant Person Named in Documents. Pen. Code, § 1025(b); *People v. Garcia* (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1165 [132 Cal.Rptr.2d 694].

### RELATED ISSUES

See the Related Issues section in CALCRIM No. 2125, *Driving Under the Influence or With 0.08 or 0.04 Percent Blood Alcohol: Prior Convictions*, and CALCRIM No. 3100, *Prior Conviction: Nonbifurcated Trial*.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, §§ 289–292.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 145, *Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses*, § 145.02[3][d] (Matthew Bender).

**2127–2129. Reserved for Future Use**

## (iv) Refusal

### 2130. Refusal—Consciousness of Guilt (Veh. Code, § 23612)

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The law requires that any driver who has been [lawfully] arrested submit to a chemical test at the request of a peace officer who has reasonable cause to believe that the person arrested was driving under the influence.

*<Give for refusal by words or conduct>*

[If the defendant refused to submit to such a test after a peace officer asked (him/her) to do so and explained the test's nature to the defendant, then the defendant's conduct may show that (he/she) was aware of (his/her) guilt. If you conclude that the defendant refused to submit to such a test, it is up to you to decide the meaning and importance of the refusal. However, evidence that the defendant refused to submit to a chemical test cannot prove guilt by itself.]

*<Give for refusal by silence>*

[A defendant's silence in response to an officer's request to (submit to a chemical test/ [or] complete a chemical test) may be a refusal. If you conclude that the defendant's silence was a refusal, it is up to you to decide its meaning and importance. However, evidence that the defendant refused to submit to a chemical test cannot prove guilt by itself.]

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2009, March 2017*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court may instruct the jury that refusal to submit to a chemical analysis for blood alcohol content may demonstrate consciousness of guilt. (*People v. Sudduth* (1966) 65 Cal.2d 543, 547 [55 Cal.Rptr. 393, 421 P.2d 401].) There is no sua sponte duty to give this instruction.

Do not give this instruction if the defendant is exempted from the implied consent law because the defendant has hemophilia or is taking anticoagulants. (See Veh. Code, § 23612(b) & (c).)

The implied consent statute states that “[t]he testing shall be incidental to a lawful arrest and administered at the direction of a peace officer having reasonable cause to believe the person was driving a motor vehicle in violation of Section 23140, 23152, or 23153.” (Veh. Code, § 23612(a)(1)(C).) If there is a factual issue as to whether the defendant was lawfully arrested or whether the officer had reasonable cause to believe the defendant was under the influence, the court should consider

whether this entire instruction, or the bracketed word “lawfully” is appropriate and/or whether the jury should be instructed on these additional issues. For an instruction on lawful arrest and reasonable cause, see CALCRIM No. 2670, *Lawful Performance: Peace Officer*.

### AUTHORITY

- Implied Consent Statute. Veh. Code, § 23612.
- Instruction Constitutional. *People v. Sudduth* (1966) 65 Cal.2d 543, 547 [55 Cal.Rptr. 393, 421 P.2d 401].
- Silence in Response to Request May Constitute Refusal. *Garcia v. Department of Motor Vehicles* (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 73, 82–84 [109 Cal.Rptr.3d 906].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Silence*

Silence in response to repeated requests to submit to a chemical analysis constitutes a refusal. (*Lampman v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles* (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 922, 926 [105 Cal.Rptr. 101].)

#### *Inability to Complete Chosen Test*

If the defendant selects one test but is physically unable to complete that test, the defendant’s refusal to submit to an alternative test constitutes a refusal. (*Cahall v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles* (1971) 16 Cal.App.3d 491, 496 [94 Cal.Rptr. 182]; *Kessler v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles* (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1134, 1139 [12 Cal.Rptr.2d 46].)

#### *Conditions Placed on Test by Defendant*

“It is established that a *conditional* consent to a test constitutes a refusal to submit to a test within the meaning of section 13353.” (*Webb v. Miller* (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 619, 626 [232 Cal.Rptr. 50] [request by defendant to see chart in wallet constituted refusal, italics in original]; *Covington v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles* (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 54, 57 [162 Cal.Rptr. 150] [defendant’s response that he would only take test with attorney present constituted refusal].) However, in *Ross v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles* (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 398, 402–403 [268 Cal.Rptr. 102], the court held that the defendant was entitled under the implied consent statute to request to see the identification of the person drawing his blood. The court found the request reasonable in light of the risks of HIV infection from improper needle use. (*Id.* at p. 403.) Thus, the defendant could not be penalized for refusing to submit to the test when the technician declined to produce identification. (*Ibid.*)

#### *Defendant Consents After Initial Refusal*

“Once the driver refuses to take any one of the three chemical tests, the law does not require that he later be given one when he decides, for whatever reason, that he is ready to submit. [Citations.] [¶] . . . Simply stated, one offer plus one rejection

equals one refusal; and, one suspension.” (*Dunlap v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles* (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 279, 283 [202 Cal.Rptr. 729].)

#### ***Defendant Refuses Request for Urine Sample Following Breath Test***

In *People v. Roach* (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 891, 893 [166 Cal.Rptr. 801], the defendant submitted to a breath test revealing a blood alcohol level of 0.08 percent. The officer then asked the defendant to submit to a urine test in order to detect the presence of drugs, but the defendant refused. (*Ibid.*) The court held that this was a refusal under the implied consent statute. (*Ibid.*)

#### ***Sample Taken by Force After Refusal***

“[T]here was no voluntary submission on the part of respondent to any of the blood alcohol tests offered by the arresting officer. The fact that a blood sample ultimately was obtained and the test completed is of no significance.” (*Cole v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles* (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 870, 875 [189 Cal.Rptr. 249].)

#### ***Refusal Admissible Even If Faulty Admonition***

Vehicle Code section 23612 requires a specific admonition to the defendant regarding the consequences of refusal to submit to a chemical test. If the officer fails to properly advise the defendant in the terms required by statute, the defendant may not be subject to the mandatory license suspension or the enhancement for willful refusal to complete a test. (See *People v. Brannon* (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 971, 978 [108 Cal.Rptr. 620]; *People v. Municipal Court (Gonzales)* (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 114, 118 [186 Cal.Rptr. 716].) However, the refusal is still admissible in criminal proceedings for driving under the influence. (*People v. Municipal Court (Gonzales)*, *supra*, 137 Cal.App.3d at p. 118.) Thus, the court in *People v. Municipal Court (Gonzales)*, *supra*, 137 Cal.App.3d at p. 118, held that the defendant’s refusal was admissible despite the officer’s failure to advise the defendant that refusal would be used against him in a court of law, an advisement specifically required by the statute. (See Veh. Code, § 23612(a)(4).)

### **SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, §§ 293–303.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 145, *Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses*, § 145.02[2][f] (Matthew Bender).

## 2131. Refusal—Enhancement (Veh. Code, §§ 23577, 23612)

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If you find the defendant guilty of (causing injury while driving under the influence/ [or] [the lesser offense of] driving under the influence), you must then decide whether the People have proved the additional allegation that the defendant willfully refused to (submit to/ [or] complete) a chemical test to determine ((his/her) blood alcohol content/ [or] whether (he/she) had consumed a drug).

To prove this allegation, the People must prove that:

1. A peace officer asked the defendant to submit to a chemical test to determine ((his/her) blood alcohol content/ [or] whether (he/she) had consumed a drug);
2. The peace officer fully advised the defendant of the requirement to submit to a test and the consequences of not submitting to a test;

[AND]

3. The defendant willfully refused to (submit to a test/ [or] to complete the test)(./;)

[AND]

4. The peace officer lawfully arrested the defendant and had reasonable cause to believe that defendant was driving a motor vehicle in violation of Vehicle Code section 23140, 23152, or 23153.]

To have *fully advised the defendant*, the peace officer must have told (him/her) all of the following information:

1. (He/She) may choose a blood(./ or) breath[, or urine] test; [if (he/she) completes a breath test, (he/she) may also be required to submit to a blood [or urine] test to determine if (he/she) had consumed a drug;] [if only one test is available, (he/she) must complete the test available;] [if (he/she) is not able to complete the test chosen, (he/she) must submit to (the other/another) test;]
2. (He/She) does not have the right to have an attorney present before saying whether (he/she) will submit to a test, before deciding which test to take, or during administration of a test;
3. If (he/she) refuses to submit to a test, the refusal may be used against (him/her) in court;
4. Failure to submit to or complete a test will result in a fine and mandatory imprisonment if (he/she) is convicted of driving under

the influence or with a blood alcohol level of 0.08 percent or more;

**AND**

- 5. Failure to submit to or complete a test will result in suspension of (his/her) driving privilege for one year or revocation of (his/her) driving privilege for two or three years.**

*<Short Alternative; see Bench Notes>*

**[(His/Her) driving privilege will be revoked for two or three years if (he/she) has previously been convicted of one or more specific offenses related to driving under the influence or if (his/her) driving privilege has previously been suspended or revoked.]**

*<Long Alternative; see Bench Notes>*

- [A. (His/Her) driving privilege will be revoked for two years if (he/she) has been convicted within the previous (seven/ten) years of a separate violation of Vehicle Code section 23140, 23152, 23153, or 23103 as specified in section 23103.5, or of Penal Code section 191.5 or 192(c)(3). (His/Her) driving privilege will also be revoked for two years if (his/her) driving privilege has been suspended or revoked under Vehicle Code section 13353, 13353.1, or 13353.2 for an offense that occurred on a separate occasion within the previous (seven/ten) years;**

**AND**

- B. (His/Her) driving privilege will be revoked for three years if (he/she) has been convicted within the previous (seven/ten) years of two or more of the offenses just listed. (His/Her) driving privilege will also be revoked for three years if (his/her) driving privilege was previously suspended or revoked on two occasions, or if (he/she) has had any combination of two convictions, suspensions, or revocations, on separate occasions, within the previous (seven/ten) years.]**

**[Vehicle Code section 23140 prohibits a person under the age of 21 from driving with a blood alcohol content of 0.05 percent or more. Vehicle Code section 23152 prohibits driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs or driving with a blood alcohol level of 0.08 percent or more. Vehicle Code section 23153 prohibits causing injury while driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs or causing injury while driving with a blood alcohol level of 0.08 percent or more. Vehicle Code section 23103 as specified in section 23103.5 prohibits reckless driving involving alcohol. Penal Code section 191.5 prohibits gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated, and Penal Code section 192(c)(3) prohibits vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated.]**

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose. It is not required that he or she intend to break the law, hurt someone else, or gain any advantage.

[A person employed as a police officer by \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of agency that employs police officer> is a *peace officer*.]

[A person employed by \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of agency that employs peace officer, e.g., “the Department of Fish and Wildlife”> is a *peace officer* if \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of facts necessary to make employee a peace officer, e.g., “designated by the director of the agency as a peace officer”>.]

[A defendant’s silence in response to an officer’s request to (submit to a chemical test/ [or] complete a chemical test) may be a refusal. If you conclude that the defendant was silent in response to an officer’s request to (submit to a chemical test/[or] complete a chemical test), you must decide whether that conduct was a refusal.]

The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant willfully refused to (submit to/ [or] complete) a chemical test to determine ((his/her) blood alcohol content/ [or] whether (he/she) had consumed a drug). If the People have not met this burden, you must find this allegation has not been proved.

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2009, March 2017*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the elements of the enhancement.

Do not give this instruction if the defendant is exempted from the implied consent law because the defendant has hemophilia or is taking anticoagulants. (See Veh. Code, § 23612(b), (c).)

The implied consent statute states that “[t]he testing shall be incidental to a lawful arrest and administered at the direction of a peace officer having reasonable cause to believe the person was driving a motor vehicle in violation of Section 23140, 23152, or 23153.” (Veh. Code, § 23612(a)(1)(C).) If there is a factual issue whether the defendant was lawfully arrested or whether the officer had reasonable cause to believe the defendant was under the influence, the court should consider whether giving bracketed element 4 is appropriate and whether the jury should be instructed on these additional issues. For an instruction on lawful arrest and reasonable cause, see CALCRIM No. 2670, *Lawful Performance: Peace Officer*.

No reported case has established the degree of detail with which the jury must be instructed regarding the refusal admonition mandated by statute. The committee has provided several different options. The first sentence of element 5 under the



definition of “fully advised” **must** be given. The court then may add either the short alternative or the long alternative or neither. If there is no issue regarding the two- and three-year revocations in the case and both parties agree, the court may choose to use the short alternative or to give just the first sentence of element 5. The court may choose to use the long alternative if there is an objection to the short version or the court determines that the longer version is more appropriate. The court may also choose to give the bracketed paragraph defining the Vehicle and Penal Code sections discussed in the long alternative at its discretion.

When giving the long version, give the option of “ten years” for the time period in which the prior conviction may be used, unless the court determines that the law prior to January 1, 2005 is applicable. In such case, the court must select the “seven-year” time period.

The jury must determine whether the witness is a peace officer. (*People v. Brown* (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 444–445 [250 Cal.Rptr. 604, 758 P.2d 1135].) The court may instruct the jury on the appropriate definition of “peace officer” from the statute (e.g., “a Garden Grove Regular Police Officer and a Garden Grove Reserve Police Officer are peace officers”). (*Ibid.*) However, the court may not instruct the jury that the witness was a peace officer as a matter of law (e.g., “Officer Reed was a peace officer”). (*Ibid.*) If the witness is a police officer, give the bracketed sentence that begins with “A person employed as a police officer.” If the witness is another type of peace officer, give the bracketed sentence that begins with “A person employed by.”

### AUTHORITY

- Enhancements. Veh. Code, §§ 23577 & 23612.
- Statute Constitutional. *Quintana v. Municipal Court* (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 361, 366–369 [237 Cal.Rptr. 397].
- Statutory Admonitions Not Inherently Confusing or Misleading. *Blitzstein v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles* (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 138, 142 [244 Cal.Rptr. 624].
- Silence in Response to Request May Constitute Refusal. *Garcia v. Department of Motor Vehicles* (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 73, 82–84 [109 Cal.Rptr.3d 906].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### ***Admonition Must Convey Strong Likelihood of Suspension***

It is insufficient for the officer to advise the defendant that his or her license “could” be suspended. (*Decker v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles* (1972) 6 Cal.3d 903, 905–906 [101 Cal.Rptr. 387, 495 P.2d 1307]; *Giomi v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles* (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 905, 907 [93 Cal.Rptr. 613].) The officer must convey to the defendant that there is a strong likelihood that his or her license will be suspended. (*Decker, supra*, 6 Cal.3d at p. 906; *Giomi, supra*, 15 Cal.App.3d at p. 907.)

#### ***Admonition Must Be Clearly Conveyed***

“[T]he burden is properly placed on the officer to give the warning required by section 13353 in a manner comprehensible to the driver.” (*Thompson v. Dept. of*



*Motor Vehicles* (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 354, 363 [165 Cal.Rptr. 626].) Thus, in *Thompson, supra*, 107 Cal.App.3d at p. 363, the court set aside the defendant's license suspension because radio traffic prevented the defendant from hearing the admonition. However, where the defendant's own "obstreperous conduct . . . prevented the officer from completing the admonition," or where the defendant's own intoxication prevented him or her from understanding the admonition, the defendant may be held responsible for refusing to submit to a chemical test. (*Morphew v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles* (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 738, 743–744 [188 Cal.Rptr. 126]; *Bush v. Bright* (1968) 264 Cal.App.2d 788, 792 [71 Cal.Rptr. 123].)

***Defendant Incapable of Understanding Due to Injury or Illness***

When the defendant, through no fault of his or her own, is incapable of understanding the admonition or of submitting to the test, the defendant cannot be penalized for refusing. (*Hughey v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles* (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 752, 760 [1 Cal.Rptr.2d 115].) Thus, in *Hughey, supra*, 235 Cal.App.3d at p. 760, the court held that the defendant was rendered incapable of refusing due to a head trauma. However, in *McDonnell v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles* (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 653, 662 [119 Cal.Rptr. 804], the court upheld the license suspension when defendant's use of alcohol triggered a hypoglycemic attack. The court held that because voluntary alcohol use aggravated the defendant's illness, the defendant could be held responsible for his subsequent refusal, even if the illness prevented the defendant from understanding the admonition. (*Ibid.*)

See the Related Issues section in CALCRIM No. 2130, *Refusal—Consciousness of Guilt*.

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, §§ 293–302.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 145, *Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses*, § 145.02[2][f], [4][a], [b] (Matthew Bender).

**2132–2139. Reserved for Future Use**



## **B. FAILURE TO PERFORM DUTY FOLLOWING ACCIDENT**

### **(i) Death or Injury**

**2140. Failure to Perform Duty Following Accident: Death or Injury—Defendant Driver (Veh. Code, §§ 20001, 20003 & 20004)**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with failing to perform a legal duty following a vehicle accident that caused (death/ [or] [permanent] injury) to another person [in violation of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert appropriate code section[s]>].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. While driving, the defendant was involved in a vehicle accident;
2. The accident caused (the death of/ [or] [permanent, serious] injury to) someone else;
3. The defendant knew that (he/she) had been involved in an accident that injured another person [or knew from the nature of the accident that it was probable that another person had been injured];

**AND**

4. The defendant willfully failed to perform one or more of the following duties:
  - (a) To immediately stop at the scene of the accident;
  - (b) To provide reasonable assistance to any person injured in the accident;
  - (c) To give to (the person struck/the driver or occupants of any vehicle collided with) or any peace officer at the scene of the accident all of the following information:
    - The defendant's name and current residence address;

**[AND]**

- The registration number of the vehicle (he/she) was driving(;/.)

*<Give following sentence if defendant not owner of vehicle.>*

**[[AND]**

- **The name and current residence address of the owner of the vehicle if the defendant is not the owner(;/.)]**

*<Give following sentence if occupants of defendant's vehicle were injured.>*

[AND

- **The names and current residence addresses of any occupants of the defendant's vehicle who were injured in the accident.]**

[AND]

- (d) **When requested, to show (his/her) driver's license if available to (the person struck/the driver or occupants of any vehicle collided with) or any peace officer at the scene of the accident(;/.)**

*<Give element 4(e) if accident caused death.>*

[AND

- (e) **The driver must, without unnecessary delay, notify either the police department of the city where the accident happened or the local headquarters of the California Highway Patrol if the accident happened in an unincorporated area.]**

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose. It is not required that he or she intend to break the law, hurt someone else, or gain any advantage.

The duty to *immediately stop* means that the driver must stop his or her vehicle as soon as reasonably possible under the circumstances.

To *provide reasonable assistance* means the driver must determine what assistance, if any, the injured person needs and make a reasonable effort to see that such assistance is provided, either by the driver or someone else. *Reasonable assistance* includes transporting anyone who has been injured for medical treatment, or arranging the transportation for such treatment, if it is apparent that treatment is necessary or if an injured person requests transportation. [The driver is not required to provide assistance that is unnecessary or that is already being provided by someone else. However, the requirement that the driver provide assistance is not excused merely because bystanders are on the scene or could provide assistance.]

The driver of a vehicle must perform the duties listed regardless of who was injured and regardless of how or why the accident happened. It does not matter if someone else caused the accident or if the accident was unavoidable.

**You may not find the defendant guilty unless all of you agree that the People have proved that the defendant failed to perform at least one of the required duties. You must all agree on which duty the defendant failed to perform.**

**[To be *involved in a vehicle accident* means to be connected with the accident in a natural or logical manner. It is not necessary for the driver's vehicle to collide with another vehicle or person.]**

**[When providing his or her name and address, the driver is required to identify himself or herself as the driver of a vehicle involved in the accident.]**

**[A *permanent, serious injury* is one that permanently impairs the function or causes the loss of any organ or body part.]**

**[An accident causes (death/ [or] [permanent, serious] injury) if the (death/ [or] injury) is the direct, natural, and probable consequence of the accident and the (death/ [or] injury) would not have happened without the accident. A natural and probable consequence is one that a reasonable person would know is likely to happen if nothing unusual intervenes. In deciding whether a consequence is natural and probable, consider all the circumstances established by the evidence.]**

**[There may be more than one cause of (death/ [or] [permanent, serious] injury). An accident causes (death/ [or] injury) only if it is a substantial factor in causing the (death/ [or] injury). A *substantial factor* is more than a trivial or remote factor. However, it need not be the only factor that causes the (death/ [or] injury).]**

**[If the accident caused the defendant to be unconscious or disabled so that (he/she) was not capable of performing the duties required by law, then (he/she) did not have to perform those duties at that time. [However, (he/she) was required to do so as soon as reasonably possible.]]**

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2006, October 2010, February 2012, March 2019*

## **BENCH NOTES**

### ***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime. Give this instruction if the prosecution alleges that the defendant drove the vehicle. If the prosecution alleges that the defendant was a nondriving owner present in the vehicle or other passenger in control of the vehicle, give CALCRIM No. 2141, *Failure to Perform Duty Following Accident: Death or Injury—Defendant Nondriving Owner or Passenger in Control*.

If causation is at issue, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on proximate cause. (*People v. Bernhardt* (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 567, 590–591 [35 Cal.Rptr. 401].) If the evidence indicates that there was only one cause of death or injury, the court should give the “direct, natural, and probable” language in the first bracketed paragraph on causation. If there is evidence of multiple causes of death or injury, the court should also give the “substantial factor” instruction in the second bracketed paragraph on causation. (See *People v. Autry* (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 363 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 135]; *People v. Pike* (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 732, 746–747 [243 Cal.Rptr. 54].)

If the defendant is charged under Vehicle Code section 20001(b)(1) with leaving the scene of an accident causing injury, but not death or permanent, serious injury, delete the words “death” and “permanent, serious” from the instruction. If the defendant is charged under Vehicle Code section 20001(b)(2) with leaving the scene of an accident causing death or permanent, serious injury, use either or both of these options throughout the instruction, depending on the facts of the case. When instructing on both offenses, give this instruction using the words “death” and/or “permanent, serious injury,” and give CALCRIM No. 2142, *Failure to Perform Duty Following Accident: Lesser Included Offense*.

Give bracketed element 4(e) only if the accident caused a death.

Give the bracketed portion that begins with “The driver is not required to provide assistance” if there is an issue over whether assistance by the defendant to the injured person was necessary in light of aid provided by others. (See *People v. Scheer* (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1009, 1027 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 676]; *People v. Scofield* (1928) 203 Cal. 703, 708 [265 P. 914]; see also discussion in the Related Issues section below.)

Give the bracketed paragraph defining “involved in a vehicle accident” if that is an issue in the case.

Give the bracketed paragraph stating that “the driver is required to identify himself or herself as the driver” if there is evidence that the defendant stopped and identified himself or herself but not in a way that made it apparent to the other parties that the defendant was the driver. (*People v. Kroncke* (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1535, 1546 [83 Cal.Rptr.2d 493].)

Give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “If the accident caused the defendant to be unconscious” if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant was unconscious or disabled at the scene of the accident.

On request, give CALCRIM No. 2241, *Driver and Driving Defined*.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Veh. Code, §§ 20001, 20003 & 20004.
- Sentence for Death or Permanent Injury. Veh. Code, § 20001(b)(2).
- Sentence for Injury. Veh. Code, § 20001(b)(1).
- Knowledge of Accident and Injury. *People v. Holford* (1965) 63 Cal.2d 74, 170

79–80 [45 Cal.Rptr. 167, 403 P.2d 423]; *People v. Carter* (1966) 243 Cal.App.2d 239, 241 [52 Cal.Rptr. 207]; *People v. Hamilton* (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 124, 133–134 [145 Cal.Rptr. 429].

- Willful Failure to Perform Duty. *People v. Crouch* (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d Supp. 14, 21–22 [166 Cal.Rptr. 818].
- Duty Applies Regardless of Fault for Accident. *People v. Scofield* (1928) 203 Cal. 703, 708 [265 P. 914].
- Involved Defined. *People v. Bammes* (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 626, 631 [71 Cal.Rptr. 415]; *People v. Sell* (1950) 96 Cal.App.2d 521, 523 [215 P.2d 771].
- Immediately Stopped Defined. *People v. Odom* (1937) 19 Cal.App.2d 641, 646–647 [66 P.2d 206].
- Duty to Render Assistance. *People v. Scofield* (1928) 203 Cal. 703, 708 [265 P. 914]; *People v. Scheer* (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1009, 1027 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 676].
- Permanent, Serious Injury Defined. Veh. Code, § 20001(d).
- Statute Does Not Violate Fifth Amendment Privilege. *California v. Byers* (1971) 402 U.S. 424, 434 [91 S.Ct. 1535, 29 L.Ed.2d 9].
- Must Identify Self as Driver. *People v. Kroncke* (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1535, 1546 [83 Cal.Rptr.2d 493].
- Unanimity Instruction Required. *People v. Scofield* (1928) 203 Cal. 703, 710 [265 P. 914].
- Unconscious Driver Unable to Comply at Scene. *People v. Flores* (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1199, 1204 [59 Cal.Rptr.2d 637].
- Offense May Occur on Private Property. *People v. Stansberry* (1966) 242 Cal.App.2d 199, 204 [51 Cal.Rptr. 403].
- Duty Applies to Injured Passenger in Defendant’s Vehicle. *People v. Kroncke* (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1535, 1546 [83 Cal.Rptr.2d 493].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Failure to Stop Following Accident—Injury. Veh. Code, § 20001(b)(1).
- Misdemeanor Failure to Stop Following Accident—Property Damage. Veh. Code, § 20002; but see *People v. Carter* (1966) 243 Cal.App.2d 239, 242–243 [52 Cal.Rptr. 207].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Constructive Knowledge of Injury*

“[K]nowledge may be imputed to the driver of a vehicle where the fact of personal injury is visible and obvious or where the seriousness of the collision would lead a

reasonable person to assume there must have been resulting injuries.” (*People v. Carter* (1966) 243 Cal.App.2d 239, 241 [52 Cal.Rptr. 207] [citations omitted].)

### ***Accusatory Pleading Alleged Property Damage***

If accusatory pleading alleges property damage, Veh. Code, § 20002, see *People v. Carter* (1966) 243 Cal.App.2d 239, 242–243 [52 Cal.Rptr. 207].

### ***Reasonable Assistance***

Failure to render reasonable assistance to an injured person constitutes a violation of the statute. (*People v. Limon* (1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 575, 578 [60 Cal.Rptr. 448].)

“In this connection it must be noted that the statute requires that *necessary* assistance be rendered.” (*People v. Scofield* (1928) 203 Cal. 703, 708 [265 P. 914] [emphasis in original].) In *People v. Scofield, supra*, the court held that where other people were caring for the injured person, the defendant’s “assistance was not *necessary*.” (*Id.* at p. 709 [emphasis in original].) An instruction limited to the statutory language on rendering assistance “is inappropriate where such assistance by the driver is unnecessary, as in the case where paramedics have responded within moments following the accident.” (*People v. Scheer* (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1009, 1027 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 676].) However, “the driver’s duty to render necessary assistance under Vehicle Code section 20003, at a minimum, requires that the driver first ascertain what assistance, if any, the injured person needs, and then the driver must make a reasonable effort to see that such assistance is provided, whether through himself or third parties.” (*Ibid.*) The presence of bystanders who offer assistance is not alone sufficient to relieve the defendant of the duty to render aid. (*Ibid.*) “[T]he ‘reasonable assistance’ referred to in the statute might be the summoning of aid,” rather than the direct provision of first aid by the defendant. (*People v. Limon* (1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 575, 578 [60 Cal.Rptr. 448].)

## **SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, §§ 313–319.

5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 91, *Sentencing*, §§ 91.60[2][b][ii], 91.81[1][d] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 140, *Challenges to Crimes*, § 140.03, Ch. 145, *Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses*, § 145.02[3A][a] (Matthew Bender).



**2141. Failure to Perform Duty Following Accident: Death or Injury—Defendant Nondriving Owner or Passenger in Control (Veh. Code, §§ 20001, 20003 & 20004)**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_ ] with failing to perform a legal duty following a vehicle accident that caused (death/ [or] [permanent] injury) to another person [in violation of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert appropriate code section[s]>].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant [owned and] was riding as a passenger in a vehicle involved in an accident;
2. At the time of the accident, the defendant had full authority to direct and control the vehicle even though another person was driving the vehicle;
3. The accident caused (the death of/ [or] [permanent, serious] injury to) someone else;
4. The defendant knew that the vehicle had been involved in an accident that injured another person [or knew from the nature of the accident that it was probable that another person had been injured];

**AND**

5. The defendant willfully failed to perform one or more of the following duties:
  - (a) To cause the driver of the vehicle to immediately stop at the scene of the accident;
  - (b) When requested, to show (his/her) driver's license, or any other available identification, to (the person struck/ the driver or occupants of any vehicle collided with) or any peace officer at the scene of the accident;
  - (c) To provide reasonable assistance to any person injured in the accident;

**[OR]**

- (d) To give to (the person struck/the driver or occupants of any vehicle collided with) or any peace officer at the scene of the accident all of the following information:
  - The defendant's name and current residence address;

- The registration number of the vehicle (he/she) (owned/  
was a passenger in);  
[AND]
- The name and current residence address of the driver of  
the vehicle(;/.)  
<Give following sentence if defendant not owner of vehicle.>  
[[AND]
- The name and current residence address of the owner of  
the vehicle if the defendant is not the owner(;/.)]  
<Give following sentence if occupants of defendant's vehicle  
were injured.>  
[AND]
- The names and current residence addresses of any  
occupants of the defendant's vehicle who were injured in  
the accident(;/.)]

<Give element 5(e) if accident caused death.>

[OR

- (e) The driver must, without unnecessary delay, notify either the police department of the city where the accident happened or the local headquarters of the California Highway Patrol if the accident happened in an unincorporated area.]

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose. It is not required that he or she intend to break the law, hurt someone else, or gain any advantage.

The duty to *immediately stop* means that the (owner/passenger in control) must cause the vehicle he or she is a passenger in to stop as soon as reasonably possible under the circumstances.

To *provide reasonable assistance* means the (owner/passenger in control) must determine what assistance, if any, the injured person needs and make a reasonable effort to see that such assistance is provided, either by the (owner/passenger in control) or someone else. *Reasonable assistance* includes transporting anyone who has been injured for medical treatment, or arranging the transportation for such treatment, if it is apparent that treatment is necessary or if an injured person requests transportation. [The (owner/passenger in control) is not required to provide assistance that is unnecessary or that is already being provided by someone else. However, the requirement that the (owner/passenger in control) provide assistance is not excused merely because bystanders are on the scene or could provide assistance.]

The (owner/passenger in control) of a vehicle must perform the duties listed regardless of who was injured and regardless of how or why the accident happened. It does not matter if someone else caused the accident or if the accident was unavoidable.

You may not find the defendant guilty unless all of you agree that the People have proved that the defendant failed to perform at least one of the required duties. You must all agree on which duty the defendant failed to perform.

[To be *involved in an accident* means to be connected with the accident in a natural or logical manner. It is not necessary for the vehicle to collide with another vehicle or person.]

[A *permanent, serious injury* is one that permanently impairs the function or causes the loss of any organ or body part.]

[An accident causes (death/ [or] [permanent, serious] injury) if the (death/ [or] injury) is the direct, natural, and probable consequence of the accident and the (death/ [or] injury) would not have happened without the accident. A natural and probable consequence is one that a reasonable person would know is likely to happen if nothing unusual intervenes. In deciding whether a consequence is natural and probable, consider all the circumstances established by the evidence.]

[There may be more than one cause of (death/ [or] [permanent, serious] injury). An accident causes (death/ [or] injury) only if it is a substantial factor in causing the (death/ [or] injury). A *substantial factor* is more than a trivial or remote factor. However, it need not be the only factor that causes the (death/ [or] injury).]

[If the accident caused the defendant to be unconscious or disabled so that (he/she) was not capable of performing the duties required by law, then (he/she) did not have to perform those duties at that time. [However, (he/she) was required to do so as soon as reasonably possible.]]

[If the defendant told the driver to stop and made a reasonable effort to stop the vehicle, but the driver refused, then the defendant is not guilty of this crime.]

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*New January 2006; Revised October 2010*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime. Give this instruction if the prosecution alleges that the defendant was a nondriving owner present in the vehicle or other passenger in control. If the

prosecution alleges that the defendant drove the vehicle, give CALCRIM No. 2140, *Failure to Perform Duty Following Accident: Death or Injury—Defendant Driver*.

If causation is at issue, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on proximate cause. (*People v. Bernhardt* (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 567, 590–591 [35 Cal.Rptr. 401].) If the evidence indicates that there was only one cause of death or injury, the court should give the “direct, natural, and probable” language in the first bracketed paragraph on causation. If there is evidence of multiple causes of death or injury, the court should also give the “substantial factor” instruction in the second bracketed paragraph on causation. (See *People v. Autry* (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 363 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 135]; *People v. Pike* (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 732, 746–747 [243 Cal.Rptr. 54].)

If the defendant is charged under Vehicle Code section 20001(b)(1) with leaving the scene of an accident causing injury, but not death or permanent, serious injury, delete the words “death” and “permanent, serious” from the instruction. If the defendant is charged under Vehicle Code section 20001(b)(2) with leaving the scene of an accident causing death or permanent, serious injury, use either or both of these options throughout the instruction, depending on the facts of the case. When instructing on both offenses, give this instruction using the words “death” and/or “permanent, serious injury,” and give CALCRIM No. 2142, *Failure to Perform Duty Following Accident: Lesser Included Offense*.

Give bracketed element 5(e) only if the accident caused a death.

Give the bracketed portion that begins with “The (owner/passenger in control) is not required to provide assistance” if there is an issue over whether assistance by the defendant to the injured person was necessary in light of aid provided by others. (See *People v. Scheer* (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1009, 1027 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 676]; *People v. Scofield* (1928) 203 Cal. 703, 708 [265 P. 914]; see also discussion in the Related Issues section of CALCRIM No. 2140, *Failure to Perform Duty Following Accident: Death or Injury—Defendant Driver*.)

Give the bracketed paragraph defining “involved in an accident” if that is an issue in the case.

Give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “If the accident caused the defendant to be unconscious” if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant was unconscious or disabled at the scene of the accident.

Give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “If the defendant told the driver to stop” if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant attempted to cause the vehicle to be stopped.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Veh. Code, §§ 20001, 20003 & 20004.
- Sentence for Death or Permanent Injury. Veh. Code, § 20001(b)(2).
- Knowledge of Accident and Injury. *People v. Holford* (1965) 63 Cal.2d 74, 79–80 [45 Cal.Rptr. 167, 403 P.2d 423]; *People v. Carter* (1966) 243 Cal.App.2d

239, 241 [52 Cal.Rptr. 207]; *People v. Hamilton* (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 124, 133–134 [145 Cal.Rptr. 429].

- Willful Failure to Perform Duty. *People v. Crouch* (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d Supp. 14, 21–22 [166 Cal.Rptr. 818].
- Duty Applies Regardless of Fault for Accident. *People v. Scofield* (1928) 203 Cal. 703, 708 [265 P. 914].
- Involved Defined. *People v. Bammes* (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 626, 631 [71 Cal.Rptr. 415]; *People v. Sell* (1950) 96 Cal.App.2d 521, 523 [215 P.2d 771].
- Immediately Stopped Defined. *People v. Odom* (1937) 19 Cal.App.2d 641, 646–647 [66 P.2d 206].
- Duty to Render Assistance. *People v. Scofield* (1928) 203 Cal. 703, 708 [265 P. 914]; *People v. Scheer* (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1009, 1027 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 676].
- Permanent, Serious Injury Defined. Veh. Code, § 20001(d).
- Nondriving Owner. *People v. Rallo* (1931) 119 Cal.App. 393, 397 [6 P.2d 516].
- Statute Does Not Violate Fifth Amendment Privilege. *California v. Byers* (1971) 402 U.S. 424, 434 [91 S.Ct. 1535, 29 L.Ed.2d 9].
- Unanimity Instruction Required. *People v. Scofield* (1928) 203 Cal. 703, 710 [265 P. 914].
- Unconscious Driver Unable to Comply at Scene. *People v. Flores* (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1199, 1204 [59 Cal.Rptr.2d 637].
- Offense May Occur on Private Property. *People v. Stansberry* (1966) 242 Cal.App.2d 199, 204 [51 Cal.Rptr. 403].
- Duty Applies to Injured Passenger in Defendant’s Vehicle. *People v. Kroncke* (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1535, 1546 [83 Cal.Rptr.2d 493].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Failure to Stop Following Accident—Injury. Veh. Code, § 20001(b)(1).
- Misdemeanor Failure to Stop Following Accident—Property Damage. Veh. Code, § 20002; but see *People v. Carter* (1966) 243 Cal.App.2d 239, 242–243 [52 Cal.Rptr. 207].

### RELATED ISSUES

See the Related Issues section in CALCRIM No. 2140, *Failure to Perform Duty Following Accident: Death or Injury—Defendant Driver*.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, §§ 313–319.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 140, *Challenges to Crimes*, § 140.03 (Matthew Bender).

## 2142. Failure to Perform Duty Following Accident: Lesser Included Offense (Veh. Code, §§ 20001, 20003 & 20004)

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The crime[s] of (failing to perform a legal duty following a vehicle accident that caused injury/ [and] failing to perform a legal duty following a vehicle accident that caused property damage) (is a/are) lesser crime[s] than failing to perform a legal duty following a vehicle accident that caused (death/ [or] permanent, serious injury).

The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of failing to perform a legal duty following a vehicle accident that caused (death/ [or] permanent, serious injury) rather than a lesser offense. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of failing to perform a legal duty following a vehicle accident that caused (death/ [or] permanent, serious injury). You must consider whether the defendant is guilty of the lesser crime[s] of [failing to perform a legal duty following a vehicle accident that caused injury] [or] [failing to perform a legal duty following a vehicle accident that caused property damage].

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*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

Give this instruction when: (1) the defendant is charged with leaving the scene of an accident resulting in death or permanent, serious injury and the court is instructing on the lesser offense of leaving the scene of an accident resulting in injury, and/or leaving the scene of an accident resulting in property damage; or (2) when the defendant is charged with leaving the scene of an accident resulting in injury and the court is instructing on the lesser offense of leaving the scene of an accident resulting in property damage.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Veh. Code, §§ 20001, 20003 & 20004.
- Sentence for Death or Permanent Injury. Veh. Code, § 20001(b)(2).
- Sentence for Injury. Veh. Code, § 20001(b)(1).
- Permanent, Serious Injury Defined. Veh. Code, § 20001(d).

### RELATED ISSUES

See the Related Issues section in CALCRIM No. 2140, *Failure to Perform Duty Following Accident: Death or Injury—Defendant Driver*.

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, §§ 313–319.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 140, *Challenges to Crimes*, § 140.03 (Matthew Bender).

**2143–2149. Reserved for Future Use**

## **(ii) Property Damage**

### **2150. Failure to Perform Duty Following Accident: Property Damage—Defendant Driver (Veh. Code, § 20002)**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with failing to perform a legal duty following a vehicle accident that caused property damage [in violation of Vehicle Code section 20002].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. While driving, the defendant was involved in a vehicle accident;
2. The accident caused damage to someone else's property;
3. The defendant knew that (he/she) had been involved in an accident that caused property damage [or knew from the nature of the accident that it was probable that property had been damaged];

**AND**

4. The defendant willfully failed to perform one or more of the following duties:
  - (a) To immediately stop at the scene of the accident;

**OR**

- (b) To immediately provide the owner or person in control of the damaged property with (his/her) name and current residence address [and the name and address of the owner of the vehicle the defendant was driving].

The driver of a vehicle may provide the required information in one of two ways:

1. The driver may locate the owner or person in control of the damaged property and give that person the information directly. On request, the driver must also show that person his or her driver's license and the vehicle registration;

**OR**

2. The driver may leave the required information in a written note in a conspicuous place on the vehicle or other damaged property. The driver must then also, without unnecessary delay, notify either the police department of the city where the accident happened or the local headquarters of the California Highway Patrol if the accident happened in an unincorporated area.



Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose. It is not required that he or she intend to break the law, hurt someone else, or gain any advantage.

The duty to *immediately stop* means that the driver must stop his or her vehicle as soon as reasonably possible under the circumstances.

The driver of a vehicle must perform the duties listed regardless of how or why the accident happened. It does not matter if someone else caused the accident or if the accident was unavoidable.

You may not find the defendant guilty unless all of you agree that the People have proved that the defendant failed to perform at least one of the required duties. You must all agree on which duty the defendant failed to perform.

[To be *involved in a vehicle accident* means to be connected with the accident in a natural or logical manner. It is not necessary for the driver's vehicle to collide with another vehicle or person.]

[When providing his or her name and address, the driver is required to identify himself or herself as the driver of a vehicle involved in the accident.]

[The property damaged may include any vehicle other than the one allegedly driven by the defendant.]

[An accident causes property damage if the property damage is the direct, natural, and probable consequence of the accident and the damage would not have happened without the accident. A *natural and probable consequence* is one that a reasonable person would know is likely to happen if nothing unusual intervenes. In deciding whether a consequence is natural and probable, consider all the circumstances established by the evidence.]

[There may be more than one cause of property damage. An accident causes property damage only if it is a substantial factor in causing the damage. A *substantial factor* is more than a trivial or remote factor. However, it need not be the only factor that causes the property damage.]

[If the accident caused the defendant to be unconscious or disabled so that (he/she) was not capable of performing the duties required by law, then (he/she) did not have to perform those duties at that time. [However, (he/she) was required to do so as soon as reasonably possible.]]

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime. Give this instruction if the prosecution alleges that the defendant drove the vehicle. If the prosecution alleges that the defendant was a nondriving owner present in the vehicle or other passenger in control of the vehicle, give CALCRIM No. 2151, *Failure to Perform Duty Following Accident: Property Damage—Defendant Nondriving Owner or Passenger in Control*.

If causation is at issue, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on proximate cause. (*People v. Bernhardt* (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 567, 590–591 [35 Cal.Rptr. 401].) If the evidence indicates that there was only one cause of property damage, the court should give the “direct, natural, and probable” language in the first bracketed paragraph on causation. If there is evidence of multiple causes of property damage, the court should also give the “substantial factor” instruction in the second bracketed paragraph on causation. (See *People v. Autry* (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 363 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 135]; *People v. Pike* (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 732, 746–747 [243 Cal.Rptr. 54].)

Give the bracketed paragraph defining “involved in a vehicle accident” if that is an issue in the case.

Give the bracketed paragraph stating that “the driver is required to identify himself or herself as the driver” if there is evidence that the defendant stopped and identified himself or herself but not in a way that made it apparent to the other parties that the defendant was the driver. (*People v. Kroncke* (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1535, 1546 [83 Cal.Rptr.2d 493].)

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “The property damaged may include” if the evidence shows that the accident may have damaged only the defendant’s vehicle.

Give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “If the accident caused the defendant to be unconscious” if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant was unconscious or disabled at the scene of the accident.

On request, give CALCRIM No. 2241, *Driver and Driving Defined*.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Veh. Code, § 20002; *People v. Carbajal* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1123, fn. 10 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 681, 899 P.2d 67].
- Knowledge of Accident. *People v. Carbajal* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1123, fn. 10 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 681, 899 P.2d 67].
- Willful Failure to Perform Duty. *People v. Crouch* (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d Supp. 14, 21–22 [166 Cal.Rptr. 818].
- Duty Applies Regardless of Fault for Accident. *People v. Scofield* (1928) 203 Cal. 703, 708 [265 P. 914].
- Involved Defined. *People v. Bammes* (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 626, 631 [71

Cal.Rptr. 415]; *People v. Sell* (1950) 96 Cal.App.2d 521, 523 [215 P.2d 771].

- Immediately Stopped Defined. *People v. Odom* (1937) 19 Cal.App.2d 641, 646–647 [66 P.2d 206].
- Statute Does Not Violate Fifth Amendment Privilege. *California v. Byers* (1971) 402 U.S. 424, 434 [91 S.Ct. 1535, 29 L.Ed.2d 9].
- Must Identify Self as Driver. *People v. Kroncke* (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1535, 1546 [83 Cal.Rptr.2d 493].
- Unanimity Instruction Required. *People v. Scofield* (1928) 203 Cal. 703, 710 [265 P. 914].
- Unconscious Driver Unable to Comply at Scene. *People v. Flores* (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1199, 1204 [59 Cal.Rptr.2d 637].
- Offense May Occur on Private Property. *People v. Stansberry* (1966) 242 Cal.App.2d 199, 204 [51 Cal.Rptr. 403].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, §§ 313–319.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 140, *Challenges to Crimes*, § 140.03 (Matthew Bender).

**2151. Failure to Perform Duty Following Accident: Property  
Damage—Defendant Nondriving Owner or Passenger in Control  
(Veh. Code, § 20002)**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with failing to perform a legal duty following a vehicle accident that caused property damage [in violation of Vehicle Code section 20002].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant [owned and] was riding as a passenger in a vehicle involved in an accident;
2. At the time of the accident, the defendant had full authority to direct and control the vehicle even though another person was driving;
3. The accident caused damage to someone else's property;
4. The defendant knew that (he/she) had been involved in an accident that caused property damage [or knew from the nature of the accident that it was probable that property had been damaged];

**AND**

5. The defendant willfully failed to perform one or more of the following duties:
  - (a) To cause the vehicle to immediately stop at the scene of the accident;

**OR**

  - (b) To provide the owner or person in control of the damaged property with (his/her) name and current residence address [and the name and address of the driver of the vehicle the defendant [owned and] was a passenger in].

The (owner/passenger in control) may provide the required information in one of two ways:

1. He or she may locate the owner or person in control of the damaged property and give that person the required information directly. On request, he or she must also show that person his or her driver's license, or any other available identification, and the vehicle registration;

**OR**

2. He or she may leave the required information in a written note in

a conspicuous place on the vehicle or other damaged property. He or she must then also, without unnecessary delay, notify either the police department of the city where the accident happened or the local headquarters of the California Highway Patrol if the accident happened in an unincorporated area.

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose. It is not required that he or she intend to break the law, hurt someone else, or gain any advantage.

The duty to *immediately stop* means that the (owner/passenger in control) must cause the vehicle he or she is a passenger in to stop as soon as reasonably possible under the circumstances.

The (owner/passenger in control) of a vehicle must perform the duties listed regardless of how or why the accident happened. It does not matter if someone else caused the accident or if the accident was unavoidable.

You may not find the defendant guilty unless all of you agree that the People have proved that the defendant failed to perform at least one of the required duties. You must all agree on which duty the defendant failed to perform.

[To be *involved in an accident* means to be connected with the accident in a natural or logical manner. It is not necessary for the vehicle to collide with another vehicle or person.]

[The property damaged may include any vehicle other than the one the defendant allegedly (owned/was a passenger in).]

[An accident causes property damage if the property damage is the direct, natural, and probable consequence of the accident and the damage would not have happened without the accident. A *natural and probable consequence* is one that a reasonable person would know is likely to happen if nothing unusual intervenes. In deciding whether a consequence is natural and probable, consider all the circumstances established by the evidence.]

[There may be more than one cause of property damage. An accident causes damage only if it is a substantial factor in causing the damage. A *substantial factor* is more than a trivial or remote factor. However, it need not be the only factor that causes the property damage.]

[If the accident caused the defendant to be unconscious or disabled so that (he/she) was not capable of performing the duties required by law, then (he/she) did not have to perform those duties at that time.

[However, (he/she) was required to do so as soon as reasonably possible.]]

[If the defendant told the driver to stop and made a reasonable effort to

**stop the vehicle, but the driver refused, then the defendant is not guilty of this crime.]**

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*New January 2006*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime. Give this instruction if the prosecution alleges that the defendant was a nondriving owner present in the vehicle or other passenger in control. If the prosecution alleges that that the defendant drove the vehicle, give CALCRIM No. 2150, *Failure to Perform Duty Following Accident: Property Damage—Defendant Driver*.

If causation is at issue, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on proximate cause. (*People v. Bernhardt* (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 567, 590–591 [35 Cal.Rptr. 401].) If the evidence indicates that there was only one cause of property damage, the court should give the “direct, natural, and probable” language in the first bracketed paragraph on causation. If there is evidence of multiple causes of property damage, the court should also give the “substantial factor” instruction in the second bracketed paragraph on causation. (See *People v. Autry* (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 363 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 135]; *People v. Pike* (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 732, 746–747 [243 Cal.Rptr. 54].)

Give the bracketed paragraph defining “involved in an accident,” if that is an issue in the case.

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “The property damaged may include” if the evidence shows that the accident may have damaged only the defendant’s vehicle.

Give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “If the accident caused the defendant to be unconscious” if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant was unconscious or disabled at the scene of the accident.

Give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “If the defendant told the driver to stop” if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant attempted to cause the vehicle to be stopped.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Veh. Code, § 20002; *People v. Carbajal* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1123, fn. 10 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 681, 899 P.2d 67].
- Knowledge of Accident. *People v. Carbajal* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1123, fn. 10 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 681, 899 P.2d 67].
- Willful Failure to Perform Duty. *People v. Crouch* (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d Supp. 14, 21–22 [166 Cal.Rptr. 818].

- Duty Applies Regardless of Fault for Accident. *People v. Scofield* (1928) 203 Cal. 703, 708 [265 P. 914].
- Involved Defined. *People v. Bammes* (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 626, 631 [71 Cal.Rptr. 415]; *People v. Sell* (1950) 96 Cal.App.2d 521, 523 [215 P.2d 771].
- Immediately Stopped Defined. *People v. Odom* (1937) 19 Cal.App.2d 641, 646–647 [66 P.2d 206].
- Nondriving Owner. *People v. Rallo* (1931) 119 Cal.App. 393, 397 [6 P.2d 516].
- Statute Does Not Violate Fifth Amendment Privilege. *California v. Byers* (1971) 402 U.S. 424, 434 [91 S.Ct. 1535, 29 L.Ed.2d 9].
- Unanimity Instruction Required. *People v. Scofield* (1928) 203 Cal. 703, 710 [265 P. 914].
- Unconscious Driver Unable to Comply at Scene. *People v. Flores* (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1199, 1204 [59 Cal.Rptr.2d 637].
- Offense May Occur on Private Property. *People v. Stansberry* (1966) 242 Cal.App.2d 199, 204 [51 Cal.Rptr. 403].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, §§ 313–319.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 140, *Challenges to Crimes*, § 140.03 (Matthew Bender).

**2152–2159. Reserved for Future Use**

### (iii) Enhancement

#### 2160. Fleeing the Scene Following Accident: Enhancement for Vehicular Manslaughter (Veh. Code, § 20001(c))

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If you find the defendant guilty of vehicular manslaughter [as a felony] [under Count \_\_\_\_\_], you must then decide whether the People have proved the additional allegation that the defendant fled the scene of the accident after committing vehicular manslaughter [in violation of Vehicle Code section 20001(c)].

To prove this allegation, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant knew that (he/she) had been involved in an accident that injured another person [or knew from the nature of the accident that it was probable that another person had been injured];

AND

2. The defendant willfully fled the scene of the accident.

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose. It is not required that he or she intend to break the law, hurt someone else, or gain any advantage.

[To be *involved in an accident* means to be connected with the accident in a natural or logical manner. It is not necessary for the driver's vehicle to collide with another vehicle or person.]

The People have the burden of proving this allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you must find that this allegation has not been proved.

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2013*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the sentencing factor. (See *Apprendi v. New Jersey* (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 475–476, 490 [120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435].)

Give this instruction if the defendant is charged with an enhancement under Vehicle Code section 20001(c). This enhancement only applies to felony vehicular manslaughter convictions (Pen. Code, §§ 191.5, 192(c)(1) & (3), and 192.5(a) & (c)) and must be pleaded and proved. (Veh. Code, § 20001(c).) Give the bracketed “felony” in the introductory paragraph if the jury is also being instructed on misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter.



Give the bracketed paragraph defining “involved in an accident” if that is an issue in the case.

### AUTHORITY

- Enhancement. Veh. Code, § 20001(c).
- Knowledge of Accident and Injury. *People v. Holford* (1965) 63 Cal.2d 74, 79–80 [45 Cal.Rptr. 167, 403 P.2d 423]; *People v. Carter* (1966) 243 Cal.App.2d 239, 241 [52 Cal.Rptr. 207]; *People v. Hamilton* (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 124, 133–134 [145 Cal.Rptr. 429].
- Willful Failure to Perform Duty. *People v. Crouch* (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d Supp. 14, 21–22 [166 Cal.Rptr. 818].
- Involved Defined. *People v. Bammes* (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 626, 631 [71 Cal.Rptr. 415]; *People v. Sell* (1950) 96 Cal.App.2d 521, 523 [215 P.2d 771].
- Fleeing Scene of Accident. *People v. Vela* (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 942, 950 [140 Cal.Rptr.3d 755].
- First Element of This Instruction Cited With Approval. *People v. Nordberg* (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1238 [117 Cal.Rptr.3d 558].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, § 312.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.02, Ch. 145, *Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses*, § 145.03[4][a] (Matthew Bender).

**2161–2179. Reserved for Future Use**



## C. EVADING

### 2180. Evading Peace Officer: Death or Serious Bodily Injury (Veh. Code, §§ 2800.1(a), 2800.3(a), (b))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with evading a peace officer and causing (death/ [or] serious bodily injury) [in violation of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert appropriate code section[s]>].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. A peace officer in a vehicle was pursuing the defendant, who was also driving a vehicle;
2. The defendant intended to evade the peace officer;
3. While driving, the defendant willfully fled from, or tried to elude, the pursuing peace officer;
4. The defendant's attempt to flee from, or elude, the pursuing peace officer caused (the death of/ [or] serious bodily injury to) someone else;

AND

5. All of the following were true:
  - (a) There was at least one lighted red lamp visible from the front of the peace officer's vehicle;
  - (b) The defendant either saw or reasonably should have seen the lamp;
  - (c) The peace officer's vehicle was sounding a siren as reasonably necessary;
  - (d) The peace officer's vehicle was distinctively marked;

AND

- (e) The peace officer was wearing a distinctive uniform.

[A person employed as a police officer by \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of agency that employs police officer> is a **peace officer**.]

[A person employed by \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of agency that employs peace officer, e.g., "the Department of Fish and Wildlife"> is a **peace officer** if \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of facts necessary to make employee a peace officer, e.g., "designated by the director of the agency as a peace officer">.]

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose. It is not required that he or she intend to break the law, hurt someone else, or gain any advantage.

[A *serious bodily injury* means a serious impairment of physical condition. Such an injury may include[, but is not limited to]: (loss of consciousness/ concussion/ bone fracture/ protracted loss or impairment of function of any bodily member or organ/ a wound requiring extensive suturing/ [and] serious disfigurement).]

A vehicle is *distinctively marked* if it has features that are reasonably noticeable to other drivers, including a red lamp, siren, and at least one other feature that makes it look different from vehicles that are not used for law enforcement purposes.

A *distinctive uniform* means clothing adopted by a law enforcement agency to identify or distinguish members of its force. The uniform does not have to be complete or of any particular level of formality. However, a badge, without more, is not enough.

[An act causes (death/ [or] serious bodily injury) if the (death/ [or] injury) is the direct, natural, and probable consequence of the act and the (death/ [or] injury) would not have happened without the act. A natural and probable consequence is one that a reasonable person would know is likely to happen if nothing unusual intervenes. In deciding whether a consequence is natural and probable, consider all the circumstances established by the evidence.]

[There may be more than one cause of (death/ [or] serious bodily injury). An act causes (death/ [or] injury) only if it is a substantial factor in causing the (death/ [or] injury). A *substantial factor* is more than a trivial or remote factor. However, it need not be the only factor that causes the (death/ [or] injury).]

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2006*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If causation is at issue, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on proximate cause. (*People v. Bernhardt* (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 567, 590–591 [35 Cal.Rptr. 401].) If the evidence indicates that there was only one cause of death or injury, the court should give the “direct, natural, and probable” language in the first bracketed paragraph on causation. If there is evidence of multiple causes of death or injury, the court should also give the “substantial factor” instruction in the second

bracketed paragraph on causation. (See *People v. Autry* (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 363 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 135]; *People v. Pike* (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 732, 746–747 [243 Cal.Rptr. 54].)

The jury must determine whether a peace officer was pursuing the defendant. (*People v. Flood* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 482 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180, 957 P.2d 869].) The court must instruct the jury on the appropriate definition of “peace officer” from the statute. (*Ibid.*) It is an error for the court to instruct that the witness is a peace officer as a matter of law. (*Ibid.* [instruction that “Officer Bridgeman and Officer Gurney are peace officers” was error].) If the witness is a police officer, give the bracketed sentence that begins with “A person employed as a police officer.” If the witness is another type of peace officer, give the bracketed sentence that begins with “A person employed by.”

On request, the court must give CALCRIM No. 3426, *Voluntary Intoxication*, if there is sufficient evidence of voluntary intoxication to negate the intent to evade. (*People v. Finney* (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 705, 712 [168 Cal.Rptr. 80].)

On request, give CALCRIM No. 2241, *Driver and Driving Defined*.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Veh. Code, §§ 2800.1(a), 2800.3(a), (b).
- Serious Bodily Injury Defined. Pen. Code, § 243(f)(4); *People v. Taylor* (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 11, 25, fn. 4 [12 Cal.Rptr.3d 693].
- Distinctively Marked Vehicle. *People v. Hudson* (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1002, 1010–1011 [44 Cal.Rptr.3d 632, 136 P.3d 168].
- Distinctive Uniform. *People v. Estrella* (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 716, 724 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d 383]; *People v. Mathews* (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 485, 491 [75 Cal.Rptr.2d 289].
- Jury Must Determine If Peace Officers. *People v. Flood* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 482 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180, 957 P.2d 869].
- Red Lamp, Siren, Additional Distinctive Feature of Car, and Distinctive Uniform Must Be Proved. *People v. Hudson* (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1002, 1013 [44 Cal.Rptr.3d 632, 136 P.3d 168]; *People v. Acevedo* (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 195, 199 [129 Cal.Rptr.2d 270]; *People v. Brown* (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 596, 599–600 [264 Cal.Rptr. 908].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Misdemeanor Evading a Pursuing Peace Officer. Veh. Code, § 2800.1; *People v. Springfield* (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1674, 1680–1681 [17 Cal.Rptr.2d 278].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Not Inherently Dangerous Felony*

Vehicle Code section 2800.3 is not an inherently dangerous felony and does not support a felony-murder conviction. (*People v. Jones* (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 663, 668–669 [98 Cal.Rptr.2d 724]; *People v. Sanchez* (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 970, 974 [103 Cal.Rptr.2d 809].)

See the Related Issues section to CALCRIM No. 2182, *Evading Peace Officer: Misdemeanor*.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, § 328, 329.

3 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 63, *Double Jeopardy*, § 63.21[2][a] (Matthew Bender).

5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 91, *Sentencing*, §§ 91.22[1][a][iv], 91.60[2][b][i], [ii], 91.81[1][d], [8] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, §§ 142.01[2][b][ii][B], 142.02[2][c], [3][c] (Matthew Bender).

**2181. Evading Peace Officer (Veh. Code, §§ 2800.1(a), 2800.2)**

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**The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with evading a peace officer [in violation of Vehicle Code section[s] (2800.1(a)/ [or] 2800.2)].**

**To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:**

- 1. A peace officer driving a motor vehicle was pursuing the defendant;**
- 2. The defendant, who was also driving a motor vehicle, willfully fled from, or tried to elude, the officer, intending to evade the officer;**

*<Give the appropriate paragraph[s] of element 3 when the defendant is charged with a violation of Vehicle Code section 2800.2>*

**[3A. During the pursuit, the defendant drove with willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property;]**

**[OR]**

**[3B. During the pursuit, the defendant caused damage to property while driving;]**

**[OR]**

**[3C. During the pursuit, the defendant committed three or more violations, each of which would make the defendant eligible for a traffic violation point;]**

**AND**

**[3/4]. All of the following were true:**

- (a) There was at least one lighted red lamp visible from the front of the peace officer's vehicle;**
- (b) The defendant either saw or reasonably should have seen the lamp;**
- (c) The peace officer's vehicle was sounding a siren as reasonably necessary;**
- (d) The peace officer's vehicle was distinctively marked;**

**AND**

**(e) The peace officer was wearing a distinctive uniform.**

**[A person employed as a police officer by \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of agency that employs police officer> is a *peace officer*.]**

**[A person employed by \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of agency that employs**

*peace officer, e.g., “the Department of Fish and Wildlife”* > **is a peace officer if** \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of facts necessary to make employee a peace officer, e.g., “designated by the director of the agency as a peace officer”>.]

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose. It is not required that he or she intend to break the law, hurt someone else, or gain any advantage.

[A person acts with *wanton disregard for safety* when (1) he or she is aware that his or her actions present a substantial and unjustifiable risk of harm, (2) and he or she intentionally ignores that risk. The person does not, however, have to intend to cause damage.]

[\_\_\_\_\_ <insert traffic violations alleged> are each assigned a traffic violation point.]

A vehicle is *distinctively marked* if it has features that are reasonably noticeable to other drivers, including a red lamp, siren, and at least one other feature that makes it look different from vehicles that are not used for law enforcement purposes.

A *distinctive uniform* means clothing adopted by a law enforcement agency to identify or distinguish members of its force. The uniform does not have to be complete or of any particular level of formality. However, a badge, without more, is not enough.

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2006, September 2018*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

The jury must determine whether a peace officer was pursuing the defendant. (*People v. Flood* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 482 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180, 957 P.2d 869].) The court must instruct the jury in the appropriate definition of “peace officer” from the statute. (*Ibid.*) It is an error for the court to instruct that the witness is a peace officer as a matter of law. (*Ibid.* [instruction that “Officer Bridgeman and Officer Gurney are peace officers” was error].) If the witness is a police officer, give the bracketed sentence that begins with “A person employed as a police officer.” If the witness is another type of peace officer, give the bracketed sentence that begins with “A person employed by.”

On request, the court must give CALCRIM No. 3426, *Voluntary Intoxication*, if there is sufficient evidence of voluntary intoxication to negate the intent to evade. (*People v. Finney* (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 705, 712 [168 Cal.Rptr. 80].)

On request, give CALCRIM No. 2241, *Driver and Driving Defined*.



### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Veh. Code, §§ 2800.1(a), 2800.2.
- Willful or Wanton Disregard. *People v. Schumacher* (1961) 194 Cal.App.2d 335, 339–340 [14 Cal.Rptr. 924].
- Three Violations or Property Damage as Wanton Disregard—Definitional. *People v. Taylor* (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1195, 1202–1203 [228 Cal.Rptr.3d 575]; *People v. Pinkston* (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 387, 392–393 [5 Cal.Rptr.3d 274].
- Distinctively Marked Vehicle. *People v. Hudson* (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1002, 1010–1011 [44 Cal.Rptr.3d 632, 136 P.3d 168].
- Distinctive Uniform. *People v. Estrella* (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 716, 724 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d 383]; *People v. Mathews* (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 485, 491 [75 Cal.Rptr.2d 289].
- Jury Must Determine Status as Peace Officer. *People v. Flood* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 482 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180, 957 P.2d 869].
- Red Lamp, Siren, Additional Distinctive Feature of Car, and Distinctive Uniform Must Be Proved. *People v. Hudson* (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1002, 1013 [44 Cal.Rptr.3d 632]; *People v. Acevedo* (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 195, 199 [129 Cal.Rptr.2d 270]; *People v. Brown* (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 596, 599–600 [264 Cal.Rptr. 908].
- Defendant Need Not Receive Violation Points for Conduct. *People v. Leonard* (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 275, 281 [222 Cal.Rptr.3d 868].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Misdemeanor Evading a Pursuing Peace Officer. Veh. Code, § 2800.1; *People v. Springfield* (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1674, 1680–1681 [17 Cal.Rptr.2d 278].
- Failure to Yield. Veh. Code, § 21806; *People v. Diaz* (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1491 [23 Cal.Rptr.3d 653]. (Lesser included offenses may not be used for the requisite “three or more violations.”)

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Inherently Dangerous Felony*

A violation of Vehicle Code section 2800.2 is not an inherently dangerous felony supporting a felony murder conviction. (*People v. Howard* (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1129, 1139 [23 Cal.Rptr.3d 306, 104 P.3d 107].)

See the Related Issues section to CALCRIM No. 2182, *Evading Peace Officer: Misdemeanor*.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, § 306.

5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 91,

*Sentencing*, § 91.22[1][a][iv] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, §§ 142.01[2][b][ii][B], 142.02[2][c] (Matthew Bender).

**2182. Evading Peace Officer: Misdemeanor (Veh. Code,  
§ 2800.1(a))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with evading a peace officer [in violation of Vehicle Code section 2800.1(a)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. A peace officer driving a motor vehicle was pursuing the defendant;
2. The defendant, who was also driving a motor vehicle, willfully fled from, or tried to elude, the officer, intending to evade the officer;

AND

3. All of the following were true:

- (a) There was at least one lighted red lamp visible from the front of the peace officer's vehicle;
- (b) The defendant either saw or reasonably should have seen the lamp;
- (c) The peace officer's vehicle was sounding a siren as reasonably necessary;
- (d) The peace officer's vehicle was distinctively marked;

AND

(e) The peace officer was wearing a distinctive uniform.

[A person employed as a police officer by \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of agency that employs police officer> is a *peace officer*.]

[A person employed by \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of agency that employs peace officer, e.g., "the Department of Fish and Wildlife"> is a *peace officer* if \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of facts necessary to make employee a peace officer, e.g., "designated by the director of the agency as a peace officer">.]

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose. It is not required that he or she intend to break the law, hurt someone else, or gain any advantage.

A vehicle is *distinctively marked* if it has features that are reasonably noticeable to other drivers, including a red lamp, siren, and at least one other feature that makes it look different from vehicles that are not used for law enforcement purposes.

**A *distinctive uniform* means clothing adopted by a law enforcement agency to identify or distinguish members of its force. The uniform does not have to be complete or of any particular level of formality. However, a badge, without more, is not enough.**

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2006*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

The jury must determine whether a peace officer was pursuing the defendant. (*People v. Flood* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 482 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180, 957 P.2d 869].) The court must instruct the jury in the appropriate definition of “peace officer” from the statute. (*Ibid.*) It is an error for the court to instruct that the witness is a peace officer as a matter of law. (*Ibid.* [instruction that “Officer Bridgeman and Officer Gurney are peace officers” was error].) If the witness is a police officer, give the bracketed sentence that begins with “A person employed as a police officer.” If the witness is another type of peace officer, give the bracketed sentence that begins with “A person employed by.”

On request, the court must give CALCRIM No. 3426, *Voluntary Intoxication*, if there is sufficient evidence of voluntary intoxication to negate the intent to evade. (*People v. Finney* (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 705, 712 [168 Cal.Rptr. 80].)

On request, give CALCRIM No. 2241, *Driver and Driving Defined*.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Veh. Code, § 2800.1(a).
- Distinctively Marked Vehicle. *People v. Hudson* (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1002, 1010–1011 [44 Cal.Rptr.3d 632, 136 P.3d 168].
- Distinctive Uniform. *People v. Estrella* (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 716, 724 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d 383]; *People v. Mathews* (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 485, 491 [75 Cal.Rptr.2d 289].
- Jury Must Determine If Peace Officers. *People v. Flood* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 482 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180, 957 P.2d 869].
- Red Lamp, Siren, Additional Distinctive Feature of Car, and Distinctive Uniform Must Be Proved. *People v. Hudson* (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1002, 1013 [44 Cal.Rptr.3d 632, 136 P.3d 168]; *People v. Acevedo* (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 195, 199 [129 Cal.Rptr.2d 270]; *People v. Brown* (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 596, 599–600 [264 Cal.Rptr. 908].

**RELATED ISSUES*****Multiple Pursuing Officers Constitutes Only One Offense***

A defendant “may only be convicted of one count of section 2800.2 even though the pursuit involved multiple police officers in multiple police vehicles.” (*People v. Garcia* (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1163 [132 Cal.Rptr.2d 694].)

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, § 328, 329.

3 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 63, *Double Jeopardy*, § 63.21[2][a] (Matthew Bender).

5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 91, *Sentencing*, § 91.22[1][a][iv] (Matthew Bender).

**2183–2199. Reserved for Future Use**



## D. RECKLESS DRIVING AND SPEED CONTEST

### 2200. Reckless Driving (Veh. Code, § 23103(a) & (b))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with reckless driving [in violation of Vehicle Code section 23103].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant drove a vehicle (on a highway/in an off-street parking facility);

AND

2. The defendant intentionally drove with wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property.

A person acts with *wanton disregard for safety* when (1) he or she is aware that his or her actions present a substantial and unjustifiable risk of harm, and (2) he or she intentionally ignores that risk. The person does not, however, have to intend to cause damage.

[If you conclude that the defendant drove faster than the legal speed limit, that fact by itself does not establish that the defendant drove with wanton disregard for safety. You may consider the defendant's speed, along with all the surrounding circumstances, in deciding whether the defendant drove with wanton disregard for safety.]

[A *vehicle* is a device by which people or things may be moved on a road or highway. A vehicle does not include a device that is moved only by human power or used only on stationary rails or tracks.]

[The term *highway* describes any area publicly maintained and open to the public for purposes of vehicular travel, and includes a street.]

[The term[s] (*vehicle/ [and] highway*) (is/are) defined in another instruction to which you should refer.]

[An *off-street parking facility* is an off-street facility open for use by the public for parking vehicles. It includes a facility open to retail customers, where no fee is charged for parking.]

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2013*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If the defendant is charged with reckless driving on a highway (Veh. Code, § 23103(a)), select the phrase “on a highway” in element 1. If the defendant is charged with reckless driving in an off-street parking facility (Veh. Code, § 23103(b)), select that phrase in element 1.

Give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “If you conclude that the defendant was driving faster than” on request if relevant based on the evidence. (*People v. Nowell* (1941) 45 Cal.App.2d Supp. 811, 813–814 [114 P.2d 81].)

The court must define the terms “highway” and “vehicle.” Give the bracketed definitions of the terms unless the court has already given these definitions in other instructions. In such cases, the court may give the bracketed sentence stating that the terms are defined elsewhere.

If the People allege that defendant violated Vehicle Code section 23105(b) in committing this crime, give CALCRIM No. 3223, *Reckless Driving With Specified Injury*, in addition to this instruction.

Give CALCRIM No. 2241, *Driver and Driving Defined*, on request.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Veh. Code, § 23103(a) & (b).
- Vehicle Defined. Veh. Code, § 670.
- Highway Defined. Veh. Code, § 360.
- Off-Street Parking Facility Defined. Veh. Code, § 12500(c).
- Willful or Wanton Disregard. *People v. Schumacher* (1961) 194 Cal.App.2d 335, 340 [14 Cal.Rptr. 924]; *People v. Young* (1942) 20 Cal.2d 832, 837 [129 P.2d 353].
- Gross Negligence Insufficient. *People v. Allison* (1951) 101 Cal.App.2d Supp. 932, 935 [226 P.2d 85].
- Speeding May Constitute Recklessness Based on Circumstances. *People v. Nowell* (1941) 45 Cal.App.2d Supp. 811, 813–814 [114 P.2d 81].
- Requires Reckless Act of Driving, Not Merely Mental State. *People v. McNutt* (1940) 40 Cal.App.2d Supp. 835, 838–839 [105 P.2d 657]; *People v. Smith* (1939) 36 Cal.App.2d Supp. 748, 751 [92 P.2d 1039].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### ***Offense Is a Misdemeanor, Not an Infraction***

Reckless driving is a misdemeanor and may not be reduced to an infraction. (*People v. Dibacco* (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1, 4 [12 Cal.Rptr.3d 258].)

#### ***Speeding Not Necessarily Lesser Included Offense***

Speeding is not a necessarily lesser included offense of reckless driving. (*People v. Dibacco* (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1, 4 [12 Cal.Rptr.3d 258].)



**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, § 271.

5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 91, *Sentencing*, §§ 91.60[2][b][i], [ii], 91.81[1][d], [8] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 145, *Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses*, § 145.02 (Matthew Bender).

## 2201. Speed Contest (Veh. Code, § 23109(c), (e)(2), (f)(1)–(3))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with engaging in a speed contest [in violation of Vehicle Code section 23109].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant drove a motor vehicle on a highway;  
[AND]
2. While so driving, the defendant willfully engaged in a speed contest(./;)  
[AND]
3. The speed contest was a substantial factor in causing someone other than the defendant to suffer [serious] bodily injury.

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose. It is not required that he or she intend to break the law, hurt someone else, or gain any advantage.

A person *engages in a speed contest* when he or she uses a motor vehicle to race against another vehicle, a clock, or other timing device. [A *speed contest* does not include an event in which the participants measure the time required to cover a set route of more than 20 miles but where the vehicle does not exceed the speed limits.]

[A *serious bodily injury* means a serious impairment of physical condition. Such an injury may include[, but is not limited to]: (loss of consciousness/concussion/bone fracture/protracted loss or impairment of function of any bodily member or organ/a wound requiring extensive suturing/ [and] serious disfigurement).]

[A *motor vehicle* includes a (passenger vehicle/motorcycle/bus/ school bus/ commercial vehicle/truck tractor/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert other type of motor vehicle>).]

[The term *highway* describes any area publicly maintained and open to the public for purposes of vehicular travel, and includes a street.]

[The term[s] (*motor vehicle*/ [and] *highway*) (is/are) defined in another instruction to which you should refer.]

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*New January 2006; Revised June 2007*

### **BENCH NOTES**

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

The court must define the terms “motor vehicle” and “highway.” Give the bracketed definitions unless the court has already given the definition in other instructions. In such cases, the court may give the bracketed sentence stating that the term is defined elsewhere.

If the defendant is charged with aiding and abetting a speed contest under Vehicle Code section 23109(b), give CALCRIM No. 401, *Aiding and Abetting: Intended Crimes*. This instruction also must be given, but the court should modify the first sentence and change “defendant” to “perpetrator” throughout the instruction.

Give the appropriate bracketed language of element 3 if the defendant is charged with causing an injury, as well as CALCRIM No. 240, *Causation*.

Give CALCRIM No. 2241, *Driver and Driving Defined*, on request.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Veh. Code, § 23109(c), (e)(2), (f)(1)–(3).
- Willfully Defined. Pen. Code, § 7(1); *People v. Lara* (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 102, 107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
- Motor Vehicle Defined. Veh. Code, § 415.
- Highway Defined. Veh. Code, § 360.
- Speed Contest. *In re Harvill* (1959) 168 Cal.App.2d 490, 492–493 [335 P.2d 1016] [discussing prior version of statute].
- Serious Bodily Injury Defined. Pen. Code, § 243(f)(4).

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, § 321.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 145, *Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses*, § 145.02[1][c] (Matthew Bender).

## 2202. Exhibition of Speed (Veh. Code, § 23109(c))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with engaging in an exhibition of speed [in violation of Vehicle Code section 23109].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant drove a motor vehicle on a highway;

AND

2. While so driving, the defendant willfully engaged in an exhibition of speed.

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose. It is not required that he or she intend to break the law, hurt someone else, or gain any advantage.

A person *engages in an exhibition of speed* when he or she accelerates or drives at a rate of speed that is dangerous and unsafe in order to show off or make an impression on someone else.

[The People must prove that the defendant intended to show off or impress someone but are not required to prove that the defendant intended to show off to or impress any particular person.]

[A *motor vehicle* includes a (passenger vehicle/motorcycle/motor scooter/bus/school bus/commercial vehicle/truck tractor and trailer/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert other type of motor vehicle>).]

[The term *highway* describes any area publicly maintained and open to the public for purposes of vehicular travel, and includes a street.]

[The term[s] (*motor vehicle*/ [and] *highway*) (is/are) defined in another instruction to which you should refer.]

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*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

The court must define the terms “motor vehicle” and “highway.” Give the bracketed definitions unless the court has already given the definition in other instructions. In such cases, the court may give the bracketed sentence stating that the term is defined elsewhere.

If the defendant is charged with aiding and abetting an exhibition of speed, give

CALCRIM No. 401, *Aiding and Abetting: Intended Crimes*. This instruction also must be given, but the court should modify the first sentence and change “defendant” to “perpetrator” throughout the instruction.

Give CALCRIM No. 2241, *Driver and Driving Defined*, on request.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Veh. Code, § 23109(c), (e)(2), (f)(1)–(3).
- Willfully Defined. Pen. Code, § 7(1); *People v. Lara* (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 102, 107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
- Motor Vehicle Defined. Veh. Code, § 415.
- Highway Defined. Veh. Code, § 360.
- Serious Bodily Injury Defined. Pen. Code, § 243(f)(4).
- Exhibition of Speed Defined. *People v. Grier* (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 360, 364 [38 Cal.Rptr. 11]; *In re Harvill* (1959) 168 Cal.App.2d 490, 492–493 [335 P.2d 1016] [discussing prior version of statute]; see also *Tischhoff v. Wolfchief* (1971) 16 Cal.App.3d 703, 707 [94 Cal.Rptr. 299] [term did not require definition in civil case].
- Screeching Tires. *In re F. E.* (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 222, 225 [136 Cal.Rptr. 547]; *People v. Grier* (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 360, 363 [38 Cal.Rptr. 11].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, § 321.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 145, *Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses*, § 145.02[1][c] (Matthew Bender).

**2203–2219. Reserved for Future Use**



## E. LICENSING OFFENSES

### 2220. Driving With Suspended or Revoked Driving Privilege (Veh. Code, §§ 13106, 14601, 14601.1, 14601.2, 14601.5)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with driving while (his/her) driving privilege was (suspended/ [or] revoked) [in violation of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert appropriate code section[s]>].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant drove a motor vehicle while (his/her) driving privilege was (suspended/ [or] revoked) [for \_\_\_\_\_ <insert basis for suspension or revocation>];

AND

2. When the defendant drove, (he/she) knew that (his/her) driving privilege was (suspended/ [or] revoked).

[If the People prove that:

1. The California Department of Motor Vehicles mailed a notice to the defendant telling (him/her) that (his/her) driving privilege had been (suspended/ [or] revoked);
2. The notice was sent to the most recent address reported to the department [or any more recent address reported by the person, a court, or a law enforcement agency];

AND

3. The notice was not returned to the department as undeliverable or unclaimed;

then you may, but are not required to, conclude that the defendant knew that (his/her) driving privilege was (suspended/ [or] revoked).]

[If the People prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a court informed the defendant that (his/her) driving privilege had been (suspended/ [or] revoked), you may but are not required to conclude that the defendant knew that (his/her) driving privilege was (suspended/ [or] revoked).]

[A *motor vehicle* includes a (passenger vehicle/motorcycle/motor scooter/bus/school bus/commercial vehicle/truck tractor and trailer/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert other type of motor vehicle>).]

[The term *motor vehicle* is defined in another instruction to which you should refer.]

*New January 2006; Revised April 2008*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

In element 1, the court may insert the reason for the suspension or revocation unless the court has accepted a stipulation regarding this issue.

The two bracketed paragraphs that begin with “If the People prove” each explain rebuttable presumptions created by statute. (See Veh. Code, §§ 14601(a), 14601.1(a), 14602(c), 14601.5(c); Evid. Code, §§ 600–607.) The California Supreme Court has held that a jury instruction phrased as a rebuttable presumption in a criminal case creates an unconstitutional mandatory presumption. (*People v. Roder* (1983) 33 Cal.3d 491, 497–505 [658 P.2d 1302].) In accordance with *Roder*, the bracketed paragraphs have been written as permissive inferences.

The court **must not** give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “If the People prove that the California Department of Motor Vehicles mailed a notice” if there is evidence that the defendant did not receive the notice or for other reasons did not know that his or her driving privilege was revoked or suspended.

Similarly, the court **must not** give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “If the People prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a court informed the defendant” if there is evidence that the defendant did not receive the notice or for other reasons did not know that his or her driving privilege was revoked or suspended. In addition, this provision regarding notice by the court only applies if the defendant is charged with a violation of Vehicle Code section 14601.2. (See Veh. Code, § 14601.2(c).) Do not give this paragraph if the defendant is charged under any other Vehicle Code section.

Give the bracketed definition of motor vehicle unless the court has already given the definition in another instruction. In such cases, the court may give the bracketed sentence stating that the term is defined elsewhere.

Give CALCRIM No. 2241, *Driver and Driving Defined*, on request.

If the defendant is charged with one or more prior convictions, give CALCRIM No. 3100, *Prior Conviction: Nonbifurcated Trial*, unless the defendant has stipulated to the conviction. If the court has granted a bifurcated trial on the prior conviction, use CALCRIM No. 3101, *Prior Conviction: Bifurcated Trial*.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Veh. Code, §§ 13106, 14601, 14601.1, 14601.2, 14601.5.
- Motor Vehicle Defined. Veh. Code, § 415.
- Actual Knowledge of Suspension or Revocation Required. *In re Murdock* (1968) 68 Cal.2d 313, 315–316 [66 Cal.Rptr. 380, 437 P.2d 764].
- Mandatory Presumption Unconstitutional Unless Instructed as Permissive



Inference. *People v. Roder* (1983) 33 Cal.3d 491, 497–505 [189 Cal.Rptr. 501, 658 P.2d 1302].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### ***Suspension or Revocation Continues Until License Restored***

In *People v. Gutierrez* (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 166], the defendant's license had been suspended for a period of one year for driving under the influence. The defendant was arrested for driving after that one-year period had expired. The court held that the defendant's license remained suspended even though the stated time period had passed because the defendant had not taken the steps necessary to restore his driving privilege. (*Id.* at pp. 8–9.)

#### ***Privilege to Drive May Be Suspended or Revoked Even If No License Issued***

A person's privilege to drive may be suspended or revoked even though that person has never been issued a valid driver's license. (*People v. Matas* (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d Supp. 7, 9 [246 Cal.Rptr. 627].)

#### ***May Be Punished for This Offense and Driving Under the Influence***

In *In re Hayes* (1969) 70 Cal.2d 604, 611 [75 Cal.Rptr. 790, 451 P.2d 430], the court held that Penal Code section 654 did not preclude punishing the defendant for both driving under the influence and driving with a suspended license.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, § 306.

5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 93, *Disabilities Flowing From Conviction*, § 93.08[6] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 145, *Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses*, § 145.02[1][c] (Matthew Bender).

## 2221. Driving Without a License (Veh. Code, § 12500(a))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with driving without a license [in violation of Vehicle Code section 12500(a)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant drove a motor vehicle on a highway;

[AND]

2. When the defendant drove, (he/she) did not hold a valid California driver's license(;/.)

<Give element 3 when instructing on statutory exemption.>

[AND]

3. The defendant was not excused from the requirement to have a California driver's license.]

Whether the defendant was properly licensed is a matter within (his/her) own knowledge. The defendant must produce evidence tending to show that (he/she) did hold a valid driver's license. If the evidence raises in your mind a reasonable doubt about whether the defendant held a valid driver's license, you must find the defendant not guilty of this crime.

[A *motor vehicle* includes a (passenger vehicle/motorcycle/motor scooter/bus/school bus/commercial vehicle/truck tractor and trailer/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert other type of motor vehicle>).]

[The term *highway* describes any area publicly maintained and open to the public for purposes of vehicular travel, and includes a street.]

[The term[s] (*motor vehicle*/ [and] *highway*) (is/are) defined in another instruction to which you should refer.]

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*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

Exemptions to the licensing requirement are stated in Vehicle Code sections 12501 to 12505. If there is sufficient evidence that the defendant was exempt, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense. Give bracketed element 3.

The court must define the terms "highway" and "motor vehicle." Give the relevant

bracketed definitions unless the court has already given the definition in other instructions. In such cases, the court may give the bracketed sentence stating that the term is defined elsewhere.

Give CALCRIM No. 2241, *Driver and Driving Defined*, on request.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Veh. Code, § 12500(a).
- Offense Is a Misdemeanor. Veh. Code, § 40000.11(b).
- Motor Vehicle Defined. Veh. Code, § 415.
- Highway Defined. Veh. Code, § 360.
- Instruction on Production of Evidence. *People v. Garcia* (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1164 [132 Cal.Rptr.2d 694]; *In re Shawnn F.* (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 184, 198–199 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 263].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, § 305.

5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 93, *Disabilities Flowing From Conviction*, § 93.08[6] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 145, *Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses*, § 145.02[1][c] (Matthew Bender).

## 2222. Failing to Present Driver's License (Veh. Code, § 12951(b))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with failing to present (his/her) driver's license to a peace officer [in violation of Vehicle Code section 12951(b)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant drove a motor vehicle;
2. A peace officer, enforcing the Vehicle Code, demanded that the defendant present (his/her) driver's license for the officer to examine;

AND

3. The defendant did not present (his/her) driver's license in response to the officer's request.

[A *motor vehicle* includes a (passenger vehicle/motorcycle/motor scooter/bus/school bus/commercial vehicle/truck tractor and trailer/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert other type of motor vehicle>).]

[The term *motor vehicle* is defined in another instruction to which you should refer.]

[A person employed as a police officer by \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of agency that employs police officer> is a *peace officer*.]

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New January 2006

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

Give the bracketed definition of motor vehicle unless the court has already given the definition in another instruction. In such cases, the court may give the bracketed sentence stating that the term is defined elsewhere.

Give CALCRIM No. 2241, *Driver and Driving Defined*, on request.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Veh. Code, § 12951(b).
- Offense Is a Misdemeanor. Veh. Code, § 40000.11(i).
- Motor Vehicle Defined. Veh. Code, § 415.

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, § 305.

1 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 11, *Arrest*, § 11.22[2] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 145, *Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses*, § 145.02[1][c] (Matthew Bender).

**2223–2239. Reserved for Future Use**



## F. OTHER VEHICLE OFFENSES

### 2240. Failure to Appear (Veh. Code, § 40508(a))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with failing to appear in court [in violation of Vehicle Code section 40508(a)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant received a citation;
2. In connection with that citation, the defendant (signed a written promise to appear (in court/[or] before a person authorized to receive a deposit of bail)/ [or] received a lawfully granted continuance of (his/her) promise to appear);

AND

3. The defendant willfully failed to appear (in court/[or] before a person authorized to receive a deposit of bail).

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose. It is not required that he or she intend to break the law, hurt someone else, or gain any advantage.

[It does not matter whether the defendant was found guilty of the violation of the Vehicle Code alleged in the original citation.]

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*New January 2006; Revised December 2008*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Veh. Code, § 40508(a).
- Willfully Defined. Pen. Code, § 7(1); *People v. Lara* (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 102, 107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

4 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Pretrial Proceedings, § 53.

1 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 11, *Arrest*, § 11.22[2], Ch. 12, *Bail*, § 12.04 (Matthew Bender).

## 2241. Driver and Driving Defined (Veh. Code, § 305)

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[A *driver* is a person who drives or is in actual physical control of a vehicle.]

[A person *drives* a vehicle when he or she intentionally causes it to move by exercising actual physical control over it. The person must cause the vehicle to move, but the movement may be slight.]

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*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

No case has held that the court has a sua sponte duty to define “driver” or “driving.” This instruction is provided for the court to use, on request, at its discretion.

### AUTHORITY

- Driver Defined. Veh. Code, § 305.
- Driving Defined. *Mercer v. Department of Motor Vehicles* (1991) 53 Cal.3d 753, 763–765 [280 Cal.Rptr. 745, 809 P.2d 404].
- Slight Movement Sufficient. *Padilla v. Meese* (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 1022, 1029 [229 Cal.Rptr. 310]; *Music v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles* (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 841, 850 [270 Cal.Rptr. 692].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Circumstantial Evidence*

Driving may be established through circumstantial evidence. (*Mercer v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles* (1991) 53 Cal.3d 753, 770 [280 Cal.Rptr. 745, 809 P.2d 404].) For example, in *People v. Wilson* (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 9 [222 Cal.Rptr. 540], the court found sufficient evidence of driving where the vehicle was parked on the freeway, over a mile from the on-ramp, and the defendant, the sole occupant of the vehicle, was found in the driver’s seat with the vehicle’s engine running.

#### *Engine Need Not Be On*

In *People v. Hernandez* (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 1177, 1184 [269 Cal.Rptr. 21], the court held that the defendant was “driving” because he was “seated in the driver’s seat steering or controlling the truck while it was still moving, even though the engine was no longer running.” (See also *People v. Jordan* (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d



Supp. 1, 9 [142 Cal.Rptr. 401] [defendant “driving” a moped when she moved it by pedaling, even though the engine was not on].)

***Steering Vehicle***

In *In re Queen T.* (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1143, 1145 [17 Cal.Rptr.2d 922], the court held that the minor was “driving” when she steered the vehicle, even though someone else was sitting in the driver’s seat operating the accelerator and brake.

***Relocating Vehicle in Accident***

In *People v. Kelley* (1937) 27 Cal.App.2d Supp. 771, 773 [70 P.2d 276], the court held that the defendant was not “driving” when he got in the driver’s seat and steered a disabled vehicle, moving it four or five feet to a safe location following an accident. The court specifically stated that its holding was based on the unique facts of the case and that it was not attempting to “give a definition to the word ‘drive.’ ” (*Id.* at p. 775.)

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 145, *Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses*, § 145.02[1][c] (Matthew Bender).

**2242–2299. Reserved for Future Use**



# CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES

## A. CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES

- 2300. Sale, Transportation for Sale, etc., of Controlled Substance (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11352, 11379)
- 2301. Offering to Sell, Transport for Sale, etc., a Controlled Substance (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11352, 11379)
- 2302. Possession for Sale of Controlled Substance (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11351, 11351.5, 11378, 11378.5)
- 2303. Possession of Controlled Substance While Armed With Firearm (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.1)
- 2304. Simple Possession of Controlled Substance (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11350, 11377)
- 2305. Defense: Momentary Possession of Controlled Substance
- 2306. Possession of Controlled Substance with Intent to Commit Sexual Assault (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11350.5, 11377.5)
- 2307–2314. Reserved for Future Use

## B. SUBSTITUTE SUBSTANCE

- 2315. Sale of Substitute Substance (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11355, 11382)
- 2316. Offer to Sell Substitute Substance (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11355, 11382)
- 2317–2319. Reserved for Future Use

## C. FORGED SUBSTANCE

- 2320. Forged Prescription for Narcotic (Health & Saf. Code, § 11368)
- 2321. Forged Prescription for Narcotic: With Possession of Drug (Health & Saf. Code, § 11368)
- 2322–2329. Reserved for Future Use

## D. MANUFACTURING

### (i) Manufacturing and Offering

- 2330. Manufacturing a Controlled Substance (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11379.6(a), 11362.3)
- 2331. Offering to Manufacture a Controlled Substance (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11379.6(a) & (c))
- 2332–2334. Reserved for Future Use

### (ii) Possession of Materials

- 2335. Possession With Intent to Manufacture Methamphetamine or N-ethylamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11383.5(a))
- 2336. Possession With Intent to Manufacture PCP (Health & Saf. Code, § 11383(a))

- 2337. Possession With Intent to Manufacture Methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11383.5(b)(1))
- 2338. Possession of Isomers or Precursors With Intent to Manufacture Controlled Substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11383.5(c)–(f))
- 2339–2349. Reserved for Future Use

**E. CANNABIS**

**(i) Sale, Offering to Sell, Possession for Sale**

- 2350. Sale, Furnishing, Administering or Importing of Cannabis (Health & Saf. Code, § 11360(a))
- 2351. Offering to Sell, Furnish, etc., Cannabis (Health & Saf. Code, § 11360)
- 2352. Possession for Sale of Cannabis (Health & Saf. Code, § 11359)
- 2353–2359. Reserved for Future Use

**(ii) Transportation or Offering to Transport**

- 2360. Transporting or Giving Away Marijuana: Not More Than 28.5 Grams—Misdemeanor (Health & Saf. Code, § 11360(b))
- 2361. Transporting for Sale or Giving Away Cannabis: More Than 28.5 Grams (Health & Saf. Code, § 11360(a))
- 2362. Offering to Transport or Give Away Marijuana: Not More Than 28.5 Grams—Misdemeanor (Health & Saf. Code, § 11360(b))
- 2363. Offering or Attempting to Transport for Sale or Offering to Give Away Cannabis: More Than 28.5 Grams (Health & Saf. Code, § 11360(a))
- 2364. Felony Cannabis Penalty Allegations (Health & Saf. Code, § 11360(a)(3))
- 2365–2369. Reserved for Future Use

**(iii) Planting**

- 2370. Planting, etc., Cannabis (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11358(c)–(d))
- 2371–2374. Reserved for Future Use

**(iv) Simple Possession**

- 2375. Simple Possession of Cannabis or Concentrated Cannabis: Misdemeanor (Health & Saf. Code, § 11357(b))
- 2376. Simple Possession of Cannabis or Concentrated Cannabis on School Grounds: Misdemeanor (Health & Saf. Code, § 11357(c))
- 2377. Simple Possession of Concentrated Cannabis (Health & Saf. Code, § 11357(a))
- 2378–2379. Reserved for Future Use

**F. OFFENSES INVOLVING MINORS**

**(i) Controlled Substances**

- 2380. Sale, Furnishing, etc., of Controlled Substance to Minor (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11353, 11354, 11380(a))
- 2381. Offering to Sell, Furnish, etc., Controlled Substance to Minor (Health & Saf.

## **CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES**

Code, §§ 11353, 11354, 11380(a))

- 2382. Employment of Minor to Sell Controlled Substance (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11353, 11354)
- 2383. Use of Minor as Agent to Violate Controlled Substance Law (Health & Saf. Code, § 11380(a))
- 2384. Inducing Minor to Violate Controlled Substance Laws (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11353, 11354, 11380(a))
- 2385–2389. Reserved for Future Use

### **(ii) Marijuana**

- 2390. Sale, Furnishing, etc., of Cannabis to Minor (Health & Saf. Code, § 11361)
- 2391. Offering to Sell, Furnish, etc., Cannabis to Minor (Health & Saf. Code, § 11361)
- 2392. Employment of Minor to Sell, etc., Cannabis (Health & Saf. Code, § 11361(a))
- 2393. Inducing Minor to Use Cannabis (Health & Saf. Code, § 11361(a))
- 2394–2399. Reserved for Future Use

## **G. USE AND POSSESSION OF PARAPHERNALIA**

### **(i) Use**

- 2400. Using or Being Under the Influence of Controlled Substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11550)
- 2401. Aiding and Abetting Unlawful Use of Controlled Substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11365)
- 2402–2409. Reserved for Future Use

### **(ii) Possession of Paraphernalia**

- 2410. Possession of Controlled Substance Paraphernalia (Health & Saf. Code, § 11364)
- 2411. Possession of Hypodermic Needle or Syringe (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 4140)
- 2412. Fraudulently Obtaining a Hypodermic Needle or Syringe (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 4326(a))
- 2413. Using or Permitting Improper Use of a Hypodermic Needle or Syringe (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 4326(b))
- 2414–2429. Reserved for Future Use

## **H. MONEY FROM CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES**

- 2430. Possession of More Than \$100,000 Related to Transaction Involving Controlled Substance: Proceeds (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.6)
- 2431. Possession of More Than \$100,000 Related to Transaction Involving Controlled Substance: Money to Purchase (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.6)
- 2432. Attorney's Possession of More Than \$100,000 Related to Transaction Involving Controlled Substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.6(b))
- 2433–2439. Reserved for Future Use

**I. OTHER RELATED OFFENSES**

- 2440. Maintaining a Place for Controlled Substance Sale or Use (Health & Saf. Code, § 11366)
- 2441. Use of False Compartment to Conceal Controlled Substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11366.8)
- 2442–2499. Reserved for Future Use

## A. CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES

### 2300. Sale, Transportation for Sale, etc., of Controlled Substance (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11352, 11379)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with (selling/furnishing/administering/giving away/transporting for sale/importing) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert type of controlled substance>, a controlled substance [in violation of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert appropriate code section[s]>].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant (sold/furnished/administered/gave away/transported for sale/imported into California) a controlled substance;
2. The defendant knew of its presence;
3. The defendant knew of the substance's nature or character as a controlled substance;

<When instructing on transportation for sale, give element 4>

[AND]

- [4. When the defendant transported the controlled substance, (he/she) intended (to sell it/[or] that someone else sell it);]

[AND]

<If the controlled substance is not listed in the schedules set forth in sections 11054 through 11058 of the Health and Safety Code, give paragraph 4/5B and the definition of analog substance below instead of paragraph 4/5A.>

- (4/5)A. The controlled substance was \_\_\_\_\_ <insert type of controlled substance>(;/.)

- (4/5)B. The controlled substance was an analog of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert type of controlled substance>(;/.)

<Give element 4/5/6 when instructing on usable amount; see Bench Notes.>

[AND]

- (4/5/6). The controlled substance was in a usable amount.]

[In order to prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People

must prove that \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of analog drug> is an analog of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert type of controlled substance>. An analog of a controlled substance:

1. Has a chemical structure substantially similar to the structure of a controlled substance(./;)]

[OR]

[(2/1). Has, is represented as having, or is intended to have a stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system substantially similar to or greater than the effect of a controlled substance.]]

[*Selling* for the purpose of this instruction means exchanging a controlled substance for money, services, or anything of value.]

[A person *transports* for sale if he or she carries or moves something from one location to another for sale, even if the distance is short.]

[A person *administers* a substance if he or she applies it directly to the body of another person by injection, or by any other means, or causes the other person to inhale, ingest, or otherwise consume the substance.]

[A *usable amount* is a quantity that is enough to be used by someone as a controlled substance. Useless traces [or debris] are not usable amounts. On the other hand, a usable amount does not have to be enough, in either amount or strength, to affect the user.]

[The People do not need to prove that the defendant knew which specific controlled substance (he/she) (sold/furnished/administered/gave away/transported for sale/imported).]

[A person does not have to actually hold or touch something to (sell/furnish/administer/transport it for sale/import/give it away) [it]. It is enough if the person has (control over it/ [or] the right to control it), either personally or through another person.]

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*New January 2006; Revised October 2010, February 2014, August 2014, February 2016, September 2017, March 2019*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

Transportation of a controlled substance requires a “usable amount.” (*People v. Emmal* (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1313, 1316 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 907]; *People v. Ormiston* (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 676, 682 [129 Cal.Rptr.2d 567].) Sale of a controlled



substance does not. (See *People v. Peregrina-Larios* (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1522, 1524 [28 Cal.Rptr.2d 316].) When the prosecution alleges transportation, give bracketed element 5 and the definition of usable amount. When the prosecution alleges sales, do not use these portions. There is no case law on whether furnishing, administering, giving away, or importing require usable quantities.

If the defendant is charged with attempting to import or transport a controlled substance, give CALCRIM No. 460, *Attempt Other Than Attempted Murder*, with this instruction.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11352, 11379.
- Administering. Health & Saf. Code, § 11002.
- Administering Does Not Include Self-Administering. *People v. Label* (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 766, 770–771 [119 Cal.Rptr. 522].
- Knowledge. *People v. Horn* (1960) 187 Cal.App.2d 68, 74–75 [9 Cal.Rptr. 578].
- Selling. *People v. Lazenby* (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1842, 1845 [8 Cal.Rptr.2d 541].
- Transportation: Usable Amount. *People v. Emmal* (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1313, 1316 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 907]; *People v. Ormiston* (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 676, 682 [129 Cal.Rptr.2d 567].
- Usable Amount. *People v. Rubacalba* (1993) 6 Cal.4th 62, 65–67 [23 Cal.Rptr.2d 628, 859 P.2d 708]; *People v. Piper* (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 248, 250 [96 Cal.Rptr. 643].
- Definition of Analog Controlled Substance. Health & Saf. Code, § 11401; *People v. Davis* (2013) 57 Cal.4th 353, 357, fn. 2 [159 Cal.Rptr.3d 405, 303 P.3d 1179].
- No Finding Necessary for “Expressly Listed” Controlled Substance. *People v. Davis, supra*, 57 Cal.4th at p. 362, fn. 5.
- Intent Requirement for Transportation for Sale. *People v. Lua* (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1004, 1014–1016 [217 Cal.Rptr.3d 23].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Simple Possession Is Not a Lesser Included Offense of This Crime. (*People v. Murphy* (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 979, 983–984 [64 Cal.Rptr.3d 926]; *People v. Peregrina-Larios* (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1522, 1524 [28 Cal.Rptr.2d 316] [lesser related offense but not necessarily included].)
- Possession for Sale Is Not a Lesser Included Offense of This Crime. (*People v. Peregrina-Larios* (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1522, 1524 [28 Cal.Rptr.2d 316] [lesser related offense but not necessarily included].)

Note: In reviewing the appropriateness of sentencing enhancements, *Valenzuela v.*

*Superior Court* (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1445, 1451 [39 Cal.Rptr.2d 781], finds that offering to sell is a lesser included offense of selling, and that therefore a lesser sentence is appropriate for offering to sell. However, the cases it cites in support of that conclusion do not address that specific issue. Because offering to sell is a specific-intent crime (see *People v. Jackson* (1963) 59 Cal.2d 468, 469–470 [30 Cal.Rptr. 329, 381 P.2d 1]) and selling does not require specific intent, the committee does not include offering to sell as a lesser included offense.

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Transportation*

Transportation does not require personal possession by the defendant. (*People v. Rogers* (1971) 5 Cal.3d 129, 134 [95 Cal.Rptr. 601, 486 P.2d 129] [abrogated in part by statute on other grounds].) Transportation of a controlled substance includes transporting by riding a bicycle (*People v. LaCross* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 182, 187 [109 Cal.Rptr.2d 802]) or walking (*People v. Ormiston* (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 676, 685 [129 Cal.Rptr.2d 567]). The controlled substance must be moved “from one location to another,” but the movement may be minimal. (*Id.* at p. 684.)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, §§ 115–123.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 145, *Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses*, § 145.01[1] (Matthew Bender).

**2301. Offering to Sell, Transport for Sale, etc., a Controlled Substance (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11352, 11379)**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with offering to (sell/furnish/administer/give away/transport for sale/import) \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert type of controlled substance>*, a controlled substance [in violation of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert appropriate code section[s]>*].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant [unlawfully] offered to (sell/furnish/administer/give away/transport for sale/import into California) a controlled substance;
2. When the defendant made the offer, (he/she) intended to (sell/furnish/administer/give away/transport for sale/import) the controlled substance.

**AND**

*<If the controlled substance is not listed in the schedules set forth in sections 11054 through 11058 of the Health and Safety Code, give paragraph 3B and the definition of analog substance below instead of paragraph 3A.>*

**3A. The controlled substance was \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert type of controlled substance>*.**

**3B. The controlled substance was an analog of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert type of controlled substance>*.**

[In order to prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of analog drug>* is an analog of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert type of controlled substance>*. An analog of a controlled substance:

- [1. Has a chemical structure substantially similar to the structure of a controlled substance(./;)]

[OR]

- [(2/1). Has, is represented as having, or is intended to have a stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system substantially similar to or greater than the effect of a controlled substance.]]

[*Selling* for the purpose of this instruction means exchanging a controlled substance for money, services, or anything of value.]

[A person *transports* for sale if he or she carries or moves something

from one location to another, even if the distance is short.]

[A person *administers* a substance if he or she applies it directly to the body of another person by injection, or by any other means, or causes the other person to inhale, ingest, or otherwise consume the substance.]

[The People do not need to prove that the defendant actually possessed the controlled substance.]

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2014, August 2014, September 2017*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11352, 11379.
- Administering. Health & Saf. Code, § 11002.
- Specific Intent. *People v. Jackson* (1963) 59 Cal.2d 468, 469–470 [30 Cal.Rptr. 329, 381 P.2d 1].
- Definition of Analog Controlled Substance. Health & Saf. Code, § 11401; *People v. Davis* (2013) 57 Cal.4th 353, 357, fn. 2 [159 Cal.Rptr.3d 405, 303 P.3d 1179].
- No Finding Necessary for “Expressly Listed” Controlled Substance. *People v. Davis, supra*, 57 Cal.4th at p. 362, fn. 5.
- Intent Requirement for Transportation for Sale. *People v. Lua* (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1004, 1014–1016 [217 Cal.Rptr.3d 23].

## LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Simple Possession of Controlled Substance. Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11350, 11377; *People v. Peregrina-Larios* (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1522, 1524 [28 Cal.Rptr.2d 316] [lesser related offense but not necessarily included]; but see *People v. Tinajero* (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1541, 1547 [24 Cal.Rptr.2d 298] [finding a lesser included offense on factual but not legal basis].
- Possession for Sale. Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11351, 11378; *People v. Peregrina-Larios* (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1522, 1524 [28 Cal.Rptr.2d 316] [lesser related offense but not necessarily included] but see *People v. Tinajero* (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1541, 1547 [24 Cal.Rptr.2d 298] [finding a lesser included offense on factual but not legal basis].

## RELATED ISSUES

### *No Requirement That Defendant Delivered or Possessed Drugs*

A defendant may be convicted of offering to sell even if there is no evidence that he or she delivered or ever possessed any controlled substance. (*People v. Jackson*

(1963) 59 Cal.2d 468, 469 [30 Cal.Rptr. 329, 381 P.2d 1]; *People v. Brown* (1960) 55 Cal.2d 64, 68 [9 Cal.Rptr. 816, 357 P.2d 1072].)

***Transportation for Sale***

Effective January 1, 2014, the definition of “transportation” is limited to transportation for sale for the purposes of section 11352. Health & Saf. Code, § 11352(c).

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, §§ 85–113, 147–151.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 145, *Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses*, § 145.01[1][a], [g]–[j] (Matthew Bender).

**2302. Possession for Sale of Controlled Substance (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11351, 11351.5, 11378, 11378.5)**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with possession for sale of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert type of controlled substance>*, a controlled substance [in violation of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert appropriate code section[s]>*].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant [unlawfully] possessed a controlled substance;
2. The defendant knew of its presence;
3. The defendant knew of the substance's nature or character as a controlled substance;
4. When the defendant possessed the controlled substance, (he/she) intended (to sell it/ [or] that someone else sell it);

*<If the controlled substance is not listed in the schedules set forth in sections 11054 through 11058 of the Health and Safety Code, give paragraph 5B and the definition of analog substance below instead of paragraph 5A.>*

**5A.** The controlled substance was \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert type of controlled substance>*;

**5B.** The controlled substance was an analog of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert type of controlled substance>*;

**AND**

6. The controlled substance was in a usable amount.

[In order to prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of analog drug>* is an analog of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert type of controlled substance>*. An analog of a controlled substance:

- [1. Has a chemical structure substantially similar to the structure of a controlled substance(/;)]

[OR]

- [(2/1). Has, is represented as having, or is intended to have a stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system substantially similar to or greater than the effect of a controlled substance.]]

**Selling** for the purpose of this instruction means exchanging \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert type of controlled substance>* for money, services, or anything of value.

**A usable amount is a quantity that is enough to be used by someone as a controlled substance. Useless traces [or debris] are not usable amounts. On the other hand, a usable amount does not have to be enough, in either amount or strength, to affect the user.**

**[The People do not need to prove that the defendant knew which specific controlled substance (he/she) possessed.]**

**[Two or more people may possess something at the same time.]**

**[A person does not have to actually hold or touch something to possess it. It is enough if the person has (control over it/ [or] the right to control it), either personally or through another person.]**

**[Agreeing to buy a controlled substance does not, by itself, mean that a person has control over that substance.]**

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*New January 2006; Revised October 2010, February 2014, February 2016, September 2017*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11351, 11351.5, 11378, 11378.5.
- Constructive vs. Actual Possession. *People v. Barnes* (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 552, 556 [67 Cal.Rptr.2d 162].
- Knowledge. *People v. Horn* (1960) 187 Cal.App.2d 68, 74–75 [9 Cal.Rptr. 578].
- Selling. *People v. Lazenby* (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1842, 1845 [8 Cal.Rptr.2d 541].
- Usable Amount. *People v. Rubacalba* (1993) 6 Cal.4th 62, 65–67 [23 Cal.Rptr.2d 628, 859 P.2d 708]; *People v. Piper* (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 248, 250 [96 Cal.Rptr. 643].
- This Instruction Is Correct. *People v. Montero* (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1170, 1177 [66 Cal.Rptr.3d 668].
- Definition of Analog Controlled Substance. Health & Saf. Code, § 11401; *People v. Davis* (2013) 57 Cal.4th 353, 357, fn. 2 [159 Cal.Rptr.3d 405, 303 P.3d 1179].
- No Finding Necessary for “Expressly Listed” Controlled Substance. *People v. Davis, supra*, 57 Cal.4th at p. 362, fn. 5.
- Specific Intent to Sell Personally or That Another Will Sell Required. *People v.*

*Parra* (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 222, 226 [8 Cal.Rptr.2d 541] and *People v. Consuegra* (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1726, 1732, fn. 4 [32 Cal.Rptr.2d 288].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Simple Possession of a Controlled Substance. *People v. Saldana* (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 443, 453–458 [204 Cal.Rptr. 465].
- Possession of Cocaine for Sale Is Not Necessarily Included Offense of Selling Cocaine Base. *People v. Murphy* (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1504, 1508 [36 Cal.Rptr.3d 872]).

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, §§ 87–88, 101.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 145, *Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses*, § 145.01[1][a]–[c], [e], [h] (Matthew Bender).



**2303. Possession of Controlled Substance While Armed With  
Firearm (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.1)**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with possessing \_\_\_\_\_  
<insert type of controlled substance specified in Health & Saf. Code,  
§ 11370.1>, a controlled substance, while armed with a firearm [in  
violation of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert appropriate code section[s]>].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must  
prove that:

1. The defendant [unlawfully] possessed a controlled substance;
2. The defendant knew of its presence;
3. The defendant knew of the substance's nature or character as a  
controlled substance;

*<If the controlled substance is not listed in the schedules set forth in  
sections 11054 through 11058 of the Health and Safety Code, give  
paragraph 4B and the definition of analog substance below instead of  
paragraph 4A.>*

- 4A. The controlled substance was \_\_\_\_\_ <insert type of  
controlled substance>;
- 4B. The controlled substance was an analog of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert  
type of controlled substance>;
5. The controlled substance was in a usable amount;
6. While possessing that controlled substance, the defendant had a  
loaded, operable firearm available for immediate offensive or  
defensive use;

**AND**

7. The defendant knew that (he/she) had the firearm available for  
immediate offensive or defensive use.

[In order to prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People  
must prove that \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of analog drug> is an analog  
of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert type of controlled substance>. An analog of a  
controlled substance:

- [1. Has a chemical structure substantially similar to the structure of  
a controlled substance(./;)]

[OR]

- [(2/1). Has, is represented as having, or is intended to have a stimulant,  
depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system

substantially similar to or greater than the effect of a controlled substance.]]

**Knowledge that an available firearm is loaded and operable is not required.**

**A *firearm* is any device designed to be used as a weapon, from which a projectile is expelled or discharged through a barrel by the force of an explosion or other form of combustion.**

**A *usable amount* is a quantity that is enough to be used by someone as a controlled substance. Useless traces [or debris] are not usable amounts. On the other hand, a usable amount does not have to be enough, in either amount or strength, to affect the user.**

**[The People do not need to prove that the defendant knew which specific controlled substance (he/she) possessed.]**

**[Two or more people may possess something at the same time.]**

**[A person does not have to actually hold or touch something to possess it. It is enough if the person has (control over it/ [or] the right to control it), either personally or through another person.]**

**[Agreeing to buy a controlled substance does not, by itself, mean that a person has control over that substance.]**

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2006, October 2010, August 2013, February 2014, September 2017*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.1; *People v. Palaschak* (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1236, 1242 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 722, 893 P.2d 717].
- Constructive vs. Actual Possession. *People v. Barnes* (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 552, 556 [67 Cal.Rptr.2d 162].
- Knowledge of Controlled Substance. *People v. Horn* (1960) 187 Cal.App.2d 68, 74–75 [9 Cal.Rptr. 578].
- Usable Amount. *People v. Rubacalba* (1993) 6 Cal.4th 62, 65–67 [23 Cal.Rptr.2d 628, 859 P.2d 708]; *People v. Piper* (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 248, 250 [96 Cal.Rptr. 643].
- Loaded Firearm. *People v. Clark* (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1147, 1153 [53 Cal.Rptr.2d 99].

- Knowledge of Presence of Firearm. *People v. Singh* (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 905, 912–913 [14 Cal.Rptr.3d 769].
- Knowledge That Firearm is Loaded or Operable Not Required. *People v. Heath* (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 490, 498 [36 Cal.Rptr.3d 66].
- Definition of Analog Controlled Substance. Health & Saf. Code, § 11401; *People v. Davis* (2013) 57 Cal.4th 353, 357, fn. 2 [159 Cal.Rptr.3d 405, 303 P.3d 1179].
- No Finding Necessary for “Expressly Listed” Controlled Substance. *People v. Davis, supra*, 57 Cal.4th at p. 362, fn. 5.

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Simple Possession of a Controlled Substance Not a Lesser Included Offense. *People v. Sosa* (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 946, 949–950 [148 Cal.Rptr.3d 826]; Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11350, 11377.

See also Firearm Possession instructions, CALCRIM Nos. 2510 to 2530.

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Loaded Firearm*

“Under the commonly understood meaning of the term ‘loaded,’ a firearm is ‘loaded’ when a shell or cartridge has been placed into a position from which it can be fired; the shotgun is not ‘loaded’ if the shell or cartridge is stored elsewhere and not yet placed in a firing position.” (*People v. Clark* (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1147, 1153 [53 Cal.Rptr.2d 99].)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, § 100.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.01[1][f]; Ch. 145, *Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses*, § 145.01[1][a]–[d], [3][b] (Matthew Bender).

**2304. Simple Possession of Controlled Substance (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11350, 11377)**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with possessing \_\_\_\_\_ <insert type of controlled substance>, a controlled substance [in violation of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert appropriate code section[s]>].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant [unlawfully] possessed a controlled substance;
2. The defendant knew of its presence;
3. The defendant knew of the substance's nature or character as a controlled substance;

*<If the controlled substance is not listed in the schedules set forth in sections 11054 through 11058 of the Health and Safety Code, give paragraph 4B and the definition of analog substance below instead of paragraph 4A.>*

- 4A. The controlled substance was \_\_\_\_\_ <insert type of controlled substance>;
- 4B. The controlled substance was an analog of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert type of controlled substance>;

**AND**

5. The controlled substance was in a usable amount.

[In order to prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of analog drug> is an analog of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert type of controlled substance>. An analog of a controlled substance:

- [1. Has a chemical structure substantially similar to the structure of a controlled substance(/;)]

[OR]

- [(2/1). Has, is represented as having, or is intended to have a stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system substantially similar to or greater than the effect of a controlled substance.]]

*A usable amount* is a quantity that is enough to be used by someone as a controlled substance. Useless traces [or debris] are not usable amounts. On the other hand, a usable amount does not have to be enough, in either amount or strength, to affect the user.

[The People do not need to prove that the defendant knew which specific controlled substance (he/she) possessed.]

[Two or more people may possess something at the same time.]

[A person does not have to actually hold or touch something, to possess it. It is enough if the person has (control over it/ [or] the right to control it), either personally or through another person.]

[Agreeing to buy a controlled substance does not, by itself, mean that a person has control over that substance.]

<Defense: Prescription>

[The defendant is not guilty of possessing \_\_\_\_\_ <insert type of controlled substance> if (he/she) had a valid, written prescription for that substance from a physician, dentist, podiatrist, [naturopathic doctor], or veterinarian licensed to practice in California. The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not have a valid prescription. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of possessing a controlled substance.]

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2006, October 2010, February 2014, August 2015, September 2017*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

When the People allege the defendant has a prior conviction for an offense listed in Penal Code section 667(e)(2)(C)(iv) or for an offense requiring registration pursuant to subdivision (c) of section 290, give CALCRIM No. 3100, *Prior Conviction: Nonbifurcated Trial*, or CALCRIM No. 3101, *Prior Conviction: Bifurcated Trial*.

### *Defenses—Instructional Duty*

The prescription defense is codified in Health and Safety Code sections 11350 and 11377. It is not available as a defense to possession of all controlled substances. The defendant need only raise a reasonable doubt about whether his or her possession of the drug was lawful because of a valid prescription. (See *People v. Mower* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 479 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067].) If there is sufficient evidence, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give the bracketed paragraph on the defense.

A recent amendment to section 11150 includes a naturopathic doctor in the category of those who may furnish or order certain controlled substances, so that bracketed option should be included in this instruction if substantial evidence supports it.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11350, 11377; *People v. Palaschak* (1995) 9 241

Cal.4th 1236, 1242 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 722, 893 P.2d 717].

- Constructive vs. Actual Possession. *People v. Barnes* (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 552, 556 [67 Cal.Rptr.2d 162].
- Knowledge. *People v. Horn* (1960) 187 Cal.App.2d 68, 74–75 [9 Cal.Rptr. 578].
- Usable Amount. *People v. Rubacalba* (1993) 6 Cal.4th 62, 65–67 [23 Cal.Rptr.2d 628, 859 P.2d 708]; *People v. Piper* (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 248, 250 [96 Cal.Rptr. 643].
- Prescription. Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11027, 11164, 11164.5.
- Persons Authorized to Write Prescriptions. Health & Saf. Code, § 11150.
- Definition of Analog Controlled Substance. Health & Saf. Code, § 11401; *People v. Davis* (2013) 57 Cal.4th 353, 357, fn. 2 [159 Cal.Rptr.3d 405, 303 P.3d 1179].
- No Finding Necessary for “Expressly Listed” Controlled Substance. *People v. Davis*, *supra*, 57 Cal.4th at p. 362, fn. 5.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare §§ 97–114.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 145, *Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses*, § 145.01[1][a]–[d], [2][b] (Matthew Bender).

## 2305. Defense: Momentary Possession of Controlled Substance

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If you conclude that the defendant possessed \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of controlled substance>, that possession was not illegal if the defendant can prove the defense of momentary possession. In order to establish this defense, the defendant must prove that:

1. The defendant possessed \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of controlled substance> only for a momentary or transitory period;
2. The defendant possessed \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of controlled substance> in order to (abandon[,]/ [or] dispose of[,]/ [or] destroy) it;

AND

3. The defendant did not intend to prevent law enforcement officials from obtaining the \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of controlled substance>.

The defendant has the burden of proving this defense by a preponderance of the evidence. This is a different standard of proof than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. To meet the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence, the defendant must prove that it is more likely than not that each of the three listed items is true.

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*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense of transitory possession when supported by the evidence. (*People v. Mijares* (1971) 6 Cal.3d 415, 423 [99 Cal.Rptr. 139, 491 P.2d 1115].)

This defense “applies only to momentary or transitory possession of contraband for the purpose of disposal . . .” (*People v. Martin* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1180, 1191 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 599, 25 P.3d 1081] [disapproving of *People v. Cole* (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 1439, 1445 [249 Cal.Rptr. 601], which had held that the length of time the contraband was possessed was just one factor to consider].) As the *Martin* court explained, the defense is established if the evidence shows “brief or transitory possession of narcotics with the intent to dispose of the contraband.” (*Id.* at p. 1191, fn. 9.) The *Martin* court did not state that the defendant must also specifically intend to end someone else’s unlawful possession of the contraband or prevent someone else from obtaining the contraband. Thus, the committee has not included this as an element.

**AUTHORITY**

- Momentary Possession. *People v. Martin* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1180, 1191 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 599, 25 P.3d 1081]; *People v. Mijares* (1971) 6 Cal.3d 415, 423 [99 Cal.Rptr. 139, 491 P.2d 1115].
- Burden on Defendant to Establish by Preponderance. *People v. Spry* (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1345, 1369 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 691] [noted as valid authority on this holding in *People v. Martin* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1180, 1192, fn. 10 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 599, 25 P.3d 1081]]; see also *People v. Mower* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 480, fn. 8 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067].

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, § 114.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 145, *Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses*, § 145.01[1][d] (Matthew Bender).



**2306. Possession of Controlled Substance with Intent to Commit Sexual Assault (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11350.5, 11377.5)**

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**The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with possession of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert type of controlled substance from sections 11056(c)(11), (g), 11054(e)(3); or 11057(d)(13) of the Health and Safety Code>, a controlled substance, with intent to commit \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of alleged target crime or crimes from sections 243.4, 261, 262, 286, 287, or 289 of the Penal Code>, [in violation of Health and Safety Code section[s] (11350.5[,]/ [and/or] 11377.5)].**

**To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:**

- 1. The defendant possessed a controlled substance;**
- 2. The defendant knew of its presence;**
- 3. The defendant knew of the substance’s nature or character as a controlled substance;**
- 4. When the defendant possessed the controlled substance, (he/she) intended to use it to commit \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of alleged target crime or crimes from sections 243.4, 261, 262, 286, 287, or 289 of the Penal Code>;**
- 5. The controlled substance was \_\_\_\_\_ <insert type of controlled substance>;**
- 6. The controlled substance was in a usable amount.**

**[A usable amount is a quantity that is enough to be used by someone as a controlled substance. Useless traces [or debris] are not usable amounts. On the other hand, a usable amount does not have to be enough, in either amount or strength, to affect the user.]**

**[The People do not need to prove that the defendant knew which specific controlled substance (he/she) possessed.]**

**[Two or more people may possess something at the same time.]**

**[A person does not have to actually hold or touch something to possess it. It is enough if the person has (control over it/ [or] the right to control it), either personally or through another person.]**

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*New September 2017*

**BENCH NOTES*****Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

The court must also give the appropriate instructions on the target sexual offense or offenses in element 4.

**AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11350.5, 11377.5.
- Prohibited Controlled Substances. Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11054(e)(3), 11056(c)(11) or (g); 11057(d)(13).
- Constructive vs. Actual Possession. *People v. Barnes* (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 552, 556 [67 Cal.Rptr.2d 162].
- Knowledge. *People v. Horn* (1960) 187 Cal.App.2d 68, 74–75 [9 Cal.Rptr. 578].
- Usable Amount. *People v. Rubacalba* (1993) 6 Cal.4th 62, 65–67 [23 Cal.Rptr.2d 628, 859 P.2d 708]; *People v. Piper* (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 248, 250 [96 Cal.Rptr. 643].

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, §§ 105, 106.

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Sex Offenses and Crimes Against Decency, §§ 1–69.

**2307–2314. Reserved for Future Use**

## B. SUBSTITUTE SUBSTANCE

### 2315. Sale of Substitute Substance (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11355, 11382)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with (selling/transporting/administering/giving/furnishing/delivering) a substance in lieu of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of controlled substance> [in violation of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert appropriate code section[s]>].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant (agreed/consented/offered/arranged/negotiated) to (sell/transport/administer/give/furnish/deliver) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of controlled substance>, a controlled substance;

AND

2. After doing so, the defendant (sold/transported/administered/gave/furnished/delivered) a substance in lieu of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of controlled substance>.

[*Selling* for the purpose of this instruction means exchanging the substance for money, services, or anything of value.]

[A person *transports* something if he or she carries or moves it from one location to another, even if the distance is short.]

[A person *administers* a substance if he or she applies it directly to the body of another person by injection, or by any other means, or causes the other person to inhale, ingest, or otherwise consume the substance.]

---

*New January 2006*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11355, 11382; *People v. McDaniel* (1979) 24 Cal.3d 661, 669–670 [156 Cal.Rptr. 865, 597 P.2d 124].

## SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, § 123.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 145, *Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses*, § 145.01[1][a], [g]–[i] (Matthew Bender).

**2316. Offer to Sell Substitute Substance (Health & Saf. Code,  
§§ 11355, 11382)**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with intending to (sell/transport/administer/give/furnish/deliver) a noncontrolled substance in lieu of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of controlled substance> [in violation of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert appropriate code section[s]>].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant [unlawfully] offered to (sell/transport/administer/give/furnish/deliver) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of controlled substance>, a controlled substance;

AND

2. When the defendant made the offer, (he/she) intended to (sell/transport/administer/give/furnish/deliver) a noncontrolled substance in lieu of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of controlled substance>.

[*Selling* for the purpose of this instruction means exchanging a noncontrolled substance for money, services, or anything of value.]

[A person *transports* something if he or she carries or moves it from one location to another, even if the distance is short.]

[A person *administers* a substance if he or she applies it directly to the body of another person by injection, or by any other means, or causes the other person to inhale, ingest, or otherwise consume the substance.]

[The People do not need to prove that the defendant actually possessed the noncontrolled substance.]

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*New January 2006*

**BENCH NOTES**

***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

**AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11355, 11382; *People v. McDaniel* (1979) 24 Cal.3d 661, 669–670 [156 Cal.Rptr. 865, 597 P.2d 124].

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, § 123.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 145, *Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses*, § 145.01[1][a], [g]–[j] (Matthew Bender).

**2317–2319. Reserved for Future Use**

## C. FORGED SUBSTANCE

### 2320. Forged Prescription for Narcotic (Health & Saf. Code, § 11368)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with ((forging/altering) a prescription/giving someone (a forged/an altered) prescription/using [or attempting to use] (a forged/an altered) prescription) for a narcotic drug [in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11368].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

*<Alternative 1A—forged or altered>*

**[1. The defendant (forged/altered) a prescription;]**

*<Alternative 1B—issued>*

**[1. The defendant gave someone (a prescription with a forged or fictitious signature/an altered prescription);]**

*<Alternative 1C—used or attempted to use>*

**[1. The defendant used [or attempted to use] (a prescription with a forged or fictitious signature) to obtain drugs;]**

**[AND]**

**2. The prescription was for a narcotic drug(;/.)**

*<Give element 3 when giving alternative 1B or 1C.>*

**[AND]**

**3. The defendant knew that the (signature on the prescription was forged or fictitious/prescription was altered).]**

\_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name or description of narcotic from Health & Saf. Code, § 11019>* **is a narcotic drug.**

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*New January 2006*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

Use this instruction when the prosecution alleges that the defendant forged, issued, or attempted to use a forged prescription without actually obtaining the narcotic.

When the prosecution alleges that the defendant obtained or possessed the narcotic by using a forged prescription, use CALCRIM No. 2321, *Forged Prescription for Narcotic: With Possession of Drug*.

Give element 3 when the prosecution alleges that the defendant issued, used, or attempted to use an altered or forged prescription. Do not give element 3 when the prosecution alleges that the defendant personally forged or altered the prescription.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Health & Saf. Code, § 11368; *People v. Beesly* (1931) 119 Cal.App. 82, 86 [6 P.2d 114] [intent to defraud not an element]; *People v. Katz* (1962) 207 Cal.App.2d 739, 745 [24 Cal.Rptr. 644].
- Narcotic Drug. Health & Saf. Code, § 11019.
- Prescription. Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11027, 11164, 11164.5.
- Persons Authorized to Write Prescriptions. Health & Saf. Code, § 11150.
- Forgery of Prescription by Telephone. *People v. Jack* (1965) 233 Cal.App.2d 446, 455 [43 Cal.Rptr. 566].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California. Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, §§ 152, 154.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 145, *Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses*, § 145.01[1][a], [2][b], [c] (Matthew Bender).



**2321. Forged Prescription for Narcotic: With Possession of Drug  
(Health & Saf. Code, § 11368)**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with (obtaining/possessing) a narcotic drug [obtained] with (a/an) (forged[,]/ fictitious[,]/ [or] altered) prescription [in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11368].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant (obtained/possessed) a narcotic drug;
2. The defendant knew of its presence;
3. The defendant knew of the substance's nature or character as a narcotic drug;
4. The narcotic drug was in a usable amount;
5. The narcotic drug was obtained by using (a/an) (forged[,]/ fictitious[,]/ [or] altered) prescription;

**AND**

6. The defendant knew that the narcotic was obtained using (a/an) (forged[,]/ fictitious[,]/ [or] altered) prescription.

\_\_\_\_\_ <insert name or description of narcotic from Health & Saf. Code, § 11019> is a narcotic drug.

*A usable amount* is a quantity that is enough to be used by someone as a narcotic drug. Useless traces [or debris] are not usable amounts. On the other hand, a usable amount does not have to be enough, in either amount or strength, to affect the user.

[The People do not need to prove that the defendant knew which specific narcotic drug (he/she) possessed.]

[Two or more people may possess something at the same time.]

[A person does not have to actually hold or touch something to possess it. It is enough if the person has (control over it/ [or] the right to control it), either personally or through another person.]

[Agreeing to buy a narcotic drug does not, by itself, mean that a person has control over that substance.]

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*New January 2006; Revised October 2010*

**BENCH NOTES*****Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

Use this instruction when the prosecution alleges that the defendant obtained or possessed the narcotic by using a forged prescription. When the prosecution alleges that the defendant forged or attempted to use a forged prescription without obtaining the narcotic, use CALCRIM No. 2320, *Forged Prescription for Narcotic*.

**AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Health & Saf. Code, § 11368; *People v. Beesly* (1931) 119 Cal.App. 82, 86 [6 P.2d 114] [intent to defraud not an element]; *People v. Katz* (1962) 207 Cal.App.2d 739, 745 [24 Cal.Rptr. 644].
- Narcotic Drug. Health & Saf. Code, § 11019.
- Prescription. Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11027, 11164, 11164.5.
- Persons Authorized to Write Prescriptions. Health & Saf. Code, § 11150.
- Forgery of Prescription by Telephone. *People v. Jack* (1965) 233 Cal.App.2d 446, 455 [43 Cal.Rptr. 566].

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, §§ 152, 154.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 145, *Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses*, § 145.01[1][a]–[d], [2][b], [c] (Matthew Bender).

**2322–2329. Reserved for Future Use**

## D. MANUFACTURING

### (i) Manufacturing and Offering

#### 2330. Manufacturing a Controlled Substance (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11379.6(a), 11362.3)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with (manufacturing/compounding/converting/producing/deriving/processing/preparing) \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert concentrated cannabis or a controlled substance from Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11054, 11055, 11056, 11057, or 11058>*, a controlled substance [in violation of Health and Safety Code section (11379.6/ 11362.3)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant (manufactured/compounded/converted/produced/derived/processed/prepared) a controlled substance, specifically \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert controlled substance>*, using chemical extraction or independent chemical synthesis;

[AND]

2. The defendant knew of the substance's nature or character as a controlled substance.

[The chemical extraction or independent chemical synthesis may be done either directly or indirectly.]

[The People do not need to prove that the defendant knew which specific controlled substance was involved, only that (he/she) was aware that it was a controlled substance.]

[The People do not need to prove that the defendant completed the process of manufacturing or producing a controlled substance. Rather, the People must prove that the defendant knowingly participated in the beginning or intermediate steps to process or make a controlled substance. [Thus, the defendant is guilty of this crime if the People have proved that:

1. The defendant engaged in the synthesis, processing, or preparation of a chemical that is not itself a controlled substance;

AND

2. The defendant knew that the chemical was going to be used in the manufacture of a controlled substance.]]

*New January 2006; Revised September 2018*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

Give the bracketed paragraph stating that “The People do not need to prove that the defendant completed the process” when the evidence indicates that the defendant completed only initial or intermediary stages of the process. (*People v. Jackson* (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1493, 1503–1504 [267 Cal.Rptr. 841]; *People v. Lancellotti* (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 809, 813 [23 Cal.Rptr.2d 640].) Give the final bracketed section stating “Thus, the defendant is guilty” when the evidence shows that the defendant manufactured a precursor chemical, such as ephedrine, but had not completed the process of manufacturing a controlled substance. (*People v. Pierson* (2000) 86 Cal.App.4th 983, 992 [103 Cal.Rptr.2d 817].)

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11379.6(a) & (b), 11054–11058, 11362.3(a)(6).
- Knowledge of Controlled Substance. *People v. Coria* (1999) 21 Cal.4th 868, 874 [89 Cal.Rptr.2d 650, 985 P.2d 970].
- Initial or Intermediary Stages. *People v. Jackson* (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1493, 1503–1504 [267 Cal.Rptr. 841]; *People v. Lancellotti* (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 809, 813 [23 Cal.Rptr.2d 640]; *People v. Heath* (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 697, 703–704 [78 Cal.Rptr.2d 240].
- Precursor Chemicals. *People v. Pierson* (2000) 86 Cal.App.4th 983, 992 [103 Cal.Rptr.2d 817].

## RELATED ISSUES

### *Providing Place for Manufacture*

Health and Safety Code section 11366.5 prohibits providing a place for the manufacture or storage of a controlled substance. A defendant who provides a place for the manufacture of a controlled substance may be convicted both as an aider and abettor under Health and Safety Code section 11379.6 and as a principal under Health and Safety Code section 11366.5. (*People v. Sanchez* (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 918, 923 [33 Cal.Rptr.2d 155]; *People v. Glenos* (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1201, 1208 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 363].) Conviction under Health and Safety Code section 11379.6 requires evidence that the defendant specifically intended to aid the manufacture of the controlled substance, while conviction under Health and Safety Code section 11366.5 requires evidence that the defendant knew that the controlled substance was for sale or distribution. (*People v. Sanchez* (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 918, 923 [33 Cal.Rptr.2d 155]; *People v. Glenos* (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1201, 1208 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 363].)

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

7 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, § 132.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 145, *Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses*, § 145.01[1][a], [b], [f] (Matthew Bender).

## 2331. Offering to Manufacture a Controlled Substance (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11379.6(a) & (c))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with offering to (manufacture/compound/convert/produce/derive/process/prepare) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert controlled substance from Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11054, 11055, 11056, 11057, or 11058>, a controlled substance [in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11379.6].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant offered to (manufacture/compound/convert/produce/derive/process/prepare) a controlled substance, specifically \_\_\_\_\_ <insert controlled substance>, intending to use chemical extraction or independent chemical synthesis;

AND

2. When the defendant made the offer, (he/she) intended to (manufacture/compound/convert/produce/derive/process/prepare) the controlled substance.

[The intent to use chemical extraction or chemical synthesis includes the intent to use such methods directly or indirectly.]

[The People do not need to prove that the defendant knew which specific controlled substance was involved, only that (he/she) was aware that it was a controlled substance.]

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*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11379.6(a) & (c), 11054–11058.
- Specific Intent. *People v. Jackson* (1963) 59 Cal.2d 468, 469–470 [30 Cal.Rptr. 329, 381 P.2d 1].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, § 132.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 145, *Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses*, § 145.01[1][a], [b], [f] (Matthew Bender).

**2332–2334. Reserved for Future Use**

## (ii) Possession of Materials

### 2335. Possession With Intent to Manufacture Methamphetamine or N-ethylamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11383.5(a))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with possessing substances with the intent to manufacture (methamphetamine/N-ethylamphetamine) [in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11383.5(a)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant possessed both (methylamine and phenyl-2-propanone/ethylamine and phenyl-2-propanone) at the same time;

AND

2. When the defendant possessed both those substances, (he/she) intended to use them to manufacture (methamphetamine/N-ethylamphetamine).

[Two or more people may possess something at the same time.]

[A person does not have to actually hold or touch something to possess it. It is enough if the person has (control over it/ [or] the right to control it), either personally or through another person.]

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*New January 2006; Revised June 2007*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If the defendant is charged with possessing isomers or precursor chemicals under Health and Safety Code section 11383.5(c), (d), (e), or (f), give CALCRIM No. 2338, *Possession of Isomers or Precursors With Intent to Manufacture Controlled Substance*, instead of this instruction.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Health & Saf. Code, § 11383.5(a).
- Constructive vs. Actual Possession. *People v. Barnes* (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 552, 556 [67 Cal.Rptr.2d 162].
- Specific Intent Required. *People v. Jenkins* (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 579, 583 [154 Cal.Rptr. 309].



**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, § 134.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 145, *Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses*, § 145.01[1][a], [d], [3][d] (Matthew Bender).

**2336. Possession With Intent to Manufacture PCP (Health & Saf. Code, § 11383(a))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with possessing substances with the intent to manufacture phencyclidine (PCP) [or \_\_\_\_\_ <insert analog from Health & Saf. Code, § 11054(d)(22) or § 11055(e)(3)>] [in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11383(a)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant possessed both (piperidine and cyclohexanone/pyrrolidine and cyclohexanone/morpholine and cyclohexanone) at the same time, either as individual substances or combined together in one substance;

AND

2. When the defendant possessed those substances, (he/she) intended to use them to manufacture phencyclidine (PCP) [or \_\_\_\_\_ <insert analog from Health & Saf. Code, § 11054(d)(22) or § 11055(e)(3)>].

[Two or more people may possess something at the same time.]

[A person does not have to actually hold or touch something to possess it. It is enough if the person has (control over it/ [or] the right to control it), either personally or through another person.]

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*New January 2006; Revised June 2007*

**BENCH NOTES**

***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If the defendant is charged with possessing isomers or precursor chemicals under Health and Safety Code section 11383.5(c), (d), (e), or (f), give CALCRIM No. 2338, *Possession of Isomers or Precursors With Intent to Manufacture Controlled Substance*, instead of this instruction.

**AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Health & Saf. Code, § 11383(a).
- Constructive vs. Actual Possession. *People v. Barnes* (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 552, 556 [67 Cal.Rptr.2d 162].
- Specific Intent Required. *People v. Jenkins* (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 579, 583 [154 Cal.Rptr. 309].

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, § 134.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 145, *Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses*, § 145.01[1][a], [d], [3][d] (Matthew Bender).

## 2337. Possession With Intent to Manufacture Methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11383.5(b)(1))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with possessing substances with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine [or \_\_\_\_\_ <insert analog from Health & Saf. Code, § 11055(d)>] [in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11383.5(b)(1)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

<Alternative 1A—ephedrine or pseudoephedrine>

1. The defendant possessed [a substance containing] (ephedrine/ [or] pseudoephedrine) [or any salts, isomers, or salts of isomers of (ephedrine/ [or] pseudoephedrine)];

<Alternative 1B—other listed substances>

1. The defendant possessed both \_\_\_\_\_ <insert substances from Health & Saf. Code, § 11383(c)> at the same time, either as individual substances or combined together in one substance;

AND

2. When the defendant possessed (that/those) substance[s], (he/she) intended to use (it/them) to manufacture methamphetamine [or \_\_\_\_\_ <insert analog from Health & Saf. Code, § 11055(d)>].

[Two or more people may possess something at the same time.]

[A person does not have to actually hold or touch something to possess it. It is enough if the person has (control over it/ [or] the right to control it), either personally or through another person.]

---

*New January 2006; Revised June 2007*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If the defendant is charged with possessing isomers or precursor chemicals under Health and Safety Code section 11383.5(c), (d), (e), or (f), give CALCRIM No. 2338, *Possession of Isomers or Precursors With Intent to Manufacture Controlled Substance*, instead of this instruction.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Health & Saf. Code, § 11383.5(b)(1).

- Constructive vs. Actual Possession. *People v. Barnes* (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 552, 556 [67 Cal.Rptr.2d 162].
- Specific Intent Required. *People v. Jenkins* (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 579, 583 [154 Cal.Rptr. 309].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, § 134.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 145, *Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses*, § 145.01[1][a], [d], [3][d] (Matthew Bender).

**2338. Possession of Isomers or Precursors With Intent to  
Manufacture Controlled Substance (Health & Saf. Code,  
§ 11383.5(c)–(f))**

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**The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with possessing substances with the intent to manufacture (methamphetamine [or \_\_\_\_\_ <insert analog of methamphetamine from Health & Saf. Code, § 11055(d)>]/N-ethylamphetamine/phencyclidine (PCP) [or \_\_\_\_\_ <insert analog of PCP from Health & Saf. Code, § 11054(d) or § 11055(e)>]) [in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11383.5].**

**To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:**

- 1. The defendant possessed \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name or description of substance[s] from Health & Saf. Code, § 11383.5(c), (d), (e), or (f)>;**

**AND**

- 2. When the defendant possessed (that/those) substance[s], (he/she) intended to use (it/them) to manufacture (methamphetamine [or \_\_\_\_\_ <insert analog of methamphetamine from Health & Saf. Code, § 11055(d)>]/N-ethylamphetamine/phencyclidine (PCP) [or \_\_\_\_\_ <insert analog of PCP from Health & Saf. Code, § 11054(d) or § 11055(e)>]).**

**[Two or more people may possess something at the same time.]**

**[A person does not have to actually hold or touch something to possess it. It is enough if the person has (control over it/ [or] the right to control it), either personally or through another person.]**

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*New January 2006; Revised June 2007*

**BENCH NOTES**

***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

Subdivisions (c), (d), (e), and (f) of Health and Safety Code section 11383.5 make it a felony to possess any of the following: isomers of other substances listed in that section, precursor chemicals sufficient for manufacturing listed substances, chemicals sufficient to manufacture hydriodic acid or another reducing agent, and compounds or mixtures containing listed substances. In element 1, the court should insert the name or description of the specific substances the defendant is charged with possessing.

**AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Health & Saf. Code, § 11383.5(c)–(f).
- Constructive vs. Actual Possession. *People v. Barnes* (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 552, 556 [67 Cal.Rptr.2d 162].
- Specific Intent Required. *People v. Jenkins* (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 579, 583 [154 Cal.Rptr. 309].

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, § 134.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 145, *Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses*, § 145.01[1][a], [d], [3][d] (Matthew Bender).

**2339–2349. Reserved for Future Use**





## E. CANNABIS

### (i) Sale, Offering to Sell, Possession for Sale

#### 2350. Sale, Furnishing, Administering or Importing of Cannabis (Health & Saf. Code, § 11360(a))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with (selling[,]/ [or] furnishing[,]/ [or] administering/importing) cannabis, a controlled substance [in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11360(a)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant (sold[,]/ [or] furnished[,]/ [or] administered[,]/ [or] imported into California) a controlled substance;
2. The defendant knew of its presence;
3. The defendant knew of the substance's nature or character as a controlled substance;

[AND]

4. The controlled substance was cannabis(;/.)

*<Give element 5 when instructing on usable amount; see Bench Notes.>*

[AND]

5. The controlled substance was in a usable amount.]

*<Sentencing Factor on defendant's age>*

If you find the defendant guilty of this crime [as charged in Count[s] \_\_\_\_\_], you must then decide whether the People have proved the additional allegation that when the defendant (sold[,]/ [or] furnished[,]/ [or] administered[,]/ [or] imported into California) cannabis, (he/she) was 18 years of age or older.

[Under the law, a person becomes one year older as soon as the first minute of his or her birthday has begun.]

[*Selling* for the purpose of this instruction means exchanging the cannabis for money, services, or anything of value.]

[A person *administers* a substance if he or she applies it directly to the body of another person by injection, or by any other means, or causes the other person to inhale, ingest, or otherwise consume the substance.]

[A *usable amount* is a quantity that is enough to be used by someone as

**a controlled substance. Useless traces [or debris] are not usable amounts. On the other hand, a usable amount does not have to be enough, in either amount or strength, to affect the user.]**

**[*Cannabis* means all or part of the *Cannabis sativa L.* plant, whether growing or not, including the seeds and resin extracted from any part of the plant. [It also includes every compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of the plant, its seeds, or resin.]]**

*<If applicable, give the definition of industrial hemp: Health & Saf. Code, § 11018.5>*

**[Cannabis does not include industrial hemp. Industrial hemp means a fiber or oilseed crop, or both, that only contain types of the plant *Cannabis sativa L.* with no more than three-tenths of 1 percent tetrahydrocannabinol from the dried flowering tops, whether growing or not. Industrial hemp may include the seeds of the plant; the resin extracted from any part of the plant; and every compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of the plant, its seeds or resin produced from the seeds.]**

**[The People do not need to prove that the defendant knew which specific controlled substance (he/she) (sold/furnished/administered/imported).]**

**[A person does not have to actually hold or touch something to (sell/furnish/administer/import) it. It is enough if the person has (control over it/ [or] the right to control it), either personally or through another person.]**

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*New January 2006; Revised December 2008, October 2010, August 2014, February 2015, September 2018*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

Sale of a controlled substance does not require a usable amount. (See *People v. Peregrina-Larios* (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1522, 1524 [28 Cal.Rptr.2d 316].) When the prosecution alleges sales, do not give element 5 or the bracketed definition of “usable amount.” There is no case law on whether furnishing, administering, or importing require usable quantities. (See *People v. Emmal* (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1313, 1316 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 907] [transportation requires usable quantity]; *People v. Ormiston* (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 676, 682 [129 Cal.Rptr.2d 567] [same].) Element 5 and the definition of usable amount are provided for the court to use at its discretion.

If any penalty allegations under Health & Safety Code section 11360(a)(3) are charged, give CALCRIM No. 2364, as appropriate.

### ***Defenses—Instructional Duty***

If a medical cannabis defense applies under the Compassionate Use Act or the Medical Marijuana Program Act (See Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11362.5, 11362.775.), the burden is on the defendant to produce sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt that the conduct was lawful. (*People v. Mower* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 470 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067]; *People v. Jackson* (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 525, 538–539 [148 Cal.Rptr.3d 375].) If the defendant introduces substantial evidence, sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt that the conduct may have been lawful, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give the relevant defense instruction: CALCRIM No. 3412, *Compassionate Use Defense*, or CALCRIM No. 3413, *Collective or Cooperative Cultivation Defense*.

Give CALCRIM No. 3415, *Legal Use Defense*, on request if supported by substantial evidence.

## **AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Health & Saf. Code, § 11360(a); *People v. Van Alstyne* (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 900, 906 [121 Cal.Rptr. 363].
- Knowledge. *People v. Romero* (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 147, 151–153, 157, fn. 3 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 16]; *People v. Winston* (1956) 46 Cal.2d 151, 158 [293 P.2d 40].
- Selling. *People v. Lazenby* (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1842, 1845 [8 Cal.Rptr.2d 541].
- Administering. Health & Saf. Code, § 11002.
- Administering Does Not Include Self-Administering. *People v. Label* (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 766, 770–771 [119 Cal.Rptr. 522].
- Constructive vs. Actual Possession. *People v. Barnes* (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 552, 556 [67 Cal.Rptr.2d 162].
- Usable Amount. *People v. Rubacalba* (1993) 6 Cal.4th 62, 65–67 [23 Cal.Rptr.2d 628, 859 P.2d 708]; *People v. Piper* (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 248, 250 [96 Cal.Rptr. 643].
- Compassionate Use Defense Generally. *People v. Wright* (2006) 40 Cal.4th 81 [51 Cal.Rptr.3d 80, 146 P.3d 531]; *People v. Urziceanu* (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 747 [33 Cal.Rptr.3d 859]; *People v. Galambos* (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1147, 1165–1167 [128 Cal.Rptr.2d 844]; *People ex rel. Lungren v. Peron* (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1383, 1389 [70 Cal.Rptr.2d 20].
- Medical Marijuana Program Act Defense. *People v. Jackson* (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 525, 538–539 [148 Cal.Rptr.3d 375].
- Definition of Cannabis. Health & Saf. Code, § 11018.
- Definition of Industrial Hemp. Health & Saf. Code, § 11018.5.

## **LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES**

- Simple Possession Is Not a Lesser Included Offense of This Crime. (*People v.*

*Murphy* (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 979, 983–984 [64 Cal.Rptr.3d 926]; *People v. Peregrina-Larios* (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1522, 1524 [28 Cal.Rptr.2d 316] [lesser related offense but not necessarily included].)

- Possession for Sale Is Not a Lesser Included Offense of This Crime. (*People v. Peregrina-Larios* (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1522, 1524 [28 Cal.Rptr.2d 316] [lesser related offense but not necessarily included].)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

7 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, § 115.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 145, *Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses*, § 145.01[1][a]–[c], [g]–[i], [3][a], [a.1] (Matthew Bender).

**2351. Offering to Sell, Furnish, etc., Cannabis (Health & Saf. Code, § 11360)**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with offering to (sell[,]/ [or] furnish[,]/ [or] administer[,]/ [or] import) cannabis, a controlled substance [in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11360].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant offered to (sell[,]/ [or] furnish[,]/ [or] administer[,]/ [or] import into California) cannabis, a controlled substance;

**AND**

2. When the defendant made the offer, (he/she) intended to (sell[,]/ [or] furnish[,]/ [or] administer[,]/ [or] import) the controlled substance.

*<Sentencing Factor on defendant's age>*

If you find the defendant guilty of this crime [as charged in Count[s] \_\_\_\_\_], you must then decide whether the People have proved the additional allegation that when the defendant offered to (sell[,]/ [or] furnish[,]/ [or] administer[,]/ [or] import) cannabis, (he/she) was 18 years of age or older.

[Under the law, a person becomes one year older as soon as the first minute of his or her birthday has begun.]

[*Selling* for the purpose of this instruction means exchanging cannabis for money, services, or anything of value.]

[A person *administers* a substance if he or she applies it directly to the body of another person by injection, or by any other means, or causes the other person to inhale, ingest, or otherwise consume the substance.]

[*Cannabis* means all or part of the *Cannabis sativa L.* plant, whether growing or not, including the seeds and resin extracted from any part of the plant. [It also includes every compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of the plant, its seeds, or resin.]]

*<If applicable, give the definition of industrial hemp: Health & Saf. Code, § 11018.5>*

[Cannabis does not include industrial hemp. Industrial hemp means a fiber or oilseed crop, or both, that only contain types of the plant *Cannabis sativa L.* with no more than three-tenths of 1 percent tetrahydrocannabinol from the dried flowering tops, whether growing or not. Industrial hemp may include the seeds of the plant; the resin

extracted from any part of the plant; and every compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of the plant, its seeds or resin produced from the seeds.]

[The People do not need to prove that the defendant actually possessed the cannabis.]

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*New January 2006; Revised December 2008, February 2015, September 2018*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If any of the penalty allegations under Health & Safety Code section 11360(a)(3) are charged, give CALCRIM No. 2364, as appropriate.

### *Defenses—Instructional Duty*

If a medical cannabis defense applies under the Compassionate Use Act or the Medical Marijuana Program Act (See Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11362.5, 11362.775.), the burden is on the defendant to produce sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt that the conduct was lawful. (*People v. Mower* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 470 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067]; *People v. Jackson* (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 525, 538–539 [148 Cal.Rptr.3d 375].) If the defendant introduces substantial evidence, sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt that the conduct may have been lawful, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give the relevant defense instruction: CALCRIM No. 3412, *Compassionate Use Defense*, or CALCRIM No. 3413, *Collective or Cooperative Cultivation Defense*.

Give CALCRIM No. 3415, *Legal Use Defense*, on request if supported by substantial evidence.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Health & Saf. Code, § 11360; *People v. Van Alstyne* (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 900, 906 [121 Cal.Rptr. 363].
- Specific Intent. *People v. Jackson* (1963) 59 Cal.2d 468, 469–470 [30 Cal.Rptr. 329, 381 P.2d 1].
- Knowledge. *People v. Romero* (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 147, 151–153, 157, fn. 3 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 16]; *People v. Winston* (1956) 46 Cal.2d 151, 158 [293 P.2d 40].
- Selling. *People v. Lazenby* (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1842, 1845 [8 Cal.Rptr.2d 541].
- Administering. Health & Saf. Code, § 11002.
- Administering Does Not Include Self-Administering. *People v. Label* (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 766, 770–771 [119 Cal.Rptr. 522].
- Compassionate Use Defense Generally. *People v. Wright* (2006) 40 Cal.4th 81

[51 Cal.Rptr.3d 80, 146 P.3d 531]; *People v. Urziceanu* (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 747 [33 Cal.Rptr.3d 859]; *People v. Galambos* (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1147, 1165–1167 [128 Cal.Rptr.2d 844]; *People ex rel. Lungren v. Peron* (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1383, 1389 [70 Cal.Rptr.2d 20].

- Medical Marijuana Program Act Defense. *People v. Jackson* (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 525, 538–539 [148 Cal.Rptr.3d 375].
- Definition of Cannabis. Health & Saf. Code, § 11018.
- Definition of Industrial Hemp. Health & Saf. Code, § 11018.5.

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *No Requirement That Defendant Delivered or Possessed Drugs*

A defendant may be convicted of offering to sell even if there is no evidence that he or she delivered or ever possessed any controlled substance. (*People v. Jackson* (1963) 59 Cal.2d 468, 469 [30 Cal.Rptr. 329, 381 P.2d 1]; *People v. Brown* (1960) 55 Cal.2d 64, 68 [9 Cal.Rptr. 816, 357 P.2d 1072].)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

7 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, § 115.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 145, *Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses*, § 145.01[1][a], [g]–[j], [3][a], [a.1] (Matthew Bender).

**2352. Possession for Sale of Cannabis (Health & Saf. Code,  
§ 11359)**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with possessing for sale cannabis, a controlled substance [in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11359].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant possessed a controlled substance;
2. The defendant knew of its presence;
3. The defendant knew of the substance's nature or character as a controlled substance;
4. When the defendant possessed the controlled substance, (he/she) intended (to sell it/ [or] that someone else sell it);
5. The controlled substance was cannabis;

**AND**

6. The controlled substance was in a usable amount.

*<Sentencing Factor on defendant's age>*

If you find the defendant guilty of this crime [as charged in Count[s] \_\_\_\_\_], you must then decide whether the People have proved the additional allegation that when the defendant possessed cannabis for sale, (he/she) was 18 years of age or older.

[Under the law, a person becomes one year older as soon as the first minute of his or her birthday has begun.]

[If you find the defendant guilty of this crime [as charged in Count[s] \_\_\_\_\_], and you find that the defendant was 18 years of age or older, then you must decide whether the People have proved the following allegation[s].] [You must decide whether the People have proved (this/these) allegation[s] and return a separate finding for each allegation.]

To prove (this/these) allegation[s] [for each crime], the People must prove that:

*<Insert the appropriate bracketed paragraphs if the defendant is charged under one of the paragraphs of Health and Safety Code section 11359(c) and sequentially number them as appropriate>*

- [\_\_\_\_. When the defendant possessed cannabis, (he/she) knew that (he/she) was (selling/ [or] attempting to sell) cannabis to another person under the age of 18 years(./;)]



- [\_\_\_]. The defendant has at least two prior convictions for possession of cannabis for sale(./;)]
- [\_\_\_]. The defendant has at least one prior conviction for (\_\_\_\_\_) <insert description of offense requiring registration pursuant to Penal Code section 290 or for an offense specified in clause (iv) of subparagraph (c) of paragraph (2) of subdivision (e) of Penal Code section 667.>](./;)

<Insert the following bracketed paragraphs if defendant is charged with violating Health and Safety Code section 11359(d)>

The defendant was 21 years of age or older when (he/she) (hired/employed/used) a person 20 years of age or younger to [unlawfully] (cultivate[,]/ [or] transport[,]/ [or] carry[,]/ [or] sell[,]/ [or] offer to sell[,]/ [or] give away[,]/ [or] prepare for sale[,]/ [or] peddle) cannabis;

**AND**

When the defendant (hired/employed/used) a person 20 years of age or younger to [unlawfully] (cultivate[,]/ [or] transport[,]/ [or] carry[,]/ [or] sell[,]/ [or] offer to sell[,]/ [or] give away[,]/ [or] prepare for sale[,]/ [or] peddle) cannabis, (he/she) knew that person's age and the tasks that the person would be doing.]

*Selling* for the purpose of this instruction means exchanging the cannabis for money, services, or anything of value.

A *usable amount* is a quantity that is enough to be used by someone as a controlled substance. Useless traces [or debris] are not usable amounts. On the other hand, a usable amount does not have to be enough, in either amount or strength, to affect the user.

[*Cannabis* means all or part of the *Cannabis sativa L.* plant, whether growing or not, including the seeds and resin extracted from any part of the plant. [It also includes every compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of the plant, its seeds, or resin.]]

<If applicable, give the definition of industrial hemp: Health & Saf. Code, § 11018.5>

[Cannabis does not include industrial hemp. Industrial hemp means a fiber or oilseed crop, or both, that only contain types of the plant *Cannabis sativa L.* with no more than three-tenths of 1 percent tetrahydrocannabinol from the dried flowering tops, whether growing or not. Industrial hemp may include the seeds of the plant; the resin extracted from any part of the plant; and every compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of the plant, its seeds or resin produced from the seeds.]

[Two or more people may possess something at the same time.]

[A person does not have to actually hold or touch something to possess it. It is enough if the person has (control over it/ [or] the right to control it), either personally or through another person.]

[Agreeing to buy a controlled substance does not, by itself, mean that a person has control over that substance.]

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*New January 2006; Revised December 2008, October 2010, February 2015, February 2016, September 2018*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

Give the appropriate bracketed elements if the offense is charged as a felony.

If a medical marijuana defense applies under the Compassionate Use Act or the Medical Marijuana Program Act (See Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11362.5, 11362.775.), the burden is on the defendant to produce sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt that the conduct was lawful. (*People v. Mower* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 470 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067]; *People v. Jackson* (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 525, 538–539 [148 Cal.Rptr.3d 375].) If the defendant introduces substantial evidence, sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt that the conduct may have been lawful, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give the relevant defense instruction: CALCRIM No. 3412, *Compassionate Use Defense*, or CALCRIM No. 3413, *Collective or Cooperative Cultivation Defense*.

Give CALCRIM No. 3415, *Legal Use Defense*, on request if supported by substantial evidence.

If the defendant is charged with prior convictions under subdivisions (c)(1) or (2) of section 11359, give CALCRIM No. 3100, *Prior Conviction: Nonbifurcated Trial* or CALCRIM No. 3101, *Prior Conviction: Bifurcated Trial*, as appropriate.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Health & Saf. Code, § 11359.
- Knowledge. *People v. Romero* (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 147, 151–153, 157, fn. 3 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 16]; *People v. Winston* (1956) 46 Cal.2d 151, 158 [293 P.2d 40].
- Constructive vs. Actual Possession. *People v. Barnes* (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 552, 556 [67 Cal.Rptr.2d 162].
- Selling. *People v. Lazenby* (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1842, 1845 [8 Cal.Rptr.2d 541].
- Usable Amount. *People v. Rubacalba* (1993) 6 Cal.4th 62, 65–67 [23 Cal.Rptr.2d 628, 859 P.2d 708]; *People v. Piper* (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 248, 250 [96 Cal.Rptr. 643].

- Compassionate Use Defense Generally. *People v. Wright* (2006) 40 Cal.4th 81 [51 Cal.Rptr.3d 80, 146 P.3d 531]; *People v. Urziceanu* (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 747 [33 Cal.Rptr.3d 859]; *People v. Galambos* (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1147, 1165–1167 [128 Cal.Rptr.2d 844]; *People ex rel. Lungren v. Peron* (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1383, 1389 [70 Cal.Rptr.2d 20].
- Medical Marijuana Program Act Defense. *People v. Jackson* (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 525, 538–539 [148 Cal.Rptr.3d 375].
- Specific Intent to Sell Personally or That Another Will Sell Required. *People v. Parra* (1999) 70 Cal. App. 4th 222, 226 [70 Cal.App.4th 222] and *People v. Consuegra* (1994) 26 Cal. App. 4th 1726, 1732, fn. 4 [32 Cal.Rptr.2d 288].
- Definition of Cannabis. Health & Saf. Code, § 11018.
- Definition of Industrial Hemp. Health & Saf. Code, § 11018.5.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

7 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, §§ 90, 101.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 145, *Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses*, § 145.01[1][a]–[e], [3][a], [a.1] (Matthew Bender).

### **2353–2359. Reserved for Future Use**

**(ii) Transportation or Offering to Transport**  
**2360. Transporting or Giving Away Marijuana: Not More Than 28.5 Grams—Misdemeanor (Health & Saf. Code, § 11360(b))**

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*New January 2006; Revised April 2010, October 2010, February 2015, August 2016; Revoked September 2018*

**2361. Transporting for Sale or Giving Away Cannabis: More Than 28.5 Grams (Health & Saf. Code, § 11360(a))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with (giving away/ [or] transporting for sale) more than 28.5 grams of cannabis, a controlled substance [in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11360(a)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant (gave away/transported for sale) a controlled substance;
2. The defendant knew of its presence;
3. The defendant knew of the substance's nature or character as a controlled substance;
4. The controlled substance was cannabis;

**AND**

5. The cannabis possessed by the defendant weighed more than 28.5 grams.

*<Sentencing Factor on defendant's age>*

If you find the defendant guilty of this crime [as charged in Count[s] \_\_\_\_\_], you must then decide whether the People have proved the additional allegation that when the defendant (gave away/ [or] transported for sale) cannabis, (he/she) was 18 years of age or older.

[Under the law, a person becomes one year older as soon as the first minute of his or her birthday has begun.]

[*Cannabis* means all or part of the *Cannabis sativa L.* plant, whether growing or not, including the seeds and resin extracted from any part of the plant. [It also includes every compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of the plant, its seeds, or resin.]]

*<If applicable, give the definition of industrial hemp: Health & Saf. Code, § 11018.5>*

[Cannabis does not include industrial hemp. Industrial hemp means a fiber or oilseed crop, or both, that only contain types of the plant *Cannabis sativa L.* with no more than three-tenths of 1 percent tetrahydrocannabinol from the dried flowering tops, whether growing or not. Industrial hemp may include the seeds of the plant; the resin extracted from any part of the plant; and every compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of the plant, its seeds or resin produced from the seeds.]

[Cannabis does not include the weight of any other ingredient combined with cannabis to prepare topical or oral administrations, food, drink, or other product.]

[A person *transports* something if he or she carries or moves it for sale from one location to another, even if the distance is short.]

[The People do not need to prove that the defendant knew which specific controlled substance (he/she) (gave away/transported).]

[A person does not have to actually hold or touch something to (give it away/transport it). It is enough if the person has (control over it/ [or] the right to control it), either personally or through another person.]

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*New January 2006; Revised April 2010, October 2010, April 2011, February 2015, August 2016, September 2018*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If any of the penalty allegations under Health & Safety Code section 11360(a)(3) are charged, give CALCRIM No. 2364, as appropriate.

### *Defenses—Instructional Duty*

If a medical cannabis defense applies under the Compassionate Use Act or the Medical Marijuana Program Act (See Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11362.5, 11362.775.), the burden is on the defendant to produce sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt that the conduct was lawful. (*People v. Mower* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 470 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067]; *People v. Jackson* (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 525, 538–539 [148 Cal.Rptr.3d 375].) If the defendant introduces substantial evidence, sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt that the conduct may have been lawful, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give the relevant defense instruction: CALCRIM No. 3412, *Compassionate Use Defense*, or CALCRIM No. 3413, *Collective or Cooperative Cultivation Defense*.

Give CALCRIM No. 3415, *Legal Use Defense*, on request, if supported by substantial evidence.

### *Related Instruction*

Use this instruction when the defendant is charged with transporting or giving away more than 28.5 grams of cannabis. For offering to transport or give away more than 28.5 grams of cannabis, use CALCRIM No. 2363, *Offering to Transport or Give Away Cannabis: More Than 28.5 Grams*.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Health & Saf. Code, § 11360(a).

- Knowledge. *People v. Romero* (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 147, 151–153, 157, fn. 3 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 16]; *People v. Winston* (1956) 46 Cal.2d 151, 158 [293 P.2d 40].
- Constructive vs. Actual Possession. *People v. Barnes* (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 552, 556 [67 Cal.Rptr.2d 162].
- Medical Cannabis. Health & Saf. Code, § 11362.5.
- Compassionate Use Defense to Transportation. *People v. Wright* (2006) 40 Cal.4th 81, 87–88 [51 Cal.Rptr.3d 80, 146 P.3d 531]; *People v. Trippet* (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1532, 1550 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 559].
- Burden of Proof for Defense of Medical Use. *People v. Mower* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 460 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067].
- Primary Caregiver. *People v. Mentch* (2008) 45 Cal.4th 274, 282–292 [85 Cal.Rptr.3d 480, 195 P.3d 1061].
- Defendant’s Burden of Proof on Compassionate Use Defense. *People v. Mentch* (2008) 45 Cal.4th 274, 292–294 [85 Cal.Rptr.3d 480, 195 P.3d 1061] (conc.opn. of Chin, J.).
- Medical Marijuana Program Defense. *People v. Jackson* (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 525, 538–539 [148 Cal.Rptr.3d 375].
- Prior Version of this Instruction Upheld. *People v. Busch* (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 150, 155–156 [113 Cal.Rptr.3d 683].
- Definition of Cannabis. Health & Saf. Code, § 11018.
- Definition of Industrial Hemp. Health & Saf. Code, § 11018.5.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

7 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, § 115.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 145, *Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses*, § 145.01[1][a], [b], [g], [3][a], [a.1] (Matthew Bender).

**2362. Offering to Transport or Give Away Marijuana: Not More Than 28.5 Grams—Misdemeanor (Health & Saf. Code, § 11360(b))**

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*New January 2006; Revised April 2010, February 2015, August 2016; Revoked September 2018*



**2363. Offering or Attempting to Transport for Sale or Offering to Give Away Cannabis: More Than 28.5 Grams (Health & Saf. Code, § 11360(a))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with (offering to give away/ [or] offering to transport for sale/ [or] attempting to transport for sale) more than 28.5 grams of cannabis, a controlled substance [in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11360(a)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant (offered to give away/ [or] offered to transport for sale/ [or] attempted to transport for sale) cannabis, a controlled substance, in an amount weighing more than 28.5 grams;

**AND**

2. When the defendant made the (offer/ [or] attempt), (he/she) intended to (give away/ [or] transport for sale) the controlled substance.

*<Sentencing Factor on defendant's age>*

If you find the defendant guilty of this crime [as charged in Count[s] \_\_\_\_\_], you must then decide whether the People have proved the additional allegation that when the defendant (offered to give away/ [or] offered to transport for sale/ [or] attempted to transport for sale) cannabis, (he/she) was 18 years of age or older.

[Under the law, a person becomes one year older as soon as the first minute of his or her birthday has begun.]

[*Cannabis* means all or part of the *Cannabis sativa L.* plant, whether growing or not, including the seeds and resin extracted from any part of the plant. [It also includes every compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of the plant, its seeds, or resin.]]

*<If applicable, give the definition of industrial hemp: Health & Saf. Code, § 11018.5>*

[Cannabis does not include industrial hemp. Industrial hemp means a fiber or oilseed crop, or both, that only contain types of the plant *Cannabis sativa L.* with no more than three-tenths of 1 percent tetrahydrocannabinol from the dried flowering tops, whether growing or not. Industrial hemp may include the seeds of the plant; the resin extracted from any part of the plant; and every compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of the plant, its seeds or resin produced from the seeds.]

**[Cannabis does not include the weight of any other ingredient combined with cannabis to prepare topical or oral administrations food, drink, or other product.]**

**[A person *transports* something if he or she carries or moves it for sale from one location to another, even if the distance is short.]**

**[The People do not need to prove that the defendant actually possessed the cannabis.]**

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*New January 2006; Revised April 2010, February 2015, August 2016, September 2018*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

Also give CALCRIM No. 460, *Attempt Other Than Attempted Murder*, if the defendant is charged with attempt to transport.

### *Defenses—Instructional Duty*

If a medical cannabis defense applies under the Compassionate Use Act or the Medical Marijuana Program Act (See Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11362.5, 11362.775.), the burden is on the defendant to produce sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt that the conduct was lawful. (*People v. Mower* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 470 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067]; *People v. Jackson* (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 525, 538–539 [148 Cal.Rptr.3d 375].) If the defendant introduces substantial evidence, sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt that the conduct may have been lawful, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give the relevant defense instruction: CALCRIM No. 3412, *Compassionate Use Defense*, or CALCRIM No. 3413, *Collective or Cooperative Cultivation Defense*.

Give CALCRIM No. 3415, *Legal Use Defense*, on request if supported by substantial evidence.

If any of the penalty allegations under Health & Safety Code section 11360(a)(3) are charged, give CALCRIM No. 2364, as appropriate.

### *Related Instructions*

Use this instruction when the defendant is charged with offering to transport or give away more than 28.5 grams of cannabis. For transporting or giving away more than 28.5 grams of cannabis, use CALCRIM No. 2361, *Transporting for Sale or Giving Away Cannabis: More Than 28.5 Grams*.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Health & Saf. Code, § 11360(a).
- Knowledge. *People v. Romero* (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 147, 151–153, 157, fn. 3

[64 Cal.Rptr.2d 16]; *People v. Winston* (1956) 46 Cal.2d 151, 158 [293 P.2d 40].

- Specific Intent. *People v. Jackson* (1963) 59 Cal.2d 468, 469–470 [30 Cal.Rptr. 329, 381 P.2d 1].
- Medical Cannabis. Health & Saf. Code, § 11362.5.
- Compassionate Use Defense to Transportation. *People v. Wright* (2006) 40 Cal.4th 81, 87–88 [51 Cal.Rptr.3d 80, 146 P.3d 531]; *People v. Trippet* (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1532, 1550 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 559].
- Burden of Proof for Defense of Medical Use. *People v. Mower* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 460 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067].
- Primary Caregiver. *People v. Mentch* (2008) 45 Cal.4th 274, 282–292 [85 Cal.Rptr.3d 480, 195 P.3d 1061].
- Defendant’s Burden of Proof on Compassionate Use Defense. *People v. Mentch* (2008) 45 Cal.4th 274, 292–294 [85 Cal.Rptr.3d 480, 195 P.3d 1061] (conc.opn. of Chin, J.).
- Medical Marijuana Program Act Defense. *People v. Jackson* (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 525, 538–539 [148 Cal.Rptr.3d 375].
- Definition of Cannabis. Health & Saf. Code, § 11018.
- Definition of Industrial Hemp. Health & Saf. Code, § 11018.5.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

7 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, § 115.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 145, *Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses*, § 145.01[1][a], [g], [j], [3][a], [a.1] (Matthew Bender).

**2364. Felony Cannabis Penalty Allegations (Health & Saf. Code, § 11360(a)(3))**

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If you find the defendant guilty of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert offense[s]>* [as charged in Count[s] \_\_\_\_\_], you must then decide whether the People have proved the additional allegation[s]. [You must decide whether the People have proved (this/these) allegation[s] for each crime and return a separate finding for each crime.]

To prove (this/these) allegation[s] [for each crime], the People must prove that:

*<Give the following paragraph if the defendant is charged under Health & Safety Code section 11360(a)(3)(A)>*

- . The defendant has at least one prior conviction for \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert description of offense requiring registration pursuant to Penal Code section 290(c) or for an offense specified in Penal Code section 667(e)(2)(C)(iv)>*(./;)]

*<Give the following paragraph if the defendant is charged under Health & Safety Code section 11360(a)(3)(B)>*

- . The defendant has at least two prior convictions for \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert description of offense specified in Health & Safety Code sections 11360(a) and 11360(a)(2)>*(./;)]

*<Give the following paragraph if the defendant is charged under Health & Safety Code section 11360(a)(3)(C)>*

- . When committing that crime, the defendant knew that (he/she) was selling, furnishing, administering, giving away, attempting to sell, or offering to sell, furnish, administer, or give away cannabis to a person under the age of 18 years(./;)]

*<Give the following paragraphs if the defendant is charged under Health & Safety Code section 11360(a)(3)(D)>*

- . The defendant (imported/[or] offered to import/[or] attempted to import) (more than 28.5 grams of cannabis/more than 4 grams of concentrated cannabis) into California(./;)]

[OR]

- . The defendant (transported for sale/ [or] offered to transport for sale/ [or] attempted to transport for sale) (more than 28.5 grams of cannabis/more than 4 grams of concentrated cannabis) out of California.]

[Selling for the purpose of this instruction means exchanging the

cannabis for money, services, or anything of value.]

[A person administers a substance if he or she applies it directly to the body of another person by injection, or by any other means, or causes the other person to inhale, ingest, or otherwise consume the substance.]

[*Cannabis* means all or part of the *Cannabis sativa L.* plant, whether growing or not, including the seeds and resin extracted from any part of the plant. [It also includes every compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of the plant, its seeds, or resin.]]

<If applicable, give the definition of industrial hemp: Health & Saf. Code, § 11018.5>

[Cannabis does not include industrial hemp. Industrial hemp means a fiber or oilseed crop, or both, that only contain types of the plant *Cannabis sativa L.* with no more than three-tenths of 1 percent tetrahydrocannabinol from the dried flowering tops, whether growing or not. It may include the seeds of the plant; the resin extracted from any part of the plant; and every compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of the plant, its seeds or resin produced from the seeds.]

[Cannabis does not include the weight of any other ingredient combined with cannabis to prepare topical or oral administrations, food, drink, or other product.]

[Concentrated cannabis means the separated resin, whether crude or purified, from cannabis.]

[The People do not need to prove that the defendant knew which specific controlled substance (he/she) (sold/furnished/administered/imported).]

[A person does not have to actually hold or touch something to (sell/furnish/administer/import) it. It is enough if the person has (control over it/ [or] the right to control it), either personally or through another person.]

The People have the burden of proving an allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met that burden as to an allegation, you must find that allegation has not been proved.

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*New September 2018*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of an enhancement. (See, e.g., *People v. Wallace* (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1699, 1702 [1 Cal.Rptr.3d 324] [statute defines enhancement, not separate offense].)

Give all relevant bracketed definitions.

***Related Instructions***

CALCRIM No. 2361, *Transporting or Giving Away Cannabis: More Than 28.5 Grams*.

CALCRIM No. 2363, *Offering or Attempting to Transport for Sale or Offering to Give Away Cannabis: More Than 28.5 Grams*.

**AUTHORITY**

- Enhancements. Health & Saf. Code, § 11360(a)(3).
- Enhancement, Not Substantive Offense. *People v. Wallace* (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1699, 1702 [1 Cal.Rptr.3d 324].
- Definition of Cannabis. Health & Saf. Code, § 11018.
- Definition of Industrial Hemp. Health & Saf. Code, § 11018.5.

**2365–2369. Reserved for Future Use**

### (iii) Planting

#### 2370. Planting, etc., Cannabis (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11358(c)–(d))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with (planting[,] [or]/ cultivating[,] [or]/ harvesting[,] [or]/ drying[,] [or]/ processing) more than six living cannabis plants, [or any part thereof,] a controlled substance [in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11358 \_\_\_\_\_ <insert appropriate subsection[s] of statute>].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant (planted[,] [or]/ cultivated[,] [or]/ harvested[,] [or]/ dried[,] [or]/ processed) more than six cannabis plants;

AND

2. The defendant knew that the substance (he/she) (planted[,] [or]/ cultivated[,] [or]/ harvested[,] [or]/ dried[,] [or]/ processed) was cannabis.

<Sentencing Factor on defendant's age>

If you find the defendant guilty of this crime [as charged in Count[s] \_\_\_\_\_], you must then decide whether the People have proved the additional allegation that when the defendant (planted[,] [or]/ cultivated[,] [or]/ harvested[,] [or]/ dried[,] [or]/ processed) more than six cannabis plants, (he/she) was 18 years of age or older.

[Under the law, a person becomes one year older as soon as the first minute of his or her birthday has begun.]

[If you find the defendant guilty of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert offense[s]> [as charged in Count[s] \_\_\_\_\_], you must then decide whether the People have proved the additional allegation[s].] [You must decide whether the People have proved (this/these) allegation[s] for each crime and return a separate finding for each crime.]

To prove (this/these) allegation[s] [for each crime], the People must prove that:

<Give the next paragraph if defendant is charged with violating a subsection of Health & Safety Code section 11358(d)>

- [\_\_\_\_. (The defendant's conduct caused \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of statutory violation specified in Health & Safety Code section 11358(d)(3)>./ The defendant intentionally or with gross negligence caused substantial environmental harm to public lands or other public resources;)]

<Give the appropriate paragraphs below if defendant has prior convictions specified in Health & Safety Code section 11358(d)(1–2)>

[\_\_\_]. **The defendant has at least two prior convictions for \_\_\_\_\_**  
<insert description of prior convictions for this crime>(,;)]

[\_\_\_]. **The defendant has at least one prior conviction for \_\_\_\_\_**  
<insert description of offense[s] specified in clause (iv) of subparagraph (C) of paragraph (2) of subdivision (e) of Section 667 of the Penal Code or an offense requiring registration pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 290 of the Penal Code>.]

**[Cannabis means all or part of the *Cannabis sativa L.* plant, whether growing or not, including the seeds and resin extracted from any part of the plant. [It also includes every compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of the plant, its seeds, or resin.]]**

<If applicable, give the definition of industrial hemp: Health & Saf. Code, § 11018.5>

**[Cannabis does not include industrial hemp. Industrial hemp means a fiber or oilseed crop, or both, that only contain types of the plant *Cannabis sativa L.* with no more than three-tenths of 1 percent tetrahydrocannabinol from the dried flowering tops, whether growing or not. It may include the seeds of the plant; the resin extracted from any part of the plant; and every compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of the plant, its seeds or resin produced from the seeds.]**

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*New January 2006; Revised June 2007, April 2010, February 2015, September 2018*

## BENCH NOTES

### ***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

### ***Defenses—Instructional Duty***

A medical marijuana defense under the Compassionate Use Act or the Medical Marijuana Program Act may be raised to a charge of violating Health and Safety Code section 11358. (See Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11362.5, 11362.775.) The burden is on the defendant to produce sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt that the conduct was lawful. (*People v. Mower* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 460 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067]; *People v. Jackson* (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 525, 538–539 [148 Cal.Rptr.3d 375].) If the defendant introduces substantial evidence, sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt that the conduct may have been lawful, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give the relevant defense instruction: CALCRIM No. 3412, *Compassionate Use Defense*, or CALCRIM No. 3413, *Collective or Cooperative Cultivation Defense*.



Give CALCRIM No. 3415, *Legal Use Defense*, on request if supported by substantial evidence.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Health & Saf. Code, § 11358.
- Harvesting. *People v. Villa* (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 386, 390 [192 Cal.Rptr. 674].
- Aider and Abettor Liability. *People v. Null* (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 849, 852 [204 Cal.Rptr. 580].
- Medical Cannabis. Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11362.5, 11362.775.
- Burden of Proof for Defense of Medical Use. *People v. Mower* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 460 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067].
- Amount Must Be Reasonably Related to Patient’s Medical Needs. *People v. Trippet* (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1532, 1550–1551 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 559].
- Primary Caregiver. *People v. Mentch* (2008) 45 Cal.4th 274, 282–292 [85 Cal.Rptr.3d 480, 195 P.3d 1061].
- Defendant’s Burden of Proof on Compassionate Use Defense. *People v. Mentch* (2008) 45 Cal.4th 274, 292–294 [85 Cal.Rptr.3d 480, 195 P.3d 1061] (conc.opn. of Chin, J.).
- Medical Marijuana Program Act Defense. *People v. Jackson* (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 525, 538–539 [148 Cal.Rptr.3d 375].
- Definition of Cannabis. Health & Saf. Code, § 11018.
- Definition of Industrial Hemp. Health & Saf. Code, § 11018.5.

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Simple Possession of Cannabis. Health & Saf. Code, § 11357.

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Aider and Abettor Liability of Landowner*

In *People v. Null* (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 849, 852 [204 Cal.Rptr. 580], the court held that a landowner could be convicted of aiding and abetting cultivation of cannabis based on his or her knowledge of the activity and failure to prevent it. “If [the landowner] knew of the existence of the illegal activity, her failure to take steps to stop it would aid and abet the commission of the crime. This conclusion is based upon the control that she had over her property.” (*Ibid.*)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

7 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, §§ 136–146.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 145, *Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses*, § 145.01[1][a], [b], [3][a], [a.1] (Matthew Bender).

### **2371–2374. Reserved for Future Use**

## (iv) Simple Possession

### 2375. Simple Possession of Cannabis or Concentrated Cannabis: Misdemeanor (Health & Saf. Code, § 11357(b))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with possessing (more than 28.5 grams of cannabis/more than 8 grams of concentrated cannabis), a controlled substance [in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11357(b)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant possessed a controlled substance;
2. The defendant knew of its presence;
3. The defendant knew of the substance's nature or character as a controlled substance;
4. The controlled substance was (cannabis/concentrated cannabis);

AND

5. The (cannabis/concentrated cannabis) possessed by the defendant weighed more than (28.5 grams/8 grams).

*<Sentencing Factor on defendant's age>*

If you find the defendant guilty of this crime [as charged in Count[s] \_\_\_\_\_], you must then decide whether the People have proved the additional allegation that when the defendant possessed (cannabis/concentrated cannabis), (he/she) was 18 years of age or older.

[Under the law, a person becomes one year older as soon as the first minute of his or her birthday has begun.]

[*Cannabis* means all or part of the *Cannabis sativa L.* plant, whether growing or not, including the seeds and resin extracted from any part of the plant. [It also includes every compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of the plant, its seeds, or resin.]]

*<If applicable, give the definition of industrial hemp: Health & Saf. Code, § 11018.5>*

[Cannabis does not include industrial hemp. Industrial hemp means a fiber or oilseed crop, or both, that only contain types of the plant *Cannabis sativa L.* with no more than three-tenths of 1 percent tetrahydrocannabinol from the dried flowering tops, whether growing or not. Industrial hemp may include the seeds of the plant; the resin extracted from any part of the plant; and every compound, manufacture,

salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of the plant, its seeds or resin produced from the seeds.]

[Cannabis does not include the weight of any other ingredient combined with cannabis to prepare topical or oral administrations food, drink, or other product.]

[*Concentrated cannabis* means the separated resin, whether crude or purified, from the cannabis plant.]

[The People do not need to prove that the defendant knew which specific controlled substance (he/she) possessed.]

[Two or more people may possess something at the same time.]

[A person does not have to actually hold or touch something to possess it. It is enough if the person has (control over it/ [or] the right to control it), either personally or through another person.]

[Agreeing to buy a controlled substance does not, by itself, mean that a person has control over that substance.]

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*New January 2006; Revised June 2007, April 2010, October 2010, April 2011, February 2015, September 2018*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

### *Defenses—Instructional Duty*

If a medical cannabis defense applies under the Compassionate Use Act or the Medical Marijuana Program Act (See Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11362.5, 11362.775.), the burden is on the defendant to produce sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt that the conduct was lawful. (*People v. Mower* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 470 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067]; *People v. Jackson* (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 525, 538–539 [148 Cal.Rptr.3d 375].) If the defendant introduces substantial evidence, sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt that the conduct may have been lawful, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give the relevant defense instruction: CALCRIM No. 3412, *Compassionate Use Defense*, or CALCRIM No. 3413, *Collective or Cooperative Cultivation Defense*.

Give CALCRIM No. 3415, *Legal Use Defense*, on request if supported by substantial evidence.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Health & Saf. Code, § 11357(b); *People v. Palaschak* (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1236, 1242 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 722, 893 P.2d 717].

- Definition of Cannabis. Health & Saf. Code, § 11018.
- Definition of Industrial Hemp. Health & Saf. Code, § 11018.5.
- Definition of Concentrated Cannabis. Health & Saf. Code, § 11006.5.
- Knowledge. *People v. Romero* (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 147, 151–153, 157, fn. 3 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 16]; *People v. Winston* (1956) 46 Cal.2d 151, 158 [293 P.2d 40].
- Constructive vs. Actual Possession. *People v. Barnes* (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 552, 556 [67 Cal.Rptr.2d 162].
- Medical Cannabis. Health & Saf. Code, § 11362.5.
- Burden of Proof for Defense of Medical Use. *People v. Mower* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 460 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067]; *People v. Frazier* (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 807, 820–821 [27 Cal.Rptr.3d 336].
- Amount Must Be Reasonably Related to Patient’s Medical Needs. *People v. Trippet* (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1532, 1550–1551 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 559].
- Primary Caregiver. *People v. Mentch* (2008) 45 Cal.4th 274, 282–292 [85 Cal.Rptr.3d 480, 195 P.3d 1061].
- Defendant’s Burden of Proof on Compassionate Use Defense. *People v. Mentch* (2008) 45 Cal.4th 274, 292–294 [85 Cal.Rptr.3d 480, 195 P.3d 1061] (conc.opn. of Chin, J.).
- Medical Marijuana Program Act Defense. *People v. Jackson* (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 525, 538–539 [148 Cal.Rptr.3d 375].
- Prior Version of This Instruction Upheld. *People v. Busch* (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 150, 160 [113 Cal.Rptr.3d 683].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

7 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, §§ 76–77.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 145, *Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses*, § 145.01[1][a], [b], [d], [3][a], [a.1] (Matthew Bender).

**2376. Simple Possession of Cannabis or Concentrated Cannabis on School Grounds: Misdemeanor (Health & Saf. Code, § 11357(c))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with possessing (cannabis/ concentrated cannabis), a controlled substance, on the grounds of a school [in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11357(c)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant possessed a controlled substance;
2. The defendant knew of its presence;
3. The defendant knew of the substance's nature or character as a controlled substance;
4. The controlled substance was (cannabis/concentrated cannabis);
5. The (cannabis/concentrated cannabis) was in a usable amount but not more than (28.5 grams/8 grams);

**AND**

6. The defendant possessed the (cannabis/concentrated cannabis) on the grounds of or inside a school providing instruction in any grade from kindergarten through 12, when the school was open for classes or school-related programs.

*<Sentencing Factor on defendant's age>*

If you find the defendant guilty of this crime [as charged in Count[s] \_\_\_\_\_], you must then decide whether the People have proved the additional allegation that when the defendant possessed (cannabis/concentrated cannabis), (he/she) was 18 years of age or older.

*A usable amount* is a quantity that is enough to be used by someone as a controlled substance. Useless traces [or debris] are not usable amounts. On the other hand, a usable amount does not have to be enough, in either amount or strength, to affect the user.

[*Cannabis* means all or part of the *Cannabis sativa L.* plant, whether growing or not, including the seeds and resin extracted from any part of the plant. [It also includes every compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of the plant, its seeds, or resin.]]

*<If applicable, give the definition of industrial hemp: Health & Saf. Code, § 11018.5>*

[Cannabis does not include industrial hemp. Industrial hemp means a fiber or oilseed crop, or both, that only contain types of the plant

**Cannabis sativa L. with no more than three-tenths of 1 percent tetrahydrocannabinol from the dried flowering tops, whether growing or not. Industrial hemp may include the seeds of the plant; the resin extracted from any part of the plant; and every compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of the plant, its seeds or resin produced from the seeds.]**

**[Cannabis does not include the weight of any other ingredient combined with cannabis to prepare topical or oral administrations, food, drink, or other product.]**

**[Concentrated cannabis means the separated resin, whether crude or purified, from the cannabis plant.]**

**[The People do not need to prove that the defendant knew which specific controlled substance (he/she) possessed.]**

**[Two or more people may possess something at the same time.]**

**[A person does not have to actually hold or touch something to possess it. It is enough if the person has (control over it/ [or] the right to control it), either personally or through another person.]**

**[Agreeing to buy a controlled substance does not, by itself, mean that a person has control over that substance.]**

**[Under the law, a person becomes one year older as soon as the first minute of his or her birthday has begun.]**

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*New January 2006; Revised June 2007, April 2010, October 2010, February 2015, September 2018*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

Give the bracketed paragraph about calculating age if requested. (Fam. Code, § 6500; *In re Harris* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 849–850 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391].)

### *Defenses—Instructional Duty*

If a medical marijuana defense applies under the Compassionate Use Act or the Medical Marijuana Program Act (See Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11362.5, 11362.775.), the burden is on the defendant to produce sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt that the conduct was lawful. (*People v. Mower* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 470 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067]; *People v. Jackson* (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 525, 538–539 [148 Cal.Rptr.3d 375].) If the defendant introduces substantial evidence, sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt that the conduct may have been

lawful, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give the relevant defense instruction: CALCRIM No. 3412, *Compassionate Use Defense*, or CALCRIM No. 3413, *Collective or Cooperative Cultivation Defense*.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Health & Saf. Code, § 11357(c); *People v. Palaschak* (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1236, 1242 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 722, 893 P.2d 717].
- Definition of Cannabis. Health & Saf. Code, § 11018.
- Definition of Concentrated Cannabis. Health & Saf. Code, § 11006.5.
- Definition of Industrial Hemp. Health & Saf. Code, § 11018.5.
- Knowledge. *People v. Romero* (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 147, 151–153, 157, fn. 3 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 16]; *People v. Winston* (1956) 46 Cal.2d 151, 158 [293 P.2d 40].
- Constructive vs. Actual Possession. *People v. Barnes* (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 552, 556 [67 Cal.Rptr.2d 162].
- Usable Amount. *People v. Rubacalba* (1993) 6 Cal.4th 62, 65–67 [23 Cal.Rptr.2d 628, 859 P.2d 708]; *People v. Piper* (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 248, 250 [96 Cal.Rptr. 643].
- Medical Cannabis. Health & Saf. Code, § 11362.5.
- Burden of Proof for Defense of Medical Use. *People v. Mower* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 460 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067]; *People v. Frazier* (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 807, 820–821 [27 Cal.Rptr.3d 336].
- Amount Must Be Reasonably Related to Patient’s Medical Needs. *People v. Trippet* (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1532, 1550–1551 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 559].
- Primary Caregiver. *People v. Mentch* (2008) 45 Cal.4th 274, 282–292 [85 Cal.Rptr.3d 480, 195 P.3d 1061].
- Defendant’s Burden of Proof on Compassionate Use Defense. *People v. Mentch* (2008) 45 Cal.4th 274, 292–294 [85 Cal.Rptr.3d 480, 195 P.3d 1061] (conc.opn. of Chin, J.).
- Medical Marijuana Program Act Defense. *People v. Jackson* (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 525, 538–539 [148 Cal.Rptr.3d 375].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

7 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, §§ 76–77.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 145, *Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses*, § 145.01[1][a]–[d], [3][a], [a.1] (Matthew Bender).

**2377. Simple Possession of Concentrated Cannabis (Health & Saf.  
Code, § 11357(a))**

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*New January 2006; Revised June 2007, February 2015, August 2015; Revoked  
September 2018*

**2378–2379. Reserved for Future Use**



## F. OFFENSES INVOLVING MINORS

### (i) Controlled Substances

#### 2380. Sale, Furnishing, etc., of Controlled Substance to Minor (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11353, 11354, 11380(a))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with (selling/furnishing/administering/giving away) \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert type of controlled substance>*, a controlled substance, to someone under 18 years of age [in violation of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert appropriate code section[s]>*].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant [unlawfully] (sold/furnished/administered/gave away) a controlled substance to \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of alleged recipient>*;
2. The defendant knew of the presence of the controlled substance;
3. The defendant knew of the substance's nature or character as a controlled substance;
4. At that time, the defendant was 18 years of age or older;
5. At that time, \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of alleged recipient>* was under 18 years of age;

[AND]

*<If the controlled substance is not listed in the schedules set forth in sections 11054 through 11058 of the Health and Safety Code, give paragraph 6B and the definition of analog substance below instead of paragraph 6A.>*

- 6A. The controlled substance was \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert type of controlled substance>*(;/.)
- 6B. The controlled substance was an analog of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert type of controlled substance>*(;/.)

*<Give element 7 when instructing on usable amount; see Bench Notes.>*

[AND]

7. The controlled substance was in a usable amount.]

[In order to prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of analog drug>* is an analog

of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert type of controlled substance>. An analog of a controlled substance:

- [1. Has a chemical structure substantially similar to the structure of a controlled substance(/;)]

[OR]

- [(2/1). Has, is represented as having, or is intended to have a stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system substantially similar to or greater than the effect of a controlled substance.]]

[Selling for the purpose of this instruction means exchanging \_\_\_\_\_ <insert type of controlled substance> for money, services, or anything of value.]

[A person *administers* a substance if he or she applies it directly to the body of another person by injection, or by any other means, or causes the other person to inhale, ingest, or otherwise consume the substance.]

[A *usable amount* is a quantity that is enough to be used by someone as a controlled substance. Useless traces [or debris] are not usable amounts. On the other hand, a usable amount does not have to be enough, in either amount or strength, to affect the user.]

[The People do not need to prove that the defendant knew which specific controlled substance (he/she) (sold/furnished/administered/gave away).]

[A person does not have to actually hold or touch something to (sell it/ furnish it/administer it/give it away). It is enough if the person has (control over it/ [or] the right to control it), either personally or through another person.]

[Under the law, a person becomes one year older as soon as the first minute of his or her birthday has begun.]

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*New January 2006; Revised October 2010, February 2014, September 2017*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

Sale of a controlled substance does not require a usable amount. (See *People v. Peregrina-Larios* (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1522, 1524 [28 Cal.Rptr.2d 316].) When the prosecution alleges sales, do not use bracketed element 7 or the definition of usable amount. There is no case law on whether furnishing, administering, or giving away require usable quantities. (See *People v. Emmal* (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1313,

1316 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 907] [transportation requires usable quantity]; *People v. Ormiston* (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 676, 682 [129 Cal.Rptr.2d 567] [same].) The bracketed element 7 and the definition of usable amount are provided here for the court to use at its discretion.

If the defendant is charged with violating Health and Safety Code section 11354(a), in element 4, the court should replace “18 years of age or older” with “under 18 years of age.”

Give the bracketed paragraph about calculating age if requested. (Fam. Code, § 6500; *In re Harris* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 849–850 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391].)

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11353, 11354, 11380(a).
- Age of Defendant Element of Offense. *People v. Montalvo* (1971) 4 Cal.3d 328, 332 [93 Cal.Rptr. 581, 482 P.2d 205].
- No Defense of Good Faith Belief Offeree Over 18. *People v. Williams* (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 407, 410–411 [284 Cal.Rptr. 454]; *People v. Lopez* (1969) 271 Cal.App.2d 754, 760 [77 Cal.Rptr. 59].
- Administering. Health & Saf. Code, § 11002.
- Knowledge. *People v. Horn* (1960) 187 Cal.App.2d 68, 74–75 [9 Cal.Rptr. 578].
- Selling. *People v. Lazenby* (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1842, 1845 [8 Cal.Rptr.2d 541].
- Constructive vs. Actual Possession. *People v. Barnes* (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 552, 556 [67 Cal.Rptr.2d 162].
- Usable Amount. *People v. Rubacalba* (1993) 6 Cal.4th 62, 65–67 [23 Cal.Rptr.2d 628, 859 P.2d 708]; *People v. Piper* (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 248, 250 [96 Cal.Rptr. 643].
- Definition of Analog Controlled Substance. Health & Saf. Code, § 11401; *People v. Davis* (2013) 57 Cal.4th 353, 357, fn. 2 [159 Cal.Rptr.3d 405, 303 P.3d 1179].
- No Finding Necessary for “Expressly Listed” Controlled Substance. *People v. Davis, supra*, 57 Cal.4th at p. 362, fn. 5.

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Sale to Person Not a Minor. Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11352, 11379.
- Simple Possession of Controlled Substance. Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11350, 11377; *People v. Tinajero* (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1541, 1547 [24 Cal.Rptr.2d 298]; but see *People v. Peregrina-Larios, supra*, 22 Cal.App.4th at p. 1524 [lesser related offense but not necessarily included].
- Possession for Sale of Controlled Substance. Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11351,

11378; *People v. Tinajero*, *supra*, 19 Cal.App.4th at p. 1547; but see *People v. Peregrina-Larios*, *supra*, 22 Cal.App.4th at p. 1524 [lesser related offense but not necessarily included].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *No Defense of Good Faith Belief Over 18*

“The specific intent for the crime of selling cocaine to a minor is the intent to sell cocaine, not the intent to sell it to a minor. [Citations omitted.] It follows that ignorance as to the age of the offeree neither disproves criminal intent nor negates an evil design on the part of the offerer. It therefore does not give rise to a ‘mistake of fact’ defense to the intent element of the crime. [Citations omitted.]” (*People v. Williams*, *supra*, 233 Cal.App.3d at pp. 410–411.)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, §§ 124–126.

3 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 73, *Defenses and Justifications*, § 73.06[1] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.02, Ch. 145, *Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses*, § 145.01[1][a]–[c], [h], [i], [3][a], [d] (Matthew Bender).

**2381. Offering to Sell, Furnish, etc., Controlled Substance to  
Minor (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11353, 11354, 11380(a))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with offering to (sell/furnish/administer/give away) \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert type of controlled substance>*, a controlled substance, to someone under 18 years of age [in violation of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert appropriate code section[s]>*].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant [unlawfully] offered to (sell/furnish/administer/give away) a controlled substance to \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of alleged recipient>*;
2. When the defendant made the offer, (he/she) intended to (sell/furnish/administer/give away) the controlled substance;

*<If the controlled substance is not listed in the schedules set forth in sections 11054 through 11058 of the Health and Safety Code, give paragraph 3B and the definition of analog substance below instead of paragraph 3A.>*

- 3A. The controlled substance was \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert type of controlled substance>*;
- 3B. The controlled substance was an analog of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert type of controlled substance>*;
4. At that time, the defendant was 18 years of age or older;

AND

5. At that time, \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of alleged recipient>* was under 18 years of age.

[In order to prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of analog drug>* is an analog of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert type of controlled substance>*. An analog of a controlled substance:

- [1. Has a chemical structure substantially similar to the structure of a controlled substance(./;)]

[OR]

- [(2/1). Has, is represented as having, or is intended to have a stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system substantially similar to or greater than the effect of a controlled substance.]]

[Selling for the purpose of this instruction means exchanging a

controlled substance for money, services, or anything of value.]

[A person *administers* a substance if he or she applies it directly to the body of another person by injection, or by any other means, or causes the other person to inhale, ingest, or otherwise consume the substance.]

[Under the law, a person becomes one year older as soon as the first minute of his or her birthday has begun.]

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2014, September 2017*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If the defendant is charged with violating Health and Safety Code section 11354(a), in element 3, the court should replace “18 years of age or older” with “under 18 years of age.”

Give the bracketed paragraph about calculating age if requested. (Fam. Code, § 6500; *In re Harris* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 849–850 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391].)

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11353, 11354, 11380(a).
- Age of Defendant Element of Offense. *People v. Montalvo* (1971) 4 Cal.3d 328, 332 [93 Cal.Rptr. 581, 482 P.2d 205].
- No Defense of Good Faith Belief Offeree Over 18. *People v. Williams* (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 407, 410–411 [284 Cal.Rptr. 454]; *People v. Lopez* (1969) 271 Cal.App.2d 754, 760 [77 Cal.Rptr. 59].
- Specific Intent. *People v. Jackson* (1963) 59 Cal.2d 468, 469–470 [30 Cal.Rptr. 329, 381 P.2d 1].
- Administering. Health & Saf. Code, § 11002.
- Definition of Analog Controlled Substance. Health & Saf. Code, § 11401; *People v. Davis* (2013) 57 Cal.4th 353, 357, fn. 2 [159 Cal.Rptr.3d 405, 303 P.3d 1179].
- No Finding Necessary for “Expressly Listed” Controlled Substance. *People v. Davis, supra*, 57 Cal.4th at p. 362, fn. 5.

## LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Offering to Sell to Person Not a Minor. Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11352, 11360, 11379.
- Simple Possession of Controlled Substance. Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11350,

11377; *People v. Tinajero* (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1541, 1547 [24 Cal.Rptr.2d 298]; but see *People v. Peregrina-Larios* (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1522, 1524 [28 Cal.Rptr.2d 316] [lesser related offense but not necessarily included].

- Possession for Sale of Controlled Substance. Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11351, 11378; *People v. Tinajero, supra*, 19 Cal.App.4th at p. 1547; but see *People v. Peregrina-Larios, supra*, 22 Cal.App.4th at p. 1524 [lesser related offense but not necessarily included].

## RELATED ISSUES

### *No Requirement That Defendant Delivered or Possessed Drugs*

A defendant may be convicted of offering to sell even if there is no evidence that he or she delivered or ever possessed any controlled substance. (*People v. Jackson* (1963) 59 Cal.2d 468, 469 [30 Cal.Rptr. 329, 381 P.2d 1]; *People v. Brown* (1960) 55 Cal.2d 64, 68 [9 Cal.Rptr. 816, 357 P.2d 1072].)

See the Related Issues section to CALCRIM No. 2380, *Sale, Furnishing, etc., of Controlled Substance to Minor*.

## SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, §§ 124–126.

3 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 73, *Defenses and Justifications*, § 73.06[1] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 145, *Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses*, § 145.01[1][a], [h]–[j], [3][a] (Matthew Bender).

**2382. Employment of Minor to Sell Controlled Substance (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11353, 11354)**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with (hiring/employing/using) someone under 18 years of age to (transport/carry/sell/give away/prepare for sale/peddle) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert type of controlled substance>, a controlled substance [in violation of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert appropriate code section[s]>].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant [unlawfully] (hired/employed/used) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of person hired>;
2. \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of person hired> was (hired/employed/used) to (transport/carry/sell/give away/prepare for sale/peddle) a controlled substance;

<If the controlled substance is not listed in the schedules set forth in sections 11054 through 11058 of the Health and Safety Code, give paragraph 3B and the definition of analog substance below instead of paragraph 3A.>

- 3A. The controlled substance was \_\_\_\_\_ <insert type of controlled substance>;
- 3B. The controlled substance was an analog of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert type of controlled substance>;
4. At that time, the defendant was 18 years of age or older;
5. At that time, \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of person hired> was under 18 years of age;

AND

6. The defendant knew of the substance's nature or character as a controlled substance.

[In order to prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of analog drug> is an analog of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert type of controlled substance> . An analog of a controlled substance:

- [1. Has a chemical structure substantially similar to the structure of a controlled substance(./;)]

[OR]

- [(2/1). Has, is represented as having, or is intended to have a stimulant,



**depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system substantially similar to or greater than the effect of a controlled substance.]]**

**[Selling for the purpose of this instruction means exchanging a controlled substance for money, services, or anything of value.]**

**[A person *transports* for sale if he or she carries or moves something from one location to another, even if the distance is short.]**

**[The People do not need to prove that the defendant knew which specific controlled substance was to be (transported/carried/sold/given away/prepared for sale/peddled), only that (he/she) was aware that it was a controlled substance.]**

**[Under the law, a person becomes one year older as soon as the first minute of his or her birthday has begun.]**

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2014, September 2017*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If the defendant is charged with violating Health and Safety Code section 11354(a), in element 3, the court should replace “18 years of age or older” with “under 18 years of age.”

Give the bracketed paragraph about calculating age if requested. (Fam. Code, § 6500; *In re Harris* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 849–850 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391].)

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11353, 11354.
- Age of Defendant Element of Offense. *People v. Montalvo* (1971) 4 Cal.3d 328, 332 [93 Cal.Rptr. 581, 482 P.2d 205].
- Knowledge. *People v. Horn* (1960) 187 Cal.App.2d 68, 74–75 [9 Cal.Rptr. 578].
- Selling. *People v. Lazenby* (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1842, 1845 [8 Cal.Rptr.2d 541].
- Definition of Analog Controlled Substance. Health & Saf. Code, § 11401; *People v. Davis* (2013) 57 Cal.4th 353, 357, fn. 2 [159 Cal.Rptr.3d 405, 303 P.3d 1179].
- No Finding Necessary for “Expressly Listed” Controlled Substance. *People v. Davis, supra*, 57 Cal.4th 353 at p. 362, fn. 5.

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, §§ 124–126.

3 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 73, *Defenses and Justifications*, § 73.06[1] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 140, *Challenges to Crimes*, § 140.12, Ch. 145, *Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses*, § 145.01[1][a], [b], [g], [h], [3][a], [b], [c] (Matthew Bender).

**2383. Use of Minor as Agent to Violate Controlled Substance Law  
(Health & Saf. Code, § 11380(a))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with using someone under 18 years of age as an agent to (transport/sell/give away/possess/possess for sale) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert type of controlled substance>, a controlled substance [in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11380(a)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant used \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of person hired> as an agent;
2. \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of person hired> was used by the defendant to (transport/sell/give away/possess/possess for sale) a controlled substance;

*<If the controlled substance is not listed in the schedules set forth in sections 11054 through 11058 of the Health and Safety Code, give paragraph 3B and the definition of analog substance below instead of paragraph 3A.>*

- 3A. The controlled substance was \_\_\_\_\_ <insert type of controlled substance>;
- 3B. The controlled substance was an analog of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert type of controlled substance>;
4. At that time, the defendant was 18 years of age or older;
5. At that time, \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of person hired> was under 18 years of age;

**AND**

6. The defendant knew of the substance's nature or character as a controlled substance.

[In order to prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of analog drug> is an analog of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert type of controlled substance>. An analog of a controlled substance:

- [1. Has a chemical structure substantially similar to the structure of a controlled substance(./;)]

[OR]

- [(2/1). Has, is represented as having, or is intended to have a stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system

substantially similar to or greater than the effect of a controlled substance.]]

An *agent* is a person who is authorized to act for the defendant in dealings with other people.

[*Selling* for the purpose of this instruction means exchanging a controlled substance for money, services, or anything of value.]

[A person *transports* for sale if he or she carries or moves something from one location to another, even if the distance is short.]

[The People do not need to prove that the defendant knew which specific controlled substance was to be (transported/sold/given away/possessed/ possessed for sale), only that (he/she) was aware that it was a controlled substance.]

[Under the law, a person becomes one year older as soon as the first minute of his or her birthday has begun.]

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2014, September 2017*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

Give the bracketed paragraph about calculating age if requested. (Fam. Code, § 6500; *In re Harris* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 849–850 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391].)

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Health & Saf. Code, § 11380(a).
- Age of Defendant Element of Offense. *People v. Montalvo* (1971) 4 Cal.3d 328, 332 [93 Cal.Rptr. 581, 482 P.2d 205].
- Knowledge. *People v. Horn* (1960) 187 Cal.App.2d 68, 74–75 [9 Cal.Rptr. 578].
- Selling. *People v. Lazenby* (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1842, 1845 [8 Cal.Rptr.2d 541].
- Agent. Civ. Code, § 2295.
- Definition of Analog Controlled Substance. Health & Saf. Code, § 11401; *People v. Davis* (2013) 57 Cal.4th 353, 357, fn. 2 [159 Cal.Rptr.3d 405, 303 P.3d 1179].
- No Finding Necessary for “Expressly Listed” Controlled Substance. *People v. Davis, supra*, 57 Cal.4th at p. 362, fn. 5.

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, §§ 124–126.

3 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 73, *Defenses and Justifications*, § 73.06[1] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 140, *Challenges to Crimes*, § 140.12, Ch. 145, *Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses*, § 145.01[1][a], [b], [d], [e], [g], [h], [3][a] (Matthew Bender).

**2384. Inducing Minor to Violate Controlled Substance Laws  
(Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11353, 11354, 11380(a))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with (soliciting/inducing/encouraging/intimidating) someone under 18 years of age to commit the crime of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert description of Health and Safety Code violation alleged>* [in violation of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert appropriate code section[s]>*].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant willfully (solicited/induced/encouraged/intimidated) \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of person solicited>* to commit the crime of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert description of Health and Safety Code violation alleged>* [of] a controlled substance;

*<If the controlled substance is not listed in the schedules set forth in sections 11054 through 11058 of the Health and Safety Code, give paragraph 2B and the definition of analog substance below instead of paragraph 2A.>*

- 2A. The controlled substance was \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert type of controlled substance>*;
- 2B. The controlled substance was an analog of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert type of controlled substance>*;
3. The defendant intended that \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of person solicited>* would commit that crime;
4. At that time, the defendant was 18 years of age or older;

AND

5. At that time, \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of person solicited>* was under 18 years of age.

[In order to prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of analog drug>* is an analog of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert type of controlled substance>*. An analog of a controlled substance:

- [1. Has a chemical structure substantially similar to the structure of a controlled substance(./;)]

[OR]

- [(2/1). Has, is represented as having, or is intended to have a stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system substantially similar to or greater than the effect of a controlled substance.]]

**To decide whether the defendant intended that \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of person solicited> would commit the crime of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of Health and Safety Code violation alleged>, please refer to the separate instructions that I (will give/have given) you on that crime.**

**Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose.**

**[Under the law, a person becomes one year older as soon as the first minute of his or her birthday has begun.]**

*<Defense: Good Faith Belief Over 18>*

**[The defendant is not guilty of this crime if (he/she) reasonably and actually believed that \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of person solicited> was 18 years of age or older. The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not reasonably and actually believe that \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of person solicited> was at least 18 years of age. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of this crime.]**

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2014, September 2017, September 2018*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

Where indicated in the instruction, insert a description of the Health and Safety Code violation allegedly solicited. For example, “the crime of possession for sale of cocaine,” or “the crime of sale of cannabis.”

If the defendant is charged with violating Health and Safety Code section 11354(a), in element 3, the court should replace “18 years of age or older” with “under 18 years of age.”

Give the bracketed paragraph about calculating age if requested. (Fam. Code, § 6500; *In re Harris* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 849–850 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391].)

### *Defenses—Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give the final bracketed paragraph if there is substantial evidence supporting the defense that the defendant had a reasonable and good faith belief that the person was over 18 years of age. (*People v. Goldstein* (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 1024, 1036–1037 [182 Cal.Rptr. 207].)

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11353, 11354, 11380(a).
- Age of Defendant Element of Offense. *People v. Montalvo* (1971) 4 Cal.3d

328, 332 [93 Cal.Rptr. 581, 482 P.2d 205].

- Good Faith Belief Minor Over 18 Defense to Inducing or Soliciting. *People v. Goldstein* (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 1024, 1036–1037 [182 Cal.Rptr. 207].
- Definition of Analog Controlled Substance. Health & Saf. Code, § 11401; *People v. Davis* (2013) 57 Cal.4th 353, 357, fn. 2 [159 Cal.Rptr.3d 405, 303 P.3d 1179].
- No Finding Necessary for “Expressly Listed” Controlled Substance. *People v. Davis, supra*, 57 Cal.4th at p. 362, fn. 5.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

7 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, §§ 124, 125.

3 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 73, *Defenses and Justifications*, § 73.06[1] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 140, *Challenges to Crimes*, § 140.12, Ch. 145, *Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses*, § 145.01[1][a], [3][a] (Matthew Bender).

**2385–2389. Reserved for Future Use**



## (ii) Marijuana

### 2390. Sale, Furnishing, etc., of Cannabis to Minor (Health & Saf. Code, § 11361)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with (selling/furnishing/administering/giving away) cannabis, a controlled substance, to someone under (18/14) years of age [in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11361].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant [unlawfully] (sold/furnished/administered/gave away) cannabis, a controlled substance, to \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of alleged recipient>;
2. The defendant knew of the presence of the controlled substance;
3. The defendant knew of the substance's nature or character as a controlled substance;
4. At that time, the defendant was 18 years of age or older;

[AND]

5. At that time, \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of alleged recipient> was under (18/14) years of age;

<Give element 6 when instructing on usable amount; see Bench Notes.>

[AND]

6. The cannabis was in a usable amount.]

[*Selling* for the purpose of this instruction means exchanging the cannabis for money, services, or anything of value.]

[A person *administers* a substance if he or she applies it directly to the body of another person by injection, or by any other means, or causes the other person to inhale, ingest, or otherwise consume the substance.]

[A *usable amount* is a quantity that is enough to be used by someone as a controlled substance. Useless traces [or debris] are not usable amounts. On the other hand, a usable amount does not have to be enough, in either amount or strength, to affect the user.]

[*Cannabis* means all or part of the *Cannabis sativa L.* plant, whether growing or not, including the seeds and resin extracted from any part of the plant. [It also includes every compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of the plant, its seeds, or resin.]]

<If applicable, give the definition of industrial hemp: Health & Saf. Code, § 11018.5.>

**[Cannabis does not include industrial hemp. Industrial hemp means a fiber or oilseed crop, or both, that only contain types of the plant Cannabis sativa L. with no more than three-tenths of 1 percent tetrahydrocannabinol from the dried flowering tops, whether growing or not. It may include the seeds of the plant; the resin extracted from any part of the plant; and every compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of the plant, its seeds or resin produced from the seeds.]**

**[The People do not need to prove that the defendant knew which specific controlled substance (he/she) (sold/furnished/administered/gave away).]**

**[A person does not have to actually hold or touch something to (sell it/ furnish it/administer it/give it away). It is enough if the person has (control over it/ [or] the right to control it), either personally or through another person.]**

**[Under the law, a person becomes one year older as soon as the first minute of his or her birthday has begun.]**

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*New January 2006; Revised October 2010, September 2018*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

In element 5, give the alternative of “under 14 years of age” only if the defendant is charged with furnishing, administering, or giving away cannabis to a minor under 14. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11361(a).)

Sale of a controlled substance does not require a usable amount. (See *People v. Peregrina-Larios* (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1522, 1524 [28 Cal.Rptr.2d 316].) When the prosecution alleges sales, do not use bracketed element 6 or the definition of usable amount. There is no case law on whether furnishing, administering, or giving away require usable quantities. (See *People v. Emmal* (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1313, 1316 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 907] [transportation requires usable quantity]; *People v. Ormiston* (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 676, 682 [129 Cal.Rptr.2d 567] [same].) Element 6 and the bracketed definition of usable amount are provided here for the court to use at its discretion.

When instructing on the definition of “cannabis,” the court may choose to give just the first bracketed sentence or may give the first bracketed sentence with either or both of the bracketed sentences following. The second and third sentences should be given if requested and relevant based on the evidence. (See Health & Saf. Code, § 11018 [defining cannabis].)

Give the bracketed paragraph about calculating age if requested. (Fam. Code, § 6500; *In re Harris* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 849–850 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391].)

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Health & Saf. Code, § 11361.
- Age of Defendant Element of Offense. *People v. Montalvo* (1971) 4 Cal.3d 328, 332 [93 Cal.Rptr. 581, 482 P.2d 205].
- No Defense of Good Faith Belief Offeree Over 18. *People v. Williams* (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 407, 410–411 [284 Cal.Rptr. 454]; *People v. Lopez* (1969) 271 Cal.App.2d 754, 760 [77 Cal.Rptr. 59].
- Administering. Health & Saf. Code, § 11002.
- Knowledge. *People v. Horn* (1960) 187 Cal.App.2d 68, 74–75 [9 Cal.Rptr. 578].
- Selling. *People v. Lazenby* (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1842, 1845 [8 Cal.Rptr.2d 541].
- Constructive vs. Actual Possession. *People v. Barnes* (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 552, 556 [67 Cal.Rptr.2d 162].
- Usable Amount. *People v. Piper* (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 248, 250 [96 Cal.Rptr. 643].
- “Cannabis” Defined. Health & Saf. Code, § 11018.

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Sale to Person Not a Minor. Health & Saf. Code, § 11360.
- Simple Possession of Cannabis. Health & Saf. Code, § 11357.
- Possession for Sale of Cannabis. Health & Saf. Code, § 11359.

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *No Defense of Good Faith Belief Over 18*

“The specific intent for the crime of selling cocaine to a minor is the intent to sell cocaine, not the intent to sell it to a minor. [Citations omitted.] It follows that ignorance as to the age of the offeree neither disproves criminal intent nor negates an evil design on the part of the offerer. It therefore does not give rise to a ‘mistake of fact’ defense to the intent element of the crime. [Citations omitted.]” (*People v. Williams* (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 407, 410–411 [284 Cal.Rptr. 454].)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

7 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, §§ 124–126.

3 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 73, *Defenses and Justifications*, § 73.06[1] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 145,

*Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses, § 145.01[1][a]–[c], [h], [i], [3][a]* (Matthew Bender).

**2391. Offering to Sell, Furnish, etc., Cannabis to Minor (Health & Saf. Code, § 11361)**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with offering to (sell/furnish/administer/give away) cannabis, a controlled substance, to someone under (18/14) years of age [in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11361].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant [unlawfully] offered to (sell/furnish/administer/give away) cannabis, a controlled substance, to \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of alleged recipient>;
2. When the defendant made the offer, (he/she) intended to (sell/furnish/administer/give away) the controlled substance;
3. At that time, the defendant was 18 years of age or older;

AND

4. At that time, \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of alleged recipient> was under (18/14) years of age.

[*Selling* for the purpose of this instruction means exchanging the cannabis for money, services, or anything of value.]

[A person *administers* a substance if he or she applies it directly to the body of another person by injection, or by any other means, or causes the other person to inhale, ingest, or otherwise consume the substance.]

[*Cannabis* means all or part of the *Cannabis sativa L.* plant, whether growing or not, including the seeds and resin extracted from any part of the plant. [It also includes every compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of the plant, its seeds, or resin.]]

<If applicable, give the definition of industrial hemp: Health & Saf. Code, § 11018.5>

[Cannabis does not include industrial hemp. Industrial hemp means a fiber or oilseed crop, or both, that only contain types of the plant *Cannabis sativa L.* with no more than three-tenths of 1 percent tetrahydrocannabinol from the dried flowering tops, whether growing or not. It may include the seeds of the plant; the resin extracted from any part of the plant; and every compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of the plant, its seeds or resin produced from the seeds.]

[Under the law, a person becomes one year older as soon as the first

minute of his or her birthday has begun.]

[The People do not need to prove that the defendant actually possessed the cannabis.]

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*New January 2006; Revised September 2018*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

In element 4, give the alternative of “under 14 years of age” only if the defendant is charged with offering to furnish, administer, or give away cannabis to a minor under 14. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11361(a).)

Give the bracketed paragraph about calculating age if requested. (Fam. Code, § 6500; *In re Harris* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 849–850 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391].)

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Health & Saf. Code, § 11361.
- Age of Defendant Element of Offense. *People v. Montalvo* (1971) 4 Cal.3d 328, 332 [93 Cal.Rptr. 581, 482 P.2d 205].
- No Defense of Good Faith Belief Offeree Over 18. *People v. Williams* (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 407, 410–411 [284 Cal.Rptr. 454]; *People v. Lopez* (1969) 271 Cal.App.2d 754, 760 [77 Cal.Rptr. 59].
- Specific Intent. *People v. Jackson* (1963) 59 Cal.2d 468, 469–470 [30 Cal.Rptr. 329, 381 P.2d 1].
- Administering. Health & Saf. Code, § 11002.
- “Cannabis” Defined. Health & Saf. Code, § 11018.

## LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Offering to Sell to Person Not a Minor. Health & Saf. Code, § 11360.
- Simple Possession of Cannabis. Health & Saf. Code, § 11357.
- Possession for Sale of Cannabis. Health & Saf. Code, § 11359.
- “Cannabis” Defined. Health & Saf. Code, § 11018.

## RELATED ISSUES

### *No Requirement That Defendant Delivered or Possessed Drugs*

A defendant may be convicted of offering to sell even if there is no evidence that he or she delivered or ever possessed any controlled substance. (*People v. Jackson* (1963) 59 Cal.2d 468, 469 [30 Cal.Rptr. 329, 381 P.2d 1]; *People v. Brown* (1960)

55 Cal.2d 64, 68 [9 Cal.Rptr. 816, 357 P.2d 1072].)

See the Related Issues section to CALCRIM No. 2390, *Sale, Furnishing, etc., of Cannabis to Minor*.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

7 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, §§ 124–126.

3 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 73, *Defenses and Justifications*, § 73.06[1] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 145, *Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses*, § 145.01[1][a], [h]–[j], [3][a] (Matthew Bender).

**2392. Employment of Minor to Sell, etc., Cannabis (Health & Saf. Code, § 11361(a))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with (hiring/employing/using) someone under 18 years of age to (transport/carry/sell/give away/prepare for sale/peddle) cannabis, a controlled substance [in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11361(a)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant (hired/employed/used) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of person hired>;
2. \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of person hired> was (hired/employed/used) to (transport/carry/sell/give away/prepare for sale/peddle) cannabis, a controlled substance;
3. At that time, the defendant was 18 years of age or older;
4. At that time, \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of person hired> was under 18 years of age;

AND

5. The defendant knew of the substance's nature or character as a controlled substance.

[*Selling* for the purpose of this instruction means exchanging the cannabis for money, services, or anything of value.]

[A person *transports* something if he or she carries or moves it from one location to another, even if the distance is short.]

[*Cannabis* means all or part of the *Cannabis sativa L.* plant, whether growing or not, including the seeds and resin extracted from any part of the plant. [It also includes every compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of the plant, its seeds, or resin.]]

<If applicable, give the definition of industrial hemp: Health & Saf. Code, § 11018.5>

[Cannabis does not include industrial hemp. Industrial hemp means a fiber or oilseed crop, or both, that only contain types of the plant *Cannabis sativa L.* with no more than three-tenths of 1 percent tetrahydrocannabinol from the dried flowering tops, whether growing or not. Industrial hemp may include the seeds of the plant; the resin extracted from any part of the plant; and every compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of the plant, its seeds or resin produced from the seeds.]



**[The People do not need to prove that the defendant knew which specific controlled substance was to be (transported/carried/sold/given away/prepared for sale/peddled), only that (he/she) was aware that it was a controlled substance.]**

**[Under the law, a person becomes one year older as soon as the first minute of his or her birthday has begun.]**

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*New January 2006; Revised September 2018*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

When instructing on the definition of “cannabis,” the court may choose to give just the first bracketed sentence or may give the first bracketed sentence with either or both of the bracketed sentences following. The second and third sentences should be given if requested and relevant based on the evidence. (See Health & Saf. Code, § 11018 [defining cannabis].)

Give the bracketed paragraph about calculating age if requested. (Fam. Code, § 6500; *In re Harris* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 849–850 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391].)

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Health & Saf. Code, § 11361(a).
- Age of Defendant Element of Offense. *People v. Montalvo* (1971) 4 Cal.3d 328, 332 [93 Cal.Rptr. 581, 482 P.2d 205].
- Knowledge. *People v. Horn* (1960) 187 Cal.App.2d 68, 74–75 [9 Cal.Rptr. 578].
- Selling. *People v. Lazenby* (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1842, 1845 [8 Cal.Rptr.2d 541].
- “Cannabis” Defined. Health & Saf. Code, § 11018.

## SECONDARY SOURCES

7 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, §§ 124–126.

3 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 73, *Defenses and Justifications*, § 73.06[1] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 145, *Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses*, § 145.01[1][a], [b], [g], [h], [3][a] (Matthew Bender).

**2393. Inducing Minor to Use Cannabis (Health & Saf. Code,  
§ 11361(a))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with inducing someone under 18 years of age to use cannabis [in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11361(a)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant [unlawfully] (encouraged/persuaded/solicited/intimidated/induced) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of person solicited> to use cannabis;
  2. At that time, the defendant was at least 18 years of age or older;
- AND
3. At that time, \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of person solicited> was under 18 years of age.

[*Cannabis* means all or part of the *Cannabis sativa L.* plant, whether growing or not, including the seeds and resin extracted from any part of the plant. [It also includes every compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of the plant, its seeds, or resin.]]

<If applicable, give the definition of industrial hemp: Health & Saf. Code, § 11018.5.>

[*Cannabis* does not include industrial hemp. Industrial hemp means a fiber or oilseed crop, or both, that only contain types of the plant *Cannabis sativa L.* with no more than three-tenths of 1 percent tetrahydrocannabinol from the dried flowering tops, whether growing or not. It may include the seeds of the plant; the resin extracted from any part of the plant; and every compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of the plant, its seeds or resin produced from the seeds.]

[Under the law, a person becomes one year older as soon as the first minute of his or her birthday has begun.]

<Defense: Good Faith Belief Over 18.>

[The defendant is not guilty of this crime if (he/she) reasonably and actually believed that \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of person solicited> was at least 18 years of age. The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not reasonably and actually believe that \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of person solicited> was at least 18 years of age. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of this crime.]

*New January 2006; Revised September 2018*

## BENCH NOTES

### ***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

Give the bracketed paragraph about calculating age if requested. (Fam. Code, § 6500; *In re Harris* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 849–850 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391].)

### ***Defenses—Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give the final bracketed paragraph if there is substantial evidence supporting the defense that the defendant had a reasonable and good faith belief that the person was over 18 years of age. (*People v. Goldstein* (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 1024, 1036–1037 [182 Cal.Rptr. 207].)

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Health & Saf. Code, § 11361(a).
- Age of Defendant Element of Offense. *People v. Montalvo* (1971) 4 Cal.3d 328, 332 [93 Cal.Rptr. 581, 482 P.2d 205].
- Good Faith Belief Minor Over 18 Defense to Inducing or Soliciting. *People v. Goldstein* (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 1024, 1036–1037 [182 Cal.Rptr. 207].
- “Cannabis” Defined. Health & Saf. Code, § 11018.

## SECONDARY SOURCES

7 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, § 126.

3 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 73, *Defenses and Justifications*, § 73.06[1] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 145, *Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses*, § 145.01[1][a], [3][a] (Matthew Bender).

**2394–2399. Reserved for Future Use**



## G. USE AND POSSESSION OF PARAPHERNALIA

### (i) Use

#### 2400. Using or Being Under the Influence of Controlled Substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11550)

---

The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with (using/ [or] being under the influence of) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert controlled substance listed in Health & Saf. Code, § 11550>, a controlled substance [in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11550].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

<Alternative A—use of controlled substance>

1. The defendant willfully [and unlawfully] used \_\_\_\_\_ <insert controlled substance listed in Health & Saf. Code, § 11550>, a controlled substance[, a short time before (his/her) arrest](;/.)

[OR]

<Alternative B—under the influence of controlled substance>

- (1/2). The defendant was willfully [and unlawfully] under the influence of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert controlled substance listed in Health & Saf. Code, § 11550>, a controlled substance, when (he/she) was arrested.

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose.

[Someone is *under the influence of a controlled substance* if that person has taken or used a controlled substance that has appreciably affected the person's nervous system, brain, or muscles or has created in the person a detectable abnormal mental or physical condition.]

<Defense: Prescription>

[The defendant is not guilty of (using/ [or] being under the influence of) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert controlled substance listed in Health & Saf. Code, § 11550> if (he/she) had a valid prescription for that substance written by a physician, dentist, podiatrist, [naturopathic doctor] or veterinarian licensed to practice in California. The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not have a valid prescription. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty.]

New January 2006; Revised August 2006

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

A violation of Health and Safety Code section 11550 based on “use” of a controlled substance requires “ ‘current use’ or ‘use immediately prior to arrest’ . . . .” (*People v. Jones* (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 398, 403–404 [234 Cal.Rptr. 408]; see also *People v. Velasquez* (1976) 54 Cal.App.3d 695, 699–700 [126 Cal.Rptr. 656]; *People v. Gutierrez* (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 397, 402 [140 Cal.Rptr. 122].) In *People v. Jones, supra*, 189 Cal.App.3d at p. 406, the court found evidence of use within 48 hours prior to the defendant’s arrest sufficient. If there is an issue in the case over when the defendant allegedly used the substance, give the bracketed phrase “a short time before (his/her) arrest” in element 1. (*Ibid.*) Alternatively, the court may insert a specific time or time frame in element 1, e.g., “24 to 48 hours prior to (his/her) arrest.”

A recent amendment to section 11150 includes a naturopathic doctor in the category of those who may furnish or order certain controlled substances, so that bracketed option should be included in this instruction if substantial evidence supports it.

If the court instructs the jury on both use and being under the influence, the court should consider whether a unanimity instruction is required. (See CALCRIM No. 3500, *Unanimity*.)

### *Defenses—Instructional Duty*

The prescription defense is codified in Health and Safety Code section 11550. The defendant need only raise a reasonable doubt about whether his or her use of the drug was lawful because of a valid prescription. (See *People v. Mower* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 479 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067].) If there is sufficient evidence, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense. Give the bracketed “and unlawfully” in the elements and the bracketed paragraph on the defense.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Health & Saf. Code, § 11550.
- Under the Influence. *People v. Culberson* (1956) 140 Cal.App.2d Supp. 959, 960–961 [295 P.2d 598]; see also *People v. Canty* (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1266, 1278 [14 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 90 P.3d 1168]; *People v. Enriquez* (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 661, 665 [49 Cal.Rptr.2d 710].
- Under the Influence and Use Distinguished. *People v. Gutierrez* (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 397, 402 [140 Cal.Rptr. 122].
- Willfulness Element of Offense. *People v. Little* (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 766, 775 [9 Cal.Rptr.3d 446].

- Willfully Defined. Pen. Code, § 7(1); *People v. Lara* (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 102, 107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
- Specific Controlled Substance Must Be Alleged. *Sallas v. Municipal Court* (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 737, 743 [150 Cal.Rptr. 543].
- Requires Current Use. *People v. Jones* (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 398, 403–404 [234 Cal.Rptr. 408]; see also *People v. Velasquez* (1976) 54 Cal.App.3d 695, 699–700 [126 Cal.Rptr. 656]; *People v. Gutierrez* (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 397, 402 [140 Cal.Rptr. 122].
- Statute Constitutional. *Bosco v. Justice Court* (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 179, 191–192 [143 Cal.Rptr. 468].
- Prescription Defense. Health & Saf. Code, § 11550.
- Prescription Defined. Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11027, 11164, 11164.5.
- Persons Authorized to Write Prescriptions. Health & Saf. Code, § 11150.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, § 93.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 145, *Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses*, § 145.01[1][a], [k], [l], [2][b] (Matthew Bender).

**2401. Aiding and Abetting Unlawful Use of Controlled Substance  
(Health & Saf. Code, § 11365)**

---

The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with aiding and abetting unlawful use of a controlled substance in a place [in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11365].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant willfully and intentionally (visited/ [or] was present in) a place where someone else was (smoking/ [or] using) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert controlled substance specified in Health & Saf. Code, § 11365>, a controlled substance;
2. The defendant knew that the other person intended to (smoke/ [or] use) the controlled substance;
3. The defendant intended to aid and abet the other person in (smoking/ [or] using) the controlled substance;
4. The defendant did or said something that did in fact aid and abet the other person in (smoking/ [or] using) the controlled substance;

AND

5. The defendant knew that (his/her) words or conduct aided and abetted the other person in (smoking/ [or] using) the controlled substance.

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose.

Someone *aids and abets* a crime if, before or during the commission of the crime, he or she knows of the perpetrator's unlawful purpose and he or she specifically intends to, and does in fact, aid, facilitate, promote, encourage, or instigate the perpetrator's commission of that crime.

[If you conclude that the defendant was present at the scene of the crime or failed to prevent the crime, you may consider that fact in determining whether the defendant was an aider and abettor. However, the fact that a person is present at the scene of a crime or fails to prevent the crime does not, by itself, make him or her an aider and abettor.]

[A person who aids and abets a crime is not guilty of that crime if he or she withdraws before the crime is committed. To withdraw, a person must do two things:

1. He or she must notify everyone else he or she knows is involved



**in the commission of the crime that he or she is no longer participating. The notification must be made early enough to prevent the commission of the crime;**

**AND**

- 2. He or she must do everything reasonably within his or her power to prevent the crime from being committed. He or she does not have to actually prevent the crime.**

**The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not withdraw. If the People have not met this burden, you may not find the defendant guilty under an aiding and abetting theory.]**

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*New January 2006*

## **BENCH NOTES**

### ***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime. (See *People v. Beeman* (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 560–561 [199 Cal.Rptr. 60, 674 P.2d 1318] [duty to instruct on aiding and abetting].)

### ***Defenses—Instructional Duty***

If there is evidence that the defendant was merely present at the scene or only had knowledge that a crime was being committed, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give the bracketed portion that begins with “If you conclude that the defendant was present.” (*People v. Boyd* (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 541, 557, fn. 14 [271 Cal.Rptr. 738]; *In re Michael T.* (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 907, 911 [149 Cal.Rptr. 87].)

If there is evidence that the defendant withdrew from participation in the crime, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on withdrawal. (*People v. Norton* (1958) 161 Cal.App.2d 399, 403 [327 P.2d 87]; *People v. Ross* (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 391, 404–405 [154 Cal.Rptr. 783].) Give the bracketed portion that begins with “A person who aids and abets a crime is not guilty.”

## **AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Health & Saf. Code, § 11365.
- Willfully Defined. Pen. Code, § 7(1); *People v. Lara* (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 102, 107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
- Aiding and Abetting Required. Health. & Saf. Code, § 11365(b); *People v. Cressey* (1970) 2 Cal.3d 836, 848–849 [87 Cal.Rptr. 699, 471 P.2d 19].
- Knowledge and Willful, Intentional Involvement Required. *People v. Brim* (1968) 257 Cal.App.2d 839, 842 [65 Cal.Rptr. 265].
- Requirements for Aiding and Abetting Generally. *People v. Beeman* (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 560–561 [199 Cal.Rptr. 60, 674 P.2d 1318].

- Withdrawal. *People v. Norton* (1958) 161 Cal.App.2d 399, 403 [327 P.2d 87]; *People v. Ross* (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 391, 404–405 [154 Cal.Rptr. 783].
- Presence or Knowledge Insufficient. *People v. Boyd* (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 541, 557, fn. 14 [271 Cal.Rptr. 738]; *In re Michael T.* (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 907, 911 [149 Cal.Rptr. 87].

## RELATED ISSUES

### *Drug Use in Car*

A car is a “place” for the purposes of this offense. (*People v. Lee* (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 836, 840–841 [67 Cal.Rptr. 709].)

See also the Related Issues section of CALCRIM No. 401, *Aiding and Abetting: Intended Crimes*.

## SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, § 157.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 140, *Challenges to Crimes*, § 140.10[3]; Ch. 145, *Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses*, § 145.01[1][a], [m] (Matthew Bender).

**2402–2409. Reserved for Future Use**

## (ii) Possession of Paraphernalia

### 2410. Possession of Controlled Substance Paraphernalia (Health & Saf. Code, § 11364)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with possessing an object that can be used to unlawfully inject or smoke a controlled substance [in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11364].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant [unlawfully] possessed an object used for unlawfully injecting or smoking a controlled substance;
2. The defendant knew of the object's presence;

AND

3. The defendant knew it to be an object used for unlawfully injecting or smoking a controlled substance.

[Two or more people may possess something at the same time.]

[A person does not have to actually hold or touch something to possess it. It is enough if the person has (control over it/ [or] the right to control it), either personally or through another person.]

[The People allege that the defendant possessed the following items: \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert each specific item of paraphernalia when multiple items alleged>*. You may not find the defendant guilty unless you all agree that the People have proved that the defendant possessed at least one of these items and you all agree on which item (he/she) possessed.]

*<Defense: Authorized Possession for Personal Use>*

[The defendant did not unlawfully possess [a] hypodermic (needle[s]/ [or] syringe[s]) if (he/she) was legally authorized to possess (it/them). The defendant was legally authorized to possess (it/them) if:

1. (He/She) possessed the (needle[s]/ [or] syringe[s]) for personal use;

[AND]

2. (He/She) obtained (it/them) from \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert source authorized by Health & Safety Code section 11364(c)>*.]

The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not legally authorized to possess the hypodermic (needle[s]/ [or] syringe[s]). If the People have not met this burden, you

**must find the defendant not guilty of this crime.]**

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*New January 2006; Revised October 2010, April 2011, August 2015, September 2018*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If the prosecution alleges under a single count that the defendant possessed multiple items, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on unanimity. (See *People v. Wolfe* (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 177, 184–185 [7 Cal.Rptr.3d 483]; *People v. Rowland* (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 61, 65 [88 Cal.Rptr.2d 900].) Give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “The People allege that the defendant possessed,” inserting the items alleged.

### *Defenses—Instructional Duty*

Section 11364 does not apply to possession of hypodermic needles or syringes for personal use if acquired from an authorized source. The defendant need only raise a reasonable doubt about whether his or her possession of these items was lawful. (See *People v. Mower* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 479 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067].) If there is sufficient evidence, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on this defense. (See *People v. Fuentes* (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 1041, 1045 [274 Cal.Rptr. 17] [authorized possession of hypodermic is an affirmative defense]; *People v. Mower*, at pp. 478–481 [discussing affirmative defenses generally and the burden of proof].) Give the bracketed word “unlawfully” in element 1 and the bracketed paragraph on that defense.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Health & Saf. Code, § 11364.
- Statute Constitutional. *People v. Chambers* (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 4 [257 Cal.Rptr. 289].
- Constructive vs. Actual Possession. *People v. Barnes* (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 552, 556 [67 Cal.Rptr.2d 162].
- Unanimity. *People v. Wolfe* (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 177, 184–185 [7 Cal.Rptr.3d 483].
- Authorized Possession Defense. Health & Saf. Code, § 11364(c).

## RELATED ISSUES

### *Cannabis Paraphernalia Excluded*

Possession of a device for smoking cannabis, without more, is not a crime. (*In re Johnny O.* (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 888, 897 [132 Cal.Rptr.2d 471].)

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare § 155.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.04[2][a] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 145, *Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses*, § 145.01[1][a], [b] (Matthew Bender).

**2411. Possession of Hypodermic Needle or Syringe (Bus. & Prof.  
Code, § 4140)**

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*New January 2006; Revised June 2007; Revoked August 2015*

## 2412. Fraudulently Obtaining a Hypodermic Needle or Syringe (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 4326(a))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with fraudulently obtaining a hypodermic (needle/ [or] syringe) [in violation of Business and Professions Code section 4326(a)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant obtained a hypodermic (needle/ [or] syringe);

AND

2. To do so, the defendant (used fraud[,]/ [or] used a forged or fictitious name[,]/ [or] violated the law by \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of conduct in violation of statute>).

[A person *uses fraud* when he or she makes a false statement, misrepresents information, hides the truth, or otherwise does something with the intent to deceive.]

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*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Bus. & Prof. Code, § 4326(a).
- Fraud Defined. See *People v. Pugh* (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 66, 72 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 770].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012), Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, § 470.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 143, *Crimes Against Property*, § 143.04; Ch. 145, *Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses*, § 145.01[1][a] (Matthew Bender).

## 2413. Using or Permitting Improper Use of a Hypodermic Needle or Syringe (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 4326(b))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with (using[,]/ [or] permitting[,]/ [or] causing) a hypodermic (needle/ [or] syringe) [to be used] for a purpose other than the one for which it had been obtained [in violation of Business and Professions Code section 4326(b)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant obtained a hypodermic (needle/ [or] syringe) from someone who had a license to (sell/ [or] furnish) the (needle/ [or] syringe);

AND

2. The defendant (used[,]/ [or] permitted[,]/ [or] caused) that hypodermic (needle/ [or] syringe) [to be used] for a purpose other than the one for which it had been obtained.

[The defendant may have either directly or indirectly caused the hypodermic (needle/ [or] syringe) to be used for a purpose other than the one for which it had been obtained.]

---

*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Bus. & Prof. Code, § 4326(b).

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012), Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, § 470.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 145, *Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses*, § 145.01[1][a] (Matthew Bender).

**2414–2429. Reserved for Future Use**



## H. MONEY FROM CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES

### 2430. Possession of More Than \$100,000 Related to Transaction Involving Controlled Substance: Proceeds (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.6)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with the unlawful possession of more than \$100,000 obtained from a transaction involving a controlled substance [in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11370.6].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant possessed more than \$100,000 in (cash/ [or] \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert type[s] of negotiable instrument[s]>*);
2. The (cash/ [or] \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert type[s] of negotiable instrument[s]>*) (was/were) obtained from the (sale/possession for sale/transportation/manufacture/offer to sell/offer to manufacture) [of] \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name[s] of controlled substance[s]>*, [a] controlled substance[s];

AND

3. The defendant knew that the (cash/ [or] \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert type[s] of negotiable instrument[s]>*) (was/were) obtained as a result of the (sale/possession for sale/transportation/manufacture/offer to sell/offer to manufacture) [of] a controlled substance.

[In determining whether or not the defendant is guilty of this crime, you may consider, in addition to any other relevant evidence:

[Whether the defendant had paid employment(;/.)]

[The opinion of a controlled substances expert on the source of the (cash/ [or] \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert type[s] of negotiable instrument[s]>*)(;/.)]

[Documents or ledgers, if any, that show sales of controlled substances.]

You must decide the significance, if any, of this evidence.]

[Two or more people may possess something at the same time.]

[A person does not have to actually hold or touch something to possess it. It is enough if the person has (control over it/ [or] the right to control it), either personally or through another person.]

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the elements of this crime.

Give the bracketed paragraphs instructing that the jury may consider the defendant's employment, expert testimony, and ledgers if such evidence has been presented. If a controlled substances expert testifies, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct the jury on evaluating the expert's testimony. (Pen. Code, § 1127b.) Give CALCRIM No. 332, *Expert Witness Testimony*.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.6.
- Possession Has Same Meaning as in Drug Possession Cases. *People v. Howard* (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1407, 1419, fn. 6 [39 Cal.Rptr.2d 766].
- Constructive vs. Actual Possession. *People v. Barnes* (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 552, 556 [67 Cal.Rptr.2d 162].
- Statute Constitutional. *People v. Mitchell* (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 783, 793 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 150]; *People v. Granados* (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 517, 519 [20 Cal.Rptr.2d 131].
- Instruction on Factor to Consider Constitutional. *People v. Mitchell* (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 783, 804–811 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 150].

## RELATED ISSUES

### *No Requirement Defendant Be Involved in Drug Crime*

Culpability under Health and Safety Code section 11370.6 does not require that the defendant possess a controlled substance or participate in a transaction involving controlled substances in any manner. (*People v. Mitchell* (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 783, 797–798 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 150].) However, the defendant must have knowledge of the origin of the money. (*Id.* at p. 798.)

## SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, § 159.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 145, *Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses*, § 145.01[4] (Matthew Bender).

**2431. Possession of More Than \$100,000 Related to Transaction Involving Controlled Substance: Money to Purchase (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.6)**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with the unlawful possession of more than \$100,000 intended for purchasing a controlled substance [in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11370.6].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant possessed more than \$100,000 in (cash/ [or] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert type[s] of negotiable instrument[s]>);
2. The defendant intended to use the (cash/ [or] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert type[s] of negotiable instrument[s]>) to unlawfully purchase \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] of controlled substance[s]>, [a] controlled substance[s];

**AND**

3. The defendant committed an act in substantial furtherance of the purchase.

[In determining whether or not the defendant is guilty of this crime, you may consider, in addition to any other relevant evidence:

[Whether the defendant had paid employment(;/.)]

[The opinion of a controlled substances expert on the source of the (cash/ [or] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert type[s] of negotiable instrument[s]>)(;/.)]

[Documents or ledgers, if any, that show sales of controlled substances.]

You must decide the significance, if any, of this evidence.]

[Two or more people may possess something at the same time.]

[A person does not have to actually hold or touch something to possess it. It is enough if the person has (control over it/ [or] the right to control it), either personally or through another person.]

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*New January 2006*

## **BENCH NOTES**

### ***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the elements of this crime.

Give the bracketed paragraphs instructing that the jury may consider the defendant's employment, expert testimony, and ledgers if such evidence has been presented. If a

controlled substances expert testifies, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct the jury on evaluating the expert's testimony. (Pen. Code, § 1127b.) Give CALCRIM No. 332, *Expert Witness Testimony*.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.6.
- Possession Has Same Meaning as in Drug Possession Cases. *People v. Howard* (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1407, 1419, fn. 6 [39 Cal.Rptr.2d 766].
- Constructive vs. Actual Possession. *People v. Barnes* (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 552, 556 [67 Cal.Rptr.2d 162].
- Statute Constitutional. *People v. Mitchell* (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 783, 793 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 150]; *People v. Granados* (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 517, 519 [20 Cal.Rptr.2d 131].
- Instruction on Factor to Consider Constitutional. *People v. Mitchell* (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 783, 804–811 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 150].

### RELATED ISSUES

See the Related Issues section to CALCRIM No. 2430, *Possession of More Than \$100,000 Related to Transaction Involving Controlled Substance: Proceeds*.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, § 159.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 145, *Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses*, § 145.01[4] (Matthew Bender).

**2432. Attorney's Possession of More Than \$100,000 Related to  
Transaction Involving Controlled Substance (Health & Saf. Code,  
§ 11370.6(b))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with being an attorney who knowingly accepted more than \$100,000 from a client who obtained it from a transaction involving a controlled substance [in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11370.6(b)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant (is/was) an attorney;
2. The defendant accepted a fee of more than \$100,000 in (cash/ [or] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert type[s] of negotiable instrument[s]>) for representing a client in a criminal investigation or proceeding;
3. The (cash/ [or] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert type[s] of negotiable instrument[s]>) (was/were) obtained from the (sale/possession for sale/transportation/manufacture/offer to sell/offer to manufacture) [of] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] of controlled substance[s]>, [a] controlled substance[s];
4. The defendant knew that the (cash/ [or] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert type[s] of negotiable instrument[s]>) (was/were) obtained from the (sale/possession for sale/transportation/manufacture/offer to sell/ offer to manufacture) of the controlled substance;

**AND**

<A. Intent to Participate>

- 5A. [The defendant accepted the (cash/ [or] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert type[s] of negotiable instrument[s]>) with the intent to participate in the client's (sale/possession for sale/transportation/manufacture/offer to sell/offer to manufacture) [of] a controlled substance(;/.)]

**[OR]**

<B. Intent to Disguise Source>

- 5B. [The defendant accepted the money with the intent to disguise or aid in disguising the source of the funds or the nature of the criminal activity.]

An attorney is someone licensed by [the] (California State Bar/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of licensing state or country>) to practice law.

[In determining whether or not the defendant is guilty of this crime, you

may consider, in addition to any other relevant evidence:

[Whether the defendant had paid employment(;/.)]

[The opinion of a controlled substances expert on the source of the (cash/ [or] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert type[s] of negotiable instrument[s]>)(;/.)]

[Documents or ledgers, if any, that show sales of controlled substances.]

You must decide the significance, if any, of this evidence.]

[Two or more people may possess something at the same time.]

[A person does not have to actually hold or touch something to possess it. It is enough if the person has (control over it/ [or] the right to control it), either personally or through another person.]

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*New January 2006*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the elements of this crime.

When an attorney is charged with unlawful possession of drug proceeds, the prosecution must prove the additional element that the attorney intended to aid the illegal activity or to disguise the source of the funds. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.6(b); *People v. Granados* (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 517, 519 [20 Cal.Rptr.2d 131].) Give either optional paragraph A, B, or both, depending on the charged crime and the evidence proffered at trial.

Give the bracketed paragraphs instructing that the jury may consider the defendant's employment, expert testimony, and ledgers if such evidence has been presented. If a controlled substances expert testifies, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct the jury on evaluating the expert's testimony. (Pen. Code, § 1127b.) Give CALCRIM No. 332, *Expert Witness Testimony*.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.6(b).
- Possession Has Same Meaning as in Drug Possession Cases. *People v. Howard* (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1407, 1419, fn. 6 [39 Cal.Rptr.2d 766].
- Constructive vs. Actual Possession. *People v. Barnes* (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 552, 556 [67 Cal.Rptr.2d 162].
- Statute Constitutional. *People v. Mitchell* (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 783, 793 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 150]; *People v. Granados* (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 517, 519 [20 Cal.Rptr.2d 131].
- Instruction on Factor to Consider Constitutional. *People v. Mitchell* (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 783, 804–811 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 150].

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, § 159.

1 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 1, *The California Defense Advocate*, § 1.12[2] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 145, *Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses*, §§ 145.01[4], 145.01A[5] (Matthew Bender).

**2433–2439. Reserved for Future Use**





## I. OTHER RELATED OFFENSES

### 2440. Maintaining a Place for Controlled Substance Sale or Use (Health & Saf. Code, § 11366)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with (opening/ [or] maintaining) a place for the (sale/ [or] use) of a (controlled substance/ [or] narcotic drug) [in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11366].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant (opened/ [or] maintained) a place;

AND

2. The defendant (opened/ [or] maintained) the place with the intent to (sell[,]/ [or] give away[,]/ [or] allow others to use) a (controlled substance/ [or] narcotic drug), specifically \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of drug>, on a continuous or repeated basis at that place.

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2009, October 2010*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Health & Saf. Code, § 11366.
- Purpose Must Be Continuous or Repetitive Use of Place for Illegal Activity. *People v. Horn* (1960) 187 Cal.App.2d 68, 72 [9 Cal.Rptr. 578]; *People v. Holland* (1958) 158 Cal.App.2d 583, 588–589 [322 P.2d 983].
- Jury Must Be Instructed on Continuous or Repeated Use. *People v. Shoals* (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 475, 490 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 296].
- “Opening” and “Maintaining” Need Not Be Defined. *People v. Hawkins* (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 675, 684 [21 Cal.Rptr.3d 500].
- Violations Are Crimes of Moral Turpitude Involving Intent to Corrupt Others, So Solo Use of Drugs Not Covered by Section 11366. *People v. Vera* (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1100, 1102–1103 [82 Cal.Rptr.2d 128].
- Evidence of Personal Drug Use Not Sufficient. *People v. Franco* (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 713, 718–719 [103 Cal.Rptr.3d 310].

**RELATED ISSUES*****Corpus Delicti Includes Intent***

“[T]he perpetrator’s purpose of continuously or repeatedly using a place for selling, giving away, or using a controlled substance is part of the corpus delict of a violation of Health and Safety Code section 11366.” (*People v. Hawkins* (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 675, 681 [21 Cal.Rptr.3d 500].)

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, § 157.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 145, *Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses*, § 145.01[1][n] (Matthew Bender).

**2441. Use of False Compartment to Conceal Controlled  
Substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11366.8)**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with ((possessing/using/controlling)/ [or] (designing/constructing/building/altering/fabricating/installing/attaching)) a false compartment with the intent to (store/conceal/smuggle/transport) a controlled substance in a vehicle [in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11366.8].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

<A. *Possessed, Used, Controlled*>

1. [The defendant (possessed/used/controlled) a false compartment with the intent to (store/conceal/smuggle/transport) a controlled substance in the false compartment in a vehicle(;/.)]

[OR

<B. *Designed, Built, etc.*>

2. ][The defendant (designed/constructed/built/altered/fabricated/installed/attached) a false compartment (for/in/to) a vehicle with the intent to (store/conceal/smuggle/transport) a controlled substance in it.]

*A false compartment* is any box, container, space, or enclosure intended or designed to (conceal[,]/hide[,]/ [or] [otherwise] prevent discovery of) any controlled substance within or attached to a vehicle. A false compartment may be ((a/an) (false/modified/altere)d fuel tank[,]/original factory equipment of a vehicle that is (modified/altere)d/changed)[,]/ [or] a compartment, space, or box that is added to, or made or created from, existing compartments, spaces, or boxes within a vehicle).

A *vehicle* includes any car, truck, bus, aircraft, boat, ship, yacht, or vessel.

[Two or more people may possess something at the same time.]

[A person does not have to actually hold or touch something to possess it. It is enough if the person has (control over it/ [or] the right to control it), either personally or through another person.]

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*New January 2006*

**BENCH NOTES*****Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime. Give either optional paragraph A, B, or both, depending on the charged crime and the evidence proffered at trial.

**AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Health & Saf. Code, § 11366.8.
- False Compartment Does Not Require Modification. *People v. Gonzalez* (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1405, 1414 [11 Cal.Rptr.3d 434].
- Constructive vs. Actual Possession. *People v. Barnes* (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 552, 556 [67 Cal.Rptr.2d 162].

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, § 156.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 145, *Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses*, § 145.01[1][o] (Matthew Bender).

**2442–2499. Reserved for Future Use**

# WEAPONS

## A. POSSESSION OF ILLEGAL OR DEADLY WEAPON

- 2500. Illegal Possession, etc., of Weapon
- 2501. Carrying Concealed Explosive or Dirk or Dagger (Pen. Code, §§ 21310, 16470)
- 2502. Possession, etc., of Switchblade Knife (Pen. Code, § 21510)
- 2503. Possession of Deadly Weapon With Intent to Assault (Pen. Code, § 17500)
- 2504–2509. Reserved for Future Use

## B. POSSESSION OF FIREARM BY PERSON PROHIBITED

- 2510. Possession of Firearm by Person Prohibited Due to Conviction—No Stipulation to Conviction (Pen. Code, §§ 29800, 29805, 29820, 29900)
- 2511. Possession of Firearm by Person Prohibited Due to Conviction—Stipulation to Conviction (Pen. Code, §§ 29800, 29805, 29820, 29900)
- 2512. Possession of Firearm by Person Prohibited by Court Order (Pen. Code, §§ 29815, 29825)
- 2513. Possession of Firearm by Person Addicted to a Narcotic Drug (Pen. Code, § 29800)
- 2514. Possession of Firearm by Person Prohibited by Statute: Self-Defense
- 2515–2519. Reserved for Future Use

## C. CARRYING A FIREARM

### (i) Concealed

- 2520. Carrying Concealed Firearm on Person (Pen. Code, § 25400(a)(2))
- 2521. Carrying Concealed Firearm Within Vehicle (Pen. Code, § 25400(a)(1))
- 2522. Carrying Concealed Firearm: Caused to Be Carried Within Vehicle (Pen. Code, § 25400(a)(3))
- 2523–2529. Reserved for Future Use

### (ii) Loaded

- 2530. Carrying Loaded Firearm (Pen. Code, § 25850(a))
- 2531–2539. Reserved for Future Use

### (iii) Sentencing Factors

- 2540. Carrying Firearm: Specified Convictions (Pen. Code, §§ 25400(a), 25850(c))
- 2541. Carrying Firearm: Stolen Firearm (Pen. Code, §§ 25400(c)(2), 25850(c)(2))
- 2542. Carrying Firearm: Active Participant in Criminal Street Gang (Pen. Code, §§ 25400(c)(3), 25850(c)(3))
- 2543. Carrying Firearm: Not in Lawful Possession (Pen. Code, §§ 25400(c)(4), 25850(c)(4))
- 2544. Carrying Firearm: Possession of Firearm Prohibited Due to Conviction,

- Court Order, or Mental Illness (Pen. Code, §§ 25400(c)(4), 25850(c)(4))
2545. Carrying Loaded Firearm: Not Registered Owner (Pen. Code, § 25850(c)(6))
2546. Carrying Concealed Firearm: Not Registered Owner and Weapon Loaded (Pen. Code, § 25400(c)(6))
- 2547–2559. Reserved for Future Use

**D. ASSAULT WEAPONS**

2560. Possession, etc., of Assault Weapon or .50 BMG Rifle (Pen. Code, §§ 30605, 30600)
2561. Possession, etc., of Assault Weapon or .50 BMG Rifle While Committing Other Offense—Charged as Separate Count and as Enhancement (Pen. Code, § 30615)
2562. Possession, etc., of Assault Weapon or .50 BMG Rifle While Committing Other Offense—Charged Only as Enhancement (Pen. Code, § 30615)
- 2563–2569. Reserved for Future Use

**E. EXPLOSIVES AND DESTRUCTIVE DEVICES**

2570. Possession of Destructive Device (Pen. Code, § 18710)
2571. Carrying or Placing Explosive or Destructive Device on Common Carrier (Pen. Code, § 18725)
2572. Possession of Explosive or Destructive Device in Specified Place (Pen. Code, § 18715)
2573. Possession, Explosion, etc., of Explosive or Destructive Device With Intent to Injure or Damage (Pen. Code, § 18740)
2574. Sale or Transportation of Destructive Device (Pen. Code, § 18730)
2575. Offer to Sell Destructive Device (Pen. Code, § 18730)
2576. Explosion of Explosive or Destructive Device With Intent to Murder (Pen. Code, § 18745)
2577. Explosion of Explosive or Destructive Device Causing Bodily Injury (Pen. Code, § 18750)
2578. Explosion of Explosive or Destructive Device Causing Death, Mayhem, or Great Bodily Injury (Pen. Code, § 18755)
2579. Possession of Materials to Make Destructive Device or Explosive (Pen. Code, § 18720)
- 2580–2589. Reserved for Future Use

**F. OTHER WEAPONS OFFENSES**

2590. Armed Criminal Action (Pen. Code, § 25800)
2591. Possession of Ammunition by Person Prohibited From Possessing Firearm Due to Conviction or Mental Illness (Pen. Code, § 30305(a))
2592. Possession of Ammunition by Person Prohibited From Possessing Firearm Due to Court Order (Pen. Code, § 30305(a))
- 2593–2599. Reserved for Future Use

## A. POSSESSION OF ILLEGAL OR DEADLY WEAPON

### 2500. Illegal Possession, etc., of Weapon

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with unlawfully (possessing/manufacturing/causing to be manufactured/importing/keeping for sale/offering or exposing for sale/giving/lending/buying/receiving) a weapon, specifically (a/an) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert type of weapon> [in violation of Penal Code section[s] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert appropriate code section[s]>].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant (possessed/manufactured/caused to be manufactured/imported into California/kept for sale/offered or exposed for sale/gave/lent/bought/received) (a/an) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert type of weapon>;
2. The defendant knew that (he/she) (possessed/manufactured/caused to be manufactured/imported/kept for sale/offered or exposed for sale/gave/lent/bought/received) the \_\_\_\_\_ <insert type of weapon>;

[AND]

<Alternative 3A—object capable of innocent uses>

- [3. The defendant (possessed/manufactured/caused to be manufactured/imported/kept for sale/offered or exposed for sale/gave/lent/bought/received) the object as a weapon (;/.)]

<Alternative 3B—object designed solely for use as weapon>

- [3. The defendant knew that the object (was (a/an) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert characteristics of weapon, e.g., “unusually short shotgun, penknife containing stabbing instrument”>/could be used \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of weapon, e.g., “as a stabbing weapon,” or “for purposes of offense or defense”>).]

<Give element 4 only if defendant is charged with offering or exposing for sale.>

[AND]

4. The defendant intended to sell it.]

[The People do not have to prove that the defendant intended to use the object as a weapon.]

<Give only if alternative 3A is given.>

[When deciding whether the defendant (possessed/manufactured/caused

to be manufactured/imported/kept for sale/offered or exposed for sale/gave/lent/bought/received) the object *as a weapon*, consider all the surrounding circumstances relating to that question, including when and where the object was (possessed/manufactured/caused to be manufactured/imported/kept for sale/offered or exposed for sale/gave/lent/bought/received)[,] [and] [where the defendant was going][,] [and] [whether the object was changed from its standard form][,] and any other evidence that indicates whether the object would be used for a dangerous, rather than a harmless, purpose.]

*<Give only if alternative 3B is given.>*

[(A/An) \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert type of weapon>* means \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert appropriate definition>*.]

*<Give only if the weapon used has specific characteristics of which the defendant must have been aware.>*

[A \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert type of weapon specified in element 3B>* is \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert defining characteristics of weapon>*.

[The People do not have to prove that the object was (concealable[,]/ [or] carried by the defendant on (his/her) person[,]/ [or] (displayed/visible)).]

[(A/An) \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert prohibited firearm>* does not need to be in working order if it was designed to shoot and appears capable of shooting.]

[Two or more people may possess something at the same time.]

[A person does not have to actually hold or touch something to possess it. It is enough if the person has (control over it/ [or] the right to control it), either personally or through another person.]

[The People allege that the defendant (possessed/manufactured/caused to be manufactured/imported/kept for sale/offered or exposed for sale/gave/lent/bought/received) the following weapons: \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert description of each weapon when multiple items alleged>*. You may not find the defendant guilty unless all of you agree that the People have proved that the defendant (possessed/manufactured/caused to be manufactured/imported/kept for sale/offered or exposed for sale/gave/lent/bought/received) at least one of these weapons and you all agree on which weapon (he/she) (possessed/manufactured/ caused to be manufactured/imported/kept for sale/offered or exposed for sale/gave/lent/bought/received).]

*<Defense: Statutory Exemptions>*

[The defendant did not unlawfully (possess/manufacture/cause to be manufactured/import/keep for sale/offer or expose for sale/give/lend/buy/ receive) (a/an) \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert type of weapon>* if \_\_\_\_\_



*<insert exception>*. **The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant unlawfully (possessed/ manufactured/caused to be manufactured/imported/kept for sale/offered or exposed for sale/gave/lent/bought/received) (a/an) \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert type of weapon>*. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of this crime.]**

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2006, April 2008, February 2012, February 2015, March 2017, March 2019*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

Penal Code section 12020 has been repealed. In its place, the legislature enacted numerous new statutes that became effective January 1, 2012. Whenever a blank in the instruction calls for inserting a type of weapon, an exception, or a definition, refer to the appropriate new Penal Code section.

Element 3 contains the requirement that the defendant know that the object is a weapon. A more complete discussion of this issue is provided in the Commentary section below. Select alternative 3A if the object is capable of innocent uses. In such cases, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on when an object is possessed “as a weapon.” (*People v. Fannin, supra*, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 1404; *People v. Grubb* (1965) 63 Cal.2d 614, 620–621, fn. 9 [47 Cal.Rptr. 772, 408 P.2d 100].)

Select alternative 3B if the object “has no conceivable innocent function” (*People v. Fannin* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1399, 1405 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 496]), or when the item is specifically designed to be one of the weapons defined in the Penal Code (see *People v. Gaitan* (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 540, 547 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 885]).

Give element 4 only if the defendant is charged with offering or exposing for sale. (See *People v. Jackson* (1963) 59 Cal.2d 468, 469–470 [30 Cal.Rptr. 329, 381 P.2d 1].)

For any of the weapons not defined in the Penal Code, use an appropriate definition from the case law, where available.

If the prosecution alleges under a single count that the defendant possessed multiple weapons and the possession was “fragmented as to time . . . [or] space,” the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on unanimity. (See *People v. Wolfe* (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 177, 184–185 [7 Cal.Rptr.3d 483].) Give the bracketed paragraph beginning “The People allege that the defendant possessed the following weapons,”

inserting the items alleged. Also make the appropriate adjustments to the language of the instruction to refer to multiple weapons or objects.

### ***Defenses—Instructional Duty***

If there is sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt about the existence of one of the statutory exemptions, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give the bracketed instruction on that defense. (See *People v. Mower* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 478–481 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067] [discussing affirmative defenses generally and the burden of proof].) Insert the appropriate language in the bracketed paragraph beginning, “The defendant did not unlawfully . . .”.

### **AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 19200, 20310, 20410, 20510, 20610, 20710, 20910, 21110, 21810, 22010, 22210, 24310, 24410, 24510, 24610, 24710, 30210, 31500, 32310, 32311, 32900, 33215, 33600.
- Need Not Prove Intent to Use. *People v. Rubalcava* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 322, 328 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 735, 1 P.3d 52]; *People v. Grubb* (1965) 63 Cal.2d 614, 620–621, fn. 9 [47 Cal.Rptr. 772, 408 P.2d 100].
- Knowledge Required. *People v. Rubalcava* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 322, 331–332 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 735, 1 P.3d 52]; *People v. Gaitan* (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 540, 547 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 885].
- Specific Intent Required for Offer to Sell. *People v. Jackson* (1963) 59 Cal.2d 468, 469–470 [30 Cal.Rptr. 329, 381 P.2d 1].
- Specific Intent Includes Knowledge of Forbidden Characteristics of Weapon. *People v. King* (2006) 38 Cal.4th 617, 627–628 [42 Cal.Rptr.3d 743, 133 P.3d 636].
- Innocent Object—Must Prove Possessed as Weapon. *People v. Grubb* (1965) 63 Cal.2d 614, 620–621 [47 Cal.Rptr. 772, 408 P.2d 100]; *People v. Fannin* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1399, 1404 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 496].
- Definition of Blackjack, etc. *People v. Fannin* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1399, 1402 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 496]; *People v. Mulherin* (1934) 140 Cal.App. 212, 215 [35 P.2d 174].
- Firearm Need Not Be Operable. *People v. Favalora* (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 988, 991 [117 Cal.Rptr. 291].
- Measurement of Sawed-Off Shotgun. *People v. Rooney* (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 1207, 1211–1213 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 900]; *People v. Stinson* (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 497, 500 [87 Cal.Rptr. 537].
- Measurement of Fléchette Dart. *People v. Olmsted* (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 270, 275 [100 Cal.Rptr.2d 755].
- Constructive vs. Actual Possession. *People v. Azevedo* (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 235, 242–243 [207 Cal.Rptr. 270], questioned on other grounds in *In re Jorge M.* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 866, 876, fn. 6 [98 Cal.Rptr.2d 466, 4 P.3d 297].

- Knowledge of Specific Characteristics of Weapon. *People v. King* (2006) 38 Cal.4th 617, 628 [42 Cal.Rptr.3d 743, 133 P.3d 636].
- Intent to Use as a Weapon. *People v. Baugh* (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 438, 446 [228 Cal.Rptr.3d 898].

## COMMENTARY

### *Element 3—Knowledge*

“Intent to use a weapon is not an element of the crime of weapon possession.”

(*People v. Fannin* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1399, 1404 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 496].)

However, interpreting now-repealed Penal Code section 12020(a)(4), possession of a concealed dirk or dagger, the Supreme Court stated that “[a] defendant who does not know that he is carrying the weapon or that the concealed instrument may be used as a stabbing weapon is . . . not guilty of violating section 12020.” (*People v. Rubalcava* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 322, 331–332 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 735, 1 P.3d 52].)

Applying this holding to possession of other weapons prohibited under now-repealed Penal Code section 12020(a), the courts have concluded that the defendant must know that the object is a weapon or may be used as a weapon, or must possess the object “as a weapon.” (*People v. Gaitan* (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 540, 547 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 885]; *People v. Taylor* (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 933, 941 [114 Cal.Rptr.2d 23]; *People v. Fannin, supra*, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 1404.)

In *People v. Gaitan, supra*, 92 Cal.App.4th at p. 547, for example, the court considered the possession of “metal knuckles,” defined in now-repealed Penal Code section 12020(c)(7) as an object “worn for purposes of offense or defense.” The court held that the prosecution does not have to prove that the defendant *intended* to use the object for offense or defense but must prove that the defendant *knew* that “the instrument may be used for purposes of offense or defense.” (*Id.* at p. 547.)

Similarly, in *People v. Taylor, supra*, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 941, involving possession of a cane sword, the court held that “[i]n order to protect against the significant possibility of punishing innocent possession by one who believes he or she simply has an ordinary cane, we infer the Legislature intended a scienter requirement of actual knowledge that the cane conceals a sword.”

Finally, *People v. Fannin, supra*, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 1404, considered whether a bicycle chain with a lock at the end met the definition of a “slungshot.” The court held that “if the object is not a weapon per se, but an instrument with ordinary innocent uses, the prosecution must prove that the object was possessed *as a weapon*.” (*Ibid.* [emphasis in original]; see also *People v. Grubb* (1965) 63 Cal.2d 614, 620–621 [47 Cal.Rptr. 772, 408 P.2d 100] [possession of modified baseball bat].)

In element 3 of the instruction, the court should give alternative 3B if the object has no innocent uses, inserting the appropriate description of the weapon. If the object has innocent uses, the court should give alternative 3A. The court may choose not to give element 3 if the court concludes that a previous case holding that the prosecution does not need to prove knowledge is still valid authority. However, the

committee would caution against this approach in light of *Rubalcava* and *In re Jorge M.* (See *People v. Schaefer* (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 893, 904–905 [13 Cal.Rptr.3d 442] [observing that, since *In re Jorge M.*, it is unclear if the prosecution must prove that the defendant knew shotgun was “sawed off” but that failure to give instruction was harmless if error].)

It is not unlawful to possess a large-capacity magazine or large-capacity conversion kit. It is unlawful, however, to receive or buy these items after January 1, 2014, the effective date of Penal Code sections 32310 and 32311.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, §§ 211–212.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.02[2][a][i] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.01 (Matthew Bender).

**2501. Carrying Concealed Explosive or Dirk or Dagger (Pen. Code, §§ 21310, 16470)**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with unlawfully carrying a concealed (explosive/dirk or dagger) [in violation of Penal Code section 21310].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant carried on (his/her) person (an explosive/a dirk or dagger);
2. The defendant knew that (he/she) was carrying it;
3. It was substantially concealed on the defendant's person;

AND

4. The defendant knew that it (was an explosive/could readily be used as a stabbing weapon).

The People do not have to prove that the defendant used or intended to use the alleged (explosive/dirk or dagger) as a weapon.

[An *explosive* is any substance, or combination of substances, (1) whose main or common purpose is to detonate or rapidly combust and (2) that is capable of a relatively instantaneous or rapid release of gas and heat.]

[An *explosive* is also any substance whose main purpose is to be combined with other substances to create a new substance that can release gas and heat rapidly or relatively instantaneously.]

[\_\_\_\_\_ <insert type of explosive from Health & Saf. Code, § 12000> is an *explosive*.]

[A *dirk or dagger* is a knife or other instrument with or without a handguard that is capable of ready use as a stabbing weapon that may inflict great bodily injury or death. *Great bodily injury* means significant or substantial physical injury. It is an injury that is greater than minor or moderate harm.]

[A (pocketknife/nonlocking folding knife/folding knife that is not prohibited by Penal Code section 21510) is not a *dirk or dagger* unless the blade of the knife is exposed and locked into position.]

[A knife carried in a sheath and worn openly suspended from the waist of the wearer is not *concealed*.]

<Give only if object may have innocent uses.>

[When deciding whether the defendant knew the object (was an

explosive/could be used as a stabbing weapon), consider all the surrounding circumstances, including the time and place of possession. Consider also (the destination of the defendant[,]/ the alteration of the object from standard form[,]) and other facts, if any.]

[The People allege that the defendant carried the following weapons: \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of each weapon when multiple items alleged>. You may not find the defendant guilty unless all of you agree that the People have proved that the defendant carried at least one of these weapons and you all agree on which weapon (he/she) carried and when (he/she) carried it.]

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2012, September 2020*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If the prosecution alleges under a single count that the defendant possessed multiple weapons and the possession was “fragmented as to time . . . [or] space,” the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on unanimity. (See *People v. Wolfe* (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 177, 184–185 [7 Cal.Rptr.3d 483].) Give the bracketed paragraph beginning “The People allege that the defendant possessed the following weapons,” inserting the items alleged.

Give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “When deciding whether” only if the object was not designed solely for use as a stabbing weapon but may have innocent uses. (*People v. Fannin* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1399, 1404 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 496]; *People v. Grubb* (1965) 63 Cal.2d 614, 620–621, fn. 9 [47 Cal.Rptr. 772, 408 P.2d 100].)

When instructing on the meaning of “explosive,” if the explosive is listed in Health and Safety Code section 12000, the court may use the bracketed sentence stating, “\_\_\_\_\_ is an explosive.” For example, “Nitroglycerine is an explosive.” However, the court may not instruct the jury that the defendant used an explosive. For example, the court may not state, “The defendant used an explosive, nitroglycerine,” or “The substance used by the defendant, nitroglycerine, was an explosive.” (See *People v. Dimitrov* (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 18, 25–26 [39 Cal.Rptr.2d 257]; *People v. Brown* (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 444–445 [250 Cal.Rptr. 604, 758 P.2d 1135].)

If the court gives the instruction on a “folding knife that is not prohibited by Penal Code section 21510,” give a modified version of CALCRIM No. 2502, *Possession, etc., of Switchblade Knife*.

The second sentence of the great bodily injury definition could result in error if the prosecution improperly argues great bodily injury may be shown by greater than

minor injury alone. (Compare *People v. Medellin* (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 519, 533–535 [258 Cal.Rptr.3d 867] [the definition was reasonably susceptible to prosecutor’s erroneous argument that the injury need only be greater than minor] with *People v. Quinonez* (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 457, 466 [260 Cal.Rptr.3d 86] [upholding instructions containing great bodily injury definition as written].)

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 21310.
- Need Not Prove Intent to Use. *People v. Rubalcava* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 322, 328 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 735, 1 P.3d 52].
- Knowledge Required. *People v. Rubalcava* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 322, 331–332 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 735, 1 P.3d 52].
- Substantial Concealment. *People v. Wharton* (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 72, 75 [6 Cal.Rptr.2d 673]; *People v. Fuentes* (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 953, 955 [134 Cal.Rptr. 885].
- Explosive Defined. Health & Saf. Code, § 12000; *People v. Clark* (1990) 50 Cal.3d 583, 604 [268 Cal.Rptr. 399, 789 P.2d 127].
- Dirk or Dagger Defined. Pen. Code, § 16470.
- Dirk or Dagger—No Length Requirement. *In re Victor B.* (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 521, 526 [29 Cal.Rptr.2d 362].
- Dirk or Dagger—Object Not Originally Designed as Knife. *In re Victor B.* (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 521, 525–526 [29 Cal.Rptr.2d 362].
- Dirk or Dagger—Capable of Ready Use. *People v. Sisneros* (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1454, 1457 [67 Cal.Rptr.2d 782].
- Dirk or Dagger—Pocketknives. *In re Luke W.* (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 650, 655–656 [105 Cal.Rptr.2d 905]; *In re George W.* (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1208, 1215 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 868].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Knowledge Element*

“[T]he relevant language of section 12020 is unambiguous and establishes that carrying a concealed dirk or dagger does not require an intent to use the concealed instrument as a stabbing weapon.” (*People v. Rubalcava* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 322, 328 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 735, 1 P.3d 52] [interpreting now-repealed Pen. Code, § 12020].) However, “to commit the offense, a defendant must still have the requisite *guilty mind*: that is, the defendant must knowingly and intentionally carry concealed upon his or her person an instrument ‘that is capable of ready use as a stabbing weapon.’ ([now repealed] § 12020(a), (c)(24).) A defendant who does not know that he is carrying the weapon or that the concealed instrument may be used as a stabbing weapon is therefore not guilty of violating section 12020.” (*Id.* at pp. 331–332



[emphasis in original] [referencing repealed Pen. Code § 12020; see now Pen. Code, §§ 16479, 21310].)

***Definition of Dirk or Dagger***

The definition of “dirk or dagger” contained in Penal Code section 16470 was effective on January 1, 2012. Prior decisions interpreting the meaning of “dirk or dagger” should be viewed with caution. (See *People v. Mowatt* (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 713, 719–720 [65 Cal.Rptr.2d 722] [comparing old and new definitions]; *People v. Sisneros* (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1454, 1457 [67 Cal.Rptr.2d 782] [same]; *In re George W.* (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1208, 1215 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 868] [discussing 1997 amendment].)

***Dirk or Dagger—“Capable of Ready Use”***

“[T]he ‘capable of ready use’ requirement excludes from the definition of dirk or dagger a device carried in a configuration that requires assembly before it can be utilized as a weapon.” (*People v. Sisneros* (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1454, 1457 [67 Cal.Rptr.2d 782].)

***Dirk or Dagger—“Pocketknife”***

“Although they may not have folding blades, small knives obviously designed to be carried in a pocket in a closed state, and which cannot be used until there have been several intervening manipulations, comport with the implied legislative intent that such knives do not fall within the definition of proscribed dirks or daggers but are a type of pocketknife excepted from the statutory proscription.” (*In re Luke W.* (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 650, 655–656 [105 Cal.Rptr.2d 905].)

## SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, § 213.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.02[2][a][i] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.01[1][a] (Matthew Bender).



## 2502. Possession, etc., of Switchblade Knife (Pen. Code, § 21510)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with unlawfully (possessing in a vehicle/carrying on (his/her) person/selling/offering or exposing for sale/giving/lending/transferring) a switchblade knife [in violation of Penal Code section 21510].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant (possessed in the (passenger's/ [or] driver's) area of a motor vehicle in a (public place/place open to the public)/ carried on (his/her) person/sold/offered or exposed for sale/gave/lent/transferred) a switchblade knife [to another person];
2. The blade of the knife was two or more inches long;
3. The defendant knew that (he/she) (possessed/carried/sold/offered or exposed for sale/gave/lent/transferred) it [to another person];

[AND]

4. The defendant knew that it had the characteristics of a switchblade(;/.)

*<Give element 5 only if defendant is charged with offering or exposing for sale.>*

[AND]

5. The defendant intended to sell it.]

A *switchblade* knife is a knife that looks like a pocketknife and has a blade that can be released automatically by a flick of a button, pressure on the handle, flip of the wrist or other mechanical device, or is released by the weight of the blade or any other mechanism. A *switchblade* includes a spring-blade knife, snap-blade knife, gravity knife, or any other similar type knife. A *switchblade* knife does not include a knife that opens with one hand utilizing thumb pressure applied solely to the blade of the knife or a thumb stud attached to the blade, if the knife has a detent or other mechanism that provides resistance that must be overcome in opening the blade or that biases the blade back toward its closed position.

[The (*passenger's/ [or] driver's*) area means that part of a motor vehicle that is designed to carry the (driver/ [and] passengers), including the interior compartment or space within.]

The People do not have to prove that the defendant used or intended to use the alleged switchblade knife as a weapon.

[Two or more people may possess something at the same time.]

[A person does not have to actually hold or touch something to possess it. It is enough if the person has (control over it/ [or] the right to control it), either personally or through another person.]

[The People allege that the defendant (possessed in a vehicle/carried/sold/offered or exposed for sale/gave/lent/transferred) the following switchblade knives: \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of each knife when multiple items alleged>. You may not find the defendant guilty unless all of you agree that the People have proved that the defendant (possessed in a vehicle/carried/sold/offered or exposed for sale/gave/lent/transferred) at least one of these knives which was a switchblade and you all agree on which switchblade knife (he/she) (possessed in a vehicle/carried/sold/offered or exposed for sale/gave/lent/transferred).]

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2015*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If the prosecution alleges under a single count that the defendant possessed multiple weapons and the possession was “fragmented as to time . . . [or] space,” the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on unanimity. (See *People v. Wolfe* (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 177, 184–185 [7 Cal.Rptr.3d 483].) Give the bracketed paragraph beginning “The People allege that the defendant possessed the following switchblade knives,” inserting the items alleged.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 21510.
- Need Not Prove Intent to Use. See *People v. Rubalcava* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 322, 328 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 735, 1 P.3d 52]; *People v. Mendoza* (1967) 251 Cal.App.2d 835, 842–843 [60 Cal.Rptr. 5].
- Knowledge Required. See *People v. Rubalcava* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 322, 331–332 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 735, 1 P.3d 52].
- Specific Intent Required for Offer to Sell. *People v. Jackson* (1963) 59 Cal.2d 468, 469–470 [30 Cal.Rptr. 329, 381 P.2d 1].
- Constructive vs. Actual Possession. *People v. Azevedo* (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 235, 242–243 [207 Cal.Rptr. 270], questioned on other grounds in *In re Jorge M.* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 866, 876, fn. 6, [98 Cal.Rptr.2d 466, 4 P.3d 297].
- Passenger’s or Driver’s Area Defined. Pen. Code, § 16965.

## RELATED ISSUES

### *Butterfly and Tekna Knives Included*

Butterfly and Tekna knives are prohibited switchblades under Penal Code section 17235 [formerly section 653k]. (*People ex rel. Mautner v. Quattrone* (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1389, 1395 [260 Cal.Rptr. 44].)

### *Broken-Spring Knife*

Where the spring mechanism on the knife did not work, the court found insufficient evidence that the knife was a prohibited switchblade under Penal Code section 17235 [formerly section 653k]. (*In re Roderick S.* (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 48, 52 [177 Cal.Rptr. 800].)

### *Public Place*

On the meaning of “public place,” see *In re Danny H.* (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 92, 98 [128 Cal.Rptr.2d 222], discussing the meaning of public place in Penal Code section 594.1. See also CALCRIM No. 2966, *Disorderly Conduct: Under the Influence in Public*, and cases cited therein.

## SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, § 230.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.02[2][a][i] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.01[1][a] (Matthew Bender).

### **2503. Possession of Deadly Weapon With Intent to Assault (Pen. Code, § 17500)**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with possessing a deadly weapon with intent to assault [in violation of Penal Code section 17500].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant possessed a deadly weapon on (his/her) person;
2. The defendant knew that (he/she) possessed the weapon;

AND

3. At the time the defendant possessed the weapon, (he/she) intended to assault someone.

A person intends to assault someone else if he or she intends to do an act that by its nature would directly and probably result in the application of force to a person.

[A *deadly weapon* is any object, instrument, or weapon [that is inherently deadly or one] that is used in such a way that it is capable of causing and likely to cause death or great bodily injury.]

[An object is *inherently deadly* if it is deadly or dangerous in the ordinary use for which it was designed.]

[*Great bodily injury* means significant or substantial physical injury. It is an injury that is greater than minor or moderate harm.]

[The term *deadly weapon* is defined in another instruction to which you should refer.]

[In deciding whether an object is a deadly weapon, consider all the surrounding circumstances, including when and where the object was possessed[,] [and] [where the person who possessed the object was going][,] [and] [whether the object was changed from its standard form] and any other evidence that indicates that the object would be used for a dangerous, rather than a harmless, purpose.]

The term *application of force* means to touch in a harmful or offensive manner. The slightest touching can be enough if it is done in a rude or angry way. Making contact with another person, including through his or her clothing, is enough. The touching does not have to cause pain or injury of any kind.

[The touching can be done indirectly by causing an object [or someone else] to touch the other person.]

[The People are not required to prove that the defendant actually touched someone.]

**[The People allege that the defendant possessed the following weapons:**  
 \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert description of each weapon when multiple items  
 alleged>*. **You may not find the defendant guilty unless you all agree that  
 the People have proved that the defendant possessed at least one of these  
 weapons and you all agree on which weapon (he/she) possessed.]**

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2012, February 2013, September 2019,  
 September 2020*

## BENCH NOTES

### ***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If the prosecution alleges under a single count that the defendant possessed multiple weapons and the possession was “fragmented as to time [or] space,” the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on unanimity. (See *People v. Wolfe* (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 177, 184–185 [7 Cal.Rptr.3d 483].) Give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “The People allege that the defendant possessed the following weapons,” inserting the items alleged.

Give the definition of deadly weapon unless the court has already given the definition in other instructions. In such cases, the court may give the bracketed sentence stating that the term is defined elsewhere.

Give the bracketed phrase “that is inherently deadly or one” and give the bracketed definition of *inherently deadly* only if the object is a deadly weapon as a matter of law. (*People v. Stutelberg* (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 314, 317–318 [240 Cal.Rptr.3d 156].)

Give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “In deciding whether” if the object is not a weapon as a matter of law and is capable of innocent uses. (*People v. Aguilar* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1023, 1028–1029 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 655, 945 P.2d 1204]; *People v. Godwin* (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1562, 1573–1574 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 545].)

If determining whether the item is an inherently deadly weapon requires resolution of a factual issue, give both bracketed instructions.

### ***Defenses—Instructional Duty***

Evidence of voluntary intoxication or mental impairment may be admitted to show that the defendant did not form the required mental state. (See *People v. Ricardi* (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1427, 1432 [12 Cal.Rptr.2d 364].) The court has no sua sponte duty to instruct on these defenses; however, the trial court must give these instructions on request if supported by the evidence. (*People v. Saille* (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1103, 1119 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 364, 820 P.2d 588] [on duty to instruct generally]; *People v. Stevenson* (1978) 79 Cal.App.3d 976, 988 [145 Cal.Rptr. 301] [instructions applicable to possession of weapon with intent to assault].) See Defenses and Insanity, CALCRIM No. 3400 et seq.

The second sentence of the great bodily injury definition could result in error if the prosecution improperly argues great bodily injury may be shown by greater than minor injury alone. (Compare *People v. Medellin* (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 519, 533–535 [258 Cal.Rptr.3d 867] [the definition was reasonably susceptible to prosecutor’s erroneous argument that the injury need only be greater than minor] with *People v. Quinonez* (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 457, 466 [260 Cal.Rptr.3d 86] [upholding instructions containing great bodily injury definition as written].)

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 17500.
- Deadly Weapon Defined. *People v. Brown* (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1, 6–8 [147 Cal.Rptr.3d 848]; *People v. Aguilar* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1023, 1028–1029 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 655, 945 P.2d 1204].
- Objects With Innocent Uses. *People v. Aguilar* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1023, 1028–1029 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 655, 945 P.2d 1204]; *People v. Godwin* (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1562, 1573–1574 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 545].
- Knowledge Required. See *People v. Rubalcava* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 322, 331–332 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 735, 1 P.3d 52]; *People v. Gaitan* (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 540, 547 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 885].
- Assault. Pen. Code, § 240; see also *People v. Williams* (2001) 26 Cal.4th 779, 790 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 114, 29 P.3d 197].
- Least Touching. *People v. Myers* (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 328, 335 [71 Cal.Rptr.2d 518] [citing *People v. Rocha* (1971) 3 Cal.3d 893, 899–900, fn. 12 [92 Cal.Rptr. 172, 479 P.2d 372]].
- Inherently Deadly Defined. *People v. Perez* (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1055, 1065 [232 Cal.Rptr.3d 51, 416 P.3d 42]; *People v. Aguilar* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1023, 1028–1029 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 655, 945 P.2d 1204].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, § 189.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.02[2][a][i] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.01[1] (Matthew Bender).

**2504–2509. Reserved for Future Use**

## B. POSSESSION OF FIREARM BY PERSON PROHIBITED

### 2510. Possession of Firearm by Person Prohibited Due to Conviction—No Stipulation to Conviction (Pen. Code, §§ 29800, 29805, 29820, 29900)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with unlawfully possessing a firearm [in violation of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert appropriate code section[s]>].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant (owned/purchased/received/possessed) a firearm;
2. The defendant knew that (he/she) (owned/purchased/received/possessed) the firearm;

[AND]

3. The defendant had previously been convicted of (a felony/two offenses of brandishing a firearm/the crime of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert misdemeanor offense from Pen. Code, § 29805 or Pen. Code, § 23515(a), (b), or (d), or a juvenile finding from Pen. Code, § 29820>)(;/.)

[AND]

<Alternative 4A—give only if the defendant is charged under Pen. Code, § 29805.>

4. The previous conviction was within 10 years of the date the defendant possessed the firearm.]

<Alternative 4B—give only if the defendant is charged under Pen. Code, § 29820.>

4. The defendant was under 30 years old at the time (he/she) possessed the firearm.]

[A *firearm* is any device designed to be used as a weapon, from which a projectile is expelled or discharged through a barrel by the force of an explosion or other form of combustion. [The frame or receiver of such a *firearm* is also a *firearm* for the purpose of this instruction.]]

<Do not use the language below unless the other instruction defines *firearm* in the context of a crime charged pursuant to Pen. Code, § 29800.>

[The term *firearm* is defined in another instruction.]

[A *firearm* does not need to be in working order if it was designed to



shoot and appears capable of shooting.]

[A *juvenile court finding* is the same as a conviction.]

[A conviction of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of other-state or federal offense> is the same as a conviction for a felony.]

[Two or more people may possess something at the same time.]

[A person does not have to actually hold or touch something to possess it. It is enough if the person has (control over it/ [or] the right to control it), either personally or through another person.]

[You may consider evidence, if any, that the defendant was previously convicted of a crime only in deciding whether the People have proved this element of the crime [or for the limited purpose of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert other permitted purpose, e.g., assessing defendant's credibility>]. Do not consider such evidence for any other purpose.]

[The People allege that the defendant (owned/purchased/received/ possessed) the following firearms: \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of each firearm when multiple firearms alleged>. You may not find the defendant guilty unless all of you agree that the People have proved that the defendant (owned/purchased/received/possessed) at least one of the firearms, and you all agree on which firearm (he/she) (owned/purchased/ received/possessed).]

<Defense: Momentary Possession>

[If you conclude that the defendant possessed a firearm, that possession was not unlawful if the defendant can prove the defense of momentary possession. In order to establish this defense, the defendant must prove that:

1. (He/She) possessed the firearm only for a momentary or transitory period;
2. (He/She) possessed the firearm in order to (abandon[,]/ [or] dispose of[,]/ [or] destroy) it;

AND

3. (He/She) did not intend to prevent law enforcement officials from seizing the firearm.

The defendant has the burden of proving each element of this defense by a preponderance of the evidence. This is a different standard of proof than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. To meet the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence, the defendant must prove that it is more likely than not that each element of the defense is true.]

<Defense: Justifiable Possession>

[If you conclude that the defendant possessed a firearm, that possession



was not unlawful if the defendant can prove that (he/she) was justified in possessing the firearm. In order to establish this defense, the defendant must prove that:

1. (He/She) (found the firearm/took the firearm from a person who was committing a crime against the defendant);

[AND]

2. (He/She) possessed the firearm no longer than was necessary to deliver or transport the firearm to a law enforcement agency for that agency to dispose of the weapon(;/.)

[AND]

3. If the defendant was transporting the firearm to a law enforcement agency, (he/she) gave prior notice to the law enforcement agency that (he/she) would be delivering a firearm to the agency for disposal.]]

The defendant has the burden of proving each element of this defense by a preponderance of the evidence. This is a different standard of proof than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. To meet the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence, the defendant must prove that it is more likely than not that each element of the defense is true.

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*New January 2006; Revised April 2010, February 2012, August 2013*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime. Use this instruction only if the defendant does not stipulate to the prior conviction. (*People v. Sapp* (2003) 31 Cal.4th 240, 261 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 554, 73 P.3d 433]; *People v. Valentine* (1986) 42 Cal.3d 170, 173 [228 Cal.Rptr. 25, 720 P.2d 913].) If the defendant stipulates, use CALCRIM No. 2511, *Possession of Firearm by Person Prohibited Due to Conviction—Stipulation to Conviction*. (*People v. Sapp, supra*, 31 Cal.4th at p. 261; *People v. Valentine, supra*, 42 Cal.3d at p. 173.)

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the union of act and specific intent or mental state. (*People v. Alvarez* (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 220 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 385, 926 P.2d 365].) Therefore, because of the knowledge requirement in element 2 of this instruction, the court **must give** CALCRIM No. 251, *Union of Act and Intent: Specific Intent or Mental State*, together with this instruction. Nevertheless, the knowledge requirement in element 2 does not require any “specific intent.”

If the prosecution alleges under a single count that the defendant possessed multiple firearms and the possession was “fragmented as to time . . . [or] space,” the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on unanimity. (*People v. Wolfe* (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 177, 184–185 [7 Cal.Rptr.3d 483].) Give the bracketed paragraph

beginning “The People allege that the defendant possessed the following firearms,” inserting the items alleged.

Element 4 should be given only if the defendant is charged under Penal Code section 29805, possession within 10 years of a specified misdemeanor conviction, or Penal Code section 29820, possession by someone under 30 years old with a specified juvenile finding.

The court should give the bracketed definition of “firearm” unless the court has already given the definition in other instructions on crimes based on Penal Code section 29800. In such cases, the court may give the bracketed sentence stating that the term is defined elsewhere.

On request, the court should give the limiting instruction regarding the evidence of the prior conviction that begins, “You may consider . . .” (*People v. Valentine* (1986) 42 Cal.3d 170, 182, fn. 7 [228 Cal.Rptr. 25, 720 P.2d 913].) There is no sua sponte duty to give the limiting instruction, and the defense may prefer that no limiting instruction be given. (*People v. Griggs* (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1139 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 380].)

#### ***Defenses—Instructional Duty***

“[T]he defense of transitory possession devised in [*People v. Mijares* (1971) 6 Cal.3d 415, 420, 423 [99 Cal.Rptr. 139, 491 P.2d 1115]] applies only to momentary or transitory possession of contraband for the purpose of disposal.” (*People v. Martin* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1180, 1191–1192 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 599, 25 P.3d 1081].) The court in *Martin, supra*, approved of *People v. Hurtado* (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 805, 814 [54 Cal.Rptr.2d 853], which held that the defense of momentary possession applies to a charge of violating now-repealed Penal Code section 12021. This is an affirmative defense, and the defense bears the burden of establishing it by a preponderance of the evidence. (*People v. Mower* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 478–481 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067].) If sufficient evidence has been presented, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give the bracketed paragraph, “Defense: Momentary Possession.”

Penal Code section 29850 states that a violation of the statute is “justifiable” if the listed conditions are met. This is an affirmative defense, and the defense bears the burden of establishing it by a preponderance of the evidence. (*Ibid.*) If sufficient evidence has been presented, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give the bracketed paragraph, “Defense: Justifiable Possession.”

If there is sufficient evidence that the defendant possessed the firearm only in self-defense, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give CALCRIM No. 2514, *Possession of Firearm by Person Prohibited by Statute—Self-Defense*.

#### **AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 23515, 29800, 29805, 29820, 29900; *People v. Snyder* (1982) 32 Cal.3d 590, 592 [186 Cal.Rptr. 485, 652 P.2d 42].
- Defense of Justifiable Possession. Pen. Code, § 29850.
- Presenting Evidence of Prior Conviction to Jury. *People v. Sapp* (2003) 31

Cal.4th 240, 261 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 554, 73 P.3d 433]; *People v. Valentine* (1986) 42 Cal.3d 170, 173 [228 Cal.Rptr. 25, 720 P.2d 913].

- Limiting Instruction on Prior Conviction. *People v. Valentine* (1986) 42 Cal.3d 170, 182, fn. 7 [228 Cal.Rptr. 25, 720 P.2d 913]; *People v. Griggs* (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1139 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 380].
- Accidental Possession. *People v. Jeffers* (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 917, 922 [49 Cal.Rptr.2d 86].
- Lack of Knowledge of Nature of Conviction Not a Defense. *People v. Snyder* (1982) 32 Cal.3d 590, 593 [186 Cal.Rptr. 485, 652 P.2d 42].
- Momentary Possession Defense. *People v. Martin* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1180, 1191–1192 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 599, 25 P.3d 1081]; *People v. Hurtado* (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 805, 814 [54 Cal.Rptr.2d 853]; *People v. Mijares* (1971) 6 Cal.3d 415, 420, 423 [99 Cal.Rptr. 139, 491 P.2d 1115].
- Constructive vs. Actual Possession. *People v. Azevedo* (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 235, 242–243 [207 Cal.Rptr. 270], questioned on other grounds in *In re Jorge M.* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 866, 876, fn. 6 [98 Cal.Rptr.2d 466, 4 P.3d 297].
- Possession of Frame or Receiver Sufficient but not Necessary For Crimes Charged Under [Now-Superseded] Section 12021. *People v. Arnold* (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1408, 1414 [52 Cal.Rptr.3d 545].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

Neither possessing firearm after conviction of felony nor possessing firearm after conviction of specified violent offense is a lesser included offense of the other. (*People v. Sanders* (2012) 55 Cal.4th 731, 739–740 [149 Cal.Rptr.3d 26, 288 P.3d 83].)

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Proof of Prior Conviction*

The trial court “has two options when a prior conviction is a substantive element of a current charge: Either the prosecution proves each element of the offense to the jury, or the defendant stipulates to the conviction and the court ‘sanitizes’ the prior by telling the jury that the defendant has a prior felony conviction, without specifying the nature of the felony committed.” (*People v. Sapp* (2003) 31 Cal.4th 240, 261 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 554, 73 P.3d 433]; *People v. Valentine* (1986) 42 Cal.3d 170, 173 [228 Cal.Rptr. 25, 720 P.2d 913].)

#### *Lack of Knowledge of Status of Conviction Not a Defense*

“[R]egardless of what she reasonably believed, or what her attorney may have told her, defendant was deemed to know under the law that she was a convicted felon forbidden to possess concealable firearms. Her asserted mistake regarding her correct legal status was a mistake of law, not fact. It does not constitute a defense to

[now-superseded] section 12021.” (*People v. Snyder* (1982) 32 Cal.3d 590, 593 [186 Cal.Rptr. 485, 652 P.2d 42].)

### ***Out-of-State Convictions***

For an out-of-state conviction, it is sufficient if the offense is a felony under the laws of the “convicting jurisdiction.” (*People v. Shear* (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 278, 283 [83 Cal.Rptr.2d 707].) The prosecution does not have to establish that the offense would be a felony under the laws of California. (*Ibid.*) Even if the convicting jurisdiction has restored the defendant’s right to possess a firearm, the defendant may still be convicted of violating [now-superseded] Penal Code section 12021. (*Ibid.*)

### ***Pardons and Penal Code Section 1203.4 Motions***

A pardon pursuant to Penal Code section 4852.17 restores a person’s right to possess a firearm unless the person was convicted of a “felony involving the use of a dangerous weapon.” (Pen. Code, § 4852.17.) The granting of a Penal Code section 1203.4 motion, however, does not restore the person’s right to possess any type of firearm. (Pen. Code, § 1203.4(a); *People v. Frawley* (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 784, 796 [98 Cal.Rptr.2d 555].)

### ***Submitting False Application for Firearm***

A defendant who submitted a false application to purchase a firearm may not be prosecuted for “attempted possession of a firearm by a felon.” (*People v. Duran* (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 666, 673 [21 Cal.Rptr.3d 495].) “Instead, the felon may only be prosecuted pursuant to the special statute, [now-repealed Penal Code section] 12076, which expressly proscribes such false application.” (*Ibid.*) [see now Pen. Code, § 28215].

## **SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, §§ 233–237.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.02[2][a][i] (Matthew Bender).

5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 93, *Disabilities Flowing From Conviction*, § 93.06 (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.01[1][d] (Matthew Bender).

**2511. Possession of Firearm by Person Prohibited Due to  
Conviction—Stipulation to Conviction (Pen. Code, §§ 29800,  
29805, 29820, 29900)**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with unlawfully possessing a firearm [in violation of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert appropriate code section[s]>].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant (owned/purchased/received/possessed) a firearm;
2. The defendant knew that (he/she) (owned/purchased/received/possessed) the firearm;

[AND]

3. The defendant had previously been convicted of (a/two) (felony/misdemeanor[s])(;/.)

[AND]

<Alternative 4A—give only if the defendant is charged under Pen. Code, § 29805.>

4. The previous conviction was within 10 years of the date the defendant possessed the firearm.]

<Alternative 4B—give only if the defendant is charged under Pen. Code, § 29820.>

4. The defendant was under 30 years old at the time (he/she) possessed the firearm.]

[A *firearm* is any device designed to be used as a weapon, from which a projectile is expelled or discharged through a barrel by the force of an explosion or other form of combustion. [The frame or receiver of such a *firearm* is also a *firearm* for the purpose of this instruction.]]

<Do not use the language below unless the other instruction defines *firearm* in the context of a crime charged pursuant to Pen. Code, § 29800.>

[The term *firearm* is defined in another instruction.]

[A firearm does not need to be in working order if it was designed to shoot and appears capable of shooting.]

[Two or more people may possess something at the same time.]

[A person does not have to actually hold or touch something to possess it. It is enough if the person has (control over it/ [or] the right to control it), either personally or through another person).]

The defendant and the People have stipulated, or agreed, that the defendant was previously convicted of (a/two) (felony/misdemeanor[s]). This stipulation means that you must accept this fact as proved.

[Do not consider this fact for any other purpose [except for the limited purpose of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert other permitted purpose, e.g., determining the defendant's credibility>*]. Do not speculate about or discuss the nature of the conviction.]

[The People allege that the defendant (owned/purchased/received/possessed) the following firearms: \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert description of each firearm when multiple firearms alleged>*. You may not find the defendant guilty unless all of you agree that the People have proved that the defendant (owned/purchased/received/possessed) at least one of the firearms, and you all agree on which firearm (he/she) (owned/purchased/received/possessed).]

*<Defense: Momentary Possession>*

[If you conclude that the defendant possessed a firearm, that possession was not unlawful if the defendant can prove the defense of momentary possession. In order to establish this defense, the defendant must prove that:

1. (He/She) possessed the firearm only for a momentary or transitory period;
2. (He/She) possessed the firearm in order to (abandon[,]/ [or] dispose of[,]/ [or] destroy) it;

AND

3. (He/She) did not intend to prevent law enforcement officials from seizing the firearm.

The defendant has the burden of proving each element of this defense by a preponderance of the evidence. This is a different standard of proof than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. To meet the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence, the defendant must prove that it is more likely than not that each element of the defense is true. If the defendant has not met this burden, (he/she) has not proved this defense.]

*<Defense: Justifiable Possession>*

[If you conclude that the defendant possessed a firearm, that possession was not unlawful if the defendant can prove that (he/she) was justified in possessing the firearm. In order to establish this defense, the defendant must prove that:

1. (He/She) (found the firearm/took the firearm from a person who was committing a crime against the defendant);

[AND]

2. (He/She) possessed the firearm no longer than was necessary to deliver or transport the firearm to a law enforcement agency for that agency to dispose of the weapon(;/.)

[AND]

3. If the defendant was transporting the firearm to a law enforcement agency, (he/she) gave prior notice to the law enforcement agency that (he/she) would be delivering a firearm to the agency for disposal.]]

The defendant has the burden of proving each element of this defense by a preponderance of the evidence. This is a different standard of proof than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. To meet the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence, the defendant must prove that it is more likely than not that each element of the defense is true.

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*New January 2006; Revised April 2010, February 2012, August 2013*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime. Use this instruction only if the defendant stipulates to the prior conviction. (*People v. Sapp* (2003) 31 Cal.4th 240, 261 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 554, 73 P.3d 433]; *People v. Valentine* (1986) 42 Cal.3d 170, 173 [228 Cal.Rptr. 25, 720 P.2d 913].) If the defendant does not stipulate, use CALCRIM No. 2510, *Possession of Firearm by Person Prohibited Due to Conviction—No Stipulation to Conviction*. (*People v. Sapp, supra*, 31 Cal.4th at p. 261; *People v. Valentine, supra*, 42 Cal.3d at p. 173.)

If the defendant has stipulated to the fact of the conviction, the court should sanitize all references to the conviction to prevent disclosure of the nature of the conviction to the jury. (*People v. Sapp, supra*, 31 Cal.4th at p. 261; *People v. Valentine, supra*, 42 Cal.3d at p. 173.) If the defendant agrees, the court should not read the portion of the information describing the nature of the conviction. Likewise, the court should ensure that the verdict forms do not reveal the nature of the conviction.

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the union of act and specific intent or mental state. (*People v. Alvarez* (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 220 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 385, 926 P.2d 365].) Therefore, because of the knowledge requirement in element 2 of this instruction, the court must give CALCRIM No. 251, *Union of Act and Intent: Specific Intent or Mental State*, together with this instruction. Nevertheless, the knowledge requirement in element 2 does not require any “specific intent.”

If the prosecution alleges under a single count that the defendant possessed multiple firearms and the possession was “fragmented as to time . . . [or] space,” the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on unanimity. (*People v. Wolfe* (2003) 114



Cal.App.4th 177, 184–185 [7 Cal.Rptr.3d 483].) Give the bracketed paragraph beginning “The People allege that the defendant possessed the following firearms,” inserting the items alleged.

Element 4 should be given only if the defendant is charged under Penal Code section 29805, possession within 10 years of a specified misdemeanor conviction, or Penal Code section 29820, possession by someone under 30 years old with a specified juvenile finding.

The court should give the bracketed definition of “firearm” unless the court has already given the definition in other instructions. In such cases, the court may give the bracketed sentence stating that the term is defined elsewhere.

On request, the court should give the limiting instruction regarding the evidence of the prior conviction that begins, “Do not consider this fact for any other purpose . . . .” (*People v. Valentine* (1986) 42 Cal.3d 170, 182, fn. 7 [228 Cal.Rptr. 25, 720 P.2d 913].) There is no sua sponte duty to give the limiting instruction, and the defense may prefer that no limiting instruction be given. (*People v. Griggs* (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1139 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 380].)

#### ***Defenses—Instructional Duty***

“[T]he defense of transitory possession devised in [*People v. Mijares* (1971) 6 Cal.3d 415, 420, 423 [99 Cal.Rptr. 139, 491 P.2d 1115]] applies only to momentary or transitory possession of contraband for the purpose of disposal.” (*People v. Martin* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1180, 1191–1192 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 599, 25 P.3d 1081].) The court in *Martin, supra*, approved of *People v. Hurtado* (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 805, 814 [54 Cal.Rptr.2d 853], which held that the defense of momentary possession applies to a charge of violating now-repealed Penal Code section 12021. This is an affirmative defense, and the defense bears the burden of establishing it by a preponderance of the evidence. (*People v. Mower* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 478–481 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067].) If sufficient evidence has been presented, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give the bracketed paragraph, “Defense: Momentary Possession.”

Penal Code section 29850 states that a violation of the statute is “justifiable” if the listed conditions are met. This is an affirmative defense, and the defense bears the burden of establishing it by a preponderance of the evidence. (*Ibid.*) If sufficient evidence has been presented, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give the bracketed paragraph, “Defense: Justifiable Possession.”

If there is sufficient evidence that the defendant possessed the firearm only in self-defense, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give CALCRIM No. 2514, *Possession of Firearm by Person Prohibited by Statute—Self-Defense*.

#### **AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 23515, 29800, 29805, 29820, 29900; *People v. Snyder* (1982) 32 Cal.3d 590, 592 [186 Cal.Rptr. 485, 652 P.2d 42].
- Defense of Justifiable Possession. Pen. Code, § 29850.
- Presenting Evidence of Prior Conviction to Jury. *People v. Sapp* (2003) 31



Cal.4th 240, 261 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 554, 73 P.3d 433]; *People v. Valentine* (1986) 42 Cal.3d 170, 173 [228 Cal.Rptr. 25, 720 P.2d 913].

- Limiting Instruction on Prior Conviction. *People v. Valentine* (1986) 42 Cal.3d 170, 182, fn. 7 [228 Cal.Rptr. 25, 720 P.2d 913]; *People v. Griggs* (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1139 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 380].
- Accidental Possession. *People v. Jeffers* (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 917, 922 [49 Cal.Rptr.2d 86].
- Lack of Knowledge of Nature of Conviction Not a Defense. *People v. Snyder* (1982) 32 Cal.3d 590, 593 [186 Cal.Rptr. 485, 652 P.2d 42].
- Momentary Possession Defense. *People v. Martin* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1180, 1191–1192 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 599, 25 P.3d 1081]; *People v. Hurtado* (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 805, 814 [54 Cal.Rptr.2d 853]; *People v. Mijares* (1971) 6 Cal.3d 415, 420, 423 [99 Cal.Rptr. 139, 491 P.2d 1115].
- Constructive vs. Actual Possession. *People v. Azevedo* (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 235, 242–243 [207 Cal.Rptr. 270], questioned on other grounds in *In re Jorge M.* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 866, 876, fn. 6 [98 Cal.Rptr.2d 466, 4 P.3d 297].
- Possession of Frame or Receiver Sufficient but not Necessary For Crimes Charged Under [Now-Superseded] Section 12021. *People v. Arnold* (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1408, 1414 [52 Cal.Rptr.3d 545].

### RELATED ISSUES

See CALCRIM No. 2510, *Possession of Firearm by Person Prohibited Due to Conviction—No Stipulation to Conviction*.

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

Neither possessing firearm after conviction of felony nor possessing firearm after conviction of specified violent offense is a lesser included offense of the other. (*People v. Sanders* (2012) 55 Cal.4th 731, 739–740 [149 Cal.Rptr.3d 26, 288 P.3d 83].)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, §§ 233–237.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.02[2][a][i] (Matthew Bender).

5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 93, *Disabilities Flowing From Conviction*, § 93.06 (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.01[1][d] (Matthew Bender).

**2512. Possession of Firearm by Person Prohibited by Court Order  
(Pen. Code, §§ 29815, 29825)**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with unlawfully possessing a firearm [in violation of Penal Code section[s] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert appropriate code section[s]>].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant (owned/purchased/received/possessed) a firearm;
2. The defendant knew that (he/she) (owned/purchased/received/possessed) the firearm;

[AND]

3. A court had ordered that the defendant not (own/purchase/receive/possess) a firearm(;/.)

<Give element 4 only if the defendant is charged under Pen. Code, § 29825.>

[AND]

4. The defendant knew of the court's order.]

[A *firearm* is any device designed to be used as a weapon, from which a projectile is expelled or discharged through a barrel by the force of an explosion or other form of combustion. [The frame or receiver of such a *firearm* is also a *firearm* for the purpose of this instruction.]]

<Do not use the language below unless the other instruction defines *firearm* in the context of a crime charged pursuant to Pen. Code, § 29800.>

[The term *firearm* is defined in another instruction.]

[A firearm does not need to be in working order if it was designed to shoot and appears capable of shooting.]

[Two or more people may possess something at the same time.]

[A person does not have to actually hold or touch something to possess it. It is enough if the person has (control over it/ [or] the right to control it), either personally or through another person.]

[The defendant and the People have stipulated, or agreed, that a court ordered the defendant not to (own/purchase/receive/possess) a firearm. This stipulation means that you must accept this fact as proved.]

<Alternative A—limiting instruction when stipulation to order>

[Do not consider this fact for any other purpose [except for the limited

**purpose of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert other permitted purpose, e.g., determining the defendant's credibility>]. Do not speculate about why the court's order was made.]**

*<Alternative B—limiting instruction when no stipulation to order>*

**[You may consider evidence, if any, that a court ordered the defendant not to (own/purchase/receive/possess) a firearm only in deciding whether the People have proved this element of the crime [or for the limited purpose of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert other permitted purpose, e.g., assessing defendant's credibility>]. Do not consider such evidence for any other purpose.]**

**[The People allege that the defendant (owned/purchased/received/possessed) the following firearms: \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of each firearm when multiple firearms alleged>. You may not find the defendant guilty unless all of you agree that the People have proved that the defendant (owned/purchased/received/possessed) at least one of the firearms, and you all agree on which firearm (he/she) (owned/purchased/received/possessed).]**

*<Defense: Momentary Possession>*

**[If you conclude that the defendant possessed a firearm, that possession was not unlawful if the defendant can prove the defense of momentary possession. In order to establish this defense, the defendant must prove that:**

- 1. (He/She) possessed the firearm only for a momentary or transitory period;**
- 2. (He/She) possessed the firearm in order to (abandon[,]/ [or] dispose of[,]/ [or] destroy) it;**

**AND**

- 3. (He/She) did not intend to prevent law enforcement officials from seizing the firearm.**

**The defendant has the burden of proving each element of this defense by a preponderance of the evidence. This is a different standard of proof than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. To meet the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence, the defendant must prove that it is more likely than not that each element of the defense is true. If the defendant has not met this burden, (he/she) has not proved this defense.]**

*<Defense: Justifiable Possession>*

**[If you conclude that the defendant possessed a firearm, that possession was not unlawful if the defendant can prove that (he/she) was justified in possessing the firearm. In order to establish this defense, the defendant must prove that:**

1. (He/She) (found the firearm/took the firearm from a person who was committing a crime against the defendant);

[AND]

2. (He/She) possessed the firearm no longer than was necessary to deliver or transport the firearm to a law enforcement agency for that agency to dispose of the weapon(;/.)

[AND]

3. If the defendant was transporting the firearm to a law enforcement agency, (he/she) had given prior notice to the agency that (he/she) would be delivering a firearm to the agency for disposal.]

The defendant has the burden of proving each element of this defense by a preponderance of the evidence. This is a different standard of proof than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. To meet the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence, the defendant must prove that it is more likely than not that each element of the defense is true.

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*New January 2006; Revised April 2010, February 2012*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime. Use this instruction only if the defendant is charged under Penal Code section 29815, possession by someone prohibited as a condition of probation following conviction for a crime not listed in other provisions of Penal Code section 29800, or Penal Code section 29825, possession by someone prohibited by a temporary restraining order or other protective order.

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the union of act and specific intent or mental state. (*People v. Alvarez* (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 220 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 385, 926 P.2d 365].) Therefore, because of the knowledge requirement in element 2 of this instruction, the court **must give** CALCRIM No. 251, *Union of Act and Intent: Specific Intent or Mental State*, together with this instruction. Nevertheless, the knowledge requirement in element 2 does not require any “specific intent.”

If the prosecution alleges under a single count that the defendant possessed multiple firearms and the possession was “fragmented as to time . . . [or] space,” the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on unanimity. (*People v. Wolfe* (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 177, 184–185 [7 Cal.Rptr.3d 483].) Give the bracketed paragraph beginning “The People allege that the defendant possessed the following firearms,” inserting the items alleged.

Give element 4 only if the defendant is charged under Penal Code section 29825.

The court should give the bracketed definition of “firearm” unless the court has

already given the definition in other instructions. In such cases, the court may give the bracketed sentence stating that the term is defined elsewhere.

If the defendant has not stipulated to the probation order, do not give the bracketed paragraph that begins, “The defendant and the People have stipulated . . . .”

If the defendant does stipulate to the probation order, the court must give the bracketed paragraph that begins, “The defendant and the People have stipulated . . . .” The court must also sanitize all references to the probation order to prevent disclosure of the nature of the conviction to the jury. (*People v. Sapp*, (2003) 31 Cal.4th 240, 261 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 554, 73 P.3d 433]; *People v. Valentine* (1986) 42 Cal.3d 170, 173 [228 Cal.Rptr. 25, 720 P.2d 913].) If the defendant agrees, the court must not read the portion of the information describing the nature of the conviction. Likewise, the court must ensure that the verdict forms do not reveal the nature of the conviction.

On request, the court should give the limiting instruction regarding the evidence of the probation condition. (*People v. Valentine, supra*, 42 Cal.3d at 182, fn. 7.) There is no sua sponte duty to give the limiting instruction, and the defense may prefer that no limiting instruction be given. (*People v. Griggs* (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1139 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 380].) If the defendant does not stipulate to the probation condition, give alternative A. If the defendant does stipulate, give alternative B.

#### ***Defenses—Instructional Duty***

“[T]he defense of transitory possession devised in [*People v. Mijares* (1971) 6 Cal.3d 415, 420, 423 [99 Cal.Rptr. 139, 491 P.2d 1115]] applies only to momentary or transitory possession of contraband for the purpose of disposal.” (*People v. Martin* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1180, 1191–1192 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 599, 25 P.3d 1081].) The court in *Martin, supra*, approved of *People v. Hurtado* (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 805, 814 [54 Cal.Rptr.2d 853], which held that the defense of momentary possession applies to a charge of violating now-repealed Penal Code section 12021. This is an affirmative defense, and the defense bears the burden of establishing it by a preponderance of the evidence. (*People v. Mower* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 478–481 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067].) If sufficient evidence has been presented, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give the bracketed paragraph, “Defense: Momentary Possession.”

Penal Code section 29850 states that a violation of the statute is “justifiable” if the listed conditions are met. This is an affirmative defense, and the defense bears the burden of establishing it by a preponderance of the evidence. (*Ibid.*) If sufficient evidence has been presented, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give the bracketed paragraph, “Defense: Justifiable Possession.”

If there is sufficient evidence that the defendant possessed the firearm only in self-defense, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give CALCRIM No. 2514, *Possession of Firearm by Person Prohibited by Statute—Self-Defense*.

#### **AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 29815 & 29825; *People v. Snyder* (1982) 32 Cal.3d

590, 592 [186 Cal.Rptr. 485, 652 P.2d 42].

- Defense of Justifiable Possession. Pen. Code, § 29850.
- Limiting Instruction on Prior Conviction. *People v. Valentine* (1986) 42 Cal.3d 170, 182, fn. 7 [228 Cal.Rptr. 25, 720 P.2d 913]; *People v. Griggs* (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1139 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 380].
- Accidental Possession. *People v. Jeffers* (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 917, 922 [49 Cal.Rptr.2d 86].
- Momentary Possession Defense. *People v. Martin* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1180, 1191–1192 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 599, 25 P.3d 1081]; *People v. Hurtado* (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 805, 814 [54 Cal.Rptr.2d 853]; *People v. Mijares* (1971) 6 Cal.3d 415, 420, 423 [99 Cal.Rptr. 139, 491 P.2d 1115].
- Constructive vs. Actual Possession. *People v. Azevedo* (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 235, 242–243 [207 Cal.Rptr. 270], questioned on other grounds in *In re Jorge M.* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 866, 876, fn. 6 [98 Cal.Rptr.2d 466, 4 P.3d 297].
- Possession of Frame or Receiver Sufficient but not Necessary For Crimes Charged Under [Now-Superseded] Section 12021. *People v. Arnold* (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1408, 1414 [52 Cal.Rptr.3d 545].

## SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, § 233–237.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.02[2][a][i] (Matthew Bender).

5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 93, *Disabilities Flowing From Conviction*, § 93.06 (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.01[1] (Matthew Bender).

**2513. Possession of Firearm by Person Addicted to a Narcotic Drug (Pen. Code, § 29800)**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with unlawfully possessing a firearm [in violation of Penal Code section 29800].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant (owned/purchased/received/possessed) a firearm;
2. The defendant knew that (he/she) (owned/purchased/received/possessed) the firearm;

AND

3. At the time the defendant (owned/purchased/received/possessed) the firearm, (he/she) was addicted to the use of a narcotic drug.

\_\_\_\_\_ <insert narcotic drug alleged> is a narcotic drug.

A person is *addicted* to the use of a narcotic drug if:

1. The person has become emotionally dependent on the drug in the sense that he or she experiences a compulsive need to continue its use;
2. The person has developed a tolerance to the drug's effects and therefore requires larger and more potent doses;

AND

3. The person has become physically dependent, suffering withdrawal symptoms if he or she is deprived of the drug.

[A *firearm* is any device designed to be used as a weapon, from which a projectile is expelled through a barrel by the force of an explosion or other form of combustion.]

[The term *firearm* is defined in another instruction.]

[A firearm does not need to be in working order if it was designed to shoot and appears capable of shooting.]

[Two or more people may possess something at the same time.]

[A person does not have to actually hold or touch something to possess it. It is enough if the person has (control over it/ [or] the right to control it), either personally or through another person.]

[The People allege that the defendant (owned/purchased/received/possessed) the following firearms: \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of each firearm when multiple firearms alleged>. You may not find the defendant



guilty unless all of you agree that the People have proved that the defendant (owned/purchased/received/possessed) at least one of the firearms, and you all agree on which firearm (he/she) (owned/purchased/received/possessed).]

*<Defense: Momentary Possession>*

[If you conclude that the defendant possessed a firearm, that possession was not unlawful if the defendant can prove the defense of momentary possession. In order to establish this defense, the defendant must prove that:

1. (He/She) possessed the firearm only for a momentary or transitory period;
2. (He/She) possessed the firearm in order to (abandon[,]/ [or] dispose of[,]/ [or] destroy) it;

AND

3. (He/She) did not intend to prevent law enforcement officials from seizing the firearm.

The defendant has the burden of proving each element of this defense by a preponderance of the evidence. This is a different standard of proof than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. To meet the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence, the defendant must prove that it is more likely than not that each element of the defense is true. If the defendant has not met this burden, (he/she) has not proved this defense.]

*<Defense: Justifiable Possession>*

[If you conclude that the defendant possessed a firearm, that possession was not unlawful if the defendant can prove that (he/she) was justified in possessing the firearm. In order to establish this defense, the defendant must prove that:

1. (He/She) (found the firearm/took the firearm from a person who was committing a crime against the defendant);

[AND]

2. (He/She) possessed the firearm no longer than was necessary to deliver or transport the firearm to a law enforcement agency for that agency to dispose of the weapon(;/.)

[AND]

3. If the defendant was transporting the firearm to a law enforcement agency, the defendant gave prior notice to the law enforcement agency that (he/she) would be delivering a firearm to the agency for disposal.]]



**The defendant has the burden of proving each element of this defense by a preponderance of the evidence. This is a different standard of proof than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. To meet the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence, the defendant must prove that it is more likely than not that each element of the defense is true.**

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2012*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the union of general criminal intent and action, CALCRIM No. 251, *Union of Act and Intent—General Intent*. (*People v. Jeffers* (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 917, 924 [49 Cal.Rptr.2d 86].) “Wrongful intent must be shown with regard to the possession and custody elements of the crime of being a felon in possession of a firearm . . . [A] felon who acquires possession of a firearm through misfortune or accident, but who has no intent to exercise control or to have custody, commits the prohibited act without the required wrongful intent.” (*Id.* at p. 922.) The defendant is also entitled to a pinpoint instruction on unintentional possession if there is sufficient evidence to support the defense. (*Id.* at pp. 924–925.)

If the prosecution alleges under a single count that the defendant possessed multiple firearms and the possession was “fragmented as to time . . . [or] space,” the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on unanimity. (*People v. Wolfe* (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 177, 184–185 [7 Cal.Rptr.3d 483].) Give the bracketed paragraph beginning “The People allege that the defendant possessed the following firearms,” inserting the items alleged.

The court should give the bracketed definition of “firearm” unless the court has already given the definition in other instructions. In such cases, the court may give the bracketed sentence stating that the term is defined elsewhere.

### *Defenses—Instructional Duty*

“[T]he defense of transitory possession devised in [*People v. Mijares* (1971) 6 Cal.3d 415, 420, 423 [99 Cal.Rptr. 139, 491 P.2d 1115]] applies only to momentary or transitory possession of contraband for the purpose of disposal.” (*People v. Martin* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1180, 1191–1192 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 599, 25 P.3d 1081].) The court in *Martin, supra*, approved of *People v. Hurtado* (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 805, 814 [54 Cal.Rptr.2d 853], which held that the defense of momentary possession applies to a charge of violating now-repealed Penal Code section 12021. This is an affirmative defense and the defense bears the burden of establishing it by a preponderance of the evidence. (*People v. Mower* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 478–481 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067].) If sufficient evidence has been presented, the

court has a **sua sponte** duty to give the bracketed paragraph, “Defense: Momentary Possession.”

Penal Code section 29850 states that a violation of the statute is “justifiable” if the listed conditions are met. This is an affirmative defense and the defense bears the burden of establishing it by a preponderance of the evidence. (*Ibid.*) If sufficient evidence has been presented, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give the bracketed paragraph, “Defense: Justifiable Possession.”

If there is sufficient evidence that the defendant possessed the firearm only in self-defense, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give CALCRIM No. 2514, *Possession of Firearm by Person Prohibited by Statute—Self-Defense*.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 29800; *People v. Snyder* (1982) 32 Cal.3d 590, 592 [186 Cal.Rptr. 485, 652 P.2d 42].
- Narcotic Addict. *People v. O’Neil* (1965) 62 Cal.2d 748, 754 [44 Cal.Rptr. 320, 401 P.2d 928].
- Defense of Justifiable Possession. Pen. Code, § 29850.
- Accidental Possession. *People v. Jeffers* (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 917, 922 [49 Cal.Rptr.2d 86].
- Momentary Possession Defense. *People v. Martin* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1180, 1191–1192 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 599, 25 P.3d 1081]; *People v. Hurtado* (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 805, 814 [54 Cal.Rptr.2d 853]; *People v. Mijares* (1971) 6 Cal.3d 415, 420, 423 [99 Cal.Rptr. 139, 491 P.2d 1115].
- Constructive vs. Actual Possession. *People v. Azevedo* (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 235, 242–243 [207 Cal.Rptr. 270], questioned on other grounds in *In re Jorge M.* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 866, 876, fn. 6 [98 Cal.Rptr.2d 466, 4 P.3d 297].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, § 233–237.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.02[2][a][i] (Matthew Bender).

5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 93, *Disabilities Flowing From Conviction*, § 93.06 (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.01[1][d] (Matthew Bender).

## 2514. Possession of Firearm by Person Prohibited by Statute: Self-Defense

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The defendant is not guilty of unlawful possession of a firearm[, as charged in Count \_\_\_\_\_,] if (he/she) temporarily possessed the firearm in (self-defense/ [or] defense of another). The defendant possessed the firearm in lawful (self-defense/ [or] defense of another) if:

1. The defendant reasonably believed that (he/she/someone else/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of third party>) was in imminent danger of suffering great bodily injury;
2. The defendant reasonably believed that the immediate use of force was necessary to defend against that danger;
3. A firearm became available to the defendant without planning or preparation on (his/her) part;
4. The defendant possessed the firearm temporarily, that is, for a period no longer than was necessary [or reasonably appeared to have been necessary] for self-defense;
5. No other means of avoiding the danger of injury was available;

AND

6. The defendant's use of the firearm was reasonable under the circumstances.

Belief in future harm is not sufficient, no matter how great or how likely the harm is believed to be. The defendant must have believed there was imminent danger of great bodily injury to (himself/herself/ [or] someone else). Defendant's belief must have been reasonable and (he/she) must have acted only because of that belief. The defendant is only entitled to use that amount of force that a reasonable person would believe is necessary in the same situation. If the defendant used more force than was reasonable, the defendant did not act in lawful (self-defense/ [or] defense of another).

When deciding whether the defendant's beliefs were reasonable, consider all the circumstances as they were known to and appeared to the defendant and consider what a reasonable person in a similar situation with similar knowledge would have believed. If the defendant's beliefs were reasonable, the danger does not need to have actually existed.

*Great bodily injury* means significant or substantial physical injury. It is an injury that is greater than minor or moderate harm.

[The defendant's belief that (he/she/someone else) was threatened may be reasonable even if (he/she) relied on information that was not true.

**However, the defendant must actually and reasonably have believed that the information was true.]**

**[If you find that \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of person who allegedly threatened defendant> threatened or harmed the defendant [or others] in the past, you may consider that information in deciding whether the defendant’s conduct and beliefs were reasonable.]**

**[If you find that the defendant knew that \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of person who allegedly threatened defendant> had threatened or harmed others in the past, you may consider that information in deciding whether the defendant’s conduct and beliefs were reasonable.]**

**[Someone who has been threatened or harmed by a person in the past, is justified in acting more quickly or taking greater self-defense measures against that person.]**

**[If you find that the defendant received a threat from someone else that (he/she) reasonably associated with \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of person who was the alleged source of the threat>, you may consider that threat in deciding whether the defendant was justified in acting in (self-defense/ [or] defense of another).]**

**The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not temporarily possess the firearm in (self-defense/ [or] defense of another). If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of this crime.**

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*New January 2006; Revised December 2008, February 2012, September 2020*

## **BENCH NOTES**

### ***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on self-defense when “it appears that the defendant is relying on such a defense, or if there is substantial evidence supportive of such a defense and the defense is not inconsistent with the defendant’s theory of the case.” (See *People v. Breverman* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 157 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094] [discussing duty to instruct on defenses generally]; see also *People v. Lemus* (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 470, 478 [249 Cal.Rptr. 897] [if substantial evidence of self-defense exists, court must instruct sua sponte and let jury decide credibility of witnesses]; *People v. King* (1978) 22 Cal.3d 12, 24 [148 Cal.Rptr. 409, 582 P.2d 1000] [self-defense applies to charge under now-repealed Pen. Code, § 12021].)

On defense request and when supported by sufficient evidence, the court must instruct that the jury may consider the effect of “antecedent threats or assaults against the defendant on the reasonableness of defendant’s conduct.” (*People v. Garvin* (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 484, 488 [1 Cal.Rptr.3d 774].) The court must also

instruct that the jury may consider previous threats or assaults by the aggressor against someone else or threats received by the defendant from a third party that the defendant reasonably associated with the aggressor. (See *People v. Pena* (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 462, 475 [198 Cal.Rptr. 819]; *People v. Minifie* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1055, 1065, 1068 [56 Cal.Rptr.2d 133, 920 P.2d 1337]; see also CALCRIM No. 505, *Justifiable Homicide: Self-Defense or Defense of Another*.) If these instructions have already been given in CALCRIM No. 3470 or CALCRIM No. 505, the court may delete them here.

The second sentence of the great bodily injury definition could result in error if the prosecution improperly argues great bodily injury may be shown by greater than minor injury alone. (Compare *People v. Medellin* (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 519, 533–535 [258 Cal.Rptr.3d 867] [the definition was reasonably susceptible to prosecutor’s erroneous argument that the injury need only be greater than minor] with *People v. Quinonez* (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 457, 466 [260 Cal.Rptr.3d 86] [upholding instructions containing great bodily injury definition as written].)

### **Related Instructions**

CALCRIM No. 3470, *Right to Self-Defense or Defense of Another (Non-Homicide)*.

CALCRIM No. 3471, *Right to Self-Defense: Mutual Combat or Initial Aggressor*.

CALCRIM No. 3472, *Right to Self-Defense: May Not Be Contrived*.

CALCRIM No. 505, *Justifiable Homicide: Self-Defense or Defense of Another*.

### **AUTHORITY**

- Temporary Possession of Firearm by Felon in Self-Defense. *People v. King* (1978) 22 Cal.3d 12, 24 [148 Cal.Rptr. 409, 582 P.2d 1000].
- Duty to Retreat Limited to Felon in Possession Cases. *People v. Rhodes* (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1343–1346 [29 Cal.Rptr.3d 226].
- Possession Must Be Brief and Not Planned. *People v. McClindon* (1980) 114 Cal.App.3d 336, 340 [170 Cal.Rptr. 492].
- Instructional Requirements. *People v. Moody* (1943) 62 Cal.App.2d 18 [143 P.2d 978]; *People v. Myers* (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 328, 335, 336 [71 Cal.Rptr.2d 518].
- Lawful Resistance. Pen. Code, §§ 692, 693, 694; Civ. Code, § 50.
- Burden of Proof. Pen. Code, § 189.5; *People v. Banks* (1976) 67 Cal.App.3d 379, 383–384 [137 Cal.Rptr. 652].
- Elements. *People v. Humphrey* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073, 1082 [56 Cal.Rptr.2d 142, 921 P.2d 1].
- Imminence. *People v. Aris* (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1178, 1187 [264 Cal.Rptr. 167], disapproved on other grounds by *People v. Humphrey* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073, 1088–1089 [56 Cal.Rptr.2d 142].
- Reasonable Belief. *People v. Humphrey* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073, 1082 [56 Cal.Rptr.2d 142, 921 P.2d 1]; *People v. Clark* (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 371, 377 [181 Cal.Rptr. 682].

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Defenses, §§ 86, 87, 68, 71, 72, 73.

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, § 233–237.

3 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 73, *Defenses and Justifications*, § 73.11[1][a] (Matthew Bender).

5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 93, *Disabilities Flowing From Conviction*, § 93.06 (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.01[1][d] (Matthew Bender).

**2515–2519. Reserved for Future Use**

## C. CARRYING A FIREARM

### (i) Concealed

#### 2520. Carrying Concealed Firearm on Person (Pen. Code, § 25400(a)(2))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with unlawfully carrying a concealed firearm on (his/her) person [in violation of Penal Code section 25400(a)(2)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant carried on (his/her) person a firearm capable of being concealed on the person;
2. The defendant knew that (he/she) was carrying a firearm;

AND

3. It was substantially concealed on the defendant's person.

[A *firearm capable of being concealed on the person* is any device designed to be used as a weapon, from which a projectile is expelled or discharged through a barrel by the force of an explosion or other form of combustion and that has a barrel less than 16 inches in length. [A *firearm capable of being concealed on the person* also includes any device that has a barrel 16 inches or more in length that is designed to be interchanged with a barrel less than 16 inches in length.] [A *firearm* also includes any rocket, rocket-propelled projectile launcher, or similar device containing any explosive or incendiary material, whether or not the device is designed for emergency or distress signaling purposes.]]

[The term *firearm capable of being concealed on the person* is defined in another instruction.]

[A firearm does not need to be in working order if it was designed to shoot and appears capable of shooting.]

[Firearms carried openly in belt holsters are not concealed.]

<Defense: Statutory Exemption>

[The defendant did not unlawfully carry a concealed firearm if \_\_\_\_\_ <insert defense from Pen. Code, § 25450, 25510, 25525, 25600, or 25605>. The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant unlawfully carried a concealed firearm. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the



**defendant not guilty of this crime.]**

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2012, March 2021*

**BENCH NOTES*****Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime. If the defendant is charged with any of the sentencing factors in Penal Code section 25400(c), the court must also give the appropriate instruction from CALCRIM Nos. 2540–2546. (*People v. Hall* (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 128, 135 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 690].)

The court should give the bracketed definition of “firearm capable of being concealed on the person” unless the court has already given the definition in other instructions. In such cases, the court may give the bracketed sentence stating that the term is defined elsewhere.

Penal Code section 25400(a) prohibits carrying a concealed “pistol, revolver, or other firearm capable of being concealed upon the person.” Penal Code section 16530 provides a single definition for this class of weapons. Thus, the committee has chosen to use solely the all-inclusive phrase “firearm capable of being concealed on the person.”

***Defenses—Instructional Duty***

Exemptions and a justification for carrying a concealed firearm are stated in Penal Code sections 25600, 25605, 25525, 25510, and 25450. If sufficient evidence has been presented to raise a reasonable doubt about the existence of a legal basis for the defendant’s actions, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give the bracketed instruction on the defense. (See *People v. Mower* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 478–481 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067] [discussing affirmative defenses generally and the burden of proof].) Insert the appropriate language in the bracketed paragraph that begins, “The defendant did not unlawfully . . . .”

***Related Instructions***

CALCRIM No. 2540, *Carrying Firearm: Specified Convictions*.

CALCRIM No. 2541, *Carrying Firearm: Stolen Firearm*.

CALCRIM No. 2542, *Carrying Firearm: Active Participant in Criminal Street Gang*.

CALCRIM No. 2543, *Carrying Firearm: Not in Lawful Possession*.

CALCRIM No. 2544, *Carrying Firearm: Possession of Firearm Prohibited Due to Conviction, Court Order, or Mental Illness*.

CALCRIM No. 2545, *Carrying Firearm: Not Registered Owner*.

CALCRIM No. 2546, *Carrying Concealed Firearm: Not Registered Owner and Weapon Loaded*.



## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 25400(a)(2).
- Firearm Defined. Pen. Code, § 16520.
- Knowledge Required. *People v. Jurado* (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d 1027, 1030–1031 [102 Cal.Rptr. 498]; *People v. Rubalcava* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 322, 331–332 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 735, 1 P.3d 52].
- Concealment Required. *People v. Nelson* (1960) 185 Cal.App.2d 578, 580–581 [8 Cal.Rptr. 288].
- Factors in Pen. Code, § 25400(c) Sentencing Factors, Not Elements. *People v. Hall* (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 128, 135 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 690].
- Justifications and Exemptions. Pen. Code, §§ 25600, 25605, 25525, 25510, 25450.
- Need Not Be Operable. *People v. Marroquin* (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 77, 82 [258 Cal.Rptr. 290].
- Substantial Concealment. *People v. Wharton* (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 72, 75 [6 Cal.Rptr.2d 673] [interpreting now-repealed Pen. Code, § 12020(a)(4)]; *People v. Fuentes* (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 953, 955 [134 Cal.Rptr. 885] [same].
- Statute Is Not Unconstitutionally Vague. *People v. Hodges* (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1348, 1355 [83 Cal.Rptr.2d 619].

## LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

If the defendant is charged with one of the sentencing factors that makes this offense a felony, then the misdemeanor offense is a lesser included offense. The statute defines as a misdemeanor all violations of the statute not covered by the specified sentencing factors. (Pen. Code, § 25400(c)(7).) The court must provide the jury with a verdict form on which the jury will indicate if the sentencing factor has been proved. If the jury finds that the sentencing factor has not been proved, then the offense should be set at a misdemeanor.

## RELATED ISSUES

### *Multiple Convictions Prohibited*

A single act of carrying a concealed firearm cannot result in multiple convictions under different subdivisions of Penal Code section 25400(a). (*People v. Duffy* (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 257, 266 [265 Cal.Rptr.3d 59].)

## SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, §§ 203, 204–209.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.01[1][d] (Matthew Bender).

**2521. Carrying Concealed Firearm Within Vehicle (Pen. Code,  
§ 25400(a)(1))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with unlawfully carrying a concealed firearm within a vehicle [in violation of Penal Code section 25400].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant carried within a vehicle a firearm capable of being concealed on the person;
2. The defendant knew the firearm was in the vehicle;
3. The firearm was substantially concealed within the vehicle;

AND

4. The vehicle was under the defendant's control or direction.

[A *firearm capable of being concealed on the person* is any device designed to be used as a weapon, from which a projectile is expelled or discharged through a barrel by the force of an explosion or other form of combustion and that has a barrel less than 16 inches in length. [A *firearm capable of being concealed on the person* also includes any device that has a barrel 16 inches or more in length that is designed to be interchanged with a barrel less than 16 inches in length.] [A *firearm* also includes any rocket, rocket-propelled projectile launcher, or similar device containing any explosive or incendiary material, whether or not the device is designed for emergency or distress signaling purposes.]]

[The term *firearm capable of being concealed on the person* is defined in another instruction.]

[A firearm does not need to be in working order if it was designed to shoot and appears capable of shooting.]

[Firearms carried openly in belt holsters are not concealed.]

<Defense: Statutory Exemption>

[The defendant did not unlawfully carry a concealed firearm with in a vehicle if \_\_\_\_\_ <insert defense from Pen. Code, §§ 25450, 25510, 25525, 25600, 25605, or 25610>. The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant unlawfully carried a concealed firearm within a vehicle. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of this crime.]

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime. If the defendant is charged with any of the sentencing factors in Penal Code section 25400(c), the court must also give the appropriate instruction from CALCRIM Nos. 2540–2546. (*People v. Hall* (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 128, 135 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 690].)

The court should give the bracketed definition of “firearm capable of being concealed on the person” unless the court has already given the definition in other instructions. In such cases, the court may give the bracketed sentence stating that the term is defined elsewhere.

Penal Code section 25400(a) prohibits carrying a concealed “pistol, revolver, or other firearm capable of being concealed upon the person.” Penal Code section 16530 provides a single definition for this class of weapons. Thus, the committee has chosen to use solely the all-inclusive phrase “firearm capable of being concealed on the person.”

### *Defenses—Instructional Duty*

Exemptions and a justification for carrying a concealed firearm are stated in Penal Code sections 25450, 25510, 25525, 25600, 25605, and 25610. If sufficient evidence has been presented to raise a reasonable doubt about the existence of a legal basis for the defendant’s actions, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give the bracketed instruction on the defense. (See *People v. Mower* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 478–481 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067] [discussing affirmative defenses generally and the burden of proof].) Insert the appropriate language in the bracketed paragraph that begins, “The defendant did not unlawfully . . . .”

### *Related Instructions*

CALCRIM No. 2540, *Carrying Firearm: Specified Convictions*.

CALCRIM No. 2541, *Carrying Firearm: Stolen Firearm*.

CALCRIM No. 2542, *Carrying Firearm: Active Participant in Criminal Street Gang*.

CALCRIM No. 2543, *Carrying Firearm: Not in Lawful Possession*.

CALCRIM No. 2544, *Carrying Firearm: Possession of Firearm Prohibited Due to Conviction, Court Order, or Mental Illness*.

CALCRIM No. 2545, *Carrying Firearm: Not Registered Owner*.

CALCRIM No. 2546, *Carrying Concealed Firearm: Not Registered Owner and Weapon Loaded*.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 25400(a)(1).
- Firearm Defined. Pen. Code, § 16520.
- Knowledge Required. *People v. Jurado* (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d 1027, 1030–1031

[102 Cal.Rptr. 498]; *People v. Rubalcava* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 322, 331–332 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 735, 1 P.3d 52].

- Concealment Required. *People v. Nelson* (1960) 185 Cal.App.2d 578, 580–581 [8 Cal.Rptr. 288].
- Factors in Pen. Code, § 25400(c) Sentencing Factors, Not Elements. *People v. Hall* (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 128, 135 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 690].
- Justifications and Exemptions. Pen. Code, §§ 25600, 25605, 25525, 25510, 25450.
- Need Not Be Operable. *People v. Marroquin* (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 77, 82 [258 Cal.Rptr. 290].
- Substantial Concealment. *People v. Wharton* (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 72, 75 [6 Cal.Rptr.2d 673] [interpreting now-repealed Pen. Code, § 12020(a)(4)]; *People v. Fuentes* (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 953, 955 [134 Cal.Rptr. 885] [same].
- Statute Is Not Unconstitutionally Vague. *People v. Hodges* (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1348, 1355 [83 Cal.Rptr.2d 619].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

If the defendant is charged with one of the sentencing factors that makes this offense a felony, then the misdemeanor offense is a lesser included offense. The statute defines as a misdemeanor all violations of the statute not covered by the specified sentencing factors. (Pen. Code, § 25400(c)(7).) The court must provide the jury with a verdict form on which the jury will indicate if the sentencing factor has been proved. If the jury finds that the sentencing factor has not been proved, then the offense should be set at a misdemeanor.

### RELATED ISSUES

#### ***Gun in Unlocked Carrying Case Is Concealed***

“If a firearm is transported in a vehicle in such a manner as to be invisible unless its carrying case is opened, it is concealed in the ordinary and usual meaning of the term.” (*People v. Hodges* (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1348, 1355 [83 Cal.Rptr.2d 619].) Thus, carrying a firearm in an unlocked case in a vehicle violates Penal Code section 25400(a)(1). (*Ibid.*) However, Penal Code section 25525 makes it lawful to transport a firearm in a vehicle if it is in a *locked* case.

#### ***Not Necessary for Defendant to Possess or Control the Firearm***

“The statute does not require that the defendant have the exclusive possession and control of the firearm.” (*People v. Davis* (1958) 157 Cal.App.2d 33, 36 [320 P.2d 88].) The court in *People v. Davis, supra*, upheld the conviction where the defendant owned and controlled the vehicle and knew of the presence of the firearm below the seat, even though the weapon was placed there by someone else and belonged to someone else. (*Ibid.*)

#### ***Multiple Convictions Prohibited***

A single act of carrying a concealed firearm cannot result in multiple convictions under different subdivisions of Penal Code section 25400(a). (*People v. Duffy* (2020)

51 Cal.App.5th 257, 266 [265 Cal.Rptr.3d 59].)

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, §§ 203–209.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.01[1][d] (Matthew Bender).

**2522. Carrying Concealed Firearm: Caused to Be Carried Within Vehicle (Pen. Code, § 25400(a)(3))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with unlawfully causing a firearm to be carried concealed within a vehicle [in violation of Penal Code section 25400].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant caused a firearm capable of being concealed on the person to be concealed while it was carried within a vehicle;
2. The defendant knew that (he/she) caused the firearm to be concealed in the vehicle;
3. The firearm was substantially concealed within the vehicle;

AND

4. The defendant was in the vehicle during the time the firearm was concealed there.

[A *firearm capable of being concealed on the person* is any device designed to be used as a weapon, from which a projectile is expelled or discharged through a barrel by the force of an explosion or other form of combustion and that has a barrel less than 16 inches in length. [A *firearm capable of being concealed on the person* also includes any device that has a barrel 16 inches or more in length that is designed to be interchanged with a barrel less than 16 inches in length.] [A *firearm* also includes any rocket, rocket-propelled projectile launcher, or similar device containing any explosive or incendiary material, whether or not the device is designed for emergency or distress signaling purposes.]]

[The term *firearm capable of being concealed on the person* is defined in another instruction.]

[A firearm does not need to be in working order if it was designed to shoot and appears capable of shooting.]

[Firearms carried openly in belt holsters are not concealed.]

[The People do not need to prove that the defendant initially brought the firearm into the vehicle.]

<Defense: Statutory Exemption>

[The defendant did not unlawfully cause a firearm to be carried concealed within a vehicle if \_\_\_\_\_ <insert defense from Pen. Code, § 25450, 25510, 25525, 25600 or 25605>. The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant unlawfully caused

**a firearm to be carried concealed within a vehicle. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of this crime.]**

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2012, March 2021*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime. If the defendant is charged with any of the sentencing factors in Penal Code section 25400(c), the court must also give the appropriate instruction from CALCRIM Nos. 2540–2546. (*People v. Hall* (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 128, 135 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 690].)

The court should give the bracketed definition of “firearm capable of being concealed on the person” unless the court has already given the definition in other instructions. In such cases, the court may give the bracketed sentence stating that the term is defined elsewhere.

Penal Code section 25400(a) prohibits carrying a concealed “pistol, revolver, or other firearm capable of being concealed upon the person.” Penal Code section 16530 provides a single definition for this class of weapons. Thus, the committee has chosen to use solely the all-inclusive phrase “firearm capable of being concealed on the person.”

### *Defenses—Instructional Duty*

Exemptions and a justification for carrying a concealed firearm are stated in Penal Code sections 25600, 25605, 25525, 25510, and 25450. If the defense presents sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt about the existence of a legal basis for the defendant’s actions, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give the bracketed instruction on the defense. (See *People v. Mower* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 478–481 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067] [discussing affirmative defenses generally and the burden of proof].) Insert the appropriate language in the bracketed paragraph that begins, “The defendant did not unlawfully . . . .”

### *Related Instructions*

CALCRIM No. 2540, *Carrying Firearm: Specified Convictions*.

CALCRIM No. 2541, *Carrying Firearm: Stolen Firearm*.

CALCRIM No. 2542, *Carrying Firearm: Active Participant in Criminal Street Gang*.

CALCRIM No. 2543, *Carrying Firearm: Not in Lawful Possession*.

CALCRIM No. 2544, *Carrying Firearm: Possession of Firearm Prohibited Due to Conviction, Court Order, or Mental Illness*.

CALCRIM No. 2545, *Carrying Firearm: Not Registered Owner*.

CALCRIM No. 2546, *Carrying Concealed Firearm: Not Registered Owner and Weapon Loaded*.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 25400(a)(3).
- Firearm Defined. Pen. Code, § 16520.
- Knowledge Required. *People v. Jurado* (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d 1027, 1030–1031 [102 Cal.Rptr. 498]; *People v. Rubalcava* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 322, 331–332 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 735, 1 P.3d 52].
- Concealment Required. *People v. Nelson* (1960) 185 Cal.App.2d 578, 580–581 [8 Cal.Rptr. 288].
- Factors in Pen. Code, § 25400(c) Sentencing Factors, Not Elements. *People v. Hall* (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 128, 135 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 690].
- Justifications and Exemptions. Pen. Code §§ 25600, 25605, 25525, 25510, 25450.
- Need Not Be Operable. *People v. Marroquin* (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 77, 82 [258 Cal.Rptr. 290].
- Substantial Concealment. *People v. Wharton* (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 72, 75 [6 Cal.Rptr.2d 673] [interpreting now-repealed Pen. Code, § 12020(a)(4)]; *People v. Fuentes* (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 953, 955 [134 Cal.Rptr. 885] [same].
- Statute Is Not Unconstitutionally Vague. *People v. Hodges* (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1348, 1355 [83 Cal.Rptr.2d 619].

## LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

If the defendant is charged with one of the sentencing factors that makes this offense a felony, then the misdemeanor offense is a lesser included offense. The statute defines as a misdemeanor all violations of the statute not covered by the specified sentencing factors. (Pen. Code, § 25400(c)(7).) The court must provide the jury with a verdict form on which the jury will indicate if the sentencing factor has been proved. If the jury finds that the sentencing factor has not been proved, then the offense should be set at a misdemeanor.

## RELATED ISSUES

### ***Defendant Need Not Bring Firearm Into Car***

“Appellant caused the gun to be carried concealed in a vehicle in which he was an occupant, by concealing the gun between the seats. His conduct fits the language and purpose of the statute. The prosecution was not required to prove that appellant initially brought the gun into the car.” (*People v. Padilla* (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 127, 134 [119 Cal.Rptr.2d 457].)

### ***Multiple Convictions Prohibited***

A single act of carrying a concealed firearm cannot result in multiple convictions under different subdivisions of Penal Code section 25400(a). (*People v. Duffy* (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 257, 266 [265 Cal.Rptr.3d 59].)



**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, §§ 203, 204–209.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.01[1][d] (Matthew Bender).

**2523–2529. Reserved for Future Use**

## (ii) Loaded

### 2530. Carrying Loaded Firearm (Pen. Code, § 25850(a))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with unlawfully carrying a loaded firearm (on (his/her) person/in a vehicle) [in violation of Penal Code section 25850(a)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant carried a loaded firearm (on (his/her) person/in a vehicle);
2. The defendant knew that (he/she) was carrying a firearm;

AND

3. At that time, the defendant was in a public place or on a public street in (an incorporated city/in an unincorporated area where it was unlawful to discharge a firearm).

[A *public place* is a place that is open and accessible to anyone who wishes to go there.]

[A *firearm* is any device designed to be used as a weapon, from which a projectile is expelled or discharged through a barrel by the force of any explosion or other form of combustion. [A *firearm* also includes any rocket, rocket-propelled projectile launcher, or similar device containing any explosive or incendiary material, whether or not the device is designed for emergency or distress signaling purposes.]]

[The term *firearm* is defined in another instruction.]

As used here, a firearm is *loaded* if there is an unexpended cartridge or shell in the firing chamber or in either a magazine or clip attached to the firearm. An *unexpended cartridge or shell* consists of a case that holds a charge of powder and a bullet or shot. [A *muzzle-loader firearm* is *loaded* when it is capped or primed and has a powder charge and ball or shot in the barrel or cylinder.]

[A firearm does not need to be in working order if it was designed to shoot and appears capable of shooting.]

[\_\_\_\_\_ <insert location> is (an incorporated city/in an unincorporated area where it is unlawful to discharge a firearm).]

<Defense: Statutory Exemption>

[The defendant did not unlawfully carry a loaded firearm if \_\_\_\_\_ <insert defense from Pen Code, §§ 25900, 26000 et seq.>. The People have

**the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant unlawfully carried a loaded firearm. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of this crime.]**

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2012, March 2019*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime. If the defendant is charged with any of the sentencing factors in Penal Code section 25850, the court must also give the appropriate instruction from CALCRIM Nos. 2540–2546. (See *People v. Hall* (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 128, 135 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 690].)

The court should give the bracketed definition of “firearm” unless the court has already given the definition in other instructions. In such cases, the court may give the bracketed sentence stating that the term is defined elsewhere.

### *Defenses—Instructional Duty*

If the defense presents sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt about the existence of a legal basis for the defendant’s actions, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give the bracketed instruction on the defense. (See *People v. Mower* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 478–481 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067] [discussing affirmative defenses generally and the burden of proof].) Insert the appropriate language in the bracketed paragraph that begins, “The defendant did not unlawfully . . . .”

### *Related Instructions*

CALCRIM No. 2540, *Carrying Firearm: Specified Convictions.*

CALCRIM No. 2541, *Carrying Firearm: Stolen Firearm.*

CALCRIM No. 2542, *Carrying Firearm: Active Participant in Criminal Street Gang.*

CALCRIM No. 2543, *Carrying Firearm: Not in Lawful Possession.*

CALCRIM No. 2544, *Carrying Firearm: Possession of Firearm Prohibited Due to Conviction, Court Order, or Mental Illness.*

CALCRIM No. 2545, *Carrying Firearm: Not Registered Owner.*

CALCRIM No. 2546, *Carrying Concealed Firearm: Not Registered Owner and Weapon Loaded.*

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 25850(a).
- Firearm Defined. Pen. Code, § 16520.
- Knowledge of Presence of Weapon Required. See *People v. Rubalcava* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 322, 331–332 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 735, 1 P.3d 52]; *People v. Dillard*

(1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 261, 267 [201 Cal.Rptr. 136].

- Knowledge Firearm Loaded Not Required. *People v. Dillard* (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 261, 266 [201 Cal.Rptr. 136]; *People v. Harrison* (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 115, 120 [81 Cal.Rptr. 396].
- Factors in Pen. Code, § 25400(c) Sentencing Factors, Not Elements. *People v. Hall* (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 128, 135 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 690].
- Justifications and Exemptions. Pen. Code, § 25900, 26000 et seq.
- Need Not Be Operable. *People v. Taylor* (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 432, 437 [199 Cal.Rptr. 6].
- “Loaded” Firearm. *People v. Clark* (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1147, 1153 [53 Cal.Rptr.2d 99].
- Must Be in Incorporated City or Prohibited Area of Unincorporated Territory. *People v. Knight* (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1568, 1575 [18 Cal.Rptr.3d 384].
- Public Place Defined. *In re Zorn* (1963) 59 Cal.2d 650, 652 [30 Cal.Rptr. 811, 381 P.2d 635]; *People v. Strider* (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1393, 1401 [100 Cal.Rptr. 3d 66].
- Loaded Firearm in Backpack is “On the Person.” *People v. Wade* (2016) 63 Cal.4th 137, 140 [201 Cal.Rptr.3d 876].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

If the defendant is charged with one of the sentencing factors that makes this offense a felony, then the misdemeanor offense is a lesser included offense. The statute defines as a misdemeanor all violations of the statute not covered by the specified sentencing factors. (Pen. Code, § 25850(c)(7).) The court must provide the jury with a verdict form on which the jury will indicate if the sentencing factor has been proved. If the jury finds that the sentencing factor has not been proved, then the offense should be set at a misdemeanor.

### RELATED ISSUES

#### ***Loaded Firearm***

“Under the commonly understood meaning of the term ‘loaded,’ a firearm is ‘loaded’ when a shell or cartridge has been placed into a position from which it can be fired; the shotgun is not ‘loaded’ if the shell or cartridge is stored elsewhere and not yet placed in a firing position.” (*People v. Clark* (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1147, 1153 [53 Cal.Rptr.2d 99].)

#### ***Location—Court May Take Judicial Notice***

“The location of local streets within city boundaries is properly a matter of judicial notice [citation omitted], as is the fact that a particular jurisdiction is an incorporated city.” (*People v. Vega* (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 954, 958 [96 Cal.Rptr. 391] [footnote and citation omitted].)

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, §§ 249–251.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.01[1][d], [f] (Matthew Bender).

**2531–2539. Reserved for Future Use**

### (iii) Sentencing Factors

#### 2540. Carrying Firearm: Specified Convictions (Pen. Code, §§ 25400(a), 25850(c))

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If you find the defendant guilty of unlawfully (carrying a concealed firearm (on (his/her) person/within a vehicle)[,]/ causing a firearm to be carried concealed within a vehicle[,]/ [or] carrying a loaded firearm) [under Count[s] \_\_\_\_\_], you must then decide whether the People have proved the additional allegation that (he/she) was previously convicted of (a felony/the crime[s] of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert one or more weapons offenses punishable as a felony, crimes against the person or property, or narcotics and dangerous drug violations>*). It has already been determined that the defendant is the person named in exhibits \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert numbers or descriptions of exhibits>*. You must decide whether the evidence proves that the defendant was convicted of the alleged crime[s].

The People allege that the defendant has been convicted of:

[1.] A violation of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert code section alleged>*, on \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert date of conviction>*, in the \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of court>*, in Case Number \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert docket or case number>*(;/.)

[AND *<Repeat for each prior conviction alleged>*.]

[A conviction of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of offense from other state or federal offense>* is the same as a conviction for a felony.]

[Consider the evidence presented on this allegation only when deciding whether the defendant was previously convicted of the crime[s] alleged [or for the limited purpose of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert other permitted purpose, e.g., assessing credibility of the defendant>*]. Do not consider this evidence for any other purpose.]

[You must consider each alleged conviction separately.] The People have the burden of proving this allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden [for any alleged conviction], you must find that the alleged conviction has not been proved.

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2012*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the sentencing factor. (*People v. Hall* (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 128, 135 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 690].)

Give this instruction if the defendant is charged under Penal Code section 25400(c)(1), (5), 25850(c)(1), (5), unless the court has granted a bifurcated trial on the prior conviction or the defendant stipulates to the prior conviction. (*People v. Hall, supra*, 67 Cal.App.4th at p. 135.) This instruction **must** be given with the appropriate instruction defining the elements of carrying a concealed firearm, CALCRIM No. 2520, 2521, or 2522, or carrying a loaded firearm, CALCRIM No. 2530. The court must provide the jury with a verdict form on which the jury will indicate if the sentencing factor has been proved.

If the court grants bifurcation, do not give this instruction. Give CALCRIM No. 3101, *Prior Conviction: Bifurcated Trial*.

If the defendant does stipulate to the prior conviction, this instruction should not be given and the prior conviction should not be disclosed to the jury unless the court admits it as otherwise relevant. (*People v. Hall, supra*, 67 Cal.App.4th at p. 135.)

On request, the court should give the limiting instruction regarding the evidence of the prior conviction that begins, “Consider the evidence presented . . . .” (*People v. Valentine* (1986) 42 Cal.3d 170, 182, fn. 7 [228 Cal.Rptr. 25, 720 P.2d 913].) There is no sua sponte duty to give the limiting instruction, and the defense may prefer that no limiting instruction be given. (*People v. Griggs* (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1139 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 380].)

### AUTHORITY

- Factors in Pen. Code, §§ 25400(c), 25850(c) Sentencing Factors, Not Elements. *People v. Hall* (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 128, 135 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 690].
- Limiting Instruction on Prior Conviction. *People v. Valentine* (1986) 42 Cal.3d 170, 182, fn. 7 [228 Cal.Rptr. 25, 720 P.2d 913]; *People v. Griggs* (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1139 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 380].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, §§ 203, 204, 249, 250.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.01[1][d] (Matthew Bender).

**2541. Carrying Firearm: Stolen Firearm (Pen. Code, §§ 25400(c)(2), 25850(c)(2))**

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**If you find the defendant guilty of unlawfully (carrying a concealed firearm (on (his/her) person/within a vehicle)[,]/ causing a firearm to be carried concealed within a vehicle[,]/ [or] carrying a loaded firearm) [under Count[s] \_\_\_\_\_], you must then decide whether the People have proved the additional allegation that the firearm was stolen.**

**To prove this allegation, the People must prove that:**

- 1. The firearm the defendant (carried/ [or] caused to be carried concealed in a vehicle) was stolen;**

**AND**

- 2. The defendant knew or had reasonable cause to believe the firearm was stolen.**

**The People have the burden of proving this allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you must find this allegation has not been proved.**

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2012*

**BENCH NOTES**

***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the sentencing factor. (See *Apprendi v. New Jersey* (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 475–476, 490 [120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435].)

Give this instruction if the defendant is charged under Penal Code section 25400(c)(2) or 25850(c)(2) and the defendant does not stipulate to the firearm being stolen. (*People v. Hall* (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 128, 135 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 690].) This instruction **must** be given with the appropriate instruction defining the elements of carrying a concealed firearm, CALCRIM No. 2520, 2521, or 2522, or carrying a loaded firearm, CALCRIM No. 2530. The court must provide the jury with a verdict form on which the jury will indicate if the sentencing factor has been proved.

If the defendant does stipulate that the firearm was stolen, this instruction should not be given and that information should not be disclosed to the jury. (See *People v. Hall, supra*, 67 Cal.App.4th at p. 135.)

**AUTHORITY**

- Factors. Pen. Code, §§ 25400(c)(2), 25850(c)(2). Sentencing Factors, Not Elements *People v. Hall* (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 128, 135 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 690].



**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, §§ 203–204, 249–250.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.01[1][d] (Matthew Bender).

**2542. Carrying Firearm: Active Participant in Criminal Street Gang  
(Pen. Code, §§ 25400(c)(3), 25850(c)(3))**

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If you find the defendant guilty of unlawfully (carrying a concealed firearm (on (his/her) person/within a vehicle)[,]/ causing a firearm to be carried concealed within a vehicle[,]/ [or] carrying a loaded firearm) [under Count[s] \_\_\_\_\_], you must then decide whether the People have proved the additional allegation that the defendant was an active participant in a criminal street gang.

To prove this allegation, the People must prove that:

1. When the defendant (carried the firearm/ [or] caused the firearm to be carried concealed in a vehicle), the defendant was an active participant in a criminal street gang;
2. When the defendant participated in the gang, (he/she) knew that members of the gang engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity;

**AND**

3. The defendant willfully assisted, furthered, or promoted felonious criminal conduct by members of the gang either by:
  - a. Directly and actively committing a felony offense;

**OR**

  - b. aiding and abetting a felony offense.

At least two members of that same gang must have participated in committing the felony offense. The defendant may count as one of those members if you find that the defendant was a member of the gang.

*Active participation* means involvement with a criminal street gang in a way that is more than passive or in name only.

[The People do not have to prove that the defendant devoted all or a substantial part of (his/her) time or efforts to the gang, or that (he/she) was an actual member of the gang.]

A *criminal street gang* is any ongoing organization, association, or group of three or more persons, whether formal or informal:

1. That has a common name or common identifying sign or symbol;
2. That has, as one or more of its primary activities, the commission of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert one or more crimes listed in Pen. Code, § 186.22(e)(1)–(25), (31)–(33)>;

**AND**

3. Whose members, whether acting alone or together, engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity.

In order to qualify as a *primary* activity, the crime must be one of the group's chief or principal activities rather than an occasional act committed by one or more persons who happen to be members of the group.

*<Give this paragraph only when the conduct that establishes the primary activity, i.e., predicate offenses, has not resulted in a conviction or sustained juvenile petition.>*

[To decide whether the organization, association, or group has, as one of its primary activities, the commission of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert felony or felonies from Pen. Code, § 186.22(e)(1)–(25), (31)–(33)>*, please refer to the separate instructions that I (will give/have given) you on (that/those) crime[s].]

A *pattern of criminal gang activity*, as used here, means:

1. [The] (commission of[,]/ [or] attempted commission of[,]/ [or] conspiracy to commit[,]/ [or] solicitation to commit[,]/ [or] conviction of[,]/ [or] (Having/having) a juvenile petition sustained for commission of)

*<Give Alternative 1A if the crime or crimes are in Pen. Code, § 186.22(e)(1)–(25), (31)–(33).>*

- 1A. (any combination of two or more of the following crimes/[,][or] two or more occurrences of [one or more of the following crimes]:) \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert one or more crimes listed in Pen. Code, § 186.22(e)(1)–(25), (31)–(33)>*;

[OR]

*<Give Alternative 1B if one or more of the crimes are in Pen. Code, § 186.22(e)(26)–(30).>*

- 1B. [at least one of the following crimes:] \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert one or more crimes from Pen. Code, § 186.22(e)(1)–(25), (31)–(33)>*

AND

[at least one of the following crimes:] \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert one or more crimes in Pen. Code, § 186.22(e)(26)–(30)>*;

2. At least one of those crimes was committed after September 26, 1988;
3. The most recent crime occurred within three years of one of the earlier crimes;

AND

**4. The crimes were committed on separate occasions or were personally committed by two or more persons.**

*<Give this paragraph only when the conduct that establishes the pattern of primary activity, i.e., predicate offenses, has not resulted in a conviction or sustained juvenile petition>*

**[To decide whether a member of the gang [or the defendant] committed \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert felony or felonies from Pen. Code, § 186.22(e)(1)–(33)>*, please refer to the separate instructions that I (will give/have given) you on (that/those) crime[s].]**

**[If you find the defendant guilty of a crime in this case, you may consider that crime in deciding whether one of the group’s primary activities was commission of that crime and whether a pattern of criminal gang activity has been proved.]**

**[You may not find that there was a pattern of criminal gang activity unless all of you agree that two or more crimes that satisfy these requirements were committed, but you do not have to all agree on which crimes were committed.]**

**As the term is used here, a *willful act* is one done willingly or on purpose.**

***Felonious criminal conduct* means committing or attempting to commit [any of] the following crime[s]: \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert felony or felonies by gang members that the defendant is alleged to have furthered, assisted, or promoted>*.**

**To decide whether a member of the gang [or the defendant] committed \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert felony or felonies listed immediately above and crimes from Pen. Code, § 186.22(e)(1)–(33) inserted in definition of pattern of criminal gang activity>*, please refer to the separate instructions that I (will give/have given) you on (that/those) crime[s].**

**To prove that the defendant aided and abetted felonious criminal conduct by a member of the gang, the People must prove that:**

- 1. A member of the gang committed the crime;**
- 2. The defendant knew that the gang member intended to commit the crime;**
- 3. Before or during the commission of the crime, the defendant intended to aid and abet the gang member in committing the crime;**

**AND**

- 4. The defendant’s words or conduct did in fact aid and abet the commission of the crime.**

Someone *aids and abets* a crime if he or she knows of the perpetrator's unlawful purpose and he or she specifically intends to, and does in fact, aid, facilitate, promote, encourage, or instigate the perpetrator's commission of that crime.

[If all of these requirements are proved, the defendant does not need to actually have been present when the crime was committed to be guilty as an aider and abettor.]

[If you conclude that defendant was present at the scene of the crime or failed to prevent the crime, you may consider that fact in determining whether the defendant was an aider and abettor. However, the fact that a person is present at the scene of a crime or fails to prevent the crime does not, by itself, make him or her an aider and abettor.]

[A person who aids and abets a crime is not guilty of that crime if he or she withdraws before the crime is committed. To withdraw, a person must do two things:

1. He or she must notify everyone else he or she knows is involved in the commission of the crime that he or she is no longer participating. The notification must be made early enough to prevent the commission of the crime;

**AND**

2. He or she must do everything reasonably within his or her power to prevent the crime from being committed. He or she does not have to actually prevent the crime.

The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not withdraw. If the People have not met this burden, you may not find the defendant guilty under an aiding and abetting theory.]

The People have the burden of proving this allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you must find this allegation has not been proved.

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2006, June 2007, December 2008, February 2012, August 2013, February 2014, February 2016*

## **BENCH NOTES**

### ***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the sentencing factor. (*People v. Sengpadychith* (2001) 26 Cal.4th 316, 327 [109 Cal.Rptr.2d 851, 27 P.3d 739]; *People v. Robles* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1106, 1115 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 120, 5 P.3d 176] [now-repealed Pen. Code, § 12031(a)(2)(C)

incorporates entire substantive gang offense defined in section 186.22(a)]; see *Apprendi v. New Jersey* (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 475–476, 490 [120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435].)

Give this instruction if the defendant is charged under Penal Code section 25400(c)(3) or 25850(c)(3) and the defendant does not stipulate to being an active gang participant. (*People v. Hall* (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 128, 135 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 690].) This instruction **must** be given with the appropriate instruction defining the elements of carrying a concealed firearm, CALCRIM No. 2520, 2521, or 2522, or carrying a loaded firearm, CALCRIM No. 2530. The court must provide the jury with a verdict form on which the jury will indicate if the sentencing factor has been proved.

If the defendant does stipulate that he or she is an active gang participant, this instruction should not be given and that information should not be disclosed to the jury. (See *People v. Hall*, *supra*, 67 Cal.App.4th at p. 135.)

In element 2 of the paragraph defining a “criminal street gang,” insert one or more of the crimes listed in Penal Code section 186.22(e)(1)–(25), (31)–(33) that are alleged to be the primary activities of the gang. (See *People v. Sengpadychith*, *supra*, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 316, 323–324.)

In element 1A of the paragraph defining a “pattern of criminal gang activity,” insert one or more of the crimes listed in Penal Code section 186.22(e) that have been committed, attempted, or solicited two or more times (See *In re Nathaniel C.* (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 990, 1002–1003 [279 Cal.Rptr. 236] [two instances of same offense, or single incident with multiple participants committing one or more specified offenses, are sufficient]) if the alleged crime or crimes are listed in Penal Code section 186.22(e)(1)–(25), (31)–(33). Give on request the bracketed phrase “any combination of” if two or more different crimes are inserted in the blank. If one or more of the alleged crimes are listed in Penal Code section 186.22(e)(26)–(30), give element 1B and insert that crime or crimes and one or more of the crimes listed in Penal Code section 186.22(e)(1)–(25), (31)–(33). (See Pen. Code, § 186.22(j) [“A pattern of gang activity cannot be established solely by proof of commission of offenses enumerated in paragraphs (26) to (30), inclusive, of subdivision (e), alone.”].)

In the definition of “felonious criminal conduct,” insert the felony or felonies the defendant allegedly aided and abetted. (See *People v. Green* (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 692, 704 [278 Cal.Rptr. 140].)

The court should also give the appropriate instructions defining the elements of all crimes inserted in the definition of “criminal street gang,” “pattern of criminal gang activity,” or “felonious criminal conduct.”

Note that a defendant’s misdemeanor conduct in the charged case, which is elevated to a felony by operation of Penal Code section 186.22(a), is not sufficient to satisfy the felonious criminal conduct requirement of an active gang participation offense charged under subdivision (a) of section 186.22 or of active gang participation

charged as an element of felony firearm charges under sections 25400(c)(3) or 25850(c)(3). *People v. Lamas* (2007) 42 Cal.4th 516, 524 [67 Cal.Rptr.3d 179, 169 P.3d 102].

On request, give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “The People do not need to prove that the defendant devoted all or a substantial part of . . . .” (See Pen. Code, § 186.22(i).)

On request, give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “If you find the defendant guilty of a crime in this case.” (*People v. Sengpadychith, supra*, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 322–323; *People v. Duran* (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1448, 1464–1465 [119 Cal.Rptr.2d 272].)

On request, give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “You may not find that there was a pattern of criminal gang activity.” (*People v. Funes* (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1506, 1527–1528 [28 Cal.Rptr.2d 758]; see also Related Issues section to CALCRIM No. 1400, *Active Participation in Criminal Street Gang*.)

On request, the court must give a limiting instruction on the gang evidence. (*People v. Hernandez* (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1040, 1051–1052 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 880, 94 P.3d 1080].) If requested, give CALCRIM No. 1403, *Limited Purpose of Evidence of Gang Activity*.

### ***Defenses—Instructional Duty***

If there is evidence that the defendant was merely present at the scene or only had knowledge that a crime was being committed, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “If you conclude that defendant was present.” (*People v. Boyd* (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 541, 557, fn. 14 [271 Cal.Rptr. 738]; *In re Michael T.* (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 907, 911 [149 Cal.Rptr. 87].)

If there is sufficient evidence that the defendant withdrew, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give the final bracketed section on the defense of withdrawal.

### ***Related Instructions***

CALCRIM No. 1400, *Active Participation in Criminal Street Gang*.

CALCRIM No. 1401, *Felony or Misdemeanor Committed for Benefit of Criminal Street Gang* (Pen. Code, § 186.22(b)(1) (Felony) and § 186.22(d) (Felony or Misdemeanor)).

For additional instructions relating to liability as an aider and abettor, see series 400, Aiding and Abetting.

## **AUTHORITY**

- Factors. Pen. Code, §§ 25400(c)(3), 25850(c)(3) Sentencing Factors, Not Elements. *People v. Hall* (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 128, 135 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 690].
- Elements of Gang Factor. Pen. Code, § 186.22(a); *People v. Robles* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1106, 1115 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 120, 5 P.3d 176].
- Active Participation Defined. Pen. Code, § 186.22(i); *People v. Salcido* (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 356 [56 Cal.Rptr.3d 912]; *People v. Castenada* (2000) 23

Cal.4th 743, 747 [97 Cal.Rptr.2d 906, 3 P.3d 278].

- Criminal Street Gang Defined. Pen. Code, § 186.22(f); see *People v. Duran*, *supra*, 97 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1464–1465.
- Pattern of Criminal Gang Activity Defined. Pen. Code, §§ 186.22(e), (j); *People v. Gardeley* (1996) 14 Cal.4th 605, 624–625 [59 Cal.Rptr.2d 356, 927 P.2d 713]; *In re Nathaniel C.* (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 990, 1002–1003 [279 Cal.Rptr. 236].
- Willfully Assisted, Furthered, or Promoted Felonious Criminal Conduct. *People v. Rodriguez* (2012) 55 Cal.4th 1125, 1132–1138 [150 Cal.Rptr.3d 533, 290 P.3d 1143].
- Crimes Committed After Charged Offense Not Predicates. *People v. Duran*, *supra*, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 1458.
- Proof of Sufficient Connection Among Gang “Subsets” and Umbrella Gang Required. *People v. Prunty* (2015) 62 Cal.4th 59, 81–85 [192 Cal.Rptr.3d 309, 355 P.3d 480].

## RELATED ISSUES

### *Gang Expert Cannot Testify to Defendant’s Knowledge or Intent*

In *People v. Killebrew* (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 644, 658 [126 Cal.Rptr.2d 876], the court held it was error to permit a gang expert to testify that the defendant knew there was a loaded firearm in the vehicle:

[The gang expert] testified to the subjective *knowledge and intent* of each occupant in each vehicle. Such testimony is much different from the *expectations* of gang members in general when confronted with a specific action . . . ¶ . . . [The gang expert] simply informed the jury of his belief of the suspects’ knowledge and intent on the night in question, issues properly reserved to the trier of fact. [The expert’s] beliefs were irrelevant.

(*Ibid.* [emphasis in original].)

See also the Commentary and Related Issues sections of the Bench Notes for CALCRIM No. 1400, *Active Participation in Criminal Street Gang*.

## SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, §§ 31–46, 204, 249–250.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, §§ 144.01[1], 144.03 (Matthew Bender).



**2543. Carrying Firearm: Not in Lawful Possession (Pen. Code, §§ 25400(c)(4), 25850(c)(4))**

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The People have also alleged that the defendant did not lawfully possess the firearm at issue in this case. If you find the defendant guilty of unlawfully (carrying a concealed firearm (on (his/her) person/within a vehicle)[,]/ causing a firearm to be carried concealed within a vehicle[,]/ [or] carrying a loaded firearm) [under Count[s] \_\_\_\_\_], you must then decide whether the People have proved this additional allegation.

To prove this allegation, the People must prove that the defendant did not lawfully possess the firearm.

A person *lawfully possesses a firearm* if he or she either lawfully owns the firearm or has the permission of (the lawful owner/ [or] a person who otherwise has apparent authority over the firearm). A person does not have lawful possession of a firearm if he or she takes it without the permission of the lawful owner or custodian of the firearm.

The People have the burden of proving this allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you must find this allegation has not been proved.

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2012*

**BENCH NOTES**

***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the sentencing factor. (See *Apprendi v. New Jersey* (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 475–476, 490 [120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435].)

Give this instruction if the defendant is charged under Penal Code section 25400(c)(4) or 25850(c)(4) and the defendant does not stipulate to unlawful possession. (*People v. Hall* (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 128, 135 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 690].) This instruction **must** be given with the appropriate instruction defining the elements of carrying a concealed firearm, CALCRIM No. 2520, 2521, or 2522, or carrying a loaded firearm, CALCRIM No. 2530. The court must provide the jury with a verdict form on which the jury will indicate if the sentencing factor has been proved.

If the defendant does stipulate to unlawful possession, this instruction should not be given and that information should not be disclosed to the jury. (See *People v. Hall, supra*, 67 Cal.App.4th at p. 135.)

**AUTHORITY**

- Factors. Pen. Code, §§ 25400(c)(4), 25850(c)(4).
- Factors in Now Repealed Pen. Code, § 12025(b) Sentencing Factors, Not

Elements. *People v. Hall* (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 128, 135 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 690].

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, §§ 203, 204, 249, 250.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.01[1][d] (Matthew Bender).

**2544. Carrying Firearm: Possession of Firearm Prohibited Due to Conviction, Court Order, or Mental Illness (Pen. Code, §§ 25400(c)(4), 25850(c)(4))**

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If you find the defendant guilty of unlawfully (carrying a concealed firearm (on (his/her) person/within a vehicle)[,]/ causing a firearm to be carried concealed within a vehicle[,]/ [or] carrying a loaded firearm) [under Count[s] \_\_\_\_\_], you must then decide whether the People have proved the additional allegation that the defendant was prohibited by law from possessing a firearm.

To prove this allegation, the People must prove that:

*<Alternative 1A—prohibited due to mental illness or SVP status>*

[The defendant \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert description from Welf. & Inst. Code, § 8100 or 8103>*.]

*<Alternatives 1B & 2B—prohibited by court order. Give both elements 1B and 2B in cases involving restraining orders. For probation orders, give only 1B.>*

**[1. A court had ordered that the defendant not (own/ purchase/ receive/possess) a firearm(;/.)]**

**[AND**

**2. The defendant knew about the court’s order.]**

*<Alternatives 1C & 2C—prohibited due to conviction. Give both elements 1C and 2C in cases involving misdemeanor convictions or juvenile findings. For all other cases involving prior convictions, give 1C only.>*

**[1. The defendant had previously been convicted of (a felony/two offenses of brandishing a firearm/the crime of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert misdemeanor offense from Pen. Code, § 29805 or 23515, or a juvenile finding from Pen. Code, § 29820(a)(2)>*)(;/.)]**

**[AND**

**2. (The previous conviction was within 10 years of the date the defendant (carried the firearm/caused the firearm to be carried concealed in a vehicle)./The defendant was less than 30 years old at the time (he/she) (carried the firearm/caused the firearm to be carried concealed in a vehicle).)]**

**[A juvenile court finding is the same as a conviction.]**

**[A conviction of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of offense from other state or federal offense>* is the same as a conviction for a felony.]**

**[You may consider evidence, if any, that (the defendant was previously**

convicted of a crime/a court ordered the defendant not to (own[,]/ purchase[,]/ receive[,]/ [or] possess) a firearm) only in deciding whether the People have proved this allegation [or for the limited purpose of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert other permitted purpose, e.g., assessing defendant's credibility>]. Do not consider such evidence for any other purpose.]

**The People have the burden of proving this allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you must find this allegation has not been proved.**

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*New January 2006; Revised June 2007, February 2012*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the sentencing factor. (See *Apprendi v. New Jersey* (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 475–476, 490 [120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435].)

Give this instruction if the defendant is charged under Penal Code section 25400(c)(4) or 25850(c)(4) and the defendant does not stipulate that he or she is prohibited from possessing a firearm. (*People v. Hall* (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 128, 135 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 690].) This instruction **must** be given with the appropriate instruction defining the elements of carrying a concealed firearm, CALCRIM No. 2521, 2522, or carrying a loaded firearm, CALCRIM No. 2530. The court must provide the jury with a verdict form on which the jury will indicate if the sentencing factor has been proved.

If the defendant does stipulate that he or she is prohibited from possessing a firearm, this instruction should not be given and that information should not be disclosed to the jury unless the court admits the information as otherwise relevant. (See *People v. Hall, supra*, 67 Cal.App.4th at p. 135.)

When giving alternative 1B, only give element 2B if the prosecution alleges that the defendant was prohibited from possessing a firearm under Penal Code section 29825(a), (b).

When giving alternative 1C, only give element 2C if the prosecution alleges that the defendant was prohibited from possessing a firearm under Penal Code section 29805, possession within ten years of a specified misdemeanor conviction, or Penal Code section 29820(a), (b), possession by someone under 30 years old with a specified juvenile finding.

On request, the court should give the limiting instruction regarding the evidence of the prior conviction that begins, “You may consider . . . .” (*People v. Valentine* (1986) 42 Cal.3d 170, 182, fn. 7 [228 Cal.Rptr. 25, 720 P.2d 913].) There is no sua sponte duty to give the limiting instruction, and the defense may prefer that no limiting instruction be given. (*People v. Griggs* (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1139 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 380].)

**AUTHORITY**

- Factors. Pen. Code, §§ 25400(c)(4), 25850(c)(4) Sentencing Factors, Not Elements. *People v. Hall* (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 128, 135 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 690].
- Limiting Instruction on Prior Conviction. *People v. Valentine* (1986) 42 Cal.3d 170, 182, fn. 7 [228 Cal.Rptr. 25, 720 P.2d 913]; *People v. Griggs* (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1139 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 380].

**RELATED ISSUES**

See Related Issues section of Bench Notes for CALCRIM No. 2510, *Possession of Firearm by Person Prohibited Due to Conviction—No Stipulation to Conviction*.

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, §§ 203, 204, 249, 250.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.01[1][d] (Matthew Bender).

## 2545. Carrying Loaded Firearm: Not Registered Owner (Pen. Code, § 25850(c)(6))

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If you find the defendant guilty of unlawfully carrying a loaded firearm [under Count \_\_\_\_\_], you must then decide whether the People have proved the additional allegation that the defendant was not the registered owner of the firearm.

To prove this allegation, the People must prove that the defendant is not listed with the Department of Justice as the registered owner of the firearm.

The People have the burden of proving this allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you must find this allegation has not been proved.

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2012*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the sentencing factor. (See *Apprendi v. New Jersey* (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 475–476, 490 [120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435].)

Give this instruction if the defendant is charged under Penal Code section 25850(c)(6) and the defendant does not stipulate that he or she was not the registered owner. (*People v. Hall* (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 128, 135 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 690].) This instruction **must** be given with the appropriate instruction defining the elements of carrying a loaded firearm, CALCRIM No. 2530. The court must provide the jury with a verdict form on which the jury will indicate if the sentencing factor has been proved.

If the defendant does stipulate that he or she was not the registered owner, this instruction should not be given and that information should not be disclosed to the jury. (See *People v. Hall, supra*, 67 Cal.App.4th at p. 135.)

### AUTHORITY

- Factors. Pen. Code, § 25850(c)(6) Sentencing Factors, Not Elements. *People v. Hall* (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 128, 135 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 690].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, §§ 203, 204, 249, 250.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.01[1][d] (Matthew Bender).

## 2546. Carrying Concealed Firearm: Not Registered Owner and Weapon Loaded (Pen. Code, § 25400(c)(6))

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If you find the defendant guilty of unlawfully (carrying a concealed firearm (on (his/her) person/within a vehicle)/causing a firearm to be carried concealed within a vehicle) [under Count[s] \_\_\_\_\_], you must then decide whether the People have proved the additional allegation that the defendant was not the registered owner of the firearm and (the firearm was loaded/the defendant possessed the firearm with ammunition).

To prove this allegation, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant is not listed with the Department of Justice as the registered owner of the firearm;

AND

<Alternative 2A—firearm loaded>

- [2. The firearm was loaded.]

<Alternative 2B—ammunition nearby>

- [2. The firearm and unexpended ammunition capable of being discharged from that firearm were either in the defendant's immediate possession or readily accessible to (him/her).]

The People have the burden of proving this allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you must find this allegation has not been proved.

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2012*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the sentencing factor. (See *Apprendi v. New Jersey* (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 475–476, 490 [120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435].)

Give this instruction if the defendant is charged under Penal Code section 25400(c)(6) and the defendant does not stipulate that the firearm was loaded or possessed with ammunition and that he or she was not the registered owner. (*People v. Hall* (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 128, 135 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 690].) This instruction **must** be given with the appropriate instruction defining the elements of carrying a concealed firearm, CALCRIM No. 2520, 2521, or 2522. The court must provide the jury with a verdict form on which the jury will indicate if the sentencing factor has been proved.

If the defendant does stipulate to this sentencing factor, this instruction should not be given and that information should not be disclosed to the jury. (See *People v. Hall*, *supra*, 67 Cal.App.4th at p. 135.)

### AUTHORITY

- Factors. Pen. Code, § 25400(c) Sentencing Factors, Not Elements. *People v. Hall* (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 128, 135 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 690].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, §§ 203, 204, 249, 250.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.01[1][d] (Matthew Bender).

**2547–2559. Reserved for Future Use**



## D. ASSAULT WEAPONS

### 2560. Possession, etc., of Assault Weapon or .50 BMG Rifle (Pen. Code, §§ 30605, 30600)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with unlawfully (possessing/manufacturing/causing to be manufactured/distributing/transporting/importing/keeping for sale/offering or exposing for sale/giving/lending) (an assault weapon, specifically [a/an] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert type of weapon from Pen. Code, § 30510 or description from § 30515>/a **.50 BMG rifle**) [in violation of Penal Code section \_\_\_\_\_ <insert relevant Penal Code section>].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant (possessed/manufactured/caused to be manufactured/distributed/transported/imported/kept for sale/offered or exposed for sale/gave/lent) (an assault weapon, specifically [a/an] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert type of weapon from Pen. Code, § 30510 or description from § 30515>/a **.50 BMG rifle**);
2. The defendant knew that (he/she) (possessed/manufactured/caused to be manufactured/distributed/transported/imported/kept for sale/offered or exposed for sale/gave/lent) it;

AND

3. The defendant knew or reasonably should have known that it had characteristics that made it (an assault weapon/a **.50 BMG rifle**).

[(A/An) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert type of weapon from Pen. Code, § 30510 or description from § 30515> is an **assault weapon**.]

[A **.50 BMG rifle** is a center fire rifle that can fire a **.50 BMG cartridge** [and that is not an assault weapon or a machine gun]. A **.50 BMG cartridge** is a cartridge that is designed and intended to be fired from a center fire rifle and that has all three of the following characteristics:

1. The overall length is 5.54 inches from the base of the cartridge to the tip of the bullet;
2. The bullet diameter for the cartridge is from .510 to, and including, .511 inch;

AND

3. The case base diameter for the cartridge is from .800 inch to, and including, .804 inch.]

[Two or more people may possess something at the same time.]

[A person does not have to actually hold or touch something to possess it. It is enough if the person has (control over it/ [or] the right to control it), either personally or through another person.]

[The People allege that the defendant (possessed/manufactured/caused to be manufactured/distributed/transported/imported/kept for sale/offered or exposed for sale/gave/lent) the following weapons: \_\_\_\_\_  
*<insert description of each weapon when multiple items alleged>*. You may not find the defendant guilty unless all of you agree that the People have proved that the defendant (possessed/manufactured/caused to be manufactured/distributed/transported/imported/kept for sale/offered or exposed for sale/gave/lent) at least one of these weapons, and you all agree on which weapon (he/she) (possessed/manufactured/caused to be manufactured/distributed/transported/imported/kept for sale/offered or exposed for sale/gave/lent).]

*<Defense: Permit, Registration, or Exemption From Statute>*

[The defendant did not unlawfully (possess/manufacture/cause to be manufactured/distribute/transport/import/keep for sale/offer or expose for sale/give/lend) (an assault weapon/a .50 BMG rifle) if (he/she) (had registered the weapon/had a valid permit to (possess/manufacture/sell) the weapon/ \_\_\_\_\_*<insert exemption from Pen. Code, §§ 30625, 30630(a)–(c), 30635, 30640, 30645, 30655(a), (b), 30660(a)–(c), 30665, 30670(a), (b), 30675(a)–(c)>*). The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not (register the weapon/have a valid permit to (possess/manufacture/sell) the weapon/ \_\_\_\_\_*<insert exemption from Pen. Code, §§ 30625, 30630(a)–(c), 30635, 30640, 30645, 30655(a), (b), 30660(a)–(c), 30665, 30670(a), (b), 30675(a)–(c)>*). If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of this crime.]

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2006, February 2012*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If the prosecution alleges under a single count that the defendant possessed multiple weapons and the possession was “fragmented as to time . . . [or] space,” the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on unanimity. (See *People v. Wolfe* (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 177, 184–185 [7 Cal.Rptr.3d 483].) Give the bracketed paragraph that begins, “The People allege that the defendant possessed the following weapons,” inserting the items alleged. But see Pen. Code, § 30600(c), which states that except

in case of a first violation involving not more than two firearms, if more than one assault weapon or .50 BMG rifle is involved in any violation of this section, there shall be a distinct and separate offense for each.

The jury must decide if the weapon possessed was an assault weapon or a .50 BMG rifle. (See *People v. Flood* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 482 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180, 957 P.2d 869].) When instructing on the definition of assault weapon or .50 BMG rifle, the court should not state that the weapon possessed by the defendant was an assault weapon or was a .50 BMG rifle. In the case of an assault weapon, where indicated in the instruction, the court may insert a weapon listed in Penal Code section 30510 or a description of a weapon from section 30515. In the case of a .50 BMG rifle, give the bracketed definition of that term.

If the defendant is charged with both a separate count and an enhancement for violating Penal Code section 30615 while committing another crime, give this instruction and CALCRIM No. 2561, *Possession, etc., of Assault or .50 BMG Rifle Weapon While Committing Other Offense: Pen. Code, § 30615—Enhancement of Punishment for Another Crime* (Pen. Code, § 30615; *People v. Jimenez* (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 391, 398 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 281].) If the defendant is only charged with an enhancement under Penal Code section 30615 and not with a separate count for violating Penal Code section(s) 30605 or 30610, give only CALCRIM No. 2562, *Possession, etc., of Assault Weapon or .50 BMG Rifle While Committing Other Offense: Pen. Code, § 30615—Charged Only as Enhancement*.

#### ***Defenses—Instructional Duty***

Registration and permitting procedures are contained in Penal Code sections 30900 to 31005. Exemptions to the statute are stated in Penal Code section 30625 et seq. The existence of a statutory exemption is an affirmative defense. (*People v. Jimenez, supra*, 8 Cal.App.4th at pp. 395–397.) If the defense presents sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt about the existence of a legal basis for his or her actions, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give the bracketed instruction on the defense. (See *People v. Mower* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 478–481 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067] [discussing affirmative defenses generally and the burden of proof].) Insert the appropriate language in the bracketed paragraph that begins, “The defendant did not unlawfully . . . .”

### **AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 30605, 30600.
- Assault Weapon Defined. Pen. Code §§ 30510, 30515; see also *Harrott v. County of Kings* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1138, 1142–1145 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 445, 25 P.3d 649] [discussing statutory definition of assault weapon, amendments to statute and petition procedure by which the Attorney General may have weapon listed].
- .50 BMG Rifle Defined. Pen. Code, § 30530.
- Permits and Registration. Pen. Code, §§ 30900–31005.
- Exemptions. Pen. Code, § 30625 et seq.

- Knowledge Required. *In re Jorge M.* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 866, 887 [98 Cal.Rptr.2d 466, 4 P.3d 297].
- Permits, Registration, and Exemptions Are Affirmative Defenses. *People v. Jimenez* (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 391, 395–397 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 281].
- Constructive vs. Actual Possession. *People v. Azevedo* (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 235, 242–243 [207 Cal.Rptr. 270], questioned on other grounds in *In re Jorge M.* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 866, 876, fn. 6 [98 Cal.Rptr.2d 466, 4 P.3d 297].
- Statute Constitutional. *Silveira v. Lockyer* (2002) 312 F.3d 1052, 1056; *Kasler v. Lockyer* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 472, 478 [97 Cal.Rptr.2d 334, 2 P.3d 581].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, §§ 216–219, 220–222.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.02[2][a][i] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.01[1][b], [d] (Matthew Bender).

**2561. Possession, etc., of Assault Weapon or .50 BMG Rifle While Committing Other Offense—Charged as Separate Count and as Enhancement (Pen. Code, § 30615)**

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If you find the defendant guilty of both (possessing/manufacturing/ causing to be manufactured/distributing/transporting/importing/keeping for sale/offering or exposing for sale/giving/lending) (an assault weapon/a .50 BMG rifle) under Count \_\_\_\_\_ and the crime of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert other offense alleged> under Count \_\_\_\_\_, you must then decide whether the People have proved the additional allegation that (he/she) committed the first crime while committing the second one.

To prove this allegation, the People must prove that the defendant (possessed/ manufactured/ caused to be manufactured/distributed/ transported/imported/kept for sale/offered or exposed for sale/gave/lent) (an assault weapon/a .50 BMG rifle) while committing the crime of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert other offense alleged>.

The People have the burden of proving this allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you must find this allegation has not been proved.

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2012*

**BENCH NOTES**

***Instructional Duty***

The court has a  **sua sponte**  duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the enhancement. (See *Apprendi v. New Jersey* (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 475–476, 490 [120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435]; *People v. Jimenez* (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 391, 398 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 281] [enhancement under Pen. Code, § 30600(b) must be pleaded and proved].)

Give this instruction if the defendant is charged with a separate count for violating Penal Code section 30615 and an enhancement for violating Penal Code section 30600 while committing another crime. (Pen. Code, § 30615; *People v. Jimenez, supra*, 8 Cal.App.4th at p. 398.) This instruction  **must**  be given with CALCRIM No. 2560, *Possession, etc., of Assault Weapon or .50 BMG Rifle*, and the appropriate instruction defining the elements of the other offense charged.

The court must provide the jury with a verdict form on which the jury will indicate if the sentencing enhancement has been proved.

If the defendant is not charged with a separate count for violating Penal Code section 30600 but is charged only with the enhancement, do not give this instruction. Give CALCRIM No. 2562, *Possession, etc., of Assault Weapon or .50*

*BMG Rifle While Committing Other Offense: Pen. Code, § 30600—Charged Only as Enhancement.*

### AUTHORITY

- Enhancement. Pen. Code, § 30615; *People v. Jimenez* (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 391, 398 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 281].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, §§ 216–219, 220–222.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.01[1][b] (Matthew Bender).

**2562. Possession, etc., of Assault Weapon or .50 BMG Rifle While Committing Other Offense—Charged Only as Enhancement (Pen. Code, § 30615)**

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If you find the defendant guilty of the crime of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert other offense alleged>* [under Count \_\_\_\_\_], you must then decide whether the People have proved the additional allegation that (he/she) committed that offense while unlawfully (possessing/manufacturing/causing to be manufactured/distributing/ transporting/importing/keeping for sale/offering or exposing for sale/giving/lending) (an assault weapon, specifically [a/an] \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert type of weapon from Pen. Code, § 30510 or description from § 30515>*/a **.50 BMG rifle**).

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant (possessed/manufactured/caused to be manufactured/distributed/transported/imported/kept for sale/offered or exposed for sale/gave/lent) (an assault weapon, specifically [a/an] \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert type of weapon from Pen. Code, § 30510 or description from § 30515>*/a **.50 BMG rifle**);
2. The defendant knew that (he/she) (possessed/manufactured/caused to be manufactured/distributed/transported/ imported/kept for sale/offered or exposed for sale/gave/lent) it;
3. The defendant knew or reasonably should have known that it had characteristics that made it (an assault weapon/a **.50 BMG rifle**);

**AND**

4. The defendant (possessed/manufactured/caused to be manufactured/distributed/transported/imported/kept for sale/offered or exposed for sale/gave/lent) the weapon while committing the crime of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert other offense alleged>*.

[(A/An) \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert type of weapon from Pen. Code, § 30510 or description from § 30515>* is an **assault weapon**.]

[A **.50 BMG rifle** is a center fire rifle that can fire a **.50 BMG cartridge** [and that is not an assault weapon or a machine gun]. A **.50 BMG cartridge** is a cartridge that is designed and intended to be fired from a center fire rifle and that has all three of the following characteristics:

1. The overall length is 5.54 inches from the base to the tip of the bullet;
2. The bullet diameter for the cartridge is from **.510** to, and including, **.511** inch;

AND

3. The case base diameter for the cartridge is from .800 inch to, and including, .804 inch.]

[Two or more people may possess something at the same time.]

[A person does not have to actually hold or touch something to possess it. It is enough if the person has (control over it/ [or] the right to control it), either personally or through another person.]

[The People allege that the defendant (possessed/manufactured/caused to be manufactured/distributed/transported/imported/kept for sale/offered or exposed for sale/gave/lent) the following weapons: \_\_\_\_\_  
<insert description of each weapon when multiple items alleged>. You may not find this additional allegation true unless all of you agree that the People have proved that the defendant (possessed/manufactured/caused to be manufactured/distributed/transported/imported/kept for sale/offered or exposed for sale/gave/lent) at least one of these weapons, and you all agree on which weapon (he/she) (possessed/manufactured/caused to be manufactured/distributed/transported/imported/kept for sale/offered or exposed for sale/gave/lent).]

The People have the burden of proving this allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you must find this allegation has not been proved.

<Defense: Permit, Registration, or Exemption From Statute>

[The defendant did not unlawfully (possess/manufacture/cause to be manufactured/distribute/transport/import/keep for sale/offer or expose for sale/give/lend) (an assault weapon/a .50 BMG rifle) if (he/she) (had registered the weapon/had a valid permit to (possess/manufacture/sell) the weapon/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert exemption from Pen. Code, § 12280(e)-(s)>). The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not (register the weapon/have a valid permit to (possess/manufacture/sell) the weapon/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert exemption from Pen. Code, §§ 30625, 30630(a)-(c), 30635, 30640, 30645, 30655(a), (b), 30660(a)-(c), 30665, 30670(a), (b), 30675(a)-(c)>). If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of this allegation.]

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2006, February 2012*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the enhancement. (See *Apprendi v. New Jersey* (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 475–476, 490 [120



S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435] [any fact, other than prior conviction, that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged, submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt]; *People v. Jimenez* (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 391, 398 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 281] [enhancement under Pen. Code, § 30600(b) must be pleaded and proved].)

Give this instruction if the defendant is charged with an enhancement for violating Penal Code section 12280 while committing another crime but is not charged with a separate count for violating Penal Code section 30600. (Pen. Code, § 30615; *People v. Jimenez, supra*, 8 Cal.App.4th at p. 398.) The court must provide the jury with a verdict form on which the jury will indicate if the sentencing enhancement has or has not been proved.

If the defendant has been charged with a separate count for violating Penal Code section 30600 and with the enhancement, do not give this instruction. Give CALCRIM No. 2561, *Possession, etc., of Assault Weapon or .50 BMG Rifle While Committing Other Offense: Pen. Code, § 30615—Charged as Separate Count and as Enhancement*.

If the prosecution alleges under a single enhancement that the defendant possessed multiple weapons and the possession was “fragmented as to time . . . [or] space,” the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on unanimity. (See *People v. Wolfe* (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 177, 184–185 [7 Cal.Rptr.3d 483].) Give the bracketed paragraph that begins, “The People allege that the defendant possessed the following weapons,” inserting the items alleged. But see Pen. Code, § 30600(c), which states that except in case of a first violation involving not more than two firearms, if more than one assault weapon or .50 BMG rifle is involved in any violation of this section, there shall be a distinct and separate offense for each.

The jury must decide if the weapon possessed was an assault weapon or .50 BMG rifle. (See *People v. Flood* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 482 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180, 957 P.2d 869].) When instructing on the definition of assault weapon or .50 BMG rifle, the court should not state that the weapon possessed by the defendant was an assault weapon or was a .50 BMG rifle. In the case of an assault weapon, where indicated in the instruction, the court may insert a weapon listed in Penal Code section 30510 or a description of a weapon from section 30515. In the case of a .50 BMG rifle, give the bracketed definition of that term.

### ***Defenses—Instructional Duty***

Registration and permitting procedures are contained in Penal Code sections 30900 to 31005. Exemptions to the statute are stated in Penal Code section 30625 et seq. The existence of a statutory exemption is an affirmative defense. (*People v. Jimenez, supra*, 8 Cal.App.4th at pp. 395–397.) If the defense presents sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt about the existence of a legal basis for the defendant’s actions, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give the bracketed instruction on the defense. (See *People v. Mower* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 478–481 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067] [discussing affirmative defenses generally and the burden of

proof].) Insert the appropriate language in the bracketed paragraph beginning, “The defendant did not unlawfully . . . .”

### AUTHORITY

- Enhancement. Pen. Code, § 30615; *People v. Jimenez* (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 391, 398 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 281].
- Assault Weapon Defined. Pen. Code, §§ 30510, 30515; see also *Harrott v. County of Kings* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1138, 1142–1145 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 445, 25 P.3d 649] [discussing statutory definition of assault weapon, amendments to statute and petition procedure by which the Attorney General may have weapon listed].
- .50 BMG Rifle Defined. Pen. Code, § 30530.
- Permits and Registration. Pen. Code, §§ 30900–31005.
- Exemptions. Pen. Code, § 30625 et seq.
- Knowledge Required. *In re Jorge M.* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 866, 887 [98 Cal.Rptr.2d 466, 4 P.3d 297].
- Permits, Registration, and Exemptions Are Affirmative Defenses. *People v. Jimenez* (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 391, 395–397 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 281].
- Constructive vs. Actual Possession. *People v. Azevedo* (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 235, 242–243 [207 Cal.Rptr. 270], questioned on other grounds in *In re Jorge M.* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 866, 876, fn. 6 [98 Cal.Rptr.2d 466, 4 P.3d 297].
- Statute Constitutional. *Silveira v. Lockyer* (2002) 312 F.3d 1052, 1056; *Kasler v. Lockyer* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 472, 478 [97 Cal.Rptr.2d 334, 2 P.3d 581].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, §§ 216–219, 220–222.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.01[1][b] (Matthew Bender).

**2563–2569. Reserved for Future Use**

## E. EXPLOSIVES AND DESTRUCTIVE DEVICES

### 2570. Possession of Destructive Device (Pen. Code, § 18710)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with unlawfully possessing a destructive device [in violation of Penal Code section 18710].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant possessed a destructive device;
2. The defendant knew (he/she) possessed it;

AND

3. The defendant knew that what (he/she) possessed was a destructive device.

[A *destructive device* is \_\_\_\_\_ <insert definition from Pen. Code, § 16460>.]

[\_\_\_\_\_ <insert type of destructive device from Pen. Code, § 16460> is a *destructive device*.]

[The term *destructive device* is defined in another instruction.]

[Two or more people may possess something at the same time.]

[A person does not have to actually hold or touch something to possess it. It is enough if the person has (control over it/ [or] the right to control it), either personally or through another person.]

[The People allege that the defendant possessed the following destructive devices: \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of each destructive device when multiple devices alleged>. You may not find the defendant guilty unless all of you agree that the People have proved that the defendant possessed at least one of the alleged devices, and you all agree on which alleged device (he/she) possessed.]

<Defense: Permit>

[The defendant did not unlawfully possess a destructive device if (he/she) had a valid permit to do so. The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not have a valid permit. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of this crime.]

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If the prosecution alleges under a single count that the defendant possessed multiple items, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on unanimity. (*People v. Heideman* (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 321, 333 [130 Cal.Rptr. 349].) Give the bracketed paragraph that begins, “The People allege that the defendant possessed the following destructive devices,” inserting the items alleged.

Give the bracketed definition of “destructive device,” inserting the appropriate definition from Penal Code section 16460, unless the court has already given the definition in other instructions. In such cases, the court may give the bracketed sentence stating that the term is defined elsewhere. If the case involves a specific device listed in Penal Code section 16460, the court may instead give the bracketed sentence stating that the listed item “is a destructive device.” For example, “A grenade is a destructive device.” However, the court may not instruct the jury that the defendant used a destructive device. For example, the court may not state that “the defendant used a destructive device, a grenade,” or “the device used by the defendant, a grenade, was a destructive device.” (*People v. Dimitrov* (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 18, 25–26 [39 Cal.Rptr.2d 257].)

If the device used is a bomb, the court may insert the word “bomb” in the bracketed definition of destructive device without further definition. (*People v. Dimitrov, supra*, 33 Cal.App.4th at p. 25.) Appellate courts have held that the term “bomb” is not vague and is understood in its “common, accepted, and popular sense.” (*People v. Quinn* (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 251, 258 [129 Cal.Rptr. 139]; *People v. Dimitrov, supra*, 33 Cal.App.4th at p. 25.) If the court wishes to define the term “bomb,” the court may use the following definition: “A bomb is a device carrying an explosive charge fused to blow up or detonate under certain conditions.” (See *People v. Morse* (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 620, 647, fn. 8 [3 Cal.Rptr.2d 343].)

### *Defenses—Instructional Duty*

Penal Code section 18900 allows for the possession of a destructive device with a permit. The existence of a valid permit is an affirmative defense. (*People v. Yoshimura* (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 609, 627–629 [154 Cal.Rptr. 314].) The defendant bears the burden of producing evidence of a valid permit. If there is sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt about the existence of a permit, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give the bracketed instruction on the defense. (See *People v. Mower* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 478–481 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067] [discussing affirmative defenses generally and the burden of proof].)

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 18710.
- Destructive Device Defined. Pen. Code, § 16460.
- Permit Exemption. Pen. Code, § 18900; *People v. Yoshimura* (1979) 91

Cal.App.3d 609, 627–628 [154 Cal.Rptr. 314].

- Knowledge. See *People v. Rubalcava* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 322, 331–332 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 735, 1 P.3d 52]; *In re Jorge M.* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 866, 887 [98 Cal.Rptr.2d 466, 4 P.3d 297]; *People v. Yoshimura* (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 609, 629 [154 Cal.Rptr. 314].
- Constructive vs. Actual Possession. See *People v. Azevedo* (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 235, 242–243 [207 Cal.Rptr. 270], questioned on other grounds in *In re Jorge M.* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 866, 876, fn. 6 [98 Cal.Rptr.2d 466, 4 P.3d 297]; *People v. Yoshimura* (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 609, 619 [154 Cal.Rptr. 314].

## RELATED ISSUES

### *Tracer Ammunition*

Penal Code section 16460(a)(1) states that “destructive device” includes “that which is commonly known as tracer or incendiary ammunition, except tracer ammunition manufactured for use in shotguns.” In *People v. Miller* (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 190, 213 [81 Cal.Rptr.2d 410], the court held that “proof of the purpose for which tracer ammunition was manufactured is an affirmative defense to the charge of possessing a destructive device, and not an element of the offense.”

## SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, §§ 225–226, 227.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.01[1][c] (Matthew Bender).

**2571. Carrying or Placing Explosive or Destructive Device on  
Common Carrier (Pen. Code, § 18725)**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with (carrying/ [or] placing) (an explosive/ [or] a destructive device) on (a/an) (common carrier/boat/ plane/car/bus/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert type of other vehicle>) that transports paying passengers [in violation of Penal Code section 18725].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

<Alternative 1A—carried or placed on common carrier>

- [1. The defendant willfully (carried/ [or] placed) (an explosive/ [or] a destructive device) on (a/an) (common carrier/boat/plane/car/bus/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert type of other vehicle>) that transports paying passengers;]

<Alternative 1B—carried or placed in baggage while on common carrier>

- [1. The defendant willfully (carried/ [or] placed) (an explosive/ [or] a destructive device) in (hand baggage[,]/ a roll[,]/ (or another/a) container) while on board (a/an) (common carrier/boat/plane/car/ bus/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert type of other vehicle>) that transports paying passengers;]

<Alternative 1C—placed in baggage to be checked on common carrier>

- [1. The defendant willfully placed (an explosive/ [or] a destructive device) in baggage that was later checked with a common carrier;]

AND

2. The defendant knew that the object that (he/she) (carried/ [or] placed) was (an explosive/ [or] a destructive device).

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose. It is not required that he or she intend to break the law, hurt someone else, or gain any advantage.

[An *explosive* is any substance, or combination of substances, (1) whose main or common purpose is to detonate or rapidly combust and (2) which is capable of a relatively instantaneous or rapid release of gas and heat.]

[An *explosive* is also any substance whose main purpose is to be combined with other substances to create a new substance that can release gas and heat rapidly or relatively instantaneously.]

[\_\_\_\_\_ <insert type of explosive from Health & Saf. Code, § 16460> **is an explosive.**]

[A **destructive device** is \_\_\_\_\_ <insert definition from Pen. Code, § 16460>.]

[\_\_\_\_\_ <insert type of destructive device from Pen. Code, § 16460> **is a destructive device.**]

[The term[s] (*explosive/ [and] destructive device*) (is/are) defined in another instruction.]

[A **common carrier** is a person or business that publicly offers to carry persons, property, or messages. [A person or business that publicly offers to carry only telegraphic messages is not a common carrier.]]

[\_\_\_\_\_ <insert type or name of common carrier> **is a common carrier.**]

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2012*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

Depending on the device or substance used, give the bracketed definitions of “explosive” or “destructive device,” inserting the appropriate definition from Penal Code section 16460, unless the court has already given the definition in other instructions. In such cases, the court may give the bracketed sentence stating that the term is defined elsewhere. If the case involves a specific device listed in Health and Safety Code section 12000 or Penal Code section 16460, the court may instead give the bracketed sentence stating that the listed item “is an explosive” or “is a destructive device.” For example, “A grenade is a destructive device.” However, the court may not instruct the jury that the defendant used a destructive device. For example, the court may not state that “the defendant used a destructive device, a grenade,” or “the device used by the defendant, a grenade, was a destructive device.” (*People v. Dimitrov* (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 18, 25–26 [39 Cal.Rptr.2d 257].)

Similarly, in the definition of “common carrier,” the court may instruct generally that a type of vehicle is a common carrier. For example, “a Greyhound bus is a common carrier.” The court may not instruct that the particular vehicle in the case was a common carrier. For example, the court may not instruct that “the defendant was on a common carrier, a Greyhound bus,” or “the vehicle in this case, a Greyhound bus, is a common carrier.”

If the device used is a bomb, the court may insert the word “bomb” in the bracketed definition of destructive device without further definition. (*People v. Dimitrov, supra*,



33 Cal.App.4th at p. 25.) Appellate courts have held that the term “bomb” is not vague and is understood in its “common, accepted, and popular sense.” (*People v. Quinn* (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 251, 258 [129 Cal.Rptr. 139]; *People v. Dimitrov, supra*, 33 Cal.App.4th at p. 25.) If the court wishes to define the term “bomb,” the court may use the following definition: “A bomb is a device carrying an explosive charge fused to blow up or detonate under certain conditions.” (See *People v. Morse* (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 620, 647, fn. 8 [3 Cal.Rptr.2d 343].)

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 18725.
- Explosive Defined. Health & Saf. Code, § 12000.
- Destructive Device Defined. Pen. Code, § 16460.
- Knowledge. See *People v. Rubalcava* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 322, 331–332 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 735, 1 P.3d 52]; *In re Jorge M.* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 866, 887 [98 Cal.Rptr.2d 466, 4 P.3d 297]; *People v. Yoshimura* (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 609, 619 [154 Cal.Rptr. 314].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Possession of Destructive Device. Pen. Code, § 18710.

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Gasoline Not an Explosive*

“Under the statutory definition of explosive, the nature of the substance, not the manner in which a substance is used, is determinative.” (*People v. Clark* (1990) 50 Cal.3d 583, 604 [268 Cal.Rptr. 399, 789 P.2d 127] [gasoline, by its nature, not an explosive even where used to ignite a fire].)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, §§ 225–226, 227.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.01[1][c] (Matthew Bender).



## 2572. Possession of Explosive or Destructive Device in Specified Place (Pen. Code, § 18715)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with recklessly or maliciously possessing (an explosive/ [or] a destructive device) (in[,]/ on[,]/ [or] near) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert type of place alleged from Pen. Code, § 18715> [in violation of Penal Code section 18715].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant recklessly or maliciously possessed (an explosive/ [or] a destructive device);

AND

2. At the time the defendant possessed the (substance/ [or] device), (he/she) was

<2A.>

[on a public street or highway];([ or]/.)

<2B.>

[in or near a (theater[,]/ hall[,]/ school[,]/ college[,]/ church[,]/ hotel[,]/ [or] other public building/ [or] private habitation);([ or]/.)

<2C.>

[in, on, or near a (plane[,]/ passenger train[,]/ car[,]/ cable road or cable car[,]/ boat carrying paying passengers)];( or/.)

<2D.>

[in, on, or near another public place ordinarily passed by human beings].

A person acts *recklessly* when (1) he or she is aware that his or her actions present a substantial and unjustifiable risk, (2) he or she ignores that risk, and (3) the person's behavior is grossly different from what a reasonable person would have done in the same situation.

Someone acts *maliciously* when he or she intentionally does a wrongful act or when he or she acts with the unlawful intent to annoy or injure someone else.

[An *explosive* is any substance, or combination of substances, (1) whose main or common purpose is to detonate or rapidly combust and (2) which is capable of a relatively instantaneous or rapid release of gas and heat.]

[An *explosive* is also any substance whose main purpose is to be combined with other substances to create a new substance that can release gas and heat rapidly or relatively instantaneously.]

[\_\_\_\_\_ <insert type of explosive from Health & Saf. Code, § 12000> is an *explosive*.]

[A *destructive device* is \_\_\_\_\_ <insert definition from Pen. Code, § 16460>.]

[\_\_\_\_\_ <insert type of destructive device from Pen. Code, § 16460> is a *destructive device*.]

[The term[s] (*explosive*/ [and] *destructive device*) (is/are) defined in another instruction.]

[The People do not need to prove that the (*explosive*/ [or] *destructive device*) was set to explode.]

[Two or more people may possess something at the same time.]

[A person does not have to actually hold or touch something to possess it. It is enough if the person has (control over it/ [or] the right to control it), either personally or through another person.]

[The People allege that the defendant possessed the following (*explosive*[s]/ [or] *destructive device*[s]): \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of each explosive or destructive device when multiple items alleged>. **You may not find the defendant guilty unless all of you agree that the People have proved that the defendant possessed at least one of the alleged items and you all agree on which alleged item (he/she) possessed.**]

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2012, September 2019*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If the prosecution alleges under a single count that the defendant possessed multiple items, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on unanimity. (*People v. Heideman* (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 321, 333 [130 Cal.Rptr. 349].) Give the bracketed paragraph that begins, “The People allege that the defendant possessed the following,” inserting the items alleged. The jury does not have to be unanimous about whether the defendant acted recklessly or maliciously. (*Ibid.*) The jury also does not have to agree on whether the item was an explosive or a destructive device. (*People v. Westoby* (1976) 63 Cal.App.3d 790, 797 [134 Cal.Rptr. 97]; see also *People v. Quinn*, (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 251, 257 [129 Cal.Rptr. 139] [a bomb may be an explosive and may be a destructive device].)

Depending on the device or substance used, give the bracketed definitions of “explosive” or “destructive device,” inserting the appropriate definition from Penal Code section 16460, unless the court has already given the definition in other instructions. In such cases, the court may give the bracketed sentence stating that the term is defined elsewhere. If the case involves a specific device listed in Health and Safety Code section 12000 or Penal Code section 16460, the court may instead give the bracketed sentence stating that the listed item “is an explosive” or “is a destructive device.” For example, “A grenade is a destructive device.” However, the court may not instruct the jury that the defendant used a destructive device. For example, the court may not state that “the defendant used a destructive device, a grenade,” or “the device used by the defendant, a grenade, was a destructive device.” (*People v. Dimitrov* (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 18, 25–26 [39 Cal.Rptr.2d 257].)

If the device used is a bomb, the court may insert the word “bomb” in the bracketed definition of destructive device without further definition. (*People v. Dimitrov, supra*, 33 Cal.App.4th at p. 25.) Appellate courts have held that the term “bomb” is not vague and is understood in its “common, accepted, and popular sense.” (*People v. Quinn, supra*, 57 Cal.App.3d at p. 258; *People v. Dimitrov, supra*, 33 Cal.App.4th at p. 25.) If the court wishes to define the term “bomb,” the court may use the following definition: “A bomb is a device carrying an explosive charge fused to blow up or detonate under certain conditions.” (See *People v. Morse* (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 620, 647, fn. 8 [3 Cal.Rptr.2d 343].)

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 18715.
- Explosive Defined. Health & Saf. Code, § 12000.
- Destructive Device Defined. Pen. Code, § 16460.
- Recklessly Defined. *People v. Heideman* (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 321, 334 [130 Cal.Rptr. 349]; *In re Steven S.* (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 598, 614–615 [31 Cal.Rptr.2d 644]; Model Pen. Code, § 2.02(2)(c).
- Maliciously Defined. Pen. Code, § 7(4); *People v. Lopez* (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 545, 550 [222 Cal.Rptr. 101]; see also *People v. Heideman* (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 321, 335 [130 Cal.Rptr. 349].
- Constructive vs. Actual Possession. See *People v. Azevedo* (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 235, 242–243 [207 Cal.Rptr. 270], questioned on other grounds in *In re Jorge M.* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 866, 876, fn. 6 [98 Cal.Rptr.2d 466, 4 P.3d 297]; *People v. Yoshimura* (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 609, 619 [154 Cal.Rptr. 314].
- Unanimity. *People v. Heideman* (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 321, 333 [130 Cal.Rptr. 349].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Possession of Destructive Device. Pen. Code, § 18710; *People v. Westoby* (1976) 63 Cal.App.3d 790, 795 [134 Cal.Rptr. 97].

- Possession of Explosive. Health & Saf. Code, § 12305; *People v. Westoby* (1976) 63 Cal.App.3d 790, 795 [134 Cal.Rptr. 97].

## RELATED ISSUES

### *Need Not Be Set to Explode*

“One need not possess a destructive device already set to explode in order to violate [now-repealed] Penal Code section 12303.2.” (*People v. Westoby* (1976) 63 Cal.App.3d 790, 795 [134 Cal.Rptr. 97].) Thus, the defendant in *Westoby* was guilty of possessing a destructive device even though the battery wires were not connected on the pipe bomb. (*Ibid.*) Similarly, in *People v. Heideman* (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 321, 335–336 [130 Cal.Rptr. 349], the defendant was guilty of illegally possessing dynamite even though he did not have the blasting caps necessary to ignite the dynamite. (See also *People v. Morse* (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 620, 646–647 [3 Cal.Rptr.2d 343] [instruction on this point proper].)

### *Multiple Charges Based on Multiple Explosives or Destructive Devices*

The defendant may be charged with multiple counts of violating Penal Code section 18715 based on possession of multiple explosives or destructive devices. (*People v. DeGuzman* (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 538, 548 [6 Cal.Rptr.3d 739].)

### *Maliciously—People v. Heideman*

In *People v. Heideman* (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 321 [130 Cal.Rptr. 349], the defendant offered to commit murder for hire using explosives and possessed the explosives. (*Id.* at pp. 327–329.) The defendant asserted that he did not actually intend to physically injure anyone but simply to defraud the individuals offering to pay for the murders. (*Id.* at pp. 330–331.) On appeal, the defendant contended that the court had improperly instructed on the meaning of “recklessness,” which the prosecution conceded. (*Id.* at p. 334.) Noting that the “[d]efendant admitted that his purpose in storing the dynamite in his room was to carry out a nefarious scheme to defraud his victims,” the court found sufficient evidence to establish malice. (*Id.* at p. 335.) The court stated that under the facts of the case before it, the term “maliciously” did not “require an actual intent to physically injure, intimidate or terrify others.” (*Ibid.*) Accordingly, the court found that the error in the instruction on “recklessness” was harmless given that there was sufficient evidence to support the higher culpability standard of malice. (*Ibid.*) The committee did not incorporate the language from *Heideman* in the definition of “maliciously” in this instruction because the committee concluded that this case reflects unique facts and that the language quoted is dicta, not essential to the ruling of the case.

See the Related Issues section to CALCRIM No. 2571, *Carrying or Placing Explosive or Destructive Device on Common Carrier*.

## SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, §§ 225–227.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 85,

*Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.02[2][a][i] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.01[1][c] (Matthew Bender).

**2573. Possession, Explosion, etc., of Explosive or Destructive Device With Intent to Injure or Damage (Pen. Code, § 18740)**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with (possessing/ [or] exploding/ [or] igniting/ [or] attempting to (explode/ [or] ignite)) (an explosive/ [or] a destructive device) with intent (to injure, intimidate, or terrify another person/ [or] to wrongfully damage or destroy someone else's property) [in violation of Penal Code section 18740].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant (possessed/ [or] exploded/ [or] ignited/ [or] attempted to (explode/ [or] ignite)) (an explosive/ [or] a destructive device);

AND

2. At the time the defendant acted, (he/she) intended (to injure, intimidate, or terrify another person/ [or] to wrongfully damage or destroy someone else's property).

[An *explosive* is any substance, or combination of substances, (1) whose main or common purpose is to detonate or rapidly combust and (2) which is capable of a relatively instantaneous or rapid release of gas and heat.]

[An *explosive* is also any substance whose main purpose is to be combined with other substances to create a new substance that can release gas and heat rapidly or relatively instantaneously.]

[\_\_\_\_\_ <insert type of explosive from Health & Saf. Code, § 12000> is an *explosive*.]

[A *destructive device* is \_\_\_\_\_ <insert definition from Pen. Code, § 16460>.]

[\_\_\_\_\_ <insert type of destructive device from Pen. Code, § 16460> is a *destructive device*.]

[The term[s] (*explosive*/ [and] *destructive device*) (is/are) defined in another instruction.]

[Two or more people may possess something at the same time.]

[A person does not have to actually hold or touch something to possess it. It is enough if the person has (control over it/ [or] the right to control it), either personally or through another person.]

[The People allege that the defendant (possessed/ [or] exploded/ [or]

**ignited/ [or] attempted to (explode/ [or] ignite)) the following (explosive[s]/ [or] destructive device[s]): \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of each explosive or destructive device when multiple items alleged>. You may not find the defendant guilty unless all of you agree that the People have proved that the defendant (possessed/ [or] exploded/ [or] ignited/ [or] attempted to (explode/ [or] ignite)) at least one of the alleged items, and you all agree on which alleged item (he/she) (possessed/ [or] exploded/ [or] ignited/ [or] attempted to (explode/ [or] ignite)).**

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2012*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If the prosecution alleges under a single count that the defendant possessed multiple items, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on unanimity. (*People v. Heideman* (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 321, 333 [130 Cal.Rptr. 349].) Give the bracketed paragraph that begins, “The People allege that the defendant possessed the following,” inserting the items alleged. The jury also does not have to agree on whether the item was an explosive or a destructive device. (*People v. Westoby* (1976) 63 Cal.App.3d 790, 797 [134 Cal.Rptr. 97]; see also *People v. Quinn*, (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 251, 257 [129 Cal.Rptr. 139] [a bomb may be an explosive and may be a destructive device].)

If the prosecution alleges that the defendant attempted to explode or ignite the item, the court **must** also give CALCRIM No. 460, *Attempt Other Than Attempted Murder*.

Depending on the device or substance used, give the bracketed definitions of “explosive” or “destructive device,” inserting the appropriate definition from Penal Code section 16460, unless the court has already given the definition in other instructions. In such cases, the court may give the bracketed sentence stating that the term is defined elsewhere. If the case involves a specific device listed in Health and Safety Code section 12000 or Penal Code section 16460, the court may instead give the bracketed sentence stating that the listed item “is an explosive” or “is a destructive device.” For example, “A grenade is a destructive device.” However, the court may not instruct the jury that the defendant used a destructive device. For example, the court may not state that “the defendant used a destructive device, a grenade,” or “the device used by the defendant, a grenade, was a destructive device.” (*People v. Dimitrov* (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 18, 25–26 [39 Cal.Rptr.2d 257].)

If the device used is a bomb, the court may insert the word “bomb” in the bracketed definition of destructive device without further definition. (*People v. Dimitrov, supra*, 33 Cal.App.4th at p. 25.) Appellate courts have held that the term “bomb” is not

vague and is understood in its “common, accepted, and popular sense.” (*People v. Quinn, supra*, 57 Cal.App.3d at p. 258; *People v. Dimitrov, supra*, 33 Cal.App.4th at p. 25.) If the court wishes to define the term “bomb,” the court may use the following definition: “A bomb is a device carrying an explosive charge fused to blow up or detonate under certain conditions.” (See *People v. Morse* (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 620, 647, fn. 8 [3 Cal.Rptr.2d 343].)

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 18740.
- Explosive Defined. Health & Saf. Code, § 12000.
- Destructive Device Defined. Pen. Code, § 16460.
- Must Intend to Harm Another Person. *People v. Godwin* (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1118 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d 708].
- Constructive vs. Actual Possession. See *People v. Azevedo* (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 235, 242–243 [207 Cal.Rptr. 270], questioned on other grounds in *In re Jorge M.* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 866, 876, fn. 6 [98 Cal.Rptr.2d 466, 4 P.3d 297]; *People v. Yoshimura* (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 609, 619 [154 Cal.Rptr. 314].
- Unanimity. *People v. Heideman* (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 321, 333 [130 Cal.Rptr. 349].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Possession of Destructive Device. Pen. Code, § 18710; *People v. Westoby* (1976) 63 Cal.App.3d 790, 795 [134 Cal.Rptr. 97].
- Possession of Explosive. Health & Saf. Code, § 12305; *People v. Westoby* (1976) 63 Cal.App.3d 790, 795 [134 Cal.Rptr. 97].

### RELATED ISSUES

See the Related Issues section to CALCRIM No. 2571, *Carrying or Placing Explosive or Destructive Device on Common Carrier*, and CALCRIM No. 2572, *Possession of Explosive or Destructive Device in Specified Place*.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, §§ 225–226, 227.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.02[2][a][i] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.01[1][c] (Matthew Bender).



**2574. Sale or Transportation of Destructive Device (Pen. Code, § 18730)**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with (selling/transporting) a destructive device [in violation of Penal Code section 18730].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant (sold/transported) a destructive device;
2. The defendant knew (he/she) (sold/transported) it;

AND

3. The defendant knew that what (he/she) (sold/transported) was a destructive device.

[As used here, *selling* means exchanging something for money, services, or anything of value.]

[A person *transports* something if he or she carries or moves it from one location to another even if the distance is short.]

[A *destructive device* is \_\_\_\_\_ <insert definition from Pen. Code, § 16460>.]

[\_\_\_\_\_ <insert type of destructive device from Pen. Code, § 16460> is a *destructive device*.]

[The term *destructive device* is defined in another instruction.]

[Two or more people may (sell/transport) something at the same time.]

[A person does not have to actually hold or touch something to (sell/transport) it. It is enough if the person has (control over it/ [or] the right to control it), either personally or through another person.]

<Defense: Statutory Exception>

[The defendant did not unlawfully (sell/transport) a destructive device if (he/she) was legally authorized to do so. The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not legally authorized to (sell/transport) a destructive device. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of this crime.]

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2012*

**BENCH NOTES**

***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

Depending on the device used, give the bracketed definitions of “destructive device,” inserting the appropriate definition from Penal Code section 16460, unless the court has already given the definition in other instructions. In such cases, the court may give the bracketed sentence stating that the term is defined elsewhere. If the case involves a specific device listed in Penal Code section 16460, the court may instead give the bracketed sentence stating that the listed item “is a destructive device.” For example, “A grenade is a destructive device.” However, the court may not instruct the jury that the defendant used a destructive device. For example, the court may not state that “the defendant used a destructive device, a grenade,” or “the device used by the defendant, a grenade, was a destructive device.” (*People v. Dimitrov* (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 18, 25–26 [39 Cal.Rptr.2d 257].)

If the device used is a bomb, the court may insert the word “bomb” in the bracketed definition of destructive device without further definition. (*People v. Dimitrov, supra*, 33 Cal.App.4th at p. 25.) Appellate courts have held that the term “bomb” is not vague and is understood in its “common, accepted, and popular sense.” (*People v. Quinn* (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 251, 258 [129 Cal.Rptr. 139]; *People v. Dimitrov, supra*, 33 Cal.App.4th at p. 25.) If the court wishes to define the term “bomb,” the court may use the following definition: “A bomb is a device carrying an explosive charge fused to blow up or detonate under certain conditions.” (See *People v. Morse* (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 620, 647, fn. 8 [3 Cal.Rptr.2d 343].)

### **Defenses—Instructional Duty**

Penal Code section 18730 allows for the sale, offer to sell, or transportation of a destructive device “as provided by this chapter.” As with a permit for possession, the existence of a legally valid basis for the defendant to sell or transport a destructive device is an affirmative defense. (See *People v. Yoshimura* (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 609, 627–629 [154 Cal.Rptr. 314].) If there is sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt about the existence of a legal basis for the defendant’s actions, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give the bracketed instruction on the defense. (See *People v. Mower* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 478–481 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067] [discussing affirmative defenses generally and the burden of proof].)

## **AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 18730.
- Destructive Device Defined. Pen. Code, § 16460.
- Knowledge. See *People v. Yoshimura* (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 609, 619 [154 Cal.Rptr. 314]; *People v. Guy* (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 593 [165 Cal.Rptr. 463].
- Constructive vs. Actual Possession. See *People v. Azevedo* (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 235, 242–243 [207 Cal.Rptr. 270], questioned on other grounds in *In re Jorge M.* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 866, 876, fn. 6 [98 Cal.Rptr.2d 466, 4 P.3d 297]; *People v. Yoshimura* (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 609, 619 [154 Cal.Rptr. 314].

## **LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES**

- Possession of Destructive Device. Pen. Code, § 18710; *People v. Westoby*  
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(1976) 63 Cal.App.3d 790, 795 [134 Cal.Rptr. 97].

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, §§ 225–226, 227.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 144, Crimes Against Order, § 144.01[1][c] (Matthew Bender).

## 2575. Offer to Sell Destructive Device (Pen. Code, § 18730)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with offering to sell a destructive device [in violation of Penal Code section 18730].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant offered to sell a destructive device;

AND

2. The defendant intended to sell a destructive device.

[As used here, *selling* means exchanging something for money, services, or anything of value.]

[A *destructive device* is \_\_\_\_\_ <insert definition from Pen. Code, § 16460>.]

[\_\_\_\_\_ <insert type of destructive device from Pen. Code, § 16460> is a *destructive device*.]

[The term *destructive device* is defined in another instruction.]

<Defense: Statutory Exception>

[The defendant did not unlawfully offer to sell a destructive device if (he/she) was legally authorized to do so. The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not legally authorized to offer to sell a destructive device. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of this crime.]

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2012*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

Depending on the device used, give the bracketed definitions of “destructive device,” inserting the appropriate description from Penal Code section 16460, unless the court has already given the definition in other instructions. In such cases, the court may give the bracketed sentence stating that the term is defined elsewhere. If the case involves a specific device listed in Penal Code section 16460, the court may instead give the bracketed sentence stating that the listed item “is a destructive device.” For example, “A grenade is a destructive device.” However, the court may not instruct the jury that the defendant used a destructive device. For example, the court may not state that “the defendant used a destructive device, a grenade,” or

“the device used by the defendant, a grenade, was a destructive device.” (*People v. Dimitrov* (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 18, 25–26 [39 Cal.Rptr.2d 257].)

If the device used is a bomb, the court may insert the word “bomb” in the bracketed definition of destructive device without further definition. (*People v. Dimitrov, supra*, 33 Cal.App.4th at p. 25.) Appellate courts have held that the term “bomb” is not vague and is understood in its “common, accepted, and popular sense.” (*People v. Quinn* (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 251, 258 [129 Cal.Rptr. 139]; *People v. Dimitrov, supra*, 33 Cal.App.4th at p. 25.) If the court wishes to define the term “bomb,” the court may use the following definition: “A bomb is a device carrying an explosive charge fused to blow up or detonate under certain conditions.” (See *People v. Morse* (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 620, 647, fn. 8 [3 Cal.Rptr.2d 343].)

### ***Defenses—Instructional Duty***

Penal Code section 18730 allows for the sale, offer to sell, or transportation of a destructive device “as provided by this chapter.” As with a permit for possession, the existence of a legally valid basis for the defendant to offer to sell a destructive device is an affirmative defense. (See *People v. Yoshimura* (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 609, 627–629 [154 Cal.Rptr. 314].) If there is sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt about the existence of a legal basis for the defendant’s actions, the court has a  **sua sponte**  duty to give the bracketed instruction on the defense. (See *People v. Mower* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 478–481 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067] [discussing affirmative defenses generally and the burden of proof].)

## **AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 18730.
- Destructive Device Defined. Pen. Code, § 16460.
- Specific Intent Required for Offer to Sell. *People v. Jackson* (1963) 59 Cal.2d 468, 469–470 [30 Cal.Rptr. 329, 381 P.2d 1].
- Knowledge. See *People v. Yoshimura* (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 609, 619 [154 Cal.Rptr. 314]; *People v. Guy* (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 593, 601 [165 Cal.Rptr. 463].
- Constructive vs. Actual Possession. See *People v. Azevedo* (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 235, 242–243 [207 Cal.Rptr. 270], questioned on other grounds in *In re Jorge M.* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 866, 876, fn. 6 [98 Cal.Rptr.2d 466, 4 P.3d 297]; *People v. Yoshimura* (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 609, 619 [154 Cal.Rptr. 314].

## **LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES**

- Possession of Destructive Device. Pen. Code, § 18710; *People v. Westoby* (1976) 63 Cal.App.3d 790, 795 [134 Cal.Rptr. 97].

## **SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, §§ 225–226, 227.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 144, *Crimes* 457

*Against Order*, § 144.01[1][c] (Matthew Bender).

## 2576. Explosion of Explosive or Destructive Device With Intent to Murder (Pen. Code, § 18745)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with (exploding/ [or] igniting/ [or] attempting to (explode/ [or] ignite)) (an explosive/ [or] a destructive device) with intent to commit murder [in violation of Penal Code section 18745].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant (exploded/ [or] ignited/ [or] attempted to (explode/ [or] ignite)) (an explosive/ [or] a destructive device);

AND

2. When the defendant did so, (he/she) acted with the intent to murder someone.

[An *explosive* is any substance, or combination of substances, (1) whose main or common purpose is to detonate or rapidly combust and (2) which is capable of a relatively instantaneous or rapid release of gas and heat.]

[An *explosive* is also any substance whose main purpose is to be combined with other substances to create a new substance that can release gas and heat rapidly or relatively instantaneously.]

[\_\_\_\_\_ <insert type of explosive from Health & Saf. Code, § 12000> is an *explosive*.]

[A *destructive device* is \_\_\_\_\_ <insert definition from Pen. Code, § 16460>.]

[\_\_\_\_\_ <insert type of destructive device from Pen. Code, § 16460> is a *destructive device*.]

[The term[s] (*explosive*/ [and] *destructive device*) (is/are) defined in another instruction.]

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2012*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If the prosecution alleges that the defendant attempted to explode or ignite the item, the court **must** also give CALCRIM No. 460, *Attempt Other Than Attempted Murder*.

Depending on the device or substance used, give the bracketed definitions of “explosive” or “destructive device,” inserting the appropriate definition from Penal Code section 16460, unless the court has already given the definition in other instructions. In such cases, the court may give the bracketed sentence stating that the term is defined elsewhere. If the case involves a specific device listed in Health and Safety Code section 12000 or Penal Code section 16460, the court may instead give the bracketed sentence stating that the listed item “is an explosive” or “is a destructive device.” For example, “A grenade is a destructive device.” However, the court may not instruct the jury that the defendant used a destructive device. For example, the court may not state that “the defendant used a destructive device, a grenade,” or “the device used by the defendant, a grenade, was a destructive device.” (*People v. Dimitrov* (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 18, 25–26 [39 Cal.Rptr.2d 257].)

If the device used is a bomb, the court may insert the word “bomb” in the bracketed definition of destructive device without further definition. (*People v. Dimitrov, supra*, 33 Cal.App.4th at p. 25.) Appellate courts have held that the term “bomb” is not vague and is understood in its “common, accepted, and popular sense.” (*People v. Quinn* (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 251, 258 [129 Cal.Rptr. 139]; *People v. Dimitrov, supra*, 33 Cal.App.4th at p. 25.) If the court wishes to define the term “bomb,” the court may use the following definition: “A bomb is a device carrying an explosive charge fused to blow up or detonate under certain conditions.” (See *People v. Morse* (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 620, 647, fn. 8 [3 Cal.Rptr.2d 343].)

### ***Related Instructions***

If the jury is not otherwise instructed on murder or attempted murder, give a modified version of CALCRIM No. 520, *Murder With Malice Aforethought*.

## **AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 18745.
- Explosive Defined. Health & Saf. Code, § 12000.
- Destructive Device Defined. Pen. Code, § 16460.

## **LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES**

- Possession of Destructive Device. Pen. Code, § 18710; *People v. Westoby* (1976) 63 Cal.App.3d 790, 795 [134 Cal.Rptr. 97].
- Possession of Explosive. Health & Saf. Code, § 12305; *People v. Westoby* (1976) 63 Cal.App.3d 790, 795 [134 Cal.Rptr. 97].

## **RELATED ISSUES**

### ***Multiple Charges Based on Multiple Victims Appropriate***

The defendant may be charged with multiple counts of violating Penal Code section 18745 based on multiple victims, even if he or she used only one explosive device. (*People v. Ramirez* (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1762, 1766–1767 [8 Cal.Rptr.2d 624].)

See the Related Issues section to CALCRIM No. 2571, *Carrying or Placing*



*Explosive or Destructive Device on Common Carrier.*

### **SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, §§ 225–226, 227.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.01[1][c] (Matthew Bender).

**2577. Explosion of Explosive or Destructive Device Causing  
Bodily Injury (Pen. Code, § 18750)**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with (exploding/ [or] igniting) (an explosive/ [or] a destructive device) causing bodily injury to another person [in violation of Penal Code section 18750].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant willfully and maliciously (exploded/ [or] ignited) (an explosive/ [or] a destructive device);

AND

2. The explosion caused bodily injury to another person.

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose. It is not required that he or she intend to break the law, hurt someone else, or gain any advantage.

Someone acts *maliciously* when he or she intentionally does a wrongful act or when he or she acts with the unlawful intent to annoy or injure someone else.

[An *explosive* is any substance, or combination of substances, (1) whose main or common purpose is to detonate or rapidly combust and (2) which is capable of a relatively instantaneous or rapid release of gas and heat.]

[An *explosive* is also any substance whose main purpose is to be combined with other substances to create a new substance that can release gas and heat rapidly or relatively instantaneously.]

[\_\_\_\_\_ <insert type of explosive from Health & Saf. Code, § 12000> is an *explosive*.]

[A *destructive device* is \_\_\_\_\_ <insert definition from Pen. Code, § 16460>.]

[\_\_\_\_\_ <insert type of destructive device from Pen. Code, § 16460> is a *destructive device*.]

[The term[s] (*explosive/ [and] destructive device*) (is/are) defined in another instruction.]

[An act causes bodily injury if the injury is the direct, natural, and probable consequence of the act, and the injury would not have happened without the act. A *natural and probable consequence* is one that a reasonable person would know is likely to happen if nothing

**unusual intervenes. In deciding whether a consequence is natural and probable, consider all of the circumstances established by the evidence.]**  
**[There may be more than one cause of bodily injury. An act causes bodily injury only if it is a substantial factor in causing the injury. A *substantial factor* is more than a trivial or remote factor. However, it need not be the only factor that causes the injury.]**

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2012*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If causation is at issue, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on proximate cause. (See *People v. Bernhardt* (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 567, 590–591 [35 Cal.Rptr. 401] [causation issue in homicide].) If the evidence indicates that there was only one cause of injury, the court should give the “direct, natural, and probable” language in the first bracketed paragraph on causation. If there is evidence of multiple causes of injury, the court should also give the “substantial factor” instruction and definition in the second bracketed paragraph. (See *People v. Autry* (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 363 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 135]; *People v. Pike* (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 732, 746–747 [243 Cal.Rptr. 54].)

Depending on the device or substance used, give the bracketed definitions of “explosive” or “destructive device,” inserting the appropriate definition from Penal Code section 16460, unless the court has already given the definition in other instructions. In such cases, the court may give the bracketed sentence stating that the term is defined elsewhere. If the case involves a specific device listed in Health and Safety Code section 12000 or Penal Code section 16460, the court may instead give the bracketed sentence stating that the listed item “is an explosive” or “is a destructive device.” For example, “A grenade is a destructive device.” However, the court may not instruct the jury that the defendant used a destructive device. For example, the court may not state that “the defendant used a destructive device, a grenade,” or “the device used by the defendant, a grenade, was a destructive device.” (*People v. Dimitrov* (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 18, 25–26 [39 Cal.Rptr.2d 257].)

If the device used is a bomb, the court may insert the word “bomb” in the bracketed definition of destructive device without further definition. (*People v. Dimitrov, supra*, 33 Cal.App.4th at p. 25.) Appellate courts have held that the term “bomb” is not vague and is understood in its “common, accepted, and popular sense.” (*People v. Quinn* (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 251, 258 [129 Cal.Rptr. 139]; *People v. Dimitrov, supra*, 33 Cal.App.4th at p. 25.) If the court wishes to define the term “bomb,” the court may use the following definition: “A bomb is a device carrying an explosive charge fused to blow up or detonate under certain conditions.” (See *People v. Morse*

(1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 620, 647, fn. 8 [3 Cal.Rptr.2d 343].)

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 18750.
- Explosive Defined. Health & Saf. Code, § 12000.
- Destructive Device Defined. Pen. Code, § 16460.
- Maliciously Defined. Pen. Code, § 7(4); *People v. Lopez* (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 545, 550 [222 Cal.Rptr. 101]; see also *People v. Heideman* (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 321, 335 [130 Cal.Rptr. 349].
- Must Injure Another Person. *People v. Teroganesian* (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1534, 1538 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d 489].
- General Intent Crime. See *People v. Thompson* (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1966, 1970–1971 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 15].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Possession of Destructive Device. Pen. Code, § 18710; *People v. Westoby* (1976) 63 Cal.App.3d 790, 795 [134 Cal.Rptr. 97].
- Possession of Explosive. Health & Saf. Code, § 12305; *People v. Westoby* (1976) 63 Cal.App.3d 790, 795 [134 Cal.Rptr. 97].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### ***Maliciously—People v. Heideman***

In *People v. Heideman* (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 321 [130 Cal.Rptr. 349], the defendant offered to commit murder for hire using explosives and possessed the explosives. (*Id.* at pp. 327–329.) The defendant asserted that he did not actually intend to physically injure anyone but simply to defraud the individuals offering to pay for the murders. (*Id.* at pp. 330–331.) On appeal, the defendant contended that the court had improperly instructed on the meaning of “recklessness,” which the prosecution conceded. (*Id.* at p. 334.) Noting that the “[d]efendant admitted that his purpose in storing the dynamite in his room was to carry out a nefarious scheme to defraud his victims,” the court found sufficient evidence to establish malice. (*Id.* at p. 335.) The court stated that under the facts of the case before it, the term “maliciously” did not “require an actual intent to physically injure, intimidate or terrify others.” (*Ibid.*) Accordingly, the court found that the error in the instruction on “recklessness” was harmless given that there was sufficient evidence to support the higher culpability standard of malice. (*Ibid.*) The committee did not incorporate the language from *Heideman* in the definition of “maliciously” in this instruction because the committee concluded that this case reflects unique facts and that the language quoted is dicta, not essential to the ruling of the case.

See the Related Issues section to CALCRIM No. 2571, *Carrying or Placing Explosive or Destructive Device on Common Carrier*.

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, §§ 225–226, 227.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 140, *Challenges to Crimes*, § 140.04, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.01[1][e] (Matthew Bender).

**2578. Explosion of Explosive or Destructive Device Causing Death, Mayhem, or Great Bodily Injury (Pen. Code, § 18755)**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with (exploding/ [or] igniting) (an explosive/ [or] a destructive device) causing (death[,]/ mayhem[,]/ [or] great bodily injury) to another person [in violation of Penal Code section 18755].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant willfully and maliciously (exploded/ [or] ignited) (an explosive/ [or] a destructive device);

AND

2. The explosion caused (death[,]/ mayhem[,]/ [or] great bodily injury) to another person.

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose. It is not required that he or she intend to break the law, hurt someone else, or gain any advantage.

Someone acts *maliciously* when he or she intentionally does a wrongful act or when he or she acts with the unlawful intent to annoy or injure someone else.

[*Great bodily injury* means significant or substantial physical injury. It is an injury that is greater than minor or moderate harm.]

[*Mayhem* means unlawfully:

<A. *Removing Body Part*>

[Removing a part of someone's body](; [ or]/.)

<B. *Disabling Body Part*>

[Disabling or making useless a part of someone's body and the disability is more than slight or temporary](; [ or]/.)

<C. *Disfigurement*>

[Permanently disfiguring someone](; [ or]/.)

<D. *Tongue Injury*>

[Cutting or disabling someone's tongue](; [ or]/.)

<E. *Slitting Nose, Ear, or Lip*>

[Slitting someone's (nose[,]/ear[,]/ [or] lip)](; or/.)

<F. *Significant Eye Injury*>

[Putting out someone's eye or injuring someone's eye in a way that so significantly reduces his or her ability to see that the eye is useless for the purpose of ordinary sight.]

[A disfiguring injury may be *permanent* even though it can be repaired by medical procedures.]

[An *explosive* is any substance, or combination of substances, (1) whose main or common purpose is to detonate or rapidly combust and (2) which is capable of a relatively instantaneous or rapid release of gas and heat.]

[An *explosive* is also any substance whose main purpose is to be combined with other substances to create a new substance that can release gas and heat rapidly or relatively instantaneously.]

[\_\_\_\_\_ <insert type of explosive from Health & Saf. Code, § 12000> is an *explosive*.]

[A *destructive device* is \_\_\_\_\_ <insert definition from Pen. Code, § 16460>.]

[\_\_\_\_\_ <insert type of destructive device from Pen. Code, § 16460> is a *destructive device*.]

[The term[s] (*explosive*/ [and] *destructive device*) (is/are) defined in another instruction.]

[An act causes (death[,]/ mayhem[,]/ [or] great bodily injury) if the (death/injury) is the direct, natural, and probable consequence of the act, and the (death[,]/ mayhem[,]/ [or] great bodily injury) would not have happened without the act. A natural and probable consequence is one that a reasonable person would know is likely to happen if nothing unusual intervenes. In deciding whether a consequence is natural and probable, consider all of the circumstances established by the evidence.]

[There may be more than one cause of (death[,]/ mayhem[,]/ [or] great bodily injury). An act causes (death/injury) only if it is a substantial factor in causing the (death/injury). A *substantial factor* is more than a trivial or remote factor. However, it need not be the only factor that causes the (death/injury).]

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2012, September 2020*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If causation is at issue, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on proximate

cause. (See *People v. Bernhardt* (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 567, 590–591 [35 Cal.Rptr. 401] [causation issue in homicide].) If the evidence indicates that there was only one cause of injury, the court should give the “direct, natural, and probable” language in the first bracketed paragraph on causation. If there is evidence of multiple causes of injury, the court should also give the “substantial factor” instruction and definition in the second bracketed paragraph. (See *People v. Austry* (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 363 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 135]; *People v. Pike* (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 732, 746–747 [243 Cal.Rptr. 54].)

Depending on the device or substance used, give the bracketed definitions of “explosive” or “destructive device,” inserting the appropriate definition from Penal Code section 16460, unless the court has already given the definition in other instructions. In such cases, the court may give the bracketed sentence stating that the term is defined elsewhere. If the case involves a specific device listed in Health and Safety Code section 12000 or Penal Code section 16460, the court may instead give the bracketed sentence stating that the listed item “is an explosive” or “is a destructive device.” For example, “A grenade is a destructive device.” However, the court may not instruct the jury that the defendant used a destructive device. For example, the court may not state that “the defendant used a destructive device, a grenade,” or “the device used by the defendant, a grenade, was a destructive device.” (*People v. Dimitrov* (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 18, 25–26 [39 Cal.Rptr.2d 257].)

If the device used is a bomb, the court may insert the word “bomb” in the bracketed definition of destructive device without further definition. (*People v. Dimitrov, supra*, 33 Cal.App.4th at p. 25.) Appellate courts have held that the term “bomb” is not vague and is understood in its “common, accepted, and popular sense.” (*People v. Quinn* (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 251, 258 [129 Cal.Rptr. 139]; *People v. Dimitrov, supra*, 33 Cal.App.4th at p. 25.) If the court wishes to define the term “bomb,” the court may use the following definition: “A bomb is a device carrying an explosive charge fused to blow up or detonate under certain conditions.” (See *People v. Morse* (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 620, 647, fn. 8 [3 Cal.Rptr.2d 343].)

The second sentence of the great bodily injury definition could result in error if the prosecution improperly argues great bodily injury may be shown by greater than minor injury alone. (Compare *People v. Medellin* (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 519, 533–535 [258 Cal.Rptr.3d 867] [the definition was reasonably susceptible to prosecutor’s erroneous argument that the injury need only be greater than minor] with *People v. Quinonez* (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 457, 466 [260 Cal.Rptr.3d 86] [upholding instructions containing great bodily injury definition as written].)

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 18755.
- Explosive Defined. Health & Saf. Code, § 12000.
- Destructive Device Defined. Pen. Code, § 16460.
- Maliciously Defined. Pen. Code, § 7(4); *People v. Lopez* (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 545, 550 [222 Cal.Rptr. 101]; see also *People v. Heideman* (1976)



58 Cal.App.3d 321, 335 [130 Cal.Rptr. 349].

- Must Injure Another Person. See *People v. Teroganesian* (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1534, 1538 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d 489].
- General Intent Crime. See *People v. Thompson* (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1966, 1970–1971 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 15].
- Great Bodily Injury Defined. *People v. Poulin* (1972) 27 Cal.App.3d 54, 61 [103 Cal.Rptr. 623].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Possession of Destructive Device. Pen. Code, § 18710; *People v. Westoby* (1976) 63 Cal.App.3d 790, 795 [134 Cal.Rptr. 97].
- Possession of Explosive. Health & Saf. Code, § 12305; *People v. Westoby* (1976) 63 Cal.App.3d 790, 795 [134 Cal.Rptr. 97].
- Explosion of a Destructive Device Causing Injury. Pen. Code, § 18750; see *People v. Poulin* (1972) 27 Cal.App.3d 54, 60 [103 Cal.Rptr. 623].

### RELATED ISSUES

See the Related Issues section to CALCRIM No. 2571, *Carrying or Placing Explosive or Destructive Device on Common Carrier*, and CALCRIM No. 2577, *Explosion of Explosive or Destructive Device Causing Bodily Injury*.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, §§ 225–226, 227.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 140, *Challenges to Crimes*, § 140.04, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.01[2][a][i], [ii], Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.01[1][c] (Matthew Bender).

**2579. Possession of Materials to Make Destructive Device or Explosive (Pen. Code, § 18720)**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with unlawfully possessing a (substance[,]/[or] material[,]/ [or] combination of substances and materials) with the intent to make (an explosive/ [or] a destructive device) [in violation of Penal Code section 18720].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant possessed a (substance[,]/ [or] material[,]/ [or] combination of substances and materials);

AND

2. When the defendant possessed (that/those) item[s], (he/she) intended to make (an explosive/ [or] a destructive device).

[An *explosive* is any substance, or combination of substances, (1) whose main or common purpose is to detonate or rapidly combust and (2) which is capable of a relatively instantaneous or rapid release of gas and heat.]

[An *explosive* is also any substance whose main purpose is to be combined with other substances to create a new substance that can release gas and heat rapidly or relatively instantaneously.]

[\_\_\_\_\_ <insert type of explosive from Health & Saf. Code, § 12000> is an *explosive*.]

[A *destructive device* is \_\_\_\_\_ <insert definition from Pen. Code, § 16460>.]

[\_\_\_\_\_ <insert type of destructive device from Pen. Code, § 16460> is a *destructive device*.]

[The term[s] (*explosive/ [and] destructive device*) (is/are) defined in another instruction.]

[Two or more people may possess something at the same time.]

[A person does not have to actually hold or touch something to possess it. It is enough if the person has (control over it/ [or] the right to control it), either personally or through another person.]

<Defense: Permit>

[The defendant did not unlawfully possess a (substance[,]/ [or] material[,]/ [or] combination of substances and materials) if (he/she) had a valid permit to make (an explosive/ [or] a destructive device). The

**People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not have a valid permit to make (an explosive/ [or] a destructive device). If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of this crime.]**

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2012*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

Depending on the device or substance used, give the bracketed definitions of “explosive” or “destructive device,” inserting the appropriate definition from Penal Code section 16460, unless the court has already given the definition in other instructions. In such cases, the court may give the bracketed sentence stating that the term is defined elsewhere. If the case involves a specific device listed in Health and Safety Code section 12000 or Penal Code section 16460, the court may instead give the bracketed sentence stating that the listed item “is an explosive” or “is a destructive device.” For example, “A grenade is a destructive device.” However, the court may not instruct the jury that the defendant used a destructive device. For example, the court may not state that “the defendant used a destructive device, a grenade,” or “the device used by the defendant, a grenade, was a destructive device.” (*People v. Dimitrov* (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 18, 25–26 [39 Cal.Rptr.2d 257].)

If the device used is a bomb, the court may insert the word “bomb” in the bracketed definition of destructive device without further definition. (*People v. Dimitrov, supra*, 33 Cal.App.4th at p. 25.) Appellate courts have held that the term “bomb” is not vague and is understood in its “common, accepted, and popular sense.” (*People v. Quinn* (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 251, 258 [129 Cal.Rptr. 139]; *People v. Dimitrov, supra*, 33 Cal.App.4th at p. 25.) If the court wishes to define the term “bomb,” the court may use the following definition: “A bomb is a device carrying an explosive charge fused to blow up or detonate under certain conditions.” (See *People v. Morse* (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 620, 647, fn. 8 [3 Cal.Rptr.2d 343].)

### *Defenses—Instructional Duty*

The existence of a valid permit is an affirmative defense to a violation of Penal Code section 18720. (*People v. Yoshimura* (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 609, 627–629 [154 Cal.Rptr. 314] [discussing repealed Penal Code section 12312].) The defendant bears the burden of producing evidence of a valid permit. If there is sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt about the existence of a permit, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give the bracketed instruction on the defense. (See *People v. Mower* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 478–481 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067] [discussing affirmative defenses generally and the burden of proof].)

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 18720.
- Explosive Defined. Health & Saf. Code, § 12000.
- Destructive Device Defined. Pen. Code, § 16460.
- Permit Exemption. Pen. Code, § 18900; *People v. Yoshimura* (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 609, 627–628 [154 Cal.Rptr. 314].
- Substance or Material. *People v. Yoshimura* (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 410, 415 [133 Cal.Rptr. 228].
- Constructive vs. Actual Possession. See *People v. Azevedo* (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 235, 242–243 [207 Cal.Rptr. 270], questioned on other grounds in *In re Jorge M.* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 866, 876, fn. 6 [98 Cal.Rptr.2d 466, 4 P.3d 297]; *People v. Yoshimura* (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 609, 619 [154 Cal.Rptr. 314].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *“Substance” or “Material” Not Unconstitutionally Vague*

[Now-repealed] Section 12312 provides that possession of a “substance” or “material” is punishable only if the possession is with the specific intent to make a destructive device or explosive . . . . When the statute is thus read as a whole, the vagueness of the meaning of “substance” and “material” is eliminated, and the terms are seen to refer to constituent or necessary items in the construction of nonlicensed destructive devices and explosives.

(*People v. Yoshimura* (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 410, 415 [133 Cal.Rptr. 228].)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, §§ 225–226, 227.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.01[1][c] (Matthew Bender).

**2580–2589. Reserved for Future Use**

## F. OTHER WEAPONS OFFENSES

### 2590. Armed Criminal Action (Pen. Code, § 25800)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with carrying a loaded firearm with intent to commit a felony [in violation of Penal Code section 25800].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant carried a firearm;
2. The defendant knew that (he/she) was carrying the firearm;
3. When the defendant carried the firearm, (he/she) intended to commit \_\_\_\_\_ <insert felony alleged>;

[AND]

4. The firearm was loaded(;/.)

<See Commentary regarding element 5.>

[AND]

5. The defendant knew that the firearm was loaded.]

[A *firearm* is any device designed to be used as a weapon, from which a projectile is expelled or expelled through a barrel by the force of an explosion or other form of combustion.]

[The term *firearm* is defined in another instruction.]

As used here, a firearm is *loaded* if the firearm and ammunition capable of being discharged from the firearm are in the immediate possession of the same person.

<See Commentary regarding this paragraph.>

[A firearm does not need to be in working order if it was designed to shoot and appears capable of shooting.]

<See Commentary regarding this paragraph.>

[A person *carries* a firearm when he or she has the firearm on his or her person or has it available for use in either offense or defense.]

To decide whether the defendant intended to commit \_\_\_\_\_ <insert felony alleged>, please refer to the separate instructions that I (will give/have given) you on that crime.

*New January 2006; Revised February 2012*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

The court should give the bracketed definition of “firearm” unless the court has already given the definition in other instructions. In such cases, the court may give the bracketed sentence stating that the term is defined elsewhere.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 25800.
- Firearm Defined. Pen. Code, § 16520.
- Loaded Defined. Pen. Code, § 16840.
- Knowledge of Presence of Weapon Required. See *People v. Rubalcava* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 322, 331–332 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 735, 1 P.3d 52].

## COMMENTARY

There are no published cases on this statute. Thus, it is unclear whether the firearm must be operable or whether the defendant must know the firearm is “loaded.” It is also unclear whether the statute requires that the defendant carry the firearm on his or her person or whether it is sufficient if the defendant “has the firearm available.” (See *People v. Wandick* (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 918, 928 [278 Cal.Rptr. 274] [discussing meaning of “armed” in Pen. Code, § 12022(a)].) The instruction has been drafted to provide the court options on these issues. If these issues are present in the case, the court must decide whether to give bracketed element 5 and which of the bracketed paragraphs are appropriate.

## SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, § 261.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.01[1][d] (Matthew Bender).

**2591. Possession of Ammunition by Person Prohibited From Possessing Firearm Due to Conviction or Mental Illness (Pen. Code, § 30305(a))**

---

The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with unlawfully possessing ammunition [in violation of Penal Code section 30305(a)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant (owned/possessed/had under (his/her) custody or control) ammunition;
2. The defendant knew (he/she) (owned/possessed/had under (his/her) custody or control) the ammunition;

[AND]

*<Alternative 3A—prohibited due to mental illness or SVP status>*

3. The defendant \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert description from Welf. & Inst. Code, § 8100 or 8103>.*

*<Alternative 3B—prohibited due to conviction. Give both element 3B and element 4 in cases involving misdemeanor convictions or juvenile findings. For all other cases involving prior convictions, give 3B only.>*

3. The defendant had previously been convicted of (a felony/a misdemeanor/two offenses of brandishing a firearm/the crime of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert misdemeanor offense from Pen. Code, § 29805 or 23515, or a juvenile finding from Pen. Code, § 29820>(;/.)*)

[AND]

4. (The previous conviction was within 10 years of the date the defendant possessed the ammunition./The defendant was less than 30 years old at the time (he/she) possessed the ammunition.)

*Ammunition* means a bullet, cartridge, magazine, clip, speed loader, autoloader, or projectile capable of being fired from a firearm with a deadly consequence. *Ammunition* includes reloaded ammunition.

[A juvenile court finding is the same as a conviction.]

[A conviction of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of offense from other state or federal offense>* is the same as a conviction for a felony.]

[Two or more people may possess something at the same time.]

[A person does not have to actually hold or touch something to possess it. It is enough if the person has (control over it/ [or] the right to control it), either personally or through another person.]

[The defendant and the People have stipulated, or agreed, that the defendant was previously convicted of a (a felony/a misdemeanor/two offenses of brandishing a firearm/the crime of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert misdemeanor offense from Pen. Code, § 29805 or 23515, or a juvenile finding from Pen. Code, § 29820>). This stipulation means that you must accept this fact as proved.]

<Alternative A—limiting instruction when stipulation as to conviction>

[Do not consider this fact for any other purpose [except for the limited purpose of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert other permitted purpose, e.g., determining the defendant's credibility>]. Do not speculate about or discuss the nature of the conviction.]

<Alternative B—limiting instruction when no stipulation as to conviction>

[You may consider evidence, if any, that the defendant was previously convicted of a crime only in deciding whether the People have proved this element of the charged crime [or for the limited purpose of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert other permitted purpose, e.g., assessing defendant's credibility>]. Do not consider such evidence for any other purpose.]

<Defense: Justifiable Possession>

[If you conclude that the defendant possessed ammunition, that possession was not unlawful if the defendant can prove that (he/she) was justified in possessing the ammunition. In order to establish this defense, the defendant must prove that:

1. (He/She) (found the ammunition/took the ammunition from a person who was committing a crime against the defendant);

AND

2. (He/She) possessed the ammunition no longer than was necessary to deliver or transport the ammunition to a law enforcement agency for that agency to dispose of the ammunition.

The defendant has the burden of proving each element of this defense by a preponderance of the evidence. This is a different standard of proof than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. To meet the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence, the defendant must prove that it is more likely than not that each element of the defense is true.]

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2012*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.



Give element 4 only if the prosecution alleges that the defendant was prohibited from possessing firearms under Penal Code section 29805, possession within 10 years of a specified misdemeanor conviction, or Penal Code section 29820, possession by someone under 30 years old with a specified juvenile finding.

If the defendant has not stipulated to the conviction, do not give the bracketed paragraph that begins, “The defendant and the People have stipulated,” and insert the full name of the offense in element 3B.

If the defendant does stipulate to the conviction, the court must give the bracketed paragraph that begins, “The defendant and the People have stipulated,” and in element 3B select the word “felony” or “misdemeanor.” The court must sanitize all references to the conviction to prevent disclosure of the nature of the conviction to the jury. (*People v. Sapp* (2003) 31 Cal.4th 240, 261 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 554, 73 P.3d 433]; *People v. Valentine* (1986) 42 Cal.3d 170, 173 [228 Cal.Rptr. 25, 720 P.2d 913].) If the defendant agrees, the court must not read the portion of the information describing the nature of the conviction. Likewise, the court must ensure that the verdict forms do not reveal the nature of the conviction.

On request, the court should give the limiting instruction regarding the evidence of the conviction. (*People v. Valentine, supra*, 42 Cal.3d at p. 182, fn. 7.) There is no sua sponte duty to give the limiting instruction, and the defense may prefer that no limiting instruction be given. (*People v. Griggs* (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1139 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 380].) If the defendant does not stipulate to the conviction, give alternative A. If the defendant does stipulate, give alternative B.

### ***Defenses—Instructional Duty***

Penal Code section 30305(c) states that a violation of the statute is “justifiable” if the listed conditions are met. This is an affirmative defense, and the defense bears the burden of establishing the defense by a preponderance of the evidence. (*Ibid.*) If sufficient evidence has been presented, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give the bracketed paragraph on the defense of justifiable possession. This defense only applies to persons “prohibited from possessing any ammunition or reloaded ammunition solely because that person is prohibited from owning or possessing a firearm only by virtue of [now-repealed] Section 12021.” (Pen. Code, § 30305(b).)

## **AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 30305(a).
- Ammunition Defined. Pen. Code, § 16150.
- Knowledge. See *People v. Rubalcava* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 322, 331–332 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 735, 1 P.3d 52].
- Justifiable Possession. Pen. Code, § 30305(b).
- Limiting Instruction on Prior Conviction. *People v. Valentine* (1986) 42 Cal.3d 170, 182, fn. 7 [228 Cal.Rptr. 25, 720 P.2d 913]; *People v. Griggs* (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1139 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 380].
- Constructive vs. Actual Possession. See *People v. Azevedo* (1984) 161

Cal.App.3d 235, 242–243 [207 Cal.Rptr. 270], questioned on other grounds in *In re Jorge M.* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 866, 876, fn. 6 [98 Cal.Rptr.2d 466, 4 P.3d 297].

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, § 210.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.01[1][e] (Matthew Bender).

**2592. Possession of Ammunition by Person Prohibited From Possessing Firearm Due to Court Order (Pen. Code, § 30305(a))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with unlawfully possessing ammunition [in violation of Penal Code section 30305(a)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant (owned/possessed/had under (his/her) custody or control) ammunition;
2. The defendant knew (he/she) (owned/possessed/had under (his/her) custody or control) the ammunition;

[AND]

3. A court had ordered that the defendant not (own/purchase/receive/possess) a firearm(;/.)

*<Give element 4 in cases involving restraining orders.>*

[AND]

4. The defendant knew of the court's order.]

*Ammunition* means a bullet, cartridge, magazine, clip, speed loader, autoloader, or projectile capable of being fired from a firearm with a deadly consequence. *Ammunition* includes reloaded ammunition.

[Two or more people may possess something at the same time.]

[A person does not have to actually hold or touch something to possess it. It is enough if the person has (control over it/ [or] the right to control it), either personally or through another person.]

[The defendant and the People have stipulated, or agreed, that a court ordered the defendant not to (own/purchase/receive/possess) a firearm. This stipulation means that you must accept this fact as proved.]

*<Alternative A—limiting instruction when stipulation as to order>*

[Do not consider this fact for any other purpose [except for the limited purpose of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert other permitted purpose, e.g., determining the defendant's credibility>*]. Do not speculate about why the court's order was made.]

*<Alternative B—limiting instruction when no stipulation as to order>*

[You may consider evidence, if any, that a court ordered the defendant not to (own/purchase/receive/possess) a firearm only in deciding whether the People have proved this element of the charged crime [or for the

**limited purpose of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert other permitted purpose, e.g., assessing defendant's credibility>]. Do not consider such evidence for any other purpose.]**

*<Defense: Justifiable Possession>*

**[If you conclude that the defendant possessed ammunition, that possession was not unlawful if the defendant can prove that (he/she) was justified in possessing the ammunition. In order to establish this defense, the defendant must prove that:**

- 1. (He/She) (found the ammunition/took the ammunition from a person who was committing a crime against the defendant);**

**AND**

- 2. (He/She) possessed the ammunition no longer than was necessary to deliver or transport the ammunition to a law enforcement agency for that agency to dispose of the ammunition.**

**The defendant has the burden of proving each element of this defense by a preponderance of the evidence. This is a different standard of proof than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. To meet the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence, the defendant must prove that it is more likely than not that each element of the defense is true.]**

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2012*

## **BENCH NOTES**

### ***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

Use this instruction only if the prosecution alleges that the defendant was prohibited from possessing firearms under Penal Code section 29815, possession by someone prohibited as a condition of probation who was convicted of a crime not listed in other provisions of Penal Code section 29800, or under Penal Code section 29825, possession by someone prohibited by a temporary restraining order or other protective order.

Give element 4 only if the prosecution alleges that the defendant was prohibited from possessing firearms under Penal Code section 29825.

If the defendant has not stipulated to the probation order, do not give the bracketed paragraph that begins, "The defendant and the People have stipulated."

If the defendant does stipulate to the probation order, the court must give the bracketed paragraph that begins, "The defendant and the People have stipulated."

The court must also sanitize all references to the probation order to prevent disclosure of the nature of the conviction to the jury. (*People v. Sapp* (2003) 31

Cal.4th 240, 261 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 554, 73 P.3d 433]; *People v. Valentine* (1986) 42 Cal.3d 170, 173 [228 Cal.Rptr. 25, 720 P.2d 913].) If the defendant agrees, the court must not read the portion of the information describing the nature of the conviction. Likewise, the court must ensure that the verdict forms do not reveal the nature of the conviction.

On request, the court should give the limiting instruction regarding the evidence of the probation condition. (*People v. Valentine, supra*, 42 Cal.3d at p. 182, fn. 7.) There is no sua sponte duty to give the limiting instruction, and the defense may prefer that no limiting instruction be given. (*People v. Griggs* (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1139 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 380].) If the defendant does not stipulate to the probation condition, give alternative A. If the defendant does stipulate, give alternative B.

### ***Defenses—Instructional Duty***

Penal Code section 30305(c) states that a violation of the statute is “justifiable” if the listed conditions are met. This is an affirmative defense and the defense bears the burden of establishing the defense by a preponderance of the evidence. (*Ibid.*) If sufficient evidence has been presented, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give the bracketed paragraph on the defense of justifiable possession.

## **AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 30305(a).
- Ammunition Defined. Pen. Code, § 16150.
- Knowledge. See *People v. Rubalcava* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 322, 331–332 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 735, 1 P.3d 52].
- Justifiable Possession. Pen. Code, § 30305(c).
- Limiting Instruction on Prior Conviction. *People v. Valentine* (1986) 42 Cal.3d 170, 182, fn. 7 [228 Cal.Rptr. 25, 720 P.2d 913]; *People v. Griggs* (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1139 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 380].
- Constructive vs. Actual Possession. See *People v. Azevedo* (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 235, 242–243 [207 Cal.Rptr. 270], questioned on other grounds in *In re Jorge M.* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 866, 876, fn. 6 [98 Cal.Rptr.2d 466, 4 P.3d 297].

## **SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, § 210.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.01[1][c] (Matthew Bender).

**2593–2599. Reserved for Future Use**



# CRIMES AGAINST GOVERNMENT

## A. BRIBERY OF OFFICIAL

- 2600. Giving or Offering a Bribe to an Executive Officer (Pen. Code, § 67)
- 2601. Giving or Offering a Bribe to a Ministerial Officer (Pen. Code, § 67.5)
- 2602. Giving or Offering a Bribe to a Ministerial Officer: Value of Thing Offered (Pen. Code, § 67.5(b))
- 2603. Requesting or Taking a Bribe (Pen. Code, §§ 68, 86, 93)
- 2604–2609. Reserved for Future Use

## B. BRIBERY OR INTIMIDATION OF WITNESS

### (i) Bribery

- 2610. Giving or Offering a Bribe to a Witness (Pen. Code, § 137(a))
- 2611. Giving or Offering a Bribe to a Witness Not to Testify (Pen. Code, § 138(a))
- 2612. Witness Receiving a Bribe (Pen. Code, § 138(b))
- 2613–2619. Reserved for Future Use

### (ii) Threatening or Intimidating

- 2620. Using Force or Threatening a Witness Before Testimony or Information Given (Pen. Code, § 137(b))
- 2621. Influencing a Witness by Fraud (Pen. Code, § 137(b))
- 2622. Intimidating a Witness (Pen. Code, § 136.1(a) & (b))
- 2623. Intimidating a Witness: Sentencing Factors (Pen. Code, § 136.1(c))
- 2624. Threatening a Witness After Testimony or Information Given (Pen. Code, § 140(a))
- 2625–2629. Reserved for Future Use

## C. EVIDENCE TAMPERING

- 2630. Evidence Tampering by Peace Officer or Other Person (Pen. Code, § 141)
- 2631–2639. Reserved for Future Use

## D. PERJURY

- 2640. Perjury (Pen. Code, § 118)
- 2641. Perjury by False Affidavit (Pen. Code, § 118a)
- 2642–2649. Reserved for Future Use

## E. THREATENING OR RESISTING OFFICER

- 2650. Threatening a Public Official (Pen. Code, § 76)
- 2651. Trying to Prevent an Executive Officer From Performing Duty (Pen. Code, § 69)
- 2652. Resisting an Executive Officer in Performance of Duty (Pen. Code, § 69)
- 2653. Taking Firearm or Weapon While Resisting Peace Officer or Public Officer

(Pen. Code, § 148(b) & (c))

- 2654. Intentionally Taking or Attempting to Take Firearm From Peace Officer or Public Officer (Pen. Code, § 148(d))
- 2655. Causing Death or Serious Bodily Injury While Resisting Peace Officer (Pen. Code, § 148.10(a) & (b))
- 2656. Resisting Peace Officer, Public Officer, or EMT (Pen. Code, § 148(a))
- 2657–2669. Reserved for Future Use

**F. LAWFUL PERFORMANCE**

- 2670. Lawful Performance: Peace Officer
- 2671. Lawful Performance: Custodial Officer
- 2672. Lawful Performance: Resisting Unlawful Arrest With Force
- 2673. Pat-Down Search
- 2674–2679. Reserved for Future Use

**G. UNLAWFUL ASSEMBLY AND DISTURBING THE PEACE**

- 2680. Courthouse Picketing (Pen. Code, § 169)
- 2681. Disturbance of Public Meeting (Pen. Code, § 403)
- 2682. Inciting a Riot (Pen. Code, § 404.6(a))
- 2683. Participating in a Riot (Pen. Code, §§ 404, 405)
- 2684. Participating in a Rout (Pen. Code, §§ 406, 408)
- 2685. Participating in an Unlawful Assembly (Pen. Code, §§ 407, 408)
- 2686. Refusal to Disperse: Riot, Rout, or Unlawful Assembly (Pen. Code, §§ 407, 409)
- 2687. Refusal to Disperse: Intent to Commit Unlawful Act (Pen. Code, § 416(a))
- 2688. Disturbing the Peace: Fighting or Challenging Someone to Fight (Pen. Code, §§ 415(1), 415.5(a)(1))
- 2689. Disturbing the Peace: Loud and Unreasonable Noise (Pen. Code, §§ 415(2), 415.5(a)(2))
- 2690. Disturbing the Peace: Offensive Words (Pen. Code, §§ 415(3), 415.5(a)(3))
- 2691–2699. Reserved for Future Use

**H. VIOLATION OF COURT ORDER**

- 2700. Violation of Court Order (Pen. Code, § 166(a)(4) & (b)(1))
- 2701. Violation of Court Order: Protective Order or Stay Away (Pen. Code, §§ 166(c)(1), 273.6)
- 2702. Violation of Court Order: Protective Order or Stay Away—Physical Injury (Pen. Code, §§ 166(c)(2), 273.6(b))
- 2703. Violation of Court Order: Protective Order or Stay Away—Act of Violence (Pen. Code, §§ 166(c)(4), 273.6(d))
- 2704–2719. Reserved for Future Use



## CRIMES AGAINST GOVERNMENT

### I. CRIMES INVOLVING PRISONERS

#### (i) Assault and Battery

- 2720. Assault by Prisoner Serving Life Sentence (Pen. Code, § 4500)
- 2721. Assault by Prisoner (Pen. Code, § 4501)
- 2722. Battery by Gassing (Pen. Code, §§ 243.9, 4501.1)
- 2723. Battery by Prisoner on Nonprisoner (Pen. Code, § 4501.5)
- 2724–2734. Reserved for Future Use

#### (ii) Hostage Taking and Rioting

- 2735. Holding a Hostage (Pen. Code, § 4503)
- 2736. Inciting a Riot in a Prison or Jail (Pen. Code, § 404.6(c))
- 2737–2744. Reserved for Future Use

#### (iii) Possession of Contraband

- 2745. Possession or Manufacture of Weapon in Penal Institution (Pen. Code, § 4502)
- 2746. Possession of Firearm, Deadly Weapon, or Explosive in a Jail or County Road Camp (Pen. Code, § 4574(a))
- 2747. Bringing or Sending Firearm, Deadly Weapon, or Explosive Into Penal Institution (Pen. Code, § 4574(a)–(c))
- 2748. Possession of Controlled Substance or Paraphernalia in Penal Institution (Pen. Code, § 4573.6)
- 2749–2759. Reserved for Future Use

#### (iv) Escape

- 2760. Escape (Pen. Code, § 4532(a)(1) & (b)(1))
- 2761. Escape by Force or Violence (Pen. Code, § 4532(a)(2) & (b)(2))
- 2762. Escape After Remand or Arrest (Pen. Code, § 836.6)
- 2763. Escape After Remand or Arrest: Force or Violence (Pen. Code, § 836.6)
- 2764. Escape: Necessity Defense

### J. MISAPPROPRIATION OF PUBLIC MONEY

- 2765. Misappropriation of Public Money (Pen. Code § 424(a)(1–7))
- 2766–2799. Reserved for Future Use



## A. BRIBERY OF OFFICIAL

### 2600. Giving or Offering a Bribe to an Executive Officer (Pen. Code, § 67)

---

The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with (giving/ [or] offering) a bribe to an executive officer [in violation of Penal Code section 67].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant (gave/ [or] offered) a bribe to an executive officer in this state [or someone acting on the officer's behalf];

AND

2. The defendant acted with the corrupt intent to unlawfully influence that officer's official (act[,]/ decision[,]/ vote[,]/ opinion[,]/ [or] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of alleged conduct in other proceeding>).

As used here, *bribe* means something of present or future value or advantage, or a promise to give such a thing, that is given or offered with the corrupt intent to unlawfully influence the public or official action, vote, decision, [or] opinion, [or] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of alleged conduct at other proceeding>] of the person to whom the bribe is given.

A person acts with *corrupt intent* when he or she acts to wrongfully gain a financial or other advantage for himself, herself, or someone else.

The official (act[,]/ decision[,]/ vote[,]/ opinion[,]/ [or] proceeding) the defendant sought to influence must have related to an existing subject that could have been brought before the public officer in his or her official capacity. It does not have to relate to a duty specifically given by statute to that officer.

An *executive officer* is a government official who may use his or her own discretion in performing his or her job duties. [(A/An) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert title, e.g., police officer, commissioner, etc.> is an executive officer.]

[The executive officer does not need to have (accepted the bribe[,]/ [or] performed the requested act[,]/ [or] deliberately failed to perform a duty).]

[*Offering a bribe* does not require specific words or behavior, as long as the language used and the circumstances clearly show an intent to bribe. [The thing offered does not need to actually be given, exist at the time it

is offered, or have a specific value.]]

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*New January 2006*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

The statute applies to giving or offering a bribe to “any executive officer . . . with intent to influence him in respect to any act, decision, vote, opinion, or other proceeding as such officer . . . .” It is unclear what “other proceeding” refers to and there are no cases defining the phrase. If the evidence presents an issue about attempting to influence an officer in any “other proceeding,” the court may insert a description of the proceeding where indicated.

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “The executive officer does not” if the evidence shows that the executive officer did not accept the bribe or follow through on the action sought.

Give the bracketed definition of “offering a bribe” if the prosecution is pursuing this theory. Give the bracketed sentence that begins, “The thing offered does not need to actually,” on request.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 67.
- Bribe Defined. Pen. Code, § 7(6).
- Corruptly Defined. Pen. Code, § 7(3).
- Executive Officer Defined. *People v. Strohl* (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 347, 361 [129 Cal.Rptr. 224].
- Corrupt Intent Is an Element of Bribery. *People v. Gliksman* (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 343, 351 [144 Cal.Rptr. 451]; *People v. Zerillo* (1950) 36 Cal.2d 222, 232 [223 P.2d 223].
- Subject Matter of Bribe. *People v. Megladdery* (1940) 40 Cal.App.2d 748, 782 [106 P.2d 84], disapproved on other grounds in *People v. Posey* (2004) 32 Cal.4th 193, 214–215 [8 Cal.Rptr.3d 551, 82 P.3d 755] and *People v. Simon* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1082, 1108 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 385, 25 P.3d 598]; *People v. Diedrich* (1982) 31 Cal.3d 263, 276 [182 Cal.Rptr. 354, 643 P.2d 971].
- Offering a Bribe. *People v. Britton* (1962) 205 Cal.App.2d 561, 564 [22 Cal.Rptr. 921].
- Bribery and Extortion Distinguished. *People v. Powell* (1920) 50 Cal.App. 436, 441 [195 P. 456].
- No Bilateral Agreement Necessary. *People v. Gliksman* (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 343, 350–351 [144 Cal.Rptr. 451].

## RELATED ISSUES

### *Entrapment*

The crime is complete once an offer is made. Accordingly, subsequent efforts to procure corroborative evidence do not constitute entrapment. (*People v. Finkelstein* (1950) 98 Cal.App.2d 545, 553 [220 P.2d 934]; *People v. Bunkers* (1905) 2 Cal.App. 197, 209 [84 P. 364].)

### *Accomplice Liability and Conspiracy*

The giver and the recipient of a bribe are not accomplices of one another, nor are they coconspirators, because they are guilty of distinct crimes that require different mental states. (*People v. Wolden* (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 798, 804 [63 Cal.Rptr. 467].)

### *Extortion Distinguished*

Extortion is bribery with the additional element of coercion. Accordingly, the defendant cannot be guilty of receiving a bribe and extortion in the same transaction. (*People v. Powell* (1920) 50 Cal.App. 436, 441 [195 P. 456].)

## SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Governmental Authority, §§ 33–56.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 141, *Conspiracy, Solicitation, and Attempt*, § 141.10 (Matthew Bender).

**2601. Giving or Offering a Bribe to a Ministerial Officer (Pen. Code, § 67.5)**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with (giving/ [or] offering) a bribe to a (ministerial officer/government employee/government appointee) [in violation of Penal Code section 67.5].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant (gave/ [or] offered) a bribe to (a/an) (ministerial officer/employee/appointee) of the (State of California/City of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of city>/County of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of county>/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of political subdivision from Pen. Code, § 67.5>) [or to someone acting on the (officer's/ employee's/appointee's) behalf];

AND

2. The defendant acted with the corrupt intent to unlawfully influence that (officer's/employee's/appointee's) official (act[,]/ decision[,]/ vote[,]/ opinion[,]/ [or] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of alleged conduct in other proceeding>).

As used here, *bribe* means something of present or future value or advantage, or a promise to give such a thing, that is given or offered with the corrupt intent to unlawfully influence the public or official action, vote, decision, or opinion of the person to whom the bribe is given.

A person acts with *corrupt intent* when he or she acts to wrongfully gain a financial or other advantage for himself, herself, or someone else.

The official (act[,]/ decision[,]/ vote[,]/ opinion[,]/ [or] proceeding) the defendant sought to influence must have related to an existing subject that could have been brought before the (officer/employee/appointee) in his or her official capacity. It does not have to relate to a duty specifically given by statute to that (officer/employee/appointee).

[A *ministerial officer* is an officer who has a clear and mandatory duty involving the performance of specific tasks without the exercise of discretion.]

[The (officer/employee/appointee) does not need to have (accepted the bribe[,]/ [or] performed the requested act[,]/ [or] deliberately failed to perform a duty).]

[*Offering a bribe* does not require specific words or behavior, as long as the language used and the circumstances clearly show an intent to bribe.]

**[The thing offered does not need to actually be given, exist at the time it is offered, or have a specific value.]**

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2012*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If the defendant is charged with a felony based on the value of the item offered or given (Pen. Code, § 67.5(b)), give CALCRIM No. 2602, *Giving or Offering a Bribe to a Ministerial Officer: Value of Thing Offered*.

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “The (officer/employee/appointee) does not” if the evidence shows that the officer did not accept the bribe or follow through on the action sought.

Give the bracketed definition of “offering a bribe” if the prosecution is pursuing this theory. Give the bracketed sentence that begins, “The thing offered does not need to actually,” on request.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 67.5.
- Bribe Defined. Pen. Code, § 7, subd. 6.
- Corruptly Defined. Pen. Code, § 7, subd. 3.
- Grand Theft Defined. Pen. Code, § 487.
- Ministerial Officer Defined. Gov. Code, § 820.25(b); *People v. Strohl* (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 347, 361 [129 Cal.Rptr. 224].
- Corrupt Intent Is an Element of Bribery. *People v. Gliksman* (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 343, 351 [144 Cal.Rptr. 451]; *People v. Zerillo* (1950) 36 Cal.2d 222, 232 [223 P.2d 223].
- Subject Matter of Bribe. *People v. Megladdery* (1940) 40 Cal.App.2d 748, 782 [106 P.2d 84], disapproved on other grounds in *People v. Posey* (2004) 32 Cal.4th 193, 214–215 [8 Cal.Rptr.3d 551, 82 P.3d 755] and *People v. Simon* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1082, 1108 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 385, 25 P.3d 598]; *People v. Diedrich* (1982) 31 Cal.3d 263, 276 [182 Cal.Rptr. 354, 643 P.2d 971].
- Offering a Bribe. *People v. Britton* (1962) 205 Cal.App.2d 561, 564 [22 Cal.Rptr. 921].
- Bribery and Extortion Distinguished. *People v. Powell* (1920) 50 Cal.App. 436, 441 [195 P. 456].
- No Bilateral Agreement Necessary. *People v. Gliksman* (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 343, 350–351 [144 Cal.Rptr. 451].

**LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES**

If the defendant is charged with a felony based on the value of the item offered or given (Pen. Code, § 67.5(b)), then the misdemeanor is a lesser included offense (Pen. Code, § 67.5(a)). The court must provide the jury with a verdict form on which the jury will indicate if the prosecution has proved that the thing offered was worth more than \$950 or was something that if stolen would qualify as grand theft. If the jury finds that this allegation has not been proved, then the offense should be set at a misdemeanor.

**RELATED ISSUES**

See the Related Issues section of CALCRIM No. 2600, *Giving or Offering a Bribe to an Executive Officer*.

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Governmental Authority, §§ 33–56.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 141, *Conspiracy, Solicitation, and Attempt*, § 141.10 (Matthew Bender).



**2602. Giving or Offering a Bribe to a Ministerial Officer:  
Value of Thing Offered (Pen. Code, § 67.5(b))**

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If you find the defendant guilty of (giving/ [or] offering) a bribe to a (ministerial officer/government employee/government appointee), you must then decide whether the People have proved the additional allegation that the defendant (gave/ [or] offered) the (officer/employee/ appointee) (something worth more than \$950/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert other item from Pen. Code, § 487>).

The People have the burden of proving this allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you must find that this allegation has not been proved.

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2012*

**BENCH NOTES**

***Instructional Duty***

If the defendant is charged with a felony based on the value of the item offered or given (Pen. Code, § 67.5(b)), the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on this sentencing factor.

This instruction **must** be given with CALCRIM No. 2601, *Giving or Offering a Bribe to a Ministerial Officer*.

The court must provide the jury with a verdict form on which the jury will indicate if the alleged sentencing factor has or has not been proved.

**AUTHORITY**

- Enhancement. Pen. Code, § 67.5(b).

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Governmental Authority, §§ 33–56.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 141, *Conspiracy, Solicitation, and Attempt*, § 141.10 (Matthew Bender).

## 2603. Requesting or Taking a Bribe (Pen. Code, §§ 68, 86, 93)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with (requesting[,]/ taking[,]/ [or] agreeing to take) a bribe [in violation of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert appropriate code section[s]>].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant was (a/an) (executive officer/ministerial officer/ employee/appointee/legislative officer/judicial officer) of the (State of California/City of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of city>/County of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of county>/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of political subdivision from Pen. Code, § 68>);
2. The defendant (requested[,]/ took[,]/ [or] agreed to take) a bribe;
3. When the defendant (requested[,]/ took[,]/ [or] agreed to take) the bribe, (he/she) represented that the bribe would unlawfully influence (his/her) official (act[,]/ decision[,]/ vote[,]/ [or] opinion). The representation may have been express or implied;

AND

4. The defendant acted with the corrupt intent that (his/her) public or official duty would be unlawfully influenced.

As used here, *bribe* means something of present or future value or advantage, or a promise to give such a thing, that is requested or taken with the corrupt intent that the public or official action, vote, decision, or opinion of the person to who is requesting, taking, or agreeing to take the bribe, will be unlawfully influenced.

A person acts with *corrupt intent* when he or she acts to wrongfully gain a financial or other advantage for himself, herself, or someone else.

[An *executive officer* is a government official who may use his or her own discretion in performing his or her job duties. [A \_\_\_\_\_ <insert title, e.g., police officer, commissioner, etc.> is an executive officer.]]

[A *ministerial officer* is an officer who has a clear and mandatory duty involving the performance of specific tasks without the exercise of discretion.]

[A *legislative officer* is a member of the (Assembly/Senate/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of other legislative body specified in Penal Code, § 86>) of this state.]

[A *judicial officer* includes a (juror[,]/ [or] judge [,]/ [or] referee[,]/ [or] commissioner[,]/ [or] arbitrator [,]/ [or] umpire[,]/ [or] [other] person

authorized by law to hear or determine any question or controversy).]

**[Requesting or agreeing to take a bribe does not require specific words or behavior, as long as the language used and the circumstances clearly show that the person is seeking a bribe from someone else. [The People do not need to prove that the other person actually consented to give a bribe.]]**

**[The People do not need to prove that the defendant made any effort to follow through on the purpose for which the bribe was sought.]**

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*New January 2006; Revised June 2007*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

Give the bracketed definition of “requesting or agreeing to take a bribe” if the prosecution is pursuing this theory.

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “The People do not need to prove that the defendant made any effort to follow through” if there is no evidence that the defendant took any action based on the alleged bribe.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 68, 86, 93.
- Bribe Defined. Pen. Code, § 7, subd. 6.
- Corruptly Defined. Pen. Code, § 7, subd. 3.
- Executive Officer Defined. *People v. Strohl* (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 347, 361 [129 Cal.Rptr. 224].
- Ministerial Officer Defined. Gov. Code, § 820.25(b); *People v. Strohl* (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 347, 361 [129 Cal.Rptr. 224].
- Legislative Member. Pen. Code, § 86.
- Judicial Officer. Pen. Code, § 93.
- Corrupt Intent Is an Element of Bribery. *People v. Gliksman* (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 343, 346–350 [144 Cal.Rptr. 451]; *People v. Zerillo* (1950) 36 Cal.2d 222, 232 [223 P.2d 223].
- Meaning of Understanding or Agreement. *People v. Pic'l* (1982) 31 Cal.3d 731, 738–740 [183 Cal.Rptr. 685, 646 P.2d 847]; *People v. Diedrich* (1982) 31 Cal.3d 263, 273–274 [182 Cal.Rptr. 354, 643 P.2d 971]; *People v. Gliksman* (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 343, 346–350 [144 Cal.Rptr. 451].
- Bribery and Extortion Distinguished. *People v. Powell* (1920) 50 Cal.App. 436, 441 [195 P. 456].

### RELATED ISSUES

See the Related Issues section of CALCRIM No. 2600, *Giving or Offering a Bribe to an Executive Officer*.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Governmental Authority, §§ 33–56.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 141, *Conspiracy, Solicitation, and Attempt*, § 141.10 (Matthew Bender).

**2604–2609. Reserved for Future Use**

## B. BRIBERY OR INTIMIDATION OF WITNESS

### (i) Bribery

#### 2610. Giving or Offering a Bribe to a Witness (Pen. Code, § 137(a))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with (giving[,]/ [or] offering[,]/ [or] promising) a bribe to a witness [in violation of Penal Code section 137(a)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant (gave[,]/ [or] offered[,]/ [or] promised) a bribe to (a witness[,]/ [or] a person about to be called as a witness[,]/ [or] a person about to give material information to a law enforcement official about a crime)[,] [or to someone acting on the (witness's/ [or] person's) behalf];

AND

2. The defendant acted with the corrupt intent to persuade the (witness/ [or] person) to agree that the bribe would unlawfully influence the (testimony/information) that the (witness/ [or] person) would give.

As used here, *bribe* means something of present or future value or advantage, or a promise to give such a thing, that is given or offered with the corrupt intent to unlawfully influence the testimony or information of the person to whom the bribe is given.

A person acts with *corrupt intent* when he or she acts to wrongfully gain a financial or other advantage for himself, herself, or someone else.

[As used here, *witness* means someone [or a person the defendant reasonably believed to be someone]:

<Give the appropriate bracketed paragraph[s].>

- [Who knows about the existence or nonexistence of facts relating to a crime(;/.)]

[OR]

- [Whose declaration under oath has been or may be received as evidence(;/.)]

[OR]

- [Who has reported a crime to a (peace officer[,]/ [or]

prosecutor[,]/ [or] probation or parole officer[,]/ [or] correctional officer[,]/ [or] judicial officer)(;/.)]

[OR

- Who has been served with a subpoena issued under the authority of any state or federal court.]]

[A person is *about to be called as a witness* (if he or she knows or has been told that he or she will be called as a witness [,]/ [or] if he or she knows material information relating to the issues in a case that has been or may be filed).]

[Information is *material* if it is significant or important.]

[(A/The) (district attorney[,]/ [or] deputy district attorney[,]/ [or] city attorney[,]/ [or] deputy city attorney[,]/ [or] Attorney General[,]/ [or] deputy attorney general[,]/ [or] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert title of peace officer included in Pen. Code, § 830 et seq.>) is a *law enforcement official*.]

[The (witness/ [or] person giving information) does not need to (have accepted the bribe[,]/ have been influenced by the bribe[,]/ [or] have intended to give the (testimony/information) the defendant sought).]

[*Offering a bribe* does not require specific words or behavior, as long as the language used and the circumstances clearly show an intent to bribe. [The thing offered does not need to actually be given, exist at the time it is offered, or have a specific value.]]

*New January 2006*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “The (witness/person giving information) does not need” if the evidence shows the witness did not accept the bribe or follow through on the bribe.

Give the bracketed definition of “offering a bribe” if the prosecution is pursuing this theory. Give the bracketed sentence that begins, “The thing offered does not need to actually,” on request.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 137(a).
- Witness Defined. Pen. Code, § 136(2).
- Bribe Defined. Pen. Code, § 7, subd. 6.

- Corruptly Defined. Pen. Code, § 7, subd. 3.
- Law Enforcement Official Defined. Pen. Code, § 137(e).
- About to Be Called as a Witness. *People v. Broce* (1977) 76 Cal.App.3d 71, 75–76 [142 Cal.Rptr. 628].
- Meaning of Understanding or Agreement. *People v. Pic'l* (1982) 31 Cal.3d 731, 738–740 [183 Cal.Rptr. 685, 646 P.2d 847]; *People v. Diedrich* (1982) 31 Cal.3d 263, 273–274 [182 Cal.Rptr. 354, 643 P.2d 971]; *People v. Gliksman* (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 343, 346–350 [144 Cal.Rptr. 451].
- Intent Requirement. *People v. Gliksman* (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 343, 346–350 [144 Cal.Rptr. 451].
- Offering a Bribe. *People v. Britton* (1962) 205 Cal.App.2d 561, 564 [22 Cal.Rptr. 921].

## RELATED ISSUES

### *Extortion Distinguished*

Extortion is bribery with the additional element of coercion. Accordingly, one cannot be guilty of receiving a bribe and extortion in the same transaction. (*People v. Powell* (1920) 50 Cal.App. 436, 441 [195 P. 456].)

### *Witness*

A witness need not have information that is actually true or that relates to charges that result in conviction. (*People v. Cribas* (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 596, 610–611 [282 Cal.Rptr. 538].)

## SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Governmental Authority, §§ 33–56.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 141, *Conspiracy, Solicitation, and Attempt*, § 141.10 (Matthew Bender).

**2611. Giving or Offering a Bribe to a Witness Not to Testify (Pen. Code, § 138(a))**

---

The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with (giving[,]/ [or] offering[,]/ [or] promising) a bribe to a witness not to testify [in violation of Penal Code section 138(a)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant (gave[,]/ [or] offered[,]/ [or] promised) a bribe to (a witness/ [or] a person about to be called as a witness) [or to someone else acting on the (witness's/ [or] person's) behalf];

**AND**

2. The defendant acted with the corrupt intent that the bribe would unlawfully persuade the (witness/ [or] person) not to attend (a trial/ [or] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert type of other judicial proceeding>).

As used here, *bribe* means something of present or future value or advantage, or a promise to give such a thing, that is given or offered with the corrupt intent to unlawfully influence the witness not to attend (a trial/ [or] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert type of other judicial proceeding>).

A person acts with *corrupt intent* when he or she acts to wrongfully gain a financial or other advantage for himself, herself, or someone else.

[As used here, *witness* means someone [or a person the defendant reasonably believed to be someone]:

<Give the appropriate bracketed paragraph[s].>

- [Who knows about the existence or nonexistence of facts relating to a crime(;/.)]

[OR]

- [Whose declaration under oath has been or may be received as evidence(;/.)]

[OR]

- [Who has reported a crime to a (peace officer[,]/ [or] prosecutor[,]/ [or] probation or parole officer[,]/ [or] correctional officer[,]/ [or] judicial officer)(;/.)]

[OR]

- Who has been served with a subpoena issued under the authority of any state or federal court.[]

[A person is *about to be called as a witness* (if he or she knows or has



been told that he or she will be called as a witness[,]/ [or] if he or she knows material information relating to the issues in a case that has been or may be filed). [Information is *material* if it is significant or important.]]

[The (witness/ [or] person giving information) does not need to (have accepted the bribe[,]/ have been influenced by the bribe[,]/ [or] have failed to attend (the trial[,]/ [or] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert type of other judicial proceeding>)).]

[*Offering a bribe* does not require specific words or behavior, as long as the language used and the circumstances clearly show an intent to ensure that the witness will not attend (a trial/ [or] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert type of other judicial proceeding>). [The thing offered does not need to actually be given, exist at the time it is offered, or have a specific value.]]

New January 2006

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “The (witness/person giving information) does not need” if the evidence shows the witness did not accept the bribe or follow through on the bribe.

Give the bracketed definition of “offering a bribe” if the prosecution is pursuing this theory. Give the bracketed sentence that begins, “The thing offered does not need to actually,” on request.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 138(a).
- Witness Defined. Pen. Code, § 136(2).
- Bribe Defined. Pen. Code, § 7, subd. 6.
- Corruptly Defined. Pen. Code, § 7, subd. 3.
- About to Be Called as a Witness. *People v. Broce* (1977) 76 Cal.App.3d 71, 75–76 [142 Cal.Rptr. 628].
- Meaning of Understanding or Agreement. *People v. Pic'l* (1982) 31 Cal.3d 731, 738–740 [183 Cal.Rptr. 685, 646 P.2d 847]; *People v. Diedrich* (1982) 31 Cal.3d 263, 273–274 [182 Cal.Rptr. 354, 643 P.2d 971]; *People v. Gliksmán* (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 343, 346–350 [144 Cal.Rptr. 451].
- Intent Requirement. *People v. Gliksmán* (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 343, 346–350 [144 Cal.Rptr. 451].
- Offering a Bribe. *People v. Britton* (1962) 205 Cal.App.2d 561, 564 [22 Cal.Rptr. 921].

**RELATED ISSUES**

See the Related Issues section of CALCRIM No. 2610, *Giving or Offering a Bribe to a Witness*.

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Governmental Authority, §§ 33–56.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 141, *Conspiracy, Solicitation, and Attempt*, § 141.10 (Matthew Bender).

## 2612. Witness Receiving a Bribe (Pen. Code, § 138(b))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with receiving a bribe as a witness [in violation of Penal Code section 138(b)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant was (a witness/about to be called as a witness);
2. The defendant (received/ [or] offered to receive) a bribe;
3. When the defendant (received/ [or] offered to receive) the bribe, (he/she) represented that the bribe would unlawfully (influence (his/her) testimony/cause (him/her) not to attend the (trial/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert type of other judicial proceeding>)). The representation may have been express or implied;

AND

4. The defendant acted with the corrupt intent that the bribe would unlawfully (influence (his/her) testimony/cause (him/her) not to attend the (trial/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert type of other judicial proceeding>)).

As used here, *bribe* means something of present or future value or advantage, or a promise to give such a thing, that is requested or received with corrupt intent.

A person acts with *corrupt intent* when he or she acts to wrongfully gain a financial or other advantage for himself, herself, or someone else.

[As used here, *witness* means someone [or a person reasonably believed to be someone]:

<Give the appropriate bracketed paragraph[s].>

- [Who knows about the existence or nonexistence of facts relating to a crime(;/.)]

[OR]

- [Whose declaration under oath has been or may be received as evidence(;/.)]

[OR]

- [Who has reported a crime to a (peace officer[,]/ [or] prosecutor[,]/ [or] probation or parole officer[,]/ [or] correctional officer[,]/ [or] judicial officer)(;/.)]

[OR]

- Who has been served with a subpoena issued under the authority of any state or federal court.]]

[A person is *about to be called as a witness* (if he or she knows or has been told that he or she will be called as a witness[,]/ [or] if he or she knows material information relating to the issues in a case that has been or may be filed). [Information is *material* if it is significant or important.]]

[*Offering to receive a bribe* does not require specific words or behavior, as long as the language used and the circumstances clearly show that the person is seeking a bribe from someone else. [The People do not need to prove that the other person actually consented to give a bribe.]]

[The People do not need to prove that the defendant made any effort to follow through on the purpose for which the bribe was sought.]

*New January 2006*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

Give the definition of “offering to take a bribe” if that is the prosecution’s theory of the case.

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “The People do not need to prove” if there is no evidence that the defendant took any action based on the alleged bribe.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 138(b).
- Witness Defined. Pen. Code, § 136(2).
- Bribe Defined. Pen. Code, § 7, subd. 6.
- Corruptly Defined. Pen. Code, § 7, subd. 3.
- About to Be Called as a Witness. *People v. Broce* (1977) 76 Cal.App.3d 71, 75–76 [142 Cal.Rptr. 628].
- Meaning of Understanding or Agreement. *People v. Pic’l* (1982) 31 Cal.3d 731, 738–740 [183 Cal.Rptr. 685, 646 P.2d 847]; *People v. Diedrich* (1982) 31 Cal.3d 263, 273–274 [182 Cal.Rptr. 354, 643 P.2d 971]; *People v. Gliksman* (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 343, 346–350 [144 Cal.Rptr. 451].
- Offering a Bribe. *People v. Britton* (1962) 205 Cal.App.2d 561, 564 [22 Cal.Rptr. 921].

## RELATED ISSUES

See the Related Issues section of CALCRIM No. 2610, *Giving or Offering a Bribe to a Witness*.

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Governmental Authority, §§ 33–56.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 141, *Conspiracy, Solicitation, and Attempt*, § 141.10 (Matthew Bender).

**2613–2619. Reserved for Future Use**

## (ii) Threatening or Intimidating

### 2620. Using Force or Threatening a Witness Before Testimony or Information Given (Pen. Code, § 137(b))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with (using force/ [or] threatening to use force) against a person to cause that person [or someone else] to (give false (testimony/ [or] information)/ [or] withhold true (testimony/ [or] information)) [in violation of Penal Code section 137(b)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant [unlawfully] (used force/ [or] threatened to use force) against \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name/description of person allegedly targeted>;

AND

<Alternative 2A—to give or withhold testimony>

- [2. When the defendant (used force/ [or] made the threat), (he/she) intended to cause \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name/description of person defendant allegedly sought to influence> to (give false testimony/ [or] withhold true testimony).]

<Alternative 2B—to give or withhold information>

- [2. When the defendant (used force/ [or] made the threat), (he/she) intended to cause \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name/description of person defendant allegedly sought to influence> to (give false material information about a crime to/ [or] withhold true material information about a crime from) a law enforcement official.]

[A person *makes a threat of force* when he or she communicates to someone else a believable threat of unlawful injury to a person or property.]

[Information is *material* if it is significant or important.]

[(A/The) (district attorney[,]/ [or] deputy district attorney[,]/ [or] city attorney[,]/ [or] deputy city attorney[,]/ [or] Attorney General[,]/ [or] deputy attorney general[,]/ [or] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert title of peace officer included in Pen. Code, § 830 et seq.>) is a *law enforcement official*.]

[The People do not need to prove that \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name/description of person defendant allegedly sought to influence> **actually** (gave false (testimony/information)/ [or] withheld true (testimony/information)).]

*New January 2006*

## BENCH NOTES

### ***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “A person *makes a threat of force*” whenever the prosecution alleges that the defendant made a threat. (Pen. Code, § 137(b).)

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “The People do not need to prove that” if the evidence shows that the testimony or information of the alleged target was not affected.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 137(b).
- Threat Defined. Pen. Code, § 137(b).
- Law Enforcement Official Defined. Pen. Code, § 137(e).
- Specific Intent Required. *People v. Womack* (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 926, 929–930 [47 Cal.Rptr.2d 76].

## LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

The misdemeanor offense of knowingly inducing a false statement to a law enforcement official in violation of Penal Code section 137(c) is not a lesser included offense of section 137(b) because the latter offense lacks the element that the defendant must actually cause a false statement to be made. (*People v. Miles* (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 575, 580 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 52].)

## RELATED ISSUES

### ***Penal Code Sections 137(b), 136.1, and 138***

Because one cannot “influence” the testimony of a witness if the witness does not testify, a conviction under Penal Code section 137(b) is inconsistent with a conviction under Penal Code section 136.1 or 138, which require that a defendant prevent, rather than influence, testimony. (*People v. Womack* (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 926, 931 [47 Cal.Rptr.2d 76].)

## SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Governmental Authority, §§ 6, 12.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 141, *Conspiracy, Solicitation, and Attempt*, § 141.10 (Matthew Bender).

## 2621. Influencing a Witness by Fraud (Pen. Code, § 137(b))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with using fraud to influence a person to (give false (testimony/ [or] information)/ [or] withhold true (testimony/ [or] information)) [in violation of Penal Code section 137(b)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant used fraud against \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name/description of person defendant allegedly sought to influence>;

**AND**

<Alternative 2A—to give or withhold testimony>

- [2. When the defendant used fraud, (he/she) intended to cause \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name/description of person defendant allegedly sought to influence> to (give false testimony/ [or] withhold true testimony).]

<Alternative 2B—to give or withhold information>

- [2. When the defendant used fraud, (he/she) intended to cause \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name/description of person defendant allegedly sought to influence> to (give false material information about a crime to/ [or] withhold true material information about a crime from) a law enforcement official.]

A person *uses fraud* when he or she makes a false statement, misrepresents information, hides the truth, or otherwise does something with the intent to deceive.

[Information is *material* if it is significant or important.]

[(A/The) (district attorney[,]/ [or] deputy district attorney[,]/ [or] city attorney[,]/ [or] deputy city attorney[,]/ [or] Attorney General[,]/ [or] deputy attorney general[,]/ [or] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert title of peace officer included in Pen. Code, § 830 et seq.>) is a *law enforcement official*.]

[The People do not need to prove that \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name/description of person defendant allegedly sought to influence> **actually** (gave false (testimony/information)/ [or] withheld true (testimony/information)).]



## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “The People do not need to prove that” if the evidence shows that the testimony or information of the alleged target was not affected.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 137(b).
- Fraud Defined. *People v. Pugh* (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 66, 72 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 770].
- Law Enforcement Official Defined. Pen. Code, § 137(e).
- Specific Intent Required. *People v. Womack* (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 926, 929–930 [47 Cal.Rptr.2d 76].

## LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

The misdemeanor offense of knowingly inducing a false statement to a law enforcement official in violation of Penal Code section 137(c) is not a lesser included offense of section 137(b) because the latter offense lacks the element that the defendant must actually cause a false statement to be made. (*People v. Miles* (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 575, 580 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 52].)

## RELATED ISSUES

### *Deceiving a Witness*

Deceiving a witness is a separate crime under Penal Code section 133:

Every person who practices any fraud or deceit, or knowingly makes or exhibits any false statement, representation, token, or writing, to any witness or person about to be called as a witness upon any trial, proceeding, inquiry, or investigation whatever, authorized by law, with intent to affect the testimony of such witness, is guilty of a misdemeanor.

## SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Governmental Authority, § 12.

**2622. Intimidating a Witness (Pen. Code, § 136.1(a) & (b))**

---

The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with intimidating a witness [in violation of Penal Code section 136.1].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

*<Alternative 1A—attending or giving testimony>*

- [1. The defendant maliciously (tried to (prevent/ [or] discourage)/(prevented/ [or] discouraged)) \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name/description of person defendant allegedly sought to influence>* from (attending/ [or] giving testimony at) \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert type of judicial proceeding or inquiry authorized by law>*];

*<Alternative 1B—report of victimization>*

- [1. The defendant (tried to (prevent/ [or] discourage)/(prevented/ [or] discouraged)) \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name/description of person defendant allegedly sought to influence>* from making a report that (he/she/someone else) was a victim of a crime to \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert type of official specified in Pen. Code, § 136.1(b)(1)>*];

*<Alternative 1C—causing prosecution>*

- [1. The defendant (tried to (prevent/ [or] discourage)/(prevented/ [or] discouraged)) \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name/description of person defendant allegedly sought to influence>* from cooperating or providing information so that a (complaint/indictment/information/probation violation/parole violation) could be sought and prosecuted, and from helping to prosecute that action;]

*<Alternative 1D—causing arrest>*

- [1. The defendant (tried to (prevent/ [or] discourage)/(prevented/ [or] discouraged)) \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name/description of person defendant allegedly sought to influence>* from (arresting[,]/ [or] (causing/ [or] seeking) the arrest of [,]) someone in connection with a crime;]
2. \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name/description of person defendant allegedly sought to influence>* was a (witness/ [or] crime victim);

**AND**

3. The defendant knew (he/she) was (trying to (prevent/ [or] discourage)/(preventing/ [or] discouraging)) \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name/description of person defendant allegedly sought to influence>*

from \_\_\_\_\_ <insert appropriate description from element 1>  
and intended to do so.

[A person acts *maliciously* when he or she unlawfully intends to annoy, harm, or injure someone else in any way, or intends to interfere in any way with the orderly administration of justice.]

[As used here, *witness* means someone [or a person the defendant reasonably believed to be someone]:

<Give the appropriate bracketed paragraph[s].>

- [Who knows about the existence or nonexistence of facts relating to a crime(;/.)]

[OR]

- [Whose declaration under oath has been or may be received as evidence(;/.)]

[OR]

- [Who has reported a crime to a (peace officer[,]/ [or] prosecutor[,]/ [or] probation or parole officer[,]/ [or] correctional officer[,]/ [or] judicial officer)(;/.)]

[OR]

- [Who has been served with a subpoena issued under the authority of any state or federal court.]]

[A person is a *victim* if there is reason to believe that a federal or state crime is being or has been committed or attempted against him or her.]

[It is not a defense that the defendant was not successful in preventing or discouraging the (victim/ [or] witness).]

[It is not a defense that no one was actually physically injured or otherwise intimidated.]

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*New January 2006; Revised September 2020*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

In element 1, alternative 1A applies to charges under Penal Code section 136.1(a), which prohibits “knowingly and maliciously” preventing or attempting to prevent a witness or victim from giving testimony. Alternatives 1B through 1D apply to charges under Penal Code section 136.1(b). Because the offense always requires

specific intent, the committee has included the knowledge requirement with the specific intent requirement in element 3. (*People v. Ford* (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 985, 990 [193 Cal.Rptr. 684]; see also *People v. Womack* (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 926, 929–930 [47 Cal.Rptr.2d 76].)

If the defendant is charged with one of the sentencing factors in Penal Code section 136.1(c), give CALCRIM No. 2623, *Intimidating a Witness: Sentencing Factors*. If the defendant is charged with the sentencing factor based on a prior conviction, the court must give both CALCRIM No. 2623 and CALCRIM No. 3100, *Prior Conviction: Nonbifurcated Trial*, unless the court has granted a bifurcated trial on the prior conviction or the defendant has stipulated to the conviction.

Note that Penal Code section 136.1(a)(3) states, “For purposes of this section, evidence that the defendant was a family member who interceded in an effort to protect the witness or victim shall create a presumption that the act was without malice.” It is unclear whether the court must instruct on this presumption.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 136.1(a) & (b).
- Malice Defined. Pen. Code, § 136(1).
- Witness Defined. Pen. Code, § 136(2).
- Victim Defined. Pen. Code, § 136(3).
- Specific Intent Required. *People v. Ford* (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 985, 990 [193 Cal.Rptr. 684]; see also *People v. Womack* (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 926, 929–930 [47 Cal.Rptr.2d 76].
- Malice Not Required For Violations of Penal Code Section 136.1(b). *People v. Brackins* (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 56, 66–67 [249 Cal.Rptr.3d 261].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

A violation of Penal Code section 136.1(a) or (b) is a felony-misdemeanor, punishable by a maximum of three years in state prison. If the defendant is also charged with one of the sentencing factors in Penal Code section 136.1(c), then the offense is a felony punishable by two, three, or four years. If the defendant is charged under Penal Code section 131.6(c), then the offenses under subdivisions (a) and (b) are lesser included offenses. The court must provide the jury with a verdict form on which the jury will indicate if the prosecution has proved the sentencing factor alleged. If the jury finds that this allegation has not been proved, then the offense should be set at the level of the lesser offense.

The misdemeanor offense of knowingly inducing a false statement to a law enforcement official in violation of Penal Code section 137(c) is not a lesser included offense of Penal Code section 137(b) because the latter offense lacks the element that the defendant must actually cause a false statement to be made. (*People v. Miles* (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 575, 580 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 52].)

**RELATED ISSUES*****Penal Code Sections 137(b), 136.1, and 138***

Because one cannot “influence” the testimony of a witness if the witness does not testify, a conviction under Penal Code section 137(b) is inconsistent with a conviction under Penal Code section 136.1 or 138, which requires that a defendant prevent, rather than influence, testimony. (*People v. Womack* (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 926, 931 [47 Cal.Rptr.2d 76].)

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Governmental Authority, §§ 5, 6.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 82, *Witnesses*, § 82.07, Ch. 84, *Motions at Trial*, § 84.11 (Matthew Bender).

5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 91, *Sentencing*, §§ 91.23[6][e], 91.43 (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.13[4][b]; Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.03[2], [4] (Matthew Bender).

**2623. Intimidating a Witness: Sentencing Factors (Pen. Code,  
§ 136.1(c))**

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If you find the defendant guilty of intimidating a witness, you must then decide whether the People have proved the additional allegation[s] that the defendant [acted maliciously] [and] [(acted in furtherance of a conspiracy/ [or] used or threatened to use force/ [or] acted to obtain money or something of value)].

To prove (this/these) allegation[s], the People must prove that:

[1. The defendant acted maliciously(;/.)]

[AND]

<Alternative A—furtherance of a conspiracy>

[(2A/1). The defendant acted with the intent to assist in a conspiracy to intimidate a witness(;/.)]

<Alternative B—used or threatened force>

[(2B/2). The defendant used force or threatened, either directly or indirectly, to use force or violence on the person or property of [a] (witness[,]/ [or] victim[,]/ [or] any other person)(;/.)]

<Alternative C—financial gain>

[(2C/3). The defendant acted (in order to obtain (money/ [or] something of value)/ [or] at the request of someone else in exchange for something of value).]

[Instruction[s] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert instruction number[s]> explain[s] when someone is acting in a conspiracy to intimidate a witness. You must apply (that/those) instruction[s] when you decide whether the People have proved this additional allegation. <The court must modify and give Instruction 415, et seq., explaining the law of conspiracy as it applies to the facts of the particular case.>]

[A person acts *maliciously* when he or she unlawfully intends to annoy, harm, or injure someone else in any way, or intends to interfere in any way with the orderly administration of justice.]

The People have the burden of proving (this/each) allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden [for any allegation], you must find that (this/the) allegation has not been proved.

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

If the defendant is charged with a felony based on Penal Code section 136.1(c), the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the alleged sentencing factor. This instruction **must** be given with CALCRIM No. 2622, *Intimidating a Witness*.

As noted in the Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 2622, the court will instruct the jury that knowledge and malice are elements of a violation of Penal Code section 136.1(a). If the court has given the malice element in CALCRIM No. 2622, the court may delete it here. If the court has not already given this element and the defendant is charged under subdivision (c), the court must give the bracketed element requiring malice here.

If the defendant is charged with the sentencing factor based on a prior conviction, the court must give CALCRIM No. 3100, *Prior Conviction: Nonbifurcated Trial*, unless the court has granted a bifurcated trial on the prior conviction or the defendant has stipulated to the conviction. In such cases, the court should also give this instruction, CALCRIM No. 2623, only if the court has not already instructed the jury on malice or the defendant is also charged with another sentencing factor.

The court must provide the jury with a verdict form on which the jury will indicate if each alleged sentencing factor has or has not been proved.

If the court instructs on furtherance of a conspiracy, give the appropriate corresponding instructions on conspiracy. (See CALCRIM No. 415, *Conspiracy*.)

## AUTHORITY

- Factors. Pen. Code, § 136.1(c).
- Malice Defined. Pen. Code, § 136(1).

## SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Governmental Authority, § 6.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 82, *Witnesses*, § 82.07, Ch. 84, *Motions at Trial*, § 84.11 (Matthew Bender).

5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 91, *Sentencing*, §§ 91.23[6][e], 91.43 (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.13[4][b], Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.03[2], [4] (Matthew Bender).

**2624. Threatening a Witness After Testimony or Information Given  
(Pen. Code, § 140(a))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with (using force/ [or] threatening to use force) against a witness [in violation of Penal Code section 140(a)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name/description of person allegedly targeted>* gave (assistance/ [or] information) to a (law enforcement officer/ public prosecutor) in a (criminal case/juvenile court case);

[AND]

2. The defendant willfully (used force/ [or] threatened to use force or violence against \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name/description of person allegedly targeted>*/ [or] threatened to take, damage, or destroy the property of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name/description of person allegedly targeted>*) because (he/she) had given that (assistance/ [or] information)(;/.)

*<Give the following language if the violation is based on a threat>*

[AND]

- [3. A reasonable listener in a similar situation with similar knowledge would interpret the threat, in light of the context and surrounding circumstances, as a serious expression of intent to commit an act of unlawful force or violence(;/.)]

[OR]

- [ (3./4.) A reasonable listener in a similar situation with similar knowledge would interpret the threat, in light of the context and surrounding circumstances, as a serious expression of intent to commit an act of unlawful taking, damage or destruction of property.]

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose.

[An officer or employee of (a/an) (local police department[,]/ [or] sheriff's office[,]/ [or] \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert title of agency of peace officer enumerated in Pen. Code, § 13519(b)>*) is a *law enforcement officer*.]

[A lawyer employed by (a/an/the) (district attorney's office[,]/ [or] Attorney General's office[,]/ [or] city (prosecutor's/attorney's) office) to prosecute cases is a *public prosecutor*.]



**[The People do not need to prove that the threat was communicated to \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name/description of person allegedly targeted> or that (he/she) was aware of the threat.]**

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2012, March 2021*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 140(a).
- Witness Defined. Pen. Code, § 136(2).
- Victim Defined. Pen. Code, § 136(3).
- Public Prosecutor Defined. Gov. Code, §§ 26500, 12550, 41803.
- Law Enforcement Officer Defined. Pen. Code, § 13519(b).
- General Intent Offense. *People v. McDaniel* (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 278, 283 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 306].
- Threat Need Not Be Communicated to Target. *People v. McLaughlin* (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 836, 842 [54 Cal.Rptr.2d 4].
- Reasonable Listener Standard. *People v. Lowery* (2011) 52 Cal.4th 419, 427 [128 Cal.Rptr.3d 648, 257 P.3d 72].

## COMMENTARY

Penal Code section 140 does not define “threat.” (Cf. Pen. Code, §§ 137(b), 76 [both statutes containing definition of threat].) In *People v. McDaniel* (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 278, 283 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 306], the Court of Appeal held that threatening a witness under Penal Code section 140 is a general intent crime. According to the holding of *People v. McDaniel, supra*, 22 Cal.App.4th at p. 284, there is no requirement that the defendant intend to cause fear to the victim or intend to affect the victim’s conduct in any manner. In *People v. McLaughlin* (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 836, 842 [54 Cal.Rptr.2d 4], the court held that the threat does not need to be communicated to the intended target in any manner. The committee has drafted this instruction in accordance with these holdings. However, the court may wish to consider whether the facts in the case before it demonstrate a sufficiently “genuine threat” to withstand First Amendment scrutiny. (See *In re George T.* (2004) 33 Cal.4th 620, 637–638 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 61, 93 P.3d 1007]; *People v. Gudger* (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 310, 320–321 [34 Cal.Rptr.2d 510]; *Watts v. United States* (1969) 394 U.S. 705, 707 [89 S.Ct. 1399, 22 L.Ed.2d 664]; *United States v. Kelner* (2d Cir. 1976) 534 F.2d 1020, 1027.)

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Governmental Authority, § 9.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 140, *Challenges to Crimes*, § 140.02; Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.11A[1][a] (Matthew Bender).

**2625–2629. Reserved for Future Use**

## C. EVIDENCE TAMPERING

### 2630. Evidence Tampering by Peace Officer or Other Person (Pen. Code, § 141)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with tampering with evidence [in violation of Penal Code section 141].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant willfully, intentionally, and wrongfully (changed[,]/ [or] planted[,]/ [or] placed[,]/ [or] made[,]/ [or] hid[,]/ [or] moved) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name/description of physical matter at issue>;
2. The defendant knew (he/she) was (changing[,]/ [or] planting[,]/ [or] placing[,]/ [or] making[,]/ [or] hiding[,]/ [or] moving) the \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name/ description of physical matter at issue>;

[AND]

3. When the defendant (changed[,]/ [or] planted[,]/ [or] placed[,]/ [or] made[,]/ [or] hid[,]/ [or] moved) the \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name/description of physical matter at issue>, (he/she) intended that (his/her) action would result in (someone being charged with a crime/ [or] the \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name/description of physical matter at issue> being wrongfully produced as genuine or true in (a/an) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert type of court proceeding specified in Pen. Code, § 141>)(;/.)

<Give element 4 if the defendant is charged under Pen. Code, § 141(b).>

[AND]

4. When the defendant acted, (he/she) was a peace officer.]

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose.

[A sworn member of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of agency that employs peace officer>, authorized by \_\_\_\_\_ <insert appropriate section from Pen. Code, § 830 et seq.> to \_\_\_\_\_ <describe statutory authority>, is a *peace officer*.]

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New January 2006; Revised August 2016

**BENCH NOTES*****Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

Give element 4 if the defendant is a peace officer charged with a felony violation of Penal Code section 141(b).

The jury must determine whether the defendant was a peace officer. (See *People v. Flood* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 482 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180, 957 P.2d 869].) The court must instruct the jury on the appropriate definition of “peace officer” from the statute. (*Ibid.*) It is error for the court to instruct that a person is a peace officer as a matter of law. (*Ibid.* [instruction that “Officer Bridgeman and Officer Gurney are peace officers” was error].)

**AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 141.
- Peace Officer Defined. Pen. Code, § 830 et seq.

**LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES**

If the defendant is charged with a felony based on being a peace officer (Pen. Code, § 141(b)), then the misdemeanor of evidence tampering by a non-peace officer is a lesser included offense. (Pen. Code, § 141(a).)

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Governmental Authority, § 4.

3 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 70, *Discovery and Inspection*, § 70.21[3] (Matthew Bender).

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 83, *Evidence*, § 83.10[2] (Matthew Bender).

**2631–2639. Reserved for Future Use**

## D. PERJURY

### 2640. Perjury (Pen. Code, § 118)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with perjury [in violation of Penal Code section 118].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

*<Alternative 1A—defendant took an oath>*

1. The defendant took an oath to (testify[,]/ [or] declare[,]/ [or] depose[,]/ [or] certify) truthfully before a competent (tribunal[,]/ [or] officer[,]/ [or] person) under circumstances in which the oath of the State of California lawfully may be given;

*<Alternative 1B—defendant gave statement under penalty of perjury>*

1. The defendant (testified[,]/ [or] declared[,]/ [or] deposed[,]/ [or] certified) under penalty of perjury under circumstances in which such (testimony[,]/ [or] declaration[,]/ [or] deposition[,]/ [or] certificate) was permitted by law;
2. When the defendant (testified[,]/ [or] declared[,]/ [or] deposed[,]/ [or] certified), (he/she) willfully stated that the information was true even though (he/she) knew it was false;
3. The information was material;
4. The defendant knew (he/she) was making the statement under (oath/penalty of perjury);

[AND]

5. When the defendant made the false statement, (he/she) intended to (testify[,]/ [or] declare[,]/ [or] depose[,]/ [or] certify) falsely while under (oath/penalty of perjury)(;/.)

*<Give element 6 only if statement made in declaration, deposition, or certificate.>*

[AND]

6. The defendant signed and delivered (his/her) (declaration[,]/ [or] deposition[,]/ [or] certificate) to someone else intending that it be circulated or published as true.]

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose.

[An *oath* is an affirmation or any other method authorized by law to affirm the truth of a statement.]

[Information is *material* if it is probable that the information would influence the outcome of the proceedings, but it does not need to actually have an influence on the proceedings.]

[Information is *material* if \_\_\_\_\_ <insert appropriate definition; see *Bench Notes*>.]

The People do not need to prove that the defendant knew that the information in (his/her) statement was material.

You may not find the defendant's statement was false based on the testimony of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of witness> alone. In addition to the testimony of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of witness>, there must be some other evidence that the defendant's statement was false. This other evidence may be direct or indirect. [However, if you conclude, based on the defendant's own testimony, that the allegedly false statement was in fact false, then additional evidence is not required.]

If the defendant actually believed that the statement was true, the defendant is not guilty of this crime even if the defendant's belief was mistaken.

The People allege that the defendant made the following false statement[s]: \_\_\_\_\_ <insert alleged statement[s]>.

[You may not find the defendant guilty unless all of you agree that the People have proved that the defendant made at least one false statement and you all agree on which particular false statement the defendant made. The People do not need to prove that all the allegedly false statements were in fact false.]

[It is not a defense (that the oath was given or taken in an irregular manner/ [or] that the defendant did not go before or take the oath in the presence of the officer claiming to administer the oath) as long as the defendant caused the officer administering the oath to certify that the oath had been taken.]

[When a person makes a statement, without qualification, that information is true, but he or she does not know whether the information is true, the making of that statement is the same as saying something that the person knows is false.]

[If the defendant attempted to correct the statement after it was made, that attempt may show that the defendant did not intend to (testify[,]/ [or] declare[,]/ [or] depose[,]/ [or] certify) falsely. It is up to you to decide the meaning and importance of that conduct.]

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to define “material.” (*People v. Kobrin* (1995) 11 Cal.4th 416, 430 [45 Cal.Rptr.2d 895, 903 P.2d 1027] [materiality is a fact question to be decided by the jury].) The first bracketed definition of material is appropriate for court proceedings or legislative hearings. (*People v. Hedgecock* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 395, 405 [272 Cal.Rptr. 803, 795 P.2d 1260] [not appropriate for charge of perjury on required disclosure forms].) For other types of proceedings, the court should use the second bracketed sentence, inserting an appropriate definition in the blank provided. (*Id.* at pp. 405–407.)

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct the jury about the need for corroboration of the evidence of perjury. (*People v. Di Giacomo* (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 688, 698 [14 Cal.Rptr. 574]; Pen. Code, § 118(b).) If the evidence that the statement is false is based in whole or in part on the defendant’s testimony, give the bracketed sentence that begins with “However, if you conclude, based on the defendant’s own testimony.”

If the prosecution alleges under a single count that the defendant made multiple statements that were perjury, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on unanimity. (*People v. McRae* (1967) 256 Cal.App.2d 95, 120–121 [63 Cal.Rptr. 854].) Give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “You may not find the defendant guilty unless.”

Give element 6 if the case involves a declaration, deposition, or certificate. (Pen. Code, § 124; *People v. Griffini* (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 581, 596 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 590] [delivery requirement applies to “declaration”; discussing at length meaning of “deposition,” “declaration,” “certificate,” and “affidavit”]; *Collins v. Superior Court* (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1244, 1247 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 123]; *People v. Post* (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 467, 480–481 [114 Cal.Rptr.2d 356].)

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “It is not a defense (that the oath was given or taken in an irregular manner” on request if supported by the evidence and when instructing with element 1A. (Pen. Code, § 121.)

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “When a person makes a statement, without qualification,” on request if supported by the evidence. (Pen. Code, § 125.)

If there is sufficient evidence, give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “If the defendant attempted to correct.” (*People v. Baranov* (1962) 201 Cal.App.2d 52, 60–61 [19 Cal.Rptr. 866].)

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 118.
- Oath Defined. Pen. Code, § 119.
- Irregular Oath Not a Defense. Pen. Code, § 121.

- Knowledge of Materiality Not Necessary. Pen. Code, § 123.
- Completion of Deposition, Affidavit, or Certificate. Pen. Code, § 124; *Collins v. Superior Court* (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1244, 1247 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 123].
- Unqualified Statement Equivalent to False Statement. Pen. Code, § 125.
- Material Defined. *People v. Pierce* (1967) 66 Cal.2d 53, 61 [56 Cal.Rptr. 817, 423 P.2d 969]; *People v. Hedgecock* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 395, 405 [272 Cal.Rptr. 803, 795 P.2d 1260]; *People v. Rubio* (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 927, 930–934 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 524].
- Materiality Is Element to Be Decided by Jury. *People v. Kobrin* (1995) 11 Cal.4th 416, 430 [45 Cal.Rptr.2d 895, 903 P.2d 1027]; *People v. Feinberg* (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1566, 1576 [60 Cal.Rptr.2d 323].
- Specific Intent to Testify Falsely Required. *People v. Viniegra* (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 577, 584 [181 Cal.Rptr. 848]; see also *People v. Hagen* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 652, 663–664 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 24, 967 P.2d 563] [discussing intent requirement for perjury].
- Good Faith Belief Statement True Negates Intent. *People v. Von Tiedeman* (1898) 120 Cal. 128, 134 [52 P. 155] [cited with approval in *People v. Hagen* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 652, 663–664 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 24, 967 P.2d 563]]; *People v. Louie* (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d Supp. 28, 43 [205 Cal.Rptr. 247].
- Declaration Must Be Delivered. *People v. Griffini* (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 581, 596 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 590].
- Unanimity. *People v. McRae* (1967) 256 Cal.App.2d 95, 120–121 [63 Cal.Rptr. 854].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Attempted Perjury. *People v. Post* (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 467, 480–481 [114 Cal.Rptr.2d 356].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Unsigned Deposition*

In *People v. Post* (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 467, 480–481 [114 Cal.Rptr.2d 356], the court held that an unexecuted deposition transcript was like an undelivered statement that could not form the basis for a perjury conviction. Nevertheless, it was sufficient evidence to support a conviction on the lesser included offense of attempted perjury. (*Ibid.*)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Governmental Authority, §§ 57–85.

2 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 40, *Accusatory Pleadings*, § 40.07[6] (Matthew Bender).



## 2641. Perjury by False Affidavit (Pen. Code, § 118a)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with perjury by false affidavit [in violation of Penal Code section 118a].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant gave an affidavit in which (he/she) (swore[,]/ [or] affirmed[,]/ [or] declared[,]/ [or] deposed[,]/ [or] certified) that (he/she) would (testify[,]/ [or] declare[,]/ [or] depose[,]/ [or] certify) before a competent (tribunal[,]/ [or] officer[,]/ [or] person) in connection with a case that had been or would be filed;
2. The defendant signed and delivered (his/her) affidavit to someone else intending that it be used, circulated, or published as true;
3. In the affidavit, the defendant willfully stated that information was true even though (he/she) knew it was false;
4. The information was material;
5. The defendant knew (he/she) was making the statement under (oath/affirmation);

AND

6. When the defendant made the false statement, (he/she) intended to (testify[,]/ [or] declare[,]/ [or] depose[,]/ [or] certify) falsely while under (oath/affirmation).

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose.

An *affidavit* is a written statement made under an (oath/affirmation) given by a person authorized to administer oaths. [An *oath* is an affirmation or any other method authorized by law to affirm the truth of a statement.]

[Information is *material* if it is probable that the information would influence the outcome of the proceedings, but it does not need to actually have an influence on the proceedings.]

[Information is *material* if \_\_\_\_\_ <insert appropriate definition; see *Bench Notes*>.]

The People do not need to prove that the defendant knew that the information in (his/her) statement was material.

You may not find the defendant's statement was false based on the testimony of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of witness> alone. In addition to

the testimony of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of witness>*, there must be some other evidence that the defendant's statement was false. This other evidence may be direct or indirect. [However, if you conclude, based on the defendant's own testimony, that the allegedly false statement was in fact false, then additional evidence is not required.]

If the defendant actually believed that the statement was true, the defendant is not guilty of this crime even if the defendant's belief was mistaken.

The People allege that the defendant made the following false statement[s]: \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert alleged statement[s]>*.

[You may not find the defendant guilty unless all of you agree that the People have proved that the defendant made at least one false statement and you all agree on which particular false statement the defendant made. The People do not need to prove that all the allegedly false statements were in fact false.]

[It is not a defense (that the oath was given or taken in an irregular manner/ [or] that the defendant did not go before or take the oath in the presence of the officer claiming to administer the oath) as long as the defendant caused the officer administering the oath to certify that the oath had been taken.]

[If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that after the defendant made the statement[s] in the affidavit, (he/she) testified under oath in another case involving the same facts, but made [a] statement[s] that (was/were) different from (that/those) in the affidavit, you may, but are not required to, rely on that testimony to conclude that the statement[s] in the affidavit (is/are) false.]

[When a person makes a statement, without qualification, that information is true, but he or she does not know whether the information is true, the making of that statement is the same as saying something that the person knows is false.]

[If the defendant attempted to correct the statement after it was made, that attempt may show that the defendant did not intend to (testify[,]/ [or] declare[,]/ [or] depose[,]/ [or] certify) falsely. It is up to you to decide the meaning and importance of that conduct.]

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*New January 2006*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to define “material.” (*People v. Kobrin* (1995) 11 Cal.4th 416, 430 [45 Cal.Rptr.2d 895, 903 P.2d 1027] [materiality is a fact question to be decided by the jury].) The first bracketed definition of material is appropriate for court proceedings or legislative hearings. (*People v. Hedgecock* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 395, 405 [272 Cal.Rptr. 803, 795 P.2d 1260] [not appropriate for charge of perjury on required disclosure forms].) For other types of proceedings, the court should use the second bracketed sentence, inserting an appropriate definition in the blank provided. (*Ibid.*)

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct the jury about the need for corroboration of the evidence of perjury. (*People v. Di Giacomo* (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 688, 698 [14 Cal.Rptr. 574]; Pen. Code, § 118(b).) If the evidence that the statement is false is based in whole or in part on the defendant’s testimony, give the bracketed sentence that begins with “However, if you conclude, based on the defendant’s own testimony.”

If the prosecution alleges under a single count that the defendant made multiple statements that were perjury, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on unanimity. (*People v. McRae* (1967) 256 Cal.App.2d 95, 120–121 [63 Cal.Rptr. 854].) Give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “You may not find the defendant guilty unless.”

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “It is not a defense (that the oath was given or taken in an irregular manner” on request if supported by the evidence. (Pen. Code, § 121.)

Do not give the bracketed paragraph stating that defendant “testified under oath in another case involving the same facts” if there is evidence that the defendant’s statements alleged to be false in the current case were in fact true. (Pen. Code, § 118a; Evid. Code, §§ 600–607; *People v. Roder* (1983) 33 Cal.3d 491, 497–505 [189 Cal.Rptr. 501, 658 P.2d 1302].) Although the statute creates a rebuttable presumption that the first statements made were false, the instruction has been written as a permissive inference. An instruction phrased as a rebuttable presumption would create an unconstitutional mandatory presumption. (See *People v. Roder, supra*, 33 Cal.3d at pp. 497–505.)

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “When a person makes a statement, without qualification,” on request if supported by the evidence. (Pen. Code, § 125.)

If there is sufficient evidence, give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “If the defendant attempted to correct.” (*People v. Baranov* (1962) 201 Cal.App.2d 52, 60–61 [19 Cal.Rptr. 866].)

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 118a.
- Oath Defined. Pen. Code, § 119.
- Irregular Oath Not a Defense. Pen. Code, § 121.
- Knowledge of Materiality Not Necessary. Pen. Code, § 123.

- Completion of Deposition, Affidavit, or Certificate. Pen. Code, § 124; *Collins v. Superior Court* (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1244, 1247 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 123].
- Unqualified Statement Equivalent to False Statement. Pen. Code, § 125.
- Material Defined. *People v. Pierce* (1967) 66 Cal.2d 53, 61 [56 Cal.Rptr. 817, 423 P.2d 969]; *People v. Hedgecock* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 395, 405 [272 Cal.Rptr. 803, 795 P.2d 1260]; *People v. Rubio* (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 927, 930–934 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 524].
- Materiality Is Element to Be Decided by Jury. *People v. Kobrin* (1995) 11 Cal.4th 416, 430 [45 Cal.Rptr.2d 895, 903 P.2d 1027]; *People v. Feinberg* (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1566, 1576 [60 Cal.Rptr.2d 323].
- Specific Intent to Testify Falsely Required. *People v. Viniestra* (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 577, 584 [181 Cal.Rptr. 848]; see also *People v. Hagen* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 652, 663–664 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 24, 967 P.2d 563] [discussing intent requirement for perjury].
- Good Faith Belief Statement True Negates Intent. *People v. Von Tiedeman* (1898) 120 Cal. 128, 134 [52 P. 155] [cited with approval in *People v. Hagen* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 652, 663–664 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 24, 967 P.2d 563]]; *People v. Louie* (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d Supp. 28, 43 [205 Cal.Rptr. 247].
- Unanimity. *People v. McRae* (1967) 256 Cal.App.2d 95, 120–121 [63 Cal.Rptr. 854].
- Mandatory Presumption Unconstitutional Unless Instructed as Permissive Inference. *People v. Roder* (1983) 33 Cal.3d 491, 497–505 [189 Cal.Rptr. 501, 658 P.2d 1302].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Attempted Perjury. *People v. Post* (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 467, 480–481 [114 Cal.Rptr.2d 356].

### RELATED ISSUES

See the Related Issues section of CALCRIM No. 2640, *Perjury*.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Governmental Authority, §§ 57–85.

2 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 40, *Accusatory Pleadings*, § 40.07[6] (Matthew Bender).

**2642–2649. Reserved for Future Use**

## E. THREATENING OR RESISTING OFFICER

### 2650. Threatening a Public Official (Pen. Code, § 76)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with threatening a public official [in violation of Penal Code section 76].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant willingly (threatened to kill/ [or] threatened to cause serious bodily harm to) (a/an) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert title of person specified in Pen. Code, § 76(a)> [or a member of the immediate family of (a/an) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert title of person specified in Pen. Code, § 76(a)>];
2. When the defendant acted, (he/she) intended that (his/her) statement be taken as a threat;
3. When the defendant acted, (he/she) knew that the person (he/she) threatened was (a/an) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert title of person specified in Pen. Code, § 76(a)> [or a member of the immediate family of (a/an) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert title of person specified in Pen. Code, § 76(a)>];
4. When the defendant acted, (he/she) had the apparent ability to carry out the threat;

[AND]

5. The person threatened reasonably feared for (his/her) safety [or for the safety of (his/her) immediate family](;/.)

<Give element 6 if directed at a person specified in Pen. Code, § 76(d) or (e).>

[AND]

6. The threat was directly related to the \_\_\_\_\_'s <insert title of person specified in Pen. Code, § 76(d) or (e)> performance of (his/her) job duties.]

A threat may be oral or written and may be implied by a pattern of conduct or a combination of statements and conduct.

[When the person making the threat is an incarcerated prisoner with a stated release date, the *ability to carry out the threat* includes the ability to do so in the future.]

[*Serious bodily harm* includes serious physical injury or serious traumatic condition.]

**[Immediate family includes a spouse, parent, or child[, or anyone who has regularly resided in the household for the past six months].]**

**[Staff of a judge includes court officers and employees[, as well as commissioners, referees, and retired judges sitting on assignment].]**

**[The defendant does not have to communicate the threat directly to the intended victim, but may do so through someone else.]**

**[Someone who intends that a statement be understood as a threat does not have to actually intend to carry out the threatened act [or intend to have someone else do so].]**

*New January 2006*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements and Definitions. Pen. Code, § 76.
- Reasonable Fear by Victim Is Element. *People v. Andrews* (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 1173, 1178 [89 Cal.Rptr.2d 683].
- Statute Constitutional. *People v. Gudger* (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 310, 321 [34 Cal.Rptr.2d 510].
- This Instruction Upheld. *People v. Barrios* (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 270, 278 [77 Cal.Rptr.3d 456].

## LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

An offense under Penal Code section 71, threatening a public officer to prevent him or her from performing his or her duties, may be a lesser included offense. However, there is no case law on this issue.

## RELATED ISSUES

### *Threat Must Convey Intent to Carry Out*

“Although there is no requirement in section 76 of specific intent to execute the threat, the statute requires the defendant to have the specific intent that the statement be taken as a threat and also to have the apparent ability to carry it out, requirements which convey a sense of immediacy and the reality of potential danger and sufficiently proscribe only true threats, meaning threats which ‘convincingly express an intention of being carried out.’ . . . [¶] . . . Thus, section 76 . . . adequately expresses the notion that the threats proscribed are only those ‘so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate and specific as to the person threatened, as to convey a gravity of purpose and imminent prospect of execution.’ ” [citations

omitted] (*People v. Gudger* (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 310, 320–321 [34 Cal.Rptr.2d 510]; see also *In re George T.* (2004) 33 Cal.4th 620, 637–638 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 61, 93 P.3d 1007].)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Governmental Authority, § 16.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.11A[1][b] (Matthew Bender).

## 2651. Trying to Prevent an Executive Officer From Performing Duty (Pen. Code, § 69)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with trying to (prevent/ [or] deter) an executive officer from performing that officer's duty [in violation of Penal Code section 69].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant willfully and unlawfully used (violence/ [or] a threat of violence) to try to (prevent/ [or] deter) an executive officer from performing the officer's lawful duty;
2. When the defendant acted, (he/she) intended to (prevent/ [or] deter) the executive officer from performing the officer's lawful duty;

<Give the following language if the violation is based on a threat>

- [3. A reasonable listener in a similar situation with similar knowledge would interpret the threat, in light of the context and surrounding circumstances, as a serious expression of intent to commit an act of unlawful force or violence;]

AND

- (3/4). When the defendant acted, (he/she) knew that the person was an executive officer.

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose.

An *executive officer* is a government official who may use his or her own discretion in performing his or her job duties. [(A/An) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert title, e.g., peace officer, commissioner, etc.> is an *executive officer*.]

The executive officer does not need to be performing his or her job duties at the time the threat is communicated.

A threat may be oral or written and may be implied by a pattern of conduct or a combination of statements and conduct.

[Photographing or recording an *executive officer* while the officer is in a public place or while the person photographing or recording is in a place where he or she has the right to be is not, by itself, a crime.]

[The defendant does not have to communicate the threat directly to the intended victim, but may do so through someone else. The defendant must, however, intend that (his/her) statement be taken as a threat by the intended victim.]



[Someone who intends that a statement be understood as a threat does not have to actually intend to carry out the threatened act [or intend to have someone else do so].]

[A sworn member of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of agency that employs peace officer>, authorized by \_\_\_\_\_ <insert appropriate section from Pen. Code, § 830 et seq.> to \_\_\_\_\_ <describe statutory authority>, is a peace officer.]

[The duties of (a/an) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert title of officer specified in Pen. Code, § 830 et seq.> include \_\_\_\_\_ <insert job duties>.]

<When lawful performance is an issue, give the following paragraph and Instruction 2670, Lawful Performance: Peace Officer.>

[A peace officer is not lawfully performing his or her duties if he or she is (unlawfully arresting or detaining someone/ [or] using unreasonable or excessive force in his or her duties). Instruction 2670 explains (when an arrest or detention is unlawful/ [and] when force is unreasonable or excessive).]

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New January 2006; Revised August 2014, August 2016, September 2019, March 2021

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a  **sua sponte**  duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

In order to be “performing a lawful duty,” an executive officer, including a peace officer, must be acting lawfully. (*In re Manuel G.* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 805, 816–817 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 701, 941 P.2d 880]; *People v. Gonzalez* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1217 [275 Cal.Rptr. 729, 800 P.2d 1159].) The court has a  **sua sponte**  duty to instruct on lawful performance and the defendant’s reliance on self-defense as it relates to the use of excessive force when this is an issue in the case. (*People v. Castain* (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 138, 145 [175 Cal.Rptr. 651]; *People v. Olguin* (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 39, 46–47 [173 Cal.Rptr. 663]; *People v. White* (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 161, 167–168 [161 Cal.Rptr. 541].)

For this offense, “the relevant factor is simply the lawfulness of the official conduct that the defendant (through threat or violence) has attempted to deter, and not the lawfulness (or official nature) of the conduct in which the officer is engaged at the time the threat is made.” (*In re Manuel G.*, *supra*, 16 Cal.4th at p. 817.) Thus, if the evidence supports the conclusion that the defendant attempted to deter the officer’s current performance of a duty, the court should instruct on the lawfulness of that duty. (*Ibid.*) Where the evidence supports the conclusion that the defendant attempted to deter the officer from performing a duty in the future, the court should only instruct on the lawfulness of that future duty. (*Ibid.*)

If there is an issue in the case as to the lawful performance of a duty by a peace officer, give the last bracketed paragraph and CALCRIM No. 2670, *Lawful Performance: Peace Officer*.

If a different executive officer was the alleged victim, the court will need to draft an appropriate definition of lawful duty if this is an issue in the case.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 69; *People v. Atkins* (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 963, 979 [243 Cal.Rptr.3d 283] [statute requires actual knowledge that person was an executive officer].
- Specific Intent Required. *People v. Gutierrez* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083, 1154 [124 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 52 P.3d 572].
- Immediate Ability to Carry Out Threat Not Required. *People v. Hines* (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1061 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 594, 938 P.2d 388].
- Lawful Performance Element to Attempting to Deter. *In re Manuel G.* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 805, 816–817 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 701, 941 P.2d 880].
- Statute Constitutional. *People v. Hines* (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1061 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 594, 938 P.2d 388].
- Merely Photographing or Recording Officers Not a Crime. Pen. Code, § 69(b).
- Reasonable Listener Standard *People v. Lowery* (2011) 52 Cal.4th 419, 427 [128 Cal.Rptr.3d 648, 257 P.3d 72]; *People v. Smolkin* (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 183, 188 [262 Cal.Rptr.3d 696].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### ***Resisting an Officer Not Lesser Included Offense***

Resisting an officer, Penal Code section 148(a), is not a lesser included offense of attempting by force or violence to deter an officer. (*People v. Smith* (2013) 57 Cal.4th 232, 240–245 [159 Cal.Rptr.3d 57, 303 P.3d 368].)

#### ***Statute as Written Is Overbroad***

The statute as written would prohibit lawful threatening conduct. To avoid overbreadth, this instruction requires that the defendant act both “willfully” and “unlawfully.” (*People v. Superior Court (Anderson)* (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 893, 895–896 [199 Cal.Rptr. 150].)

#### ***State of Mind of Victim Irrelevant***

Unlike other threat crimes, the state of mind of the intended victim is irrelevant. (*People v. Gutierrez* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083, 1153 [124 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 52 P.3d 572]; *People v. Hines* (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1061, fn. 15 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 594, 938 P.2d 388].)

#### ***Immediate Ability to Carry Out Threat Not Required***

“As long as the threat reasonably appears to be a serious expression of intention to inflict bodily harm and its circumstances are such that there is a reasonable tendency

to produce in the victim a fear that the threat will be carried out, a statute proscribing such threats is not unconstitutional for lacking a requirement of immediacy or imminence. Thus, threats may be constitutionally prohibited even when there is no *immediate* danger that they will be carried out.” (*People v. Hines* (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1061 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 594, 938 P.2d 388] [quoting *In re M.S.* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 698, 714 [42 Cal.Rptr.2d 355, 896 P.2d 1365], citation and internal quotation marks removed, emphasis in original]; see also *People v. Gudger* (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 310, 320–321 [34 Cal.Rptr.2d 510]; *Watts v. United States* (1969) 394 U.S. 705, 707 [89 S.Ct. 1399, 22 L.Ed.2d 664]; *United States v. Kelner* (2d Cir. 1976) 534 F.2d 1020, 1027.)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Governmental Authority, § 128.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.11A[1][b] (Matthew Bender).

**2652. Resisting an Executive Officer in Performance of Duty (Pen. Code, § 69)**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with resisting an executive officer in the performance of that officer's duty [in violation of Penal Code section 69].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant [unlawfully] used force [or violence] to resist an executive officer;
2. When the defendant acted, the officer was performing (his/her) lawful duty;
3. When the defendant acted, the defendant knew that the person (he/she) resisted was an executive officer;

AND

4. When the defendant acted, (he/she) knew the executive officer was performing (his/her) duty.

**An executive officer is a government official who may use his or her own discretion in performing his or her job duties. [(A/An) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert title, e.g., peace officer, commissioner, etc.> is an executive officer.]**

**[A sworn member of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of agency that employs peace officer>, authorized by \_\_\_\_\_ <insert appropriate section from Pen. Code, § 830 et seq.> to \_\_\_\_\_ <describe statutory authority>, is a peace officer.]**

**[The duties of (a/an) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert title of officer specified in Pen. Code, § 830 et seq.> include \_\_\_\_\_ <insert job duties>.]**

**[Taking a photograph or making an audio or video recording of an executive officer while the officer is in a public place or the person taking the photograph or making the recording is in a place where he or she has the right to be is not, by itself, a crime.]**

*<When lawful performance is an issue, give the following paragraph and Instruction 2670, Lawful Performance: Peace Officer.>*

**[A peace officer is not lawfully performing his or her duties if he or she is (unlawfully arresting or detaining someone/ [or] using unreasonable or excessive force in his or her duties). Instruction 2670 explains (when an arrest or detention is unlawful/ [and] when force is unreasonable or excessive).]**

*New January 2006; Revised August 2014, February 2015, August 2016, September 2019*

## BENCH NOTES

### ***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

In order to be “performing a lawful duty,” an executive officer, including a peace officer, must be acting lawfully. (*In re Manuel G.* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 805, 816 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 701, 941 P.2d 880]; *People v. Gonzalez* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1217 [275 Cal.Rptr. 729, 800 P.2d 1159].) The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on lawful performance and the defendant’s reliance on self-defense as it relates to the use of excessive force when this is an issue in the case. (*People v. Castain* (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 138, 145 [175 Cal.Rptr. 651]; *People v. Olguin* (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 39, 46–47 [173 Cal.Rptr. 663]; *People v. White* (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 161, 167–168 [161 Cal.Rptr. 541].)

If there is an issue in the case as to the lawful performance of a duty by a peace officer, give the last bracketed paragraph and CALCRIM No. 2670, *Lawful Performance: Peace Officer*.

If a different executive officer was the alleged victim, the court will need to draft an appropriate definition of lawful duty if this is an issue in the case.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 69.
- General Intent Offense. *People v. Roberts* (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 9 [182 Cal.Rptr. 757].
- Lawful Performance Element to Resisting Officer. *In re Manuel G.* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 805, 816 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 701, 941 P.2d 880].
- Merely Photographing or Recording Officers Not a Crime. Pen. Code, § 69(b).

## LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

Penal Code section 148(a) is not a lesser included offense of this crime under the statutory elements test, but may be one under the accusatory pleading test. *People v. Smith* (2013) 57 Cal.4th 232, 241–242 [159 Cal.Rptr.3d 57, 303 P.3d 368]; see also *People v. Belmares* (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 19, 26 [130 Cal.Rptr.2d 400] and *People v. Lopez* (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1508, 1532 [29 Cal.Rptr.3d 586].

Assault may be a lesser included offense of this crime under the accusatory pleading test. See *People v. Brown* (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 140, 153 [199 Cal.Rptr.3d 303].

## SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Governmental Authority, § 128.

1 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 11, *Arrest*, § 11.06[3] (Matthew Bender).

3 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 73, *Defenses and Justifications*, § 73.15[2] (Matthew Bender).

**2653. Taking Firearm or Weapon While Resisting Peace Officer or Public Officer (Pen. Code, § 148(b) & (c))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with taking a (firearm/weapon) from a (peace/public) officer while (resisting[,]/obstructing[,]/[or] delaying) the officer in performing or attempting to perform (his/her) duties [in violation of Penal Code section 148].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. \_\_\_\_\_ <insert officer's name, excluding title> was a (peace/public) officer lawfully performing or attempting to perform (his/her) duties as a (peace/public) officer;
2. The defendant willfully (resisted[,]/obstructed[,]/ [or] delayed) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert officer's name, excluding title> in the performance of or attempt to perform those duties;
3. When the defendant acted, (he/she) knew, or reasonably should have known, that \_\_\_\_\_ <insert officer's name, excluding title> was a (peace/public) officer performing or attempting to perform (his/her) duties;

[AND]

4. While the defendant (resisted[,]/obstructed[,]/ [or] delayed) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert officer's name, excluding title>, the defendant took or removed a (firearm/weapon) from \_\_\_\_\_'s <insert officer's name, excluding title> person [or immediate presence](;/.>

<Give element 5 when instructing on self-defense or defense of another.>

[AND]

5. The defendant did not act (in self-defense/ [or] in defense of someone else).]

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose. It is not required that he or she intend to break the law, hurt someone else, or gain any advantage.

[A *firearm* is any device designed to be used as a weapon, from which a projectile is discharged or expelled through a barrel by the force of an explosion or other form of combustion.]

[The term *firearm* is defined in another instruction to which you should refer.]

[A person who is employed as a police officer by \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of agency that employs police officer> is a *peace officer*.]

[A person employed by \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of agency that employs peace officer, e.g., “the Department of Fish and Wildlife”> is a **peace officer** if \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of facts necessary to make employee a peace officer, e.g., “designated by the director of the agency as a peace officer”>.]

[An officer or employee of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of state or local government agency that employs public officer> is a **public officer**.]

[The duties of (a/an) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert title of peace or public officer> include \_\_\_\_\_ <insert job duties>.]

[Taking a photograph or making an audio or video recording of a (peace officer/ [or] public officer) while the officer is in a public place or the person taking the photograph or making the recording is in a place where he or she has the right to be is not, by itself, a crime.]

<When lawful performance is an issue, give the following paragraph and Instruction 2670, Lawful Performance: Peace Officer.>

[A peace officer is not lawfully performing his or her duties if he or she is (unlawfully arresting or detaining someone/ [or] using unreasonable or excessive force in his or her duties). Instruction 2670 explains (when an arrest or detention is unlawful/ [and] when force is unreasonable or excessive).]

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2012, August 2016*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If there is sufficient evidence of self-defense or defense of another, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense. Give bracketed element 5 and any appropriate defense instructions. (See CALCRIM Nos. 3470–3477.)

In addition, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on defendant’s reliance on self-defense as it relates to the use of excessive force. (*People v. White* (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 161, 167–168 [161 Cal.Rptr. 541].) If excessive force is an issue, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct the jury that the defendant is not guilty of the offense charged, or any lesser included offense in which lawful performance is an element, if the defendant used reasonable force in response to excessive force. (*People v. Olguin* (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 39, 46–47 [173 Cal.Rptr. 663].) On request, the court must instruct that the prosecution has the burden of proving the lawfulness of the arrest beyond a reasonable doubt. (*People v. Castain* (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 138, 145 [175 Cal.Rptr. 651].) If lawful performance of a peace officer is an issue, give the bracketed paragraph on lawful performance and the appropriate



portions of CALCRIM No. 2670, *Lawful Performance: Peace Officer*. If lawful performance by a public officer is an issue, the court must draft an appropriate instruction depending on the duties of the officer.

Give the bracketed definition of “firearm” unless the court has already given the definition in other instructions. In such cases, the court may give the bracketed sentence stating that the term is defined elsewhere.

The jury must determine whether the alleged victim is a peace officer. (*People v. Brown* (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 444–445 [250 Cal.Rptr. 604, 758 P.2d 1135].) The court may instruct the jury on the appropriate definition of “peace officer” from the statute (e.g., “a Garden Grove Regular Police Officer and a Garden Grove Reserve Police Officer are peace officers”). (*Ibid.*) However, the court may not instruct the jury that the alleged victim was a peace officer as a matter of law (e.g., “Officer Reed was a peace officer”). (*Ibid.*) If the alleged victim is a police officer, give the bracketed sentence that begins with “A person employed as a police officer.” If the alleged victim is another type of peace officer, give the bracketed sentence that begins with “A person employed by.”

The court may give the bracketed sentence that begins, “The duties of a \_\_\_\_\_ <insert title . . . > include,” on request. The court may insert a description of the officer’s duties such as “the correct service of a facially valid search warrant.” (*People v. Gonzalez* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1222 [275 Cal.Rptr. 729, 800 P.2d 1159].)

### ***Related Instructions***

CALCRIM No. 2654, *Intentionally Taking or Attempting to Take Firearm From Peace Officer or Public Officer*.

## **AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 148(b) & (c); see *In re Muhammed C.* (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1325, 1329 [116 Cal.Rptr.2d 21] [elements of Pen. Code, § 148(a) offense]; *Nuno v. County of San Bernardino* (1999) 58 F.Supp.2d 1127, 1133 [officer lawfully performing duties]; *People v. Lopez* (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 592, 599–600 [233 Cal.Rptr. 207] [knowledge that other person is an officer].
- Firearm Defined. Pen. Code, § 16520.
- Multiple Violations. Pen. Code, § 148(e).
- Peace Officer Defined. Pen. Code, § 830 et seq.
- Public Officer. See, e.g., Pen. Code, §§ 831(a) [custodial officer], 831.4 [sheriff’s or police security officer], 831.5 [custodial officer], 831.6 [transportation officer], 3089 [county parole officer]; *In re Frederick B.* (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 79, 89–90 [237 Cal.Rptr. 338], disapproved on other grounds in *In re Randy G.* (2001) 26 Cal.4th 556, 567, fn. 2 [110 Cal.Rptr.2d 516, 28 P.3d 239] [“public officers” is broader category than “peace officers”]; see also Pen. Code, § 836.5(a) [authority to arrest without warrant].
- Public Official Defined. Gov. Code, § 82048; see *In re Eddie D.* (1991) 235

Cal.App.3d 417, 421 [286 Cal.Rptr. 684].

- Unlawful Arrest or Act by Officer. Pen. Code, § 148(f); *Franklin v. Riverside County* (1997) 971 F.Supp. 1332, 1335–1336; *People v. Curtis* (1969) 70 Cal.2d 347, 354 [74 Cal.Rptr. 713, 450 P.2d 33]; *Susag v. City of Lake Forest* (2002) 94 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1409 [115 Cal.Rptr.2d 269].
- Delaying Officer From Performing Duties. *People v. Allen* (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 981, 985–986, 987 [167 Cal.Rptr. 502].
- General Intent Crime. *In re Muhammed C.* (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1325, 1329 [116 Cal.Rptr.2d 21]; *People v. Matthews* (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 164, 175 [82 Cal.Rptr.2d 502].
- “Take” or “Remove” Defined. *People v. Matthews* (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 164, 173, 175 [82 Cal.Rptr.2d 502].
- Verbal Resistance or Obstruction. *People v. Quiroga* (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 961, 968, 970–972 [20 Cal.Rptr.2d 446] [nondisclosure of identity following arrest for felony, not misdemeanor]; *People v. Green* (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1433, 1438 [59 Cal.Rptr.2d 913] [attempt to intimidate suspected victim into denying offense].
- Merely Photographing or Recording Officers Not a Crime. Pen. Code, § 148(g).

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Attempted Removal of Firearm or Weapon. Pen. Code, §§ 663, 148(b) & (c).
- Misdemeanor Resisting Arrest. Pen. Code, § 148(a)(1).

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Multiple Violations*

A person may be convicted of multiple violations of this section if there are multiple officer victims. (Pen. Code, § 148(e).) However, a person may not be convicted of both resisting an officer in violation of Penal Code section 148(a) and removing a weapon or firearm from an officer in violation of Penal Code section 148(b), (c), or (d) if the resistance and removal were committed against the same officer. (Pen. Code, § 148(e).)

#### *Other Forms of Resistance or Interference*

It is a misdemeanor under Penal Code section 148(a)(1) to willfully resist, delay, or obstruct any emergency medical technician in discharging or attempting to discharge his or her duties of employment. (See Health & Saf. Code, § 1797 [defining emergency medical technician].) It is also a misdemeanor under Penal Code section 148(a)(2) to knowingly and maliciously interrupt, disrupt, impede, or otherwise interfere with the transmission of a communication over a public safety radio frequency.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Governmental Authority, §§ 18–20.

1 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 11, *Arrest*, § 11.06[3] (Matthew Bender).

**2654. Intentionally Taking or Attempting to Take Firearm From Peace Officer or Public Officer (Pen. Code, § 148(d))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with intentionally (taking/ [or] attempting to take) a firearm from a (peace/public) officer while the officer was performing (his/her) duties [in violation of Penal Code section 148(d)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert officer's name, excluding title>* was a (peace/public) officer lawfully performing (his/her) duties as a (peace/public) officer;
2. The defendant (took or removed/ [or] attempted to take or remove) a firearm from \_\_\_\_\_'s *<insert officer's name, excluding title>* person [or immediate presence];
3. When the defendant acted, (he/she) intended to take or remove the firearm from \_\_\_\_\_'s *<insert officer's name, excluding title>* person [or immediate presence];

[AND]

4. When the defendant acted, (he/she) knew, or reasonably should have known, that \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert officer's name, excluding title>* was a (peace/public) officer performing (his/her) duties(;/.)

*<Give element 5 when instructing on self-defense or defense of another.>*

[AND]

5. The defendant did not act (in self-defense/ [or] in defense of someone else).]

To prove that the defendant intended to take or remove a firearm from \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert officer's name, excluding title>*, the People must prove [at least one of] the following:

- [1. The defendant unfastened \_\_\_\_\_'s *<insert officer's name, excluding title>* holster strap.]
- [2. The defendant partially removed the firearm from \_\_\_\_\_'s *<insert officer's name, excluding title>* holster.]
- [3. The defendant released the safety on \_\_\_\_\_'s *<insert officer's name, excluding title>* firearm.]
- [4. (a) The defendant said that (he/she) intended to remove the firearm from \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert officer's name, excluding title>*; (b) the defendant actually touched the firearm; and (c) an

independent witness has given testimony that you believe, which supports the conclusion that the defendant made the statement about (his/her) intent and actually touched the firearm.]

- [5. (a) The defendant actually had (his/her) hand on the firearm; (b) the defendant tried to take it away from \_\_\_\_\_ <insert officer's name, excluding title>, who was holding it; and (c) an independent witness has given testimony that you believe, which supports the conclusion that the defendant actually had (his/her) hand on the firearm and tried to take it away from the officer.]
- [6. The defendant's fingerprint[s] (was/were) found on the firearm or holster.]
- [7. Physical evidence authenticated by a scientifically verifiable procedure establishes that the defendant touched the firearm.]
- [8. \_\_\_\_\_'s <insert officer's name, excluding title> firearm fell during a struggle and the defendant attempted to pick it up.]

[A person may intend to take a weapon from an officer without intending to permanently deprive the officer of the firearm.]

[A *firearm* is any device designed to be used as a weapon, from which a projectile is discharged or expelled through a barrel by the force of an explosion or other form of combustion.]

[The term *firearm* is defined in another instruction to which you should refer.]

[A person who is employed as a police officer by \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of agency that employs police officer> is a **peace officer**.]

[A person employed by \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of agency that employs peace officer, e.g., "the Department of Fish and Wildlife"> is a **peace officer** if \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of facts necessary to make employee a peace officer, e.g., "designated by the director of the agency as a peace officer">.]

[An officer or employee of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of state or local government agency that employs public officer> is a **public officer**.]

[The duties of (a/an) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert title of peace or public officer> include \_\_\_\_\_ <insert job duties>.]

<When lawful performance is an issue, give the following paragraph and Instruction 2670, Lawful Performance: Peace Officer.>

[A peace officer is not lawfully performing his or her duties if he or she is (unlawfully arresting or detaining someone/ [or] using unreasonable or excessive force in his or her duties). Instruction 2670 explains (when an arrest or detention is unlawful/ [and] when force is unreasonable or

excessive).]

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2012*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime. Depending on the evidence in the case, give the appropriate bracketed paragraph or paragraphs describing direct but ineffectual acts that establish defendant's specific intent to remove or take a firearm. (See Pen. Code, § 148(d)(1)–(8).)

If there is sufficient evidence of self-defense or defense of another, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense. Give bracketed element 5 and any appropriate defense instructions. (See CALCRIM Nos. 3470–3477.)

In addition, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on defendant's reliance on self-defense as it relates to the use of excessive force. (*People v. White* (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 161, 167–168 [161 Cal.Rptr. 541].) If excessive force is an issue, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct the jury that the defendant is not guilty of the offense charged, or any lesser included offense in which lawful performance is an element, if the defendant used reasonable force in response to excessive force. (*People v. Olguin* (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 39, 46–47 [173 Cal.Rptr. 663].) On request, the court must instruct that the prosecution has the burden of proving the lawfulness of the arrest beyond a reasonable doubt. (*People v. Castain* (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 138, 145 [175 Cal.Rptr. 651].) If lawful performance of a peace officer is an issue, give the bracketed paragraph on lawful performance and the appropriate portions of CALCRIM No. 2670, *Lawful Performance: Peace Officer*. If lawful performance by a public officer is an issue, the court must draft an appropriate instruction depending on the duties of the officer.

Give the bracketed definition of “firearm” unless the court has already given the definition in other instructions. In such cases, the court may give the bracketed sentence stating that the term is defined elsewhere.

The jury must determine whether the alleged victim is a peace officer. (*People v. Brown* (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 444–445 [250 Cal.Rptr. 604, 758 P.2d 1135].) The court may instruct the jury on the appropriate definition of “peace officer” from the statute (e.g., “a Garden Grove Regular Police Officer and a Garden Grove Reserve Police Officer are peace officers”). (*Ibid.*) However, the court may not instruct the jury that the alleged victim was a peace officer as a matter of law (e.g., “Officer Reed was a peace officer”). (*Ibid.*) If the alleged victim is a police officer, give the bracketed sentence that begins with “A person employed as a police officer.” If the alleged victim is another type of peace officer, give the bracketed sentence that begins with “A person employed by.”

The court may give the bracketed sentence that begins, “The duties of a

\_\_\_\_\_ <insert title . . .> include,” on request. The court may insert a description of the officer’s duties such as “the correct service of a facially valid search warrant.” (*People v. Gonzalez* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1222 [275 Cal.Rptr. 729, 800 P.2d 1159].)

### ***Related Instructions***

CALCRIM No. 2653, *Taking Firearm or Weapon While Resisting Peace Officer or Public Officer*.

CALCRIM No. 1801, *Theft: Degrees* (theft of firearm from an officer).

## **AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 148(d); see *In re Muhammed C.* (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1325, 1329 [116 Cal.Rptr.2d 21] [elements of Pen. Code, § 148(a) offense]; *Nuno v. County of San Bernardino* (1999) 58 F.Supp.2d 1127, 1133 [officer lawfully performing duties]; *People v. Lopez* (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 592, 599–600 [233 Cal.Rptr. 207] [knowledge that other person is an officer].
- Firearm Defined. Pen. Code, § 16520.
- Multiple Violations. Pen. Code, § 148(e).
- Peace Officer Defined. Pen. Code, § 830 et seq.
- Public Officer. See, e.g., Pen. Code, §§ 831(a) [custodial officer], 831.4 [sheriff’s or police security officer], 831.5 [custodial officer], 831.6 [transportation officer], 3089 [county parole officer]; *In re Frederick B.* (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 79, 89–90 [237 Cal.Rptr. 338] [“public officers” is broader category than “peace officers”], disapproved on other grounds in *In re Randy G.* (2001) 26 Cal.4th 556, 567, fn. 2 [110 Cal.Rptr.2d 516, 28 P.3d 239]; see also Pen. Code, § 836.5(a) [authority to arrest without warrant].
- Public Official Defined. Gov. Code, § 82048; see *In re Eddie D.* (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 417, 421 [286 Cal.Rptr. 684].
- Unlawful Arrest or Act by Officer. Pen. Code, § 148(f); *Franklin v. Riverside County* (1997) 971 F.Supp. 1332, 1335–1336; *People v. Curtis* (1969) 70 Cal.2d 347, 354 [74 Cal.Rptr. 713, 450 P.2d 33]; *Susag v. City of Lake Forest* (2002) 94 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1409 [115 Cal.Rptr.2d 269].
- “Take” or “Remove” Defined. See *People v. Matthews* (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 164, 173, 175 [82 Cal.Rptr.2d 502] [in context of Pen. Code, § 148(a)].

## **RELATED ISSUES**

See the Related Issues section to CALCRIM No. 2653, *Taking Firearm or Weapon While Resisting Peace Officer or Public Officer*.

## **SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Governmental Authority, §§ 18–20.

1 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 11, *Arrest*, § 11.06[3][b] (Matthew Bender).



**2655. Causing Death or Serious Bodily Injury While Resisting  
Peace Officer (Pen. Code, § 148.10(a) & (b))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with causing (the death of/serious bodily injury to) a peace officer performing (his/her) duties [in violation of Penal Code section 148.10].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. \_\_\_\_\_ <insert officer's name, excluding title> was a peace officer lawfully performing or attempting to perform (his/her) duties as a peace officer;
2. The defendant willfully resisted \_\_\_\_\_ <insert officer's name, excluding title> in the performance of or the attempt to perform (his/her) duties;
3. When the defendant acted, (he/she) knew, or reasonably should have known, that \_\_\_\_\_ <insert officer's name, excluding title> was a peace officer performing or attempting to perform (his/her) duties;
4. \_\_\_\_\_'s <insert officer's name, excluding title> actions were reasonable, based on the facts or circumstances confronting (him/her) at the time;
5. The detention and arrest of (the defendant/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of person other than defendant who was arrested>) were lawful and there was probable cause to detain;

[AND]

6. The defendant's willful resistance caused (the death of/serious bodily injury to) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert officer's name, excluding title>(;/.)

<Give element 7 when instructing on self-defense or defense of another.>

[AND]

7. The defendant did not act (in self-defense/ [or] in defense of someone else).]

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose. It is not required that he or she intend to break the law, hurt someone else, or gain any advantage.

In order to prove that \_\_\_\_\_'s <insert officer's name, excluding title> (death/serious bodily injury) was *caused* by the defendant's willful resistance, the People must prove that:



1. A reasonable person in the defendant's position would have foreseen that (his/her) willful resistance could begin a chain of events likely to result in the officer's death or serious bodily injury;
2. Defendant's willful resistance was a direct and substantial factor in causing \_\_\_\_\_'s *<insert officer's name, excluding title>* (death/serious bodily injury);

**AND**

3. \_\_\_\_\_'s *<insert officer's name, excluding title>* (death/serious bodily injury) would not have happened if the defendant had not willfully resisted \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert officer's name, excluding title>* from performing or attempting to perform (his/her) duties.

*A substantial factor is more than a trivial or remote factor. However, it does not need to be the only factor that caused \_\_\_\_\_'s <insert officer's name, excluding title> (death/serious bodily injury).*

[Willful resistance may include fleeing from the officer.]

[A *serious bodily injury* means a serious impairment of physical condition. Such an injury may include[, but is not limited to]: (loss of consciousness/ concussion/ bone fracture/ protracted loss or impairment of function of any bodily member or organ/ a wound requiring extensive suturing/ [and] serious disfigurement).]

[A person who is employed as a police officer by \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of agency that employs police officer>* is a **peace officer**.]

[A person employed by \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of agency that employs peace officer, e.g., "the Department of Fish and Wildlife">* is a **peace officer** if \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert description of facts necessary to make employee a peace officer, e.g., "designated by the director of the agency as a peace officer">*.]

[The duties of (a/an) \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert title of peace officer>* include \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert job duties>*.]

[Taking a photograph or making an audio or video recording of an *executive officer* while the officer is in a public place or the person taking the photograph or making the recording is in a place where he or she has the right to be is not, by itself, a crime.]

*<When lawful performance is an issue, give the following paragraph and Instruction 2670, Lawful Performance: Peace Officer.>*

[A peace officer is not lawfully performing his or her duties if he or she is (unlawfully arresting or detaining someone/ [or] using unreasonable or

excessive force in his or her duties). Instruction 2670 explains (when an arrest or detention is unlawful/ [and] when force is unreasonable or excessive).]

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2006, August 2016*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If there is sufficient evidence of self-defense or defense of another, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense. Give bracketed element 7 and any appropriate defense instructions. (See CALCRIM Nos. 3470–3477.)

In addition, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on defendant’s reliance on self-defense as it relates to the use of excessive force. (*People v. White* (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 161, 167–168 [161 Cal.Rptr. 541].) If excessive force is an issue, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct the jury that the defendant is not guilty of the offense charged, or any lesser included offense in which lawful performance is an element, if the defendant used reasonable force in response to excessive force. (*People v. Olguin* (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 39, 46–47 [173 Cal.Rptr. 663].) On request, the court must instruct that the prosecution has the burden of proving the lawfulness of the arrest beyond a reasonable doubt. (*People v. Castain* (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 138, 145 [175 Cal.Rptr. 651].) If lawful performance of a peace officer is an issue, give the bracketed paragraph on lawful performance and the appropriate portions of CALCRIM No. 2670, *Lawful Performance: Peace Officer*.

The jury must determine whether the alleged victim is a peace officer. (*People v. Brown* (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 444–445 [250 Cal.Rptr. 604, 758 P.2d 1135].) The court may instruct the jury on the appropriate definition of “peace officer” from the statute (e.g., “a Garden Grove Regular Police Officer and a Garden Grove Reserve Police Officer are peace officers”). (*Ibid.*) However, the court may not instruct the jury that the alleged victim was a peace officer as a matter of law (e.g., “Officer Reed was a peace officer”). (*Ibid.*) If the alleged victim is a police officer, give the bracketed sentence that begins with “A person employed as a police officer.” If the alleged victim is another type of peace officer, give the bracketed sentence that begins with “A person employed by.”

The court may give the bracketed sentence that begins, “The duties of a \_\_\_\_\_ <insert title . . .> include,” on request. The court may insert a description of the officer’s duties such as “the correct service of a facially valid search warrant.” (*People v. Gonzalez* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1222 [275 Cal.Rptr. 729, 800 P.2d 1159].)

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 148.10(a) & (b).

- Peace Officer Defined. Pen. Code, § 830 et seq.
- Serious Bodily Injury Defined. Pen. Code, §§ 148.10(d), 243(f)(4); *People v. Taylor* (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 11, 25, fn. 4 [12 Cal.Rptr.3d 693].
- Willful Resistance Includes Flight. *People v. Superior Court (Ferguson)* (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1525, 1535 [34 Cal.Rptr.3d 481].
- Unlawful Arrest or Act by Officer. Pen. Code, § 148(f); *Franklin v. Riverside County* (1997) 971 F.Supp. 1332, 1335–1336; *People v. Curtis* (1969) 70 Cal.2d 347, 354 [74 Cal.Rptr. 713, 450 P.2d 33]; *Susag v. City of Lake Forest* (2002) 94 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1409 [115 Cal.Rptr.2d 269].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Misdemeanor Resisting Arrest. Pen. Code, § 148(a)(1).

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Exclusions*

Penal Code section 148.10 “does not apply to conduct that occurs during labor picketing, demonstrations, or disturbing the peace.” (Pen. Code, § 148.10(c).)

#### *Photographing or Recording Officers*

Penal Code section 148(g) provides that merely photographing or recording a public officer or peace officer under certain conditions is not a crime. This new provision limits its application to violations of subdivision (a) of the same statute, however. Until the legislature or courts of review provide further guidance, it is unclear whether section 148(g) would apply to violations of Penal Code section 148.10.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Governmental Authority, § 21.

1 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 11, *Arrest*, § 11.06[3][b] (Matthew Bender).

**2656. Resisting Peace Officer, Public Officer, or EMT (Pen. Code, § 148(a))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with (resisting[,]/ [or] obstructing[,]/ [or] delaying) a (peace officer/public officer/emergency medical technician) in the performance or attempted performance of (his/her) duties [in violation of Penal Code section 148(a)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name, excluding title> was (a/an) (peace officer/public officer/emergency medical technician) lawfully performing or attempting to perform (his/her) duties as a (peace officer/public officer/emergency medical technician);
2. The defendant willfully (resisted[,]/ [or] obstructed[,]/ [or] delayed) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name, excluding title> in the performance or attempted performance of those duties;

AND

3. When the defendant acted, (he/she) knew, or reasonably should have known, that \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name, excluding title> was (a/an) (peace officer/public officer/emergency medical technician) performing or attempting to perform (his/her) duties.

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose. It is not required that he or she intend to break the law, hurt someone else, or gain any advantage.

[A person who is employed as a police officer by \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of agency that employs police officer> is a *peace officer*.]

[A person employed by \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of agency that employs peace officer, e.g., “the Department of Fish and Wildlife”> is a *peace officer* if \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of facts necessary to make employee a peace officer, e.g., “designated by the director of the agency as a peace officer”>.]

[An officer or employee of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of state or local government agency that employs public officer> is a *public officer*.]

[An *emergency medical technician* is someone who holds a valid certificate as an emergency medical technician.]

[The duties of (a/an) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert title of peace officer, public officer, or emergency medical technician> include \_\_\_\_\_ <insert job duties>.]

[Taking a photograph or making an audio or video recording of a (*peace*

*officer/public officer/emergency medical technician) while the officer is in a public place or the person taking the photograph or making the recording is in a place where he or she has the right to be is not, by itself, a crime.]*

*<When lawful performance is an issue, give the following paragraph and Instruction 2670, Lawful Performance: Peace Officer.>*

**[A peace officer is not lawfully performing his or her duties if he or she is (unlawfully arresting or detaining someone/ [or] using unreasonable or excessive force in his or her duties). Instruction 2670 explains (when an arrest or detention is unlawful/ [and] when force is unreasonable or excessive).]**

**[[The People allege that the defendant (resisted[,]/ [or] obstructed[,]/ [or] delayed) \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name, excluding title>* by doing the following: \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert description of acts when multiple acts alleged>*.] You may not find the defendant guilty unless you all agree that the People have proved that the defendant committed at least one of the alleged acts of (resisting[,]/ [or] obstructing[,]/ [or] delaying) a (peace officer/public officer/emergency medical technician) who was lawfully performing his or her duties, and you all agree on which act (he/she) committed.]**

**[If a person intentionally goes limp, requiring an officer to drag or carry the person in order to accomplish a lawful arrest, that person may have willfully (resisted[,]/ [or] obstructed[,]/ [or] delayed) the officer if all the other requirements are met.]**

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*New January 2006; Revised June 2007, August 2016*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

The court may use the optional bracketed language in the penultimate paragraph to insert a description of the multiple acts alleged if appropriate.

“[I]f a defendant is charged with violating section 148 and the arrest is found to be unlawful, a defendant cannot be convicted of that section.” (*People v. White* (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 161, 166 [161 Cal.Rptr. 541].) An unlawful arrest includes both an arrest made without legal grounds and an arrest made with excessive force. (*Id.* at p. 167.) “[D]isputed facts bearing on the issue of legal cause must be submitted to the jury considering an engaged-in-duty element.” (*People v. Gonzalez* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1217 [275 Cal.Rptr. 729, 800 P.2d 1159].) The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct that the defendant is not guilty of the offense charged if the arrest was unlawful. (*People v. Olguin* (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 39, 46–47 [173 Cal.Rptr. 663].)

On request, the court must instruct that the prosecution has the burden of proving the lawfulness of an arrest beyond a reasonable doubt. (*People v. Castain* (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 138, 145 [175 Cal.Rptr. 651].)

If lawful performance is an issue, give the bracketed paragraph on lawful performance and the appropriate portions of CALCRIM No. 2670, *Lawful Performance: Peace Officer*. When giving the portion of CALCRIM No. 2670 on the “use of force,” the court **must** either delete the following sentence or specify that this sentence does not apply to a charge of violating Penal Code section 148: “If a person knows, or reasonably should know, that a peace officer is arresting or detaining him or her, the person must not use force or any weapon to resist an officer’s use of reasonable force.” (*People v. White, supra*, 101 Cal.App.3d at pp. 168–169 [court must clarify that Pen. Code, § 834a does not apply to charge under section 148].)

If the prosecution alleges multiple, distinct acts of resistance, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on unanimity. (*People v. Moreno* (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 9 [108 Cal.Rptr. 338].) Give CALCRIM No. 3500, *Unanimity*, if needed.

The jury must determine whether the alleged victim is a peace officer. (*People v. Brown* (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 444–445 [250 Cal.Rptr. 604, 758 P.2d 1135].) The court may instruct the jury on the appropriate definition of “peace officer” from the statute (e.g., “a Garden Grove Regular Police Officer and a Garden Grove Reserve Police Officer are peace officers”). (*Ibid.*) However, the court may not instruct the jury that the alleged victim was a peace officer as a matter of law (e.g., “Officer Reed was a peace officer”). (*Ibid.*) If the alleged victim is a police officer, give the bracketed sentence that begins with “A person employed as a police officer.” If the alleged victim is another type of peace officer, give the bracketed sentence that begins with “A person employed by.”

The court may give the bracketed sentence that begins with “The duties of a \_\_\_\_\_ <insert title . . . > include” on request. The court may insert a description of the alleged victim’s duties such as “the correct service of a facially valid search warrant.” (*People v. Gonzalez* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1222 [275 Cal.Rptr. 729, 800 P.2d 1159].)

If the facts indicate passive resistance to arrest, give the bracketed sentence that begins with “If a person goes limp.” (*In re Bacon* (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 34, 53 [49 Cal.Rptr. 322].)

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 148(a); see *In re Muhammed C.* (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1325, 1329 [116 Cal.Rptr.2d 21].
- General-Intent Crime. *In re Muhammed C.* (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1325, 1329 [116 Cal.Rptr.2d 21].
- Knowledge Required. *People v. Lopez* (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 592, 599–600 [233 Cal.Rptr. 207].
- Multiple Violations Permissible If Multiple Officers. Pen. Code, § 148(e).

- Peace Officer Defined. Pen. Code, § 830 et seq.
- Emergency Medical Technician Defined. Health & Saf. Code, §§ 1797.80–1797.84.
- Delaying Officer From Performing Duties. *People v. Allen* (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 981, 985–986, 987 [167 Cal.Rptr. 502].
- Verbal Resistance or Obstruction. *People v. Quiroga* (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 961, 968, 970–972 [20 Cal.Rptr.2d 446] [nondisclosure of identity following arrest for felony, not misdemeanor]; *People v. Green* (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1433, 1438 [59 Cal.Rptr.2d 913] [attempt to intimidate suspected victim into denying offense].
- Passive Resistance to Arrest. *In re Bacon* (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 34, 53 [49 Cal.Rptr. 322].
- Unanimity. *People v. Moreno* (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 9 [108 Cal.Rptr. 338].
- Merely Photographing or Recording Officers Not a Crime. Pen. Code, § 148(g).

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Governmental Authority, §§ 18–19.

1 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 11, *Arrest*, § 11.06[3][b] (Matthew Bender).

**2657–2669. Reserved for Future Use**





## F. LAWFUL PERFORMANCE

### 2670. Lawful Performance: Peace Officer

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The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name, excluding title>* was lawfully performing (his/her) duties as a peace officer. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name[s] of all offense[s] with lawful performance as an element>*.

A peace officer is not lawfully performing his or her duties if he or she is (unlawfully arresting or detaining someone/ [or] using unreasonable or excessive force when making or attempting to make an otherwise lawful arrest or detention).

*<A. Unlawful Detention>*

[A peace officer may legally detain someone if [the person consents to the detention or if]:

1. Specific facts known or apparent to the officer lead him or her to suspect that the person to be detained has been, is, or is about to be involved in activity relating to crime;

AND

2. A reasonable officer who knew the same facts would have the same suspicion.

Any other detention is unlawful.

In deciding whether the detention was lawful, consider evidence of the officer's training and experience and all the circumstances known by the officer when he or she detained the person.]

*<B. Unlawful Arrest>*

[A peace officer may legally arrest someone [either] (on the basis of an arrest warrant/ [or] if he or she has probable cause to make the arrest).

Any other arrest is unlawful.

Probable cause exists when the facts known to the arresting officer at the time of the arrest would persuade someone of reasonable caution that the person to be arrested has committed a crime.

In deciding whether the arrest was lawful, consider evidence of the officer's training and experience and all the circumstances known by the officer when he or she arrested the person.

*<Arrest without warrant for most misdemeanors or infractions>*

[In order for an officer to lawfully arrest someone without a warrant for

**a misdemeanor or infraction, the officer must have probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested committed a misdemeanor or infraction in the officer's presence.]**

*<Arrest without warrant for felony or misdemeanor not requiring commission in officer's presence; see Bench Notes>*

**[In order for an officer to lawfully arrest someone for (a/an) (felony/ [or] \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert misdemeanor not requiring commission in officer's presence>*) without a warrant, the officer must have probable cause to believe the person to be arrested committed (a/an) (felony/ [or] \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert misdemeanor not requiring commission in officer's presence>*). However, it is not required that the offense be committed in the officer's presence.]**

**\_\_\_\_\_ *<insert crime that was basis for arrest>* is (a/an) (felony/ misdemeanor/infraction).**

*<Entering home without warrant>*

**[In order for an officer to enter a home to arrest someone without a warrant [and without consent]:**

- 1. The officer must have probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested committed a crime and is in the home;**

**AND**

- 2. Exigent circumstances require the officer to enter the home without a warrant.**

**The term *exigent circumstances* describes an emergency situation that requires swift action to prevent (1) imminent danger to life or serious damage to property, or (2) the imminent escape of a suspect or destruction of evidence.]**

**[The officer must tell that person that the officer intends to arrest him or her, why the arrest is being made, and the authority for the arrest. [The officer does not have to tell the arrested person these things if the officer has probable cause to believe that the person is committing or attempting to commit a crime, is fleeing immediately after having committed a crime, or has escaped from custody.] [The officer must also tell the arrested person the offense for which he or she is being arrested if he or she asks for that information.]]**

*<When giving either paragraph A on unlawful detention or paragraph B on unlawful arrest, give the following paragraph also, if applicable>*

**[Photographing or recording a *peace officer* while the officer is in a public place or while the person photographing or recording is in a place where he or she has the right to be is not, by itself, a crime nor a basis**

for (reasonable suspicion to detain/ [nor] probable cause to arrest).]

<C. Use of Force>

[Special rules control the use of force.

A peace officer may use reasonable force to arrest or detain someone, to prevent escape, to overcome resistance, or in self-defense.

[If a person knows, or reasonably should know, that a peace officer is arresting or detaining him or her, the person must not use force or any weapon to resist an officer's use of reasonable force. [However, you may not find the defendant guilty of resisting arrest if the arrest was unlawful, even if the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the officer was arresting him.]]

If a peace officer uses unreasonable or excessive force while (arresting or attempting to arrest/ [or] detaining or attempting to detain) a person, that person may lawfully use reasonable force to defend himself or herself.

A person being arrested or detained uses reasonable force when he or she: (1) uses that degree of force that he or she actually believes is reasonably necessary to protect himself or herself from the officer's use of unreasonable or excessive force; and (2) uses no more force than a reasonable person in the same situation would believe is necessary for his or her protection.]

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2016*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction if there is sufficient evidence that the officer was not lawfully performing his or her duties and lawful performance is an element of the offense. (*People v. Gonzalez* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1217 [275 Cal.Rptr. 729, 800 P.2d 1159] [“disputed facts bearing on the issue of legal cause must be submitted to the jury considering an engaged-in-duty element”]; *People v. Olguin* (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 39, 46–47 [173 Cal.Rptr. 663]; *People v. Castain* (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 138, 145 [175 Cal.Rptr. 651]; *People v. White* (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 161, 166–168 [161 Cal.Rptr. 541].)

Give section A if there is an issue as to whether the officer had a legal basis to detain someone. Give section B if there is an issue as to whether the officer had a legal basis to arrest someone. Give section C if there is an issue as to whether the officer used excessive force in arresting or detaining someone. If the issue is whether the officer used excessive force in some other duty, give section C with any necessary modifications.

If this instruction is only relevant to a charge of violating Penal Code section 148,

the court **must not give** the bracketed sentence in section C that begins with “If a person knows, or reasonably should know, that a peace officer is arresting or detaining him or her.” (*People v. White, supra*, 101 Cal.App.3d at pp. 168–169 [court must clarify that Penal Code section 834a does not apply to charge under section 148].) If the case does not involve an alleged violation of Penal Code section 148 (either as a charge offense or as a lesser), the court should give that bracketed sentence. If the case involves an alleged violation of Penal Code section 148 as well as other offenses in which lawful performance is an element, the court may give the bracketed sentence but must also give the sentence that begins with “However, you may not find the defendant guilty of resisting arrest.”

When giving the bracketed section under the heading “A. Unlawful Detention,” if there is a factual issue about whether the person was in fact “detained,” the court should provide the jury with a definition of when a person is detained. Similarly, if there is a factual issue as to whether the person consented to the detention, the court should instruct on consent. (See *People v. Wilkins* (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 761, 777 [17 Cal.Rptr.2d 743].)

In the section headed “B. Unlawful Arrest,” two options are provided for arrests without a warrant. The general rule is that an officer may not make an arrest for a misdemeanor or infraction unless the offense was committed in the officer’s presence. (See Pen. Code, § 836(a)(1).) Statutes provide exceptions to this requirement for some misdemeanors. (See, e.g., Pen. Code, § 836(c) [violation of domestic violence protective or restraining order]; Veh. Code, § 40300.5 [driving under the influence plus traffic accident or other specified circumstance].) If the officer made the arrest for an infraction or a misdemeanor falling under the general rule, give the bracketed paragraph under the heading “Arrest without warrant for most misdemeanors or infraction.” If the officer made the arrest for a felony or misdemeanor not requiring commission in the officer’s presence give the bracketed paragraph under the heading “Arrest without warrant for felony or misdemeanor not requiring commission in officer’s presence.” The court may also give both bracketed paragraphs, if appropriate.

Give the bracketed section about entering a home without a warrant if the arrest took place in a home. (*People v. Wilkins* (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 761, 777 [17 Cal.Rptr.2d 743].) If there is a factual issue about whether the officer had consent to enter the home, the court must also instruct on the legal requirements for consent. (*Ibid.*)

### AUTHORITY

- Instructional Duty. *People v. Gonzalez* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1217 [275 Cal.Rptr. 729, 800 P.2d 1159]; *People v. Olguin* (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 39, 46–47 [173 Cal.Rptr. 663]; *People v. Castain* (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 138, 145 [175 Cal.Rptr. 651]; *People v. White* (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 161, 166–168 [161 Cal.Rptr. 541].
- Lawful Detention. *People v. Celis* (2004) 33 Cal.4th 667, 674–675 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 85, 93 P.3d 1027].

- Lawful Arrest. Pen. Code, §§ 834–836, 841.
- Probable Cause Defined. *People v. Celis* (2004) 33 Cal.4th 667, 673 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 85, 93 P.3d 1027]; *People v. Fischer* (1957) 49 Cal.2d 442, 446 [317 P.2d 967].
- Officer’s Training and Experience Relevant. *People v. Lilienthal* (1978) 22 Cal.3d 891, 899 [150 Cal.Rptr. 910, 587 P.2d 706]; *People v. Clayton* (1970) 13 Cal.App.3d 335, 338 [91 Cal.Rptr. 494].
- Duty to Submit to Arrest or Detention. Pen. Code, § 834(a); *People v. Allen* (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 981, 985 [167 Cal.Rptr. 502]; *People v. Curtis* (1969) 70 Cal.2d 347, 351 [74 Cal.Rptr. 713, 450 P.2d 33].
- Exigent Circumstances to Enter Home. *People v. Wilkins* (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 761, 777 [17 Cal.Rptr.2d 743]; *People v. Ramey* (1976) 16 Cal.3d 263, 276 [127 Cal.Rptr. 629, 545 P.2d 1333]; *People v. Hoxter* (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 406, 414, fn. 7 [89 Cal.Rptr.2d 259].
- Reasonable Force. Pen. Code, §§ 692, 693.
- Excessive Force Makes Arrest Unlawful. *People v. White* (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 161, 166–168 [161 Cal.Rptr. 541].
- Excessive Force Triggers Right to Self-Defense With Reasonable Force. *People v. Curtis* (1969) 70 Cal.2d 347, 356 [74 Cal.Rptr. 713, 450 P.2d 33].
- Merely Photographing or Recording Officers Not a Crime. Pen. Code, § 148(g).

## RELATED ISSUES

### *Service of Warrant*

An officer is lawfully engaged in his or her duties if he or she is correctly serving “a facially valid search or arrest warrant, regardless of the legal sufficiency of the facts shown in support of the warrant.” (*People v. Gonzalez* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1222 [275 Cal.Rptr. 729, 800 P.2d 1159].) On the other hand, “the proper *service* of a warrant is a jury issue under the engaged-in-duty requirement.” (*Id.* at p. 1223 [emphasis in original].) If there is a factual dispute over the manner in which the warrant was served, the court should instruct the jury on the requirements for legal service of the warrant. (*Ibid.*)

### *Lawfulness of Officer’s Conduct Based on Objective Standard*

The rule “requires that the officer’s lawful conduct be established as an objective fact; it does not establish any requirement with respect to the defendant’s mens rea.” (*People v. Jenkins* (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 1020 [95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044].) The defendant’s belief about whether the officer was or was not acting lawfully is irrelevant. (*Id.* at p. 1021.)

### *Photographing or Recording Officers*

Penal Code section 148(g) provides that merely photographing or recording a public officer or peace officer under certain conditions is not a crime. The intended scope of this new legislation is unclear. Until the legislature or courts of review provide

further guidance, the court will have to determine whether section 148(g) should apply in an individual case.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 11, *Arrest*, §§ 11.01–11.06 (Matthew Bender).

3 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 73, *Defenses and Justifications*, § 73.15[1], [2] (Matthew Bender).

## 2671. Lawful Performance: Custodial Officer

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The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name, excluding title>* was lawfully performing (his/her) duties as a custodial officer. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name[s] of all offense[s] with lawful performance as an element>*.

A custodial officer is not lawfully performing his or her duties if he or she is using unreasonable or excessive force in his or her duties.

Special rules control the use of force.

A custodial officer may use reasonable force in his or her duties to restrain a person, to overcome resistance, to prevent escape, or in self-defense.

If a person knows, or reasonably should know, that a custodial officer is restraining him or her, that person must not use force or any weapon to resist an officer's use of reasonable force.

If a custodial officer uses unreasonable or excessive force while (restraining a person/ [or] overcoming a person's resistance/ [or] preventing a person from escaping/ [or] defending him- or herself from a person), that person may lawfully use reasonable force to defend himself or herself.

A person uses reasonable force when he or she: (1) uses that degree of force that he or she actually believes is reasonably necessary to protect himself or herself from the officer's use of unreasonable or excessive force; and (2) uses no more force than a reasonable person in the same situation would believe is necessary for his or her protection.

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*New January 2006; Revised April 2010*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction if there is sufficient evidence that the officer was not lawfully performing his or her duties and lawful performance is an element of the offense. (*People v. Gonzalez* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1217 [275 Cal.Rptr. 729, 800 P.2d 1159] [“disputed facts bearing on the issue of legal cause must be submitted to the jury considering an engaged-in-duty element”]; *People v. Olguin* (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 39, 46–47 [173 Cal.Rptr. 663]; *People v. Castain* (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 138, 145 [175 Cal.Rptr. 651]; *People v. White* (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 161, 166–168 [161 Cal.Rptr. 541].)

### AUTHORITY

- Instructional Duty. *People v. Gonzalez* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1217 [275 563

Cal.Rptr. 729, 800 P.2d 1159]; *People v. Olguin* (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 39, 46–47 [173 Cal.Rptr. 663]; *People v. Castain* (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 138, 145 [175 Cal.Rptr. 651]; *People v. White* (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 161, 166–168 [161 Cal.Rptr. 541].

- Reasonable Force. Pen. Code, §§ 692, 693.
- Excessive Force Triggers Right to Self-Defense With Reasonable Force. *People v. Curtis* (1969) 70 Cal.2d 347, 356 [74 Cal.Rptr. 713, 450 P.2d 33].
- Circumstances Under Which Defendant May Resort to Self-Defense. *People v. Gutierrez* (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 515, 522–524 [94 Cal.Rptr.3d 228].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Lawfulness of Officer’s Conduct Based on Objective Standard*

The rule “requires that the officer’s lawful conduct be established as an objective fact; it does not establish any requirement with respect to the defendant’s mens rea.” (*People v. Jenkins* (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 1020 [95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044].) The defendant’s belief about whether the officer was or was not acting lawfully is irrelevant. (*Id.* at p. 1021.)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

3 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 73, *Defenses and Justifications*, §§ 73.11–73.14 (Matthew Bender).



## 2672. Lawful Performance: Resisting Unlawful Arrest With Force

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The defendant is not guilty of the crime of (battery against a peace officer[,]/ [or] assault against a peace officer[,]/ [or] assault with (force likely to produce great bodily injury/a deadly weapon/a firearm/a semiautomatic firearm/a machine gun/an assault weapon) against a peace officer[,]/ [or] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert other crime charged, e.g., resisting arrest>) if the officer was not lawfully performing (his/her) duties because (he/she) was unlawfully arresting someone.

However, even if the arrest was unlawful, as long as the officer used only reasonable force to accomplish the arrest, the defendant may be guilty of the lesser crime of (battery[,]/ [or] assault[,]/ [or] assault with (force likely to produce great bodily injury/a deadly weapon/a firearm/a semiautomatic firearm/a machine gun/an assault weapon)).

On the other hand, if the officer used unreasonable or excessive force, and the defendant used only reasonable force in (self-defense/ [or] defense of another), then the defendant is not guilty of the lesser crime[s] of (battery[,]/ [or] assault[,]/ [or] assault with (force likely to produce great bodily injury/a deadly weapon/a firearm/a semiautomatic firearm/a machine gun/an assault weapon)).

The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the officer was lawfully performing (his/her) duties. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty [of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert crimes>].

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*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court may give this instruction on request.

### AUTHORITY

- No Right to Forcibly Resist Arrest. Pen. Code, § 834a.
- Applies to Arrest, Not Detention. *People v. Coffey* (1967) 67 Cal.2d 204, 221 [60 Cal.Rptr. 457, 430 P.2d 15]; *People v. Jones* (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 710, 717 [87 Cal.Rptr. 625].
- Forcible Resistance to Unlawful Arrest Is Battery or Assault on Nonofficer. *People v. Curtis* (1969) 70 Cal.2d 347, 355–356 [74 Cal.Rptr. 713, 450 P.2d 33]; *People v. White* (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 161, 166 [161 Cal.Rptr. 541].

- Use of Reasonable Force in Response to Excessive Force Is Complete Defense. *People v. White* (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 161, 168 [161 Cal.Rptr. 541].
- May Not Be Convicted of Resisting Unlawful Arrest. *People v. White* (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 161, 166 [161 Cal.Rptr. 541]; *People v. Moreno* (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 10 [108 Cal.Rptr. 338].

### **SECONDARY SOURCES**

3 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 73, *Defenses and Justifications*, §§ 73.11[2][b], 73.15[2] (Matthew Bender).

## 2673. Pat-Down Search

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**An officer who has lawfully detained someone may conduct a carefully limited search of the detained person’s outer clothing, in order to discover whether that person has a weapon. The officer may conduct this limited search only if he or she reasonably believes that the detained person may be armed and dangerous.**

**[If, during the search, the officer finds an object that feels reasonably like (a/an) (knife[,]/ [or] gun[,]/ [or] club[,]/ [or] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert specific type of weapon>), the officer may remove the object from the person’s clothing.]**

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*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court may give this instruction on request.

### AUTHORITY

- Stop and Frisk Permissible. *Terry v. Ohio* (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 30–31 [88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889]; *People v. Scott* (1976) 16 Cal.3d 242, 248 [128 Cal.Rptr. 39, 546 P.2d 327].
- Officer May Remove Object That Feels Like Typical Weapon. *People v. Collins* (1970) 1 Cal.3d 658, 663 [83 Cal.Rptr. 179, 463 P.2d 403]; *People v. Watson* (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 130, 135 [90 Cal.Rptr. 483].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Illegally Obtained Evidence, § 306 et seq.

1 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 10, *Investigative Detention*, §§ 10.01–10.06 (Matthew Bender).

**2674–2679. Reserved for Future Use**



## G. UNLAWFUL ASSEMBLY AND DISTURBING THE PEACE

### 2680. Courthouse Picketing (Pen. Code, § 169)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with (picketing/ [or] parading) near a courthouse [in violation of Penal Code section 169].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant (picketed/ [or] paraded) in or near a state court building;

AND

2. When the defendant acted, (he/she) did so with the intent (to interfere with, obstruct, or impede the administration of justice/ [or] to influence (a/an) (judge[,]/ [or] juror[,]/ [or] witness[,]/ [or] officer of the court) in the discharge of his or her duty).
- 

*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 169.
- Similar Statute Constitutional. *Cox v. Louisiana* (1964) 379 U.S. 559, 564 [85 S.Ct. 476, 13 L.Ed.2d 487] [upholding Louisiana statute nearly identical to Pen. Code, § 169].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Governmental Authority, § 32.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.21 (Matthew Bender).

## 2681. Disturbance of Public Meeting (Pen. Code, § 403)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with (disturbing/ [or] breaking up) a public meeting [in violation of Penal Code section 403].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant intentionally committed acts that violated (implicit customs or usages of/ [or] explicit rules for governing) a public meeting;
2. The defendant knew or reasonably should have known that (his/her) acts violated those (customs[,]/ [or] usages[,]/ [or] rules);

AND

3. The defendant's acts substantially [and unlawfully] interfered with the conduct of the meeting.

You may not find the defendant guilty of this crime unless you find that the defendant's acts themselves, not the message or expressive content of the acts, substantially interfered with the conduct of the meeting.

[When deciding whether the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that (his/her) acts violated the (implicit customs or usages of/ [or] explicit rules for governing) the meeting, you may consider whether someone warned or requested the defendant to stop (his/her) activities.]

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2012*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

On request, give the bracketed sentence that begins with “When deciding whether,” if the meeting did not have explicit rules of governance. (*In re Kay* (1970) 1 Cal.3d 930, 945 [83 Cal.Rptr. 686, 464 P.2d 142].)

Do not give this instruction if the disturbance occurs at a religious meeting covered by Pen. Code, § 302 or at a meeting where “electors” are “assembling” pursuant to Elec. Code, § 18340. The court will need to draft separate instructions for those offenses.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 403; *In re Kay* (1970) 1 Cal.3d 930, 941–943 [83 Cal.Rptr. 686, 464 P.2d 142].

- First Amendment Limitations on Statute. *In re Kay* (1970) 1 Cal.3d 930, 941–942 [83 Cal.Rptr. 686, 464 P.2d 142].
- Must Be Public Meeting. *Farraher v. Superior Court* (1919) 45 Cal.App. 4, 6 [187 P. 72].
- No Clear and Present Danger Requirement. *McMahon v. Albany Unified School Dist.* (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1275, 1287–1288 [129 Cal.Rptr.2d 184].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, § 60.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.21 (Matthew Bender).

## 2682. Inciting a Riot (Pen. Code, § 404.6(a))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with inciting a riot [in violation of Penal Code section 404.6(a)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant (did an act or engaged in conduct that encouraged a riot[,]/ [or] urged others to commit acts of force or violence[,]/ [or] urged others to burn or destroy property);
2. The defendant acted at a time and place and under circumstances that produced a clear, present, and immediate danger that (a riot would occur/ [or] acts of force or violence would happen/ [or] property would be burned or destroyed);

AND

3. When the defendant acted, (he/she) intended to cause a riot.

A *riot* occurs when two or more people, acting together and without legal authority, disturb the public peace by using force or violence or by threatening to use force or violence with the immediate ability to carry out those threats.

[The People do not have to prove that anyone actually (rioted/ [or] committed acts of force or violence/ [or] burned or destroyed property).]

---

*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “The People do not have to prove” on request.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 404.6(a).
- Riot Defined. Pen. Code, § 404.
- Statute Constitutional. *People v. Davis* (1968) 68 Cal.2d 481, 484–487 [67 Cal.Rptr. 547, 439 P.2d 651].
- Terms of Statute Understandable. *People v. Jones* (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 437, 447 [96 Cal.Rptr. 795].



**RELATED ISSUES*****Defendant Must Urge Others***

To be guilty of inciting a riot, the defendant must urge others to commit acts of force or property destruction. (*People v. Boyd* (1985) 38 Cal.3d 762, 778 [215 Cal.Rptr. 1, 700 P.2d 782]; *In re Wagner* (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 90, 106 [173 Cal.Rptr. 766].) Thus, in *In re Wagner, supra*, 119 Cal.App.3d at p. 106, the court held that the evidence was insufficient to establish incitement to riot where the defendant was observed throwing rocks at the police.

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, § 17.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.21 (Matthew Bender).

## 2683. Participating in a Riot (Pen. Code, §§ 404, 405)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with participating in a riot [in violation of Penal Code section 405].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that the defendant willfully participated in a riot.

A *riot* occurs when two or more people, acting together and without legal authority, disturb the public peace by using force or violence or by threatening to use force or violence with the immediate ability to carry out those threats.

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose.

---

*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 404, 405.
- Riot Defined. Pen. Code, § 404.
- Willfully Defined. Pen. Code, § 7(1); *People v. Lara* (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 102, 107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Prior Agreement Not Necessary*

“It [is] not necessary that a previous agreement between the aggressors should have been alleged, or have existed, to bring such offenses within the inhibitions of section 404.” (*People v. Bundte* (1948) 87 Cal.App.2d 735, 743 [197 P.2d 823].) “Thus, it is the *concurrence* of unlawful action by individuals in the use, or threat to unlawfully use force or violence that constitutes the offense of riot. [Citation.] All persons who encourage, incite, promote, give support to or countenance a riot are principals in a riot.” (*People v. Cipriani* (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 299, 304 [95 Cal.Rptr. 722] [italics in original, citing *People v. Bundte, supra*, 87 Cal.App.2d at pp. 744–746].)

#### *Mere Presence Not Sufficient*

Mere presence alone does not make someone a rioter. (*People v. Bundte* (1948) 87 Cal.App.2d 735, 746 [197 P.2d 823].)

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, § 16.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.21 (Matthew Bender).

## 2684. Participating in a Rout (Pen. Code, §§ 406, 408)

---

The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with participating in a rout [in violation of Penal Code section 408].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that the defendant willfully participated in a rout.

A *rout* occurs when two or more people, assembled and acting together, make an attempt to commit or advance toward committing an act that would be a riot if actually committed.

A *riot* occurs when two or more people, acting together and without legal authority, disturb the public peace by using force or violence or by threatening to use force or violence with the immediate ability to carry out those threats.

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose.

---

*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 406, 408; *In re Wagner* (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 90, 106 [173 Cal.Rptr. 766].
- Rout Defined. Pen. Code, § 406.
- Riot Defined. Pen. Code, § 404.
- Willfully Defined. Pen. Code, § 7(1); *People v. Lara* (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 102, 107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, § 13.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.21 (Matthew Bender).

**2685. Participating in an Unlawful Assembly (Pen. Code, §§ 407, 408)**

---

The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with participating in an unlawful assembly [in violation of Penal Code section 408].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant willfully participated in an unlawful assembly;

AND

2. The defendant knew that the assembly was unlawful when (he/she) participated.

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose.

An *unlawful* assembly occurs when two or more people assemble together (to commit a crime/ [or] to do a lawful act in a violent manner).

[When two or more people assemble to do a lawful act in a violent manner, the assembly is not *unlawful* unless violence actually occurs or there is a clear and present danger that violence will occur immediately.]

---

*New January 2006*

**BENCH NOTES**

***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

Penal Code section 407 defines an “unlawful assembly” as two or more people assembled together “to do an unlawful act, or do a lawful act in a violent, boisterous, or tumultuous manner.” The Supreme Court has held that “the proscriptions of sections 407 and 408 on assemblies to do a lawful act must be limited to assemblies which are violent or which pose a clear and present danger of imminent violence.” (*In re Brown* (1973) 9 Cal.3d 612, 623 [108 Cal.Rptr. 465, 510 P.2d 1017]; see *Collins v. Jordan* (9th Cir. 1996) 110 F.3d 1363, 1371.) Because the assembly must in fact be violent or pose an immediate threat of violence, an assembly that is “boisterous or tumultuous” does not establish a violation of the statute. The committee has therefore eliminated these words from the instruction since they are archaic and potentially confusing.

**AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 407, 408.

- Unlawful Assembly Defined. Pen. Code, § 407.
- Assembly for Lawful Act Requires Violence or Clear and Present Danger of Violence. *In re Brown* (1973) 9 Cal.3d 612, 623 [108 Cal.Rptr. 465, 510 P.2d 1017]; see *Collins v. Jordan* (9th Cir. 1996) 110 F.3d 1363, 1371.
- Specific Intent to Commit Unlawful or Violent Act Not Required. *People v. Kerrick* (1927) 86 Cal.App. 542, 551 [261 P. 756].
- Knowledge That Assembly Unlawful Required. *In re Wagner* (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 90, 103–104 [173 Cal.Rptr. 766]; *Coverstone v. Davies* (1952) 38 Cal.2d 315, 320 [239 P.2d 876].
- Willfully Defined. Pen. Code, § 7(1); *People v. Lara* (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 102, 107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, § 14.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.21 (Matthew Bender).

**2686. Refusal to Disperse: Riot, Rout, or Unlawful Assembly (Pen. Code, §§ 407, 409)**

---

The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with refusal to disperse after being ordered to do so [in violation of Penal Code section 409].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant was present at the location of (a/an) (riot[,]/ [or] rout[,]/ [or] unlawful assembly);
2. A public officer lawfully ordered the defendant to disperse;

[AND]

3. The defendant willfully remained present at the location of the (riot[,]/ [or] rout[,]/ [or] unlawful assembly) after the order to disperse(;/.)

<Give element 4 when instructing on the defense of being a public officer or person assisting an officer.>

[AND]

4. The defendant was not a public officer or a person assisting an officer in attempting to disperse the (riot[,]/ [or] rout[,]/ [or] unlawful assembly).]

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose.

[A *riot* occurs when two or more people, acting together and without legal authority, disturb the public peace by using force or violence or by threatening to use force or violence with the immediate ability to carry out those threats.]

[A *rout* occurs when two or more people, assembled and acting together, make an attempt to commit or advance toward committing an act that would be a riot if actually committed.]

[An *unlawful* assembly occurs when two or more people assemble together (to commit a crime/ [or] to do a lawful act in a violent manner).

[When two or more people assemble to do a lawful act in a violent manner, the assembly is not *unlawful* unless violence actually occurs or there is a clear and present danger that violence will occur immediately.]]

(A/An) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description> is a *public officer*.

A public officer *lawfully warns people to disperse* when the officer directs

them, in the name of the People of the State, to immediately disperse. The officer is not required to use any particular words. However, the words used must be sufficient to inform a reasonable person that the officer is acting in an official capacity and ordering people to leave the area. In addition, the officer must communicate the order in a reasonable way that ensures that the order is heard.

[The People do not have to prove that the defendant participated in the (riot[,]/ [or] rout[,]/ [or] unlawful assembly).]

---

*New January 2006*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

Give element 4 if there is evidence that the defendant was a public officer or assisting a public officer.

Penal Code section 407 defines an “unlawful assembly” as two or more people assembled together “to do an unlawful act, or do a lawful act in a violent, boisterous, or tumultuous manner.” The Supreme Court has held that “the proscriptions of sections 407 and 408 on assemblies to do a lawful act must be limited to assemblies which are violent or which pose a clear and present danger of imminent violence.” (*In re Brown* (1973) 9 Cal.3d 612, 623 [108 Cal.Rptr. 465, 510 P.2d 1017]; see *Collins v. Jordan* (9th Cir. 1996) 110 F.3d 1363, 1371.) Because the assembly must in fact be violent or pose an immediate threat of violence, an assembly that is “boisterous or tumultuous” does not establish a violation of the statute. The committee has therefore eliminated these words from the instruction since they are archaic and potentially confusing.

The jury must determine whether the person who allegedly gave the order was a public officer. (See *People v. Brown* (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 444–445 [250 Cal.Rptr. 604, 758 P.2d 1135].) The court may instruct the jury on the appropriate definition of “public officer” (e.g., in the case of “peace officer,” the court may state “a Garden Grove Regular Police Officer and a Garden Grove Reserve Police Officer are peace officers”). (*Ibid.*) However, the court may not instruct the jury that the person was a public officer as a matter of law (e.g., “Officer Reed was a peace officer”). (*Ibid.*)

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “The People do not have to prove” on request. (*In re Bacon* (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 34, 49 [49 Cal.Rptr. 322].)

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 407, 409.
- Command to Disperse. Pen. Code, § 726.



- Riot Defined. Pen. Code, § 404.
- Rout Defined. Pen. Code, § 406.
- Unlawful Assembly Defined. Pen. Code, § 407.
- Assembly for Lawful Act Requires Violence or Clear and Present Danger of Violence. *In re Brown* (1973) 9 Cal.3d 612, 623 [108 Cal.Rptr. 465, 510 P.2d 1017]; see *Collins v. Jordan* (9th Cir. 1996) 110 F.3d 1363, 1371.
- No Particular Manner of Warning Required. *In re Bacon* (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 34, 50–51 [49 Cal.Rptr. 322]; *People v. Cipriani* (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 299, 307–308 [95 Cal.Rptr. 722]; *In re Wagner* (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 90, 105 [173 Cal.Rptr. 766].
- Willfully Defined. Pen. Code, § 7(1); *People v. Lara* (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 102, 107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Penal Code Sections 409 and 416(a)*

Penal Code section 409 applies to any person remaining at an unlawful assembly following an order to disperse, whether or not that person is involved in the violent or illegal activity. (*Dubner v. City and Co. of San Francisco* (9th Cir. 2001) 266 F.3d 959, 967–968; *In re Bacon* (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 34, 49 [49 Cal.Rptr. 322].) Refusal to disperse is also punishable under Penal Code section 416(a). Penal Code section 416(a) applies only to those who have the specific intent to commit violent or unlawful acts but does not require that the gathering meet the definition of riot, rout, or unlawful assembly. (*Dubner v. City and Co. of San Francisco* (2001) 266 F.3d 959, 967–968; *In re Wagner* (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 90, 110–111 [173 Cal.Rptr. 766].) Use this instruction only for a charge of violating Penal Code section 409. If the defendant is charged under Penal Code section 416(a), give CALCRIM No. 2687, *Refusal to Disperse: Intent to Commit Unlawful Act*.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, § 18.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.21 (Matthew Bender).

**2687. Refusal to Disperse: Intent to Commit Unlawful Act (Pen. Code, § 416(a))**

---

The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with refusal to disperse after being ordered to do so [in violation of Penal Code section 416(a)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant assembled with one or more other people;
2. The defendant intended to (disturb the public peace/ [or] commit a crime);
3. A public officer had probable cause to believe that the purpose of the assembly was unlawful;
4. The public officer lawfully warned the defendant to disperse;

AND

5. The defendant willfully remained present at the location after the order to disperse.

[As used here, a person *intends to disturb the public peace* if he or she intends to commit overt acts that are themselves violent or that tend to incite others to violence.]

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose.

(A/An) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description> is a *public officer*.

A public officer *lawfully warns people to disperse* when the officer directs them, in the name of the People of the State, to immediately disperse. The officer is not required to use any particular words. However, the words used must be sufficient to inform a reasonable person that the officer is acting in an official capacity and ordering people to leave the area. In addition, the officer must communicate the order in a reasonable way that ensures that the order is heard.

An officer has *probable cause* to believe that the purpose of the assembly is unlawful if the officer knows facts that would persuade someone of reasonable caution to believe that the people present intend to (immediately commit criminal or violent acts/ [or] incite others to immediately commit acts of violence).

In deciding whether the officer has probable cause, consider evidence of the officer's training and experience and all the circumstances the officer knew about at the time.

*New January 2006*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

The jury must determine whether the person who allegedly gave the order was a public officer. (See *People v. Brown* (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 444–445 [250 Cal.Rptr. 604, 758 P.2d 1135].) The court may instruct the jury on the appropriate definition of “public officer” (e.g., in the case of “peace officer,” the court may state “a Garden Grove Regular Police Officer and a Garden Grove Reserve Police Officer are peace officers”). (*Ibid.*) However, the court may not instruct the jury that the person was a public officer as a matter of law (e.g., “Officer Reed was a peace officer”). (*Ibid.*)

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 416(a).
- First Amendment Limitations on Statute. *Chambers v. Municipal Court* (1977) 65 Cal.App.3d 904, 909–911 [135 Cal.Rptr. 695].
- Command to Disperse. Pen. Code, § 726.
- No Particular Manner of Warning Required. *In re Bacon* (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 34, 50–51 [49 Cal.Rptr. 322]; *People v. Cipriani* (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 299, 307–308 [95 Cal.Rptr. 722]; *In re Wagner* (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 90, 105 [173 Cal.Rptr. 766].
- Willfully Defined. Pen. Code, § 7(1); *People v. Lara* (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 102, 107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].

## RELATED ISSUES

### *Penal Code Sections 409 and 416(a)*

Penal Code section 409 applies to any person remaining at an unlawful assembly following an order to disperse, whether or not that person is involved in the violent or illegal activity. (*Dubner v. City and Co. of San Francisco* (9th Cir. 2001) 266 F.3d 959, 967–968; *In re Bacon* (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 34, 49 [49 Cal.Rptr. 322].) Refusal to disperse is also punishable under Penal Code section 416(a). Penal Code section 416(a) applies only to those who have the specific intent to commit violent or unlawful acts but does not require that the gathering meet the definition of riot, rout, or unlawful assembly. (*Dubner v. City and Co. of San Francisco* (9th Cir. 2001) 266 F.3d 959, 967–968; *In re Wagner* (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 90, 110–111 [173 Cal.Rptr. 766].) Use this instruction only for a charge of violating Penal Code section 416(a). If the defendant is charged under Penal Code section 409, give CALCRIM No. 2686, *Refusal to Disperse: Riot, Rout, or Unlawful Assembly*.

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, § 18.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, §§ 144.21, 144.22 (Matthew Bender).

**2688. Disturbing the Peace: Fighting or Challenging Someone to Fight (Pen. Code, §§ 415(1), 415.5(a)(1))**

---

The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with disturbing the peace [in violation of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert appropriate code section[s]>].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant willfully [and unlawfully] (fought/ [or] challenged someone else to fight);

[AND]

2. The defendant and the other person were (in a public place/in a building or on the grounds of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of school from Pen. Code, § 415.5>) when (the fight occurred/ [or] the challenge was made)(;/.)

<Give element 3 when instructing on self-defense or defense of another.>

[AND]

- [3. The defendant did not act (in self-defense/ [or] in defense of someone else)(;/.)]

<Give element 4 when instructing on Pen. Code, § 415.5(f).>

[AND]

- (3/4). The defendant was not (a registered student at the school/ [or] a person engaged in lawful employee-related activity).]

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose.

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*New January 2006*

## **BENCH NOTES**

### ***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime. Give this instruction if the defendant is charged with violating Penal Code section 415(1) or section 415.5(a)(1).

If there is sufficient evidence of self-defense or defense of another, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on that defense. Give bracketed element 3, the phrase “and unlawfully” in element 1, and any appropriate defense instructions. (See CALCRIM Nos. 3470–3477.)

If the defendant is charged under Penal Code section 415.5(a)(1), select “within a

building or on the grounds of” in element 2 and insert the type of school from the statute. If there is sufficient evidence that the exemption in Penal Code section 415.5(f) applies, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give bracketed element 4.

If the defendant is charged under Penal Code section 415(1), select “in a public place” in element 2. Do not give bracketed element 4.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 415(1), 415.5(a)(1).
- Willfully Defined. Pen. Code, § 7(1); *People v. Lara* (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 102, 107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, §§ 2–3, 50.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.22 (Matthew Bender).

**2689. Disturbing the Peace: Loud and Unreasonable Noise (Pen. Code, §§ 415(2), 415.5(a)(2))**

---

The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with disturbing the peace [in violation of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert appropriate code section[s]>].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

[1.] The defendant maliciously and willfully disturbed another person by causing loud and unreasonable noise(;/.)

<Give element 2 when instructing on Pen. Code, § 415.5(a)(2).>

[AND]

[2. The other person was in a building or on the grounds of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of school from Pen. Code, § 415.5> at the time of the disturbance(;/.)]

<Give element 3 when instructing on Pen. Code, § 415.5(f).>

[AND]

(2/3). The defendant was not (a registered student of the school/ [or] a person engaged in lawful employee-related activity).]

Someone acts *maliciously* when he or she intentionally does a wrongful act or when he or she acts with the unlawful intent to annoy or injure someone else.

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose.

In order to *disturb another person by causing loud and unreasonable noise*, there must be either:

1. A clear and present danger of immediate violence;

OR

2. The noise must be used for the purpose of disrupting lawful activities, rather than as a means to communicate.

The People do not have to prove that the defendant intended to provoke a violent response.

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*New January 2006*

**BENCH NOTES**

***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime. Give this instruction if the defendant is charged with violating Penal Code section 415(2) or section 415.5(a)(2).

If the defendant is charged under Penal Code section 415.5(a)(2), give bracketed element 2 and insert the type of school from the statute. If there is sufficient evidence that the exemption in Penal Code section 415.5(f) applies, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give bracketed element 3.

If the defendant is charged under Penal Code section 415(1), give only element 1. Do not give bracketed elements 2 and 3.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 415(2), 415.5(a)(2).
- Willfully Defined. Pen. Code, § 7(1); *People v. Lara* (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 102, 107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
- Maliciously Defined. Pen. Code, § 7(4).
- Loud and Unreasonable Noise Defined. *In re Brown* (1973) 9 Cal.3d 612, 618–621 [108 Cal.Rptr. 465, 510 P.2d 1017].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, §§ 2–3, 50.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.22 (Matthew Bender).



**2690. Disturbing the Peace: Offensive Words (Pen. Code,  
§§ 415(3), 415.5(a)(3))**

---

The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with disturbing the peace [in violation of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert appropriate code section[s]>*].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant used offensive words that were inherently likely to provoke an immediate violent reaction;

[AND]

2. When the defendant used those words, (he/she) was (in a public place/in a building or on the grounds of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert description of school from Pen. Code, § 415.5>*)(;/.)

*<Give element 3 when instructing on Pen. Code, § 415.5(f).>*

[AND]

3. The defendant was not (a registered student of the school/ [or] a person engaged in lawful employee-related activity).]

*A person uses offensive words inherently likely to provoke an immediate violent reaction if:*

1. He or she says something that is reasonably likely to provoke someone else to react violently;

AND

2. When he or she makes that statement, there is a clear and present danger that the other person will immediately erupt into violence.

In deciding whether the People have proved both of these factors, consider all the circumstances in which the statement was made and the person to whom the statement was addressed.

The People do not have to prove that the defendant intended to provoke a violent response.

*<Defense: Good Faith Belief Language Not Likely to Provoke>*

[The defendant is not guilty of this crime if (he/she) reasonably and actually believed that the language (he/she) used was not inherently likely to provoke an immediate violent reaction. The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not reasonably and actually believe this to be true. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of this crime.]

New January 2006

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime. Give this instruction if the defendant is charged with violating Penal Code section 415(3) or section 415.5(a)(3).

If the defendant is charged under Penal Code section 415.5(a)(3), select “within a building or on the grounds of” in element 2 and insert the type of school from the statute. If there is sufficient evidence that the exemption in Penal Code section 415.5(f) applies, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give bracketed element 3.

If the defendant is charged under Penal Code section 415(3), select “in a public place” in element 2. Do not give bracketed element 3.

### *Defenses—Instructional Duty*

If there is sufficient evidence to support the defense that the defendant reasonably believed that his or her words would not provoke, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give the instruction on that defense. (See *In re John V.* (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 761, 770 [213 Cal.Rptr. 503] [recognizing defense].)

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 415(3), 415.5(a)(3).
- Must Be Clear and Present Danger of Immediate Violence. *Cohen v. California* (1971) 403 U.S. 15, 17 [91 S.Ct. 1780, 29 L.Ed.2d 284]; *In re Brown* (1973) 9 Cal.3d 612, 618 [108 Cal.Rptr. 465, 510 P.2d 1017].
- Statement Must Be Uttered in Provocative Manner. *Jefferson v. Superior Court* (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 721, 724–725 [124 Cal.Rptr. 507]; *In re John V.* (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 761, 767–768 [213 Cal.Rptr. 503]; *In re Alejandro G.* (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 44, 47–50 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 471].
- Context Must Be Considered. *Jefferson v. Superior Court* (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 721, 724–725 [124 Cal.Rptr. 507]; *In re John V.* (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 761, 767–768 [213 Cal.Rptr. 503]; *In re Alejandro G.* (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 44, 47–50 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 471].
- Intention to Cause Violence Not Required. *Cantwell v. Connecticut* (1940) 310 U.S. 296, 309 [60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213].
- Good Faith Defense. *In re John V.* (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 761, 770 [213 Cal.Rptr. 503].

## RELATED ISSUES

### *Statement Made to Police Officer*

“In determining whether section 415 subdivision (3) was violated, courts must consider the totality of the circumstances, including the status of the addressee. That the addressee was a police officer trained and obliged to exercise a higher degree of

restraint than the average citizen is merely one factor to be considered along with the other circumstances.” (*In re Alejandro G.* (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 44, 47–50 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 471]; see also *People v. Callahan* (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 631, 635 [214 Cal.Rptr. 294] [evidence showed officer “was neither offended . . . nor provoked”].)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, §§ 2–3, 50.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.22 (Matthew Bender).

**2691–2699. Reserved for Future Use**



## H. VIOLATION OF COURT ORDER

### 2700. Violation of Court Order (Pen. Code, § 166(a)(4) & (b)(1))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with violating a court order [in violation of Penal Code section 166].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. A court [lawfully] issued a written order that the defendant \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of order>;
2. The defendant knew about the court order and its contents;
3. The defendant had the ability to follow the court order;

AND

4. The defendant willfully violated the court order.

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose.

[The People must prove that the defendant knew about the court order and that (he/she) had the opportunity to read the order or to otherwise become familiar with what it said. But the People do not have to prove that the defendant actually read the court order.]

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*New January 2006*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

In order for a defendant to be guilty of violating Penal Code section 166(a)(4), the court order must be “lawfully issued.” (Pen. Code, § 166(a)(4); *People v. Gonzalez* (1996) 12 Cal.4th 804, 816–817 [50 Cal.Rptr.2d 74, 910 P.2d 1366].) The defendant may not be convicted for violating an order that is unconstitutional, and the defendant may bring a collateral attack on the validity of the order as a defense to this charge. (*People v. Gonzalez, supra*, 12 Cal.4th at pp. 816–818; *In re Berry* (1968) 68 Cal.2d 137, 147 [65 Cal.Rptr. 273, 436 P.2d 273].) The defendant may raise this issue on demurrer but is not required to. (*People v. Gonzalez, supra*, 12 Cal.4th at pp. 821, 824; *In re Berry, supra*, 68 Cal.2d at p. 146.) The legal question of whether the order was lawfully issued is the type of question normally resolved by the court. (*People v. Gonzalez, supra*, 12 Cal.4th at pp. 816–820; *In re Berry*,

*supra*, 68 Cal.2d at p. 147.) If, however, there is a factual issue regarding the lawfulness of the court order and the trial court concludes that the issue must be submitted to the jury, give the bracketed word “lawfully” in element 1. The court must also instruct on the facts that must be proved to establish that the order was lawfully issued.

Penal Code section 166(b)(1) provides for an increased sentence if the defendant was previously convicted of stalking and violated a court order “by willfully contacting a victim by phone or mail, or directly.” If the prosecution alleges this factor, in element 1, the court should state that the court ordered the defendant “not to contact \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of victim in stalking case> directly, by phone, or by mail,” or something similar. The jury must also determine if the prior conviction has been proved unless the defendant stipulates to the truth of the prior. (See CALCRIM Nos. 3100–3103 on prior convictions.)

If the prosecution alleges that the defendant violated a protective order in a case involving domestic violence (Pen. Code, §§ 166(c)(1), 273.6), do not use this instruction. Give CALCRIM No. 2701, *Violation of Court Order: Protective Order or Stay Away*.

Give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “The People must prove that the defendant knew” on request. (*People v. Poe* (1965) 236 Cal.App.2d Supp. 928, 938–941 [47 Cal.Rptr. 670]; *People v. Brindley* (1965) 236 Cal.App.2d Supp. 925, 927–928 [47 Cal.Rptr. 668], both decisions *affd. sub nom. People v. Von Blum* (1965) 236 Cal.App.2d Supp. 943 [47 Cal.Rptr. 679].)

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 166(a)(4) & (b)(1).
- Willfully Defined. Pen. Code, § 7(1); *People v. Lara* (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 102, 107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
- Order Must Be Lawfully Issued. Pen. Code, § 166(a)(4); *People v. Gonzalez* (1996) 12 Cal.4th 804, 816–817 [50 Cal.Rptr.2d 74, 910 P.2d 1366]; *In re Berry* (1968) 68 Cal.2d 137, 147 [65 Cal.Rptr. 273, 436 P.2d 273].
- Knowledge of Order Required. *People v. Saffell* (1946) 74 Cal.App.2d Supp. 967, 979 [168 P.2d 497].
- Proof of Service Not Required. *People v. Saffell* (1946) 74 Cal.App.2d Supp. 967, 979 [168 P.2d 497].
- Must Have Opportunity to Read but Need Not Actually Read Order. *People v. Poe* (1965) 236 Cal.App.2d Supp. 928, 938–941 [47 Cal.Rptr. 670]; *People v. Brindley* (1965) 236 Cal.App.2d Supp. 925, 927–928 [47 Cal.Rptr. 668], both decisions *affd. sub nom. People v. Von Blum* (1965) 236 Cal.App.2d Supp. 943 [47 Cal.Rptr. 679].
- Ability to Comply With Order. *People v. Greenfield* (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 4 [184 Cal.Rptr. 604].
- General-Intent Offense. *People v. Greenfield* (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 4 [184 Cal.Rptr. 604].

## RELATED ISSUES

### *Violation of Order to Pay Support—Court May Suspend Proceedings*

If the defendant is charged with violating Penal Code section 166(a)(4) based on a failure to pay child, spousal, or family support, the court may suspend criminal proceedings if the defendant acknowledges his or her obligation to pay and posts a bond or other surety. (Pen. Code, § 166.5.)

### *Person Not Directly Bound by Order*

A person who is not directly bound by a court order may nevertheless violate Penal Code section 166(a)(4) if he or she acts in concert with a person who is directly bound by the order. (*People v. Saffell* (1946) 74 Cal.App.2d Supp. 967, 978–979 [168 P.2d 497]; *Berger v. Superior Court* (1917) 175 Cal. 719, 721 [167 P. 143].) “[A] nonparty to an injunction is subject to the contempt power of the court when, with knowledge of the injunction, the nonparty violates its terms *with or for* those who are restrained.” (*People v. Conrad* (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 896, 903 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 248] [italics in original].) The mere fact that the nonparty shares the same purpose as the restrained party is not sufficient. (*Ibid.*) “An enjoined party . . . has to be demonstrably implicated in the nonparty’s activity.” (*Ibid.*)

### *Violating Condition of Probation*

A defendant may not be prosecuted under Penal Code section 166(a)(4) for violating a condition of probation. (*People v. Johnson* (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 106, 109 [24 Cal.Rptr.2d 628].)

## SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Governmental Authority, § 31.

1 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 1, *The California Defense Advocate*, § 1.30 (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.13[4]; Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.10[1] (Matthew Bender).

**2701. Violation of Court Order: Protective Order or Stay Away  
(Pen. Code, §§ 166(c)(1), 273.6)**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with violating a court order [in violation of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert appropriate code section[s]>].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. A court [lawfully] issued a written order that the defendant \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of content of order>;
2. The court order was a (protective order/stay-away court order/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of other type of order>), issued under \_\_\_\_\_ <insert code section under which order made> [in a pending criminal proceeding involving domestic violence/as a condition of probation after a conviction for (domestic violence/ elder abuse/dependent adult abuse)].
3. The defendant knew of the court order;
4. The defendant had the ability to follow the court order;

**AND**

<For violations of Pen. Code, § 166(c)(3), choose “willfully”; for violations of Pen. Code § 273.6(c), choose “intentionally” for the scienter requirement.>

5. The defendant (willfully/intentionally) violated the court order.

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose.

[The People must prove that the defendant knew of the court order and that (he/she) had the opportunity to read the order or to otherwise become familiar with what it said. But the People do not have to prove that the defendant actually read the court order.]

[*Domestic violence* means abuse committed against (an adult/a fully emancipated minor) who is a (spouse[,]/ [or] former spouse[,]/ [or] cohabitant[,]/ [or] former cohabitant[,]/ [or] person with whom the defendant has had a child[,]/ [or] person who dated or is dating the defendant[,]/ [or] person who was or is engaged to the defendant).

*Abuse* means intentionally or recklessly causing or attempting to cause bodily injury, or placing another person in reasonable fear of imminent serious bodily injury to himself or herself or to someone else.]

[The term *cohabitants* means two unrelated persons living together for a substantial period of time, resulting in some permanency of the



relationship. Factors that may determine whether people are cohabiting include, but are not limited to, (1) sexual relations between the parties while sharing the same residence, (2) sharing of income or expenses, (3) joint use or ownership of property, (4) the parties' holding themselves out as (husband and wife/domestic partners), (5) the continuity of the relationship, and (6) the length of the relationship.]

[(*Elder/(D/d)dependent adult*) abuse means that under circumstances or conditions likely to produce great bodily harm or death, the defendant:

1. Willfully caused or permitted any (elder/dependent adult) to suffer;

OR

2. Inflicted on any (elder/dependent adult) unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering;

OR

3. Having the care or custody of any (elder/dependent adult), willfully caused or permitted the person or health of the (elder/dependent adult) to be injured;

OR

4. Willfully caused or permitted the (elder/dependent adult) to be placed in a situation in which (his/her) person or health was endangered.

[An *elder* is someone who is at least 65 years old.]

[A *dependent adult* is someone who is between 18 and 64 years old and has physical or mental limitations that restrict his or her ability to carry out normal activities or to protect his or her rights.] [This definition includes an adult who has physical or developmental disabilities or whose physical or mental abilities have decreased because of age.] [A *dependent adult* is also someone between 18 and 64 years old who is an inpatient in a (health facility/psychiatric health facility/ [or] chemical dependency recovery hospital).]

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*New January 2006; Revised June 2007, April 2008, August 2009*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

In order for a defendant to be guilty of violating Penal Code section 166(a)(4), the court order must be “lawfully issued.” (Pen. Code, § 166(a)(4); *People v. Gonzalez*

(1996) 12 Cal.4th 804, 816–817 [50 Cal.Rptr.2d 74, 910 P.2d 1366].) The defendant may not be convicted for violating an order that is unconstitutional, and the defendant may bring a collateral attack on the validity of the order as a defense to this charge. (*People v. Gonzalez, supra*, 12 Cal.4th at pp. 816–818; *In re Berry* (1968) 68 Cal.2d 137, 147 [65 Cal.Rptr. 273, 436 P.2d 273].) The defendant may raise this issue on demurrer but is not required to. (*People v. Gonzalez, supra*, 12 Cal.4th at pp. 821, 824; *In re Berry, supra*, 68 Cal.2d at p. 146.) The legal question of whether the order was lawfully issued is the type of question normally resolved by the court. (*People v. Gonzalez, supra*, 12 Cal.4th at pp. 816–820; *In re Berry, supra*, 68 Cal.2d at p. 147.) If, however, there is a factual issue regarding the lawfulness of the court order and the trial court concludes that the issue must be submitted to the jury, give the bracketed word “lawfully” in element 1. The court must also instruct on the facts that must be proved to establish that the order was lawfully issued.

In element 2, give the bracketed phrase “in a criminal case involving domestic violence” if the defendant is charged with a violation of Penal Code section 166(c)(1). In such cases, also give the bracketed definition of “domestic violence” and the associated terms.

In element 2, if the order was not a “protective order” or “stay away order” but another type of qualifying order listed in Penal Code section 166(c)(3) or 273.6(c), insert a description of the type of order from the statute.

In element 2, in all cases, insert the statutory authority under which the order was issued. (See Pen. Code, §§ 166(c)(1) & (3), 273.6(a) & (c).)

Give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “The People must prove that the defendant knew” on request. (*People v. Poe* (1965) 236 Cal.App.2d Supp. 928, 938–941 [47 Cal.Rptr. 670]; *People v. Brindley* (1965) 236 Cal.App.2d Supp. 925, 927–928 [47 Cal.Rptr. 668], both decisions affd. *sub nom. People v. Von Blum* (1965) 236 Cal.App.2d Supp. 943 [47 Cal.Rptr. 679].)

If the prosecution alleges that physical injury resulted from the defendant’s conduct, in addition to this instruction, give CALCRIM No. 2702, *Violation of Court Order: Protective Order or Stay Away—Physical Injury*. (Pen. Code, §§ 166(c)(2), 273.6(b).)

If the prosecution charges the defendant with a felony based on a prior conviction and a current offense involving an act of violence or credible threat of violence, in addition to this instruction, give CALCRIM No. 2703, *Violation of Court Order: Protective Order or Stay Away—Act of Violence*. (Pen. Code, §§ 166(c)(4), 273.6(d).) The jury also must determine if the prior conviction has been proved unless the defendant stipulates to the truth of the prior. (See CALCRIM Nos. 3100–3103 on prior convictions.)

### ***Related Instruction***

CALCRIM No. 831, *Abuse of Elder or Dependent Adult* (Pen. Code, § 368(c)).

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 166(c)(1), 273.6.
- Willfully Defined. Pen. Code, § 7(1); *People v. Lara* (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 102, 107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
- Order Must Be Lawfully Issued. Pen. Code, § 166(a)(4); *People v. Gonzalez* (1996) 12 Cal.4th 804, 816–817 [50 Cal.Rptr.2d 74, 910 P.2d 1366]; *In re Berry* (1968) 68 Cal.2d 137, 147 [65 Cal.Rptr. 273, 436 P.2d 273].
- Knowledge of Order Required. *People v. Saffell* (1946) 74 Cal.App.2d Supp. 967, 979 [168 P.2d 497].
- Proof of Service Not Required. *People v. Saffell* (1946) 74 Cal.App.2d Supp. 967, 979 [168 P.2d 497].
- Must Have Opportunity to Read but Need Not Actually Read Order. *People v. Poe* (1965) 236 Cal.App.2d Supp. 928, 938–941 [47 Cal.Rptr. 670]; *People v. Brindley* (1965) 236 Cal.App.2d Supp. 925, 927–928 [47 Cal.Rptr. 668], both decisions *affd. sub nom. People v. Von Blum* (1965) 236 Cal.App.2d Supp. 943 [47 Cal.Rptr. 679].
- Ability to Comply With Order. *People v. Greenfield* (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 4 [184 Cal.Rptr. 604].
- General-Intent Offense. *People v. Greenfield* (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 4 [184 Cal.Rptr. 604].
- Abuse Defined. Pen. Code, § 13700(a).
- Cohabitant Defined. Pen. Code, § 13700(b).
- Domestic Violence Defined. Evid. Code, § 1109(d)(3); Pen. Code, § 13700(b); see *People v. Poplar* (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1129, 1139 [83 Cal.Rptr.2d 320] [spousal rape is higher level of domestic violence].
- Abuse of Elder or Dependent Adult Defined. Pen. Code, § 368.

### COMMENTARY

Penal Code section 166(c)(1) also includes protective orders and stay aways “issued as a condition of probation after a conviction in a criminal proceeding involving domestic violence . . . .” However, in *People v. Johnson* (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 106, 109 [24 Cal.Rptr.2d 628], the court held that a defendant cannot be prosecuted for contempt of court under Penal Code section 166 for violating a condition of probation. Thus, the committee has not included this option in the instruction.

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

If the defendant is charged with a felony based on a prior conviction and the allegation that the current offense involved an act of violence or credible threat of violence (Pen. Code, §§ 166(c)(4), 273.6(d)), then the misdemeanor offense is a lesser included offense. The court must provide the jury with a verdict form on which the jury will indicate if the additional allegations have or have not been

proved. If the jury finds that the either allegation was not proved, then the offense should be set at a misdemeanor.

### **RELATED ISSUES**

See the Related Issues section of CALCRIM No. 2700, *Violation of Court Order*.

### **SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Governmental Authority, § 31.

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, §§ 64, 66–68.

1 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 11, *Arrest*, § 11.02[1] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.13[4] (Matthew Bender).

**2702. Violation of Court Order: Protective Order or Stay Away—Physical Injury (Pen. Code, §§ 166(c)(2), 273.6(b))**

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**If you find the defendant guilty of violating a court order, you must then decide whether the People have proved that the defendant’s conduct resulted in physical injury to another person.**

**The People have the burden of proving this allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you must find that this allegation has not been proved.**

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*New January 2006*

**BENCH NOTES**

***Instructional Duty***

If the prosecution alleges that the defendant’s violation of the court order resulted in physical injury, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on this sentencing factor. This instruction **must** be given with CALCRIM No. 2701, *Violation of Court Order: Protective Order or Stay Away*.

The court must provide the jury with a verdict form on which the jury will indicate if the prosecution has or has not been proved the allegation.

**AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 166(c)(2), 273.6(b).

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Governmental Authority, § 31.

1 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 11, *Arrest*, § 11.02[1] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.13[4] (Matthew Bender).

**2703. Violation of Court Order: Protective Order or Stay Away—Act of Violence (Pen. Code, §§ 166(c)(4), 273.6(d))**

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If you find the defendant guilty of violating a court order, you must then decide whether the People have proved that the defendant’s conduct involved an act of violence [or a credible threat of violence].

[A person makes a *credible threat of violence* when he or she willfully and maliciously communicates a threat to a victim of or a witness to the conduct that violated a court order. The threat must be to use force or violence against that person or that person’s family. The threat must be made with the intent and the apparent ability to carry out the threat in a way to cause the target of the threat to reasonably fear for his or her safety or the safety of his or her immediate family.]

[Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose.]

[Someone acts *maliciously* when he or she intentionally does a wrongful act or when he or she acts with the unlawful intent to disturb, defraud, annoy, or injure someone else.]

The People have the burden of proving this allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you must find that this allegation has not been proved.

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*New January 2006*

**BENCH NOTES**

***Instructional Duty***

If the defendant is charged with a felony for violating a court order based on a prior conviction and an act of violence or credible threat of violence, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on this sentencing factor.

This instruction **must** be given with CALCRIM No. 2701, *Violation of Court Order: Protective Order or Stay Away*.

The court must provide the jury with a verdict form on which the jury will indicate if the prosecution has or has not been proved the allegation.

The court must also give CALCRIM No. 3100, *Prior Conviction: Nonbifurcated Trial*, unless the defendant has stipulated to the conviction. If the court has granted a bifurcated trial on the prior conviction, use CALCRIM No. 3101, *Prior Conviction: Bifurcated Trial*.

**AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 166(c)(4), 273.6(d).

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Governmental Authority, § 31.

1 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 11, *Arrest*, § 11.02[1] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.13[4] (Matthew Bender).

**2704–2719. Reserved for Future Use**





# I. CRIMES INVOLVING PRISONERS

## (i) Assault and Battery

### 2720. Assault by Prisoner Serving Life Sentence (Pen. Code, § 4500)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with assault with (force likely to produce great bodily injury/a deadly weapon) with malice aforethought, while serving a life sentence [in violation of Penal Code section 4500].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

*<Alternative 1A—force with weapon>*

- [1. The defendant did an act with a deadly weapon that by its nature would directly and probably result in the application of force to a person;]

*<Alternative 1B—force without weapon>*

- [1. The defendant did an act that by its nature would directly and probably result in the application of force to a person, and the force used was likely to produce great bodily injury;]
2. The defendant did that act willfully;
3. When the defendant acted, (he/she) was aware of facts that would lead a reasonable person to realize that (his/her) act by its nature would directly and probably result in the application of force to someone;
4. When the defendant acted, (he/she) had the present ability to apply force (likely to produce great bodily injury/with a deadly weapon) to a person;
5. The defendant acted with malice aforethought;

[AND]

*<Alternative 6A—defendant sentenced to life term>*

- [6. When (he/she) acted, the defendant had been sentenced to a maximum term of life in state prison [in California](;/.)]

*<Alternative 6B—defendant sentenced to life and to determinate term>*

- [6. When (he/she) acted, the defendant had been sentenced to both a specific term of years and a maximum term of life in state prison [in California](;/.)]

*<Give element 7 when self-defense or defense of another is an issue raised by the evidence.>*

[AND

7. The defendant did not act (in self-defense/ [or] in defense of someone else).]

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose.

[The terms *application of force* and *apply force* mean to touch in a harmful or offensive manner. The slightest touching can be enough if it is done in a rude or angry way. Making contact with another person, including through his or her clothing, is enough. The touching does not have to cause pain or injury of any kind.]

[The touching can be done indirectly by causing an object [or someone else] to touch the other person.]

[The People are not required to prove that the defendant actually touched someone.]

No one needs to actually have been injured by defendant's act. But if someone was injured, you may consider that fact, along with all the other evidence, in deciding whether the defendant committed an assault[, and if so, what kind of assault it was].

[A *deadly weapon* is any object, instrument, or weapon [that is inherently deadly or dangerous or one] that is used in such a way that it is capable of causing and likely to cause death or great bodily injury.]

[An object is *inherently deadly* if it is deadly or dangerous in the ordinary use for which it was designed.]

[In deciding whether an object is a deadly weapon, consider all the surrounding circumstances.]

[*Great bodily injury* means significant or substantial physical injury. It is an injury that is greater than minor or moderate harm.]

[The term (*great bodily injury/deadly weapon*) is defined in another instruction.]

There are two kinds of *malice aforethought*, express malice and implied malice. Proof of either is sufficient to establish the state of mind required for this crime.

The defendant acted with *express malice* if (he/she) unlawfully intended to kill the person assaulted.

The defendant acted with *implied malice* if:

1. (He/She) intentionally committed an act.
2. The natural and probable consequences of the act were dangerous to human life.

3. At the time (he/she) acted, (he/she) knew (his/her) act was dangerous to human life.

AND

4. (He/She) deliberately acted with conscious disregard for human life.

Malice aforethought does not require hatred or ill will toward the victim. It is a mental state that must be formed before the act is committed. It does not require deliberation or the passage of any particular period of time.

[A person is *sentenced to a term in a state prison* if he or she is (sentenced to confinement in \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of institution from Pen. Code, § 5003>/committed to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation[, Division of Juvenile Justice,]) by an order made according to law[, regardless of both the purpose of the (confinement/commitment) and the validity of the order directing the (confinement/commitment), until a judgment of a competent court setting aside the order becomes final]. [A person may be *sentenced to a term in a state prison* even if, at the time of the offense, he or she is confined in a local correctional institution pending trial or is temporarily outside the prison walls or boundaries for any permitted purpose, including but not limited to serving on a work detail.] [However, a prisoner who has been released on parole is *not sentenced to a term in a state prison*.]]

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2013, August 2016, September 2019, September 2020*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If there is sufficient evidence of self-defense or defense of another, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense. Give bracketed element 7 and any appropriate defense instructions. (See CALCRIM Nos. 3470–3477.)

In element 1, give alternative 1A if it is alleged the assault was committed with a deadly weapon. Give alternative 1B if it is alleged that the assault was committed with force likely to produce great bodily injury.

In element 6, give alternative 6A if the defendant was sentenced to only a life term. Give element 6B if the defendant was sentenced to both a life term and a determinate term. (*People v. Superior Court of Monterey (Bell)* (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1341 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d 836].)

Give the bracketed definition of “application of force and apply force” on request.

Give the relevant bracketed definitions unless the court has already given the definition in other instructions. In such cases, the court may give the bracketed sentence stating that the term is defined elsewhere.

Give the bracketed phrase “that is inherently deadly or one” and give the bracketed definition of *inherently deadly* only if the object is a deadly weapon as a matter of law. (*People v. Stutelberg* (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 314, 317–318 [240 Cal.Rptr.3d 156].)

Give the bracketed portion that begins with “In deciding whether” if the object is not a weapon as a matter of law and is capable of innocent uses. (*People v. Aguilar* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1023, 1028–1029 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 655, 945 P.2d 1204]; *People v. Godwin* (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1562, 1573–1574 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 545].)

If determining whether the item is an inherently deadly weapon requires resolution of a factual issue, give both bracketed instructions.

On request, give the bracketed definition of “sentenced to a term in state prison.” Within that definition, give the bracketed portion that begins with “regardless of the purpose,” or the bracketed second or third sentence, if requested and relevant based on the evidence.

Do not give an attempt instruction in conjunction with this instruction. There is no crime of “attempted assault” in California. (*In re James M.* (1973) 9 Cal.3d 517, 519, 521–522 [108 Cal.Rptr. 89, 510 P.2d 33].)

Penal Code section 4500 provides that the punishment for this offense is death or life in prison without parole, unless “the person subjected to such assault does not die within a year and a day after” the assault. If this is an issue in the case, the court should consider whether the time of death should be submitted to the jury for a specific factual determination pursuant to *Apprendi v. New Jersey* (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 490 [120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435].

The second sentence of the great bodily injury definition could result in error if the prosecution improperly argues great bodily injury may be shown by greater than minor injury alone. (Compare *People v. Medellin* (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 519, 533–535 [258 Cal.Rptr.3d 867] [the definition was reasonably susceptible to prosecutor’s erroneous argument that the injury need only be greater than minor] with *People v. Quinonez* (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 457, 466 [260 Cal.Rptr.3d 86] [upholding instructions containing great bodily injury definition as written].)

### ***Defense—Instructional Duty***

As with murder, the malice required for this crime may be negated by evidence of heat of passion or imperfect self-defense. (*People v. St. Martin* (1970) 1 Cal.3d 524, 530–531 [83 Cal.Rptr. 166, 463 P.2d 390]; *People v. Chacon* (1968) 69 Cal.2d 765, 780–781 [73 Cal.Rptr. 10, 447 P.2d 106].) If the evidences raises an issue about one or both of these potential defenses, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give the appropriate instructions, CALCRIM No. 570, *Voluntary Manslaughter: Heat of Passion—Lesser Included Offense*, or CALCRIM No. 571, *Voluntary Manslaughter:*

*Imperfect Self-Defense—Lesser Included Offense.* The court must modify these instructions for the charge of assault by a life prisoner.

***Related Instructions***

CALCRIM No. 875, *Assault With Deadly Weapon or Force Likely to Produce Great Bodily Injury*.

CALCRIM No. 520, *Murder With Malice Aforethought*.

**AUTHORITY**

- Elements of Assault by Life Prisoner. Pen. Code, § 4500.
- Elements of Assault With Deadly Weapon or Force Likely. Pen. Code, §§ 240, 245(a)(1)–(3) & (b).
- Willful Defined. Pen. Code, § 7(1); *People v. Lara* (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 102, 107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
- Deadly Weapon Defined. *People v. Aguilar* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1023, 1028–1029 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 655, 945 P.2d 1204].
- Least Touching. *People v. Myers* (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 328, 335 [71 Cal.Rptr.2d 518] [citing *People v. Rocha* (1971) 3 Cal.3d 893, 899–900, fn. 12 [92 Cal.Rptr. 172, 479 P.2d 372]].
- Malice Equivalent to Malice in Murder. *People v. St. Martin* (1970) 1 Cal.3d 524, 536–537 [83 Cal.Rptr. 166, 463 P.2d 390]; *People v. Chacon* (1968) 69 Cal.2d 765, 780–781 [73 Cal.Rptr. 10, 447 P.2d 106].
- Malice Defined. Pen. Code, § 188; *People v. Dellinger* (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1212, 1217–1222 [264 Cal.Rptr. 841, 783 P.2d 200]; *People v. Nieto Benitez* (1992) 4 Cal.4th 91, 103–105 [13 Cal.Rptr.2d 864, 840 P.2d 969].
- Ill Will Not Required for Malice. *People v. Sedeno* (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703, 722 [112 Cal.Rptr. 1, 518 P.2d 913], overruled on other grounds in *People v. Flannel* (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 684, fn. 12 [160 Cal.Rptr. 84, 603 P.2d 1].
- Undergoing Sentence of Life. *People v. Superior Court of Monterey (Bell)* (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1341 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d 836].
- Inherently Deadly Defined. *People v. Perez* (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1055, 1065 [232 Cal.Rptr.3d 51, 416 P.3d 42]; *People v. Aguilar* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1023, 1028–1029 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 655, 945 P.2d 1204].

**LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES**

- Assault With Deadly Weapon or Force Likely to Produce Great Bodily Injury—Not a Prisoner. Pen. Code, § 245; see *People v. St. Martin* (1970) 1 Cal.3d 524, 536 [83 Cal.Rptr. 166, 463 P.2d 390]; *People v. Noah* (1971) 5 Cal.3d 469, 478–479 [96 Cal.Rptr. 441, 487 P.2d 1009].
- Assault. Pen. Code, § 240; *People v. Noah* (1971) 5 Cal.3d 469, 478–479 [96 Cal.Rptr. 441, 487 P.2d 1009].

**Note:** In *People v. Noah* (1971) 5 Cal.3d 469, 476–477 [96 Cal.Rptr. 441, 487 609

P.2d 1009], the court held that assault by a prisoner not serving a life sentence, Penal Code section 4501, is not a lesser included offense of assault by a prisoner serving a life sentence, Penal Code section 4500. The court based its conclusion on the fact that Penal Code section 4501 includes as an element of the offense that the prisoner was not serving a life sentence. However, Penal Code section 4501 was amended, effective January 1, 2005, to remove this element. The trial court should, therefore, consider whether Penal Code section 4501 is now a lesser included offense to Penal Code section 4500.

## RELATED ISSUES

### *Status as Life Prisoner Determined on Day of Alleged Assault*

Whether the defendant is sentenced to a life term is determined by his or her status on the day of the assault. (*People v. Superior Court of Monterey (Bell)* (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1341 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d 836]; *Graham v. Superior Court* (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 880, 890 [160 Cal.Rptr. 10].) It does not matter if the conviction is later overturned or the sentence is later reduced to something less than life. (*People v. Superior Court of Monterey (Bell)*, *supra*, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 1341; *Graham v. Superior Court*, *supra*, 98 Cal.App.3d at p. 890.)

### *Undergoing Sentence of Life*

This statute applies to “[e]very person undergoing a life sentence . . .” (Pen. Code, § 4500.) In *People v. Superior Court of Monterey (Bell)* (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1341 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d 836], the defendant had been sentenced both to life in prison and to a determinate term and, at the time of the assault, was still technically serving the determinate term. The court held that he was still subject to prosecution under this statute, stating “a prisoner who commits an assault is subject to prosecution under section 4500 for the crime of assault by a life prisoner if, on the day of the assault, the prisoner was serving a sentence which potentially subjected him to actual life imprisonment, and therefore the prisoner might believe he had ‘nothing left to lose’ by committing the assault.” (*Ibid.*)

### *Error to Instruct on General Definition of Malice and General Intent*

“Malice,” as used in Penal Code section 4500, has the same meaning as in the context of murder. (*People v. St. Martin* (1970) 1 Cal.3d 524, 536–537 [83 Cal.Rptr. 166, 463 P.2d 390]; *People v. Chacon* (1968) 69 Cal.2d 765, 780–781 [73 Cal.Rptr. 10, 447 P.2d 106].) Thus, it is error to give the general definition of malice found in Penal Code section 7, subdivision 4. (*People v. Jeter* (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1212, 1217 [23 Cal.Rptr.3d 402].) It is also error to instruct that Penal Code section 4500 is a general intent crime. (*Ibid.*)

## SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, §§ 58–60.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.11[3] (Matthew Bender).

## 2721. Assault by Prisoner (Pen. Code, § 4501)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with assault with (force likely to produce great bodily injury/a deadly weapon) while serving a state prison sentence [in violation of Penal Code section 4501].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

<Alternative 1A—force with weapon>

1. The defendant did an act with a deadly weapon that by its nature would directly and probably result in the application of force to a person;]

<Alternative 1B—force without weapon>

1. The defendant did an act that by its nature would directly and probably result in the application of force to a person, and the force used was likely to produce great bodily injury;]
2. The defendant did that act willfully;
3. When the defendant acted, (he/she) was aware of facts that would lead a reasonable person to realize that (his/her) act by its nature would directly and probably result in the application of force to someone;
4. When the defendant acted, (he/she) had the present ability to apply force (likely to produce great bodily injury/with a deadly weapon) to a person;

[AND]

5. When (he/she) acted, the defendant was confined in a [California] state prison(;/.)

<Give element 6 when self-defense or defense of another is an issue raised by the evidence.>

[AND]

6. The defendant did not act (in self-defense/ [or] in defense of someone else).]

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose. It is not required that he or she intend to break the law, hurt someone else, or gain any advantage.

[The terms *application of force* and *apply force* mean to touch in a harmful or offensive manner. The slightest touching can be enough if it is done in a rude or angry way. Making contact with another person, including through his or her clothing, is enough. The touching does not have to cause pain or injury of any kind.]

[The touching can be done indirectly by causing an object [or someone else] to touch the other person.]



[The People are not required to prove that the defendant actually touched someone.]

No one needs to actually have been injured by defendant's act. But if someone was injured, you may consider that fact, along with all the other evidence, in deciding whether the defendant committed an assault[, and if so, what kind of assault it was].

[A *deadly weapon* is any object, instrument, or weapon [that is inherently deadly or dangerous or one] that is used in such a way that it is capable of causing and likely to cause death or great bodily injury.]

[An object is *inherently deadly* if it is deadly or dangerous in the ordinary use for which it was designed.]

[In deciding whether an object is a deadly weapon, consider all the surrounding circumstances.]

[*Great bodily injury* means significant or substantial physical injury. It is an injury that is greater than minor or moderate harm.]

[The term (*great bodily injury/deadly weapon*) is defined in another instruction.]

A person is confined in a state prison if he or she is (confined in \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of institution from Pen. Code, § 5003>/committed to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation[, Division of Juvenile Justice,]) by an order made according to law[, regardless of both the purpose of the (confinement/commitment) and the validity of the order directing the (confinement/commitment), until a judgment of a competent court setting aside the order becomes final]. [A person may be *confined in a state prison* even if, at the time of the offense, he or she is confined in a local correctional institution pending trial or is temporarily outside the prison walls or boundaries for any permitted purpose, including but not limited to serving on a work detail.] [However, a prisoner who has been released on parole is not *confined in a state prison*.]

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2016, September 2019, September 2020*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If there is sufficient evidence of self-defense or defense of another, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense. Give bracketed element 6 and any appropriate defense instructions. (See CALCRIM Nos. 3470–3477.)



In element 1, give alternative 1A if it is alleged the assault was committed with a deadly weapon. Give alternative 1B if it is alleged that the assault was committed with force likely to produce great bodily injury.

Give the bracketed definition of “application of force and apply force” on request.

Give the bracketed phrase “that is inherently deadly or one” and give the bracketed definition of *inherently deadly* only if the object is a deadly weapon as a matter of law. (*People v. Stutelberg* (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 314, 317–318 [240 Cal.Rptr.3d 156].)

Give the bracketed portion that begins with “In deciding whether” if the object is not a weapon as a matter of law and is capable of innocent uses. (*People v. Aguilar* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1023, 1028–1029 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 655, 945 P.2d 1204]; *People v. Godwin* (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1562, 1573–1574 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 545].)

If determining whether the item is an inherently deadly weapon requires resolution of a factual issue, give both bracketed instructions.

Give the relevant bracketed definitions unless the court has already given the definition in other instructions. In such cases, the court may give the bracketed sentence stating that the term is defined elsewhere.

In the definition of “serving a sentence in a state prison,” give the bracketed portion that begins with “regardless of the purpose,” or the bracketed second or third sentence, if requested and relevant based on the evidence.

Do not give an attempt instruction in conjunction with this instruction. There is no crime of “attempted assault” in California. (*In re James M.* (1973) 9 Cal.3d 517, 519, 521–522 [108 Cal.Rptr. 89, 510 P.2d 33].)

The second sentence of the great bodily injury definition could result in error if the prosecution improperly argues great bodily injury may be shown by greater than minor injury alone. (Compare *People v. Medellin* (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 519, 533–535 [258 Cal.Rptr.3d 867] [the definition was reasonably susceptible to prosecutor’s erroneous argument that the injury need only be greater than minor] with *People v. Quinonez* (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 457, 466 [260 Cal.Rptr.3d 86] [upholding instructions containing great bodily injury definition as written].)

### ***Related Instructions***

CALCRIM No. 875, *Assault With Deadly Weapon or Force Likely to Produce Great Bodily Injury*.

## **AUTHORITY**

- Elements of Assault by Prisoner. Pen. Code, § 4501.
- Elements of Assault With Deadly Weapon or Force Likely to Produce Great Bodily Injury. Pen. Code, §§ 240, 245(a)(1)–(3) & (b).
- Willful Defined. Pen. Code, § 7(1); *People v. Lara* (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 102, 107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
- Deadly Weapon Defined. *People v. Aguilar* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1023, 1028–1029 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 655, 945 P.2d 1204].

- Least Touching. *People v. Myers* (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 328, 335 [71 Cal.Rptr.2d 518] [citing *People v. Rocha* (1971) 3 Cal.3d 893, 899–900, fn. 12 [92 Cal.Rptr. 172, 479 P.2d 372]].
- Confined in State Prison Defined. Pen. Code, § 4504.
- Underlying Conviction Need Not Be Valid. *Wells v. California* (9th Cir. 1965) 352 F.2d 439, 442.
- Inherently Deadly Defined. *People v. Perez* (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1055, 1065 [232 Cal.Rptr.3d 51, 416 P.3d 42]; *People v. Aguilar* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1023, 1028–1029 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 655, 945 P.2d 1204].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Assault With Deadly Weapon or Force Likely to Produce Great Bodily Injury—Not a Prisoner. Pen. Code, § 245; see *People v. Noah* (1971) 5 Cal.3d 469, 478–479 [96 Cal.Rptr. 441, 487 P.2d 1009].
- Assault. Pen. Code, § 240; *People v. Noah* (1971) 5 Cal.3d 469, 478–479 [96 Cal.Rptr. 441, 487 P.2d 1009].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Not Serving a Life Sentence*

Previously, this statute did not apply to an inmate “undergoing a life sentence.” (See *People v. Noah* (1971) 5 Cal.3d 469, 477 [96 Cal.Rptr. 441, 487 P.2d 1009].) The statute has been amended to remove this restriction, effective January 1, 2005. If the case predates this amendment, the court must add to the end of element 5, “for a term other than life.”

### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, §§ 61, 63.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.11[3] (Matthew Bender).

## 2722. Battery by Gassing (Pen. Code, §§ 243.9, 4501.1)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with battery by gassing [in violation of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert appropriate code section[s]>].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant was (serving a sentence in a [California] state prison/confined in a local detention facility);
2. While so confined, the defendant intentionally committed an act of gassing, that is, (he/she) (placed[,]/ [or] threw[,]/ [or] caused to be placed or thrown) (human excrement/human urine/human bodily fluids or substances/a mixture containing human bodily substances) on the body of (a peace officer/an employee of a (state prison/local detention facility));

AND

3. The (excrement/urine/bodily fluids or substances/mixture) actually made contact with the skin [or membranes] of (a peace officer/an employee of a (state prison/local detention facility)).

[A person is *serving a sentence in a state prison* if he or she is (confined in \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of institution from Pen. Code, § 5003>/committed to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation[, Division of Juvenile Justice,]) by an order made according to law[, regardless of both the purpose of the (confinement/commitment) and the validity of the order directing the (confinement/commitment), until a judgment of a competent court setting aside the order becomes final]. [A person may be *serving a sentence in a state prison* even if, at the time of the offense, he or she is confined in a local correctional institution pending trial or is temporarily outside the prison walls or boundaries for any permitted purpose, including but not limited to serving on a work detail.] [However, a prisoner who has been released on parole is not *serving a sentence in a state prison*.]

[A (county jail/city jail/\_\_\_\_\_ <insert description>) is a *local detention facility*.]

[A sworn member of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of agency that employs peace officer>, authorized by \_\_\_\_\_ <insert appropriate section from Pen. Code, § 830 et seq.> to \_\_\_\_\_ <describe statutory authority>, is a *peace officer*.]

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If the battery is charged under Penal Code section 4501.1, in element 1, use the phrase “serving a sentence in state prison” and the bracketed definition of this phrase. If the battery is charged under Penal Code section 243.9, in element 1, give the language referencing a “local detention facility” and the bracketed definition of local detention facility.

When giving the definition of “serving a sentence in a state prison,” give the bracketed portion that begins “regardless of the purpose,” or the bracketed second or third sentence, if requested and relevant based on the evidence.

The jury must determine whether the alleged victim was a peace officer. (*People v. Flood* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 482 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180, 957 P.2d 869].) The court must instruct the jury in the appropriate definition of “peace officer” from the statute. (*Ibid.*) It is error for the court to instruct that the witness is a peace officer as a matter of law. (*Ibid.* [instruction that “Officer Bridgeman and Officer Gurney are peace officers” was error].)

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 242, 243.9, 4501.1.
- Confined in State Prison Defined. Pen. Code, § 4504.
- Local Detention Facility Defined. Pen. Code, § 6031.4.

## LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Battery by Prisoner on Non-Prisoner. *People v. Flores* (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 924, 929 [97 Cal.Rptr.3d 924].

## SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, §§ 13–15, 62.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.12 (Matthew Bender).

## 2723. Battery by Prisoner on Nonprisoner (Pen. Code, § 4501.5)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with battery on someone who was not a prisoner [in violation of Penal Code section 4501.5].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant willfully touched \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of person allegedly battered, excluding title of law enforcement agent> in a harmful or offensive manner;
2. When (he/she) acted, the defendant was serving a sentence in a [California] state prison;

[AND]

3. \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of person allegedly battered, excluding title of law enforcement agent> was not serving a sentence in state prison(;/.)

<Give element 4 when self-defense or defense of another is an issue raised by the evidence.>

[AND]

4. The defendant did not act (in self-defense/ [or] in defense of someone else).]

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose. It is not required that he or she intend to break the law, hurt someone else, or gain any advantage.

The slightest touching can be enough to commit a battery if it is done in a rude or angry way. Making contact with another person, including through his or her clothing, is enough. The touching does not have to cause pain or injury of any kind.

[The touching can be done indirectly by causing an object [or someone else] to touch the other person.]

A person is *serving a sentence in a state prison* if he or she is (confined in \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of institution from Pen. Code, § 5003>/committed to the Department of (Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Justice/Corrections and Rehabilitation)) by an order made according to law[, regardless of both the purpose of the (confinement/commitment) and the validity of the order directing the (confinement/commitment), until a judgment of a competent court setting aside the order becomes final]. [A person may be *serving a sentence in a state prison* even if, at the time of the offense, he

**or she is confined in a local correctional institution pending trial or is temporarily outside the prison walls or boundaries for any permitted purpose, including but not limited to serving on a work detail.]**  
**[However, a prisoner who has been released on parole is not *serv*ing a sentence in a state prison.]**

*<When lawful performance is an issue, give the following paragraph and Instruction 2671, Lawful Performance: Custodial Officer.>*

**[A custodial officer is not lawfully performing his or her duties if he or she is using unreasonable or excessive force in his or her duties. Instruction 2671 explains when force is unreasonable or excessive.]**

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2016, March 2017*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If there is sufficient evidence of self-defense or defense of another, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense. Give bracketed element 4 and any appropriate defense instructions. (See CALCRIM Nos. 3470–3477.)

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on defendant’s reliance on self-defense as it relates to the use of excessive force. (See *People v. Coleman* (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 1016, 1022–1023 [149 Cal.Rptr. 134]; *People v. White* (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 161, 167–168 [161 Cal.Rptr. 541]; *People v. Olguin* (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 39, 46–47 [173 Cal.Rptr. 663].) If there is evidence of excessive force, give bracketed element 4, the last bracketed paragraph, and the appropriate portions of CALCRIM No. 2671, *Lawful Performance: Custodial Officer*.

Give the bracketed paragraph on indirect touching if that is an issue.

In the definition of “serving a sentence in a state prison,” give the bracketed portion that begins with “regardless of the purpose,” or the bracketed second or third sentence, if requested and relevant based on the evidence.

### *Related Instructions*

CALCRIM No. 960, *Simple Battery*.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements of Battery by Prisoner on Nonprisoner. Pen. Code, § 4501.5.
- Elements of Battery. Pen. Code, § 242; see *People v. Martinez* (1970) 3 Cal.App.3d 886, 889 [83 Cal.Rptr. 914] [harmful or offensive touching].
- Willful Defined. Pen. Code, § 7(1); *People v. Lara* (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 102, 107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
- Least Touching. *People v. Myers* (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 328, 335 [71

Cal.Rptr.2d 518] [citing *People v. Rocha* (1971) 3 Cal.3d 893, 899–900, fn. 12 [92 Cal.Rptr. 172, 479 P.2d 372]].

- Confined in State Prison Defined. Pen. Code, § 4504.
- Underlying Conviction Need Not Be Valid. *Wells v. California* (9th Cir. 1965) 352 F.2d 439, 442.

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Simple Battery. Pen. Code, § 242.
- Assault. Pen. Code, § 240.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, §§ 13–16, 57.

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Defenses, § 69.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.12 (Matthew Bender).

**2724–2734. Reserved for Future Use**

## (ii) Hostage Taking and Rioting

### 2735. Holding a Hostage (Pen. Code, § 4503)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with holding a hostage [in violation of Penal Code section 4503].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant (held a person hostage/ [or] held a person against his or her will, by force or threat of force, in defiance of official orders) inside a (prison/facility under the jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections);

AND

2. When the defendant acted, (he/she) was serving a sentence in a [California] state prison.

A person is *serving a sentence in a state prison* if he or she is (confined in \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of institution from Pen. Code, § 5003>/committed to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation[, Division of Juvenile Justice,]) by an order made according to law[, regardless of both the purpose of the (confinement/commitment) and the validity of the order directing the (confinement/commitment), until a judgment of a competent court setting aside the order becomes final]. [A person may be *serving a sentence in a state prison* even if, at the time of the offense, he or she is confined in a local correctional institution pending trial or is temporarily outside the prison walls or boundaries for any permitted purpose, including but not limited to serving on a work detail.] [However, a prisoner who has been released on parole is not *serving a sentence in a state prison*.]

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2016*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

In the definition of “serving a sentence in a state prison,” give the bracketed portion that begins with “regardless of the purpose,” or the bracketed second or third sentence, if requested and relevant based on the evidence.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 4503.



- Confined in State Prison Defined. Pen. Code, § 4504.
- Underlying Conviction Need Not Be Valid. Wells v. California (9th Cir. 1965) 352 F.2d 439, 442.

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, § 291.

## 2736. Inciting a Riot in a Prison or Jail (Pen. Code, § 404.6(c))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with inciting a riot [in a (state prison/county jail)] [in violation of Penal Code section 404.6(c)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant (did an act [or engaged in conduct] that encouraged a riot[,]/ [or] urged others to commit acts of force or violence[,]/ [or] urged others to (burn/ [or] destroy) property);
2. The defendant acted at a time and place and under circumstances that produced a clear, present, and immediate danger that (acts of force or violence would happen/ [or] property would be (burned/ [or] destroyed));
3. When the defendant acted, (he/she) intended to cause a riot;
4. As a result of the defendant's action [or conduct], a riot occurred [in a (state prison/county jail)];

AND

5. The riot resulted in serious bodily injury to someone.

A *riot* occurs when two or more people, acting together and without legal authority, disturb the public peace by using force or violence or by threatening to use force or violence with the immediate ability to carry out those threats. [A disturbance of the public peace may happen in any place of confinement, including a (state prison/ [or] county jail).]

A *serious bodily injury* means a serious impairment of physical condition. Such an injury may include[, but is not limited to]: (loss of consciousness/ concussion/ bone fracture/ protracted loss or impairment of function of any bodily member or organ/ a wound requiring extensive suturing/ [and] serious disfigurement).

[To *commit acts of force or violence* means to wrongfully [and unlawfully] apply physical force to the property or person of another.]

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*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

The defendant may admit to the fact that the incident occurred in a state prison or

county jail. (Pen. Code, § 404.6(d).) If the defendant makes such an admission, the court should delete all bracketed references to state prison or county jail. If the defendant does not make such an admission, the court should give the bracketed portions referring to state prison or county jail.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 404.6(c).
- Riot Defined. Pen. Code, § 404.
- Serious Bodily Injury Defined. Pen. Code, § 243(f)(4); *People v. Taylor* (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 11, 25, fn. 4 [12 Cal.Rptr.3d 693].
- Force or Violence Defined. See *People v. Lozano* (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 618, 627 [237 Cal.Rptr. 612]; *People v. Bravott* (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 93, 97 [227 Cal.Rptr. 810].
- Statute Constitutional. *People v. Davis* (1968) 68 Cal.2d 481, 484–487 [67 Cal.Rptr. 547, 439 P.2d 651].
- Terms of Statute Understandable. *People v. Jones* (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 437, 447 [96 Cal.Rptr. 795].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Defendant Must Urge Others*

To be guilty of inciting a riot, the defendant must urge others to commit acts of force or property destruction. (*People v. Boyd* (1985) 38 Cal.3d 762, 778 [215 Cal.Rptr. 1, 700 P.2d 782]; *In re Wagner* (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 90, 106 [173 Cal.Rptr. 766].) Thus, in *In re Wagner, supra*, 119 Cal.App.3d at p. 106, the court held that the evidence was insufficient to establish incitement to riot where the defendant was observed throwing rocks at the police. (*Ibid.*)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, § 17.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.21 (Matthew Bender).

### **2737–2744. Reserved for Future Use**

### (iii) Possession of Contraband

#### 2745. Possession or Manufacture of Weapon in Penal Institution (Pen. Code, § 4502)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with (possessing[,]/ [or] manufacturing[,]/ [or] attempting to manufacture) a weapon, specifically [(a/an)] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert type of weapon from Pen. Code, § 4502, e.g., “explosive”>, while (in a penal institution/being taken to or from a penal institution/under the custody of an (official/officer/employee) of a penal institution) [in violation of Penal Code section 4502].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant was (present at or confined in a penal institution/ being taken to or from a penal institution/under the custody of an (official/officer/employee) of a penal institution);
2. The defendant (possessed[,]/ [or] carried on (his/her) person[,]/ [or] had under (his/her) custody or control[,]/ [or] manufactured[,]/ [or] attempted to manufacture) [(a/an)] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert type of weapon from Pen. Code, § 4502, e.g., “explosive”>;
3. The defendant knew that (he/she) (possessed[,]/ [or] carried on (his/her) person[,]/ [or] had under (his/her) custody or control[,]/ [or] manufactured[,]/ [or] attempted to manufacture) the \_\_\_\_\_ <insert type of weapon from Pen. Code, § 4502, e.g., “explosive”>;

**AND**

4. The defendant knew that the object (was [(a/an)] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert type of weapon from Pen. Code, § 4502, e.g., “explosive”>/ could be used \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of weapon’s use, e.g., “as a stabbing weapon,” or “for purposes of offense or defense”>).

A *penal institution* is a (state prison[,]/ [or] prison camp or farm[,]/ [or] county jail[,]/ [or] county road camp).

[*Metal knuckles* means any device or instrument made wholly or partially of metal that is worn in or on the hand for purposes of offense or defense and that either protects the wearer’s hand while striking a blow or increases the injury or force of impact from the blow. The metal contained in the device may help support the hand or fist, provide a shield to protect it, or consist of projections or studs that would contact the individual receiving a blow.]

[An *explosive* is any substance, or combination of substances, (1) whose main or common purpose is to detonate or rapidly combust and (2) which is capable of a relatively instantaneous or rapid release of gas and heat.]

[An *explosive* is also any substance whose main purpose is to be combined with other substances to create a new substance that can release gas and heat rapidly or relatively instantaneously.]

[\_\_\_\_\_ <insert type of explosive from Health & Saf. Code, § 12000> (is/are) [an] *explosive[s]*.]

[*Fixed ammunition* is a projectile and powder enclosed together in a case ready for loading.]

[A *dirk or dagger* is a knife or other instrument, with or without a handguard, that is capable of ready use as a stabbing weapon that may inflict great bodily injury or death.] [*Great bodily injury* means significant or substantial physical injury. It is an injury that is greater than minor or moderate harm.]

[A *firearm* is any device designed to be used as a weapon, from which a projectile is discharged or expelled through a barrel by the force of an explosion or other form of combustion.] [A firearm need not be in working order if it was designed to shoot and appears capable of shooting.]

[*Tear gas* is a liquid, gaseous, or solid substance intended to produce temporary physical discomfort or permanent injury when vaporized or otherwise dispersed in the air.]

[A *tear gas weapon* is a shell, cartridge, or bomb capable of being discharged or exploded to release or emit tear gas.] [A *tear gas weapon* [also] means a revolver, pistol, fountain pen gun, billy, or other device, portable or fixed, intended specifically to project or release tear gas.] [A *tear gas weapon* does not include a device regularly manufactured and sold for use with firearm ammunition.]

[[**(A/An)**] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert type of weapon from Pen. Code, § 4502, not covered in above definitions> **(is/means/includes)** \_\_\_\_\_ <insert appropriate definition, see Bench Notes>.]

**The People do not have to prove that the defendant used or intended to use the object as a weapon.**

[You may consider evidence that the object could be used in a harmless way in deciding if the object is (a/an) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert type of weapon from Pen. Code, § 4502>, as defined here.]

[The People do not have to prove that the object was (concealable[,]/ [or] carried by the defendant on (his/her) person[,]/ [or] (displayed/visible)).]

[Two or more people may possess something at the same time.]

[A person does not have to actually hold or touch something to possess it. It is enough if the person has (control over it/ [or] the right to control it), either personally or through another person.]

[The People allege that the defendant (possessed[,]/ [or] carried on (his/her) person[,]/ [or] had under (his/her) custody or control[,]/ [or] manufactured[,]/ [or] attempted to manufacture) the following weapons: \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of each weapon when multiple items alleged>. You may not find the defendant guilty unless all of you agree that the People have proved that the defendant (possessed[,]/ [or] carried on (his/her) person[,]/ [or] had under (his/her) custody or control[,]/ [or] manufactured[,]/ [or] attempted to manufacture) at least one of these weapons and you all agree on which weapon (he/she) (possessed[,]/ [or] carried on (his/her) person[,]/ [or] had under (his/her) custody or control[,]/ [or] manufactured[,]/ [or] attempted to manufacture).]

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2012, September 2020*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

Where indicated in the instruction, insert one or more of the following weapons from Penal Code section 4502, based on the evidence presented:

metal knuckles

explosive substance

fixed ammunition

dirk or dagger

sharp instrument

pistol, revolver, or other firearm

tear gas or tear gas weapon

an instrument or weapon of the kind commonly known as a blackjack, slungshot, billy, sandclub, sandbag

Following the elements, give the appropriate definition of the alleged weapon. If the prosecution alleges that the defendant possessed an “instrument or weapon of the kind commonly known as a blackjack, slungshot, billy, sandclub, [or] sandbag,” the court should give an appropriate definition based on case law. (See *People v. Fannin* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1399, 1402 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 496] [definition of “slungshot”];

*People v. Mulherin* (1934) 140 Cal.App. 212, 215 [35 P.2d 174] [definition of this class of weapons].)

If the prosecution alleges under a single count that the defendant possessed multiple weapons, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on unanimity. (See *People v. Wolfe* (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 177, 184–185 [7 Cal.Rptr.3d 483]; *People v. Rowland* (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 61, 65 [88 Cal.Rptr.2d 900].) Give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “The People allege that the defendant possessed,” inserting the items alleged.

If there is sufficient evidence of a harmless use for the object possessed, give the bracketed sentence that begins with “You may consider evidence that the object could be used in a harmless way . . .” (*People v. Savedra* (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 738, 743–744 [19 Cal.Rptr.2d 115].)

If the prosecution alleges that the defendant attempted to manufacture a weapon, give CALCRIM No. 460, *Attempt Other Than Attempted Murder*.

It is unclear if the defense of momentary possession for disposal applies to a charge of weapons possession in a penal institution. In *People v. Brown* (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 736, 740 [98 Cal.Rptr.2d 519], the court held that the defense was not available on the facts of the case before it but declined to consider whether “there can ever be a circumstance justifying temporary possession in a penal institution.” (*Ibid.* [emphasis in original].) The California Supreme Court has reaffirmed that the momentary possession defense is available to a charge of illegal possession of a weapon. (*People v. Martin* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1180, 1191–1192 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 599, 25 P.3d 1081].) However, the Supreme Court has yet to determine whether the defense is available in a penal institution. If the trial court determines that an instruction on momentary possession is warranted on the facts of the case before it, give a modified version of the instruction on momentary possession contained in CALCRIM No. 2510, *Possession of Firearm by Person Prohibited Due to Conviction—No Stipulation to Conviction*.

If there is sufficient evidence of imminent death or bodily injury, the defendant may be entitled to an instruction on the defense of duress or threats. (*People v. Otis* (1959) 174 Cal.App.2d 119, 125–126 [344 P.2d 342].) Give CALCRIM No. 3402, *Duress or Threats*, modified as necessary.

The second sentence of the great bodily injury definition could result in error if the prosecution improperly argues great bodily injury may be shown by greater than minor injury alone. (Compare *People v. Medellin* (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 519, 533–535 [258 Cal.Rptr.3d 867] [the definition was reasonably susceptible to prosecutor’s erroneous argument that the injury need only be greater than minor] with *People v. Quinonez* (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 457, 466 [260 Cal.Rptr.3d 86] [upholding instructions containing great bodily injury definition as written].)

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 4502.
- Metal Knuckles Defined. Pen. Code, § 21810.

- Explosive Defined. Health & Saf. Code, § 12000.
- Fixed Ammunition. *The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military Terms*, [http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod\\_dictionary/](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/) (accessed January 11, 2012).
- Dirk or Dagger Defined. Pen. Code, § 16470.
- Firearm Defined. Pen. Code, § 16520.
- Tear Gas Defined. Pen. Code, § 17240.
- Tear Gas Weapon Defined. Pen. Code, § 17250.
- Blackjack, etc., Defined. *People v. Fannin* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1399, 1402 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 496]; *People v. Mulherin* (1934) 140 Cal.App. 212, 215 [35 P.2d 174].
- Knowledge. See *People v. Rubalcava* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 322, 331–332 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 735]; *People v. Reynolds* (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 776, 779 [252 Cal.Rptr. 637], overruled on other grounds, *People v. Flood* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 484 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180, 957 P.2d 869].
- Harmless Use. *People v. Savedra* (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 738, 743–744 [19 Cal.Rptr.2d 115]; *People v. Martinez* (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 905, 910–913 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 334].
- Unanimity. *People v. Wolfe* (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 177, 184–185 [7 Cal.Rptr.3d 483].
- Constructive vs. Actual Possession. *People v. Reynolds* (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 776, 782, fn. 5 [252 Cal.Rptr. 637], overruled on other grounds in *People v. Flood* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 484 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180, 957 P.2d 869].

## RELATED ISSUES

### *Administrative Punishment Does Not Bar Criminal Action*

“[P]rison disciplinary measures do not bar subsequent prosecution in a criminal action for violation of a penal statute prohibiting the same act which was the basis of the prison discipline by virtue of the proscription against double punishment provided in section 654 [citation] or by the proscription against double jeopardy provided in the California Constitution (art. I, § 13) and section 1023.” (*People v. Vattelli* (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 54, 58 [92 Cal.Rptr. 763] [citing *People v. Eggleston* (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 337, 340 [63 Cal.Rptr. 104]].)

### *Possession of Multiple Weapons at One Time Supports Only One Conviction*

“[D]efendant is subject to only one conviction for his simultaneous possession of three sharp wooden sticks in prison.” (*People v. Rowland* (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 61, 65 [88 Cal.Rptr.2d 900].)

## SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, §§ 244, 248.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 85,



*Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.02[2][a][i] (Matthew Bender).

5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 94, *Prisoners' Rights*, § 94.04 (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.01 (Matthew Bender).

**2746. Possession of Firearm, Deadly Weapon, or Explosive in a Jail or County Road Camp (Pen. Code, § 4574(a))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with possessing a weapon while confined in a (jail/county road camp) [in violation of Penal Code section 4574(a)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant was lawfully confined in a (jail/county road camp);
2. While confined there, the defendant [unlawfully] possessed [(a/an)] (firearm[,]/ [or] deadly weapon[,]/ [or] explosive[,]/ [or] tear gas[,]/ [or] tear gas weapon) within the (jail/county road camp);
3. The defendant knew that (he/she) possessed the (firearm[,]/ [or] deadly weapon[,]/ [or] explosive[,]/ [or] tear gas[,]/ [or] tear gas weapon);

**AND**

4. The defendant knew that the object was [(a/an)] (firearm[,]/ [or] deadly weapon[,]/ [or] explosive[,]/ [or] tear gas[,]/ [or] tear gas weapon).

[A *jail* is a place of confinement where people are held in lawful custody.]

[A *firearm* is any device designed to be used as a weapon, from which a projectile is discharged or expelled through a barrel by the force of an explosion or other form of combustion.] [A firearm need not be in working order if it was designed to shoot and appears capable of shooting.]

[As used here, a *deadly weapon* is any weapon, instrument, or object that has the reasonable potential of being used in a manner that would cause great bodily injury or death.] [*Great bodily injury* means significant or substantial physical injury. It is an injury that is greater than minor or moderate harm.]

[An *explosive* is any substance, or combination of substances, (1) whose main or common purpose is to detonate or rapidly combust and (2) which is capable of a relatively instantaneous or rapid release of gas and heat.]

[An *explosive* is also any substance whose main purpose is to be combined with other substances to create a new substance that can release gas and heat rapidly or relatively instantaneously.]

[\_\_\_\_\_ <insert type of explosive from Health & Saf. Code, § 12000> (is/are) [an] *explosive[s]*.]

[*Tear gas* is a liquid, gaseous, or solid substance intended to produce temporary physical discomfort or permanent injury through being vaporized or otherwise dispersed in the air.]

[A *tear gas weapon* is a shell, cartridge, or bomb capable of being discharged or exploded to release or emit tear gas.] [A *tear gas weapon* [also] means a revolver, pistol, fountain pen gun, billy, or other device, portable or fixed, intended specifically to project or release tear gas.] [A *tear gas weapon* does not include a device regularly manufactured and sold for use with firearm ammunition.]

The People do not have to prove that the defendant used or intended to use the object as a weapon.

[You may consider evidence that the object could be used in a harmless way in deciding whether the object is a deadly weapon as defined here.]

[The People do not have to prove that the object was (concealable[,]/ [or] carried by the defendant on (his/her) person[,]/ [or] (displayed/visible)).]

[Two or more people may possess something at the same time.]

[A person does not have to actually hold or touch something to possess it. It is enough if the person knowingly has (control over it/ [or] the right to control it), either personally or through another person).]

[The People allege that the defendant possessed the following weapons: \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of each weapon when multiple items alleged>. You may not find the defendant guilty unless all of you agree that the People have proved that the defendant possessed at least one of these weapons and you all agree on which weapon (he/she) possessed.]

<Defense: Possession Authorized>

[The defendant is not guilty of this offense if (he/she) was authorized to possess the weapon by (law[,]/ [or] a person in charge of the (jail/county road camp)[,]/ [or] an officer of the (jail/county road camp) empowered by the person in charge of the (jail/camp) to give such authorization). The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not authorized to possess the weapon. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of this offense.]

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2012, September 2020*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If the prosecution alleges under a single count that the defendant possessed multiple weapons, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on unanimity. (See *People v. Wolfe* (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 177, 184–185 [7 Cal.Rptr.3d 483]; *People v. Rowland* (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 61, 65 [88 Cal.Rptr.2d 900].) Give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “The People allege that the defendant possessed,” inserting the items alleged.

Note that the definition of “deadly weapon” in the context of Penal Code section 4574 differs from the definition given in other instructions. (*People v. Martinez* (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 905, 909 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 334].)

If there is sufficient evidence of a harmless use for the object possessed, give the bracketed sentence that begins with “You may consider evidence that the object could be used in a harmless way . . . .” (*People v. Savedra* (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 738, 743–744 [19 Cal.Rptr.2d 115].)

If there is sufficient evidence that the defendant was authorized to possess the weapon, give the bracketed word “unlawfully” in element 2. Give also the bracketed paragraph headed “Defense: Possession Authorized.”

It is unclear if the defense of momentary possession for disposal applies to a charge of weapons possession in a penal institution. In *People v. Brown* (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 736, 740 [98 Cal.Rptr.2d 519], the court held that the defense was not available on the facts of the case before it but declined to consider whether “there can ever be a circumstance justifying temporary possession in a penal institution.” (*Ibid.* [emphasis in original].) The California Supreme Court has reaffirmed that the momentary possession defense is available to a charge of illegal possession of a weapon. (*People v. Martin* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1180, 1191–1192 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 599, 25 P.3d 1081].) However, the Supreme Court has yet to determine whether the defense is available in a penal institution. If the trial court determines that an instruction on momentary possession is warranted on the facts of the case before it, give a modified version of the instruction on momentary possession contained in CALCRIM No. 2510, *Possession of Firearm by Person Prohibited Due to Conviction—No Stipulation to Conviction*.

If there is sufficient evidence of imminent death or bodily injury, the defendant may be entitled to an instruction on the defense of duress or threats. (*People v. Otis* (1959) 174 Cal.App.2d 119, 125–126 [344 P.2d 342].) Give CALCRIM No. 3402, *Duress or Threats*, modified as necessary.

The second sentence of the great bodily injury definition could result in error if the prosecution improperly argues great bodily injury may be shown by greater than minor injury alone. (Compare *People v. Medellin* (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 519, 533–535 [258 Cal.Rptr.3d 867] [the definition was reasonably susceptible to prosecutor’s erroneous argument that the injury need only be greater than minor] with *People v. Quinonez* (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 457, 466 [260 Cal.Rptr.3d 86] [upholding instructions containing great bodily injury definition as written].)

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 4574(a).
- Firearm Defined. Pen. Code, § 16520.
- Explosive Defined. Health & Saf. Code, § 12000.
- Tear Gas Defined. Pen. Code, § 17240.
- Tear Gas Weapon Defined. Pen. Code, § 17250.
- Deadly Weapon Defined. *People v. Martinez* (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 905, 909 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 334].
- Jail Defined. *People v. Carter* (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 546, 550 [172 Cal.Rptr. 838].
- Knowledge. See *People v. Rubalcava* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 322, 331–332 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 735, 1 P.3d 52]; *People v. James* (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 645, 650 [81 Cal.Rptr. 845].
- Harmless Use. *People v. Savedra* (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 738, 743–744 [19 Cal.Rptr.2d 115]; *People v. Martinez* (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 905, 910–913 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 334].
- Unanimity. *People v. Wolfe* (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 177, 184–185 [7 Cal.Rptr.3d 483].
- Firearm Need Not Be Operable. *People v. Talkington* (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 557, 563 [189 Cal.Rptr. 735].
- Constructive vs. Actual Possession. *People v. Reynolds* (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 776, 782, fn. 5 [252 Cal.Rptr. 637], overruled on other grounds, *People v. Flood* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 484 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180, 957 P.2d 869].

## RELATED ISSUES

### *Administrative Punishment Does Not Bar Criminal Action*

“[P]rison disciplinary measures do not bar subsequent prosecution in a criminal action for violation of a penal statute prohibiting the same act which was the basis of the prison discipline by virtue of the proscription against double punishment provided in section 654 [citation] or by the proscription against double jeopardy provided in the California Constitution (art. I, § 13) and section 1023.” (*People v. Vatelli* (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 54, 58 [92 Cal.Rptr. 763]; [citing *People v. Eggleston* (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 337, 340 [63 Cal.Rptr. 104]].)

## SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, §§ 244, 248.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.02[2][a][i] (Matthew Bender).

5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 94,

*Prisoners' Rights*, § 94.04 (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.01 (Matthew Bender).

**2747. Bringing or Sending Firearm, Deadly Weapon, or Explosive Into Penal Institution (Pen. Code, § 4574(a)–(c))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with (bringing/sending/ [or] assisting in (bringing/sending)) a weapon into a penal institution [in violation of Penal Code section 4574].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant [unlawfully] (brought/sent/ [or] assisted in (bringing/sending)) [(a/an)] (firearm[,]/ [or] deadly weapon[,]/ [or] explosive[,]/ [or] tear gas[,]/ [or] tear gas weapon) into a penal institution [or onto the grounds (of/ [or] adjacent to) a penal institution];
2. The defendant knew that (he/she) was (bringing/sending/ [or] assisting in (bringing/sending)) an object into a penal institution [or onto the grounds (of/ [or] adjacent to) a penal institution];

AND

3. The defendant knew that the object was [(a/an)] (firearm[,]/ [or] deadly weapon[,]/ [or] explosive[,]/ [or] tear gas[,]/ [or] tear gas weapon).

*A penal institution* is a (state prison[,]/ [or] prison camp or farm[,]/ [or] jail[,]/ [or] county road camp[,]/ [or] place where prisoners of the state prison are located under the custody of prison officials, officers, or employees).

[A *firearm* is any device designed to be used as a weapon, from which a projectile is discharged or expelled through a barrel by the force of an explosion or other form of combustion.] [A firearm need not be in working order if it was designed to shoot and appears capable of shooting.]

[As used here, a *deadly weapon* is any weapon, instrument or object that has the reasonable potential of being used in a manner that would cause great bodily injury or death.] [*Great bodily injury* means significant or substantial physical injury. It is an injury that is greater than minor or moderate harm.]

[An *explosive* is any substance, or combination of substances, (1) whose main or common purpose is to detonate or rapidly combust and (2) which is capable of a relatively instantaneous or rapid release of gas and heat.]

[An *explosive* is also any substance whose main purpose is to be

combined with other substances to create a new substance that can release gas and heat rapidly or relatively instantaneously.]

[\_\_\_\_\_ <insert type[s] of explosive[s] from Health & Saf. Code, § 12000> (is/are) [an] explosive[s].]

[*Tear gas* means a liquid, gaseous, or solid substance intended to produce temporary physical discomfort or permanent injury through being vaporized or otherwise dispersed in the air.]

[A *tear gas weapon* means any shell, cartridge, or bomb capable of being discharged or exploded to release or emit tear gas.] [A *tear gas weapon* [also] means a revolver, pistol, fountain pen gun, billy, or other device, portable or fixed, intended specifically to project or release tear gas.] [A *tear gas weapon* does not include a device regularly manufactured and sold for use with firearm ammunition.]

The People do not have to prove that the defendant used or intended to use the object as a weapon.

[You may consider evidence that the object could be used in a harmless way in deciding if the object is a deadly weapon as defined here.]

[The People do not have to prove that the object was (concealable[,]/ [or] carried by the defendant on (his/her) person[,]/ [or] (displayed/visible)).]

[The People allege that the defendant (brought/sent/ [or] assisted in (bringing/sending)) the following weapons: \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of each weapon when multiple items alleged>. You may not find the defendant guilty unless all of you agree that the People have proved that the defendant (brought/sent/ [or] assisted in (bringing/sending)) at least one of these weapons and you all agree on which weapon (he/she) (brought/sent/ [or] assisted in (bringing/sending)).]

<Defense: Conduct Authorized>

[The defendant is not guilty of this offense if (he/she) was authorized to (bring/send) a weapon into the penal institution by (law[,]/ [or] a person in charge of the penal institution[,]/ [or] an officer of the penal institution empowered by the person in charge of the institution to give such authorization). The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not authorized to (bring/send) the weapon into the institution. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of this offense.]

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2012, September 2020*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.



If the prosecution alleges under a single count that the defendant brought or sent multiple weapons into the institution, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on unanimity. (See *People v. Wolfe* (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 177, 184–185 [7 Cal.Rptr.3d 483]; *People v. Rowland* (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 61, 65 [88 Cal.Rptr.2d 900].) Give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “The People allege that the defendant (brought/sent/ [or] assisted in (bringing/sending)),” inserting the items alleged.

If the defendant is charged with a felony for bringing or sending tear gas or a tear gas weapon into a penal institution resulting in the release of tear gas (Pen. Code, § 4574(b)), the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct the jury on this additional allegation. The court should give the jury an additional instruction on this issue and a verdict form on which the jury may indicate if this fact has or has not been proved.

Note that the definition of “deadly weapon” in the context of Penal Code section 4574 differs from the definition given in other instructions. (*People v. Martinez* (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 905, 909 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 334].)

If there is sufficient evidence of a harmless use for the object, give the bracketed sentence that begins with “You may consider evidence that the object could be used in a harmless way . . . .” (*People v. Savedra* (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 738, 743–744 [19 Cal.Rptr.2d 115].)

If there is sufficient evidence that the defendant was authorized to bring or send the weapon, give the bracketed word “unlawfully” in element 1. Give also the bracketed paragraph headed “Defense: Conduct Authorized.”

The second sentence of the great bodily injury definition could result in error if the prosecution improperly argues great bodily injury may be shown by greater than minor injury alone. (Compare *People v. Medellin* (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 519, 533–535 [258 Cal.Rptr.3d 867] [the definition was reasonably susceptible to prosecutor’s erroneous argument that the injury need only be greater than minor] with *People v. Quinonez* (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 457, 466 [260 Cal.Rptr.3d 86] [upholding instructions containing great bodily injury definition as written].)

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 4574(a), (b) & (c).
- Firearm Defined. Pen. Code, § 16520.
- Explosive Defined. Health & Saf. Code, § 12000.
- Tear Gas Defined. Pen. Code, § 17240.
- Tear Gas Weapon Defined. Pen. Code, § 17250.
- Deadly Weapon Defined. *People v. Martinez* (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 905, 909 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 334].
- Jail Defined. *People v. Carter* (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 546, 550 [172 Cal.Rptr. 838].
- Knowledge of Nature of Object. See *People v. Rubalcava* (2000) 23 Cal.4th

322, 331–332 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 735, 1 P.3d 52]; *People v. James* (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 645, 650 [81 Cal.Rptr. 845].

- Knowledge of Location as Penal Institution. *People v. Seale* (1969) 274 Cal.App.2d 107, 111 [78 Cal.Rptr. 811].
- Harmless Use. *People v. Savedra* (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 738, 743–744 [19 Cal.Rptr.2d 115]; *People v. Martinez* (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 905, 910–913 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 334].
- Unanimity. *People v. Wolfe* (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 177, 184–185 [7 Cal.Rptr.3d 483].
- Firearm Need Not Be Operable. *People v. Talkington* (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 557, 563 [189 Cal.Rptr. 735].
- “Adjacent to” and “Grounds” Not Vague. *People v. Seale* (1969) 274 Cal.App.2d 107, 114–115 [78 Cal.Rptr. 811].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Attempt to Bring or Send Weapon Into Penal Institution. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 4574(a), (b), or (c); *People v. Carter* (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 546, 548 [172 Cal.Rptr. 838].

If the defendant is charged with bringing or sending tear gas or a tear gas weapon into a penal institution, the offense is a misdemeanor unless tear gas was released in the institution. (Pen. Code, § 4574(b) & (c).) If the defendant is charged with a felony, then the misdemeanor offense is a lesser included offense. The court must provide the jury with a verdict form on which the jury will indicate if the prosecution has proved that tear gas was released. If the jury finds that this has not been proved, then the offense should be set at a misdemeanor.

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Inmate Transferred to Mental Hospital*

A prison inmate transferred to a mental hospital for treatment pursuant to Penal Code section 2684 is not “under the custody of prison officials.” (*People v. Superior Court (Ortiz)* (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 995, 1002 [9 Cal.Rptr.3d 745].)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Governmental Authority, § 105.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.02[2][a][i] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.01 (Matthew Bender).

**2748. Possession of Controlled Substance or Paraphernalia in Penal Institution (Pen. Code, § 4573.6)**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with possessing ( \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert type of controlled substance>*, a controlled substance/ an object intended for use to inject or consume controlled substances), in a penal institution [in violation of Penal Code section 4573.6].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant [unlawfully] possessed (a controlled substance/an object intended for use to inject or consume controlled substances) in a penal institution [or on the grounds of a penal institution];
2. The defendant knew of the (substance's/object's) presence;

[AND]

3. The defendant knew (of the substance's nature or character as a controlled substance/that the object was intended to be used for injecting or consuming controlled substances)(;/.)

*<Give elements 4 and 5 if defendant is charged with possession of a controlled substance, not possession of paraphernalia.>*

*<If the controlled substance is not listed in the schedules set forth in sections 11054 through 11058 of the Health and Safety Code, give paragraph 4B and the definition of analog substance below instead of paragraph 4A.>*

[4A. The controlled substance was \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert type of controlled substance>*;

4B. The controlled substance was an analog of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert type of controlled substance>*;

AND

5. The controlled substance was a usable amount.]

[In order to prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of analog drug>* is an analog of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert type of controlled substance>*. An analog of a controlled substance:

- [1. Has a chemical structure substantially similar to the structure of a controlled substance(./;)]

[OR]

**[(2/1). Has, is represented as having, or is intended to have a stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system substantially similar to or greater than the effect of a controlled substance.]]**

**A *penal institution* is a (state prison[,]/ [or] prison camp or farm[,]/ [or] (county/ [or] city) jail[,]/ [or] county road camp[,]/ [or] county farm[,]/ [or] place where prisoners of the state prison are located under the custody of prison officials, officers, or employees/ [or] place where prisoners or inmates are being held under the custody of a (sheriff[,]/ [or] chief of police[,]/ [or] peace officer[,]/ [or] probation officer).**

**[A *usable amount* is a quantity that is enough to be used by someone as a controlled substance. Useless traces [or debris] are not usable amounts. On the other hand, a usable amount does not have to be enough, in either amount or strength, to affect the user.]**

**[The People do not need to prove that the defendant knew which specific controlled substance (he/she) possessed.]**

**[An object is *intended to be used* for injecting or consuming controlled substances if the defendant (1) actually intended it to be so used, or (2) should have known, based on the item's objective features, that it was intended for such use.]**

**[Two or more people may possess something at the same time.]**

**[A person does not have to actually hold or touch something to possess it. It is enough if the person has (control over it/ [or] the right to control it), either personally or through another person.]**

**[Agreeing to buy a controlled substance does not, by itself, mean that a person has control over that substance.]**

**[The People allege that the defendant possessed the following items: \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of each controlled substance or all paraphernalia when multiple items alleged>. You may not find the defendant guilty unless all of you agree that the People have proved that the defendant possessed at least one of these items and you all agree on which item (he/she) possessed.]**

**<A. Defense: Prescription>**

**[The defendant is not guilty of unlawfully possessing \_\_\_\_\_ <insert type of controlled substance> if (he/she) had a valid prescription for that substance written by a physician, dentist, podiatrist, or veterinarian licensed to practice in California. The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not have a valid prescription. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of possessing a controlled substance.]**

*<B. Defense: Conduct Authorized>*

**[The defendant is not guilty of this offense if (he/she) was authorized to possess the (substance/item) by (the rules of the (Department of Corrections/prison/jail/institution/camp/farm/place)/ [or] the specific authorization of the (warden[,]/ [or] superintendent[,]/ [or] jailer[,]/ [or] [other] person in charge of the (prison/jail/institution/camp/farm/place)). The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not authorized to possess the (substance/item). If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of this offense.]**

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*New January 2006; Revised October 2010, February 2014, September 2017, September 2018*

**BENCH NOTES*****Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If the defendant is charged with possessing a controlled substance, give elements 1 through 5. If the defendant is charged with possession of paraphernalia, give elements 1 through 3 only.

If the prosecution alleges under a single count that the defendant possessed multiple items, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on unanimity. (See *People v. Wolfe* (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 177, 184–185 [7 Cal.Rptr.3d 483]; *People v. Rowland* (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 61, 65 [88 Cal.Rptr.2d 900].) Give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “The People allege that the defendant possessed,” inserting the items alleged.

Give the bracketed sentence defining “intended to be used” if there is an issue over whether the object allegedly possessed by the defendant was drug paraphernalia. (See *People v. Gutierrez* (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 380, 389 [60 Cal.Rptr.2d 561].)

The prescription defense is codified in Health & Safety Code sections 11350 and 11377. This defense does apply to a charge of possession of a controlled substance in a penal institution. (*People v. Fenton* (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 965, 969 [25 Cal.Rptr.2d 52].) The defendant need only raise a reasonable doubt about whether his possession of the drug was lawful because of a valid prescription. (See *People v. Mower* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 479 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067].) If there is sufficient evidence of a prescription, give the bracketed “unlawfully” in element 1 and the bracketed paragraph headed “Defense: Prescription.”

If there is sufficient evidence that the defendant was authorized to possess the substance or item, give the bracketed word “unlawfully” in element 1 and the bracketed paragraph headed “Defense: Conduct Authorized.” (*People v. George* (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 262, 275–276 [35 Cal.Rptr.2d 750]; *People v. Cardenas*

(1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 240, 245–246 [61 Cal.Rptr.2d 583].)

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 4573.6; *People v. Palaschak* (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1236, 1242 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 722, 893 P.2d 717]; *People v. Carrasco* (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 936, 944–948 [173 Cal.Rptr. 688].
- Knowledge. *People v. Carrasco, supra*, 118 Cal.App.3d at pp. 944–947.
- Usable Amount. *People v. Carrasco, supra*, 118 Cal.App.3d at p. 948.
- Prescription Defense. Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11350, 11377.
- Prescription. Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11027, 11164, 11164.5.
- Persons Authorized to Write Prescriptions. Health & Saf. Code, § 11150.
- Prescription Defense Applies. *People v. Fenton* (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 965, 969 [25 Cal.Rptr.2d 52].
- Authorization Is Affirmative Defense. *People v. George* (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 262, 275–276 [35 Cal.Rptr.2d 750]; *People v. Cardenas, supra*, 53 Cal.App.4th at pp. 245–246.
- Jail Defined. *People v. Carter* (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 546, 550 [172 Cal.Rptr. 838].
- Knowledge of Location as Penal Institution. *People v. Seale* (1969) 274 Cal.App.2d 107, 111 [78 Cal.Rptr. 811].
- “Adjacent to” and “Grounds” Not Vague. *People v. Seale, supra*, 274 Cal.App.2d at pp. 114–115.
- Constructive vs. Actual Possession. *People v. Barnes* (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 552, 556 [67 Cal.Rptr.2d 162].
- Unanimity. *People v. Wolfe* (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 177, 184–185 [7 Cal.Rptr.3d 483].
- Definition of Analog Controlled Substance. Health & Saf. Code, § 11401; *People v. Davis* (2013) 57 Cal.4th 353, 357, fn. 2 [159 Cal.Rptr.3d 405, 303 P.3d 1179].
- No Finding Necessary for “Expressly Listed” Controlled Substance. *People v. Davis, supra*, 57 Cal.4th at p. 362, fn. 5.

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Inmate Transferred to Mental Hospital*

A prison inmate transferred to a mental hospital for treatment under Penal Code section 2684 is not “under the custody of prison officials.” (*People v. Superior Court (Ortiz)* (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 995, 1002 [9 Cal.Rptr.3d 745].) However, the inmate is “held under custody by peace officers within the facility.” (*Id.* at p. 1003.) Thus, Penal Code section 4573.6 does apply. (*Ibid.*)

#### *Use of Controlled Substance Insufficient to Prove Possession*

“‘[P]ossession,’ as used in that section, does not mean ‘use’ and mere evidence of use (or being under the influence) of a proscribed substance cannot circumstantially

prove its ‘*possession.*’ ” (*People v. Spann* (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 400, 408 [232 Cal.Rptr. 31] [italics in original]; see also *People v. Carrasco*, *supra*, 118 Cal.App.3d at p. 947.)

### ***Posting of Prohibition***

Penal Code section 4573.6 requires that its “prohibitions and sanctions” be posted on the grounds of the penal institution. (Pen. Code, § 4573.6.) However, that requirement is not an element of the offense, and the prosecution is not required to prove compliance. (*People v. Gutierrez* (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 380, 389 [60 Cal.Rptr.2d 561]; *People v. Cardenas*, *supra*, 53 Cal.App.4th at p. 246.)

### ***Possession of Multiple Items at One Time***

“[C]ontemporaneous possession in a state prison of two or more discrete controlled substances . . . at the same location constitutes but one offense under Penal Code section 4573.6.” (*People v. Rouser* (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1065, 1067 [69 Cal.Rptr.2d 563].)

### ***Administrative Punishment Does Not Bar Criminal Action***

“The protection against multiple punishment afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause . . . is not implicated by prior prison disciplinary proceedings . . . .” (*Taylor v. Hamlet* (N.D. Cal. 2003) 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19451; see also *People v. Ford* (1959) 175 Cal.App.2d 37, 39 [345 P.2d 354] [Pen. Code, § 654 not implicated].)

### ***Medical Use of Cannabis***

The medical cannabis defense provided by Health and Safety Code section 11362.5 is not available to a defendant charged with violating Penal Code section 4573.6. (*Taylor v. Hamlet*, *supra*, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19451.) However, the common law defense of medical necessity may be available. (*Ibid.*)

## **SECONDARY SOURCES**

7 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, §§ 211–212.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.02[2][a][i] (Matthew Bender).

5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 94, *Prisoners’ Rights*, § 94.04 (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 145, *Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses*, § 145.01 (Matthew Bender).

## **2749–2759. Reserved for Future Use**



## (iv) Escape

### 2760. Escape (Pen. Code, § 4532(a)(1) & (b)(1))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with (escape/ [or] attempting to escape) [in violation of Penal Code section 4532].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant was a prisoner who had been ((arrested and booked for[,]/ [or] charged with[,]/ [or] convicted of) a (misdemeanor/felony)/committed by order of the juvenile court to an adult facility);

*<Alternative 2A—confined in penal institution>*

- [2. The defendant was confined in (a/an) (county jail/city jail/prison/ industrial farm/industrial road camp);]

*<Alternative 2B—engaged in county work>*

- [2. The defendant was working on (a county road/ [or other] county work) as an inmate;]

*<Alternative 2C—lawful custody>*

- [2. The defendant was in the lawful custody of (an officer/ [or] a person);]

*<Alternative 2D—work furlough>*

- [2. The defendant was confined in (a/an) (county jail/city jail/prison/ industrial farm/industrial road camp) but was authorized to be away from the place of confinement in connection with a work furlough program;]

*<Alternative 2E—temporary release>*

- [2. The defendant was confined in (a/an) (county jail/city jail/prison/ industrial farm/industrial road camp) but was away from the place of confinement in connection with an authorized temporary release;]

*<Alternative 2F—home detention>*

- [2. The defendant was a participant in a home detention program;]

*<Alternative 2G—confined under Pen. Code, § 4011.9>*

- [2. The defendant was confined as an inmate in a hospital for treatment even though no guard was present to detain the defendant;]



**AND**

*<Alternative 3A—confined in penal institution>*

**[3. The defendant (escaped/ [or] attempted to escape) from the (jail/prison/farm/camp).]**

*<Alternative 3B—engaged in county work>*

**[3. The defendant (escaped/ [or] attempted to escape) from the custody of the (officer/ [or] person in charge of (him/her)) while engaged in work at, or going to or returning from, the county work site.]**

*<Alternative 3C—lawful custody>*

**[3. The defendant (escaped/ [or] attempted to escape) from the custody of the (officer/ [or] person) who had lawful custody of the defendant.]**

*<Alternative 3D—work furlough>*

**[3. The defendant (escaped/ [or] attempted to escape) from the (jail/prison/farm/camp) by failing to return to the place of confinement.]**

*<Alternative 3E—temporary release>*

**[3. The defendant (escaped/ [or] attempted to escape) from the (jail/prison/farm/camp) by failing to return to the place of confinement.]**

*<Alternative 3F—home detention>*

**[3. The defendant (escaped/ [or] attempted to escape) from the place of confinement in the home detention program.]**

*<Alternative 3G—confined under Pen. Code, § 4011.9>*

**[3. The defendant (escaped/ [or] attempted to escape) from the place of hospital confinement.]**

**[A person has been *booked* for a (misdemeanor/felony) if he or she has been taken to a law enforcement office where an officer or employee has recorded the arrest and taken the person’s fingerprints and photograph.]**

**[A person has been *charged* with a (misdemeanor/felony) if a formal complaint, information, or indictment has been filed in court alleging that the person committed a crime.]**

***Escape* means the unlawful departure of a prisoner from the physical limits of his or her custody. [It is not necessary for the prisoner to have left the outer limits of the institution’s property. However, the prisoner must breach a wall or fence marking the security perimeter of the**

correctional facility. It is not sufficient for the prisoner to be merely outside the particular area within the facility where he or she is permitted to be.]

[A prisoner also *escapes* if he or she willfully fails to return to his or her place of confinement within the period that he or she was authorized to be away from that place of confinement. Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose.]

[A prisoner is in the *lawful custody* of (an officer/ [or] a person) if the (officer/ [or] person), acting under legal authority, physically restrains or confines the prisoner so that the prisoner is significantly deprived of his or her freedom of movement or the prisoner reasonably believes that he or she is significantly deprived of his or her freedom of movement.]

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2013*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

In elements 2 and 3, select the location where the defendant was allegedly confined or the program that the defendant allegedly escaped from.

In the definition of escape, give the bracketed sentence if there is an issue as to whether the defendant went far enough to constitute an escape. (See *People v. Lavaie* (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 456, 459–461 [82 Cal.Rptr.2d 719].)

Give the bracketed paragraph on willful failure to return if appropriate based on the evidence.

Give the bracketed paragraph defining lawful custody if there is an issue as to whether the defendant was in lawful custody. (*People v. Nicholson* (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 823 [20 Cal.Rptr.3d 476].)

If the defendant is charged with attempt, give CALCRIM No. 460, *Attempt Other Than Attempted Murder*. (*People v. Gallegos* (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 512, 517 [114 Cal.Rptr. 166].)

If the prosecution alleges escape with force or violence (Pen. Code, § 4532(a)(2) or (b)(2)), give CALCRIM No. 2761, *Escape By Force or Violence*. (*People v. Gallegos, supra*, 39 Cal.App.3d at pp. 518–519.)

### *Defenses—Instructional Duty*

If there is sufficient evidence of necessity, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give CALCRIM No. 2764, *Escape: Necessity Defense*. (*People v. Condley* (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 999, 1008–1013 [138 Cal.Rptr. 515]; *People v. Lovercamp* (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 823, 831–832 [118 Cal.Rptr. 110].)

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 4532(a)(1) & (b)(1).
- Specific Intent Not an Element of Completed Escape. *People v. George* (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 814, 819 [167 Cal.Rptr. 603].
- Attempt to Escape—Must Instruct on Direct Act and Specific Intent. *People v. Gallegos* (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 512, 517 [114 Cal.Rptr. 166].
- Escape Defined. *People v. Lavaie* (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 456, 459–461 [82 Cal.Rptr.2d 719].
- Arrested Defendant Must Be Booked Before Statute Applies. *People v. Diaz* (1978) 22 Cal.3d 712, 716–717 [150 Cal.Rptr. 471, 586 P.2d 952]; see also *People v. Trotter* (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 965, 967, 971 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 898].
- Arrest of Probationer—Booking Not Required. *People v. Cisneros* (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 117, 120–123 [224 Cal.Rptr. 452].
- Arrest of Parolee—Booking Not Required. *People v. Nicholson* (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 823, 830 [20 Cal.Rptr.3d 476].
- Must Be Confined in Adult Penal Institution. *People v. Rackley* (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1659, 1668 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 49].

## LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

Attempted escape is not a lesser included offense of escape. (*People v. Bailey* (2012) 54 Cal.4th 740, 748–752 [143 Cal.Rptr.3d 647, 279 P.3d 1120]).

## RELATED ISSUES

### *Violating Work Furlough Conditions*

In order for an inmate assigned to work furlough to violate Penal Code section 4532, the inmate must “willfully” fail to return on time. (*Yost v. Superior Court* (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 289, 292 [125 Cal.Rptr. 74] [defendant who was arrested on other charges on his way back to camp did not willfully fail to return].) If the defendant merely violates conditions of the work furlough release, that conduct falls under Penal Code section 1208, not section 4532. (*Id.* at p. 295.)

### *Defendant Illegally Detained*

If a person is detained in custody “without any process, . . . wholly without authority of law,” or “where the judgment was void on its face,” the detention is illegal and the defendant may “depart” without committing the crime of escape. (*People v. Teung* (1891) 92 Cal. 421, 421–422, 426 [28 P. 577]; *In re Estrada* (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 749 [48 Cal.Rptr. 172, 408 P.2d 948].) “But where the imprisonment is made under authority of law and the process is simply irregular in form, or the statute under which he is confined is unconstitutional, the escape is unlawful.” (*In re Estrada, supra*, 63 Cal.2d at p. 749.) Note that this is a narrow exception, one that has not been applied by the courts since the case of *People v. Clark* (1924) 69 Cal.App. 520, 523 [231 P. 590].

## SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Governmental Authority, §§ 86–102.

1 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 11, *Arrest*, §§ 11.02, 11.06[3] (Matthew Bender).

3 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 73, *Defenses and Justifications*, § 73.05 (Matthew Bender).

5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 94, *Prisoners' Rights*, § 94.20[2] (Matthew Bender).

**2761. Escape by Force or Violence (Pen. Code, § 4532(a)(2) & (b)(2))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with (escape/ [or] attempted escape) committed by force or violence [in violation of Penal Code section 4532].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

- 1. The defendant was ((arrested and booked for[,]/ [or] charged with[,]/ [or] convicted of) a (misdemeanor/felony)/committed by order of the juvenile court to an adult facility);**

*<Alternative 2A—confined in penal institution>*

- [2. The defendant was confined in (a/an) (county jail/city jail/prison/ industrial farm/industrial road camp);]**

*<Alternative 2B—engaged in county work>*

- [2. The defendant was working on (a county road/ [or other] county work) as an inmate;]**

*<Alternative 2C—lawful custody>*

- [2. The defendant was in the lawful custody of (an officer/ [or] a person);]**

*<Alternative 2D—work furlough>*

- [2. The defendant was confined in (a/an) (county jail/city jail/prison/ industrial farm/industrial road camp) but was authorized to be away from the place of confinement in connection with a work furlough program;]**

*<Alternative 2E—temporary release>*

- [2. The defendant was confined in (a/an) (county jail/city jail/prison/ industrial farm/industrial road camp) but was away from the place of confinement in connection with an authorized temporary release;]**

*<Alternative 2F—home detention>*

- [2. The defendant was a participant in a home detention program;]**

*<Alternative 2G—confined under Pen. Code, § 4011.9>*

- [2. The defendant was confined as an inmate in a hospital for treatment even though no guard was present to detain the defendant;]**

<Alternative 3A—confined in penal institution>

[3. The defendant (escaped/ [or] attempted to escape) from the (jail/ prison/farm/camp);]

<Alternative 3B—engaged in county work>

[3. The defendant (escaped/ [or] attempted to escape) from the custody of the (officer/ [or] person in charge of (him/her)) while engaged in or going to or returning from the county work site;]

<Alternative 3C—lawful custody>

[3. The defendant (escaped/ [or] attempted to escape) from the custody of the (officer/ [or] person) who had lawful custody of the defendant;]

<Alternative 3D—work furlough>

[3. The defendant (escaped/ [or] attempted to escape) from the (jail/ prison/farm/camp) by failing to return to the place of confinement;]

<Alternative 3E—temporary release>

[3. The defendant (escaped/ [or] attempted to escape) from the (jail/ prison/farm/camp) by failing to return to the place of confinement;]

<Alternative 3F—home detention>

[3. The defendant (escaped/ [or] attempted to escape) from the place of confinement in the home detention program;]

<Alternative 3G—confined under Pen. Code, § 4011.9>

[3. The defendant (escaped/ [or] attempted to escape) from the place of hospital confinement;]

AND

4. The defendant committed the (escape/ [or] attempted escape) by force or violence.

[A person has been *booked* for a (misdemeanor/felony) if he or she has been taken to a law enforcement office where an officer or employee has recorded the arrest and taken the person's fingerprints and photograph.]

[A person has been *charged* with a (misdemeanor/felony) if a formal complaint, information, or indictment has been filed in court alleging that the person committed a crime.]

*Escape* means the unlawful departure of a prisoner from the physical limits of his or her custody. [It is not necessary for the prisoner to have

left the outer limits of the institution’s property. However, the prisoner must breach a wall or fence marking the security perimeter of the correctional facility. It is not sufficient for the prisoner to be merely outside the particular area within the facility where he or she is permitted to be.]

[A prisoner also *escapes* if he or she willfully fails to return to his or her place of confinement within the period that he or she was authorized to be away from that place of confinement. Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose.]

To commit an act *by force or violence* means to wrongfully use physical force against the property or person of another. [To *use force* against a person means to touch the other person in a harmful or offensive manner. The slightest touching can be enough if it is done in a rude or angry way. Making contact with another person, including through his or her clothing, is enough. The touching does not have to cause pain or injury of any kind.]

[The People must prove that the defendant personally used force or violence or aided and abetted another in using force or violence. Mere knowledge that someone else used force or violence is not enough. Instruction[s] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert instruction numbers; see Bench Notes> explain[s] when a person aids and abets another.]

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2013*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

In elements 2 and 3, select the location where the defendant was allegedly confined or the program that the defendant allegedly escaped from and use the appropriate alternative paragraphs.

In the definition of escape, give the bracketed sentence if there is an issue as to whether the defendant went far enough to constitute an escape. (See *People v. Lavaie* (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 456, 459–461 [82 Cal.Rptr.2d 719].)

Give the bracketed paragraph on willful failure to return if appropriate based on the evidence.

In the definition of force or violence, use the bracketed sentences if the prosecution alleges that the defendant used force against a person. (*People v. Lozano* (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 618, 627 [237 Cal.Rptr. 612] [meaning of “force” in Pen. Code, § 4532 equivalent to simple battery].)

Give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “The People must prove that the

defendant personally” if this is an issue in the case. (*People v. Moretto* (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1278 [26 Cal.Rptr.2d 719].) Give also CALCRIM No. 400, *Aiding and Abetting: General Principles*, and CALCRIM No. 401, *Aiding and Abetting: Intended Crimes*.

If the defendant is charged with attempt, give CALCRIM No. 460, *Attempt Other Than Attempted Murder*. (*People v. Gallegos* (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 512, 517 [114 Cal.Rptr. 166].)

### ***Defenses—Instructional Duty***

If there is sufficient evidence of necessity, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give CALCRIM No. 2764, *Escape: Necessity Defense*. (*People v. Condley* (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 999, 1008–1013 [138 Cal.Rptr. 515]; *People v. Lovercamp* (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 823, 831–832 [118 Cal.Rptr. 110].)

## **AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 4532(a)(2) & (b)(2).
- Specific Intent Not an Element of Completed Escape. *People v. George* (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 814, 819 [167 Cal.Rptr. 603].
- Attempt to Escape—Must Instruct on Direct Act and Specific Intent. *People v. Gallegos* (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 512, 517 [114 Cal.Rptr. 166].
- Escape Defined. *People v. Lavaie* (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 456, 459–461 [82 Cal.Rptr.2d 719].
- Force or Violence Defined. *People v. Lozano* (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 618, 627 [237 Cal.Rptr. 612]; *People v. Bravott* (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 93, 97 [227 Cal.Rptr. 810].
- Force Includes Damage to Property. *People v. White* (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 862, 866 [249 Cal.Rptr. 165]; *People v. Bravott* (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 93, 97 [227 Cal.Rptr. 810].
- Defendant Must Personally Use Force or Aid and Abet Another. *People v. Moretto* (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1278 [26 Cal.Rptr.2d 719].
- Arrested Defendant Must Be Booked Before Statute Applies. *People v. Diaz* (1978) 22 Cal.3d 712, 716–717 [150 Cal.Rptr. 471, 586 P.2d 952]; see also *People v. Trotter* (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 965, 967, 971 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 898].
- Arrest of Probationer—Booking Not Required. *People v. Cisneros* (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 117, 120–123 [224 Cal.Rptr. 452].
- Must Be Confined in Adult Penal Institution. *People v. Rackley* (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1659, 1668 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 49].

## **LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES**

Escape carries a more severe penalty if done with force or violence. (Pen. Code, § 4532(a)(2) & (b)(2).) If the defendant is charged with using force or violence, then the escape without force or violence is a lesser included offense. (*People v. Gallegos*



(1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 512, 518–519 [114 Cal.Rptr. 166].) Note that the court must instruct on all the elements of escape with force or violence and must then give a separate instruction on the lesser offense, stating all of the elements except force or violence. (*People v. Lozano* (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 618, 633 [237 Cal.Rptr. 612].) The court may not give the jury a verdict form asking specifically if the element of force or violence has been proved. (*Ibid.*)

### RELATED ISSUES

See Related Issues section in CALCRIM No. 2760, *Escape*.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Governmental Authority, §§ 86–102.

1 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 11, *Arrest*, § 11.06[3] (Matthew Bender).

3 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 73, *Defenses and Justifications*, § 73.05 (Matthew Bender).

5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 94, *Prisoners' Rights*, § 94.20[2] (Matthew Bender).

## 2762. Escape After Remand or Arrest (Pen. Code, § 836.6)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with (escape/ [or] attempted escape) following (a remand/an arrest) [in violation of Penal Code section 836.6].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

<Alternative 1A—remanded>

1. The defendant was remanded, which means that a (magistrate/ judge) ordered (him/her) placed into the custody of a (sheriff[,]/ [or] marshal[,]/ [or other] (police agency/peace officer));]

<Alternative 1B—arrested>

1. The defendant was lawfully arrested by a peace officer and the defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, that (he/she) had been arrested;]

AND

2. The defendant (escaped/ [or] attempted to escape) from the custody of the (sheriff[,]/ marshal[,]/ [or other] (police agency/ peace officer)).

*Escape* means the unlawful departure from the physical limits of custody.

[A sworn member of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of agency that employs peace officer>, authorized by \_\_\_\_\_ <insert appropriate section from Pen. Code, § 830 et seq.> to \_\_\_\_\_ <describe statutory authority>, is a **peace officer**.]

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New January 2006

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If the defendant is charged with a felony for use of force or violence, give CALCRIM No. 2763, *Escape After Remand or Arrest: Force or Violence* with this instruction.

If the defendant is charged with attempt, give CALCRIM No. 460, *Attempt Other Than Attempted Murder*. (*People v. Gallegos* (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 512, 517 [114 Cal.Rptr. 166].)

If lawfulness of the arrest is an issue, give the appropriate paragraphs from

CALCRIM No. 2670, *Lawful Performance: Peace Officer*.

The jury must determine whether the person who arrested the defendant is a peace officer. (*People v. Brown* (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 444–445 [250 Cal.Rptr. 604, 758 P.2d 1135].) The court may instruct the jury on the appropriate definition of “peace officer” from the statute (e.g., “a Garden Grove Regular Police Officer and a Garden Grove Reserve Police Officer are peace officers”). (*Ibid.*) However, the court may not instruct the jury that the person was a peace officer as a matter of law (e.g., “Officer Reed was a peace officer”). (*Ibid.*)

### ***Defenses—Instructional Duty***

If there is sufficient evidence of necessity, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give CALCRIM No. 2764, *Escape: Necessity Defense*. (*People v. Condley* (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 999, 1008–1013 [138 Cal.Rptr. 515]; *People v. Lovercamp* (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 823, 831–832 [118 Cal.Rptr. 110].)

## **AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 836.6
- Specific Intent Not an Element of Completed Escape. *People v. George* (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 814, 819 [167 Cal.Rptr. 603].
- Attempt to Escape—Must Instruct on Direct Act and Specific Intent. *People v. Gallegos* (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 512, 517 [114 Cal.Rptr. 166].
- Escape Defined. *People v. Lavaie* (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 456, 459–461 [82 Cal.Rptr.2d 719].

## **LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES**

Escape after remand or arrest is a misdemeanor unless the defendant used force or violence and caused serious bodily injury to a peace officer. (Pen. Code, § 836.6(c).) If the defendant is charged with the felony, then the misdemeanor is a lesser included offense. (See *People v. Gallegos* (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 512, 518–519 [114 Cal.Rptr. 166].) The court must provide the jury with a verdict form on which the jury will indicate if the additional elements have or have not been proved. If the jury finds that these elements have not been proved, then the offense should be set at a misdemeanor.

## **SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Governmental Authority, § 102.

1 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 11, *Arrest*, §§ 11.02, 11.06[3] (Matthew Bender).

3 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 73, *Defenses and Justifications*, § 73.05 (Matthew Bender).

**2763. Escape After Remand or Arrest: Force or Violence (Pen. Code, § 836.6)**

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If you find the defendant guilty of (escape/ [or] attempted escape) following (remand/arrest), you must then decide whether the People have proved the additional allegation that the defendant used force or violence and caused serious bodily injury to a peace officer.

To prove this allegation, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant committed the (escape/ [or] attempted escape) by force or violence;

AND

2. The defendant caused serious bodily injury to a peace officer.

As used here, *using force or violence* means the wrongful application of physical force against the person of another. To *use force* against a person means to touch the other person in a harmful or offensive manner.

[The People must prove that the defendant personally used force or violence or aided and abetted another in using force or violence. Mere knowledge that someone else used force or violence is not enough.

Instruction[s] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert instruction numbers; see Bench Notes> explain[s] when a person aids and abets another.]

A *serious bodily injury* means a serious impairment of physical condition. Such an injury may include[, but is not limited to]: (loss of consciousness/ concussion/ bone fracture/ protracted loss or impairment of function of any bodily member or organ/ a wound requiring extensive suturing/ [and] serious disfigurement).

[An act causes bodily injury to another person if the injury is the direct, natural, and probable consequence of the act and the injury would not have happened without the act. A *natural and probable consequence* is one that a reasonable person would know is likely to happen if nothing unusual intervenes. In deciding whether a consequence is natural and probable, consider all of the circumstances established by the evidence.]

[There may be more than one cause of injury. An act causes bodily injury to another person only if it is a substantial factor in causing the injury. A *substantial factor* is more than a trivial or remote factor. However, it does not need to be the only factor that causes the injury.]

A sworn member of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of agency that employs peace officer>, authorized by \_\_\_\_\_ <insert appropriate section from Pen. Code, § 830 et seq.> to \_\_\_\_\_ <describe statutory authority>, is a *peace officer*.

**The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant used force or violence and caused serious bodily injury to a peace officer. If the People have not met this burden, you must find that this allegation has not been proved.**

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*New January 2006*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the sentencing factor.

This instruction **must** be given with CALCRIM No. 2762, *Escape After Remand or Arrest*. The court must provide the jury with a verdict form on which the jury will indicate if the prosecution has or has not been proved the additional allegation of the use of force.

If causation is at issue, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on proximate cause. (*People v. Bernhardt* (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 567, 590–591 [35 Cal.Rptr. 401].) If the evidence indicates that there was only one cause of injury, the court should give the “direct, natural, and probable” language in the first bracketed paragraph on causation. If there is evidence of multiple causes of injury, the court should also give the “substantial factor” instruction in the second bracketed paragraph on causation. (See *People v. Autry* (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 363 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 135]; *People v. Pike* (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 732, 746–747 [243 Cal.Rptr. 54].)

Give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “The People must prove that the defendant personally” if this is an issue in the case. (*People v. Moretto* (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1278 [26 Cal.Rptr.2d 719].) Give also CALCRIM No. 400, *Aiding and Abetting: General Principles*, and CALCRIM No. 401, *Aiding and Abetting: Intended Crimes*.

The jury must determine whether the person who arrested the defendant is a peace officer. (*People v. Brown* (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 444–445 [250 Cal.Rptr. 604, 758 P.2d 1135].) The court may instruct the jury on the appropriate definition of “peace officer” from the statute (e.g., “a Garden Grove Regular Police Officer and a Garden Grove Reserve Police Officer are peace officers”). (*Ibid.*) However, the court may not instruct the jury that the person was a peace officer as a matter of law (e.g., “Officer Reed was a peace officer”). (*Ibid.*)

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 836.6.
- Force or Violence Defined. *People v. Lozano* (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 618, 627 [237 Cal.Rptr. 612]; *People v. Bravot* (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 93, 97 [227 Cal.Rptr. 810].
- Defendant Must Personally Use Force or Aid and Abet Another. *People v.*

*Moretto* (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1278 [26 Cal.Rptr.2d 719].

- Serious Bodily Injury Defined. Pen. Code, § 243(f)(4); *People v. Taylor* (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 11, 25, fn. 4 [12 Cal.Rptr.3d 693].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Governmental Authority, § 102.

1 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 11, *Arrest*, §§ 11.02, 11.06[3] (Matthew Bender).

3 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 73, *Defenses and Justifications*, § 73.05 (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 140, *Challenges to Crimes*, § 140.04 (Matthew Bender).

## 2764. Escape: Necessity Defense

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If you conclude that the defendant (escaped/ [or] attempted to escape), that conduct was not illegal if the defendant can prove the defense of necessity. In order to establish this defense, the defendant must prove that:

1. The defendant was faced with a specific threat of (death[,]/ [or] forcible sexual attack[,]/ [or] substantial bodily injury) in the immediate future;
2. (There was no time for the defendant to make a complaint to the authorities/ [or] (There/there) was a history of complaints that were not acted on, so that a reasonable person would conclude that any additional complaints would be ineffective);
3. There was no time or opportunity to seek help from the courts;
4. The defendant did not use force or violence against prison personnel or other people in the escape [other than the person who was the source of the threatened harm to the defendant];

AND

5. The defendant immediately reported to the proper authorities when (he/she) had attained a position of safety from the immediate threat.

The defendant has the burden of proving this defense by a preponderance of the evidence. This is a different standard of proof from proof beyond a reasonable doubt. To meet the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence, the defendant must prove that it is more likely than not that each of the five listed items is true.

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*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the defense of necessity if there is sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt. (*People v. Condley* (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 999, 1008–1013 [138 Cal.Rptr. 515]; *People v. Lovercamp* (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 823, 831–832 [118 Cal.Rptr. 110].)

### AUTHORITY

- Escape—Necessity Defense. *People v. Condley* (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 999, 1008–1013 [138 Cal.Rptr. 515]; *People v. Lovercamp* (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 823, 831–832 [118 Cal.Rptr. 110].

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Defenses, § 55.

3 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 73, *Defenses and Justifications*, § 73.05 (Matthew Bender).

5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 94, *Prisoners' Rights*, § 94.20[2] (Matthew Bender).



## J. MISAPPROPRIATION OF PUBLIC MONEY

### 2765. Misappropriation of Public Money (Pen. Code § 424(a)(1–7))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with misappropriating public money [in violation of Penal Code section 424(a)(\_\_\_\_\_) *<insert correct paragraph>*].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant was responsible for receiving, safekeeping, transferring or distributing public money;

[AND]

2. The defendant, while responsible for receiving, safekeeping, transferring or distributing public money:

*<select the element that corresponds to the paragraph of Pen. Code § 424(a) with which defendant is charged>*

- <(a)(1)> [took some of that money for (his/her) own or someone else's use without legal authority;]
- <(a)(2)> [loaned, made a profit from, or used some of that money without legal authority;]
- <(a)(3)> [knowingly kept a false account or made a false entry or erasure in any account of the money.]
- <(a)(4)> [fraudulently changed, falsified, hid, destroyed, or obliterated an accounting of that money.]
- <(a)(5)> [willfully refused or failed to disburse, on demand, any public money in (his/her) control in response to a draft, order, or warrant drawn upon that money by competent authority;]
- <(a)(6)> [willfully failed to transfer any public money when the transfer was required by law;]
- <(a)(7)> [willfully failed or refused to disburse any money that (he/she) had received to a person legally authorized to receive that money, despite having a legal duty to do so;]

*<give element 3 when instructing on Pen. Code § 424(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5), (a)(6), (a)(7)>*

[AND]

3. When the defendant did so, (he/she) (knew that (he/she) was not

following the law on receiving, safekeeping, transferring or distributing public money or was acting without legal authority/ [or] was criminally negligent in failing to know the legal requirements for or restrictions on (his/her) conduct.)]

A person who is *responsible* for public money only needs to have some control over the money. That control does not need to be a major part of that person's job.

[*Criminal negligence* involves more than ordinary carelessness, inattention, or mistake in judgment. A person acts with criminal negligence when the way he or she acts is so different from the way an ordinarily careful person would act in the same situation that his or her act amounts to disregard for the consequences of that act.]

[A person acts *fraudulently* when he or she makes a false statement, misrepresents information, hides the truth, or otherwise does something with the intent to deceive.]

[The term *public money* includes all funds, bonds, and evidence of indebtedness received or held by state, county, district, city, town, or public agency officers in their official capacity. It also includes money received from selling bonds or other evidence of indebtedness authorized by the legislative body of any city, county, district, or public agency.]

[A person commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose.]

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*New March 2018*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

### AUTHORITY

- Definition of Public Funds/Moneys. Pen. Code, §§ 424(b), 426.
- Definition of Responsible for/Charged With. *People v. Groat* (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1232 [24 Cal.Rptr.2d 15].
- Definition of Fraudulent Behavior. *People v. Pugh* (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 66, 72 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 770].
- Criminal Negligence Requirement. *Stark v. Superior Court* (2011) 52 Cal.4th 368, 399 [128 Cal.Rptr.3d 611, 257 P.3d 41].

**2766–2799. Reserved for Future Use**

# TAX CRIMES

## A. FAILURE TO FILE

- 2800. Failure to File Tax Return (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19701(a))
- 2801. Willful Failure to File Tax Return (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19706)
- 2802–2809. Reserved for Future Use

## B. FALSE RETURN

- 2810. False Tax Return (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19701(a))
- 2811. Willfully Filing False Tax Return: Statement Made Under Penalty of Perjury (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19705(a)(1))
- 2812. Willfully Filing False Tax Return: Intent to Evade Tax (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19706)
- 2813–2824. Reserved for Future Use

## C. OTHER TAX OFFENSES

- 2825. Aiding in Preparation of False Tax Return (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19705(a)(2))
- 2826. Willful Failure to Pay Tax (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19701(c))
- 2827. Concealing Property With Intent to Evade Tax (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19705(a)(4))
- 2828. Failure to Withhold Tax (Rev. & Tax. Code, §§ 19708, 19709)
- 2829–2839. Reserved for Future Use

## D. EVIDENCE

- 2840. Evidence of Uncharged Tax Offense: Failed to File Previous Returns
- 2841. No Deductions on Gross Income From Illegal Conduct (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 17282(a))
- 2842. Determining Income: Net Worth Method
- 2843. Determining Income: Bank Deposits Method
- 2844. Determining Income: Cash Expenditures Method
- 2845. Determining Income: Specific Items Method
- 2846. Proof of Unreported Taxable Income: Must Still Prove Elements of Offense
- 2847–2859. Reserved for Future Use

## E. DEFENSES

- 2860. Defense: Good Faith Belief Conduct Legal
- 2861. Defense: Reliance on Professional Advice
- 2862–2899. Reserved for Future Use



## A. FAILURE TO FILE

### 2800. Failure to File Tax Return (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19701(a))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with failing to (file a tax return with/ [or] supply information to) the Franchise Tax Board [in violation of Revenue and Taxation Code section 19701(a)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant was required to (file a tax return with/ [or] supply information to) the Franchise Tax Board;
2. The defendant repeatedly failed to (file a tax return/ [or] supply required information) over a period of two years or more;

AND

3. The defendant's failure to (file the return/ [or] supply required information) resulted in an estimated delinquent tax liability of at least fifteen thousand dollars.

[If the People prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the Franchise Tax Board issued a certificate stating that (a return had not been filed/ [or] information had not been supplied) as required by law, you may but are not required to conclude that (the return was not filed/ [or] the information was not supplied).]

[If the People prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the (president/ [or] chief operating officer) of a corporation, you may but are not required to conclude that the defendant is the person responsible for (filing a return with/ [or] supplying information to) the Franchise Tax Board as required for that corporation.]

[The People do not have to prove the exact amount of unreported income.]

[The People do not have to prove that the (unreported/ [or] underreported) income came from illegal activity.]

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2006*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

The two bracketed paragraphs that begin with “If the People prove beyond a reasonable doubt that” both explain rebuttable presumptions created by statute. (See Rev. & Tax. Code, §§ 19703, 19701(d); Evid. Code, §§ 600–607.) The California Supreme Court has held that a jury instruction phrased as a rebuttable presumption in a criminal case creates an unconstitutional mandatory presumption. (*People v. Roder* (1983) 33 Cal.3d 491, 497–505 [189 Cal.Rptr. 501, 658 P.2d 1302].) In accordance with *Roder*, the instructions have been written as permissive inferences. In addition, it is only appropriate to instruct the jury on a permissive inference if there is *no* evidence to contradict the inference. (Evid. Code, § 640.) If any evidence has been introduced to support the opposite factual finding, then the jury “shall determine the existence or nonexistence of the presumed fact from the evidence and without regard to the presumption.” (*Ibid.*)

Therefore, the court **must not** give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “If the People prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the Franchise Tax Board” if there is evidence that the return was filed or the information was supplied.

Similarly, the court **must not** give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “If the People prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the (president” if there is evidence that someone else was responsible for filing the return or supplying the information.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19701(a).
- Certificate of Franchise Tax Board. Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19703.
- President Responsible for Corporate Filings. Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19701(d).
- Mandatory Presumption Unconstitutional Unless Instructed as Permissive Inference. *People v. Roder* (1983) 33 Cal.3d 491, 497–505 [189 Cal.Rptr. 501, 658 P.2d 1302].
- Need Not Prove Exact Amount. *United States v. Wilson* (3d Cir. 1979) 601 F.2d 95, 99; *United States v. Johnson* (1943) 319 U.S. 503, 517–518 [63 S.Ct. 1233, 87 L.Ed. 1546].
- Need Not Prove From Illegal Activity. *People v. Smith* (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 1103, 1158 [203 Cal.Rptr. 196].

### COMMENTARY

Revenue and Taxation Code section 19701(a) does not require that the defendant’s conduct be “willful” and specifically states that the act may be “[w]ith or without intent to evade.” (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19701(a).) Courts have held that this language creates a strict liability offense with no intent requirement. (*People v. Allen* (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 846, 849 [25 Cal.Rptr.2d 26]; *People v. Kuhn* (1963) 216 Cal.App.2d 695, 698 [31 Cal.Rptr. 253]; *People v. Jones* (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d Supp. 41, 47 [197 Cal.Rptr. 273].) In addition, in *People v. Hagen* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 652, 670 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 24, 967 P.2d 563], the Court held that section 19701 was a lesser included offense of section 19705, willful failure to file a tax return. The

Court then concluded that the failure to instruct on the lesser included offense was not error since the “the evidence provided no basis for reasonable doubt as to willfulness.” (*Id.* at p. 672.) Thus, it appears that “willfulness” is not an element of a violation of section 19701(a).

Revenue and Taxation Code section 19701(a) states that a person is liable if the person

repeatedly over a period of two years or more, fails to file any return or to supply any information required, or who . . . makes, renders, signs, or verifies any false or fraudulent return or statement, or supplies any false or fraudulent information, resulting in an estimated delinquent tax liability of at least fifteen thousand dollars (\$15,000).

It is not completely clear from this language whether the requirement of an estimated delinquent tax liability of at least fifteen thousand dollars applies both to the failure to file a return and to the making, etc. of a false or fraudulent return. The Legislative Counsel’s Digest of Assembly Bill No. 139, the bill that added this provision to the statute, indicates that this provision is intended to apply to all the violations specified in Revenue and Taxation Code section 19701(a), including the failure to file a return or supply required information. (See Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Assem. Bill No. 139 (2005–2006 Reg. Sess.) Stats. 2005, ch. 74, par. (34).) The committee has adopted this interpretation pending clarification from either the Legislature or case law.

## SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Governmental Authority, § 136.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 140, *Challenges to Crimes*, §§ 140.02[5], 140.03 (Matthew Bender).

## 2801. Willful Failure to File Tax Return (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19706)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with intentionally failing to (file a tax return with/ [or] supply information to) the Franchise Tax Board [in violation of Revenue and Taxation Code section 19706].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant was required to (file a tax return with/ [or] supply information to) the Franchise Tax Board;
2. The defendant did not (file the tax return/ [or] supply the information) by the time required;
3. The defendant voluntarily chose not to (file the tax return/ [or] supply the information), with the intent to violate a legal duty known to (him/her);

AND

4. When the defendant made that choice, (he/she) intended to unlawfully evade paying a tax.

[If the People prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the Franchise Tax Board issued a certificate stating that (a return had not been filed/ [or] information had not been supplied) as required by law, you may but are not required to conclude that (the return was not filed/ [or] the information was not supplied).]

[The People do not have to prove the exact amount of (unreported income/ [or] [additional] tax owed). The People must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant (failed to report income/ [or] owed [additional] taxes)]

[The People do not have to prove that the (unreported/ [or] underreported) income came from illegal activity.]

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*New January 2006; Revised June 2007*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

The statute states that the defendant's acts must be "willful." (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19706.) As used in the tax code, "willful" means that the defendant must act "in voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty." (*People v. Hagen* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 652, 666 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 24, 967 P.2d 563].) The committee has chosen to



use this description of the meaning of the term in place of the word “willful” to avoid confusion with other instructions that provide a different definition of “willful.”

The bracketed paragraph that begins with “If the People prove beyond a reasonable doubt that” explains a rebuttable presumption created by statute. (See Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19703; Evid. Code, §§ 600–607.) The California Supreme Court has held that a jury instruction phrased as a rebuttable presumption in a criminal case creates an unconstitutional mandatory presumption. (*People v. Roder* (1983) 33 Cal.3d 491, 497–505 [189 Cal.Rptr. 501, 658 P.2d 1302].) In accordance with *Roder*, the instruction has been written as a permissive inference. In addition, it is only appropriate to instruct the jury on a permissive inference if there is *no* evidence to contradict the inference. (Evid. Code, § 640.) If any evidence has been introduced to support the opposite factual finding, then the jury “shall determine the existence or nonexistence of the presumed fact from the evidence and without regard to the presumption.” (*Ibid.*)

Therefore, the court **must not** give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “If the People prove beyond a reasonable doubt that” if there is evidence that the return was filed or the information was supplied.

Give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “The People do not have to prove the exact amount” on request. (*United States v. Wilson* (3d Cir. 1979) 601 F.2d 95, 99; Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, Criminal (5th ed.) § 67.08.)

#### ***Defenses—Instructional Duty***

If there is sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt that the defendant had a good faith belief that his or her conduct was legal, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give the instruction on this defense. (*People v. Hagen* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 652, 660 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 24, 967 P.2d 563].) Give CALCRIM No. 2860, *Defense: Good Faith Belief Conduct Legal*.

If there is sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt that the defendant relied on the advice of a professional, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give the instruction on this defense. (*United States v. Mitchell* (4th Cir. 1974) 495 F.2d 285, 287–288; see Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, Criminal (5th ed.) § 67.25.) Give CALCRIM No. 2861, *Defense: Reliance on Professional Advice*.

### **AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19706.
- Willful Requires Volitional Violation of Known Legal Duty. *People v. Hagen* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 652, 666 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 24, 967 P.2d 563]; see also Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, Criminal (5th ed.) § 67.20.
- Evade a Tax Defined. See *United States v. Bishop* (1973) 412 U.S. 346, 360, fn. 8 [93 S.Ct. 2008, 36 L.Ed.2d 941]; *Distinctive Theatres of Columbus v. Looker* (S.D. Ohio 1958) 165 F.Supp. 410, 411.
- Certificate of Franchise Tax Board. Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19703.
- Mandatory Presumption Unconstitutional Unless Instructed as Permissive

Inference. *People v. Roder* (1983) 33 Cal.3d 491, 497–505 [189 Cal.Rptr. 501, 658 P.2d 1302].

- Need Not Prove Exact Amount. *United States v. Wilson* (3d Cir. 1979) 601 F.2d 95, 99; *United States v. Johnson* (1943) 319 U.S. 503, 517–518 [63 S.Ct 1233, 87 L.Ed. 1546].
- Amount of Unpaid Taxes Need Not Be Substantial. *People v. Mojica* (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1204 [43 Cal.Rptr.3d 634]; *United States v. Holland* (1989) 880 F.2d 1091, 1095–1096.
- Need Not Prove From Illegal Activity. *People v. Smith* (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 1103, 1158 [203 Cal.Rptr. 196].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Failure to File Tax Return. Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19701; *People v. Smith* (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 1103, 1182–1183 [203 Cal.Rptr. 196].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Governmental Authority, § 137.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 140, *Challenges to Crimes*, §§ 140.02[5], 140.03 (Matthew Bender).

**2802–2809. Reserved for Future Use**

## B. FALSE RETURN

### 2810. False Tax Return (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19701(a))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with (supplying (false/ [or] fraudulent) information to the Franchise Tax Board/ [or] (making[,]/ [or] verifying[,]/ [or] signing[,]/ [or] rendering) a (false/ [or] fraudulent) (tax return/ [or] statement)) [in violation of Revenue and Taxation Code section 19701(a)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant repeatedly (supplied information to the Franchise Tax Board/ [or] (made[,]/ [or] verified[,]/ [or] signed[,]/ [or] rendered [a] tax return[s]/ [or] statement[s]) over a period of two years or more;
2. The (information[,]/ [or] tax return[,]/ [or] statement) was (false/ [or] fraudulent);

*<Alternative 3A—information>*

3. When the defendant supplied the information, (he/she) knew that it was (false/ [or] fraudulent);

*<Alternative 3B—tax return or statement>*

3. When the defendant (made[,]/ [or] verified[,]/ [or] signed [,]/ [or] rendered) the (tax return/ [or] statement), (he/she) knew that it contained (false/ [or] fraudulent) information;

**AND**

4. The defendant's (supplying of (false/ [or] fraudulent) information/ [or] (making[,]/ [or] verifying[,]/ [or] signing[,]/ [or] rendering) the (false/ [or] fraudulent) (tax return/ [or] statement)) resulted in an estimated delinquent tax liability of at least fifteen thousand dollars.

[If the People prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the (president/ [or] chief operating officer) of a corporation, you may but are not required to conclude that the defendant is the person responsible for (filing a return with / [or] supplying information to) the Franchise Tax Board as required for that corporation.]

[The People do not have to prove the exact amount of (unreported income/ [or] [additional] tax owed).]

[The People do not have to prove that the (unreported/ [or]

**underreported) income came from illegal activity.]**

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2006*

**BENCH NOTES*****Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

The bracketed paragraph that begins with “If the People prove beyond a reasonable doubt that” explains a rebuttable presumption created by statute. (See Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19701(d); Evid. Code, §§ 600–607.) The California Supreme Court has held that a jury instruction phrased as a rebuttable presumption in a criminal case creates an unconstitutional mandatory presumption. (*People v. Roder* (1983) 33 Cal.3d 491, 497–505 [189 Cal.Rptr. 501, 658 P.2d 1302].) In accordance with *Roder*, the instruction has been written as a permissive inference. In addition, it is only appropriate to instruct the jury on a permissive inference if there is *no* evidence to contradict the inference. (Evid. Code, § 640.) If any evidence has been introduced to support the opposite factual finding, then the jury “shall determine the existence or nonexistence of the presumed fact from the evidence and without regard to the presumption.” (*Ibid.*)

Therefore, the court **must not** give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “If the People prove beyond a reasonable doubt that” if there is evidence that someone else was responsible for filing the return or supplying the information.

**AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19701(a).
- President Responsible for Corporate Filings. Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19701(d).
- Mandatory Presumption Unconstitutional Unless Instructed as Permissive Inference. *People v. Roder* (1983) 33 Cal.3d 491, 497–505 [189 Cal.Rptr. 501, 658 P.2d 1302].
- Need Not Prove Exact Amount. *United States v. Wilson* (3d Cir. 1979) 601 F.2d 95, 99; *United States v. Johnson* (1943) 319 U.S. 503, 517–518 [63 S.Ct. 1233, 87 L.Ed. 1546].
- Need Not Prove From Illegal Activity. *People v. Smith* (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 1103, 1158 [203 Cal.Rptr. 196].

**COMMENTARY**

Revenue and Taxation Code section 19701(a) does not require that the defendant’s conduct be “willful” and specifically states that the act may be “[w]ith or without intent to evade.” (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19701(a).) In the context of failure to file a tax return, courts have held that this language creates a strict liability offense with no intent requirement. (*People v. Allen* (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 846, 849 [25 Cal.Rptr.2d 26]; *People v. Kuhn* (1963) 216 Cal.App.2d 695, 698 [31 Cal.Rptr. 253];

*People v. Jones* (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d Supp. 41, 47 [197 Cal.Rptr. 273].) In addition, in *People v. Hagen* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 652, 670 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 24, 967 P.2d 563], the Court held that section 19701 was a lesser included offense of section 19705, willful failure to file a tax return. (*Id.* at p. 670.) The Court then concluded that the failure to instruct on the lesser included offense was not error since “the evidence provided no basis for reasonable doubt as to willfulness.” (*Id.* at p. 672.) Thus, it appears that “willfulness” is not an element of a violation of section 19701(a).

Revenue and Taxation Code section 19701(a) states that a person is liable if the person

repeatedly over a period of two years or more, fails to file any return or to supply any information required, or who . . . makes, renders, signs, or verifies any false or fraudulent return or statement, or supplies any false or fraudulent information, resulting in an estimated delinquent tax liability of at least fifteen thousand dollars (\$15,000).

It is not completely clear from this language whether the requirement of an estimated delinquent tax liability of at least fifteen thousand dollars applies both to the failure to file a return and to the making, etc. of a false or fraudulent return. The Legislative Counsel’s Digest of Assembly Bill No. 139, the bill that added this provision to the statute, indicates that this provision is intended to apply to all the violations specified in Revenue and Taxation Code section 19701(a), including the failure to file a return or supply required information. (See Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Assem. Bill No. 139 (2005–2006 Reg. Sess.) Stats. 2005, ch. 74, par. (34).) The committee has adopted this interpretation pending clarification from either the Legislature or case law.

## SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Governmental Authority, § 136.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 140, *Challenges to Crimes*, §§ 140.02, 140.03 (Matthew Bender).

**2811. Willfully Filing False Tax Return: Statement Made Under Penalty of Perjury (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19705(a)(1))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with intentionally making and signing (a/an) (false/ [or] inaccurate) (tax return[,]/ [or] statement[,]/ [or other] document) provided to the Franchise Tax Board [in violation of Revenue and Taxation Code section 19705(a)(1)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant made and signed a (tax return[,]/ [or] statement[,]/ [or other] document) provided to the Franchise Tax Board;
2. The (tax return[,]/ [or] statement[,]/ [or other] document) (contained/ [or] was verified by) a written declaration that it was made under penalty of perjury;
3. The (tax return[,]/ [or] statement[,]/ [or other] document) contained a material statement that was (false/ [or] inaccurate);
4. When the defendant made and signed the (tax return[,]/ [or] statement[,]/ [or other] document), (he/she) did not believe that the document was true and correct about every material matter;

**AND**

5. When the defendant acted, (he/she) did so voluntarily, with the intent to violate a legal duty known to (him/her).

A (false/ [or] inaccurate) statement is *material* if a reasonable person would believe that it could influence the calculation or monitoring of the amount of tax owed. [Although the People must prove that the statement was material, the People do not have to prove that any additional tax was owed to the government.]

[If the People prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's name is signed to a (return[,]/ [or] statement[,]/ [or other] document) filed with the Franchise Tax Board, you may but are not required to conclude that the defendant was the person who actually signed the document. [A document can be filed using (a/an) (computer modem[,]/ [or] magnetic media[,]/ [or] optical disk[,]/ [or] facsimile machine[,]/ [or] telephone).]]

[The People do not have to prove the exact amount of (unreported income/ [or] [additional] tax owed).]

[The People do not have to prove that the (unreported/ [or] underreported) income came from illegal activity.]

New January 2006

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

Two statutes prohibit willfully making a false return. (Rev. & Tax. Code, §§ 19705(a)(1), 19706.) Section 19705(a)(1) requires verification under penalty of perjury whereas section 19706 requires an intent to evade. (*People v. Hagen* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 652, 659 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 24, 967 P.2d 563].) Give this instruction if the defendant is charged with a violation of section 19705(a)(1). If the defendant is charged with a violation of section 19706, give CALCRIM No. 2812, *Willfully Filing False Tax Return: Intent to Evade Tax*.

The statute states that the defendant's acts must be "willful." (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19705(a)(1).) As used in the tax code, "willful" means that the defendant must act "in voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty." (*People v. Hagen* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 652, 666 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 24, 967 P.2d 563].) The committee has chosen to use this description of the meaning of the term in place of the word "willful" to avoid confusion with other instructions that provide a different definition of "willful."

In the definition of "material," give the bracketed sentence beginning with "Although the People must prove that the statement was material" if requested. (*United States v. Ballard* (8th Cir. 1976) 535 F.2d 400, 404; Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, Criminal (5th ed.) §§ 67.15, 67.19.)

The bracketed paragraph that begins with "If the People prove beyond a reasonable doubt that" explains a rebuttable presumption created by statute. (See Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19075(c); Evid. Code, §§ 600–607.) The California Supreme Court has held that a jury instruction phrased as a rebuttable presumption in a criminal case creates an unconstitutional mandatory presumption. (*People v. Roder* (1983) 33 Cal.3d 491, 497–505 [189 Cal.Rptr. 501, 658 P.2d 1302].) In accordance with *Roder*, the instruction has been written as a permissive inference. In addition, it is only appropriate to instruct the jury on a permissive inference if there is *no* evidence to contradict the inference. (Evid. Code, § 640.) If any evidence has been introduced to support the opposite factual finding, then the jury "shall determine the existence or nonexistence of the presumed fact from the evidence and without regard to the presumption." (*Ibid.*)

Therefore, the court **must not** give the bracketed paragraph that begins with "If the People prove beyond a reasonable doubt that" if there is evidence that the defendant did not sign the document.

### *Defenses—Instructional Duty*

If there is sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt that the defendant had a good faith belief that his or her conduct was legal, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give the instruction on this defense. (*People v. Hagen* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 652, 660



[80 Cal.Rptr.2d 24, 967 P.2d 563].) Give CALCRIM No. 2860, *Defense: Good Faith Belief Conduct Legal*.

If there is sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt that the defendant relied on the advice of a professional, the court has a  **sua sponte**  duty to give the instruction on this defense. (*United States v. Mitchell* (4th Cir. 1974) 495 F.2d 285, 287–288; see Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, Criminal (5th ed.) § 67.25.) Give CALCRIM No. 2861, *Defense: Reliance on Professional Advice*.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19705(a)(1); see Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, Criminal (5th ed.) § 67.15.
- Willful Requires Volitional Violation of Known Legal Duty. *People v. Hagen* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 652, 666 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 24, 967 P.2d 563]; see also Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, Criminal (5th ed.) § 67.20.
- False or Inaccurate Statement Required. *People v. Hagen* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 652, 670 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 24, 967 P.2d 563].
- Material Defined. *People v. Hagen* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 652, 667–668 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 24, 967 P.2d 563].
- Mandatory Presumption Unconstitutional Unless Instructed as Permissive Inference. *People v. Roder* (1983) 33 Cal.3d 491, 497–505 [189 Cal.Rptr. 501, 658 P.2d 1302].
- Need Not Prove Exact Amount. *United States v. Wilson* (3d Cir. 1979) 601 F.2d 95, 99; *United States v. Johnson* (1943) 319 U.S. 503, 517–518 [63 S.Ct. 1233, 87 L.Ed. 1546].
- Need Not Prove From Illegal Activity. *People v. Smith* (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 1103, 1158 [203 Cal.Rptr. 196].
- Electronic Technology Defined. Rev. & Tax. Code, § 18621.5.

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Filing False Tax Return. Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19701; *People v. Hagen* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 652, 670 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 24, 967 P.2d 563].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Governmental Authority, § 137.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 140, *Challenges to Crimes*, § 140.02 (Matthew Bender).



**2812. Willfully Filing False Tax Return: Intent to Evade Tax (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19706)**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with (supplying (false/ [or] fraudulent) information/ [or] (making[,]/ [or] verifying [,]/ [or] signing[,]/ [or] rendering) [a] (false/ [or] fraudulent) (tax return[s]/ [or] statement[s])) to the Franchise Tax Board with intent to evade a tax [in violation of Revenue and Taxation Code section 19706].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant (supplied information/ [or] (made[,]/ [or] verified[,]/ [or] signed[,]/ [or] rendered) [a] (tax return[s]/ [or] statement[s] provided) to the Franchise Tax Board;
2. The (information[,]/ [or] tax return[,]/ [or] statement) was (false/ [or] fraudulent);

*<Alternative 3A—information>*

- [3. When the defendant supplied the information, (he/she) knew that it was (false/ [or] fraudulent);]

*<Alternative 3B—tax return or statement>*

- [3. When the defendant (made[,]/ [or] verified[,]/ [or] signed[,]/ [or] rendered) the (tax return/ [or] statement), (he/she) knew that it contained (false/ [or] fraudulent) information;]
4. When the defendant acted, (he/she) did so voluntarily, with intent to violate a legal duty known to (him/her);

**AND**

5. When the defendant acted, (he/she) intended to unlawfully evade paying a tax.

[The People do not have to prove the exact amount of (unreported income/ [or] [additional] tax owed). The People must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant (failed to report income/ [or] owed [additional] taxes).]

[The People do not have to prove that the (unreported/ [or] underreported) income came from illegal activity.]

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*New January 2006; Revised June 2007*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

Two statutes prohibit willfully making a false return. (Rev. & Tax. Code, §§ 19705(a)(1), 19706.) Section 19705(a)(1) requires verification under penalty of perjury whereas section 19706 requires an intent to evade. (*People v. Hagen* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 652, 659 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 24, 967 P.2d 563].) Give this instruction if the defendant is charged with a violation of section 19706. If the defendant is charged with a violation of section 19705(a)(1), give CALCRIM No. 2811, *Willfully Filing False Tax Return: Statement Made Under Penalty of Perjury*.

The statute states that the defendant's acts must be "willful." (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19706.) As used in the tax code, "willful" means that the defendant must act "in voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty." (*People v. Hagen* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 652, 666 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 24, 967 P.2d 563].) The committee has chosen to use this description of the meaning of the term in place of the word "willful" to avoid confusion with other instructions that provide a different definition of "willful."

Give the bracketed paragraph that begins with "The People do not have to prove the exact amount" on request. (*United States v. Wilson* (3d Cir. 1979) 601 F.2d 95, 99; Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, Criminal (5th ed.) § 67.08.)

### *Defenses—Instructional Duty*

If there is sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt that the defendant had a good faith belief that his or her conduct was legal, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give the instruction on this defense. (*People v. Hagen* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 652, 660 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 24, 967 P.2d 563].) Give CALCRIM No. 2860, *Defense: Good Faith Belief Conduct Legal*.

If there is sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt that the defendant relied on the advice of a professional, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give the instruction on this defense. (*United States v. Mitchell* (4th Cir. 1974) 495 F.2d 285, 287–288; see Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, Criminal (5th ed.) § 67.25.) Give CALCRIM No. 2861, *Defense: Reliance on Professional Advice*.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19706.
- Evade a Tax Defined. See *United States v. Bishop* (1973) 412 U.S. 346, 360, fn. 8 [93 S.Ct. 2008, 36 L.Ed.2d 941]; *Distinctive Theatres of Columbus v. Looker* (S.D. Ohio 1958) 165 F.Supp. 410, 411.
- Willful Requires Volitional Violation of Known Legal Duty. *People v. Hagen* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 652, 666 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 24, 967 P.2d 563]; see also Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, Criminal (5th ed.) § 67.20.
- Need Not Prove Exact Amount. *United States v. Wilson* (3d Cir. 1979) 601

F.2d 95, 99; *United States v. Johnson* (1943) 319 U.S. 503, 517–518 [63 S.Ct. 1233, 87 L.Ed. 1546].

- Need Not Prove From Illegal Activity. *People v. Smith* (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 1103, 1158 [203 Cal.Rptr. 196].
- Amount of Unpaid Taxes Need Not Be Substantial. *People v. Mojica* (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1204 [43 Cal.Rptr.3d 634]; *United States v. Holland* (1989) 880 F.2d 1091, 1095–1096.

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

- Filing False Tax Return. Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19701; *People v. Hagen* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 652, 670 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 24, 967 P.2d 563].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Governmental Authority, § 137.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 140, *Challenges to Crimes*, § 140.02 (Matthew Bender).

**2813–2824. Reserved for Future Use**



## C. OTHER TAX OFFENSES

### 2825. Aiding in Preparation of False Tax Return (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19705(a)(2))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with (aiding in[,]/ [or] assisting in[,]/ [or] procuring[,]/ [or] counseling[,]/ [or] advising) the (preparation/ [or] presentation) of a (false/ [or] fraudulent) (tax return[,]/ [or] affidavit[,]/ [or] claim[,]/ [or other] document) [in violation of Revenue and Taxation Code section 19705(a)(2)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant (aided in[,]/ assisted in[,]/ [or] procured[,]/ [or] counseled[,]/ [or] advised) the (preparation/ [or] presentation) of a (tax return[,]/ [or] affidavit[,]/ [or] claim[,]/ [or other] document) required under the (personal income/corporation) tax laws;
2. The (tax return[,]/ [or] affidavit[,]/ [or] claim[,]/ [or other] document) contained a material statement that was (false/ [or] fraudulent);

<See Bench Notes on element 3.>

3. The defendant knew that the (tax return[,]/ [or] affidavit[,]/ [or] claim[,]/ [or other] document) contained a (false/ [or] fraudulent) statement;]

AND

- (3/4). When the defendant acted, (he/she) did so voluntarily, with intent that a known legal duty would be violated.

A (false/ [or] fraudulent) statement is *material* if a reasonable person would believe that it could influence the calculation or monitoring of the amount of tax owed. [Although the People must prove that the statement was material, the People do not have to prove that any additional tax was owed to the government.]

The People do not need to prove that the taxpayer, as opposed to the defendant, knew the (tax return[,]/ [or] affidavit[,]/ [or] claim[,]/ [or other] document) contained a (false/ [or] fraudulent) statement.

Someone *aids* in the (preparation/ [or] presentation) of a (false/ [or] fraudulent) (tax return[,]/ [or] affidavit[,]/ [or] claim[,]/ [or other] document) if, before or during the (preparation/ [or] presentation) of the document, he or she does something that encourages another person to (prepare/ [or] present) the (false/ [or] fraudulent) document. [The

**defendant does not need to personally prepare the document or even be present when the document is completed.]**

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*New January 2006*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

The statute states that the defendant's acts must be "willful." (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19705(a)(2).) As used in the tax code, "willful" means that the defendant must act "in voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty." (*People v. Hagen* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 652, 666 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 24, 967 P.2d 563].) The committee has chosen to use this description of the meaning of the term in place of the word "willful" to avoid confusion with other instructions that provide a different definition of "willful."

Element 3 contains a knowledge requirement. The statute does not specifically require that the defendant knew that the return contained false information. (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19705(a)(2).) However, federal pattern jury instructions for the analogous federal crime (26 U.S.C., § 7206(2)) require that the defendant must have known that the document was false even though the federal statute also does not explicitly contain a knowledge requirement. (Pattern Jury Instructions of the District Judges Association of the Eleventh Circuit, Offense Instruction No. 95 (2003); Pattern Jury Instructions of the District Judges Association of the Fifth Circuit, Criminal Cases, Instruction No. 2.97 (2001); but see Pattern Jury Instructions of the Committee on Model Jury Instructions for the Ninth Circuit, Criminal Cases, Instruction No. 9.38 (2003) [knowledge not specifically required, defendant must assist in preparing "false" return].) Element 3 is included for the court to give at its discretion. The committee recommends that the court review current federal case law, as advised in *People v. Hagen* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 652 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 24, 967 P.2d 563].

In the definition of "material," give the bracketed sentence beginning with "Although the People must prove that the statement was material" if requested. (*Edwards v. United States* (9th Cir. 1967) 375 F.2d 862, 865, overruled on other grounds in *United States v. Bishop* (1973) 412 U.S. 346, 351, fn. 3 [93 S.Ct. 2008, 36 L.Ed.2d 941]; see also *United States v. Ballard* (8th Cir. 1976) 535 F.2d 400, 404; Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, Criminal (5th ed.) §§ 67.15, 67.19.)

### *Defenses—Instructional Duty*

If there is sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt that the defendant had a good faith belief that his or her conduct was legal, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give the instruction on this defense. (*People v. Hagen* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 652, 660

[80 Cal.Rptr.2d 24, 967 P.2d 563].) Give CALCRIM No. 2860, *Defense: Good Faith Belief Conduct Legal*.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19705(a)(2).
- Willful Requires Volitional Violation of Known Legal Duty. *People v. Hagen* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 652, 666 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 24, 967 P.2d 563].
- Material Defined. *People v. Hagen* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 652, 667–668 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 24, 967 P.2d 563].
- Aiding and Abetting. *United States v. Graham* (3d Cir. 1985) 758 F.2d 879, 885; *United States v. Buttorff* (8th Cir. 1978) 572 F.2d 619, 623.

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Defendant Need Not Personally Prepare Document*

Federal courts have held that the analogous federal statute applies to individuals who counsel and advise the preparation of fraudulent documents. (*United States v. Clark* (5th Cir. 1998) 139 F.3d 485, 489–490; *United States v. Bryan* (5th Cir. 1990) 896 F.2d 68, 74.) The defendant need not personally prepare the document or even be present when the document is completed. (*United States v. Clark, supra*, 139 F.3d at pp. 489–490; *United States v. Bryan, supra*, 896 F.2d at p. 74; see also *United States v. Buttorff* (8th Cir. 1978) 572 F.2d 619, 623 [sufficient evidence of aiding where defendants lectured about antitax views to large groups].)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Governmental Authority, § 137.

## 2826. Willful Failure to Pay Tax (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19701(c))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with intentionally failing to pay a required (tax/estimated tax) to the Franchise Tax Board [in violation of Revenue and Taxation Code section 19701(c)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant was required to pay a (tax/estimated tax) to the Franchise Tax Board;
2. The defendant failed to pay the (tax/estimated tax) by the date it was due;

AND

3. The defendant voluntarily chose not to pay, with intent to violate a legal duty known to (him/her).

[The People do not have to prove the exact amount of (unreported income/ [or] [additional] tax owed). The People must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant (failed to report a substantial amount of income/ [or] owed a substantial amount in [additional] taxes).]

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*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

The statute states that the defendant's acts must be "willful." (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19701(c).) As used in the tax code, "willful" means that the defendant must act "in voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty." (*People v. Hagen* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 652, 666 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 24, 967 P.2d 563].) The committee has chosen to use this description of the meaning of the term in place of the word "willful" to avoid confusion with other instructions that provide a different definition of "willful."

Give the bracketed paragraph that begins with "The People do not have to prove the exact amount" on request. (*United States v. Wilson* (3d Cir. 1979) 601 F.2d 95, 99; Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, Criminal (5th ed.) § 67.08.) Federal cases have held that when intent to evade is an element of the offense, the prosecution must show that the amount owed in taxes or the amount of unreported income was substantial. (*United States v. Wilson, supra*, 601 F.2d at p. 99; see also Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, Criminal (5th ed.) § 67.08.) "The word 'substantial' . . . is necessarily a relative term and not susceptible of an exact meaning." (*Canaday v.*



*United States* (8th Cir. 1966) 354 F.2d 849, 852–853.) “[It] is not measured in terms of gross or net income nor by any particular percentage of the tax shown to be due and payable. All the attendant circumstances must be taken into consideration.” (*United States v. Nunan* (2d Cir. 1956) 236 F.2d 576, 585, cert. den. (1957) 353 U.S. 912.) “Whether the tax evaded was ‘substantial’ is, therefore, a jury question . . .” (Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, Criminal (5th ed.) § 67.08 [see also § 67.03, noting that “substantial” is generally not defined for the jury].)

### ***Defenses—Instructional Duty***

If there is sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt that the defendant had a good faith belief that his or her conduct was legal, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give the instruction on this defense. (*People v. Hagen* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 652, 660 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 24, 967 P.2d 563].) Give CALCRIM No. 2860, *Defense: Good Faith Belief Conduct Legal*.

If there is sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt that the defendant relied on the advice of a professional, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give the instruction on this defense. (*United States v. Mitchell* (4th Cir. 1974) 495 F.2d 285, 287–288; see Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, Criminal (5th ed.) § 67.25.) Give CALCRIM No. 2861, *Defense: Reliance on Professional Advice*.

## **AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19701(c).
- Willful Requires Volitional Violation of Known Legal Duty. *People v. Hagen* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 652, 666 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 24, 967 P.2d 563]; see also Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, Criminal (5th ed.) § 67.20.

## **COMMENTARY**

Revenue and Taxation Code section 19701(c) provides that a person who willfully fails to pay any estimated tax or tax that the person is required to pay is guilty of a misdemeanor and shall upon conviction be fined not to exceed five thousand dollars or be imprisoned not to exceed one year, or both, at the discretion of the court, together with costs of investigation and prosecution. However, subdivision (c) also provides that the preceding sentence “shall not apply to any person who is mentally incompetent, or suffers from dementia, Alzheimer’s disease, or similar condition.” Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19701(c).

## **SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Governmental Authority, § 136.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 140, *Challenges to Crimes*, §§ 140.02[5], 140.03 (Matthew Bender).

**2827. Concealing Property With Intent to Evade Tax (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19705(a)(4))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with (removing[,]/ [or] depositing[,]/ [or] concealing) property with intent to evade a tax [in violation of Revenue and Taxation Code section 19705(a)(4)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant (removed[,]/ [or] deposited[,]/ [or] concealed) (property[,]/ [or] goods[,]/ [or] commodities);

<Alternative 2A—concealment of goods or commodities to avoid tax>

- [2. A tax was (imposed on/ [or] legally authorized for) the (goods/ [or] commodities);]

<Alternative 2B—concealment of property to avoid levy>

- [2. A levy was legally authorized against the property;]

AND

3. When the defendant acted, (he/she) intended to unlawfully (evade/ [or] defeat) the (assessment/ [or] collection) of [a] (tax[,]/ additions to a tax[,]/ penalty[,]/ [or] interest) imposed under the tax laws.

[To *levy property* means to seize, attach, or garnish the property as payment for a debt owed. A levy is *legally authorized* against property if:

1. The Franchise Tax Board has assessed a tax against the defendant and sent the defendant a notice demanding payment;
2. The defendant has neglected or refused to pay;

AND

3. The defendant owns the property that is the subject of the levy.]

[As used here, a person *removes* an item when he or she takes it from the place [where it was made and] where a tax was supposed to be assessed and paid on the item.]

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*New January 2006*

**BENCH NOTES**

***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

Revenue and Taxation Code section 19705(a)(4) applies to two situations: (1) when a person conceals or removes goods or commodities that are subject to taxation in order to prevent paying the tax owed on those goods; and (2) when a person who has failed to pay a tax owed conceals property that the government has the right to levy as payment for the tax.

In element 2, give alternative 2A if the defendant is charged with concealing goods or commodities to avoid a tax assessment. Give alternative 2B and the bracketed definition of “levy” if the defendant is charged with concealing property to avoid a levy. (*United States v. Swarthout* (6th Cir. 1970) 420 F.2d 831, 833–835.)

Depending on the legal basis of the levy, the court may need to add additional items to the explanation of “legally authorized.” (See Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19705(a)(4) and statutes cited therein on when a levy is legally authorized.)

Give the bracketed definition of “remove” if the defendant is charged with removing goods or commodities subject to taxation. (*Price v. United States* (5th Cir. 1945) 150 F.2d 283, 285.) Give the bracketed phrase “where it was made” if the defendant is charged with removing an item from the site of manufacture. (*Ibid.*)

Revenue and Taxation Code section 19705(a)(4) also penalizes anyone “concerned in removing, depositing, or concealing” property. If the defendant is charged with “being concerned in” the conduct, the court should instruct on aiding and abetting. (See CALCRIM No. 400, *Aiding and Abetting: General Principles*, et seq.)

### ***Defenses—Instructional Duty***

If there is sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt that the defendant had a good faith belief that his or her conduct was legal, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give the instruction on this defense. (*People v. Hagen* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 652, 660 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 24, 967 P.2d 563].) Give CALCRIM No. 2860, *Defense: Good Faith Belief Conduct Legal*.

If there is sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt that the defendant relied on the advice of a professional, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give the instruction on this defense. (*United States v. Mitchell* (4th Cir. 1974) 495 F.2d 285, 287–288; see Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, Criminal (5th ed.) § 67.25.) Give CALCRIM No. 2861, *Defense: Reliance on Professional Advice*.

## **AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19705(a)(4).
- Concealment to Avoid Levy: Tax Must Have Been Assessed. *United States v. Swarthout* (6th Cir. 1970) 420 F.2d 831, 833–835; *United States v. Minarik* (6th Cir. 1989) 875 F.2d 1186, 1195.
- Removal Defined. *Price v. United States* (5th Cir. 1945) 150 F.2d 283, 285.

**RELATED ISSUES*****Physical Concealment Not Required***

A defendant may “conceal” property for the purposes of this statute by making a false record that he or she does not own the property. (*United States v. Bregman* (3d Cir. 1962) 306 F.2d 653, 654–655.)

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Governmental Authority, § 137.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 140, *Challenges to Crimes*, § 140.02 (Matthew Bender).

## 2828. Failure to Withhold Tax (Rev. & Tax. Code, §§ 19708, 19709)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with intentionally failing to (withhold/collect, or truthfully account for,) and pay (a/an) (tax/ [or] amount required to be withheld) to the Franchise Tax Board [in violation of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert appropriate code section[s]>].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. Under state tax laws, the defendant was required to (withhold/collect, or truthfully account for,) and pay (a/an) (tax/ [or] amount required to be withheld) to the Franchise Tax Board;
2. The defendant did not do so;

AND

3. The defendant voluntarily chose not to do so, with intent to violate a legal duty known to (him/her).

[The People do not have to prove the exact amount owed. The People must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the amount the defendant failed to (withhold/collect, or truthfully account for,) and pay to the Franchise Tax Board was substantial.]

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*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If the defendant is charged with a violation of Revenue and Taxation Code section 19709, give the option “withhold” in the introduction, element 1, and the last bracketed paragraph. If the defendant is charged with a violation of Revenue and Taxation Code section 19708, give the option “collect or truthfully account for.” See Commentary below on the use of the term “willful.”

Give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “The People do not have to prove the exact amount” on request. (*United States v. Wilson* (3d Cir. 1979) 601 F.2d 95, 99; Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, Criminal (5th ed.) § 67.08.) Federal cases have held that when intent to evade is an element of the offense, the prosecution must show that the amount owed in taxes or the amount of unreported income was substantial. (*United States v. Wilson, supra*, 601 F.2d at p. 99; see also Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, Criminal (5th ed.) § 67.08.) “The word ‘substantial’ . . . is necessarily a relative term and not susceptible of an exact meaning.” (*Canaday v. United States* (8th Cir. 1966) 354 F.2d 849, 852–853.) “[It] is not measured in terms

of gross or net income nor by any particular percentage of the tax shown to be due and payable. All the attendant circumstances must be taken into consideration.” (*United States v. Nunan* (2d Cir. 1956) 236 F.2d 576, 585, cert. den. (1957) 353 U.S. 912.) “Whether the tax evaded was ‘substantial’ is, therefore, a jury question . . . .” (Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, Criminal (5th ed.) § 67.08 [see also § 67.03, noting that “substantial” is generally not defined for the jury].)

### ***Defenses—Instructional Duty***

If there is sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt that the defendant had a good faith belief that his or her conduct was legal, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give the instruction on this defense. (*People v. Hagen* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 652, 660 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 24, 967 P.2d 563].) Give CALCRIM No. 2860, *Defense: Good Faith Belief Conduct Legal*.

If there is sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt that the defendant relied on the advice of a professional, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give the instruction on this defense. (*United States v. Mitchell* (4th Cir. 1974) 495 F.2d 285, 287–288; see Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, Criminal (5th ed.) § 67.25.) Give CALCRIM No. 2861, *Defense: Reliance on Professional Advice*.

## **AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Rev. & Tax. Code, §§ 19708, 19709.
- Violation of Section 19709 Must Be Willful. *People v. Singer* (1980) 115 Cal.App.3d Supp. 7, 10 [171 Cal.Rptr. 587].
- Willful Requires Volitional Violation of Known Legal Duty. *People v. Hagen* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 652, 666 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 24, 967 P.2d 563]; see also Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, Criminal (5th ed.) § 67.20.
- Need Not Prove Exact Amount. *United States v. Wilson* (3d Cir. 1979) 601 F.2d 95, 99; *United States v. Johnson* (1943) 319 U.S. 503, 517–518 [63 S.Ct. 1233, 87 L.Ed. 1546].

## **COMMENTARY**

Element 3 contains the definition of “willful” violation of a tax law derived from *People v. Hagen* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 652, 659–660 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 24, 967 P.2d 563], and *United States v. Bishop* (1973) 412 U.S. 346, 360–361 [93 S.Ct. 2008, 36 L.Ed.2d 941]. Revenue and Taxation Code section 19708 specifically requires that the defendant’s act be willful, but section 19709 does not explicitly include the element of willfulness. In *People v. Singer* (1980) 115 Cal.App.3d Supp. 7, 10 [171 Cal.Rptr. 587], the court construed section 19709 as also requiring a willful violation. Although it is unclear, it appears that based on this ruling, the *Hagen-Bishop* definition of willful also applies to a violation of section 19709.

## **SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Governmental Authority, § 138.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 140, *Challenges to Crimes*, § 140.03 (Matthew Bender).

**2829–2839. Reserved for Future Use**





## D. EVIDENCE

### 2840. Evidence of Uncharged Tax Offense: Failed to File Previous Returns

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The People presented evidence that the defendant did not file [a] tax return[s] for [a] year[s] not charged in this case.

You may consider this evidence only if the People have proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant did not file [a] tax return[s] for (that/those) year[s]. Proof by a preponderance of the evidence is a different standard of proof from proof beyond a reasonable doubt. A fact is proved by a preponderance of the evidence if you conclude that it is more likely than not that the fact is true.

If the People have not met this burden, you must disregard this evidence entirely.

If you conclude that the defendant did not file [a] tax return[s] for (that/those) year[s], you may, but are not required to, consider that evidence for the limited purpose of deciding whether:

*<A. Intent>*

[The defendant acted with the intent to \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert specific intent required to prove the offense alleged>* in this case](./;)

[OR]

*<B. Accident or Mistake>*

[The defendant's alleged actions were not the result of mistake or accident.]

Do not consider this evidence for any other purpose [except for the limited purpose of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert other permitted purpose, e.g., determining the defendant's credibility>*].

If you conclude that the defendant did not file [a] tax return[s] for (that/those) year[s], that conclusion is only one factor to consider along with all the other evidence. It is not sufficient by itself to prove that the defendant is guilty of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert charged offense>*. The People must still prove (the/each) (charge/ [and] allegation) beyond a reasonable doubt.

[Do not conclude from this evidence that the defendant has a bad character or is disposed to commit crime.]

*New January 2006; Revised April 2008*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court must give this instruction on request when evidence of other offenses has been introduced under Evidence Code section 1101(b). (Evid. Code, § 1101(b); *People v. Carpenter* (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 382 [63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708]; *People v. Collie* (1981) 30 Cal.3d 43, 63–64 [177 Cal.Rptr. 458, 634 P.2d 534].)

Evidence of the failure of the defendant to file tax returns in previous years may be admitted as evidence of prior illegal acts tending to show intent or lack of accident or mistake. (*United States v. Fingado* (10th Cir. 1991) 934 F.2d 1163, 1165–1166.)

The court **must** identify for the jury what issue the evidence has been admitted for: to prove mental state, to prove lack of accident or mistake, or to prove both.

The paragraph that begins with “If you conclude that the defendant did not file” has been included to prevent jury confusion over the standard of proof. (See *People v. Reliford* (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1007, 1012–1013 [130 Cal.Rptr.2d 254, 62 P.3d 601] [instruction on Evidence Code section 1108 evidence sufficient where it advised jury that prior offense alone not sufficient to convict; prosecution still required to prove all elements beyond a reasonable doubt].)

### *Related Instructions*

CALCRIM No. 375, *Evidence of Uncharged Offenses to Prove Identity, Intent, or Common Plan, etc.*

## AUTHORITY

- Evidence of Prior Uncharged Acts. Evid. Code, § 1101(b).
- Standard of Proof Preponderance of Evidence. *People v. Carpenter* (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 382 [63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708].
- Previous Failure to File Tax Returns. *United States v. Fingado* (1991) 934 F.2d 1163, 1165–1166.

## RELATED ISSUES

See Bench Notes and Related Issues section in CALCRIM No. 375, *Evidence of Uncharged Offenses of Prove Identity, Intent, or Common Plan, etc.*

## SECONDARY SOURCES

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 83, *Evidence*, § 83.12 (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 140, *Challenges to Crimes*, §§ 140.02[5], 140.03 (Matthew Bender).

**2841. No Deductions on Gross Income From Illegal Conduct (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 17282(a))**

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**When computing taxable income, no deductions are allowed on gross income derived directly from illegal activities, including \_\_\_\_\_**  
*<insert activity from Rev. & Tax. Code, § 17282(a)>.*

**In addition, no deductions are allowed on gross income that is derived from any other activities directly connected or associated with illegal activities, or that directly tend to promote or to further illegal activities.**

**[Prohibited deductions include deductions for cost of goods sold.]**

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*New January 2006*

**BENCH NOTES**

***Instructional Duty***

Give this instruction if requested and relevant based on the evidence.

Where indicated, insert the specific offense from Revenue and Taxation Code section 17282(a) that was allegedly the source of the income.

**AUTHORITY**

- Statute. Rev. & Tax. Code, § 17282(a).

## 2842. Determining Income: Net Worth Method

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In this case, the People are using what is called the *net worth method* to try to prove that the defendant had unreported taxable income. I will now explain the net worth method.

On any given date, a person's *net worth* is the value of everything that person owns minus the value of all that person's debts and financial obligations. It is the difference between what a person owns and what that person owes. The value of any item that a person owns is measured by what it was worth when it was acquired, not its current market value.

If the People prove that the defendant's net worth increased during \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert year alleged>*, then you may but are not required to conclude that the defendant received money or property during that year.

In order to prove that the money or property received was taxable income, the People must also prove that: (1) the defendant had one or more sources of taxable income, and (2) the money or property the defendant received during the year did not come from nontaxable sources. Nontaxable sources of income include gifts, inheritances, loans, or redeposits or transfers of funds between bank accounts.

If the People have proved that: (a) the defendant's net worth increased during \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert year alleged>*, (b) the defendant had one or more sources of taxable income, and (c) the money or property the defendant received during that year did not come from nontaxable sources, then you may but are not required to conclude that the money or property received was taxable income to the defendant. If you have a reasonable doubt about whether the People have proved (a), (b), or (c), you must find that the People have not proved under the net worth method that the defendant had unreported taxable income.

In order to prove that the defendant had *unreported* taxable income [using the net worth method], the People must also prove that the defendant's net worth increased by an amount that was substantially greater than the income that the defendant reported on (his/her) tax return for \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert year alleged>*.

[There is another factor you may consider in deciding whether the People have proved that the defendant had unreported taxable income under the net worth method. If the People have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) during the year, the defendant spent money in ways that did not change (his/her) net worth at the end of the year and (2) those expenditures would not be valid tax deductions, then you may

but are not required to conclude that the defendant received money or property during the year. If the People also prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the money or property received did not come from nontaxable sources, then you may but are not required to conclude that the money or property was also taxable income. If you have a reasonable doubt about whether the People have proved any of these factors, you may not take the expenditures into account in applying the net worth method.]

In order to rely on the net worth method of proving income, the People must prove the defendant's net worth at the starting point with reasonable certainty. Here the starting point is January 1, \_\_\_\_\_ <insert year alleged>. The People are not required to prove the exact value of each and every asset the defendant owned at the starting point. However, the People must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that all the assets the defendant owned at the starting point were not enough to account for any proven increase in (his/her) net worth during the year.

In deciding whether the defendant's net worth at the starting point has been proved with reasonable certainty and whether the People have proved that any money or property the defendant received during the year did not come from nontaxable sources, consider whether law enforcement agents sufficiently investigated all reasonable "leads" concerning the existence and value of other assets and sources of nontaxable income. Law enforcement agents must investigate all reasonable leads that arise during the investigation or that the defendant suggests regarding assets and income. This duty to reasonably investigate applies only to leads that arise during the investigation or to explanations the defendant gives during the investigation. Law enforcement agents are not required to investigate every conceivable asset or source of nontaxable funds.

If you have a reasonable doubt about any of the following:

- A. Whether the investigation reasonably pursued or refuted the defendant's explanations or other leads regarding defendant's assets or income during the year,
- B. Whether the People have proved the defendant's net worth at the beginning of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert year alleged> to a reasonable degree of certainty,

OR

- C. Whether the People have proved that any increase in the defendant's net worth[, together with any nondeductible expenditures the defendant made during the year,] was substantially more than the income that the defendant reported on (his/her) tax return for \_\_\_\_\_ <insert year alleged>,

then you must find that the People have not proved under the net worth method that the defendant had unreported taxable income.

[If, on the other hand, you conclude that the defendant did have unreported taxable income, you must still decide whether the People have proved all elements of the crime[s] charged [in Count[s] \_\_\_\_].]

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*New January 2006*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

If the prosecution is relying on the net worth method, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction. (*Holland v. United States* (1954) 348 U.S. 121, 129 [75 S.Ct. 127, 99 L.Ed. 150]; *United States v. Hall* (9th Cir. 1981) 650 F.2d 994, 998.)

The court **must also give** the appropriate instruction on the elements of the offense charged.

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “If, on the other hand, you conclude” in every case, unless the court is giving CALCRIM No. 2846, *Proof of Unreported Taxable Income: Must Still Prove Elements of Offense*.

## AUTHORITY

- Net Worth Method Explained. *Holland v. United States* (1954) 348 U.S. 121, 129 [75 S.Ct. 127, 99 L.Ed. 150]; see also Pattern Jury Instructions of the District Judges Association of the Eleventh Circuit, Offense Instruction No. 93.2 (2003); Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, Criminal (5th ed.) § 67.05.
- Sua Sponte Duty to Instruct on Method. *Holland v. United States* (1954) 348 U.S. 121, 129 [75 S.Ct. 127, 99 L.Ed. 150]; *United States v. Hall* (9th Cir. 1981) 650 F.2d 994, 998.
- Requirements for Proof. *Holland v. United States* (1954) 348 U.S. 121, 129–138 [75 S.Ct. 127, 99 L.Ed. 150]; see also *United States v. Sabino* (6th Cir. 2001) 274 F.3d 1053, 1071.

## 2843. Determining Income: Bank Deposits Method

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In this case, the People are [also] using what is called the *bank deposits method* to try to prove that the defendant had unreported taxable income. I will now explain the bank deposits method.

If the People prove that: (a) the defendant engaged in an activity that produced taxable income, (b) the defendant periodically deposited money in bank accounts in (his/her) name or under (his/her) control, and (c) the money deposited did not come from nontaxable sources, then you may but are not required to conclude that these bank deposits are taxable income. Nontaxable sources of the bank deposits include gifts, inheritances, loans, or redeposits or transfers of funds between accounts. If you have a reasonable doubt about whether the People have proved (a), (b), or (c), you must find that the People have not proved under the bank deposits method that the defendant had unreported taxable income.

In order to prove that the defendant had *unreported* taxable income [using the bank deposits method], the People must also prove that the defendant's total taxable bank deposits were substantially greater than the income that the defendant reported on (his/her) tax return for \_\_\_\_\_ <insert year alleged>.

[There is another factor you may consider in deciding whether the People have proved that the defendant had unreported taxable income under the bank deposits method. If the People have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) during the year, the defendant spent money from funds not deposited in any bank and (2) those expenditures would not be valid tax deductions, then you may but are not required to conclude that the defendant received money or property during the year. If the People also prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the money or property received did not come from nontaxable sources, then you may but are not required to conclude that the money or property was also taxable income. If you have a reasonable doubt about whether the People have proved any of these factors, you may not take the expenditures into account in applying the bank deposits method.]

In order to rely on the bank deposits method of proving taxable income, the People must prove the defendant's cash on hand at the starting point with reasonable certainty. Here the starting point is January 1, \_\_\_\_\_ <insert year alleged>. *Cash on hand* is cash that the defendant had in (his/her) possession at the starting point. The People do not need to show the exact amount of the cash on hand at the starting point, but the People's claimed cash on hand figure must be reasonably certain.

In deciding whether the claimed cash on hand figure has been proved with reasonable certainty and whether the People have proved that any money or property the defendant received during the year did not come from nontaxable sources, consider whether law enforcement agents sufficiently investigated all reasonable “leads” concerning the existence and value of other assets and sources of nontaxable income. Law enforcement agents must investigate all reasonable leads that arise during the investigation or that the defendant suggests regarding assets and income. This duty to reasonably investigate applies only to leads that arise during the investigation or to explanations the defendant gives during the investigation. Law enforcement agents are not required to investigate every conceivable asset or source of nontaxable funds.

If you have a reasonable doubt about any of the following:

- A. Whether the investigation reasonably pursued or refuted the defendant’s explanations or other leads regarding defendant’s assets or income during the year,
- B. Whether the People have proved the defendant’s cash on hand at the beginning of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert year alleged> to a reasonable degree of certainty,

OR

- C. Whether the People have proved that the defendant’s total bank deposits, together with any nondeductible expenditures the defendant made during the year, were substantially more than the income that the defendant reported on (his/her) tax return for \_\_\_\_\_ <insert year alleged>,

then you must find that the People have not proved under the bank deposits method that the defendant had unreported taxable income.

[If, on the other hand, you conclude that the defendant did have unreported taxable income, you must still decide whether the People have proved all elements of the crime[s] charged [in Count[s] \_\_\_\_\_].]

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2012*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

If the prosecution is relying on the bank deposits method, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction. (See *Holland v. United States* (1954) 348 U.S. 121, 129 [75 S.Ct. 127, 99 L.Ed. 150]; *United States v. Hall* (9th Cir. 1981) 650 F.2d 994, 999.)

The court **must also give** the appropriate instruction on the elements of the offense charged.



Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “If, on the other hand, you conclude” in every case, unless the court is giving CALCRIM No. 2846, *Proof of Unreported Taxable Income: Must Still Prove Elements of Offense*.

### AUTHORITY

- Bank Deposits Method Explained. *United States v. Hall* (9th Cir. 1981) 650 F.2d 994, 997, fn. 4; see also Pattern Jury Instructions of the District Judges Association of the Eleventh Circuit, Offense Instruction No. 93.3 (2003); Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, Criminal (5th ed.) § 67.07.
- Sua Sponte Duty to Instruct on Method. *United States v. Hall* (9th Cir. 1981) 650 F.2d 994, 999.
- Requirements for Proof. *United States v. Conaway* (5th Cir. 1993) 11 F.3d 40, 43–44; *United States v. Abodeely* (8th Cir. 1986) 801 F.2d 1020, 1024; *United States v. Boulet* (5th Cir. 1978) 577 F.2d 1165, 1167.

## 2844. Determining Income: Cash Expenditures Method

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In this case, the People are [also] using the *cash expenditures method* to try to prove that the defendant had unreported taxable income. I will now explain the cash expenditures method.

The cash expenditures method involves an examination of money the defendant spent during the taxable year along with (his/her) net worth at the beginning and at the end of that year.

On any given date, a person's *net worth* is the value of everything that person owns minus the value of all that person's debts and financial obligations. It is the difference between what a person owns and what that person owes. The value of any item that a person owns is measured by what it was worth when acquired, not its current market value.

If the People have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) during the year, the defendant spent money in ways that did not change (his/her) net worth at the end of the year and (2) those expenditures would not be valid tax deductions, then you may but are not required to conclude that the defendant received money or property during the year.

The People must also prove that the money or property was taxable income. In order to do so, the People must prove that: (a) the defendant had one or more sources of taxable income, and (b) the money or property the defendant received during the year did not come from nontaxable sources. Nontaxable sources of income include gifts, inheritances, loans, or redeposits or transfers of funds between bank accounts. If you have a reasonable doubt about whether the People have proved any of these factors, you must find that the People have not proved under the cash expenditures method that the defendant had unreported taxable income.

In order to prove that the defendant had *unreported* taxable income [using the cash expenditures method], the People must prove that the defendant's cash expenditures establish taxable income that was substantially greater than the income that (he/she) reported on (his/her) tax return for \_\_\_\_\_ <insert year alleged>.

[There is another factor you may consider in deciding whether the People have proved that the defendant had unreported taxable income under the cash expenditures method. If the People prove that the defendant's net worth increased during \_\_\_\_\_ <insert year alleged>, then you may but are not required to conclude that the defendant received money or property during that year. In order to prove that the money or property received was taxable income, the People must also prove that: (1) the defendant had one or more sources

of taxable income and (2) the money or property the defendant received during the year did not come from nontaxable sources. If the People have proved that: (a) the defendant's net worth increased during \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert year alleged>*, (b) the defendant had one or more sources of taxable income, and (c) the money or property the defendant received during the year did not come from nontaxable sources, then you may but are not required to conclude that the money or property received was taxable income to the defendant. If you have a reasonable doubt about whether the People have proved (a), (b), or (c), you may not take any increase in the defendant's net worth into account in applying the cash expenditures method.]

In order to rely on an increase in the defendant's net worth to prove unreported taxable income under the cash expenditures method, the People must prove the defendant's net worth at the starting point with reasonable certainty. Here the starting point is January 1, \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert year alleged>*. The People are not required to prove the exact value of each and every asset defendant owned at the starting point. However, the People must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that all the assets defendant owned at the starting point were not enough to account for any proven increase in the defendant's net worth during the year.

In deciding whether the defendant's net worth at the starting point has been proved with reasonable certainty and whether the People have proved that any money or property the defendant received during the year did not come from nontaxable sources, consider whether law enforcement agents sufficiently investigated all reasonable "leads" concerning the existence and value of other assets and sources of nontaxable income. Law enforcement agents must investigate all reasonable leads that arise during the investigation or that defendant suggests regarding assets and income. This duty to reasonably investigate applies only to leads that arise during the investigation or to explanations the defendant gives during the investigation. Law enforcement agents are not required to investigate every conceivable asset or source of nontaxable funds.

If you have a reasonable doubt about any of the following:

- A. Whether the investigation reasonably pursued or refuted the defendant's explanations or other leads regarding defendant's assets or income during the year,
- B. Whether the People have proved the defendant's net worth at the beginning of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert year alleged>* to a reasonable degree of certainty,

OR

- C. Whether the People have proved that any nondeductible

expenditures the defendant made during the year, together with any increase in the defendant's net worth, were substantially more than the income that the defendant reported on (his/her) tax return for \_\_\_\_\_ <insert year alleged>,

then you must find that the People have not proved under the cash expenditures method that the defendant had unreported taxable income.

[If, on the other hand, you conclude that the defendant did have unreported taxable income, you must still decide whether the People have proved all elements of the crime[s] charged [in Count[s] \_\_\_\_].]

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New January 2006

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

If the prosecution is relying on the cash expenditures method, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction. (See *Holland v. United States* (1954) 348 U.S. 121, 129 [75 S.Ct. 127, 99 L.Ed. 150]; *United States v. Hall* (9th Cir. 1981) 650 F.2d 994, 998.)

The court **must also give** the appropriate instruction on the elements of the offense charged.

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with "If, on the other hand, you conclude" in every case, unless the court is giving CALCRIM No. 2846, *Proof of Unreported Taxable Income: Must Still Prove Elements of Offense*.

## AUTHORITY

- Cash Expenditures Method Explained. *United States v. Caswell* (8th Cir. 1987) 825 F.2d 1228, 1231–1232; see also Pattern Jury Instructions of the District Judges Association of the Eleventh Circuit, Offense Instruction No. 93.4 (2003); Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, Criminal (5th ed.) § 67.07.
- Sua Sponte Duty to Instruct on Method. See *Holland v. United States* (1954) 348 U.S. 121, 129 [75 S.Ct. 127, 99 L.Ed. 150]; *United States v. Hall* (1981) 650 F.2d 994, 998.
- Requirements for Proof. *United States v. Caswell* (8th Cir. 1987) 825 F.2d 1228, 1231–1232; *United States v. Citron* (2d Cir. 1986) 783 F.2d 307, 315–316; *Taglianetti v. United States* (1st Cir. 1968) 398 F.2d 558, 562–563, 565.

## 2845. Determining Income: Specific Items Method

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In this case, the People are [also] using the *specific items method* to try to prove that the defendant had unreported taxable income. I will now explain the specific items method.

In order to prove that the defendant received unreported taxable income under the specific items method, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant received income during \_\_\_\_\_ <insert year alleged>;
2. The income the defendant received was taxable;

AND

3. The income the defendant received was substantially greater than the income (he/she) reported on (his/her) tax return for \_\_\_\_\_ <insert year alleged>.

If you have a reasonable doubt about whether the People have proved 1, 2, or 3, you must find that the People have not proved under the specific items method that the defendant had unreported taxable income.

[If, on the other hand, you conclude that the defendant did have unreported taxable income, you must still decide whether the People have proved all elements of the crimes[s] charged [in Count[s] \_\_\_\_].]

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*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

It is unclear if the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the specific items method of proof. If the prosecution is relying on this method and another method of proof, the court should instruct on both methods. (See *United States v. Meriwether* (5th Cir. 1971) 440 F.2d 753, 756–757 [reversed because instructions on specific items and net worth method not sufficiently clear].)

The court **must also give** the appropriate instruction on the elements of the offense charged.

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “If, on the other hand, you conclude” in every case, unless the court is giving CALCRIM No. 2846, *Proof of Unreported Taxable Income: Must Still Prove Elements of Offense*.

### AUTHORITY

- Specific Items Method Explained. *United States v. Hart* (6th Cir. 1995) 70 F.3d 854, 860; *United States v. Black* (D.C. Cir. 1988) 843 F.2d 1456, 1459; *United*

*States v. Marabelles* (9th Cir. 1984) 724 F.2d 1374, 1379, fn. 3.

## 2846. Proof of Unreported Taxable Income: Must Still Prove Elements of Offense

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If you conclude based on the (net worth[,]/ [or] bank deposits[,]/ [or] cash expenditures[,]/ [or] specific items) method that the defendant did have unreported taxable income, you must still decide whether the People have proved all elements of the crime[s] charged [in Count[s] \_\_\_\_\_].

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*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

If the court is instructing on multiple methods of proving unreported taxable income, the court may give this instruction once, after explaining some or all of the methods, rather than repeating the last paragraph of each instruction on each method.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 83, *Evidence*, § 83.03[1] (Matthew Bender).

**2847–2859. Reserved for Future Use**





## E. DEFENSES

### 2860. Defense: Good Faith Belief Conduct Legal

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The defendant did not voluntarily and intentionally violate a legal duty known to (him/her) if (he/she) had a good faith but mistaken understanding of what (his/her) duty was under the law. This is so even if the mistaken understanding was due to (his/her) own negligence. If the defendant actually believed that (he/she) was meeting the requirements of the tax laws, (his/her) belief did not have to be reasonable.

[A person’s (opinion that the tax laws violate his or her constitutional rights/ [or] disagreement with the government’s tax collection system) does not constitute a good faith misunderstanding of the law.]

The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in good faith. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of the crime[s] charged [in Count[s] \_\_\_\_\_] [or the lesser offense[s] of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of lesser offense[s]>].

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*New January 2006*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The defendant may assert as a defense a good faith belief that his or her conduct was legal. (*People v. Hagen* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 652, 660 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 24, 967 P.2d 563]; *Cheek v. United States* (1991) 498 U.S. 192, 201 [111 S.Ct. 604, 112 L.Ed.2d 617].) This includes asserting that the defendant was ignorant of the law or mistaken in his or her interpretation of it. (*People v. Hagen, supra*, 19 Cal.4th at p. 660; *Cheek v. United States, supra*, 498 U.S. at p. 201.) Further, the defendant’s belief need not be objectively reasonable. (*People v. Hagen, supra*, 19 Cal.4th at p. 660; *Cheek v. United States, supra*, 498 U.S. at p. 201.) If there is sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt about a good faith belief, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction.

The good faith belief defense does not apply to a “tax protestor,” who asserts that the tax law is illegal or unconstitutional. (*Cheek v. United States* (1991) 498 U.S. 192, 206 [111 S.Ct. 604, 112 L.Ed.2d 617]; *United States v. Bressler* (7th Cir. 1985) 772 F.2d 287, 291.) On the other hand, “[w]e must remind ourselves here that the good-faith defense need not be rational, if there is sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that even irrational beliefs were truly held.” (*United States v. Mann* (10th Cir. 1989) 884 F.2d 532, 536–537 [reversing for failure to properly instruct on good faith defense where defendant asserted that the tax laws

were invalid, that he believed he did not fall under them, and that the system was maintained by “Satan’s little helpers”]; see also *Cheek v. United States*, *supra*, 498 U.S. at p. 203 [preventing jury from considering good faith defense based on “irrational belief” would raise constitutional problems].) Thus, while the court may exclude evidence that the defendant disagreed with the tax laws (*Cheek v. United States*, *supra*, 498 U.S. at p. 206), the court should use caution. If the court concludes that there is sufficient basis to instruct on the good faith defense but evidence that the defendant actions were based on a disagreement with the tax system has also been admitted, the court may give the bracketed sentence that begins with “A person’s opinion . . . .”

### AUTHORITY

- Good Faith Belief Defense. *People v. Hagen* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 652, 660 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 24, 967 P.2d 563]; *Cheek v. United States* (1991) 498 U.S. 192, 201 [111 S.Ct. 604, 112 L.Ed.2d 617]; see Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, Criminal (5th ed.) § 67.25.
- Disagreement With Law Is Not Good Faith Misunderstanding. *Cheek v. United States* (1991) 498 U.S. 192, 206 [111 S.Ct. 604, 112 L.Ed.2d 617]; *United States v. Bressler* (7th Cir. 1985) 772 F.2d 287, 291.
- Belief Need Not Be Rational. *Cheek v. United States* (1991) 498 U.S. 192, 203 [111 S.Ct. 604, 112 L.Ed.2d 617]; *United States v. Mann* (10th Cir. 1989) 884 F.2d 532, 536–537.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Governmental Authority, § 137.

## 2861. Defense: Reliance on Professional Advice

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The defendant did not voluntarily and intentionally violate a legal duty known to (him/her) if, (in preparing (his/her) (tax return[,]/ [or] statement[,]/ [or other] document[s] filed with the Franchise Tax Board)/ [or] failing to file a tax return), (he/she) relied in good faith on the advice of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of person allegedly relied on>*, who represented (himself/herself) to be (a/an) (accountant/attorney/ \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert other professional>*) qualified to provide such advice.

The defendant did not rely on the advice in good faith if:

1. The defendant did not give \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of person allegedly relied on>* all the information about the defendant's income and expenses for the year(;/.)

**AND**

*<Alternative 2A—defendant charged with filing false or inaccurate document>*

[2A. When the defendant submitted the (tax return[,]/ [or] statement[,]/ [or other] document) to the Franchise Tax Board, (he/she) knew or had reason to believe that the information contained in the document was incorrect or false.]

**[OR]**

*<Alternative 2B—defendant charged with failing to file>*

[(2B). When the defendant chose not to file a tax return based on \_\_\_\_\_'s *<insert name of person allegedly relied on>* advice, (he/she) knew or had reason to believe that the advice was incorrect or false.]

The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not rely in good faith on the advice of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of person allegedly relied on>*. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of the crime[s] charged [in Count[s] \_\_\_\_\_] [or the lesser offense[s] of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert description of lesser offense[s]>*].

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*New January 2006*

### **BENCH NOTES**

#### ***Instructional Duty***

The defendant may assert as a defense good faith reliance on the advice of a professional. (*United States v. Segal* (8th Cir. 1988) 867 F.2d 1173, 1179; *United*

*States v. Mitchell* (4th Cir. 1974) 495 F.2d 285, 287–288; see Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, Criminal (5th ed.) § 67.25.) “[T]he defendant must show he actually relied on expert advice and that his reliance was in good faith.” (*United States v. Segal, supra*, 867 F.2d at p. 1179.) Further, this defense is not available if the defendant failed to provide the professional with all of the relevant information or knew that the document was false or inaccurate when submitted. (*United States v. Claiborne* (9th Cir. 1985) 765 F.2d 784, 798; see also *United States v. Segal, supra*, 867 F.2d at p. 1179 [defendant, charged with failing to file tax return, knew advice was inaccurate].) If there is sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt that the defendant relied on professional advice, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction.

Give alternative A if the defendant is charged with filing a false tax return or document. Give alternative B if the defendant is charged with failing to file a tax return. The court may give both alternatives if appropriate based on the evidence.

### AUTHORITY

- Reliance on Advice Defense. *United States v. Mitchell* (4th Cir. 1974) 495 F.2d 285, 287–288; *United States v. Platt* (2d Cir. 1970) 435 F.2d 789, 792–793; *Bursten v. United States* (5th Cir. 1968) 395 F.2d 976, 981; *United States v. Duncan* (6th Cir. 1988) 850 F.2d 1104, 1117, disapproved on other grounds by *Schad v. Arizona* (1991) 501 U.S. 624, 634–635 [111 S.Ct. 2491, 115 L.Ed.2d 555]; *United States v. Phillips* (7th Cir. 1954) 217 F.2d 435, 440; *United States v. Claiborne* (9th Cir. 1985) 765 F.2d 784, 798; see also Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, Criminal (5th ed.) § 67.25.
- Reliance Must Be Actual and in Good Faith. *United States v. Segal* (8th Cir. 1988) 867 F.2d 1173, 1179; *United States v. Duncan* (6th Cir. 1988) 850 F.2d 1104, 1116.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Governmental Authority, § 137.

**2862–2899. Reserved for Future Use**

# **VANDALISM, LOITERING, TRESPASS, AND OTHER MISCELLANEOUS OFFENSES**

## **A. VANDALISM**

- 2900. Vandalism (Pen. Code, § 594)
- 2901. Vandalism: Amount of Damage (Pen. Code, § 594(b)(1))
- 2902. Damaging Phone or Electrical Line (Pen. Code, § 591)
- 2903–2914. Reserved for Future Use

## **B. LOITERING**

- 2915. Loitering (Pen. Code, § 647(h))
- 2916. Loitering: Peeking (Pen. Code, § 647(i))
- 2917. Loitering: About School (Pen. Code, § 653b)
- 2918–2928. Reserved for Future Use

## **C. TRESPASS**

- 2929. Trespass After Making Credible Threat (Pen. Code, § 601(a))
- 2930. Trespass: To Interfere With Business (Pen. Code, § 602(k))
- 2931. Trespass: Unlawfully Occupying Property (Pen. Code, § 602(m))
- 2932. Trespass: Entry Into Dwelling (Pen. Code, § 602.5(a) & (b))
- 2933. Trespass: Person Present (Pen. Code, § 602.5(b))
- 2934–2949. Reserved for Future Use

## **D. ANIMALS**

- 2950. Failing to Maintain Control of a Dangerous Animal (Pen. Code, § 399)
- 2951. Negligent Control of Attack Dog (Pen. Code, § 399.5)
- 2952. Defenses: Negligent Control of Attack Dog (Pen. Code, § 399.5(c))
- 2953. Cruelty to Animals (Pen. Code, § 597(a))
- 2954–2959. Reserved for Future Use

## **E. ALCOHOL RELATED OFFENSES (NON-DRIVING)**

- 2960. Possession of Alcoholic Beverage by Person Under 21 (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 25662(a))
- 2961. Purchase of Alcoholic Beverage by Person Under 21 (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 25658(b))
- 2962. Selling or Furnishing Alcoholic Beverage to Person Under 21 (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 25658(a))
- 2963. Permitting Person Under 21 to Consume Alcoholic Beverage (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 25658(d))
- 2964. Purchasing Alcoholic Beverage for Person Under 21: Resulting in Death or Great Bodily Injury (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 25658(a) & (c))

## VANDALISM, LOITERING, AND TRESPASS

2965. Parent Permitting Child to Consume Alcoholic Beverage: Causing Traffic Collision (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 25658.2)

2966. Disorderly Conduct: Under the Influence in Public (Pen. Code, § 647(f))

2967–2979. Reserved for Future Use

### **F. OFFENSES INVOLVING CARE OF MINOR**

2980. Contributing to Delinquency of Minor (Pen. Code, § 272)

2981. Failure to Provide (Pen. Code, § 270)

2982. Persuading, Luring, or Transporting a Minor Under 14 Years of Age (Pen. Code, § 272(b)(1))

2983–2989. Reserved for Future Use

### **G. BETTING**

2990. Bookmaking (Pen. Code, § 337a(a)(1))

2991. Pool Selling (Pen. Code, § 337a(a)(1))

2992. Keeping a Place for Recording Bets (Pen. Code, § 337a(a)(2))

2993. Receiving or Holding Bets (Pen. Code, § 337a(a)(3))

2994. Recording Bets (Pen. Code, § 337a(a)(4))

2995. Permitting Place to Be Used for Betting Activities (Pen. Code, § 337a(a)(5))

2996. Betting or Wagering (Pen. Code, § 337a(a)(6))

### **H. MONEY LAUNDERING**

2997. Money Laundering (Pen. Code, § 186.10)

2998–3000. Reserved for Future Use

### **I. FAILURE TO APPEAR**

3001. Failure to Appear While on Bail (Pen. Code, § 1320.5)

3002. Failure to Appear While on Own Recognizance Release (Pen. Code, § 1320)

3003–3099. Reserved for Future Use

## A. VANDALISM

### 2900. Vandalism (Pen. Code, § 594)

---

The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with vandalism [in violation of Penal Code section 594].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant maliciously (defaced with graffiti or with other inscribed material[,]/ [or] damaged[,]/ [or] destroyed) (real/ [or] personal) property;

[AND]

2. The defendant (did not own the property/owned the property with someone else)(;/.)

<See Bench Notes regarding when to give element 3.>

[AND]

3. The amount of damage caused by the vandalism was \$400 or more.]

Someone acts *maliciously* when he or she intentionally does a wrongful act or when he or she acts with the unlawful intent to annoy or injure someone else.

*Grffiti or other inscribed material* includes an unauthorized inscription, word, figure, mark, or design that is written, marked, etched, scratched, drawn, or painted on real or personal property.

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*New January 2006; Revised June 2007, February 2013, August 2013, September 2019*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If the defendant is charged with a felony for causing \$400 or more in damage and the court is *not* instructing on the misdemeanor offense, give element 3. If the court *is* instructing on both the felony and the misdemeanor offenses, give CALCRIM No. 2901, *Vandalism: Amount of Damage*, with this instruction. (Pen. Code, § 594(b)(1).) The court should also give CALCRIM No. 2901 if the defendant is charged with causing more than \$10,000 in damage under Penal Code section 594(b)(1).

In element 2, give the alternative language “owned the property with someone else” if there is evidence that the property was owned by the defendant jointly with someone else. (*People v. Wallace* (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 144, 150–151 [19 Cal.Rptr.3d 790]; *People v. Kahanic* (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 461, 466 [241 Cal.Rptr. 722] [Pen. Code, § 594 includes damage by spouse to spousal community property].)

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 594.
- Malicious Defined. Pen. Code, § 7, subd. 4; *People v. Lopez* (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 545, 550 [222 Cal.Rptr. 101].
- Damage to Jointly Owned Property. *People v. Wallace* (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 144, 150–151 [19 Cal.Rptr.3d 790]; *People v. Kahanic* (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 461, 466 [241 Cal.Rptr. 722].
- Wrongful Act Need Not Be Directed at Victim. *People v. Kurtenbach* (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1282 [139 Cal.Rptr.3d 637].
- This Instruction Upheld. *People v. Carrasco* (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 715, 722–723 [147 Cal.Rptr.3d 383].
- General Intent Crime. *People v. Moore* (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 889, 895–896 [228 Cal.Rptr.3d 261].

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

This offense is a misdemeanor unless the amount of damage is \$400 or more. (Pen. Code, § 594(b)(1) & (2)(A).) If the defendant is charged with a felony, then the misdemeanor offense is a lesser included offense. When instructing on both the felony and misdemeanor, the court must provide the jury with a verdict form on which the jury will indicate if the amount of damage has or has not been proved to be \$400 or more. If the jury finds that the damage has not been proved to be \$400 or more, then the offense should be set at a misdemeanor.

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Lack of Permission Not an Element*

The property owner’s lack of permission is not an element of vandalism. (*In re Rudy L.* (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1007, 1014 [34 Cal.Rptr.2d 864].)

#### *Damage Need Not Be Permanent*

To “deface” under Penal Code section 594 does not require that the defacement be permanent. (*In re Nicholas Y.* (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 941, 944 [102 Cal.Rptr.2d 511] [writing on a glass window with a marker pen was defacement under the statute].)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property, §§ 277–285.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 143, *Crimes*



*Against Property*, § 143.11[2], Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.03[2] (Matthew Bender).

## 2901. Vandalism: Amount of Damage (Pen. Code, § 594(b)(1))

---

If you find the defendant guilty of vandalism [in Count[s] \_\_\_\_\_], you must then decide whether the People have proved that the amount of damage caused by the vandalism [(in each count/in Count[s] \_\_\_\_\_)] was \$400 or more. [If you decide that the amount of damage was \$400 or more, you must then decide whether the People have proved that the damage [(in each count/in Count[s] \_\_\_\_\_)] was also \$10,000 or more.]

The People have the burden of proving this allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you must find that this allegation has not been proved.

---

*New January 2006; Revised February 2014, August 2016*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on these sentencing factors.

This instruction **must** be given with CALCRIM No. 2900, *Vandalism*.

The court must provide the jury with a verdict form on which the jury will indicate if the prosecution has or has not been proved that the damage was \$400 or more and, if appropriate, \$10,000 or more.

### AUTHORITY

- Enhancement. Pen. Code, § 594(b)(1).
- This Instruction Upheld. *People v. Carrasco* (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 715, 722–723 [147 Cal.Rptr.3d 383].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Aggregation of Damages*

Damage resulting from multiple acts of vandalism may be aggregated to constitute a felony if the acts were part of a single general impulse, intention, or plan. (*People v. Carrasco*, *supra*, 209 Cal.App.4th at pp. 719–721.)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property, §§ 277–285.

## 2902. Damaging Phone or Electrical Line (Pen. Code, § 591)

---

The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with (taking down[,]/ [or] removing [,]/ [or] damaging[,]/ [or] disconnecting/ [or] cutting/[or] obstructing/severing/making an unauthorized connection to) a (telegraph/ telephone/cable television/electrical) line [in violation of Penal Code section 591].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

<Alternative 1A—removed, damaged, or obstructed>

1. The defendant unlawfully (took down[,]/ [or] removed[,]/ [or] damaged[,]/ [or] obstructed/ [or] disconnected/ [or] cut) [part of] a (telegraph/telephone/cable television/electrical) line [or mechanical equipment connected to the line];

<Alternative 1B—severed>

1. The defendant unlawfully severed a wire of a (telegraph/telephone/ cable television/electrical) line;

<Alternative 1C—unauthorized connection>

1. The defendant unlawfully made an unauthorized connection with [part of] a line used to conduct electricity [or mechanical equipment connected to the line];

AND

2. The defendant did so maliciously.

Someone acts *maliciously* when he or she intentionally does a wrongful act or when he or she acts with the unlawful intent to annoy or injure someone else.

[As used here, *mechanical equipment* includes a telephone.]

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2015, September 2019*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

The statute uses the term “injure.” (Pen. Code, § 591.) The committee has replaced the word “injure” with the word “damage” because the word “injure” generally refers to harm to a person rather than to property.

The statute uses the phrase “appurtenances or apparatus.” (Pen. Code, § 591.) The

committee has chosen to use the more understandable “mechanical equipment” in place of this phrase.

Give the bracketed sentence that states “*mechanical equipment* includes a telephone” on request. (*People v. Tafoya* (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 220, 227 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 681]; *People v. Kreiling* (1968) 259 Cal.App.2d 699, 704 [66 Cal.Rptr. 582].)

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 591.
- Maliciously Defined. Pen. Code, § 7, subd. 4; *People v. Lopez* (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 545, 550 [222 Cal.Rptr. 101].
- Applies to Damage to Telephone. *People v. Tafoya* (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 220, 227; *People v. Kreiling* (1968) 259 Cal.App.2d 699, 704 [66 Cal.Rptr. 582].
- “Obstruct” Not Unconstitutionally Vague. *Kreiling v. Field* (9th Cir. 1970) 431 F.2d 502, 504.
- Applies to Theft of Service. *People v. Trieber* (1946) 28 Cal.2d 657, 661 [171 P.2d 1].
- General Intent Crime. *People v. Quarles* (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 631, 636 [236 Cal.Rptr.3d 49].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property §§ 304, 305.

**2903–2914. Reserved for Future Use**

## B. LOITERING

### 2915. Loitering (Pen. Code, § 647(h))

---

The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with loitering [in violation of Penal Code section 647(h)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant delayed, lingered, prowled, or wandered on the private property of someone else;
2. When the defendant was on that property, (he/she) did not have a lawful purpose for being there;
3. When the defendant was on the property, (he/she) intended to commit a crime if the opportunity arose;

AND

4. The defendant's purpose for being on the property was to commit a crime if the opportunity arose.
- 

*New January 2006*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 647(h).
- Specific Intent to Commit Crime Required. *In re Cregler* (1961) 56 Cal.2d 308, 311–312 [14 Cal.Rptr. 289, 363 P.2d 305]; see *In re Joshua M.* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 743, 746–747 [110 Cal.Rptr.2d 662].

## SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, § 71.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.20 (Matthew Bender).

## 2916. Loitering: Peeking (Pen. Code, § 647(i))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with peeking in the door or window of an inhabited (building/ [or] structure) [in violation of Penal Code section 647(i)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant delayed, lingered, prowled, or wandered on the private property of someone else;
2. When the defendant was on that property, (he/she) did not have a lawful purpose for being there;

AND

3. When the defendant was on the property, (he/she) peeked in the door or window of an inhabited building or structure.

[A (building/ [or] structure) is *inhabited* if someone uses it as a dwelling, whether or not someone is inside at the time of the alleged peeking.]

[A (building/ [or] structure) is *not inhabited* if the former residents have moved out and do not intend to return, even if some personal property remains inside.]

---

*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 647(i).
- Specific Intent to Commit Crime Not Required. *In re Joshua M.* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 743, 746–747 [110 Cal.Rptr.2d 662].
- Inhabitation Defined. See Pen. Code, § 459.
- House Not Inhabited If Former Residents Not Returning. *People v. Cardona* (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 481, 483 [191 Cal.Rptr. 109].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, § 71.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 144, *Crimes*

*Against Order*, § 144.20 (Matthew Bender).

## 2917. Loitering: About School (Pen. Code, § 653b)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with loitering at or near (a school children attend/ [or] a public place where children normally congregate) [in violation of Penal Code section 653b].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

*<If the court concludes that both loitering as defined in 1A and the conduct defined in 1B are required pursuant to the statute, give both 1A and 1B if the defendant is charged with the conduct described in 1B. Otherwise, give either 1A or 1B, as appropriate.>*

- 1A. The defendant delayed, lingered, or idled at or near (a school children attend/ [or] a public place where children normally congregate);
- 1B. The defendant entered, reentered, or remained at (a school children attend/ [or] a public place where children normally congregate) within 72 hours after having been asked to leave by (the chief administrative official of that school/ \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of other official named in Penal Code section 653(b)>*);
2. The defendant did not have a lawful purpose for being at or near the (school/ [or] public place);

AND

3. The defendant intended to commit a crime if the opportunity arose.

---

*New January 2006; Revised August 2009*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

In a nonbinding opinion, *McSherry v. Block* (9th Cir. 1989) 880 F.2d 1049, 1058, the Ninth Circuit discussed the problem caused by amending the predecessor of Penal Code section 653b by adding the language described by paragraph 1B, namely, that it made it possible to “read the request to leave language as modifying the loitering provision which has been in the statute all along.” The Ninth Circuit determined that no request to leave was necessary for a loitering conviction. The court relied on the depublished opinion of the Appellate Department in the case below, which had determined that the “request to leave” language applies only to



the vagrancy and not to the loitering provision of the statute. *McSherry v. Block* (9th Cir. 1989) 880 F.2d 1049, 1053.

In the absence of binding authority on how to resolve an apparent ambiguity in the statute, the court must exercise its own discretion to determine whether loitering is required if the defendant is charged with the conduct described in paragraph 1B, or whether paragraphs 1A and 1B define separate ways in which this offense may be committed.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 653b.
- Specific Intent to Commit Crime Required. *In re Christopher S.* (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 903, 911 [146 Cal.Rptr. 247]; *People v. Hirst* (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 75, 82–83 [106 Cal.Rptr. 815]; *People v. Frazier* (1970) 11 Cal.App.3d 174, 183 [90 Cal.Rptr. 58]; *Mandel v. Municipal Court* (1969) 276 Cal.App.2d 649, 663 [81 Cal.Rptr. 173].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Activity Protected by First Amendment*

In *Mandel v. Municipal Court* (1969) 276 Cal.App.2d 649, 670–674 [81 Cal.Rptr. 173], the court held that the defendant could not be convicted of loitering near a school for an unlawful purpose when the defendant was giving the students leaflets protesting the war and calling for a student strike. (See also *People v. Hirst* (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 75, 85–86 [106 Cal.Rptr. 815].)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, § 72.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.02 (Matthew Bender).

**2918–2928. Reserved for Future Use**



## C. TRESPASS

### 2929. Trespass After Making Credible Threat (Pen. Code, § 601(a))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with trespass after making a credible threat [in violation of Penal Code section 601(a)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant made a credible threat to cause serious bodily injury to another person;
2. The defendant made the threat with the intent to place the other person in reasonable fear for (his/her) safety [or for the safety of (his/her) immediate family];

**AND**

*<Alternative 3A—entered home>*

- [3. Within 30 days of making the threat, the defendant unlawfully entered the threatened person's residence[, or the real property next to the residence of the threatened person,] without a lawful purpose and with the intent to carry out the threat against the target of the threat.]

*<Alternative 3B—entered workplace>*

- [3. Within 30 days of making the threat, the defendant unlawfully entered the workplace of the threatened person, knowing that the place (he/she) entered was the threatened person's workplace, and tried to locate that person without a lawful purpose and with the intent to carry out the threat.]

A *credible threat* is one that causes the target of the threat to reasonably fear for his or her safety [or for the safety of his or her immediate family] and one that the maker of the threat appears able to carry out.

A credible threat may be made orally, in writing, or electronically or may be implied by a pattern of conduct or a combination of statements and conduct.

A *serious bodily injury* means a serious impairment of physical condition. Such an injury may include[, but is not limited to]: (loss of consciousness/ concussion/ bone fracture/ protracted loss or impairment of function of any bodily member or organ/ a wound requiring extensive suturing/ [and] serious disfigurement).

To decide whether the defendant unlawfully entered the threatened

person’s (residence [or the real property next to the residence]/ workplace), please refer to the separate instructions that I (will give/have given) you on unlawful entry.

*[Immediate family means (a) a spouse, parent, or child; (b) a grandchild, grandparent, brother, or sister related by blood or marriage; and (c) a person who regularly lives in the household [or who regularly lived there within the six months before the alleged incident].]*

*[A threat may be made electronically by using a telephone, cellular telephone, pager, computer, video recorder, fax machine, or other similar electronic communication device.]*

*New January 2006*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

Give alternative 3A or 3B depending on whether the prosecution alleges that the defendant entered the threatened person’s residence or property next to that residence, or entered the threatened person’s workplace. (Pen. Code, §§ 601(a)(1) & (2).)

Give the appropriate instruction defining “unlawful entry” depending on the evidence. (See CALCRIM Nos. 2930–2933.)

If there is evidence that the threatened person feared for the safety of members of his or her immediate family, give on request the bracketed phrases in element 2 and in the definition of “credible threat,” as well as the bracketed paragraph defining “immediate family.” (Pen. Code, §§ 601(a), 646.9(l); see Fam. Code, § 6205 [“affinity” defined]; Prob. Code, §§ 6401, 6402 [degrees for purposes of intestate succession].)

If there is evidence that a threat was communicated through an “electronic communication device,” give on request the bracketed paragraph listing the different means of electronically communicating a threat. (See Pen. Code, § 646.9(h) [in context of stalking]; 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12).)

### *Related Instruction*

CALCRIM No. 1301, *Stalking*.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 601(a).
- Credible Threat Defined. See Pen. Code, § 646.9(g); *People v. Falck* (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 287, 295, 297–298 [60 Cal.Rptr.2d 624] [both in context of stalking].

- Immediate Family Defined. Pen. Code, §§ 601(a), 646.9(l).
- Serious Bodily Injury Defined. Pen. Code, §§ 243(f)(4), 417.6(b), 601(a).

### **RELATED ISSUES**

#### ***Labor Union Activities***

Penal Code section 601 does not apply to any person who is engaged in labor union activities that are permitted by the California Agricultural Labor Relations Act (see Lab. Code, § 1140 et seq.) or by the National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.). (Pen. Code, § 601(c).)

#### ***Personal Residence, Real Property, or Workplace***

Penal Code section 601 does not apply if the person making the threat enters his or her own residence, real property, or workplace. (Pen. Code, § 601(b).)

### **SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, § 292–296.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.02 (Matthew Bender).

## 2930. Trespass: To Interfere With Business (Pen. Code, § 602(k))

---

The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with trespassing [in violation of Penal Code section 602(k)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant willfully entered (land/ [or] a building) belonging to someone else;
2. When the defendant entered, (he/she) intended (to damage someone else's property [or property right]/ [or] to interfere with, obstruct, or damage a lawful business or occupation carried on by the (owner of the land[,]/ [or] owner's agent[,]/ [or] person in lawful possession of the land));

AND

3. The defendant actually did (damage someone else's property [or property right]/ [or] interfere with, obstruct, or damage a lawful business or occupation carried on by the (owner of the land[,]/ [or] owner's agent[,]/ [or] person in lawful possession of the land)).

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose.

[An *agent* is a person who is authorized to act for someone else in dealings with third parties.]

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*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

The statute uses the term “injure.” (Pen. Code, § 602(k).) The committee has replaced the word “injure” with the word “damage” because the word “injure” generally refers to harm to a person rather than to property.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 602(k).
- Willfully Defined. Pen. Code, § 7(1); *People v. Lara* (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 102, 107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
- Actual Damage Required. *In re Wallace* (1970) 3 Cal.3d 289, 295 [90

Cal.Rptr. 176, 475 P.2d 208]; *In re Ball* (1972) 23 Cal.App.3d 380, 386 [100 Cal.Rptr. 189].

- “Land” Includes Building on the Land. *People v. Brown* (1965) 236 Cal.App.2d Supp. 915, 917–919 [47 Cal.Rptr. 662].
- Agent Defined. Civ. Code, § 2295.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property, §§ 287–288.

## 2931. Trespass: Unlawfully Occupying Property (Pen. Code, § 602(m))

---

The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with trespassing [in violation of Penal Code section 602(m)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant willfully entered (land/ [or] a building) belonging to someone else without the consent of the (owner[,]/ [or] owner's agent[,]/ [or] person in lawful possession of the property);
2. After the defendant entered, (he/she) occupied the (land/ [or] building) without the consent of the (owner[,]/ [or] owner's agent[,]/ [or] person in lawful possession of the property);
3. The defendant occupied some part of the (land/ [or] building) continuously until removed.

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose.

[An *agent* is a person who is authorized to act for someone else in dealings with third parties.]

---

*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 602(m).
- Willfully Defined. Pen. Code, § 7(1); *People v. Lara* (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 102, 107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
- Entry Must Be Without Consent. *People v. Brown* (1965) 236 Cal.App.2d Supp. 915, 920–921 [47 Cal.Rptr. 662]; *People v. Poe* (1965) 236 Cal.App.2d Supp. 928, 932 [47 Cal.Rptr. 670], disapproved on other grounds in *In re Hayes* (1969) 70 Cal.2d 604, 614, fn. 2 [75 Cal.Rptr. 790, 451 P.2d 430].
- Occupy Defined. *People v. Wilkinson* (1967) 248 Cal.App.2d Supp. 906, 909–911 [56 Cal.Rptr. 261].
- “Land” Includes Building on the Land. *People v. Brown* (1965) 236 Cal.App.2d Supp. 915, 917–919 [47 Cal.Rptr. 662] [partially abrogated by statute].



- Agent Defined. Civ. Code, § 2295.

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property, §§ 287–288.

## 2932. Trespass: Entry Into Dwelling (Pen. Code, § 602.5(a) & (b))

---

The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with trespassing [in violation of Penal Code section 602.5].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant willfully entered or remained in a noncommercial (dwelling house[,]/ [or] apartment[,]/ [or other] residential place) belonging to someone else;

[AND]

2. The defendant entered or remained without the consent of the (owner[,]/ [or] owner's agent[,]/ [or] person in lawful possession of the property)(;/.)

<Give element 3 if evidence shows defendant may have been public officer.>

[AND]

3. The defendant was not a public officer or employee acting in the lawful performance of (his/her) duties as a public officer or employee.]

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose.

[An *agent* is a person who is authorized to act for someone else in dealings with third parties.]

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New January 2006

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If the defendant is charged with aggravated trespass under Penal Code section 602.5(b), the court **must** also give CALCRIM No. 2933, *Trespass: Person Present*, with this instruction.

If there is sufficient evidence that the defendant was a public officer or employee, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense. Give bracketed element 3. If lawful performance is an issue, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on when a public officer is lawfully performing his or her duties and that the prosecution has the burden of proving lawful performance beyond a reasonable

doubt. (See *People v. Gonzalez* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1217 [275 Cal.Rptr. 729, 800 P.2d 1159].) For instructions on lawful performance by a public officer, see CALCRIM Nos. 2670–2673.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 602.5(a) & (b).
- Willfully Defined. Pen. Code, § 7(1); *People v. Lara* (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 102, 107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
- Entry Need Not Be Without Consent. See *People v. Brown* (1965) 236 Cal.App.2d Supp. 915, 920–921 [47 Cal.Rptr. 662].
- Building Must Be Used for Residential Purposes. *In re D. C. L.* (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 123, 125–126 [147 Cal.Rptr. 54].
- Agent Defined. Civ. Code, § 2295.

### LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

If the defendant is charged with aggravated trespass under Penal Code section 602.5(b) based on another person being present in the building, then “nonaggravated” trespass is a lesser included offense. The court must provide the jury with a verdict form on which the jury will indicate if the aggravating factor has been proved. If the jury finds that the factor has not been proved, then the offense should be set at the lower level misdemeanor.

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Not Necessarily a Lesser Included Offense of Burglary*

Trespassing in violation of Penal Code section 602.5 is not necessarily a lesser included offense of burglary based on the elements test. (*People v. Lohbauer* (1981) 29 Cal.3d 364, 369 [173 Cal.Rptr. 453, 627 P.2d 183].) A violation of Penal Code section 602.5 may be a lesser included offense of burglary depending on how that offense is charged. (See *People v. Waidla* (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 733 [94 Cal.Rptr.2d 396, 996 P.2d 46] [assuming for argument that trespass was a lesser included offense of burglary under accusatory pleading test].)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, §§ 287–288.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.02 (Matthew Bender).

## 2933. Trespass: Person Present (Pen. Code, § 602.5(b))

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If you find the defendant guilty of trespassing, you must then decide whether the People have proved that a resident [or other person authorized to be in the dwelling] was present at some time while the defendant was trespassing.

The People have the burden of proving this allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you must find that this allegation has not been proved.

---

*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction if the defendant is charged with aggravated trespass under Penal Code section 602.5(b).

This instruction **must** be given with CALCRIM No. 2932, *Trespass: Entry Into Dwelling*.

The court must provide the jury with a verdict form on which the jury will indicate if the prosecution has or has not proved that another person was present.

### AUTHORITY

- Enhancement. Pen. Code, § 602.5(b).

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property, §§ 287–288.

**2934–2949. Reserved for Future Use**

## D. ANIMALS

### 2950. Failing to Maintain Control of a Dangerous Animal (Pen. Code, § 399)

---

The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with causing (injury/death) by failing to maintain control of a dangerous animal [in violation of Penal Code section 399].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant (owned/ [or] had custody or control of) a dangerous animal;

2. The defendant knew that the animal was dangerous;

<Alternative 3A—allowed to run free>

[3. The defendant willfully allowed the animal to run free;]

<Alternative 3B—failed to use ordinary care>

[3. The defendant failed to use ordinary care in keeping the animal;]

[AND]

4. The animal (killed/caused serious bodily injury to) \_\_\_\_\_  
<insert name of person allegedly attacked> while the defendant  
(allowed it to run free/failed to use ordinary care in keeping it)(;/  
)

<Give element 5 unless alleged victim not capable of taking precautions;  
see Bench Notes.>

[AND]

5. \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of person allegedly attacked> took all  
the precautions that a reasonable person would have taken in the  
same situation.]

[If the People have proved that \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of person  
allegedly attacked> was (under the age of five years/incapable of taking  
reasonable precautions because \_\_\_\_\_ <insert reason for  
incapacity>), then the People do not need to prove item 5 and you do not  
have to find that (he/she) took all the precautions that a reasonable  
person would have taken in the same situation.]

[Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on  
purpose. It is not required that he or she intend to break the law, hurt  
someone else, or gain any advantage.]

[Using *ordinary care* means using reasonable care to prevent reasonably foreseeable harm to someone else. A person fails to use ordinary care if he or she (does something that a reasonably careful person would not do in the same situation/ [or] fails to do something that a reasonably careful person would do in the same situation).]

[A *serious bodily injury* means a serious impairment of physical condition. Such an injury may include[, but is not limited to]: (loss of consciousness/ concussion/ bone fracture/ protracted loss or impairment of function of any bodily member or organ/ a wound requiring extensive suturing/ [and] serious disfigurement).]

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*New January 2006*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

In element 3, give either alternative 3A or 3B as appropriate based on the facts of the case. When giving alternative 3A, also give the definition of “willfully.” When giving alternative 3B, also give the definition of “ordinary care.”

The first bracketed paragraph is for use when the victim is by law incapable of being held to the ordinary standard of care under the law of negligence. (See *People v. Berry* (1992) 1 Cal.App.4th 778, 785–786 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 416] [children under five are deemed incapable of negligent acts.]) If the parties agree that the alleged victim was under five years old or incapable of taking responsible precautions, the court may omit element 5 and not give the bracketed paragraph.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 399.
- Victim Incapable of Negligence Due to Lack of Capacity. *People v. Berry* (1992) 1 Cal.App.4th 778, 785–786 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 416].
- Definition of Dangerous Animal. *Sea Horse Ranch Inc. v. Superior Court* (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 446, 460 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 681].
- Negligence—Ordinary Care. Pen. Code, § 7(2); Restatement Second of Torts, § 282.
- Serious Bodily Injury Defined. Pen. Code, § 243(f)(4); *People v. Taylor* (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 11, 25, fn. 4 [12 Cal.Rptr.3d 693].

## SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, § 456.

## 2951. Negligent Control of Attack Dog (Pen. Code, § 399.5)

---

The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with failing to use ordinary care in (owning/ [or] controlling) an attack dog [in violation of Penal Code section 399.5].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant (owned/ [or] had custody or control of) a dog trained to fight, attack, or kill;
2. The defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the dog was vicious or dangerous;
3. The defendant failed to use ordinary care in (owning/ [or] controlling) the dog;

[AND]

4. As a result of the defendant's failure to use ordinary care, the dog (bit someone on two separate occasions/caused substantial physical injury to \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] of person[s] allegedly attacked>)(;/.)

<Give element 5 unless alleged victim not capable of taking precautions; see Bench Notes.>

[AND]

5. \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] of person[s] allegedly attacked> took all the precautions that a reasonable person would have taken in the same situation.]

[If the People have proved that \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] of person[s] allegedly attacked> (was/were) (under the age of five years/ [or] incapable of taking reasonable precautions because \_\_\_\_\_ <insert reason for incapacity>), then the People do not need to prove item 5 and you do not have to find that (he/she/they) took all the precautions that a reasonable person would have taken in the same situation.]

Using *ordinary care* means using reasonable care to prevent reasonably foreseeable harm to someone else. A person fails to use ordinary care if he or she (does something that a reasonably careful person would not do in the same situation/ [or] fails to do something that a reasonably careful person would do in the same situation).

**BENCH NOTES*****Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

The first bracketed paragraph is to be used when the victim is by law incapable of being held to the ordinary standard of care under the law of negligence. (See *People v. Berry* (1992) 1 Cal.App.4th 778, 785–786 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 416] [children under five are deemed incapable of negligent acts.]) If the parties agree that the alleged victim was under five years old or incapable of taking responsible precautions, the court may omit element 5 and not give the bracketed paragraph.

Penal Code section 399.5(c) states that “nothing in this section shall authorize the bringing of an action pursuant to” three listed situations. If any of these defenses are raised, give CALCRIM No. 2952, *Defenses: Negligent Control of Attack Dog*.

**AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 399.5.
- Victim Incapable of Negligence Due to Lack of Capacity. *People v. Berry* (1992) 1 Cal.App.4th 778, 785–786 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 416].

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, § 455.



**2952. Defenses: Negligent Control of Attack Dog (Pen. Code, § 399.5(c))**

---

**You must find the defendant not guilty of failing to use ordinary care in (owning/ [or] controlling) an attack dog if:**

*<Alternative A—trespassing>*

[\_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name[s] of person[s] allegedly attacked>* (was/were) trespassing at the time (he/she/they) (was/were) bitten by the dog][; or/.]

*<Alternative B—provocation>*

[\_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name[s] of person[s] allegedly attacked>* provoked the dog or otherwise contributed to (his/her/their) own injuries][; or/.]

*<Alternative C—dog doing military or police work>*

**[The dog was being used in military or police work and the biting occurred while the dog was actually performing in that capacity.]**

[A *trespasser* is someone who (enters a residence without the consent of the (owner/owner’s agent/person who lawfully possesses the property)[,]/ [or] enters land (enclosed by a fence/ [or] posted with “no trespassing” signs) and refuses to leave the property when requested to do so by the (owner/owner’s agent/person who lawfully possesses the property)[,]/ [or] \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert other definition of trespasser, see Pen. Code, § 602 et seq.>*.)]

**[Provoking includes, but is not limited to, approaching, in a threatening manner, the owner or custodian of a dog held on a leash so that the dog reacts in a protective manner.]**

*<Alternative A—reasonable doubt standard>*

**[The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that (\_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name[s] of person[s] allegedly attacked>* (was/were) not trespassing[,]/ [or] [\_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name[s] of person[s] allegedly attacked>*] did not provoke the dog[,]/ [or] the dog was not being used in military or police work). If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of this crime.]**

*<Alternative B—preponderance standard>*

**[The defendant has the burden of proving this defense by a preponderance of the evidence. This is a different standard of proof than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. To meet the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence, the defendant must prove that it is more**

**likely than not that** (\_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] of person[s] allegedly attacked> **(was/were) trespassing[,]/ [or] [**\_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] of person[s] allegedly attacked> **] provoked the dog[,]/ [or] the dog was being used in military or police work).**]

---

*New January 2006*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

Penal Code section 399.5(c) states that “nothing in this section shall authorize the bringing of an action pursuant” to this statute in the three situations described above: i.e., the bitten trespasser; the injured party who provokes the dog or who contributes to his or her own injuries; or the police or military dog performing in that capacity. No case presently addresses the issue of who must bear the burden of proving the existence or nonexistence of these facts.

Because the very bringing of a prosecution is barred under the circumstances stated in subdivision (c), it appears the Legislature intended to place these factual situations outside the scope of its criminal prohibition. This is to be contrasted with affirmative defenses such as entrapment, where the defendant’s conduct is within the statute’s facial reach but subject to an exception to the general rule based on considerations other than guilt or innocence. (See *People v. Mower* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 476–483 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067] [discussing at length affirmative defenses and burdens of proof]; 4 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000), Pretrial Proceedings, § 202.) That being so, the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the nonexistence of the subdivision (c) circumstances would properly be placed on the prosecution. (See *People v. Mower*, *supra*, 28 Cal.4th at p. 482 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067].) However, there must still be sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable jury to have a reasonable doubt about whether one or more of the circumstances existed before an instruction on this issue would be required.

Alternative paragraphs on both the reasonable doubt and preponderance of the evidence standards have been included. The court must choose, at its discretion, either alternative A—reasonable doubt standard, or alternative B—preponderance standard.

## AUTHORITY

- Defenses. Pen. Code, § 399.5(c).

## SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, § 455.

## 2953. Cruelty to Animals (Pen. Code, § 597(a))

---

The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with cruelty to animals [in violation of Penal Code section 597(a)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant (maimed[,]/ [or] mutilated[,]/ [or] tortured[,]/ [or] wounded[,]/ [or] killed) a living animal);

AND

2. The defendant acted maliciously.

[*Torture* means every act, failure to act, or neglect that causes or permits unnecessary or unjustifiable physical pain or suffering.]

[*Maiming* means disabling or disfiguring an animal permanently or depriving it of a limb, organ, or other part of the body.]

Someone acts *maliciously* when he or she intentionally does a wrongful act or when he or she acts with the unlawful intent to disturb, annoy, or injure an animal.

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*New August 2012; Revised February 2014*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

The court will need to modify this instruction if Penal Code section 599(c) applies.

The committee concluded that the definition of “animal” provided in Penal Code section 599b, including “every dumb creature,” would not be helpful to a jury and that no definition of the word was necessary.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 597(a).
- Definition of Torture. Pen. Code, § 599b
- Definition of Malicious. Pen. Code, § 7
- Maiming. See CALCRIM No. 800, *Aggravated Mayhem*
- General Intent Crime. *People v. Alvarado* (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1179, 1182 [23 Cal.Rptr.3d 391]
- Cruelty. *People v. Burnett* (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 868, 873 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 120]

- Any Living Animal. *People v. Thomason* (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1064, 1067 [101 Cal.Rptr.2d 247]

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property, § 310.

3 California Forms of Pleading and Practice, Ch. 23, *Animals: Civil Liability*, § 23.19 (Matthew Bender).

**2954–2959. Reserved for Future Use**

## **E. ALCOHOL RELATED OFFENSES (NON-DRIVING)**

### **2960. Possession of Alcoholic Beverage by Person Under 21 (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 25662(a))**

---

The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with [unlawfully] possessing an alcoholic beverage when under 21 years old [in violation of Business and Professions Code section 25662(a)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant [unlawfully] possessed an alcoholic beverage (in/on) a (street[,]/ [or] highway[,]/ [or] public place[,]/ [or] a place open to the public);

**AND**

2. At the time, the defendant was under 21 years old.

*An alcoholic beverage is a liquid or solid material intended to be consumed that contains one-half of 1 percent or more of alcohol by volume. [An alcoholic beverage includes \_\_\_\_\_ <insert type[s] of beverage[s] from Bus. & Prof. Code, § 23004, e.g., wine, beer>.]*

[Under the law, a person becomes one year older as soon as the first minute of his or her birthday has begun.]

[Two or more persons may possess something at the same time.]

[A person does not have to actually hold or touch something to possess it. It is enough if the person has (control over it/ [or] the right to control it), either personally or through another person.]

*<Defense: Following Reasonable Adult Instructions>*

[The defendant did not unlawfully possess an alcoholic beverage if (he/she) was following, in a timely manner, the reasonable instructions of (his/her) (parent/legal guardian/responsible adult relative/employer/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name or description of person designated by parent or legal guardian>) to deliver [or dispose of] the alcoholic beverage. The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not following such instructions. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of this crime.]

**BENCH NOTES*****Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

Give the bracketed sentence about calculating age if requested. (Fam. Code, § 6500; *In re Harris* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 849–850 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391].)

***Defenses—Instructional Duty***

Business and Professions Code section 25662 allows for the lawful possession of alcohol by a minor if authorized by a responsible adult for a limited purpose. If there is sufficient evidence, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense. (See *People v. Mower* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 478–481 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067] [discussing affirmative defenses generally and the burden of proof].) Give the bracketed word “unlawfully” in the first sentence and element 1, and the bracketed paragraph on the defense.

**AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Bus. & Prof. Code, § 25662(a).
- Alcoholic Beverage Defined. Bus. & Prof. Code, § 23004.
- Authorized Possession Defense. See *People v. Fuentes* (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 1041, 1045 [274 Cal.Rptr. 17]; *People v. Mower* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 478–481 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067].

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012), Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, § 364–369.

## 2961. Purchase of Alcoholic Beverage by Person Under 21 (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 25658(b))

---

The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with (purchasing/ [or] (drinking/consuming)) an alcoholic beverage when under 21 years old [in violation of Business and Professions Code section 25658(b)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

<Alternative 1A—purchased>

[1. The defendant purchased an alcoholic beverage;]

<Alternative 1B—drank or consumed>

[1. The defendant (drank/consumed) an alcoholic beverage at a business that was lawfully licensed to sell alcoholic beverages;]

AND

2. At the time, the defendant was under 21 years old.

*An alcoholic beverage is a liquid or solid material intended to be consumed that contains one-half of 1 percent or more of alcohol by volume. [An alcoholic beverage includes \_\_\_\_\_ <insert type[s] of beverage[s] from Bus. & Prof. Code, § 23004, e.g., wine, beer>.]*

[Under the law, a person becomes one year older as soon as the first minute of his or her birthday has begun.]

---

*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

Give the bracketed sentence about calculating age if requested. (Fam. Code, § 6500; *In re Harris* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 849–850 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391].)

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Bus. & Prof. Code, § 25658(b).
- Alcoholic Beverage Defined. Bus. & Prof. Code, § 23004.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012), Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, § 364–369.

**2962. Selling or Furnishing Alcoholic Beverage to Person Under 21 (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 25658(a))**

---

The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with [unlawfully] (selling[,]/ [or] furnishing[,]/ [or] giving away)[, or causing to be (sold[,]/ [or] furnished[,]/ [or] given away),] an alcoholic beverage to a person under 21 years old [in violation of Business and Professions Code section 25658(a)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant [unlawfully] (sold[,]/ [or] furnished[,]/ [or] gave away)[, or caused to be (sold[,]/ [or] furnished[,]/ [or] given away),] an alcoholic beverage to \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of person under 21>;

AND

2. When the defendant did so, \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of person under 21> was under 21 years old.

An *alcoholic beverage* is a liquid or solid material intended to be consumed that contains one-half of 1 percent or more of alcohol by volume. [An *alcoholic beverage* includes \_\_\_\_\_ <insert type[s] of beverage[s] from Bus. & Prof. Code, § 23004, e.g., wine, beer>.]

[Under the law, a person becomes one year older as soon as the first minute of his or her birthday has begun.]

<Defense: Good Faith Belief at Least 21>

[The defendant is not guilty of this crime if (he/she) reasonably and actually believed that \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of person under 21> was at least 21 years old. The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not reasonably and actually believe that \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of person under 21> was at least 21 years old. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of this crime.]

<Defense: Actual Reliance on Identification>

[The defendant did not unlawfully (sell[,]/ [or] furnish[,]/ [or] give away)[, or cause to be (sold[,]/ [or] furnished[,]/ [or] given away),] an alcoholic beverage to a person under 21 years old if:

1. The defendant [or (his/her) (employee/ [or] agent)] demanded to see a government-issued document as evidence of \_\_\_\_\_'s <insert name of person under 21> age and identity;
2. \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of person under 21> showed the



defendant [or (his/her) employee/ [or] agent)] a government-issued document, or what appeared to be a government-issued document, as evidence of (his/her) age and identity;

AND

3. The defendant [or (his/her) employee/ [or] agent)] actually relied on the document as evidence of \_\_\_\_\_'s <insert name of person under 21> age and identity.]

As used here, a *government-issued document* is a document [including a driver's license or an identification card issued to a person in the armed forces] that has been, or appears to have been, issued by a government agency and contains the person's name, date of birth, description, and picture. The government-issued document does not have to be genuine.

[An *agent* is a person who is authorized to act for the defendant in dealings with other people.]

The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not actually rely on a government-issued document, or what appeared to be a government-issued document, as evidence of \_\_\_\_\_'s <insert name of person under 21> age and identity. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of this crime.]

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2006*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

Give the bracketed sentence about calculating age if requested. (Fam. Code, § 6500; *In re Harris* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 849–850 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391].)

### *Defenses—Instructional Duty*

In *In re Jennings* (2004) 34 Cal.4th 254, 280 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 645, 95 P.3d 906], the Supreme Court held that, although the prosecution is not required to prove that the defendant knew the age of the person he or she provided with alcohol, the defendant may assert as a defense a good faith belief that the person was at least 21. The burden is on the defendant to prove this defense. (*Ibid.*) The Court failed to state what burden of proof applies. Following *People v. Mower* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 478–481 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067], the committee has drafted the instruction on the premise that the defendant's burden is to merely raise a reasonable doubt about the defense, and the prosecution must then prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defense does not apply. If there is sufficient evidence, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give the bracketed paragraph on the defense. (*Ibid.*)

Business and Professions Code section 25660 provides a defense for those who rely in good faith on bona fide evidence of age and identity. If there is sufficient evidence, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense. (See *People v. Mower*, *supra*, 28 Cal.4th at pp. 478–481 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067].) Give the bracketed word “unlawfully” in the first sentence and element 1, and the bracketed paragraph on the defense.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Bus. & Prof. Code, § 25658(a).
- Alcoholic Beverage Defined. Bus. & Prof. Code, § 23004.
- Knowledge of Age Not an Element. *In re Jennings* (2004) 34 Cal.4th 254, 280 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 645, 95 P.3d 906].
- Good Faith Belief Person at Least 21 Defense. *In re Jennings* (2004) 34 Cal.4th 254, 280 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 645, 95 P.3d 906].
- Bona Fide Evidence of Age Defense. Bus. & Prof. Code, § 25660(c); *Kirby v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board* (1968) 267 Cal.App.2d 895, 897, 898–899 [73 Cal.Rptr. 352].
- Affirmative Defenses. See *People v. Mower* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 478–481 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Use of Underage Decoys*

The police may use underage decoys to investigate sales of alcohol to people under 21. (*Proviso Corp. v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board* (1994) 7 Cal.4th 561, 564 [28 Cal.Rptr.2d 638, 869 P.2d 1163].) Moreover, a criminal defendant may not raise as a defense the failure of the police to follow the administrative regulations regarding the use of decoys. (*People v. Figueroa* (1999) 68 Cal.App.4th 1409, 1414–1415 [81 Cal.Rptr.2d 216] [court properly denied instruction on failure to follow regulation].)

#### **“Furnishing” Requires Affirmative Act**

“In order to violate section 25658, there must be some affirmative act of furnishing alcohol . . . It is clear that assisting with food and decorations cannot conceivably be construed as acts of ‘furnishing’ liquor, nor . . . can providing the room for the party, even with the knowledge that minors would be drinking . . . A permissible inference from [the] undisputed testimony was that [the defendant] tacitly authorized his son to provide his beer to the plaintiffs . . . Such an authorization constitutes the requisite affirmative act as a matter of law. In order to furnish an alcoholic beverage the offender need not pour the drink; it is sufficient if, having control of the alcohol, the defendant takes some affirmative step to supply it to the drinker.” (*Sagadin v. Ripper* (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 1141, 1157–1158 [221 Cal.Rptr. 675].)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, § 364–369.

**2963. Permitting Person Under 21 to Consume Alcoholic Beverage (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 25658(d))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with [unlawfully] permitting a person under 21 years old to consume an alcoholic beverage [in violation of Business and Professions Code section 25658(d)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant was licensed to sell alcoholic beverages on the premises of a business;
2. The defendant [unlawfully] permitted \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of person under 21>* to consume an alcoholic beverage on the premises of that business;

**AND**

3. The defendant knew that \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of person under 21>* was consuming an alcoholic beverage.

**An alcoholic beverage is a liquid or solid material intended to be consumed that contains one-half of 1 percent or more of alcohol by volume. [An alcoholic beverage includes \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert type[s] of beverage[s] from Bus. & Prof. Code, § 23004, e.g., wine, beer>*.]**

**[Under the law, a person becomes one year older as soon as the first minute of his or her birthday has begun.]**

**The People are not required to prove that the defendant knew that \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of person under 21>* was under 21.**

*<Defense: Good Faith Belief at Least 21>*

**[The defendant is not guilty of this crime if (he/she) reasonably and actually believed that \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of person under 21>* was at least 21 years old. The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not reasonably and actually believe that \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of person under 21>* was at least 21 years old. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of this crime.]**

*<Defense: Actual Reliance on Identification>*

**[The defendant did not unlawfully permit a person under 21 years old to consume an alcoholic beverage if:**

1. The defendant [or (his/her) (employee/ [or] agent)] demanded to see a government-issued document as evidence of \_\_\_\_\_'s *<insert name of person under 21>* age and identity;

2. \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of person under 21> showed the defendant [or (his/her) employee/ [or] agent] a government-issued document, or what appeared to be a government-issued document, as evidence of (his/her) age and identity;

AND

3. The defendant [or (his/her) employee/ [or] agent] actually relied on the document as evidence of \_\_\_\_\_'s <insert name of person under 21> age and identity.

As used here, a *government-issued document* is a document [including a driver's license or an identification card issued to a person in the armed forces] that has been, or appears to have been, issued by a government agency and contains the person's name, date of birth, description, and picture. The government-issued document does not have to be genuine.

[An *agent* is a person who is authorized to act for the defendant in dealings with other people.]

The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not actually rely on a government-issued document, or what appeared to be a government issued document, as evidence of \_\_\_\_\_'s <insert name of person under 21> age and identity. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of this crime.]

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2006*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

Give the bracketed sentence about calculating age if requested. (Fam. Code, § 6500; *In re Harris* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 849–850 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391].)

### *Defenses—Instructional Duty*

Business and Professions Code section 25660(c) provides a defense for those who rely in good faith on bona fide evidence of age and identity. If there is sufficient evidence, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense. (See *People v. Mower* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 478–481 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067] [discussing affirmative defenses generally and the burden of proof].) Give the bracketed word “unlawfully” in the first sentence and element 1, and the bracketed paragraph on the defense.

In *In re Jennings* (2004) 34 Cal.4th 254, 280 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 645, 95 P.3d 906], the Supreme Court held that, for a prosecution under Business and Professions Code section 25658(a), the defendant may assert as a defense a good faith belief that the

person was at least 21. If the trial court concludes that this defense also applies to a prosecution under Business and Professions Code section 25658(d) and there is sufficient evidence, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense. The court may use the bracketed language to instruct on this defense if appropriate.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Bus. & Prof. Code, § 25658(d).
- Alcoholic Beverage Defined. Bus. & Prof. Code, § 23004.
- Bona Fide Evidence of Age Defense. Bus. & Prof. Code, § 25660(c); *Kirby v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board* (1968) 267 Cal.App.2d 895, 897, 898–899 [73 Cal.Rptr. 352].
- Affirmative Defenses. See *People v. Mower* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 478–481 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067].

### RELATED ISSUES

See the Related Issues section of CALCRIM No. 2962, Selling or Furnishing Alcoholic Beverage to Person Under 21.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, § 364–369.

**2964. Purchasing Alcoholic Beverage for Person Under 21:  
Resulting in Death or Great Bodily Injury (Bus. & Prof. Code,  
§ 25658(a) & (c))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with [unlawfully] (purchasing an alcoholic beverage for[,]/ [or] (furnishing[,]/ [or] giving[,]/ [or] giving away) an alcoholic beverage to[,]) a person under 21 years old causing (death/ [or] great bodily injury) [in violation of Business and Professions Code section 25658].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant [unlawfully] (purchased an alcoholic beverage for[,]/ [or] (furnished[,]/ [or] gave[,]/ [or] gave away) an alcoholic beverage to[,]) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of person under 21>;
2. When the defendant did so, \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of person under 21> was under 21 years old;
3. \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of person under 21> consumed the alcoholic beverage;

**AND**

4. \_\_\_\_\_'s <insert name of person under 21> consumption of the alcoholic beverage caused (death/ [or] great bodily injury) to (himself/herself/ [or] another person).

*An alcoholic beverage* is a liquid or solid material intended to be consumed that contains one-half of 1 percent or more of alcohol by volume. [An alcoholic beverage includes \_\_\_\_\_ <insert type[s] of beverage[s] from Bus. & Prof. Code, § 23004, e.g., wine, beer>.]

[*Great bodily injury* is significant or substantial physical injury. It is an injury that is greater than minor or moderate harm.]

An act causes (death/ [or] great bodily injury) if the (death/ [or] injury) is the direct, natural, and probable consequence of the act and the (death/ [or] injury) would not have happened without the act. A *natural and probable consequence* is one that a reasonable person would know is likely to happen if nothing unusual intervenes. In deciding whether a consequence is natural and probable, consider all the circumstances established by the evidence.

[There may be more than one cause of (death/ [or] great bodily injury). An act causes (death/ [or] injury) only if it is a substantial factor in causing the (death/ [or] injury). A *substantial factor* is more than a trivial or remote factor. However, it does not need to be the only factor that causes the (death/ [or] injury).]

[Under the law, a person becomes one year older as soon as the first minute of his or her birthday has begun.]

*<Defense: Good Faith Belief at Least 21>*

[The defendant is not guilty of this crime if (he/she) reasonably and actually believed that \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of person under 21>* was at least 21 years old. The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not reasonably and actually believe that \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of person under 21>* was at least 21 years old. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of this crime.]

*<Defense: Actual Reliance on Identification>*

[The defendant did not unlawfully furnish an alcoholic beverage to a person under 21 years old if:

1. The defendant [or (his/her) (employee/ [or] agent)] demanded to see a government-issued document as evidence of \_\_\_\_\_'s *<insert name of person under 21>* age and identity;
2. \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of person under 21>* showed the defendant [or (his/her) employee/ [or] agent)] a government-issued document, or what appeared to be a government-issued document, as evidence of (his/her) age and identity;

AND

3. The defendant [or (his/her) employee/ [or] agent)] actually relied on the document as evidence of \_\_\_\_\_'s *<insert name of person under 21>* age and identity.

As used here, a *government-issued document* is a document [including a driver's license or an identification card issued to a person in the armed forces] that has been, or appears to have been, issued by a government agency and contains the person's name, date of birth, description, and picture. The government-issued document does not have to be genuine.

[An *agent* is a person who is authorized to act for the defendant in dealings with other people.]

The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not actually rely on a government-issued document, or what appeared to be a government-issued document, as evidence of \_\_\_\_\_'s *<insert name of person under 21>* age and identity. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of this crime.]



## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on proximate cause. (*People v. Bernhardt* (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 567, 590–591 [35 Cal.Rptr. 401].) If there is evidence of multiple causes of death or injury, the court should also give the bracketed paragraph on causation that begins with “There may be more than one cause of (death/ [or] great bodily injury).” (See *People v. Austry* (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 363 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 135]; *People v. Pike* (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 732, 746–747 [243 Cal.Rptr. 54].)

Give the bracketed sentence about calculating age if requested. (Fam. Code, § 6500; *In re Harris* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 849–850 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391].)

### *Defenses—Instructional Duty*

In *In re Jennings* (2004) 34 Cal.4th 254, 280 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 645, 95 P.3d 906], the Supreme Court held that, although the prosecution is not required to prove that the defendant knew the age of the person he or she provided with alcohol, the defendant may assert as a defense a good faith belief that the person was at least 21. The burden is on the defendant to prove this defense. (*Ibid.*) The Court failed to state what burden of proof applies. Following *People v. Mower* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 478–481 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067], the committee has drafted the instruction on the premise that the defendant’s burden is to merely raise a reasonable doubt about the defense, and the prosecution must then prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defense does not apply. If there is sufficient evidence supporting the defense, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give the bracketed paragraph on the defense. (*Ibid.*)

Business and Professions Code section 25660 provides a defense for those who rely in good faith on bona fide evidence of age and identity. If there is sufficient evidence, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense. (See *People v. Mower, supra*, 28 Cal.4th at pp. 478–481.) Give the bracketed word “unlawfully” in the first sentence and element 1, and the bracketed paragraph on the defense.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Bus. & Prof. Code, § 25658(a) & (c).
- Alcoholic Beverage Defined. Bus. & Prof. Code, § 23004.
- Great Bodily Injury Defined. Pen. Code, § 12022.7(f).
- Knowledge of Age Not an Element. *In re Jennings* (2004) 34 Cal.4th 254, 280 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 645, 95 P.3d 906].
- Good Faith Belief Person at Least 21 Defense. *In re Jennings* (2004) 34 Cal.4th 254, 280 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 645, 95 P.3d 906].
- Bona Fide Evidence of Age Defense. Bus. & Prof. Code, § 25660(c); *Kirby v.*



*Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board* (1968) 267 Cal.App.2d 895, 897, 898–899 [73 Cal.Rptr. 352].

- Affirmative Defenses. See *People v. Mower* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 478–481 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067].

### RELATED ISSUES

See the Related Issues section of CALCRIM No. 2962, *Selling or Furnishing Alcoholic Beverage to Person Under 21*.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, § 364–369.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 140, *Challenges to Crimes*, § 140.04 (Matthew Bender).

**2965. Parent Permitting Child to Consume Alcoholic Beverage:  
Causing Traffic Collision (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 25658.2)**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with permitting a child to consume an alcoholic beverage at (his/her) home [in violation of Business and Professions Code section 25658.2].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant was the (parent/guardian) of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of defendant's child>*;
2. The defendant permitted \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of defendant's child>* [or \_\_\_\_\_, *<insert name of other person under 18 years old>* who was in the company of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of defendant's child>*, or both,] to (consume an alcoholic beverage/ [or] use \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert controlled substance listed in Health & Saf. Code, § 11550>*, a controlled substance,) in the defendant's home;
3. \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of defendant's child>* [and \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of other person under 18 years old>*] (was/were) under 18 years old at the time;
4. The defendant knew that (he/she) was permitting \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of defendant's child>* [or \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of other person under 18 years old>*, or both,] to (consume an alcoholic beverage/ [or] use \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert controlled substance listed in Health & Saf. Code, § 11550>*, a controlled substance,) in the defendant's home;
5. As a result of (consuming the alcoholic beverage/ [or] using the controlled substance), \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of defendant's child or other person under 18 years old>* (had a blood-alcohol concentration of 0.05 percent or greater, as measured by a chemical test[,]/ [or] was under the influence of a controlled substance);
6. The defendant allowed \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of defendant's child or other person under 18 years old>* to drive a vehicle after leaving the defendant's home;
7. The defendant knew that (he/she) was allowing \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of defendant's child or other person under 18 years old>* to drive a vehicle after leaving the defendant's home;

AND

8. \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of defendant's child or other person*

*under 18 years old*> caused a traffic collision while driving the vehicle.

**An alcoholic beverage is a liquid or solid material intended to be consumed that contains one-half of 1 percent or more of alcohol by volume. [An alcoholic beverage includes \_\_\_\_\_ <insert type[s] of beverage[s] from Bus. & Prof. Code, § 23004, e.g., wine, beer>.]**

**An act causes a traffic collision if the collision is the direct, natural, and probable consequence of the act and the collision would not have happened without the act. A *natural and probable consequence* is one that a reasonable person would know is likely to happen if nothing unusual intervenes. In deciding whether a consequence is natural and probable, consider all the circumstances established by the evidence.**

*<Defense: Good Faith Belief at Least 18>*

**[The defendant is not guilty of this crime if (he/she) reasonably and actually believed that \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of person under 18> was at least 18 years old. The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not reasonably and actually believe that \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of person under 18> was at least 18 years old. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of this crime.]**

**[There may be more than one cause of a traffic collision. An act causes a collision only if it is a substantial factor in causing the collision. A *substantial factor* is more than a trivial or remote factor. However, it does not need to be the only factor that causes the collision.]**

**[Under the law, a person becomes one year older as soon as the first minute of his or her birthday has begun.]**

**[In evaluating the test results in this case, you may consider whether or not the person administering the test or the agency maintaining the testing device followed the regulations of the California Department of Health Services.]**

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*New January 2006*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on proximate cause. (*People v. Bernhardt* (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 567, 590–591 [35 Cal.Rptr. 401].) If there is evidence of multiple causes of the collision, the court should also give bracketed

paragraph on causation that begins with “There may be more than one cause of a traffic collision.” (See *People v. Autry* (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 363 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 135]; *People v. Pike* (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 732, 746–747 [243 Cal.Rptr. 54].)

Give the bracketed sentence about calculating age if requested. (Fam. Code, § 6500; *In re Harris* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 849–850 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391].)

If the evidence demonstrates that the person administering the test or agency maintaining the testing device failed to follow the title 17 regulations, give the bracketed that begins with “In evaluating (the/any) test results in this case.” (*People v. Adams* (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 559, 567 [131 Cal.Rptr. 190] [failure to follow regulations in administering breath test goes to weight, not admissibility, of evidence]; *People v. Williams* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 408, 417 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d 854, 49 P.3d 203] [same]; *People v. Esayian* (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1039 [5 Cal.Rptr.3d 542] [results of blood test admissible even though phlebotomist who drew blood not authorized under title 17].)

Subdivision (a)(2) of Business and Professions Code section 25658.2 only contemplates a “parent” as a defendant, whereas the other subdivisions include both “parent” as well as “legal guardian.” The committee concluded that this omission, as well as the typographical error in subdivision (a) of the statute, are inadvertent and has therefore included both options. If the court disagrees, it must revise the language of element 1 accordingly.

### ***Defenses—Instructional Duty***

In *In re Jennings* (2004) 34 Cal.4th 254, 280 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 645, 95 P.3d 906], the Supreme Court held that, for a prosecution under Business and Professions Code section 25658(a), the defendant may assert as a defense a good faith belief that the person was at least 21. If the trial court concludes that this defense also applies to a prosecution under Business and Professions Code section 25658.2, and there is sufficient evidence that the defendant had a good faith belief that the “other person under 18” with the defendant’s child was actually over 18, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense. The court may use the bracketed language to instruct on this defense, if appropriate.

## **AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Bus. & Prof. Code, § 25658.2.
- Alcoholic Beverage Defined. Bus. & Prof. Code, § 23004.

## **RELATED ISSUES**

See the Related Issues section of CALCRIM No. 2962, *Selling or Furnishing Alcoholic Beverage to Person Under 21*.

## **SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, § 364–369.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 140, *Challenges to Crimes*, § 140.04 (Matthew Bender).

**2966. Disorderly Conduct: Under the Influence in Public (Pen. Code, § 647(f))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with being under the influence of (alcohol/ [and/or] a drug) in public [in violation of Penal Code section 647(f)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant was willfully under the influence of (alcohol[,]/ [and/or] a drug[,]/ [and/or] a controlled substance[,]/ [and/or] toluene);
2. When the defendant was under the influence, (he/she) was in a public place;

**AND**

*<Alternative 3A—unable to care for self>*

- [3. The defendant was unable to exercise care for (his/her) own safety [or the safety of others].]

*<Alternative 3B—obstructed public way>*

- [3. Because the defendant was under the influence, (he/she) interfered with, obstructed, or prevented the free use of a street, sidewalk, or other public way.]

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose.

As used here, a *public place* is a place that is open and accessible to anyone who wishes to go there.

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*New January 2006; Revised March 2019*

**BENCH NOTES**

***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the crime.

**AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 647(f).
- Public Place Defined. *In re Zorn* (1963) 59 Cal.2d 650, 652 [30 Cal.Rptr. 811, 381 P.2d 635]; *People v. Strider* (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1393, 1401 [100 Cal.Rptr. 3d 66].

- Statute Constitutional. *Sundance v. Municipal Court* (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1101, 1119–1121 [232 Cal.Rptr. 814, 729 P.2d 80]; *In re Joseph G.* (1970) 7 Cal.App.3d 695, 703–704 [87 Cal.Rptr. 25]; *In re Spinks* (1967) 253 Cal.App.2d 748, 752 [61 Cal.Rptr. 743].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Defendant in Parked Car*

In *People v. Belanger* (1966) 243 Cal.App.2d 654, 657 [52 Cal.Rptr. 660], the court held that the defendant was in a public place when he was found sitting in a parked car on a public street.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, §§ 76–79.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.20 (Matthew Bender).

**2967–2979. Reserved for Future Use**





## F. OFFENSES INVOLVING CARE OF MINOR

### 2980. Contributing to Delinquency of Minor (Pen. Code, § 272)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with contributing to the delinquency of a minor [in violation of Penal Code section 272].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

*<Alternative A—caused or encouraged minor to come under jurisdiction of juvenile court>*

1. The defendant (committed an act/ [or] failed to perform a duty);

AND

2. In (doing so/ [or] failing to do so)[,] the defendant (caused[,]/ [or] encouraged[,]/ [or] contributed to (causing/ [or] encouraging)) a minor to become [or continue to be] a (dependent /delinquent) child of the juvenile court.]

*<Alternative B—induced minor to come or remain under jurisdiction of juvenile court or not to follow court order>*

[The defendant by (act[,]/ [or] failure to act[,]/ [or] threat[,]/ [or] command[,]/ [or] persuasion) induced or tried to induce a (minor/delinquent child of the juvenile court/dependent child of the juvenile court) to do either of the following:

1. Fail or refuse to conform to a lawful order of the juvenile court;

OR

2. (Do any act/Follow any course of conduct/Live in a way) that would cause or obviously tend to cause that person to become or remain a (dependent /delinquent) child of the juvenile court.]

In order to commit this crime, a person must act with [either] (general criminal intent/ [or] criminal negligence).

[In order to act with *general criminal intent*, a person must not only commit the prohibited act [or fail to do the required act], but must do so intentionally or on purpose. However, it is not required that he or she intend to break the law.]

[*Criminal negligence* involves more than ordinary carelessness, inattention, or mistake in judgment. A person acts with criminal negligence when:

1. He or she acts in a reckless way that creates a high risk of death or great bodily injury;

AND

2. A reasonable person would have known that acting in that way would create such a risk.

In other words, a person acts with criminal negligence when the way he or she acts is so different from the way an ordinarily careful person would act in the same situation that his or her act amounts to disregard for human life or indifference to the consequences of that act.]

A *minor* is a person under 18 years old.

[Under the law, a person becomes one year older as soon as the first minute of his or her birthday has begun.]

[A parent [or legal guardian] has a duty to exercise reasonable care, supervision, protection, and control over his or her minor child.]

[A *guardian* means the legal guardian of a child.]

<A. *Dependent Child Defined: Physical Abuse*>

[A minor may become a *dependent child* if his or her parent [or guardian] has intentionally inflicted serious physical harm on him or her, or there is a substantial risk that the parent [or guardian] will do so.]

[The manner in which a less serious injury, if any, was inflicted, any history of repeated infliction of injuries on the child or the child's siblings, or a combination of these and other actions by the parent or guardian may be relevant to whether the child is at substantial risk of serious physical harm.]

[*Serious physical harm* does not include reasonable and age-appropriate spanking of the buttocks when there is no evidence of serious physical injury.]

<B. *Dependent Child Defined: Neglect*>

[A minor may become a *dependent child* if he or she has suffered, or is at substantial risk of suffering, serious physical harm or illness as a result of [one of the following]:

- [1.] [The failure or inability of his or her parent [or guardian] to adequately supervise or protect the child(;/.)]

[OR]

- [(1/2).] [The willful or negligent failure of his or her parent [or guardian] to provide the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment(;/.)]

[OR]

- [(1/2/3).] [The inability of his or her parent [or guardian] to provide

regular care for the child due to the parent's [or guardian's] (mental illness[,]/ [or] developmental disability[,]/ [or] substance abuse).]

[A minor cannot become a dependent child based only on the fact that there is a lack of emergency shelter for the minor's family.]

[Deference must be given to a parent's [or guardian's] decision to give medical treatment, nontreatment, or spiritual treatment through prayer alone in accordance with the tenets and practices of a recognized church or religious denomination, by one of its accredited practitioners. A minor cannot be found to be a dependent child unless such a finding is necessary to protect the minor from suffering serious physical harm or illness. The following factors may bear on such a determination:

1. The nature of the treatment proposed by the parent [or guardian];
2. The risks, if any, to the child posed by the course of treatment or nontreatment proposed by the parent [or guardian];
3. The risks, if any, of any alternative course of treatment being proposed for the child by someone other than the parent [or guardian];

AND

4. The likely success of the course of treatment or nontreatment proposed by the parent [or guardian].]

[A minor may be a dependent child only as long as necessary to protect him or her from the risk of suffering serious physical harm or illness.]]

<C. *Dependent Child Defined: Serious Emotional Damage*>

[A minor may become a *dependent child* if (his or her parent's [or guardian's] conduct[,]/ [or] the lack of a parent [or guardian] who is capable of providing appropriate care[,]) has caused the minor to suffer serious emotional damage or to face a substantial risk of suffering serious emotional damage. *Serious emotional damage* may be shown by severe anxiety, depression, withdrawal, or unruly, aggressive behavior toward himself, herself, or others. [However, a minor cannot become a *dependent child* on this basis if the parent [or guardian] willfully fails to provide mental health treatment to the minor based on a sincerely held religious belief and a less-intrusive intervention is available.]]

<D. *Dependent Child Defined: Sexually Abused*>

[A minor may become a *dependent child* if he or she:

1. Has been sexually abused;
2. Faces a substantial risk of being sexually abused by (his or her

(parent/ [or] guardian)/ [or] a member of his or her household);

**OR**

3. **Has a parent [or guardian] who has failed to adequately protect him or her from sexual abuse when the parent [or guardian] knew or reasonably should have known that the child was in danger of sexual abuse.]**

*<E. Dependent Child Defined: Severe Physical Abuse Under Age Five>*

**[A minor may become a *dependent child* if he or she is under five years old and has suffered severe physical abuse by a parent or by any person known by the parent if the parent knew or reasonably should have known that the person was physically abusing the child.]**

**As used here, the term *severe physical abuse* means any of the following:**

1. **A single act of abuse that causes physical trauma of sufficient severity that, if left untreated, would cause permanent physical disfigurement, permanent physical disability, or death;**
2. **A single act of sexual abuse that causes significant bleeding, deep bruising, or significant external or internal swelling;**
3. **More than one act of physical abuse, each of which causes bleeding, deep bruising, significant external or internal swelling, bone fracture, or unconsciousness;**

**OR**

4. **The willful, prolonged failure to provide adequate food.]**

*<F. Dependent Child Defined: Parent or Guardian Caused Death>*

**[A minor may become a *dependent child* if his or her parent [or guardian] caused the death of another child through abuse or neglect.]**

*<G. Dependent Child Defined: Left Without Support>*

**[A minor may become a *dependent child* if he or she has been left without any provision for support.]**

**[A minor may become a *dependent child* if he or she has been voluntarily surrendered according to law and has not been reclaimed within the 14-day period following that surrender.]**

**[A minor may become a *dependent child* if his or her parent [or guardian] has been incarcerated or institutionalized and cannot arrange for the child's care.]**

**[A minor may become a *dependent child* if his or her relative or other adult custodian with whom he or she resides or has been left is unwilling or unable to provide care or support for the child, the parent's**

whereabouts are unknown, and reasonable efforts to locate the parent have been unsuccessful.]

<H. *Dependent Child Defined: Freed for Adoption*>

[A minor may become a *dependent child* if he or she has been freed for adoption by one or both parents for 12 months by either relinquishment or termination of parental rights, or an adoption petition has not been granted.]

<I. *Dependent Child Defined: Acts of Cruelty*>

[A minor may become a *dependent child* if he or she has been subjected to an act or acts of cruelty by (his or her (parent/ [or] guardian)/ [or] a member of his or her household), or the parent [or guardian] has failed to adequately protect the child from an act or acts of cruelty when the parent [or guardian] knew or reasonably should have known that the child was in danger of being subjected to an act or acts of cruelty.]

<J. *Dependent Child Defined: Sibling Abused*>

[A minor may become a *dependent child* if his or her sibling has been abused or neglected, as explained above, and there is a substantial risk that the child will be abused or neglected in the same way. The circumstances surrounding the abuse or neglect of the sibling, the mental condition of the parent [or guardian], and other factors may bear on whether there is a substantial risk to the child.]

<Delinquent Child Defined>

[A *delinquent child* is a minor whom a court has found to have committed a crime.]

[A *delinquent child* is [also] a minor who has violated a curfew based solely on age.]

[A *delinquent child* is [also] a minor who persistently or habitually refuses to obey the reasonable and proper orders or directions of his or her parent [or guardian or custodian], or who is beyond the control of that person.]

[A *delinquent child* is [also] a minor who \_\_\_\_\_ <insert other grounds for delinquency from Welf. & Inst. Code, § 601>.]

<Sexual Abuse Defined>

[*Sexual abuse* includes (rape[,]/ [and] statutory rape[,]/ [and] rape in concert[,]/ [and] incest[,]/ [and] sodomy[,]/ [and] lewd or lascivious acts on a child[,]/ [and] oral copulation[,]/ [and] sexual penetration [,]/ [and] child molestation[,]/ [and] employing a minor to perform obscene acts[,]/ [and] preparing, selling, or distributing obscene matter depicting a minor).]

To decide whether the (parent/guardian/\_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of person alleged to have committed abuse>) committed (that/one of those) crime[s], please refer to the separate instructions that I (will give/have given) you on (that/those) crime[s].

[*Sexual abuse* also includes, but is not limited to, the following:

- [Any penetration, however slight, of the vagina or anal opening of one person by the penis of another person, whether or not semen is emitted(;/.)]
- [Any sexual contact between the genitals or anal opening of one person and the mouth or tongue of another person(;/.)]
- [Any intrusion by one person into the genitals or anal opening of another person, including the use of any object for this purpose[, unless it is done for a valid medical purpose](;/.)]
- [The intentional touching of the genitals or intimate parts (including the breasts, genital area, groin, inner thighs, and buttocks), or the clothing covering them, of a child, or of the perpetrator by a child, for purposes of sexual arousal or gratification(;/.) [However, *sexual abuse* does not include touching that may be reasonably construed as normal caretaker responsibilities, interactions with, or demonstrations of affection for the child, or acts performed for a valid medical purpose(;/.)]]
- [The intentional masturbation of the perpetrator's genitals in the child's presence(;/.)]
- [Conduct by (someone who knows that he or she is aiding, assisting, employing, using, persuading, inducing, or coercing/a person responsible for a child's welfare who knows that he or she is permitting or encouraging) a child to engage in[, or assist others to engage in,] (prostitution[,]/ [or] a live performance involving obscene sexual conduct[,]/ [or] posing or modeling, alone or with others, for purposes of preparing a film, photograph, negative, slide, drawing, painting, or other pictorial depiction involving obscene sexual conduct)(;/.) [A *person responsible for a child's welfare* is a (parent[,]/ [or] guardian[,]/ [or] foster parent[,]/ [or] licensed administrator or employee of a public or private residential home, residential school, or other residential institution)(;/.)]]
- [Commercial sexual exploitation including (the sexual trafficking of a child/ [or] providing food, shelter, or payment to a child in exchange for the performance of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of sex act[s] specified in Penal Code sections 11165.1 or 236.1>).]
- [(Depicting a child in[, ] [or] (K/k)nowingly (developing/[, ]

**duplicating/[ ,] printing/[ ,] downloading/[ ,] streaming/[ ,] accessing through electronic or digital media/[ ,] [or] exchanging,) any (film/[ ,] photograph/[ ,] videotape/[ ,] video recording/[ ,] negative/[ ,] [or] slide) knowing that it shows a child engaged in an act of obscene sexual conduct. [However, *sexual abuse* does not include (conduct by a person engaged in legitimate medical, scientific, or educational activities[;]/ [or] lawful conduct between spouses[;]/ conduct by a person engaged in law enforcement activities[;]/ [or] conduct by an employee engaged in work for a commercial film developer while acting within the scope of his or her employment and as instructed by his or her employer, provided that the employee has no financial interest in the commercial developer who employs him or her).]]]**

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2015, August 2016*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If more than one act is alleged as a basis for the charge, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give a unanimity instruction. (*People v. Madden* (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 212, 215–216 [171 Cal.Rptr. 897].) Give CALCRIM No. 3500, *Unanimity*. A unanimity instruction is not required if the acts “constitute a continuing course of conduct.” (*Ibid.*) See the discussion in the Bench Notes for CALCRIM No. 3500. (See also *People v. Schoonderwood* (1945) 72 Cal.App.2d 125, 127 [164 P.2d 69] [continuous course of conduct exception applied to charge of contributing to delinquency of a minor]; *People v. Dutra* (1946) 75 Cal.App.2d 311, 321–322 [171 P.2d 41] [exception did not apply].)

If the case involves allegations of child molestation and the evidence has been presented in the form of “generic testimony” about recurring events without specific dates and times, the court should determine whether it is more appropriate to give CALCRIM No. 3501, *Unanimity: When Generic Testimony of Offense Presented*. (*People v. Jones* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 321–322 [270 Cal.Rptr. 611, 792 P.2d 643].) See discussion in the Related Issues section of CALCRIM No. 3500, *Unanimity*.

Give the bracketed paragraph about calculating age if requested. (Fam. Code, § 6500; *In re Harris* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 849–850 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391].)

The remaining bracketed paragraphs should be given on request if relevant.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements and Definitions. Pen. Code, § 272.



- Willfully Defined. Pen. Code, § 7(1); *People v. Lara* (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 102, 107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
- Sexual Abuse Defined. Pen. Code, § 11165.1.
- Delinquent/Ward of Court Defined. Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 601–602.
- Dependent Child Defined. Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300.
- Minor Defined. Pen. Code, § 270e; Fam. Code, § 6500.

## RELATED ISSUES

### *Lesser Offense of Rape or Lewd Acts*

There is disagreement regarding whether a violation of Penal Code section 272 is a necessarily lesser included offense of rape or lewd and lascivious acts. The Supreme Court concluded that it was in *People v. Greer* (1947) 30 Cal.2d 589, 597–598 [184 P.2d 512], overruled on other grounds in *People v. Fields* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 289, 308, fn. 6 [52 Cal.Rptr.2d 282, 914 P.2d 832]. However, in *People v. Bobb* (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 88, 92 [254 Cal.Rptr. 707], disapproved on other grounds by *People v. Barton* (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 198, fn. 7 [47 Cal.Rptr.2d 569, 906 P.2d 531], the Court of Appeal expressly declined to follow *Greer*, concluding that “the calculus has been altered” by an intervening amendment to Welfare and Institutions Code section 601 and further faulting *Greer* for failing to analyze the elements of the lesser included offenses.

## SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Sex Offenses and Crimes Against Decency, § 154.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.20[8], Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.10[1] (Matthew Bender).



## 2981. Failure to Provide (Pen. Code, § 270)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with failing to provide for (his/her) (child/children) [in violation of Penal Code section 270].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant was the parent of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] of child or children>;
2. \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] of child or children> (was/were) [a] minor[s];
3. The defendant failed to provide necessities for \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] of child or children>;

AND

4. The failure to provide was willful and without lawful excuse.

A *minor* is a person under 18 years old.

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose.

*Necessities* are necessary clothing, food, shelter, [and] medical care[, or other remedial care] for a minor child.

[*Other remedial care* includes spiritual treatment through prayer alone in accordance with the tenets and practices of a recognized church or religious denomination and by one of its duly accredited practitioners.]

[A parent must do all that is reasonable in order to provide necessities for minor children. A parent has a *lawful excuse* for failing to do so if, through no fault of his or her own, he or she is unable to earn enough money and does not have other income or assets to pay for those necessities. [It is not a *lawful excuse* if the parent is unable to provide necessities because he or she has unreasonably chosen to spend money on other things or has failed to diligently seek work.]]

[When you decide whether the defendant was able to provide necessities for \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] of child or children>, consider all of (his/her) income, including social insurance benefits and gifts.]

[A parent must provide necessities for a minor child even if he or she never married or is divorced from the child's other parent. This duty also exists regardless of any court order for alimony or child support in a divorce action.]

[It is not a *lawful excuse* that the other parent has legal custody of the

minor child or that the other parent, another person, or an organization voluntarily or involuntarily has provided necessities for the minor child or undertaken to do so.]

[If the People prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew of \_\_\_\_\_'s *<insert name[s] of child or children>* existence and either:

1. Abandoned or deserted \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name[s] of child or children>*,

**OR**

2. Failed to provide \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name[s] of child or children>* with necessities,

then you may but are not required to conclude that the defendant's failure to provide was willful and without lawful excuse.]

[The husband of a woman who bears a child as a result of artificial insemination is the father of that child if he consented in writing to the artificial insemination.]

[If the People prove beyond a reasonable doubt that:

1. \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name[s] of child or children>* (was/were) born while the defendant's wife was cohabiting with him,

**AND**

2. The defendant is neither impotent nor sterile,

then you may but are not required to conclude that the defendant is \_\_\_\_\_'s *<insert name[s] of child or children>* father.]

[The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is the parent of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name[s] of child or children>*. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of this crime.]

[Under the law, a person becomes one year older as soon as the first minute of his or her birthday has begun.]

[An unborn child is considered a minor for whom a parent must provide necessities.]

*New January 2006*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

The bracketed paragraphs that begin with “If the People prove beyond a reasonable doubt that” explain rebuttable presumptions created by statute. (See Pen. Code, § 270; Fam. Code, § 7540; Evid. Code, §§ 600–607.) The California Supreme Court has held that a jury instruction phrased as a rebuttable presumption in a criminal case creates an unconstitutional mandatory presumption. (*People v. Roder* (1983) 33 Cal.3d 491, 497–505 [189 Cal.Rptr. 501, 658 P.2d 1302].) In accordance with *Roder*, these paragraphs of the instruction have been written as permissive inferences. In addition, it is only appropriate to instruct the jury on a permissive inference if there is *no* evidence to contradict the inference. If any evidence has been introduced to support the opposite factual finding, then the jury “shall determine the existence or nonexistence of the presumed fact from the evidence and without regard to the presumption.” (Evid. Code, § 604.)

Therefore, the court **must not** give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “If the People prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew of \_\_\_\_\_’s <insert name[s] of child or children> existence” if there is evidence that the defendant either did not know of the child’s existence or did not act willfully or without a lawful excuse.

In addition, the court **must not** give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “If the People prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: 1. \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] of child or children> (was/were) born while the defendant’s wife was cohabiting with him” if there is evidence that the defendant is not the child’s father.

If there is evidence that the defendant is not the child’s parent, give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable that the defendant is the parent.”

Give the bracketed paragraph about calculating age if requested. (Fam. Code, § 6500; *In re Harris* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 849–850 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391].)

The remaining bracketed paragraphs should be given on request if supported by the evidence.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements and Definitions. Pen. Code, § 270.
- Willfully Defined. Pen. Code, § 7(1).
- Minor Defined. Pen. Code, § 270e; Fam. Code, § 6500.
- Inability as Excuse. *People v. Wallach* (1923) 62 Cal.App. 385, 391 [217 P. 81].
- Must Do All Reasonable. *People v. Caseri* (1933) 129 Cal.App. 88, 91–92 [18 P.2d 389].
- Parentage Through Artificial Insemination Defined. Fam. Code, § 7613.
- Presumption and Inference Defined. Evid. Code, § 600.
- Permissive Inference of Parentage. Fam. Code, § 7540; *People v. Roder* (1983)

33 Cal.3d 491, 506–507 [189 Cal.Rptr. 501, 658 P.2d 1302].

- Evidentiary Presumptions. Evid. Code, §§ 602–604.

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Sex Crimes and Crimes Against Decency, § 144.

**2982. Persuading, Luring, or Transporting a Minor Under 14 Years of Age (Pen. Code, § 272(b)(1))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with persuading, luring, or transporting a minor who is under 14 years of age [in violation of Penal Code section 272(b)(1)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant contacted or communicated with \_\_\_\_\_  
<insert name of minor>;
2. When the defendant did so, (he/she) was an adult stranger to the minor;
3. \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of minor> was under 14 years of age at the time;
4. The defendant knew that (he/she) was contacting or communicating with \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of minor>;
5. The defendant knew or reasonably should have known that \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of minor> was under 14 years of age at the time;
6. The defendant contacted or communicated with \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of minor> with the intent to persuade, lure, or transport[, or attempt to persuade, lure, or transport,] (him/her), for any purpose, away from (\_\_\_\_\_’s <insert name of minor> home/ [or] any location known by \_\_\_\_\_’s <insert name of minor> parent[, legal guardian, or custodian] as a place where the child is located);
7. The defendant did not have the express consent of \_\_\_\_\_’s <insert name of minor> parent [or legal guardian];

[AND]

8. When the defendant acted, (he/she) intended to avoid the consent of \_\_\_\_\_’s <insert name of minor> parent [or legal guardian](;/.)

<Give element 9 when instructing on an emergency situation.>

[AND]

9. The defendant was not acting in an emergency situation.]

**An adult stranger is a person at least 21 years old who has no substantial relationship with the child or is merely a casual acquaintance, or who**

has established or promoted a relationship with the child for the primary purpose of victimization.

*Express consent* means oral or written permission that is positive, direct, and unequivocal, requiring no inference or implication to supply its meaning.

[*Contact or communication* includes the use of a telephone or the Internet.]

[*Internet* means the global information system that is logically linked together by a globally unique address space based on the Internet Protocol (IP), or its subsequent extensions, and that is able to support communications using the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) suite, or its subsequent extensions, or other IP-compatible protocols, and that provides, uses, or makes accessible, either publicly or privately, high-level services layered on the communications and related infrastructure described in this definition.]

[An *emergency situation* is a situation where a child is threatened with imminent bodily, emotional, or psychological harm.]

[Under the law, a person becomes one year older as soon as the first minute of his or her birthday has begun.]

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2006*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If there is sufficient evidence, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the defense of an “emergency situation.” (Pen. Code, § 272(b)(2).) Give element 9 and the definition of “emergency situation.”

Give the bracketed paragraph about calculating age if requested. (Fam. Code, § 6500; *In re Harris* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 849–850 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391].)

The remaining bracketed paragraphs should be given on request as appropriate.

Note that the Penal Code section 272 was amended by Stats. 2005, ch. 461 (AB33) to change the victim’s age to “under 14 years of age.” Prosecutions based on conduct that occurred before January 1, 2006 should use the former age requirement of “twelve years old or younger.”

## AUTHORITY

- Elements and Definitions. Pen. Code, § 272(b)(1).
- Internet Defined. Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17538(f)(6).

- Victimization as Predatory Sexual Conduct. Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600(e).
- Minor Defined. Pen. Code, § 270e; Fam. Code, § 6500.

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Sex Crimes and Crimes Against Decency, § 154.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 144, *Crimes Against Order*, § 144.10[3] (Matthew Bender).

**2983–2989. Reserved for Future Use**





## G. BETTING

### 2990. Bookmaking (Pen. Code, § 337a(a)(1))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with bookmaking [in violation of Penal Code section 337a(a)(1)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant engaged in bookmaking;

AND

2. When the defendant acted, (he/she) knew that (he/she) was engaging in bookmaking.

*Bookmaking* includes the taking of bets, either orally or recorded in writing. The defendant does not need to be involved in betting as a business or occupation. The taking of one bet is sufficient.

A *bet* is a wager or agreement between two or more people that if an uncertain future event happens, the loser will (pay money to the winner/ [or] give the winner something of value). [A bet includes a wager made on the outcome of any actual or purported event, including but not limited to any kind of sporting contest [or \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of event from Pen. Code, § 337a>].] [It is not necessary that the event that was bet on actually take place.]

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*New January 2006*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 337a(a)(1); *People v. Burch* (1953) 118 Cal.App.2d 122, 124 [257 P.2d 44]; *People v. Ghio* (1927) 82 Cal.App. 28, 32–33 [255 P. 205].
- Knowledge Required. *People v. Coppla* (1950) 100 Cal.App.2d 766, 768 [224 P.2d 828].
- Bookmaking Defined. *People v. Thompson* (1962) 206 Cal.App.2d 734, 739 [24 Cal.Rptr. 101]; *People v. Fontes* (1970) 7 Cal.App.3d 650, 653–654 [86 Cal.Rptr. 790]; *People v. Bradford* (1949) 95 Cal.App.2d 372, 377–378 [213 P.2d 37].

- Bet Defined. *People v. Oreck* (1946) 74 Cal.App.2d 215, 220 [168 P.2d 186].
- Writing Not Required. Pen. Code, § 337a(a)(1); *People v. Burch* (1953) 118 Cal.App.2d 122, 124 [257 P.2d 44].
- One Bet Sufficient. *People v. Buckman* (1960) 186 Cal.App.2d 38, 50 [8 Cal.Rptr. 765].
- Event Need Not Occur. *People v. Ghio* (1927) 82 Cal.App. 28, 32–33 [255 P. 205].

### COMMENTARY

As a result of statutory amendments, the committee believes that there is no longer a distinction between the elements of this crime and the offense of accepting a bet. (Pen. Code § 337a(a)(6); see CALCRIM No. 2996, *Betting or Wagering*.)

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Cash Not Required*

A bet does not require that the defendant receive cash. (*People v. Raze* (1949) 91 Cal.App.2d 918, 922 [205 P.2d 1062].) It is sufficient if the defendant received something of value equivalent to money. (*Ibid.*)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, § 351.

## 2991. Pool Selling (Pen. Code, § 337a(a)(1))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with pool selling [in violation of Penal Code section 337a(a)(1)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant sold or distributed shares or chances in a betting pool;

**AND**

2. When (he/she) acted, the defendant knew that (he/she) was selling or distributing shares or chances in a betting pool.

The defendant does not need to be involved in selling or distributing shares or chances as a business or occupation. A single act that violates the statute is sufficient. [It is not necessary that the event that is the subject of a betting pool actually take place.]

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*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 337a(a)(1); *Finster v. Keller* (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 836, 846 [96 Cal.Rptr. 241].
- Knowledge Required. *People v. Coppla* (1950) 100 Cal.App.2d 766, 768 [224 P.2d 828].
- Pool Selling Defined. *Finster v. Keller* (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 836, 846 [96 Cal.Rptr. 241]; *People v. Coppla* (1950) 100 Cal.App.2d 766, 768 [224 P.2d 828].
- One Bet Sufficient. Pen. Code, § 337a(a)(1).
- Event Need Not Occur. *People v. Ghio* (1927) 82 Cal.App. 28, 32–33 [255 P. 205].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012), Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, § 352.

**2992. Keeping a Place for Recording Bets (Pen. Code,  
§ 337a(a)(2))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with keeping a place for the purpose of recording [or registering] bets or shares in a betting pool [in violation of Penal Code section 337a(a)(2)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant kept or occupied a place for any period of time;
2. The defendant kept or occupied the place for the purpose of recording [or registering] bets or shares in a betting pool;
3. The place contained [(a/an)] (book[,]/ [or] paper[,]/ [or] apparatus[,]/ [or] device[,]/ [or] paraphernalia) to record [or register] bets or shares in a betting pool;

AND

4. The defendant possessed the (book[,]/ [or] paper[,]/ [or] apparatus[,]/ [or] device[,]/ [or] paraphernalia) for the purpose of recording [or registering] bets or shares in a betting pool.

As used here, a *place* means the whole or part of any (room[,]/ [or] building[,]/ [or] stand[,]/ [or] shed[,]/ [or] tenement[,]/ [or] tent[,]/ [or] booth[,]/ [or] float[,]/ [or] vessel[,]/ [or] vehicle[,]/ [or] enclosure) of any kind.

A *bet* is a wager or agreement between two or more people that if an uncertain future event happens, the loser will (pay money to the winner/ [or] give the winner something of value). [A bet includes a wager made on the outcome of any actual or purported event, including but not limited to any kind of sporting contest [or \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of event from Pen. Code, § 337a>].] [It is not necessary that the event that was bet on actually take place.]

*Recording* [or registering] a bet means making a notation on paper, or using any other material or device, to allow winnings on the bet to be distributed in the future. [*Recording* [or registering] a bet does not require the type of registering or recording that occurs in a legitimate business establishment.]

[It is not required that any bets actually be made.]

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 337a(a)(2); *Finster v. Keller* (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 836, 847–848 [96 Cal.Rptr. 241]; *People v. Cuda* (1960) 178 Cal.App.2d 397, 414 [3 Cal.Rptr. 86].
- Place Applies to Vehicle. *People v. Roche* (1945) 68 Cal.App.2d 665, 669–670 [157 P.2d 440].
- Bet Defined. *People v. Oreck* (1946) 74 Cal.App.2d 215, 220 [168 P.2d 186].
- Actual Bet Not Required. *People v. Cuda* (1960) 178 Cal.App.2d 397, 414 [3 Cal.Rptr. 86].

## RELATED ISSUES

### *Ownership Not Required*

Test is occupancy, rather than ownership, of the premises for the illegal purposes. (*People v. Reyes* (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 53, 69 [132 Cal.Rptr. 848].)

## SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, § 353.

## 2993. Receiving or Holding Bets (Pen. Code, § 337a(a)(3))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with (receiving[,]/ [or] holding[,]/ [or] forwarding) bets [in violation of Penal Code section 337a(a)(3)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant (received[,]/ [or] held[,]/ [or] forwarded) money [or something valuable];

AND

2. The defendant knew that it was given to (him/her) as a bet.

A *bet* is a wager or agreement between two or more people that if an uncertain future event happens, the loser will (pay money to the winner/ [or] give the winner something of value). [A bet includes a wager made on the outcome of any actual or purported event, including but not limited to any kind of sporting contest [or \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of event from Pen. Code, § 337a>].] [It is not necessary that the event that was bet on actually take place.]

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New January 2006

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 337a(a)(3); *People v. Gaspard* (1960) 177 Cal.App.2d 487, 488 [2 Cal.Rptr. 193].
- Must Receive Money or Thing of Value. *People v. Gaspard* (1960) 177 Cal.App.2d 487, 488 [2 Cal.Rptr. 193]; *People v. Chavez* (1950) 100 Cal.App.2d 356, 359 [223 P.2d 663].
- Bet Defined. *People v. Oreck* (1946) 74 Cal.App.2d 215, 220 [168 P.2d 186].
- Event Need Not Occur. *People v. Chavez* (1950) 100 Cal.App.2d 356, 359 [223 P.2d 663].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Cash Not Required*

A bet does not require that the defendant receive cash. (*People v. Raze* (1949) 91 Cal.App.2d 918, 922 [205 P.2d 1062].) It is sufficient if the defendant received

something of value equivalent to money. (*Ibid.*)

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, § 354.

## 2994. Recording Bets (Pen. Code, § 337a(a)(4))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with recording [or registering] a bet [in violation of Penal Code section 337a(a)(4)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant recorded [or registered] a bet;

AND

2. When the defendant acted, (he/she) knew that (he/she) was recording or registering a bet.

A *bet* is a wager or agreement between two or more people that if an uncertain future event happens, the loser will (pay money to the winner/ [or] give the winner something of value). [A bet includes a wager made on the outcome of any actual or purported event, including but not limited to any kind of sporting contest [or \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of event from Pen. Code, § 337a>].] [It is not necessary that the event that was bet on actually take place.]

*Recording* [or registering] a bet means making a notation on paper, or using any other material or device, to allow winnings on the bet to be distributed in the future. [*Recording* [or registering] a bet does not require the type of registering or recording that occurs in a legitimate business establishment.]

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*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a *sua sponte* duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 337a(a)(4); *People v. Allen* (1953) 115 Cal.App.2d 745, 747 [252 P.2d 968].
- Knowledge Required. See *People v. Coppla* (1950) 100 Cal.App.2d 766, 768 [224 P.2d 828].
- Bet Defined. *People v. Oreck* (1946) 74 Cal.App.2d 215, 220 [168 P.2d 186].
- Event Need Not Occur. *People v. Warnick* (1948) 86 Cal.App.2d 900, 902 [195 P.2d 552].
- Recording a Bet. *People v. Ross* (1950) 100 Cal.App.2d 116, 121 [223 P.2d 85].



**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012), Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, § 354.

**2995. Permitting Place to Be Used for Betting Activities (Pen. Code, § 337a(a)(5))**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with permitting a place to be used for betting activities [in violation of Penal Code section 337a(a)(5)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant owned, rented, or occupied a place;
2. The defendant allowed the place to be used for (bookmaking[,]/ [or] pool selling[,]/ [or] recording [or registering] bets[,]/ [or] receiving, holding, or forwarding bets);

AND

3. The defendant knew that the place was being used for that purpose.

As used here, a *place* means the whole or part of any (room[,]/ [or] building[,]/ [or] stand[,]/ [or] shed[,]/ [or] tenement[,]/ [or] tent[,]/ [or] booth[,]/ [or] float[,]/ [or] vessel[,]/ [or] vehicle[,]/ [or] enclosure) of any kind.

[*Bookmaking* includes the taking of bets, either orally or recorded in writing. The defendant does not need to be involved in betting as a business or occupation. The taking of one bet is sufficient.]

[*Pool selling* means selling or distributing shares or chances in a betting pool. The defendant does not need to be involved in selling or distributing shares or chances as a business or occupation. A single act that violates the statute is sufficient. [It is not necessary that the event that is the subject of a betting pool actually take place.]]

A *bet* is a wager or agreement between two or more people that if an uncertain future event happens, the loser will (pay money to the winner/ [or] give the winner something of value). [A bet includes a wager made on the outcome of any actual or purported event, including but not limited to any kind of sporting contest [or \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of event from Pen. Code, § 337a>.] [It is not necessary that the event that was bet on actually take place.]

[*Recording* [or registering] a bet means making a notation on paper, or using any other material or device, to allow winnings on the bet to be distributed in the future. [*Recording* [or registering] a bet does not require the type of registering or recording that occurs in a legitimate business establishment.]]

*New January 2006*

## BENCH NOTES

### ***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 337a(a)(5).
- Knowledge Required. See *People v. Coppla* (1950) 100 Cal.App.2d 766, 768 [224 P.2d 828].
- “Place” Applies to Vehicle. *People v. Roche* (1945) 68 Cal.App.2d 665, 669–670 [157 P.2d 440].
- Bookmaking Defined. *People v. Thompson* (1962) 206 Cal.App.2d 734, 739 [24 Cal.Rptr. 101]; *People v. Fontes* (1970) 7 Cal.App.3d 650, 653–654 [86 Cal.Rptr. 790]; *People v. Bradford* (1949) 95 Cal.App.2d 372, 377–378 [213 P.2d 37].
- Pool Selling Defined. *Finster v. Keller* (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 836, 846 [96 Cal.Rptr. 241]; *People v. Coppla* (1950) 100 Cal.App.2d 766, 768 [224 P.2d 828].
- Bet Defined. *People v. Oreck* (1946) 74 Cal.App.2d 215, 220 [168 P.2d 186].
- Writing Not Required. Pen. Code, § 337a(a)(1); *People v. Burch* (1953) 118 Cal.App.2d 122, 124 [257 P.2d 44].
- One Bet Sufficient. *People v. Buckman* (1960) 186 Cal.App.2d 38, 50 [8 Cal.Rptr. 765].
- Event Need Not Occur. *People v. Ghio* (1927) 82 Cal.App. 28, 32–33 [255 P. 205].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, § 353.

## 2996. Betting or Wagering (Pen. Code, § 337a(a)(6))

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with (making[,]/ [or] offering[,]/ or accepting) a bet [in violation of Penal Code section 337a(a)(6)].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant (made[,]/ [or] offered[,]/ or accepted) a bet;

AND

2. The defendant knew that (he/she) was (making[,]/ [or] offering[,]/ or accepting) a bet.

A *bet* is a wager or agreement between two or more people that if an uncertain future event happens, the loser will (pay money to the winner/ [or] give the winner something of value). [A bet includes a wager made on the outcome of any actual or purported event, including but not limited to any kind of sporting contest [or \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of event from Pen. Code, § 337a>].] [It is not necessary that the event that was bet on actually take place.]

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*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 337a(a)(6).
- Knowledge Required. See *People v. Coppla* (1950) 100 Cal.App.2d 766, 768 [224 P.2d 828].
- Bet Defined. *People v. Oreck* (1946) 74 Cal.App.2d 215, 220 [168 P.2d 186].
- Event Need Not Occur. *People v. Ghio* (1927) 82 Cal.App. 28, 32–33 [255 P. 205].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Cash Not Required*

A bet does not require that the defendant receive cash. (*People v. Raze* (1949) 91 Cal.App.2d 918, 922 [205 P.2d 1062].) It is sufficient if the defendant received something of value equivalent to money. (*Ibid.*)

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, § 354.



## H. MONEY LAUNDERING

### 2997. Money Laundering (Pen. Code, § 186.10)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with money laundering [in violation of Penal Code section 186.10].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant (conducted/ [or] attempted to conduct) one or more financial transactions involving at least one monetary instrument through at least one financial institution;

*<Give 2A when only one transaction is alleged.>*

- [2A. The financial transaction involved [a] monetary instrument[s] with a total value of more than \$5,000;]

*<Give 2B and/or 2C as appropriate when multiple transactions are alleged.>*

- [2B. The defendant (conducted/ [or] attempted to conduct) the financial transactions within a seven-day period and the monetary instrument[s] involved had a total value of more than \$5,000;]

[OR]

- [2C. The defendant (conducted/ [or] attempted to conduct) the financial transactions within a 30-day period and the monetary instrument[s] involved had a total value of more than \$25,000;]

[AND]

*<Give 3A, 3B, or both, as appropriate.>*

- [3A. When the defendant did so, (he/she) intended to (promote/ [or] manage/ [or] establish/ [or] carry on/ [or] facilitate) criminal activity;]

[OR]

- [3B. The defendant knew that the monetary instrument[s] represented the proceeds of criminal activity or (was/were) derived directly or indirectly from the proceeds of criminal activity(;/.)]

[AND]

*<Give element 4 as appropriate if the defendant is an attorney.>*

- [4. The attorney defendant accepted a fee for representing a client in a criminal investigation or proceeding and accepted the monetary

**instrument with the intent to disguise or aid in disguising the source of the funds or the nature of the criminal activity.]**

**Conducting** includes, but is not limited to, initiating, participating in, or concluding a transaction.

**Financial institution** means (any national bank or banking institution/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert appropriate entity from Pen. Code, § 186.9(b)>) located or doing business in the state of California.

**A transaction** includes the (deposit/ [or] withdrawal/ [or] transfer/ [or] bailment/ [or] loan/ [or] pledge/ [or] payment/ [or] exchange) of (currency/ [or] a monetary instrument/ [or] the electronic, wire, magnetic, or manual transfer) of funds between accounts by, through, or to, a financial institution.

**A monetary instrument** means (money of the United States of America/ [or] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert appropriate item from Pen. Code, § 186.9(d)>).

**Criminal activity** means (a criminal offense punishable under the laws of the state of California by [death or] imprisonment in the state prison/ [or] a criminal offense committed in another jurisdiction, which, under the laws of that jurisdiction is punishable by death or imprisonment for a term exceeding one year).

**[Foreign bank draft** means a bank draft or check issued or made out by a foreign (bank/ [or] savings and loan/ [or] casa de cambio/ [or] credit union/ [or] currency dealer or exchanger/ [or] check cashing business/ [or] money transmitter/ [or] insurance company/ [or] investment or private bank) [or any other foreign financial institution that provides similar financial services,] on an account in the name of the foreign bank or foreign financial institution held at a bank or other financial institution located in the United States or a territory of the United States.]

<Give the following paragraph if a sentence enhancement is alleged pursuant to Pen. Code, § 186.10(c).>

**[If you find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must then determine whether the [total] value of the [attempted] transaction[s] was more than \_\_\_\_\_ <insert alleged minimum value> but less than \_\_\_\_\_ <insert alleged top limit>. The People have the burden of proving this additional allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you must find that this allegation has not been proved.]**



## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

If the definition of proceeds is an issue, see *United States v. Santos* (2008) 553 U.S. 507 [128 S.Ct. 2020, 2022, 170 L.Ed.2d 912], holding that “proceeds” in the federal money laundering statute means “profits” in the context of an illegal gambling scheme.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 186.10; *People v. Mays* (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 13, 29 [55 Cal.Rptr.3d 356].
- Definitions. Pen. Code, § 186.9.
- Definition of Proceeds. *United States v. Santos* (2008) 553 U.S. 507 [128 S.Ct. 2020, 2022, 170 L.Ed.2d 912].

## SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Governmental Authority, § 165.

5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 91, *Sentencing*, § 91.48 (Matthew Bender).

**2998–3000. Reserved for Future Use**



## I. FAILURE TO APPEAR

### 3001. Failure to Appear While on Bail (Pen. Code, § 1320.5)

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with failing to appear while out of custody on bail [in violation of Penal Code section 1320.5].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant was (charged with/convicted of) the commission of a felony in (this case/case number \_\_\_\_\_);
2. The defendant was released from custody on bail in (this/that) case;
3. The defendant was required to appear in court at a specific date, time and place in (this/that) case;
4. The defendant willfully failed to appear in court as required;

AND

5. When the defendant willfully failed to appear in court as required, (he/she) did so in order to evade the process of the court.

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose.

[If you find the defendant willfully failed to appear within 14 days of the date assigned for appearance, you may, but are not required to, infer that the failure to appear was for the purpose of evading the process of the court.]

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*New March 2018*

### BENCH NOTES

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 1320.5.
- Willfully defined. Pen. Code, § 7(1); *People v. Lara* (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 102, 107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
- Specific intent. *People v. Sutton* (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 795, 799–800 [23 Cal.Rptr.2d 632]; *People v. Wesley* (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 519 [243 Cal.Rptr. 785].

- Mandatory presumption unconstitutional unless instructed as permissive inference. *People v. Forrester* (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 1697, 1703 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d 19].

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

4 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Pretrial Proceedings, § 116.

5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 91, *Sentencing*, § 91.48 (Matthew Bender).

**3002. Failure to Appear While on Own Recognizance Release  
(Pen. Code, § 1320)**

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The defendant is charged [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] with failing to appear while released from custody on (his/her) own recognizance [in violation of Penal Code section 1320((a)/(b))].

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant was (charged with/convicted of) the commission of a (felony/misdemeanor) in (this case/case number \_\_\_\_\_);
2. The defendant was released from custody on (his/her) own recognizance pursuant to a signed written release;
3. The defendant willfully failed to appear in court as required;

**AND**

4. When the defendant willfully failed to appear in court as required, (he/she) did so in order to evade the process of the court.

Someone commits an act *willfully* when he or she does it willingly or on purpose.

A *signed written release* must contain the following:

1. Defendant's promise to appear as ordered by a judge or magistrate;
2. Defendant's promise to obey all reasonable conditions imposed by a judge or magistrate;
3. Defendant's promise not to leave the state without permission from the court;
4. Defendant's agreement to waive extradition if he or she fails to appear as required and is arrested outside the State of California;

**AND**

5. Defendant's acknowledgement that he or she has been informed of the consequences and penalties for violations of the conditions of release.

[If you find the defendant willfully failed to appear within 14 days of the date assigned for appearance, you may, but are not required to, infer that the failure to appear was for the purpose of evading the process of the court.]

New March 2018

## BENCH NOTES

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the crime.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Pen. Code, § 1320.
- Requirement of written agreement conforming to Pen. Code, § 1318. *People v. Hernandez* (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1182 [99 Cal.Rptr.3d 548]; *People v. Jenkins* (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 22 [193 Cal.Rptr. 854].
- Split of authority over whether substantial compliance with Penal Code section 1318 is sufficient. *People v. Carroll* (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1406 [167 Cal.Rptr.3d 60] (Yes); *People v. Mohammed* (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 920 [76 Cal.Rptr.3d 372] (No).
- Willfully defined. Pen. Code, § 7(1); *People v. Lara* (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 102, 107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
- Specific intent. *People v. Sutton* (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 795, 799–800 [23 Cal.Rptr.2d 632]; *People v. Wesley* (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 519 [243 Cal.Rptr. 785].
- Mandatory presumption unconstitutional unless instructed as permissive inference. *People v. Forrester* (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 1697, 1703 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d 19].

## SECONDARY SOURCES

4 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (4th Ed. 2012) Pretrial Proceedings, §§ 135–139.

**3003–3099. Reserved for Future Use**

## ENHANCEMENTS AND SENTENCING FACTORS

### A. PRIOR CONVICTION

- 3100. Prior Conviction: Nonbifurcated Trial (Pen. Code, §§ 1025, 1158)
- 3101. Prior Conviction: Bifurcated Trial (Pen. Code, §§ 1025, 1158)
- 3102. Prior Conviction: Prison Prior
- 3103. Prior Conviction: Factual Issue for Jury (Pen. Code, §§ 1025, 1158)
- 3104–3114. Reserved for Future Use

### B. ARMED WITH FIREARM

- 3115. Armed With Firearm (Pen. Code, § 12022(a)(1))
- 3116. Armed With Firearm: Assault Weapon, Machine Gun, or .50 BMG Rifle (Pen. Code, § 12022(a)(2))
- 3117. Armed With Firearm: Knowledge That Coparticipant Armed (Pen. Code, § 12022(d))
- 3118–3129. Reserved for Future Use

### C. PERSONALLY ARMED WITH DEADLY WEAPON OR FIREARM

- 3130. Personally Armed With Deadly Weapon (Pen. Code, § 12022.3)
- 3131. Personally Armed With Firearm (Pen. Code, §§ 1203.06(b)(3), 12022(c), 12022.3(b))
- 3132. Personally Armed With Firearm: Unlawfully Armed When Arrested (Pen. Code, § 1203.06(a)(3))
- 3133–3144. Reserved for Future Use

### D. PERSONALLY USED DEADLY WEAPON OR FIREARM

- 3145. Personally Used Deadly Weapon (Pen. Code, §§ 667.61(e)(3), 1192.7(c)(23), 12022(b)(1) & (2), 12022.3)
- 3146. Personally Used Firearm (Pen. Code, §§ 667.5(c)(8), 667.61(e)(4), 1203.06, 1192.7(c)(8), 12022.3, 12022.5, 12022.53(b))
- 3147. Personally Used Firearm: Assault Weapon, Machine Gun, or .50 BMG Rifle (Pen. Code, § 12022.5(b))
- 3148. Personally Used Firearm: Intentional Discharge (Pen. Code, § 12022.53(c))
- 3149. Personally Used Firearm: Intentional Discharge Causing Injury or Death (Pen. Code, §§ 667.61(e)(3), 12022.53(d))
- 3150. Personally Used Firearm: Intentional Discharge and Discharge Causing Injury or Death—Both Charged (Pen. Code, §§ 667.61(e)(3), 12022.53(d))
- 3151–3159. Reserved for Future Use

### E. GREAT BODILY INJURY

- 3160. Great Bodily Injury (Pen. Code, §§ 667.5(c)(8), 667.61(d)(6), 1192.7(c)(8), 12022.7, 12022.8)

## ENHANCEMENTS AND SENTENCING FACTORS

- 3161. Great Bodily Injury: Causing Victim to Become Comatose or Paralyzed (Pen. Code, § 12022.7(b))
- 3162. Great Bodily Injury: Age of Victim (Pen. Code, § 12022.7(c) & (d))
- 3163. Great Bodily Injury: Domestic Violence (Pen. Code, § 12022.7(e))
- 3164–3174. Reserved for Future Use

### F. SEX OFFENSES

- 3175. Sex Offenses: Sentencing Factors—Aggravated Kidnapping (Pen. Code, § 667.61(d)(2))
- 3176. Sex Offenses: Sentencing Factors—Aggravated Mayhem (Pen. Code, § 667.61(d)(3))
- 3177. Sex Offenses: Sentencing Factors—Torture (Pen. Code, § 667.61(d)(3))
- 3178. Sex Offenses: Sentencing Factors—Burglary With Intent to Commit Sex Offense (Pen. Code, § 667.61(d)(4))
- 3179. Sex Offenses: Sentencing Factors—Kidnapping (Pen. Code, § 667.61(e)(1))
- 3180. Sex Offenses: Sentencing Factors—Burglary (Pen. Code, § 667.61(e)(2))
- 3181. Sex Offenses: Sentencing Factors—Multiple Victims (Pen. Code, § 667.61(e)(4))
- 3182. Sex Offenses: Sentencing Factors—Tying or Binding (Pen. Code, § 667.61(e)(5))
- 3183. Sex Offenses: Sentencing Factors—Administered Controlled Substance (Pen. Code, § 667.61(e)(6))
- 3184. Sex Offenses: Sentencing Factors—Using Force or Fear to Cause Minor to Engage in Commercial Sex Act (Pen. Code, § 236.1(c)(2))
- 3185–3199. Reserved for Future Use

### G. CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES

- 3200. Controlled Substance: Quantity (Pen. Code, §§ 1203.07(a)(1), (2) & (4); Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11352.5, 11370.4)
- 3201. Controlled Substance: Quantity—Manufacture of Controlled Substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379.8)
- 3202–3220. Reserved for Future Use

### H. OTHER ENHANCEMENTS

- 3221. Aggravated White Collar Crime (Pen. Code, § 186.11(a)(1))
- 3222. Characteristics of Victim (Pen. Code, §§ 667.9(a) & (b), 667.10(a))
- 3223. Reckless Driving With Specified Injury (Veh. Code, § 23105(a))
- 3224–3249. Reserved for Future Use

### I. TEMPLATES

- 3250. Enhancement, Sentencing Factor, or Specific Factual Issue: Template
- 3251. Enhancement, Sentencing Factor, or Specific Factual Issue: Template—Bifurcated Trial
- 3252–3259. Reserved for Future Use



**ENHANCEMENTS AND SENTENCING FACTORS**

**J. RELATED INSTRUCTIONS**

- 3260. Duty of Jury: Verdict Form for Enhancement, Sentencing Factor, or Prior Conviction
- 3261. While Committing a Felony: Defined—Escape Rule
- 3262–3399. Reserved for Future Use



## A. PRIOR CONVICTION

### 3100. Prior Conviction: Nonbifurcated Trial (Pen. Code, §§ 1025, 1158)

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If you find the defendant guilty of a crime, you must also decide whether the People have proved the additional allegation that the defendant was previously convicted of (another/other) crime[s]. It has already been determined that the defendant is the person named in exhibit[s] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert number[s] or description[s] of exhibit[s]>. You must decide whether the evidence proves that the defendant was convicted of the alleged crime[s].

The People allege that the defendant has been convicted of:

[1.] A violation of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert code section alleged>, on \_\_\_\_\_ <insert date of conviction>, in the \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of court>, in Case Number \_\_\_\_\_ <insert docket or case number>(;/.)

[AND <Repeat for each prior conviction alleged>.]

[Consider the evidence presented on this allegation only when deciding whether the defendant was previously convicted of the crime[s] alleged [or for the limited purpose of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert other permitted purpose, e.g., assessing credibility of the defendant>]. Do not consider this evidence as proof that the defendant committed any of the crimes with which he is currently charged or for any other purpose.]

[You must consider each alleged conviction separately.] The People have the burden of proving (the/each) alleged conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden [for any alleged conviction], you must find that the alleged conviction has not been proved.

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*New January 2006; Revised March 2018, September 2020*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

If the defendant is charged with a prior conviction, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the allegation.

If identity is an issue, the court must make the factual determination that the defendant is the person who has suffered the convictions in question before giving this instruction.

Do **not** give this instruction if the court has bifurcated the trial. Instead, give

CALCRIM No. 3101, *Prior Conviction: Bifurcated Trial*.

If the defendant is charged with a prison prior, the court must determine whether the jury should decide if the defendant served a separate prison term for the conviction and whether the defendant remained free of prison custody for the “washout” period. (Pen. Code, § 667.5(a) & (b).) The Commentary below discusses these issues further. If the court chooses to submit these issues to the jury, give CALCRIM No. 3102, *Prior Conviction: Prison Prior*, with this instruction.

If the court determines that there is a factual issue regarding the prior conviction that must be submitted to the jury, give CALCRIM No. 3103: *Prior Conviction: Factual Issue for Jury*, with this instruction. The Commentary below discusses this issue further.

On request, the court should give the limiting instruction that begins with “Consider the evidence presented on this allegation only when deciding . . . .” (See *People v. Valentine* (1986) 42 Cal.3d 170, 182, fn. 7 [228 Cal.Rptr. 25, 720 P.2d 913].) There is no sua sponte duty to give the limiting instruction, and the defense may request that no limiting instruction be given. (See *People v. Griggs* (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1139 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 380].)

The court must provide the jury with a verdict form on which the jury will indicate whether the prior conviction has been proved. (Pen. Code, § 1158.)

### AUTHORITY

- Statutory Authority. Pen. Code, §§ 1025, 1158.
- Bifurcation. *People v. Calderon* (1994) 9 Cal.4th 69, 77–79 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 333, 885 P.2d 83]; *People v. Cline* (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1327, 1334–1336 [71 Cal.Rptr.2d 41].
- Judge Determines Whether Defendant Is Person Named in Documents. Pen. Code, § 1025(c); *People v. Epps* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 19, 25 [104 Cal.Rptr.2d 572, 18 P.3d 2]; *People v. Garcia* (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1165 [132 Cal.Rptr.2d 694].
- Limiting Instruction on Prior Conviction. See *People v. Valentine* (1986) 42 Cal.3d 170, 182, fn. 7 [228 Cal.Rptr. 25, 720 P.2d 913]; *People v. Griggs* (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1139 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 380].
- Disputed Factual Issues. See *People v. Gallardo* (2017) 4 Cal.5th 120, 136 [226 Cal.Rptr.3d 379, 407 P.3d 55]; *Descamps v. United States* (2013) 570 U.S. 254, 268–70 [133 S.Ct. 2276, 186 L.Ed.2d 438]; *Apprendi v. New Jersey* (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 490 [120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435].
- Three-Strikes Statutes. Pen. Code, §§ 667(e), 1170.12.
- Five-Year Enhancement for Serious Felony. Pen. Code, § 667(a)(1).
- Three-Year Enhancement for Prison Prior If Violent Felony. Pen. Code, § 667.5(a).
- One-Year Enhancement for Prison Prior. Pen. Code, § 667.5(b).

- Serious Felony Defined. Pen. Code, § 1192(c).
- Violent Felony Defined. Pen. Code, § 667.5(c).

## COMMENTARY

### *Factual Issues—Decided by Jury or Court?*

Penal Code sections 1025 and 1158 state that when an accusation charges a defendant with having suffered a prior conviction, the jury must decide whether the defendant “suffered the prior conviction” (unless the right to a jury trial is waived). Under Penal Code section 1025, the court, not the jury, must determine whether the defendant is the person named in the documents submitted to prove the prior conviction. (Pen. Code, § 1025(c); see also *People v. Epps* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 19, 24–25 [104 Cal.Rptr.2d 572, 18 P.3d 2].)

In some cases, however, a prior conviction may present an ancillary factual issue that must be decided before the conviction may be used under a particular enhancement or sentencing statute. For example, if the prosecution seeks sentencing under the “three strikes” law and alleges that the defendant was previously convicted of two burglaries, these prior convictions would qualify as “strikes” only if the burglaries were residential. (See *People v. Kelii* (1999) 21 Cal.4th 452, 455 [87 Cal.Rptr.2d 674, 981 P.2d 518].) If the defendant had been specifically convicted of first degree burglary of an inhabited dwelling, then there would be no issue over whether the prior convictions qualified. If, on the other hand, the defendant had been convicted simply of “burglary,” then whether the offenses were residential would be a factual issue. (*Ibid.*)

The court’s role is “limited to identifying those facts that were established by virtue of the conviction itself—that is, facts the jury was necessarily required to find to render a guilty verdict, or that the defendant admitted as the factual basis for a guilty plea.” (See *People v. Gallardo* (2017) 4 Cal.5th 120, 136–137 [226 Cal.Rptr.3d 379, 407 P.3d 55].) A court considering whether to impose an increased sentence based on a prior conviction may not make its own findings about what facts or conduct “realistically” supported the conviction. (*Ibid.*) To allow otherwise would constitute impermissible judicial factfinding violative of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. (*Ibid.*; see also *Descamps v. United States* (2013) 570 U.S. 254, 268–70 [133 S.Ct. 2276, 186 L.Ed.2d 438] [under federal Constitution’s Sixth Amendment right to jury trial, the only facts related to a prior conviction that a sentencing court can rely on in imposing recidivist punishment are the facts necessarily implied by the elements of the relevant prior offense].)

### *Prior Prison Term and “Washout” Period*

A similar issue arises over whether the jury or the court must decide if the defendant served a prison term as a result of a particular conviction and if the defendant has been free of custody for sufficient time to satisfy the “washout” period. (See Pen. Code, § 667.5(a) & (b).) In *People v. Winslow* (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 680, 687 [46 Cal.Rptr.2d 901], the Court of Appeal held that the jury must determine whether the defendant served a prior prison term for a felony conviction. The other holdings in *Winslow* were rejected by the California Supreme

Court. (*People v. Kelii*, *supra*, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 458–459; *People v. Wiley* (1995) 9 Cal.4th 580, 592 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 347, 889 P.2d 541].) However, the *Winslow* holding that the jury must determine if the defendant served a prison term for a felony conviction remains controlling authority.

But, in *People v. Epps*, *supra*, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 25–26, the Court expressed doubt, in dicta, about whether the fact of having served a prison term is properly submitted to the jury. Discussing the 1997 amendment to Penal Code section 1025, the Court noted that

[t]he analysis lists the following questions that the jury would still decide if Senate Bill 1146 became law: . . . ‘Was the defendant sentenced to prison based on that conviction? How long has the defendant been out of custody since he or she suffered the prior conviction?’ . . .

[T]hough we do not have a case before us raising the issue, it appears that many of the listed questions are the sort of legal questions that are for the court under [*Wiley*]. For example, determining . . . whether the defendant was sentenced to prison is “largely legal” (*Kelii*, *supra*, 21 Cal. 4th at p. 455, quoting *Wiley*, *supra*, 9 Cal. 4th at p. 590), and though these questions require resolution of some facts, “a factual inquiry, limited to examining court documents, is . . . ‘the type of inquiry traditionally performed by judges as part of the sentencing function.’ ” (*Kelii*, at p. 457, quoting *Wiley*, at p. 590.) . . . Therefore, the list of questions in the committee analysis should not be read as creating new jury trial rights that did not exist under *Wiley*.

(*Ibid.*)

On the other hand, *Apprendi v. New Jersey* (2000) 530 U.S. 466 [120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435] could be interpreted as requiring the jury to make these factual findings. (But see *People v. Thomas* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 212, 223 [110 Cal.Rptr.2d 571] [even under *Apprendi*, no federal due process right to have jury determine whether defendant served a prior prison term].)

Until the California Supreme Court resolves this question, the court should consider submitting to the jury the issues of whether the defendant served a prison term and whether the defendant has remained free of custody for sufficient time to satisfy the “washout” period. The court may use CALCRIM No. 3102, *Prior Conviction: Prison Prior*.

## RELATED ISSUES

### *Constitutionality of Prior*

The prosecution is not required to prove the constitutional validity of a prior conviction as an “element” of the enhancement. (*People v. Walker* (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 380, 386 [107 Cal.Rptr.2d 264].) Rather, following the procedures established in *People v. Sumstine* (1984) 36 Cal.3d 909, 922–924 [206 Cal.Rptr. 707, 687 P.2d 904], and *People v. Allen* (1999) 21 Cal.4th 424, 435–436 [87 Cal.Rptr.2d 682, 981 P.2d 525], the defense may bring a motion challenging the

constitutional validity of the prior. These questions are matters of law to be determined by the trial court.

***Defense Stipulation to Prior Convictions***

The defendant may stipulate to the truth of the prior convictions. (*People v. Weathington* (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 69, 90 [282 Cal.Rptr. 170].) If the defendant stipulates, the prior convictions should not be disclosed to the jury unless the court admits them as otherwise relevant. (See *People v. Hall* (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 128, 135 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 690].)

***Motion for Bifurcated Trial***

Either the defendant or the prosecution may move for a bifurcated trial. (*People v. Calderon* (1994) 9 Cal.4th 69, 77–78 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 333]; *People v. Cline* (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1327, 1334–1336 [71 Cal.Rptr.2d 41]; *People v. Weathington, supra*, 231 Cal.App.3d at p. 90.)

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

4 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, § 618.

2 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 42, *Arraignment, Pleas, and Plea Bargaining*, § 42.21[6][a] (Matthew Bender).

5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 91, *Sentencing*, §§ 91.21[2], 91.60, 91.80 (Matthew Bender).

## 3101. Prior Conviction: Bifurcated Trial (Pen. Code, §§ 1025, 1158)

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The People have alleged that the defendant was previously convicted of (another/other) crime[s]. It has already been determined that the defendant is the person named in exhibit[s] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert number[s] or description[s] of exhibit[s]>. You must decide whether the evidence proves that the defendant was convicted of the alleged crime[s].

The People allege that the defendant has been convicted of:

[1.] A violation of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert code section[s] alleged>, on \_\_\_\_\_ <insert date>, in the \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of court>, Case Number \_\_\_\_\_ <insert docket or case number>(;/.)

[AND <Repeat for each prior conviction alleged.>]

[In deciding whether the People have proved the allegation[s], consider only the evidence presented in this proceeding. Do not consider your verdict or any evidence from the earlier part of the trial.]

You may not return a finding that (the/any) alleged conviction has or has not been proved unless all 12 of you agree on that finding.

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*New January 2006; Revised September 2020*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

If the defendant is charged with a prior conviction, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the allegation. Give this instruction if the court has granted a bifurcated trial. The court **must also give** CALCRIM No. 221, *Reasonable Doubt: Bifurcated Trial*.

If the defendant is charged with a prison prior, the court must determine whether the jury should decide if the defendant served a separate prison term for the conviction and whether the defendant remained free of prison custody for the “washout” period. (Pen. Code, § 667.5(a) & (b).) The Commentary to CALCRIM No. 3100 discusses this issue. If the court chooses to submit these issues to the jury, give CALCRIM No. 3102, *Prior Conviction: Prison Prior*, with this instruction.

If the court determines that there is a factual issue regarding the prior conviction that must be submitted to the jury, give CALCRIM No. 3103: *Prior Conviction: Factual Issue for Jury*, with this instruction. The Commentary to CALCRIM No. 3100 discusses this issue.

Give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “In deciding whether the People have proved” on request.

The court must provide the jury with a verdict form on which the jury will indicate



whether each prior conviction has been proved. (Pen. Code, § 1158.)

### AUTHORITY

- Statutory Authority. Pen. Code, §§ 1025, 1158.
- Bifurcation. *People v. Calderon* (1994) 9 Cal.4th 69, 77–79 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 333, 885 P.2d 83]; *People v. Cline* (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1327, 1334–1336 [71 Cal.Rptr.2d 41].
- Judge Determines Whether Defendant Is Person Named in Documents. Pen. Code, § 1025(b); *People v. Epps* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 19, 25 [104 Cal.Rptr.2d 572, 18 P.3d 2]; *People v. Garcia* (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1165 [132 Cal.Rptr.2d 694].
- Disputed Factual Issues. See *People v. Gallardo* (2017) 4 Cal.5th 120, 136 [226 Cal.Rptr.3d 379, 407 P.3d 55]; *Descamps v. United States* (2013) 570 U.S. 254, 268–70 [133 S.Ct. 2276, 186 L.Ed.2d 438]; *Apprendi v. New Jersey* (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 490 [120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435].
- Three-Strikes Statutes. Pen. Code, §§ 667(e), 1170.12.
- Five-Year Enhancement for Serious Felony. Pen. Code, § 667(a)(1).
- Three-Year Enhancement for Prison Prior If Violent Felony. Pen. Code, § 667.5(a).
- One-Year Enhancement for Prison Prior. Pen. Code, § 667.5(b).
- Serious Felony Defined. Pen. Code, § 1192(c).
- Violent Felony Defined. Pen. Code, § 667.5(c).

### RELATED ISSUES

See *Motion for Bifurcated Trial* in the Related Issues section of CALCRIM No. 3100, *Prior Conviction: Nonbifurcated Trial*.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

- 5 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, § 618.
- 2 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 42, *Arraignment, Pleas, and Plea Bargaining*, § 42.21[6][a] (Matthew Bender).
- 5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 91, *Sentencing*, §§ 91.21[2], 91.60, 91.80 (Matthew Bender).

## 3102. Prior Conviction: Prison Prior

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If you find that the defendant was previously convicted of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert description of prior conviction>*, you must also decide whether the People have proved that the defendant served a separate prison term for the crime and did not remain (out of prison custody/ [and] free of a new felony conviction) for (5/10) years.

To prove this allegation, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant served a separate prison term for the crime of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert description of prior conviction>*;

AND [EITHER]

[2[A]. The defendant did not remain out of prison custody for (5/10) years after (he/she) was no longer in prison custody for that crime(;/.)]

[OR]

[2[B]. The defendant was convicted of a new felony that (he/she) committed within (5/10) years after (he/she) was no longer in prison custody.]

A person *served a separate prison term for a crime* if he or she served a continuous period of prison confinement imposed for that crime. [The prison term may have been served for that crime alone or in combination with prison terms imposed at the same time for other crimes.] [A person is still *serving a separate prison term for a crime* if he or she is placed back in custody (following an escape/ [or] for a parole violation).] [If a person is returned to custody following (an escape/ [or] a parole violation) and is also sentenced to prison for a new crime, then that person is serving a new separate prison term.]

A person is *in prison custody* until he or she is discharged from prison or released on parole, whichever happens first. [A person is also *in prison custody* if he or she (is placed back in custody for a parole violation/ [or] has unlawfully escaped from custody).]

A *prison term* includes confinement in [(a/the)] (state prison/federal penal institution/California Youth Authority/Division of Juvenile Justice/Department of Youth and Community Restoration/ \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of hospital or other institution where confinement entitles person to prison credits>*).

[A *prison term* includes commitment to the State Department of Mental Health as a mentally disordered sex offender following a felony conviction if the commitment lasts more than one year.]

[A conviction of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of offense from other state or federal offense> is the same as a conviction for a felony if the defendant served one year or more in prison for the crime.]

**The People have the burden of proving this allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you must find that this allegation has not been proved.**

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*New January 2006; Revised September 2020*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

Review the Commentary to CALCRIM No. 3100, *Prior Conviction: Nonbifurcated Trial*, regarding the current state of the law on whether the court must submit these issues to the jury. If the court gives this instruction, the court **must** also give either CALCRIM No. 3100 or CALCRIM No. 3101.

The court must give one of the bracketed elements (did not remain out of prison custody or was convicted of a new felony), depending on the prosecution’s theory. The court may give both of the bracketed elements with the bracketed words “either” and “or.”

The court may give the bracketed sentence that begins with “If a person is returned to custody following (an escape/ [or] a parole violation) and is also sentenced to prison for a new offense” on request if relevant based on the evidence. (*People v. Langston* (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1237, 1241 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 596, 95 P.3d 865].)

If the court gives this instruction, the court must provide the jury with a verdict form on which the jury will indicate whether the allegation has been proved. (Pen. Code, § 1158.)

## AUTHORITY

- Disputed Factual Issues. See *People v. Gallardo* (2017) 4 Cal.5th 120, 136 [226 Cal.Rptr.3d 379, 407 P.3d 55]; *People v. Epps* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 19, 23 [104 Cal.Rptr.2d 572, 18 P.3d 2]; *Descamps v. United States* (2013) 570 U.S. 254, 268–70 [133 S.Ct. 2276, 186 L.Ed.2d 438]; *Apprendi v. New Jersey* (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 490 [120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435].
- Burden of Proof. *People v. Fielder* (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1221, 1231 [8 Cal.Rptr.3d 247].
- Continuous, Completed Term. *People v. Medina* (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 986, 991–992 [254 Cal.Rptr. 89]; *People v. Cardenas* (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 51, 56 [237 Cal.Rptr. 249].
- Term for Offense Committed in Prison Is Separate. *People v. Langston* (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1237, 1242 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 596, 95 P.3d 865]; *People v. Walkkein* (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1410 [18 Cal.Rptr.2d 383]; *People v. Cardenas* (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 51, 56 [237 Cal.Rptr. 249].

- Direct Commitment to Youth Authority as Minor Is Not Prison Prior. *People v. Seals* (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1384–1385 [18 Cal.Rptr.2d 676].
- New Commitment Following Escape Is Separate Prison Term. *People v. Langston* (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1237, 1241, 1246 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 596, 95 P.3d 865].
- Three-Year Enhancement for Prison Prior If Violent Felony. Pen. Code, § 667.5(a).
- One-Year Enhancement for Prison Prior. Pen. Code, § 667.5(b).
- Violent Felony Defined. Pen. Code, § 667.5(c).

## RELATED ISSUES

### *Commitment to Youth Authority*

A direct commitment to the Department of Youth and Community Restoration (DYCR) (formerly known as California Youth Authority (CYA) and Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ)) under Welfare and Institutions Code section 1731.5(a) is not a prison prior for the purposes of Penal Code section 667.5. (Pen. Code, § 667.5(j); *People v. Seals* (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1383–1385 [18 Cal.Rptr.2d 676].) Time at one of the above facilities qualifies as a prison prior only if the person was sentenced to state prison and transferred to the facility for housing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 1731.5(c). (*People v. Seals, supra*, 14 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1383–1385.)

### *Term for Offense Committed in Prison Is Separate*

“When a consecutive sentence is imposed under section 1170.1, subdivision (c), for an offense committed in state prison, section 1170.1 requires such sentence to commence *after* the completion of the term for which the defendant was originally imprisoned. Thus, each term is a separate, ‘continuous completed’ term, which is available for enhancement under section 667.5 if the defendant is subsequently convicted of a felony.” (*People v. Walkkein* (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1409–1410 [18 Cal.Rptr.2d 383] [footnote and citations omitted; italics in original]; see also *People v. Langston* (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1237, 1242 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 596, 95 P.3d 865].)

### *Calculating “Washout” Period*

Penal Code section 667.5, subdivisions (a) and (b), contain “washout” periods of 10 and 5 years, respectively. The prosecution bears the burden of proving that the “washout” period does not apply to a particular conviction. (*People v. Fielder* (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1221, 1232 [8 Cal.Rptr.3d 247].) The “washout” period commences when the defendant is discharged from custody or released on parole, “whichever first occurs.” (Pen. Code, § 667.5(d); *People v. Nobleton* (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 76, 84–85 [44 Cal.Rptr.2d 611].) Any return to prison on a parole violation is considered part of the original prison term. (Pen. Code, § 667.5(d).) Thus, in calculating whether the defendant has remained free of prison custody and a felony conviction for sufficient time, the calculation begins from when the defendant was released on parole without subsequently returning to prison on a parole violation. (*People v. Nobleton, supra*, 38 Cal.App.4th at pp. 84–85.) The

calculation ends when the defendant commits a new offense that ultimately results in a felony conviction. (*People v. Fielder, supra*, 114 Cal.App.4th at p. 1233.) The date the offense is committed, not the date of the ultimate conviction, is controlling. (*Id.* at pp. 1233–1234.) The new felony ends the allowable time for the “washout” period regardless of whether the defendant was sentenced to prison for the new felony. (*Id.* at p. 1230.)

See the Related Issues section of CALCRIM No. 3100, *Prior Conviction: Nonbifurcated Trial*.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

5 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, § 727.

2 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 42, *Arraignment, Pleas, and Plea Bargaining*, § 42.21[6][a] (Matthew Bender).

5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 91, *Sentencing*, §§ 91.21[2], 91.80 (Matthew Bender).

### 3103. Prior Conviction: Factual Issue for Jury (Pen. Code, §§ 1025, 1158)

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If you find that the defendant was previously convicted of the crime of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of prior conviction>, you must also decide whether the People have proved that in the commission of that prior crime \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of other factual issue, e.g., the defendant personally used a firearm>.

To prove this allegation, the People must prove that:

<INSERT ELEMENTS REQUIRED.>

The People have the burden of proving this allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you must find that this allegation has not been proved.

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*New January 2006; Revised September 2020*

#### BENCH NOTES

##### *Instructional Duty*

To determine whether or not this instruction is required, review the Commentary to CALCRIM No. 3100, *Prior Conviction: Nonbifurcated Trial*, regarding the current state of the law on whether the jury must determine ancillary factual issues.

If the court gives this instruction, the court must provide the jury with a verdict form on which the jury will indicate whether the allegation has been proved. (Pen. Code, § 1158.)

#### AUTHORITY

- Statutory Authority. Pen. Code, §§ 1025, 1158.
- Disputed Factual Issues. See *People v. Gallardo* (2017) 4 Cal.5th 120, 136 [226 Cal.Rptr.3d 379, 407 P.3d 55]; *Descamps v. United States* (2013) 570 U.S. 254, 268–70 [133 S.Ct. 2276, 186 L.Ed.2d 438]; *Apprendi v. New Jersey* (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 490 [120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435].

#### RELATED ISSUES

See the Related Issues section of CALCRIM No. 3100, *Prior Conviction: Nonbifurcated Trial*.

#### SECONDARY SOURCES

- 5 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, § 727.
- 2 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 42, *Arraignment, Pleas, and Plea Bargaining*, § 42.21[6][a] (Matthew Bender).
- 5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 91,

*Sentencing*, §§ 91.21[2], 91.60[2][b], [c][ii], [3][b], 91.80[1][c], [2][a][ii] (Matthew Bender).

**3104–3114. Reserved for Future Use**





## B. ARMED WITH FIREARM

### 3115. Armed With Firearm (Pen. Code, § 12022(a)(1))

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If you find the defendant guilty of the crime[s] charged in Count[s] \_\_\_\_\_ [,] [or of attempting to commit (that/those) crime[s]] [or the lesser crime[s] of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] of alleged lesser offense[s]>], you must then decide whether[, for each crime,] the People have proved the additional allegation that one of the principals was armed with a firearm in the commission [or attempted commission] of that crime. [You must decide whether the People have proved this allegation for each crime and return a separate finding for each crime.]

A person is a *principal* in a crime if he or she directly commits [or attempts to commit] the crime or if he or she aids and abets someone else who commits [or attempts to commit] the crime.

[A *firearm* is any device designed to be used as a weapon, from which a projectile is discharged or expelled through a barrel by the force of an explosion or other form of combustion.]

[The term *firearm* is defined in another instruction.]

[A firearm does not need to be in working order if it was designed to shoot and appears capable of shooting.] [A firearm does not need to be loaded.]

A principal is *armed* with a firearm when that person:

1. Carries a firearm [or has a firearm available] for use in either offense or defense in connection with the crime[s] charged in Count[s] \_\_\_\_\_ [or the lesser crime[s] of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] of alleged lesser offense[s]>],;

**AND**

2. Knows that he or she is carrying the firearm [or has it available].

<If there is an issue in the case over whether the principal was armed with the firearm “in the commission of” the offense, see Bench Notes.>

The People have the burden of proving each allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you must find that the allegation has not been proved.

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the enhancement. (*Apprendi v. New Jersey* (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 490 [120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435].)

The court should give the bracketed definition of “firearm” unless the court has already given the definition in other instructions. In such cases, the court may give the bracketed sentence stating that the term is defined elsewhere.

When two or more defendants are charged with an arming enhancement for the same offense, the preferred approach is for the court to provide the jury with a separate verdict form for the enhancement for each defendant. (*People v. Paul* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 698, 708 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 660, 958 P.2d 412].) However, this procedure is not required. (*Id.* at p. 705.)

In the definition of “armed,” the court may give the bracketed phrase “or has a firearm available” on request if the evidence shows that the firearm was at the scene of the alleged crime and “available to the defendant to use in furtherance of the underlying felony.” (*People v. Bland* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 991, 997–998 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 77, 898 P.2d 391]; see also *People v. Wandick* (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 918, 927–928 [278 Cal.Rptr. 274] [language of instruction approved; sufficient evidence defendant had firearm available for use]; *People v. Jackson* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 411, 419–422 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 214] [evidence that firearm was two blocks away from scene of rape insufficient to show available to defendant].)

If the case involves an issue of whether the principal was armed “in the commission of” the offense, the court may give CALCRIM No. 3261, *While Committing a Felony: Defined—Escape Rule*. (See *People v. Jones* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 98, 109 [104 Cal.Rptr.2d 753, 18 P.3d 674]; *People v. Masbruch* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1001, 1014 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 760, 920 P.2d 705]; *People v. Taylor* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 578, 582 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 127].)

If there is evidence that the defendant was an aider and abettor, give the appropriate instructions on aider and abettor liability, CALCRIM Nos. 400–410.

## AUTHORITY

- Enhancement. Pen. Code, § 12022(a)(1).
- Principal Defined. Pen. Code, § 31.
- Firearm Defined. Pen. Code, § 16520.
- Armed. *People v. Bland* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 991, 997–998 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 77, 898 P.2d 391]; *People v. Jackson* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 411, 419–422 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 214]; *People v. Wandick* (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 918, 927–928 [278 Cal.Rptr. 274].
- Firearm Need Not Be Operable. *People v. Nelums* (1982) 31 Cal.3d 355, 360 [182 Cal.Rptr. 515, 644 P.2d 201].

- Firearm Need Not Be Loaded. See *People v. Steele* (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 788, 791–795 [286 Cal.Rptr. 887].
- “In Commission of” Felony/Facilitative Nexus. *People v. Bland* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 991, 1002 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 77, 898 P.2d 391]; *People v. Jones* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 98, 109–110 [104 Cal.Rptr.2d 753, 18 P.3d 674]; *People v. Masbruch* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1001, 1014 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 760, 920 P.2d 705]; *People v. Taylor* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 578, 582 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 127].
- Presence of Gun Cannot Be Accident or Coincidence. *Smith v. United States* (1993) 508 U.S. 223, 238 [113 S.Ct. 2050, 124 L.Ed.2d 138].

## RELATED ISSUES

### ***Defendant Need Not Know Principal Armed***

For an enhancement charged under Penal Code section 12022(a) where the prosecution is pursuing vicarious liability, it is not necessary for the prosecution to prove that the defendant knew that the principal was armed. (*People v. Overten* (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1497, 1501 [34 Cal.Rptr.2d 232].)

### ***Conspiracy***

A defendant convicted of conspiracy may also receive an enhancement for being armed during the conspiracy, regardless of whether the defendant is convicted of the offense alleged to be the target of the conspiracy. (*People v. Becker* (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 294, 298 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 354].)

### ***Facilitative Nexus/Connection***

Even though the Supreme Court is currently reviewing the Court of Appeal’s decision in *People v. Pitto*, the committee has revised the language of this instruction to more clearly express the facilitative nexus required in *People v. Bland* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 991, 1002 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 77, 898 P.2d 391] [contemporaneous possession of illegal drugs and firearm not sufficient without evidence of facilitative nexus between the two, comparing to federal law requirement of carrying a firearm ‘during and in relation to’ drug trafficking].

## SECONDARY SOURCES

3 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, §§ 357, 364.

5 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, § 727.

5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 91, *Sentencing*, § 91.31 (Matthew Bender).

**3116. Armed With Firearm: Assault Weapon, Machine Gun, or .50  
BMG Rifle (Pen. Code, § 12022(a)(2))**

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If you find the defendant guilty of the crime[s] charged in Count[s] \_\_\_\_\_ [,] [or of attempting to commit (that/those) crime[s]] [or the lesser crime[s] of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] of alleged lesser offense[s]>], you must then decide whether[, for each crime,] the People have proved the additional allegation that one of the principals was armed with (an assault weapon/a machine gun/a .50 BMG rifle) in the commission [or attempted commission] of that crime. [You must decide whether the People have proved this allegation for each crime and return a separate finding for each crime.]

A person is a *principal* in a crime if he or she directly commits [or attempts to commit] the crime or if he or she aids and abets someone else who commits [or attempts to commit] the crime.

[(A/An) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert type of weapon from Pen. Code, § 30510 or description from § 30515> is an *assault weapon*.]

[A *machine gun* is any weapon that (shoots[,/ [or] is designed to shoot[,/ [or] can readily be restored to shoot) automatically more than one shot by a single function of the trigger and without manual reloading.] [(A/ An) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of weapon deemed by the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms as readily convertible to a machine gun> is [also] a *machine gun*.]

[A *.50 BMG rifle* is a center fire rifle that can fire a .50 BMG cartridge [and that is not an assault weapon or a machine gun]. A *.50 BMG cartridge* is a cartridge that is designed and intended to be fired from a center fire rifle and that has all three of the following characteristics:

1. The overall length is 5.54 inches from the base to the tip of the bullet;
2. The bullet diameter for the cartridge is from .510 to, and including, .511 inch;

AND

3. The case base diameter for the cartridge is from .800 inch to, and including, .804 inch.]

[The term (*assault weapon/machine gun/.50 BMG rifle*) is defined in another instruction.]

[(An assault weapon/A machine gun/A .50 BMG rifle) does not need to be in working order if it was designed to shoot and appears capable of shooting.] [(An assault weapon/A machine gun/A .50 BMG rifle) does not need to be loaded.]

A principal is *armed* with (an assault weapon/a machine gun/a .50 BMG rifle) when that person:

1. Carries (an assault weapon/a machine gun/a .50 BMG rifle) [or has (an assault weapon/a machine gun/a .50 BMG rifle) available] for use in either offense or defense in connection with the crime[s] charged in Count[s] \_\_\_\_\_ [or the lesser crime[s] of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] of alleged lesser offense[s]>];

[AND]

2. Knows that he or she is carrying the weapon [or has it available](./;)

<See Bench Notes regarding element 3.>

[AND]

3. Knows or reasonably should know that the weapon has characteristics that make it (an assault weapon/a machine gun/a .50 BMG rifle).]

<If there is an issue in the case over whether the principal was armed with the firearm “in the commission of” the offense, see Bench Notes.>

**The People have the burden of proving each allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you must find that the allegation has not been proved.**

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2006, February 2012*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the enhancement. (*Apprendi v. New Jersey* (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 490 [120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435].)

The Supreme Court has held that for the crime of possession of an assault weapon, the prosecution must prove that the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the weapon possessed the characteristics of an assault weapon. (*In re Jorge M.* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 866, 887 [98 Cal.Rptr.2d 466, 4 P.3d 297].) It is unclear if this holding applies to an enhancement for being armed with an assault weapon. Element 3 is provided for the court to use at its discretion.

The court should give the bracketed definition of “assault weapon,” “machine gun,” or “.50 BMG rifle” unless the court has already given the definition in other instructions. In such cases, the court may give the bracketed sentence stating that the term is defined elsewhere.

When two or more defendants are charged with an arming enhancement for the

same offense, the preferred approach is for the court to provide the jury with a separate verdict form for the enhancement for each defendant. (*People v. Paul* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 698, 708 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 660, 958 P.2d 412].) However, this procedure is not required. (*Id.* at p. 705.)

In the definition of “armed,” the court may give the bracketed phrase “or has (an assault weapon/a machine gun) available” on request if the evidence shows that the weapon was at the scene of the alleged crime and “available to the defendant to use in furtherance of the underlying felony.” (*People v. Bland* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 991, 997–998 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 77, 898 P.2d 391]; see also *People v. Wandick* (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 918, 927–928 [278 Cal.Rptr. 274] [language of instruction approved; sufficient evidence defendant had firearm available for use]; *People v. Jackson* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 411, 419–422 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 214] [evidence that firearm was two blocks away from scene of rape insufficient to show available to defendant].)

If the case involves an issue of whether the principal was armed “during the commission of” the offense, the court may give CALCRIM No. 3261, *While Committing a Felony: Defined—Escape Rule*. (See *People v. Jones* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 98, 109 [104 Cal.Rptr.2d 753, 18 P.3d 674]; *People v. Masbruch* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1001, 1014 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 760, 920 P.2d 705]; *People v. Taylor* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 578, 582 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 127].)

If there is evidence that the defendant was an aider and abettor, give the appropriate instructions on aider and abettor liability, CALCRIM Nos. 400–410.

### AUTHORITY

- Enhancement. Pen. Code, § 12022(a)(2).
- Principal Defined. Pen. Code, § 31.
- Assault Weapon Defined. Pen. Code, §§ 30510, 30515.
- Machine Gun Defined. Pen. Code, § 16880.
- .50 BMG Rifle Defined. Pen. Code, § 30530.
- Knowledge Required for Possession of Assault Weapon. *In re Jorge M.* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 866, 887 [98 Cal.Rptr.2d 466, 4 P.3d 297].
- Armed. *People v. Bland* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 991, 997–998 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 77, 898 P.2d 391]; *People v. Jackson* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 411, 419–422 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 214]; *People v. Wandick* (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 918, 927–928 [278 Cal.Rptr. 274].
- Firearm Need Not Be Operable. *People v. Nelums* (1982) 31 Cal.3d 355, 360 [182 Cal.Rptr. 515, 644 P.2d 201].
- Firearm Need Not Be Loaded. See *People v. Steele* (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 788, 791–795 [286 Cal.Rptr. 887].
- “In Commission of” Felony/Facilitative Nexus. *People v. Bland* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 991, 1002 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 77, 898 P.2d 391]; *People v. Jones* (2001) 25

Cal.4th 98, 109–110 [104 Cal.Rptr.2d 753, 18 P.3d 674]; *People v. Masbruch* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1001, 1011–1013 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 760, 920 P.2d 705]; *People v. Taylor* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 578, 582 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 127].

- Presence of Gun Cannot Be Accident or Coincidence. (*Smith v. United States* (1993) 508 U.S. 223, 238 [113 S.Ct. 2050, 124 L.Ed.2d 138]).

### RELATED ISSUES

See the Related Issues section of CALCRIM No. 3115, *Armed With Firearm*.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

3 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, §§ 357, 364.

5 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, § 727.

5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 91, *Sentencing*, § 91.31 (Matthew Bender).



**3117. Armed With Firearm: Knowledge That Coparticipant Armed  
(Pen. Code, § 12022(d))**

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If you find the defendant guilty of the crime[s] charged in Count[s] \_\_\_\_\_ [,] [or of attempting to commit (that/those) crime[s]] [or the lesser crime[s] of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] of alleged lesser offense[s]>], you must then decide whether[, for each crime,] the People have proved the additional allegation that the defendant knew that someone who was a principal was armed with a firearm in the commission [or attempted commission] of that crime. [You must decide whether the People have proved this allegation for each crime and return a separate finding for each crime.]

To prove this allegation, the People must prove that:

1. Someone who was a principal in the crime was armed with a firearm during the commission [or attempted commission] of that crime;

AND

2. The defendant was also a principal in the crime and knew that the other person was armed with a firearm.

A person is a *principal* in a crime if he or she directly commits [or attempts to commit] the crime or if he or she aids and abets someone else who commits [or attempts to commit] the crime.

[A *firearm* is any device designed to be used as a weapon, from which a projectile is discharged or expelled through a barrel by the force of an explosion or other form of combustion.]

[The term *firearm* is defined in another instruction.]

[A firearm does not need to be in working order if it was designed to shoot and appears capable of shooting.] [A firearm does not need to be loaded.]

A principal is *armed* with a firearm when that person:

1. Carries a firearm [or has a firearm available] for use in either offense or defense in connection with the crime[s] charged in Count[s] \_\_\_\_\_ [or the lesser crime[s] of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] of alleged lesser offense[s]>];

AND

2. Knows that he or she is carrying the firearm [or has it available].

<If there is an issue in the case over whether the principal was armed with the firearm “in the commission of” the offense, see Bench Notes.>

The People have the burden of proving each allegation beyond a



**reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you must find that the allegation has not been proved.**

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2006, February 2012*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the enhancement. (*Apprendi v. New Jersey* (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 490 [120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435].)

The court should give the bracketed definition of “firearm” unless the court has already given the definition in other instructions. In such cases, the court may give the bracketed sentence stating that the term is defined elsewhere.

When two or more defendants are charged with an arming enhancement for the same offense, the preferred approach is for the court to provide the jury with a separate verdict form for the enhancement for each defendant. (*People v. Paul* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 698, 708 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 660, 958 P.2d 412].) However, this procedure is not required. (*Id.* at p. 705.)

In the definition of “armed,” the court may give the bracketed phrase “or has a firearm available” on request if the evidence shows that the firearm was at the scene of the alleged crime and “available to the defendant to use in furtherance of the underlying felony.” (*People v. Bland* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 991, 997–998 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 77, 898 P.2d 391]; see also *People v. Wandick* (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 918, 927–928 [278 Cal.Rptr. 274] [language of instruction approved; sufficient evidence defendant had firearm available for use]; *People v. Jackson* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 411, 419–422 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 214] [evidence that firearm was two blocks away from scene of rape insufficient to show available to defendant].)

If the case involves an issue of whether the principal was armed “in the commission” of the offense, the court may give CALCRIM No. 3261, *While Committing a Felony: Defined—Escape Rule*. (See *People v. Jones* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 98, 109 [104 Cal.Rptr.2d 753, 18 P.3d 674]; *People v. Masbruch* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1001, 1014 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 760, 920 P.2d 705]; *People v. Taylor* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 578, 582 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 127].)

If there is evidence that the defendant was an aider and abettor, give the appropriate instructions on aider and abettor liability, CALCRIM Nos. 400–410.

## AUTHORITY

- Enhancement. Pen. Code, § 12022(d).
- Principal Defined. Pen. Code, § 31.
- Firearm Defined. Pen. Code, § 16520.
- Armed. *People v. Bland* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 991, 997–998 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 77, 898 P.2d 391]; *People v. Jackson* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 411, 419–422 [38

Cal.Rptr.2d 214]; *People v. Wandick* (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 918, 927–928 [278 Cal.Rptr. 274].

- Firearm Need Not Be Operable. *People v. Nelums* (1982) 31 Cal.3d 355, 360 [182 Cal.Rptr. 515, 644 P.2d 201].
- Firearm Need Not Be Loaded. See *People v. Steele* (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 788, 791–795 [286 Cal.Rptr. 887].
- “In Commission of” Felony/Facilitative Nexus. *People v. Bland* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 991, 1002 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 77, 898 P.2d 391]; *People v. Jones* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 98, 109–110 [104 Cal.Rptr.2d 753, 18 P.3d 674]; *People v. Masbruch* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1001, 1011–1013 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 760, 920 P.2d 705]; *People v. Taylor* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 578, 582 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 127].
- Presence of Gun Cannot Be Accident or Coincidence. (*Smith v. United States* (1993) 508 U.S. 223, 238 [113 S.Ct. 2050, 124 L.Ed.2d 138]).

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Conspiracy*

A defendant convicted of conspiracy may also receive an enhancement for being armed during the conspiracy, regardless of whether the defendant is convicted of the offense alleged to be the target of the conspiracy. (*People v. Becker* (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 294, 298 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 354].)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

3 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, §§ 357, 364.

5 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, § 727.

5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 91, *Sentencing*, § 91.31 (Matthew Bender).

### **3118–3129. Reserved for Future Use**

## C. PERSONALLY ARMED WITH DEADLY WEAPON OR FIREARM

### 3130. Personally Armed With Deadly Weapon (Pen. Code, § 12022.3)

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If you find the defendant guilty of the crime[s] charged in Count[s] \_\_\_\_\_ [,] [or of attempting to commit (that/those) crime[s]] [or the lesser crime[s] of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] of alleged lesser offense[s]>], you must then decide whether[, for each crime,] the People have proved the additional allegation that the defendant was personally armed with a deadly weapon in the commission [or attempted commission] of that crime. [You must decide whether the People have proved this allegation for each crime and return a separate finding for each crime.]

A *deadly weapon* is any object, instrument, or weapon [that is inherently deadly or one] that is used in such a way that it is capable of causing and likely to cause death or great bodily injury.

[An object is *inherently deadly* if it is deadly or dangerous in the ordinary use for which it was designed.]

[In deciding whether an object is a deadly weapon, consider all the surrounding circumstances, including when and where the object was possessed[,], [and] [where the person who possessed the object was going][,], [and] [whether the object was changed from its standard form] [and any other evidence that indicates whether the object would be used for a dangerous, rather than a harmless, purpose.]]

*Great bodily injury* means significant or substantial physical injury. It is an injury that is greater than minor or moderate harm.

A person is *armed* with a deadly weapon when that person:

1. Carries a deadly weapon [or has a deadly weapon available] for use in either offense or defense in connection with the crime[s] charged;

AND

2. Knows that he or she is carrying the deadly weapon [or has it available].

<If there is an issue in the case over whether the defendant was armed with the weapon “in the commission of” the offense, see Bench Notes.>

The People have the burden of proving each allegation beyond a

**reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you must find that the allegation has not been proved.**

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*New January 2006; Revised December 2008, February 2013, September 2019, September 2020*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction when the enhancement is charged. (*Apprendi v. New Jersey* (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 490 [120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435].)

Give the bracketed phrase “that is inherently deadly or one” and give the bracketed definition of *inherently deadly* only if the object is a deadly weapon as a matter of law. (*People v. Stutelberg* (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 314, 317–318 [240 Cal.Rptr.3d 156].)

Give the bracketed portion that begins with “In deciding whether” if the object is not a weapon as a matter of law and is capable of innocent uses. (*People v. Aguilar* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1023, 1028–1029 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 655, 945 P.2d 1204]; *People v. Godwin* (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1562, 1573–1574 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 545].)

If determining whether the item is an inherently deadly weapon requires resolution of a factual issue, give both bracketed instructions.

In the definition of “armed,” the court may give the bracketed phrase “or has a deadly weapon available” on request if the evidence shows that the weapon was at the scene of the alleged crime and “available to the defendant to use in furtherance of the underlying felony.” (*People v. Bland* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 991, 997–998 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 77, 898 P.2d 391]; see also *People v. Wandick* (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 918, 927–928 [278 Cal.Rptr. 274] [language of instruction approved; sufficient evidence defendant had firearm available for use]; *People v. Jackson* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 411, 419–422 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 214] [evidence that firearm was two blocks away from scene of rape insufficient to show available to defendant].)

If the case involves an issue of whether the defendant was armed “in the commission of” the offense, the court may give CALCRIM No. 3261, *While Committing a Felony: Defined—Escape Rule*. (See *People v. Jones* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 98, 109 [104 Cal.Rptr.2d 753, 18 P.3d 674]; *People v. Masbruch* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1001, 1014 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 760, 920 P.2d 705]; *People v. Taylor* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 578, 582 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 127].)

The second sentence of the great bodily injury definition could result in error if the prosecution improperly argues great bodily injury may be shown by greater than minor injury alone. (Compare *People v. Medellin* (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 519, 533–535 [258 Cal.Rptr.3d 867] [the definition was reasonably susceptible to prosecutor’s erroneous argument that the injury need only be greater than minor] with *People v. Quinonez* (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 457, 466 [260 Cal.Rptr.3d 86]

[upholding instructions containing great bodily injury definition as written].)

### AUTHORITY

- Enhancement. Pen. Code, § 12022.3.
- Deadly Weapon Defined. *People v. Brown* (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1, 6–8 [147 Cal.Rptr.3d 848]; *People v. Aguilar* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1023, 1028–1029 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 655, 945 P.2d 1204]; *People v. Beasley* (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1078, 1086–1087 [130 Cal.Rptr.2d 717].
- Objects With Innocent Uses. *People v. Aguilar* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1023, 1028–1029 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 655, 945 P.2d 1204]; *People v. Godwin* (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1562, 1573–1574 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 545].
- Armed. *People v. Pitto* (2008) 43 Cal.4th 228, 236–240 [74 Cal.Rptr.3d 590, 180 P.3d 338]; *People v. Bland* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 991, 997–998 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 77, 898 P.2d 391]; *People v. Jackson* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 411, 419–422 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 214]; *People v. Wandick* (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 918, 927–928 [278 Cal.Rptr. 274].
- Must Be Personally Armed. *People v. Renner* (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 258, 267 [29 Cal.Rptr.2d 392]; *People v. Reed* (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 149, 152–153 [185 Cal.Rptr. 169].
- “In Commission of” Felony. *People v. Jones* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 98, 109–110 [104 Cal.Rptr.2d 753, 18 P.3d 674]; *People v. Masbruch* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1001, 1014 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 760, 920 P.2d 705]; *People v. Taylor* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 578, 582 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 127].
- Inherently Deadly Defined. *People v. Perez* (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1055, 1065 [232 Cal.Rptr.3d 51, 416 P.3d 42]; *People v. Aguilar* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1023, 1028–1029 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 655, 945 P.2d 1204].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Penal Code Section 220*

A defendant convicted of violating Penal Code section 220 may receive an enhancement under Penal Code section 12022.3 even though the latter statute does not specifically list section 220 as a qualifying offense. (*People v. Rich* (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 255, 261 [134 Cal.Rptr.2d 553].) Section 12022.3 does apply to attempts to commit one of the enumerated offenses, and a conviction for violating section 220, assault with intent to commit a sexual offense, “translates into an attempt to commit” a sexual offense. (*People v. Rich, supra*, 109 Cal.App.4th at p. 261.)

#### *Multiple Weapons*

There is a split in the Court of Appeal over whether a defendant may receive multiple enhancements under Penal Code section 12022.3 if the defendant has multiple weapons in his or her possession during the offense. (*People v. Maciel* (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 273, 279 [215 Cal.Rptr. 124] [defendant may only receive one enhancement for each sexual offense, either for being armed with a rifle or for

using a knife, but not both]; *People v. Stiltner* (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 216, 232 [182 Cal.Rptr. 790] [defendant may receive both enhancement for being armed with a knife and enhancement for using a pistol for each sexual offense].) The court should review the current state of the law before sentencing a defendant to multiple weapons enhancements under Penal Code section 12022.3.

### ***Pepper Spray***

In *People v. Blake* (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 543, 559 [11 Cal.Rptr.3d 678], the court upheld the jury's determination that pepper spray was a deadly weapon.

## **SECONDARY SOURCES**

3 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, §§ 349, 364, 388.

5 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, § 727.

5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 91, *Sentencing*, § 91.31 (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, §§ 142.20[7][c], 142.21[1][d][iii] (Matthew Bender).

**3131. Personally Armed With Firearm (Pen. Code, §§ 1203.06(b)(3),  
12022(c), 12022.3(b))**

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If you find the defendant guilty of the crime[s] charged in Count[s] \_\_\_\_\_ [,] [or of attempting to commit (that/those) crime[s]] [or the lesser crime[s] of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] of alleged lesser offense[s]>], you must then decide whether[, for each crime,] the People have proved the additional allegation that the defendant was personally armed with a firearm in the commission [or attempted commission] of that crime. [You must decide whether the People have proved this allegation for each crime and return a separate finding for each crime.]

[A *firearm* is any device designed to be used as a weapon, from which a projectile is discharged or expelled through a barrel by the force of an explosion or other form of combustion.]

[The term *firearm* is defined in another instruction.]

[A firearm does not need to be in working order if it was designed to shoot and appears capable of shooting.] [A firearm does not need to be loaded.]

A person is *armed* with a firearm when that person:

1. Carries a firearm or has a firearm available for use in either offense or defense in connection with the crime[s] charged;

**AND**

2. Knows that he or she is carrying the firearm or has it available for use.

<If there is an issue in the case over whether the defendant was armed with the firearm “in the commission of” the offense, see Bench Notes.>

**The People have the burden of proving each allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you must find that the allegation has not been proved.**

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*New January 2006; Revised June 2007, December 2008, February 2012*

**BENCH NOTES**

***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction when the enhancement is charged. (*Apprendi v. New Jersey* (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 490 [120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435].)

The court should give the bracketed definition of “firearm” unless the court has



already given the definition in other instructions. In such cases, the court may give the bracketed sentence stating that the term is defined elsewhere.

In the definition of “armed,” the court may give the bracketed phrase “or has a firearm available” on request if the evidence shows that the firearm was at the scene of the alleged crime and “available to the defendant to use in furtherance of the underlying felony.” (*People v. Bland* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 991, 997–998 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 77, 898 P.2d 391]; see also *People v. Wandick* (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 918, 927–928 [278 Cal.Rptr. 274] [language of instruction approved; sufficient evidence defendant had firearm available for use]; *People v. Jackson* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 411, 419–422 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 214] [evidence that firearm was two blocks away from scene of rape insufficient to show available to defendant].)

If the case involves an issue of whether the defendant was armed “in the commission of” the offense, the court may give CALCRIM No. 3261, *While Committing a Felony: Defined—Escape Rule*. (See *People v. Jones* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 98, 109 [104 Cal.Rptr.2d 753, 18 P.3d 674]; *People v. Masbruch* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1001, 1014 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 760, 920 P.2d 705]; *People v. Taylor* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 578, 582 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 127].)

If the defendant is charged with being ineligible for probation under Penal Code section 1203.06 for being armed during the commission of the offense and having been convicted of a specified prior crime, the court should also give CALCRIM No. 3100, *Prior Conviction: Nonbifurcated Trial*, with this instruction unless the defendant has stipulated to the prior conviction or the court has granted a bifurcated trial.

### AUTHORITY

- Enhancement. Pen. Code, §§ 1203.06(b)(3), 12022(c), 12022.3(b).
- Firearm Defined. Pen. Code, § 16520.
- Armed. *People v. Pitto* (2008) 43 Cal.4th 228, 236–240 [74 Cal.Rptr.3d 590, 180 P.3d 338]; *People v. Bland* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 991, 997–998 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 77, 898 P.2d 391]; *People v. Jackson* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 411, 419–422 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 214]; *People v. Wandick* (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 918, 927–928 [278 Cal.Rptr. 274].
- Personally Armed. *People v. Smith* (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 196, 203–208 [11 Cal.Rptr.2d 645].
- Must Be Personally Armed for Enhancement Under Penal Code Section 12022.3. *People v. Rener* (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 258, 267 [29 Cal.Rptr.2d 392]; *People v. Reed* (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 149, 152–153 [185 Cal.Rptr. 169].
- Defendant Not Present When Drugs and Weapon Found. *People v. Bland* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 991, 995 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 77, 898 P.2d 391].
- Facilitative Nexus. *People v. Pitto* (2008) 43 Cal.4th 228, 236–240 [74 Cal.Rptr.3d 590, 180 P.3d 338].
- Firearm Need Not Be Operable. *People v. Nelums* (1982) 31 Cal.3d 355, 360 [182 Cal.Rptr. 515, 644 P.2d 201].



- Firearm Need Not Be Loaded. See *People v. Steele* (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 788, 791–795 [286 Cal.Rptr. 887].
- “In Commission of” Felony. *People v. Jones* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 98, 109–110 [104 Cal.Rptr.2d 753, 18 P.3d 674]; *People v. Masbruch* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1001, 1014 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 760, 920 P.2d 705]; *People v. Taylor* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 578, 582 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 127].

**RELATED ISSUES**

***Defendant Not Present When Drugs and Weapon Found***

In *People v. Bland* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 991, 995 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 77, 898 P.2d 391], the defendant was convicted of possession of a controlled substance and an enhancement for being armed during that offense despite the fact that he was not present when the police located the illegal drugs and firearm. The Court held that there was sufficient evidence to support the arming enhancement, stating:

[W]hen the prosecution has proved a charge of felony drug possession, and the evidence at trial shows that a firearm was found in close proximity to the illegal drugs in a place frequented by the defendant, a jury may reasonably infer: (1) that the defendant knew of the firearm’s presence; (2) that its presence together with the drugs was not accidental or coincidental; and (3) that, at some point during the period of illegal drug possession, the defendant had the firearm close at hand and thus available for immediate use to aid in the drug offense. These reasonable inferences, if not refuted by defense evidence, are sufficient to warrant a determination that the defendant was “armed with a firearm in the commission” of a felony within the meaning of section 12022.

*(Ibid.)*

The *Bland* case did not state that the jury should be specifically instructed in these inferences, and it appears that no special instruction was given in *Bland*. If the prosecution requests a special instruction on this issue, the court may consider using the following language:

If the People have proved that a firearm was found close to the \_\_\_\_\_ <insert type of controlled substance allegedly possessed> in a place where the defendant was frequently present, you may but are not required to conclude that:

1. The defendant knew the firearm was present;
2. It was not accidental or coincidental that the firearm was present together with the drugs;

AND

3. During at least part of the time that the defendant allegedly possessed the illegal drug, (he/she) had the firearm close at hand and available for immediate use to aid in the drug offense.

If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the evidence supports these conclusions, you may but are not required to conclude that the defendant was personally armed with a firearm in the commission [or attempted commission]

of the \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of alleged offense>] [or the lesser crime of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of alleged lesser offense>].

***Multiple Defendants—Single Weapon***

Two or more defendants may be personally armed with a single weapon at the same time. (*People v. Smith* (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 196, 205 [11 Cal.Rptr.2d 645].) It is for the jury to decide if the firearm was readily available to both defendants for use in offense or defense. (*Ibid.*)

For enhancements charged under Penal Code section 12022.3, see also the Related Issues section of CALCRIM No. 3130, *Personally Armed With Deadly Weapon*.

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

3 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, §§ 349, 357, 364, 388.

5 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, § 727.

5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 91, *Sentencing*, § 91.31 (Matthew Bender).

**3132. Personally Armed With Firearm: Unlawfully Armed When Arrested (Pen. Code, § 1203.06(a)(3))**

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If you find the defendant guilty of the crime[s] charged in Count[s] \_\_\_\_\_ [,] [or of attempting to commit (that/those) crime[s]] [or the lesser crime[s] of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] of alleged lesser offense[s]>], you must then decide whether[, for each crime,] the People have proved the additional allegation that the defendant was unlawfully armed with a firearm when (he/she) was arrested for that crime. [You must decide whether the People have proved this allegation for each crime and return a separate finding for each crime.]

To prove this allegation, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant was personally armed with a firearm when (he/she) was arrested for the crime;

**AND**

2. The defendant possessed the firearm unlawfully.

[A *firearm* is any device designed to be used as a weapon, from which a projectile is discharged or expelled through a barrel by the force of an explosion or other form of combustion.]

[The term *firearm* is defined in another instruction.]

[A firearm does not need to be in working order if it was designed to shoot and appears capable of shooting.] [A firearm does not need to be loaded.]

A person is *armed* with a firearm when that person:

1. Carries a firearm or has a firearm available for use in either offense or defense;

**AND**

2. Knows that he or she is carrying the firearm or has it available for use.

Other instructions explain what is necessary for the People to prove that the defendant possessed the firearm unlawfully. You must apply those instructions when you decide whether the People have proved this additional allegation.

The People have the burden of proving each allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you must find that the allegation has not been proved.

*New January 2006; Revised June 2007, February 2012*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction when the enhancement is charged. (*Apprendi v. New Jersey* (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 490 [120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435].)

The court **must also give** the appropriate instruction on unlawful possession of a firearm under Penal Code section 29800, 25400, or 25850. See CALCRIM Nos. 2500 et seq., on weapons.

The court should give the bracketed definition of “firearm” unless the court has already given the definition in other instructions. In such cases, the court may give the bracketed sentence stating that the term is defined elsewhere.

In the definition of “armed,” the court may give the bracketed phrase “or has a firearm available” on request if the evidence shows that the firearm was at the scene of the alleged crime and “available to the defendant to use in furtherance of the underlying felony.” (*People v. Bland* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 991, 997–998 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 77, 898 P.2d 391]; see also *People v. Wandick* (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 918, 927–928 [278 Cal.Rptr. 274] [language of instruction approved; sufficient evidence defendant had firearm available for use]; *People v. Jackson* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 411, 419–422 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 214] [evidence that firearm was two blocks away from scene of rape insufficient to show available to defendant].)

If the defendant is charged with being ineligible for probation under Penal Code section 1203.06 for being armed when arrested and having been convicted of a specified prior crime, the court should also give CALCRIM No. 3100, *Prior Conviction: Nonbifurcated Trial*, with this instruction unless the defendant has stipulated to the prior conviction or the court has granted a bifurcated trial.

## AUTHORITY

- Enhancement. Pen. Code, § 1203.06(a)(3).
- Firearm Defined. Pen. Code, § 16520.
- Armed. *People v. Bland* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 991, 997–998 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 77, 898 P.2d 391]; *People v. Jackson* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 411, 419–422 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 214]; *People v. Wandick* (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 918, 927–928 [278 Cal.Rptr. 274].
- Personally Armed. *People v. Smith* (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 196, 203–208 [11 Cal.Rptr.2d 645].
- Firearm Need Not Be Operable. See *People v. Nelums* (1982) 31 Cal.3d 355, 360 [182 Cal.Rptr. 515, 644 P.2d 201].
- Firearm Need Not Be Loaded. See *People v. Steele* (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 788, 791–795 [286 Cal.Rptr. 887].

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

3 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, §§ 349, 357, 364, 388.

5 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, § 727.

5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 91, *Sentencing*, § 91.31 (Matthew Bender).

**3133–3144. Reserved for Future Use**



## D. PERSONALLY USED DEADLY WEAPON OR FIREARM

3145. Personally Used Deadly Weapon (Pen. Code, §§ 667.61(e)(3), 1192.7(c)(23), 12022(b)(1) & (2), 12022.3)

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If you find the defendant guilty of the crime[s] charged in Count[s] \_\_\_\_\_ [,] [or of attempting to commit (that/those) crime[s]] [or the lesser crime[s] of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] of alleged lesser offense[s]>], you must then decide whether[, for each crime,] the People have proved the additional allegation that the defendant personally used a deadly [or dangerous] weapon during the commission [or attempted commission] of that crime. [You must decide whether the People have proved this allegation for each crime and return a separate finding for each crime.]

A *deadly [or dangerous] weapon* is any object, instrument, or weapon that is [inherently deadly] [or] [dangerous] [or one that is] used in such a way that it is capable of causing and likely to cause death or great bodily injury.

[An object is *inherently deadly* if it is deadly or dangerous in the ordinary use for which it was designed.]

[In deciding whether an object is a deadly weapon, consider all the surrounding circumstances, including when and where the object was possessed[, ] [and] [where the person who possessed the object was going][, ] [and] [whether the object was changed from its standard form] [and any other evidence that indicates whether the object would be used for a dangerous, rather than a harmless, purpose.]]

*Great bodily injury* means significant or substantial physical injury. It is an injury that is greater than minor or moderate harm.

Someone *personally uses* a deadly [or dangerous] weapon if he or she intentionally [does any of the following]:

[1. Displays the weapon in a menacing manner(./;)]

[OR]

[(2/1). Hits someone with the weapon(./;)]

[OR]

[(3/2). Fires the weapon(./;)]

[OR]

[(4/3). \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of use>.]

<If there is an issue in the case over whether the defendant used the weapon “in the commission of” the offense, see Bench Notes.>

**The People have the burden of proving each allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you must find that the allegation has not been proved.**

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*New January 2006; Revised June 2007, February 2013, September 2017, September 2019, September 2020*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the enhancement. (*Apprendi v. New Jersey* (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 490 [120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435].)

Give all of the bracketed “or dangerous” phrases if the enhancement charged uses both the words “deadly” and “dangerous” to describe the weapon. (Pen. Code, §§ 667.61, 1192.7(c)(23), 12022(b).) Do not give these bracketed phrases if the enhancement uses only the word “deadly.” (Pen. Code, § 12022.3.)

Give the bracketed phrase “inherently deadly” and give the bracketed definition of *inherently deadly* only if the object is a deadly weapon as a matter of law. (*People v. Stutelberg* (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 314, 317–318 [240 Cal.Rptr.3d 156].)

Give the bracketed portion that begins with “In deciding whether” if the object is not a weapon as a matter of law and is capable of innocent uses. (*People v. Aguilar* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1023, 1028–1029 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 655, 945 P.2d 1204]; *People v. Godwin* (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1562, 1573–1574 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 545].)

If determining whether the item is an inherently deadly weapon requires resolution of a factual issue, give both bracketed instructions.

In the definition of “personally uses,” the court may give the bracketed item 3 if the case involves an object that may be “fired.”

If the case involves an issue of whether the defendant used the weapon “in the commission of” the offense, the court may give CALCRIM No. 3261, *While Committing a Felony: Defined—Escape Rule*. (See *People v. Jones* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 98, 109 [104 Cal.Rptr.2d 753, 18 P.3d 674]; *People v. Masbruch* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1001, 1014 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 760, 920 P.2d 705]; *People v. Taylor* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 578, 582 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 127].)

The second sentence of the great bodily injury definition could result in error if the prosecution improperly argues great bodily injury may be shown by greater than minor injury alone. (Compare *People v. Medellin* (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 519, 533–535 [258 Cal.Rptr.3d 867] [the definition was reasonably susceptible to prosecutor’s erroneous argument that the injury need only be greater than minor] with *People v. Quinonez* (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 457, 466 [260 Cal.Rptr.3d 86]



[upholding instructions containing great bodily injury definition as written].)

### AUTHORITY

- Enhancements. Pen. Code, §§ 667.61(e)(3), 1192.7(c)(23), 12022(b)(1) & (2), 12022.3.
- Deadly Weapon Defined. *People v. Aguilar* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1023, 1028–1029 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 655, 945 P.2d 1204]; *People v. Beasley* (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1078, 1086–1087 [130 Cal.Rptr.2d 717].
- Objects With Innocent Uses. *People v. Aguilar* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1023, 1028–1029 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 655, 945 P.2d 1204]; *People v. Godwin* (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1562, 1573–1574 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 545].
- Personally Uses. *People v. Bland* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 991, 997 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 77, 898 P.2d 391]; *People v. Johnson* (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1319–1320 [45 Cal.Rptr.2d 602]; see also Pen. Code, § 1203.06(b)(2).
- “In Commission of” Felony. *People v. Jones* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 98, 109–110 [104 Cal.Rptr.2d 753, 18 P.3d 674]; *People v. Masbruch* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1001, 1014 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 760, 920 P.2d 705]; *People v. Taylor* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 578, 582 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 127].
- May Not Receive Enhancement for Both Using and Being Armed With One Weapon. *People v. Wischemann* (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 162, 175–176 [156 Cal.Rptr. 386].
- Inherently Deadly Defined. *People v. Perez* (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1055, 1065 [232 Cal.Rptr.3d 51, 416 P.3d 42]; *People v. Aguilar* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1023, 1028–1029 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 655, 945 P.2d 1204].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *No Duty to Instruct on “Lesser Included Enhancements”*

“[A] trial court’s sua sponte obligation to instruct on lesser included offenses does not encompass an obligation to instruct on ‘lesser included enhancements.’ ” (*People v. Majors* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 385, 411 [75 Cal.Rptr.2d 684, 956 P.2d 1137].) Thus, if the defendant is charged with an enhancement for use of a weapon, the court does not need to instruct on an enhancement for being armed.

#### *Weapon Displayed Before Felony Committed*

Where a weapon is displayed initially and the underlying crime is committed some time after the initial display, the jury may conclude that the defendant used the weapon in the commission of the offense if the display of the weapon was “at least . . . an aid in completing an essential element of the subsequent crimes . . . .” (*People v. Masbruch* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1001, 1014 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 760, 920 P.2d 705].)

#### *Weapon Used Did Not Cause Death*

In *People v. Lerma* (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1221, 1224 [50 Cal.Rptr.2d 580], the defendant stabbed the victim and then kicked him. The coroner testified that the

victim died as a result of blunt trauma to the head and that the knife wounds were not life threatening. (*Ibid.*) The court upheld the finding that the defendant had used a knife during the murder even though the weapon was not the cause of death. (*Id.* at p. 1226.) The court held that in order for a weapon to be used in the commission of the crime, there must be “a nexus between the offense and the item at issue, [such] that the item was an instrumentality of the crime.” (*Ibid.*) [ellipsis and brackets omitted] Here, the court found that “[t]he knife was instrumental to the consummation of the murder and was used to advantage.” (*Ibid.*)

#### ***“One Strike” Law and Use Enhancement***

Where the defendant’s use of a weapon has been used as a basis for applying the “one strike” law for sex offenses, the defendant may not also receive a separate enhancement for use of a weapon in commission of the same offense. (*People v. Mancebo* (2002) 27 Cal.4th 735, 754 [117 Cal.Rptr.2d 550, 41 P.3d 556].)

#### ***Assault and Use of Deadly Weapon Enhancement***

“A conviction [for assault with a deadly weapon or by means of force likely to cause great bodily injury] under [Penal Code] section 245, subdivision (a)(1) cannot be enhanced pursuant to section 12022, subdivision (b).” (*People v. Summersville* (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1062, 1070 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 683].)

#### ***Robbery and Use of Deadly Weapon Enhancement***

A defendant may be convicted and sentenced for both robbery and an enhancement for use of a deadly weapon during the robbery. (*In re Michael L.* (1985) 39 Cal.3d 81, 88 [216 Cal.Rptr. 140, 702 P.2d 222].)

### **SECONDARY SOURCES**

1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, § 40.

3 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, §§ 356–357, 361–369.

5 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, § 727.

5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 91, *Sentencing*, §§ 91.30, 91.81[1][d] (Matthew Bender).

**3146. Personally Used Firearm (Pen. Code, §§ 667.5(c)(8), 667.61(e)(4), 1203.06, 1192.7(c)(8), 12022.3, 12022.5, 12022.53(b))**

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If you find the defendant guilty of the crime[s] charged in Count[s] \_\_\_\_\_ [,] [or of attempting to commit (that/those) crime[s]] [or the lesser crime[s] of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] of alleged lesser offense[s]>], you must then decide whether[, for each crime,] the People have proved the additional allegation that the defendant personally used a firearm during the commission [or attempted commission] of that crime. [You must decide whether the People have proved this allegation for each crime and return a separate finding for each crime.]

[A *firearm* is any device designed to be used as a weapon, from which a projectile is discharged or expelled through a barrel by the force of an explosion or other form of combustion.]

[The term *firearm* is defined in another instruction.]

[A firearm does not need to be in working order if it was designed to shoot and appears capable of shooting.] [A firearm does not need to be loaded.]

Someone *personally uses* a firearm if he or she intentionally does any of the following:

1. Displays the weapon in a menacing manner;
2. Hits someone with the weapon;

OR

3. Fires the weapon.

<If there is an issue in the case over whether the defendant used the firearm “during the commission of” the offense, see Bench Notes.>

The People have the burden of proving each allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you must find that the allegation has not been proved.

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2012*

## **BENCH NOTES**

### ***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the enhancement. (*Apprendi v. New Jersey* (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 490 [120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435].)

The court should give the bracketed definition of “firearm” unless the court has

already given the definition in other instructions. In such cases, the court may give the bracketed sentence stating that the term is defined elsewhere.

If the case involves an issue of whether the defendant used the weapon “during the commission of” the offense, the court may give CALCRIM No. 3261, *While Committing a Felony: Defined—Escape Rule*. (See *People v. Jones* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 98, 109 [104 Cal.Rptr.2d 753, 18 P.3d 674]; *People v. Masbruch* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1001, 1014 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 760, 920 P.2d 705]; *People v. Taylor* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 578, 582 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 127].)

### AUTHORITY

- Enhancements. Pen. Code, §§ 667.5(c)(8), 667.61(e)(4), 1203.06, 12022.3, 12022.5, 12022.53(b).
- Firearm Defined. Pen. Code, § 16520.
- Firearm Need Not Be Operable. *People v. Nelums* (1982) 31 Cal.3d 355, 360 [182 Cal.Rptr. 515, 644 P.2d 201]; see also Pen. Code, § 12022.53(b).
- Firearm Need Not Be Loaded. See *People v. Steele* (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 788, 791–795 [286 Cal.Rptr. 887]; see also Pen. Code, § 12022.53(b).
- Personally Uses. *People v. Bland* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 991, 997 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 77, 898 P.2d 391]; *People v. Johnson* (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1319–1320 [45 Cal.Rptr.2d 602]; see also Pen. Code, § 1203.06(b)(2).
- “During Commission of” Felony. *People v. Jones* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 98, 109–110 [104 Cal.Rptr.2d 753, 18 P.3d 674]; *People v. Masbruch* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1001, 1014 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 760, 920 P.2d 705]; *People v. Taylor* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 578, 582 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 127].
- May Not Receive Enhancement for Both Using and Being Armed With One Weapon. *People v. Wischemann* (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 162, 175–176 [156 Cal.Rptr. 386].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### ***Multiple Victims—Penal Code Section 12022.5***

A defendant may receive multiple use enhancements under Penal Code section 12022.5 if convicted of multiple charges based on multiple victims even if the crimes occurred in a single “transaction” or “occurrence.” (*In re Tameka C.* (2000) 22 Cal.4th 190, 195–198 [91 Cal.Rptr.2d 730, 990 P.2d 603].) Thus, where the defendant was convicted of two counts of assault based on firing a single shot at one person, injuring a second, unintended victim, the defendant properly received two use enhancements. (*Id.* at p. 200.)

See the Related Issues section of CALCRIM No. 3145, *Personally Used Deadly Weapon*.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

3 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, §§ 356, 358–369.

5 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, § 727.

5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 91, *Sentencing*, §§ 91.30, 91.81[1][d] (Matthew Bender).

**3147. Personally Used Firearm: Assault Weapon, Machine Gun, or  
.50 BMG Rifle (Pen. Code, § 12022.5(b))**

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If you find the defendant guilty of the crime[s] charged in Count[s] \_\_\_\_\_ [,] [or of attempting to commit (that/those) crime[s]] [or the lesser crime[s] of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] of alleged lesser offense[s]>], you must then decide whether[, for each crime,] the People have proved the additional allegation that the defendant personally used (an assault weapon/a machine gun/a .50 BMG rifle) during the commission [or attempted commission] of that crime. [You must decide whether the People have proved this allegation for each crime and return a separate finding for each crime.]

[(A/An) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert type of weapon from Pen. Code, § 30510 or description from § 30515> is an assault weapon.]

[A machine gun is any weapon that (shoots[,]/ [or] is designed to shoot[,]/ [or] can readily be restored to shoot) automatically more than one shot by a single function of the trigger and without manual reloading.] [(A/ An) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of weapon deemed by the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms as readily convertible to a machine gun> is [also] a machine gun.]

[A .50 BMG rifle is a center fire rifle that can fire a .50 BMG cartridge [and that is not an assault weapon or a machine gun]. A .50 BMG cartridge is a cartridge that is designed and intended to be fired from a center fire rifle and that has all three of the following characteristics:

1. The overall length is 5.54 inches from the base to the tip of the bullet;
2. The bullet diameter for the cartridge is from .510 to, and including, .511 inch;

AND

3. The case base diameter for the cartridge is from .800 inch to, and including, .804 inch.]

[The term (assault weapon/machine gun/.50 BMG rifle) is defined in another instruction.]

[(An assault weapon/A machine gun/A .50 BMG rifle) does not need to be in working order if it was designed to shoot and appears capable of shooting.] [(An assault weapon/A machine gun/A .50 BMG rifle) does not need to be loaded.]

Someone *personally uses* (an assault weapon/a machine gun/a .50 BMG rifle) if he or she [knows or reasonably should know that the weapon has

characteristics that make it (an assault weapon/a machine gun/a .50 BMG rifle) and] intentionally does any of the following:

1. Displays the (assault weapon/machine gun/.50 BMG rifle) in a menacing manner;
2. Hits someone with the (assault weapon/machine gun/.50 BMG rifle);

OR

3. Fires the (assault weapon/machine gun/.50 BMG rifle).

*<If there is an issue in the case over whether the defendant used the weapon “during the commission of” the offense, see Bench Notes.>*

**The People have the burden of proving each allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you must find that the allegation has not been proved.**

*New January 2006; Revised February 2012*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the enhancement. (*Apprendi v. New Jersey* (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 490 [120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435].)

The Supreme Court has held that for the crime of possession of an assault weapon, the prosecution must prove that the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the weapon possessed the characteristics of an assault weapon. (*In re Jorge M.* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 866, 887 [98 Cal.Rptr.2d 466, 4 P.3d 297].) It is unclear if this holding applies to an enhancement for using an assault weapon. In the definition of “personally uses,” the court may give the bracketed phrase that begins “knows or reasonably should know” at its discretion.

The court should give the bracketed definition of “assault weapon” or “machine gun” unless the court has already given the definition in other instructions. In such cases, the court may give the bracketed sentence stating that the term is defined elsewhere.

If the case involves an issue of whether the defendant used the weapon “during the commission of” the offense, the court may give CALCRIM No. 3261, *While Committing a Felony: Defined—Escape Rule*. (See *People v. Jones* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 98, 109 [104 Cal.Rptr.2d 753, 18 P.3d 674]; *People v. Masbruch* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1001, 1014 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 760, 920 P.2d 705]; *People v. Taylor* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 578, 582 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 127].)

## AUTHORITY

- Enhancement. Pen. Code, § 12022.5(b).

- Assault Weapon Defined. Pen. Code, §§ 30510, 30515.
- Machine Gun Defined. Pen. Code, § 16880.
- .50 BMG Rifle Defined. Pen. Code, § 30530.
- Knowledge Required for Assault Weapon Possession. *In re Jorge M.* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 866, 887 [98 Cal.Rptr.2d 466, 4 P.3d 297].
- Firearm Need Not Be Operable. *People v. Nelums* (1982) 31 Cal.3d 355, 360 [182 Cal.Rptr. 515, 644 P.2d 201]; see also Pen. Code, § 12022.53(b).
- Firearm Need Not Be Loaded. See *People v. Steele* (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 788, 791–795 [286 Cal.Rptr. 887]; see also Pen. Code, § 12022.53(b).
- Personally Uses. *People v. Bland* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 991, 997 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 77, 898 P.2d 391]; *People v. Johnson* (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1319–1320 [45 Cal.Rptr.2d 602]; see also Pen. Code, § 1203.06(b)(2).
- “During Commission of” Felony. *People v. Jones* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 98, 109–110 [104 Cal.Rptr.2d 753, 18 P.3d 674]; *People v. Masbruch* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1001, 1014 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 760, 920 P.2d 705]; *People v. Taylor* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 578, 582 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 127].
- May Not Receive Enhancement for Both Using and Being Armed With One Weapon. *People v. Wischemann* (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 162, 175–176 [156 Cal.Rptr. 386].

### RELATED ISSUES

See the Related Issues sections of CALCRIM No. 3145, *Personally Used Deadly Weapon*, and CALCRIM No. 3146, *Personally Used Firearm*.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

3 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, §§ 356, 358–369.

5 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, § 727.

5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 91, *Sentencing*, § 91.30[1] (Matthew Bender).



**3148. Personally Used Firearm: Intentional Discharge (Pen. Code, § 12022.53(c))**

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If you find the defendant guilty of the crime[s] charged in Count[s] \_\_\_\_\_ [,] [or of attempting to commit (that/those) crime[s]] [or the lesser crime[s] of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] of alleged lesser offense[s]>], you must then decide whether[, for each crime,] the People have proved the additional allegation that the defendant personally and intentionally discharged a firearm during that offense. [You must decide whether the People have proved this allegation for each crime and return a separate finding for each crime.]

To prove this allegation, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant personally discharged a firearm during the commission [or attempted commission] of the crime;

**AND**

2. The defendant intended to discharge the firearm.

[A *firearm* is any device designed to be used as a weapon, from which a projectile is discharged or expelled through a barrel by the force of an explosion or other form of combustion.]

[The term *firearm* is defined in another instruction.]

<If there is an issue in the case over whether the defendant discharged the firearm “during the commission of” the offense, see Bench Notes.>

**The People have the burden of proving each allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you must find that the allegation has not been proved.**

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2012*

**BENCH NOTES**

***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the enhancement. (*Apprendi v. New Jersey* (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 490 [120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435].) If the defendant is charged with an enhancement for both intentional discharge *and* intentional discharge causing great bodily injury or death, the court may give CALCRIM No. 3150, *Personally Used Firearm: Intentional Discharge and Discharge Causing Injury or Death Both Charged*, instead of this instruction.

The court should give the bracketed definition of “firearm” unless the court has already given the definition in other instructions. In such cases, the court may give

the bracketed sentence stating that the term is defined elsewhere.

If the case involves an issue of whether the defendant used the weapon “during the commission of” the offense, the court may give CALCRIM No. 3261, *While Committing a Felony: Defined—Escape Rule*. (See *People v. Jones* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 98, 109 [104 Cal.Rptr.2d 753, 18 P.3d 674]; *People v. Masbruch* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1001, 1014 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 760, 920 P.2d 705]; *People v. Taylor* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 578, 582 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 127].)

### AUTHORITY

- Enhancement. Pen. Code, § 12022.53(c).
- Firearm Defined. Pen. Code, § 16520.
- “During Commission of” Felony. *People v. Jones* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 98, 109–110 [104 Cal.Rptr.2d 753, 18 P.3d 674]; *People v. Masbruch* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1001, 1014 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 760, 920 P.2d 705]; *People v. Taylor* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 578, 582 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 127].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Self-Defense and Imperfect Self-Defense*

Penal Code section 12022.53(l) provides that “[t]he enhancements specified in this section shall not apply to the lawful use or discharge of a firearm . . . by any person in lawful self-defense, lawful defense of another, or lawful defense of property, as provided in Sections 197, 198, and 198.5.” In *People v. Watie* (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 866, 884 [124 Cal.Rptr.2d 258], the court held, “[t]his subdivision, on its face, exempts lawful (perfect) self-defense from the section’s application. It does not exempt imperfect self-defense.” Further, an instruction informing the jury that the defense of self-defense applies to the enhancement is not necessary. (*Id.* at p. 886.)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

3 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, §§ 359–360.

5 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, § 727.

5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 91, *Sentencing*, § 91.30[5] (Matthew Bender).

**3149. Personally Used Firearm: Intentional Discharge Causing Injury or Death (Pen. Code, §§ 667.61(e)(3), 12022.53(d))**

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If you find the defendant guilty of the crime[s] charged in Count[s] \_\_\_\_\_ [,] [or of attempting to commit (that/those) crime[s]] [or the lesser crime[s] of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] of alleged lesser offense[s]>], you must then decide whether[, for each crime,] the People have proved the additional allegation that the defendant personally and intentionally discharged a firearm during that crime causing (great bodily injury/ [or] death). [You must decide whether the People have proved this allegation for each crime and return a separate finding for each crime.]

To prove this allegation, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant personally discharged a firearm during the commission [or attempted commission] of that crime;
2. The defendant intended to discharge the firearm;

AND

3. The defendant's act caused (great bodily injury to/ [or] the death of) a person [who was not an accomplice to the crime].

[A *firearm* is any device designed to be used as a weapon, from which a projectile is discharged or expelled through a barrel by the force of an explosion or other form of combustion.]

[The term *firearm* is defined in another instruction.]

[*Great bodily injury* means significant or substantial physical injury. It is an injury that is greater than minor or moderate harm.]

[An act causes (great bodily injury/ [or] death) if the (injury/ [or] death) is the direct, natural, and probable consequence of the act and the (injury/ [or] death) would not have happened without the act. A *natural and probable consequence* is one that a reasonable person would know is likely to happen if nothing unusual intervenes. In deciding whether a consequence is natural and probable, consider all the circumstances established by the evidence.]

[There may be more than one cause of (great bodily injury/ [or] death). An act causes (injury/ [or] death) only if it is a substantial factor in causing the (injury/ [or] death). A *substantial factor* is more than a trivial or remote factor. However, it does not need to be the only factor that causes the (injury/ [or] death).]

[A person is an *accomplice* if he or she is subject to prosecution for the identical crime charged against the defendant. A person is subject to

prosecution if he or she committed the crime or if:

1. He or she knew of the criminal purpose of the person who committed the crime;

AND

2. He or she intended to, and did in fact, (aid, facilitate, promote, encourage, or instigate the commission of the crime/ [or] participate in a criminal conspiracy to commit the crime).]

<If there is an issue in the case over whether the defendant used the firearm “during the commission of” the offense, see Bench Notes.>

**The People have the burden of proving each allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you must find that the allegation has not been proved.**

*New January 2006; Revised February 2012, September 2020*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the enhancement. (*Apprendi v. New Jersey* (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 490 [120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435].) If the defendant is charged with an enhancement for both intentional discharge *and* intentional discharge causing great bodily injury or death, the court may give CALCRIM No. 3150, *Personally Used Firearm: Intentional Discharge and Discharge Causing Injury or Death Both Charged*, instead of this instruction.

If causation is at issue, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on proximate cause (*People v. Jomo K. Bland* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 313, 335 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d 546, 48 P.3d 1107]); give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “An act causes . . . .” If there is evidence of multiple potential causes, the court should also give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “There may be more than one cause . . . .” (*Id.* at pp. 335–338.)

The court should give the bracketed definition of “firearm” unless the court has already given the definition in other instructions. In such cases, the court may give the bracketed sentence stating that the term is defined elsewhere.

If the case involves an issue of whether the defendant used the firearm “during the commission of” the offense, the court may give CALCRIM No. 3261, *While Committing a Felony: Defined—Escape Rule*. (See *People v. Jones* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 98, 109 [104 Cal.Rptr.2d 753, 18 P.3d 674]; *People v. Masbruch* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1001, 1014 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 760, 920 P.2d 705]; *People v. Taylor* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 578, 582 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 127].)

If, in element 3, the court gives the bracketed phrase “who was not an accomplice to the crime,” the court should also give the bracketed definition of “accomplice.”

(*People v. Verlinde* (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1167–1168 [123 Cal.Rptr.2d 322].) Additional paragraphs providing further explanation of the definition of “accomplice” are contained in CALCRIM No. 334, *Accomplice Testimony Must Be Corroborated: Dispute Whether Witness Is Accomplice*. The court should review that instruction and determine whether any of these additional paragraphs should be given.

The second sentence of the great bodily injury definition could result in error if the prosecution improperly argues great bodily injury may be shown by greater than minor injury alone. (Compare *People v. Medellin* (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 519, 533–535 [258 Cal.Rptr.3d 867] [the definition was reasonably susceptible to prosecutor’s erroneous argument that the injury need only be greater than minor] with *People v. Quinonez* (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 457, 466 [260 Cal.Rptr.3d 86] [upholding instructions containing great bodily injury definition as written].)

### AUTHORITY

- Enhancement. Pen. Code, §§ 667.61(e)(3), 12022.53(d).
- Firearm Defined. Pen. Code, § 16520.
- “During Commission of” Felony. *People v. Jones* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 98, 109–110 [104 Cal.Rptr.2d 753, 18 P.3d 674]; *People v. Masbruch* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1001, 1014 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 760, 920 P.2d 705]; *People v. Taylor* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 578, 582 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 127].
- Proximate Cause. *People v. Jomo K. Bland* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 313, 335–338 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d 546, 48 P.3d 1107].
- Accomplice Defined. See Pen. Code, § 1111; *People v. Verlinde* (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1167–1168 [123 Cal.Rptr.2d 322]; *People v. Stankewitz* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 72, 90–91 [270 Cal.Rptr. 817, 793 P.2d 23].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Need Not Personally Cause Injury or Death*

“[Penal Code] Section 12022.53(d) requires that the defendant ‘intentionally and *personally* discharged a firearm’ (italics added), but only that he ‘proximately caused’ the great bodily injury or death . . . . The statute states nothing else that defendant must *personally* do. Proximately causing and personally inflicting harm are two different things.” (*People v. Jomo K. Bland* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 313, 336 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d 546, 48 P.3d 1107] [italics in original].)

#### *Person Injured or Killed Need Not Be Victim of Crime*

In *People v. Oates* (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1048, 1052 [12 Cal.Rptr.3d 325, 88 P.3d 56], the defendant fired two shots into a group of people, hitting and injuring one. He was convicted of five counts of premeditated attempted murder. The Court held that the subdivision (d) enhancement for causing great bodily injury applied to each of the five counts even though the defendant only injured one person. (*Id.* at p. 1056.) The Court observed that “the phrase, ‘any person other than an accomplice,’ does not mean ‘the victim’ of the underlying crime.” (*Id.* at p. 1055.) Note, however, that

the Supreme Court has again granted review in this case. (See *People v. Oates* (Dec. 1, 2004, S128181) [21 Cal.Rptr.3d 890, 101 P.3d 956].)

### ***Multiple Enhancements for Single Injury***

The Court in *Oates* ((2004) 32 Cal.4th 1048 [12 Cal.Rptr.3d 325, 88 P.3d 56]; discussed above) also held that the trial court was required to impose all five subdivision (d) enhancements because Penal Code section 12022.53(f) requires a court to impose the longest enhancement available. (*Id.* at p. 1056.) The Court further found that Penal Code section 654 did not preclude imposition of multiple subdivision (d) enhancements due to “the long-recognized, judicially-created exception for cases involving multiple victims of violent crime.” (*Id.* at p. 1062.) Note, however, that the Supreme Court has again granted review in this case. (See *People v. Oates* (Dec. 1, 2004, S128181) [21 Cal.Rptr.3d 890, 101 P.3d 956].)

### ***Multiple Enhancements May Not Be Imposed Based on Multiple Participants***

In *People v. Cobb* (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1051, 1054, fn. 3 [21 Cal.Rptr.3d 869], the defendant and two others simultaneously shot at the decedent. The defendant was convicted of personally inflicting death by use of a firearm. (*Id.* at p. 1053; Pen. Code, § 12022.53(d).) In addition to the sentence for personally using a firearm, the trial court also imposed two sentences under Penal Code section 12022.53(e)(1) based on the other two participants having also fired at the decedent (*People v. Cobb, supra*, at p. 1053.) The Court of Appeal reversed the latter two enhancements, holding that Penal Code section 12022.53(f) did not permit multiple sentence enhancements based on multiple participants in one crime. (*Id.* at p. 1058.)

### ***Self-Defense and Imperfect Self-Defense***

Penal Code section 12022.53(l) provides that “[t]he enhancements specified in this section shall not apply to the lawful use or discharge of a firearm by a public officer, as provided in Section 196, or by any person in lawful self-defense, lawful defense of another, or lawful defense of property, as provided in Sections 197, 198, and 198.5.” In *People v. Watie* (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 866, 884 [124 Cal.Rptr.2d 258], the court held, “[t]his subdivision, on its face, exempts lawful (perfect) self-defense from the section’s application. It does not exempt imperfect self-defense.” Further, an instruction informing the jury that the defense of self-defense applies to the enhancement is not necessary. (*Id.* at p. 886.)

## **SECONDARY SOURCES**

3 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, §§ 359–360.

5 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, § 727.

5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 91, *Sentencing*, § 91.30[5] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 140, *Challenges to Crimes*, § 140.04 (Matthew Bender).



**3150. Personally Used Firearm: Intentional Discharge and  
Discharge Causing Injury or Death—Both Charged (Pen. Code,  
§§ 667.61(e)(3), 12022.53(d))**

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If you find the defendant guilty of the crime[s] charged in Count[s] \_\_\_\_\_ [,] [or of attempting to commit (that/those) crime[s]] [or the lesser crime[s] of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] of alleged lesser offense[s]>], you must then decide whether[, for each crime,] the People have proved the additional allegations that the defendant personally and intentionally discharged a firearm during (that/those) crime[s] and, if so, whether the defendant’s act caused (great bodily injury/ [or] death). [You must decide whether the People have proved these allegations for each crime and return a separate finding for each crime.]

To prove that the defendant intentionally discharged a firearm, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant personally discharged a firearm during the commission [or attempted commission] of that crime;

**AND**

2. The defendant intended to discharge the firearm.

If the People have proved both 1 and 2, you must then decide whether the People also have proved that the defendant’s act caused (great bodily injury to/ [or] the death of) a person [who was not an accomplice to the crime].

[A *firearm* is any device designed to be used as a weapon, from which a projectile is discharged or expelled through a barrel by the force of an explosion or other form of combustion.]

[The term *firearm* is defined in another instruction.]

[*Great bodily injury* means significant or substantial physical injury. It is an injury that is greater than minor or moderate harm.]

[An act causes (great bodily injury/ [or] death) if the (injury/ [or] death) is the direct, natural, and probable consequence of the act and the (injury/ [or] death) would not have happened without the act. A *natural and probable consequence* is one that a reasonable person would know is likely to happen if nothing unusual intervenes. In deciding whether a consequence is natural and probable, consider all the circumstances established by the evidence.]

[There may be more than one cause of (great bodily injury/ [or] death). An act causes (injury/ [or] death) only if it is a substantial factor in causing the (injury/ [or] death). A *substantial factor* is more than a trivial

or remote factor. However, it does not need to be the only factor that causes the (injury/ [or] death).]

[A person is an *accomplice* if he or she is subject to prosecution for the identical crime charged against the defendant. A person is subject to prosecution if he or she committed the crime or if:

1. He or she knew of the criminal purpose of the person who committed the crime;

AND

2. He or she intended to, and did in fact, (aid, facilitate, promote, encourage, or instigate the commission of the crime/ [or] participate in a criminal conspiracy to commit the crime).]

<If there is an issue in the case over whether the defendant used the firearm “during the commission of” the offense, see Bench Notes.>

**The People have the burden of proving each of these allegations beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you must find that the allegation has not been proved.**

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2012, September 2020*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the enhancement. (*Apprendi v. New Jersey* (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 490 [120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435].) This instruction may be used when the defendant is charged with an enhancement both for intentional discharge *and* for intentional discharge causing great bodily injury or death. If only one of these enhancements is charged, do not use this instruction. Instead, give CALCRIM No. 3148, *Personally Used Firearm: Intentional Discharge*, or CALCRIM No. 3149, *Personally Used Firearm: Intentional Discharge Causing Injury or Death*, whichever is appropriate.

If causation is at issue, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on proximate cause (*People v. Jomo K. Bland* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 313, 335 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d 546, 48 P.3d 1107]); give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “An act causes . . .” If there is evidence of multiple potential causes, the court should also give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “There may be more than one cause . . .” (*Id.* at pp. 335–338.)

The court should give the bracketed definition of “firearm” unless the court has already given the definition in other instructions. In such cases, the court may give the bracketed sentence stating that the term is defined elsewhere.

If the case involves an issue of whether the defendant used the weapon “during the commission of” the offense, the court may give CALCRIM No. 3261, *While*



*Committing a Felony: Defined—Escape Rule.* (See *People v. Jones* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 98, 109 [104 Cal.Rptr.2d 753, 18 P.3d 674]; *People v. Masbruch* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1001, 1014 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 760, 920 P.2d 705]; *People v. Taylor* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 578, 582 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 127].)

If, in the paragraph following the elements, the court gives the bracketed phrase “who was not an accomplice to the crime,” the court should also give the bracketed definition of “accomplice.” (*People v. Verlinde* (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1167–1168 [123 Cal.Rptr.2d 322].) Additional paragraphs providing further explanation of the definition of “accomplice” are contained in CALCRIM No. 334, *Accomplice Testimony Must Be Corroborated: Dispute Whether Witness Is Accomplice*. The court should review that instruction and determine whether any of these additional paragraphs should be given.

The second sentence of the great bodily injury definition could result in error if the prosecution improperly argues great bodily injury may be shown by greater than minor injury alone. (Compare *People v. Medellin* (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 519, 533–535 [258 Cal.Rptr.3d 867] [the definition was reasonably susceptible to prosecutor’s erroneous argument that the injury need only be greater than minor] with *People v. Quinonez* (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 457, 466 [260 Cal.Rptr.3d 86] [upholding instructions containing great bodily injury definition as written].)

### AUTHORITY

- Enhancement. Pen. Code, §§ 667.61(e)(3), 12022.53(d).
- Firearm Defined. Pen. Code, § 16520.
- “During Commission of” Felony. *People v. Jones* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 98, 109–110 [104 Cal.Rptr.2d 753, 18 P.3d 674]; *People v. Masbruch* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1001, 1014 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 760, 920 P.2d 705]; *People v. Taylor* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 578, 582 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 127].
- Proximate Cause. *People v. Jomo K. Bland* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 313, 335–338 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d 546, 48 P.3d 1107].
- Accomplice Defined. See Pen. Code, § 1111; *People v. Verlinde* (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1167–1168 [123 Cal.Rptr.2d 322]; *People v. Stankewitz* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 72, 90–91 [270 Cal.Rptr. 817, 793 P.2d 23].

### RELATED ISSUES

See the Related Issues sections of CALCRIM No. 3148, *Personally Used Firearm: Intentional Discharge*, and CALCRIM No. 3149, *Personally Used Firearm: Intentional Discharge Causing Injury or Death*.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

3 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, §§ 359–360.

5 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, § 727.

5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 91, *Sentencing*, § 91.30[5] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 140, *Challenges to Crimes*, § 140.04 (Matthew Bender).

**3151–3159. Reserved for Future Use**

## E. GREAT BODILY INJURY

**3160. Great Bodily Injury (Pen. Code, §§ 667.5(c)(8), 667.61(d)(6), 1192.7(c)(8), 12022.7, 12022.8)**

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If you find the defendant guilty of the crime[s] charged in Count[s] \_\_\_\_\_ [,] [or of attempting to commit (that/those) crime[s]] [or the lesser crime[s] of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name[s] of alleged lesser offense[s]>*], you must then decide whether[, for each crime,] the People have proved the additional allegation that the defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury on \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of injured person>* during the commission [or attempted commission] of that crime. [You must decide whether the People have proved this allegation for each crime and return a separate finding for each crime.]

[The People must also prove that \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of injured person>* was not an accomplice to the crime.]

**Great bodily injury** means significant or substantial physical injury. It is an injury that is greater than minor or moderate harm.

[Committing the crime of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert sexual offense charged>* is not by itself the infliction of great bodily injury.]

*<Group Assault>*

[If you conclude that more than one person assaulted \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of injured person>* and you cannot decide which person caused which injury, you may conclude that the defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury on \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of injured person>* if the People have proved that:

1. Two or more people, acting at the same time, assaulted \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of injured person>* and inflicted great bodily injury on (him/her);
2. The defendant personally used physical force on \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of injured person>* during the group assault;

AND

[3A. The amount or type of physical force the defendant used on \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of injured person>* was enough that it alone could have caused \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of injured person>* to suffer great bodily injury(;/.)]

[OR]

[3B. The physical force that the defendant used on \_\_\_\_\_

*<insert name of injured person>* was sufficient in combination with the force used by the others to cause \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of injured person>* to suffer great bodily injury.]

The defendant must have applied substantial force to \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of injured person>*. If that force could not have caused or contributed to the great bodily injury, then it was not substantial.]

[A person is an *accomplice* if he or she is subject to prosecution for the identical crime charged against the defendant. Someone is subject to prosecution if he or she personally committed the crime or if:

1. He or she knew of the criminal purpose of the person who committed the crime;

AND

2. He or she intended to, and did in fact, (aid, facilitate, promote, encourage, or instigate the commission of the crime/ [or] participate in a criminal conspiracy to commit the crime).]

*<If there is an issue in the case over whether the defendant inflicted the injury “during the commission of” the offense, see Bench Notes.>*

The People have the burden of proving each allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you must find that the allegation has not been proved.

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*New January 2006; Revised June 2007, February 2015, September 2020*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction on the enhancement when charged. (*Apprendi v. New Jersey* (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 490 [120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435].)

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “Committing the crime of” if the defendant is charged with a sexual offense. (*People v. Escobar* (1992) 3 Cal.4th 740, 746 [12 Cal.Rptr.2d 586, 837 P.2d 1100] [injury must be more than that which is present in every offense of rape].)

The bracketed section beneath the heading “Group Assault” is designed to be used in cases where the evidence shows a group assault.

If the court gives the bracketed sentence instructing that the People must prove that the person assaulted “was not an accomplice to the crime,” the court should also give the bracketed definition of “accomplice.” (*People v. Verlinde* (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1167–1168 [123 Cal.Rptr.2d 322].) Additional paragraphs providing further explanation of the definition of “accomplice” are contained in CALCRIM No. 334, *Accomplice Testimony Must Be Corroborated: Dispute Whether*

*Witness Is Accomplice.* The court should review that instruction and determine whether any of these additional paragraphs should be given.

The jury must determine whether an injury constitutes “great bodily injury.” (*People v. Escobar* (1992) 3 Cal.4th 740, 750 [12 Cal.Rptr.2d 586, 837 P.2d 1100]; *People v. Nava* (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1490, 1498 [255 Cal.Rptr. 903] [reversible error to instruct that a bone fracture is a significant or substantial injury].)

If there is an issue in the case over whether the defendant inflicted the injury “during the commission of” the offense, the court may give CALCRIM No. 3261, *While Committing a Felony: Defined—Escape Rule.* (See *People v. Jones* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 98, 109 [104 Cal.Rptr.2d 753, 18 P.3d 674]; *People v. Masbruch* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1001, 1014 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 760, 920 P.2d 705]; *People v. Taylor* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 578, 582 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 127].)

The second sentence of the great bodily injury definition could result in error if the prosecution improperly argues great bodily injury may be shown by greater than minor injury alone. (Compare *People v. Medellin* (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 519, 533–535 [258 Cal.Rptr.3d 867] [the definition was reasonably susceptible to prosecutor’s erroneous argument that the injury need only be greater than minor] with *People v. Quinonez* (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 457, 466 [260 Cal.Rptr.3d 86] [upholding instructions containing great bodily injury definition as written].)

### AUTHORITY

- Enhancements. Pen. Code, §§ 667.5(c)(8), 667.61(d)(6), 12022.7, 12022.8.
- Great Bodily Injury Enhancements Do Not Apply to Conviction for Murder or Manslaughter. *People v. Cook* (2015) 60 Cal. 4th 922, 924 [183 Cal.Rptr.3d 502].
- Great Bodily Injury Defined. Pen. Code, § 12022.7(f); *People v. Escobar* (1992) 3 Cal.4th 740, 749–750 [12 Cal.Rptr.2d 586, 837 P.2d 1100].
- Great Bodily Injury May Be Established by Pregnancy or Abortion. *People v. Cross* (2008) 45 Cal.4th 58, 68 [82 Cal.Rptr.3d 373, 190 P.3d 706].
- Must Personally Inflict Injury. *People v. Lee* (2003) 31 Cal.4th 613, 631 [3 Cal.Rptr.3d 402, 74 P.3d 176]; *People v. Cole* (1982) 31 Cal.3d 568, 571 [183 Cal.Rptr. 350, 645 P.2d 1182]; *People v. Ramirez* (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 603, 627 [236 Cal.Rptr. 404] [Pen. Code, § 12022.8].
- Sex Offenses—Injury Must Be More Than Incidental to Offense. *People v. Escobar* (1992) 3 Cal.4th 740, 746 [12 Cal.Rptr.2d 586, 837 P.2d 1100].
- Group Beating Instruction. *People v. Modiri* (2006) 39 Cal.4th 481, 500–501 [46 Cal.Rptr.3d 762, 139 P.3d 136].
- This Instruction Is Correct In Defining Group Beating. *People v. Dunkerson* (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1413, 1418 [66 Cal.Rptr.3d 795].
- Accomplice Defined. See Pen. Code, § 1111; *People v. Verlinde* (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1167–1168 [123 Cal.Rptr.2d 322]; *People v. Stankewitz* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 72, 90–91 [270 Cal.Rptr. 817, 793 P.2d 23].

- “During Commission of” Felony. *People v. Jones* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 98, 109–110 [104 Cal.Rptr.2d 753, 18 P.3d 674]; *People v. Masbruch* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1001, 1014 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 760, 920 P.2d 705]; *People v. Taylor* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 578, 582 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 127].

## RELATED ISSUES

### *Specific Intent Not Required*

Penal Code section 12022.7 was amended in 1995, deleting the requirement that the defendant act with “the intent to inflict such injury.” (Stats. 1995, ch. 341, § 1; see also *People v. Carter* (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 752, 756 [70 Cal.Rptr.2d 569] [noting amendment].)

### *Instructions on Aiding and Abetting*

In *People v. Magana* (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 1371, 1378–1379 [22 Cal.Rptr.2d 59], the evidence indicated that the defendant and another person both shot at the victims. The jury asked for clarification of whether the evidence must establish that the bullet from the defendant’s gun struck the victim in order to find the enhancement for personally inflicting great bodily injury true. (*Id.* at p. 1379.) The trial court responded by giving the instructions on aiding and abetting. (*Ibid.*) The Court of Appeal reversed, finding the instructions erroneous in light of the requirement that the defendant must personally inflict the injury for the enhancement to be found true. (*Id.* at p. 1381.)

### *Sex Offenses—Examples of Great Bodily Injury*

The following have been held to be sufficient to support a finding of great bodily injury: transmission of a venereal disease (*People v. Johnson* (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 1137, 1140 [225 Cal.Rptr. 251]); pregnancy (*People v. Sargent* (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 148, 151 [150 Cal.Rptr. 113]); and a torn hymen (*People v. Williams* (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 446, 454 [171 Cal.Rptr. 401]).

### *Enhancement May be Applied Once Per Victim*

The court may impose one enhancement under Penal Code section 12022.7 for each injured victim. (Pen. Code, § 12022.7(h); *People v. Ausbie* (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 855, 864 [20 Cal.Rptr.3d 371].)

## SECONDARY SOURCES

3 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, §§ 350–351.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.02[2][a][i] (Matthew Bender).

5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 91, *Sentencing*, § 91.35 (Matthew Bender).

**3161. Great Bodily Injury: Causing Victim to Become Comatose or Paralyzed (Pen. Code, § 12022.7(b))**

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If you find the defendant guilty of the crime[s] charged in Count[s] \_\_\_\_\_[, ] [or of attempting to commit (that/those) crime[s]] [or the lesser crime[s] of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] of alleged lesser offense[s]>], you must then decide whether[, for each crime,] the People have proved the additional allegation that the defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury that caused \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of injured person> to become (comatose/ [or] permanently paralyzed). [You must decide whether the People have proved this allegation for each crime and return a separate finding for each crime.]

To prove this allegation, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury on \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of injured person> during the commission [or attempted commission] of the crime;

[AND]

2. The defendant's acts caused \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of injured person> to (become comatose due to brain injury/ [or] suffer permanent paralysis)(./);

<Give element 3 when instructing on whether injured person was an accomplice.>

[AND]

3. \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of injured person> was not an accomplice to the crime.]

*Great bodily injury* means significant or substantial physical injury. It is an injury that is greater than minor or moderate harm.

[*Paralysis* is a major or complete loss of motor function resulting from injury to the nervous system or to a muscular mechanism.]

<Group Assault>

[If you conclude that more than one person assaulted \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of injured person> and you cannot decide which person caused which injury, you may conclude that the defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury on \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of injured person> if the People have proved that:

1. Two or more people, acting at the same time, assaulted \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of injured person> and inflicted great bodily injury on (him/her);



2. The defendant personally used physical force on \_\_\_\_\_  
<insert name of injured person> during the group assault;

AND

- [3A. The amount or type of physical force the defendant used on \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of injured person> was enough that it alone could have caused \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of injured person> to suffer great bodily injury(;/.)]

[OR]

- [3B. The physical force that the defendant used on \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of injured person> was sufficient in combination with the force used by the others to cause \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of injured person> to suffer great bodily injury.]

The defendant must have applied substantial force to \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of injured person>. If that force could not have caused or contributed to the great bodily injury, then it was not substantial.]

[A person is an *accomplice* if he or she is subject to prosecution for the identical crime charged against the defendant. Someone is subject to prosecution if he or she personally committed the crime or if:

1. He or she knew of the criminal purpose of the person who committed the crime;

AND

2. He or she intended to, and did in fact, (aid, facilitate, promote, encourage, or instigate the commission of the crime/ [or] participate in a criminal conspiracy to commit the crime).]

<If there is an issue in the case over whether the defendant inflicted the injury “during the commission of” the offense, see Bench Notes.>

**The People have the burden of proving each allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you must find that the allegation has not been proved.**

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*New January 2006; Revised June 2007, December 2008, September 2020*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction on the enhancement when charged. (*Apprendi v. New Jersey* (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 490 [120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435].)

The bracketed section beneath the heading “Group Assault” is designed to be used in cases where the evidence shows a group assault.



If the court gives bracketed element 3 instructing that the People must prove that the person assaulted “was not an accomplice to the crime,” the court should also give the bracketed definition of “accomplice.” (*People v. Verlinde* (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1167–1168 [123 Cal.Rptr.2d 322].) Additional paragraphs providing further explanation of the definition of “accomplice” are contained in CALCRIM No. 334, *Accomplice Testimony Must Be Corroborated: Dispute Whether Witness Is Accomplice*. The court should review that instruction and determine whether any of these additional paragraphs should be given.

The jury must determine whether an injury constitutes “great bodily injury.” (*People v. Escobar* (1992) 3 Cal.4th 740, 750 [12 Cal.Rptr.2d 586, 837 P.2d 1100]; *People v. Nava* (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1490, 1498 [255 Cal.Rptr. 903] [reversible error to instruct that a bone fracture is a significant or substantial injury].)

If the case involves an issue of whether the defendant inflicted the injury “during the commission of” the offense, the court may give CALCRIM No. 3261, *While Committing a Felony: Defined—Escape Rule*. (See *People v. Jones* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 98, 109 [104 Cal.Rptr.2d 753, 18 P.3d 674]; *People v. Masbruch* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1001, 1014 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 760, 920 P.2d 705]; *People v. Taylor* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 578, 582 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 127].)

The second sentence of the great bodily injury definition could result in error if the prosecution improperly argues great bodily injury may be shown by greater than minor injury alone. (Compare *People v. Medellin* (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 519, 533–535 [258 Cal.Rptr.3d 867] [the definition was reasonably susceptible to prosecutor’s erroneous argument that the injury need only be greater than minor] with *People v. Quinonez* (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 457, 466 [260 Cal.Rptr.3d 86] [upholding instructions containing great bodily injury definition as written].)

### AUTHORITY

- Enhancement. Pen. Code, § 12022.7(b).
- Great Bodily Injury Defined. Pen. Code, § 12022.7(f); *People v. Escobar* (1992) 3 Cal.4th 740, 749–750 [12 Cal.Rptr.2d 586, 837 P.2d 1100].
- Must Personally Inflict Injury. *People v. Lee* (2003) 31 Cal.4th 613, 631 [3 Cal.Rptr.3d 402, 74 P.3d 176]; *People v. Cole* (1982) 31 Cal.3d 568, 571 [183 Cal.Rptr. 350, 645 P.2d 1182]; *People v. Ramirez* (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 603, 627 [236 Cal.Rptr. 404] [Pen. Code, § 12022.8].
- Group Beating Instruction. *People v. Modiri* (2006) 39 Cal.4th 481, 500–501 [46 Cal.Rptr.3d 762].
- Accomplice Defined. See Pen. Code, § 1111; *People v. Verlinde* (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1167–1168 [123 Cal.Rptr.2d 322]; *People v. Stankewitz* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 72, 90–91 [270 Cal.Rptr. 817, 793 P.2d 23].
- “During Commission of” Felony. *People v. Jones* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 98, 109–110 [104 Cal.Rptr.2d 753, 18 P.3d 674]; *People v. Masbruch* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1001, 1014 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 760, 920 P.2d 705]; *People v. Taylor* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 578, 582 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 127].

**RELATED ISSUES*****Coma Need Not Be Permanent***

In *People v. Tokash* (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1373, 1378 [94 Cal.Rptr. 2d 814], the court held that an enhancement under Penal Code section 12022.7(b) was proper where the victim was maintained in a medically induced coma for two months following brain surgery necessitated by the assault.

See the Related Issues section of CALCRIM No. 3160, *Great Bodily Injury*.

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

3 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, §§ 350–354.

5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 91, *Sentencing*, § 91.35 (Matthew Bender).

**3162. Great Bodily Injury: Age of Victim (Pen. Code, § 12022.7(c) & (d))**

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If you find the defendant guilty of the crime[s] charged in Count[s] \_\_\_\_\_[, ] [or of attempting to commit (that/those) crime[s]] [ or the lesser crime[s] of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name[s] of alleged lesser offense[s]>*], you must then decide whether[, for each crime,] the People have proved the additional allegation that the defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury on someone who was (under the age of 5 years/70 years of age or older). [You must decide whether the People have proved this allegation for each crime and return a separate finding for each crime.]

To prove this allegation, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury on \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of injured person>* during the commission [or attempted commission] of the crime;

[AND]

2. At that time, \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of injured person>* was (under the age of 5 years/70 years of age or older)(./;)

*<Give element 3 when instructing on whether injured person was an accomplice.>*

[AND]

3. \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of injured person>* was not an accomplice to the crime.]

*Great bodily injury* means significant or substantial physical injury. It is an injury that is greater than minor or moderate harm.

[Committing the crime of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert sexual offense charged>* is not by itself the infliction of great bodily injury.]

*<Group Assault>*

[If you conclude that more than one person assaulted \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of injured person>* and you cannot decide which person caused which injury, you may conclude that the defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury on \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of injured person>* if the People have proved that:

1. Two or more people, acting at the same time, assaulted \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of injured person>* and inflicted great bodily injury on (him/her);
2. The defendant personally used physical force on \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of injured person>* during the group assault;

AND

[3A. The amount or type of physical force the defendant used on \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of injured person> was enough that it alone could have caused \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of injured person> to suffer great bodily injury(;/).]

[OR]

[3B. The physical force that the defendant used on \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of injured person> was sufficient in combination with the force used by the others to cause \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of injured person> to suffer great bodily injury.]

The defendant must have applied substantial force to \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of injured person>. If that force could not have caused or contributed to the great bodily injury, then it was not substantial.]

[A person is an *accomplice* if he or she is subject to prosecution for the identical crime charged against the defendant. Someone is subject to prosecution if he or she personally committed the crime or if:

1. He or she knew of the criminal purpose of the person who committed the crime;

AND

2. He or she intended to, and did in fact, (aid, facilitate, promote, encourage, or instigate the commission of the crime/ [or] participate in a criminal conspiracy to commit the crime).]

[Under the law, a person becomes one year older as soon as the first minute of his or her birthday has begun.]

<If there is an issue in the case over whether the defendant inflicted the injury “during the commission of” the offense, see Bench Notes.>

The People have the burden of proving each allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you must find that the allegation has not been proved.

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*New January 2006; Revised June 2007, December 2008, September 2020*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction on the enhancement when charged. (*Apprendi v. New Jersey* (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 490 [120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435].)

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “Committing the crime of” if the

defendant is charged with a sexual offense. (*People v. Escobar* (1992) 3 Cal.4th 740, 746 [12 Cal.Rptr.2d 586, 837 P.2d 1100] [injury must be more than that which is present in every offense of rape].)

The bracketed section beneath the heading “Group Assault” is designed to be used in cases where the evidence shows a group assault.

If the court gives bracketed element 3 instructing that the People must prove that the person assaulted “was not an accomplice to the crime,” the court should also give the bracketed definition of “accomplice.” (*People v. Verlinde* (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1167–1168 [123 Cal.Rptr.2d 322].) Additional paragraphs providing further explanation of the definition of “accomplice” are contained in CALCRIM No. 334, *Accomplice Testimony Must Be Corroborated: Dispute Whether Witness Is Accomplice*. The court should review that instruction and determine whether any of these additional paragraphs should be given.

Give the bracketed paragraph about calculating age if requested. (Fam. Code, § 6500; *In re Harris* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 849–850 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391].)

The jury must determine whether an injury constitutes “great bodily injury.” (*People v. Escobar* (1992) 3 Cal.4th 740, 750 [12 Cal.Rptr.2d 586, 837 P.2d 1100]; *People v. Nava* (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1490, 1498 [255 Cal.Rptr. 903] [reversible error to instruct that a bone fracture is a significant or substantial injury].)

If the case involves an issue of whether the defendant inflicted the injury “during the commission of” the offense, the court may give CALCRIM No. 3261, *While Committing a Felony: Defined—Escape Rule*. (See *People v. Jones* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 98, 109 [104 Cal.Rptr.2d 753, 18 P.3d 674]; *People v. Masbruch* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1001, 1014 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 760, 920 P.2d 705]; *People v. Taylor* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 578, 582 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 127].)

The second sentence of the great bodily injury definition could result in error if the prosecution improperly argues great bodily injury may be shown by greater than minor injury alone. (Compare *People v. Medellin* (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 519, 533–535 [258 Cal.Rptr.3d 867] [the definition was reasonably susceptible to prosecutor’s erroneous argument that the injury need only be greater than minor] with *People v. Quinonez* (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 457, 466 [260 Cal.Rptr.3d 86] [upholding instructions containing great bodily injury definition as written].)

### AUTHORITY

- Enhancements. Pen. Code, § 12022.7(c) & (d).
- Great Bodily Injury Defined. Pen. Code, § 12022.7(f); *People v. Escobar* (1992) 3 Cal.4th 740, 749–750 [12 Cal.Rptr.2d 586, 837 P.2d 1100].
- Must Personally Inflict Injury. *People v. Lee* (2003) 31 Cal.4th 613, 631 [3 Cal.Rptr.3d 402, 74 P.3d 176]; *People v. Cole* (1982) 31 Cal.3d 568, 571 [183 Cal.Rptr. 350, 645 P.2d 1182]; *People v. Ramirez* (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 603, 627 [236 Cal.Rptr. 404] [Pen. Code, § 12022.8].
- Sex Offenses—Injury Must Be More Than Incidental to Offense. *People v.*

*Escobar* (1992) 3 Cal.4th 740, 746 [12 Cal.Rptr.2d 586, 837 P.2d 1100].

- Group Beating Instruction. *People v. Modiri* (2006) 39 Cal.4th 481, 500–501 [46 Cal.Rptr.3d 762].
- Accomplice Defined. See Pen. Code, § 1111; *People v. Verlinde* (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1167–1168 [123 Cal.Rptr.2d 322]; *People v. Stankewitz* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 72, 90–91 [270 Cal.Rptr. 817, 793 P.2d 23].
- “During Commission of” Felony. *People v. Jones* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 98, 109–110 [104 Cal.Rptr.2d 753, 18 P.3d 674]; *People v. Masbruch* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1001, 1014 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 760, 920 P.2d 705]; *People v. Taylor* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 578, 582 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 127].

### RELATED ISSUES

See the Related Issues section of CALCRIM No. 3160, *Great Bodily Injury*.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

3 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, §§ 350–354.

5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 91, *Sentencing*, § 91.35 (Matthew Bender).

**3163. Great Bodily Injury: Domestic Violence (Pen. Code,  
§ 12022.7(e))**

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If you find the defendant guilty of the crime[s] charged in Count[s] \_\_\_\_\_[,], [or of attempting to commit (that/those) crime[s]] [or the lesser crime[s] of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] of alleged lesser offense[s]>], you must then decide whether[, for each crime,] the People have proved the additional allegation that the defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury on \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of injured person> during the commission [or attempted commission] of that crime, under circumstances involving domestic violence. [You must decide whether the People have proved this allegation for each crime and return a separate finding for each crime.]

[The People must also prove that \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of injured person> was not an accomplice to the crime.]

*Great bodily injury* means significant or substantial physical injury. It is an injury that is greater than minor or moderate harm.

*Domestic violence* means abuse committed against (an adult/a fully emancipated minor) who is a (spouse[,]/ [or] former spouse[,]/ [or] cohabitant[,]/ [or] former cohabitant[,]/ [or] person with whom the defendant has had a child[,]/ [or] person with whom the defendant is having or has had a dating relationship[,]/ [or] person who was or is engaged to the defendant).

*Abuse* means intentionally or recklessly causing or attempting to cause bodily injury, or placing another person in reasonable fear of imminent serious bodily injury to himself or herself or to someone else.

[The term *dating relationship* means frequent, intimate associations primarily characterized by the expectation of affection or sexual involvement independent of financial considerations.]

[The term *cohabitants* means two unrelated persons living together for a substantial period of time, resulting in some permanency of the relationship. Factors that may determine whether people are cohabiting include, but are not limited to (1) sexual relations between the parties while sharing the same residence, (2) sharing of income or expenses, (3) joint use or ownership of property, (4) the parties' holding themselves out as (husband and wife/domestic partners), (5) the continuity of the relationship, and (6) the length of the relationship.]

[A *fully emancipated minor* is a person under the age of 18 who has gained certain adult rights by marrying, being on active duty for the United States armed services, or otherwise being declared emancipated under the law.]



[Committing the crime of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert sexual offense charged>* is not by itself the infliction of great bodily injury.]

*<Group Assault>*

[If you conclude that more than one person assaulted \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of injured person>* and you cannot decide which person caused which injury, you may conclude that the defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury on \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of injured person>* if the People have proved that:

1. Two or more people, acting at the same time, assaulted \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of injured person>* and inflicted great bodily injury on (him/her);
2. The defendant personally used physical force on \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of injured person>* during the group assault;

AND

[3A. The amount or type of physical force the defendant used on \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of injured person>* was enough that it alone could have caused \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of injured person>* to suffer great bodily injury(;/.)]

[OR]

[3B. The physical force that the defendant used on \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of injured person>* was sufficient in combination with the force used by the others to cause \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of injured person>* to suffer great bodily injury.]

The defendant must have applied substantial force to \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of injured person>*. If that force could not have caused or contributed to the great bodily injury, then it was not substantial.]

[A person is an *accomplice* if he or she is subject to prosecution for the identical crime charged against the defendant. Someone is subject to prosecution if he or she personally committed the crime or if:

1. He or she knew of the criminal purpose of the person who committed the crime;

AND

2. He or she intended to, and did in fact, (aid, facilitate, promote, encourage, or instigate the commission of the crime/ [or] participate in a criminal conspiracy to commit the crime).]

*<If there is an issue in the case over whether the defendant inflicted the injury "during the commission of" the offense, see Bench Notes.>*

[The person who was injured does not have to be a person with whom the defendant had a relationship.]



**The People have the burden of proving each allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you must find that the allegation has not been proved.**

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*New January 2006; Revised June 2007, December 2008, September 2020*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a  **sua sponte**  duty to give this instruction on the enhancement when charged. (*Apprendi v. New Jersey* (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 490 [120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435].)

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “Committing the crime of” if the defendant is charged with a sexual offense. (*People v. Escobar* (1992) 3 Cal.4th 740, 746 [12 Cal.Rptr.2d 586, 837 P.2d 1100] [injury must be more than that which is present in every offense of rape].)

The bracketed section beneath the heading “Group Assault” is designed to be used in cases where the evidence shows a group assault.

The jury must determine whether an injury constitutes “great bodily injury.” (*People v. Escobar* (1992) 3 Cal.4th 740, 750 [12 Cal.Rptr.2d 586, 837 P.2d 1100]; *People v. Nava* (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1490, 1498 [255 Cal.Rptr. 903] [reversible error to instruct that a bone fracture is a significant or substantial injury].)

If the case involves an issue of whether the defendant inflicted the injury “during the commission of” the offense, the court may give CALCRIM No. 3261, *While Committing a Felony: Defined—Escape Rule*. (See *People v. Jones* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 98, 109 [104 Cal.Rptr.2d 753, 18 P.3d 674]; *People v. Masbruch* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1001, 1014 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 760, 920 P.2d 705]; *People v. Taylor* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 578, 582 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 127].)

The second sentence of the great bodily injury definition could result in error if the prosecution improperly argues great bodily injury may be shown by greater than minor injury alone. (Compare *People v. Medellin* (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 519, 533–535 [258 Cal.Rptr.3d 867] [the definition was reasonably susceptible to prosecutor’s erroneous argument that the injury need only be greater than minor] with *People v. Quinonez* (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 457, 466 [260 Cal.Rptr.3d 86] [upholding instructions containing great bodily injury definition as written].)

## AUTHORITY

- Enhancement. Pen. Code, § 12022.7(e).
- Great Bodily Injury Defined. Pen. Code, § 12022.7(f); *People v. Escobar* (1992) 3 Cal.4th 740, 749–750 [12 Cal.Rptr.2d 586, 837 P.2d 1100].
- Dating Relationship Defined. Fam. Code, § 6210; Pen. Code, § 243(f)(10).
- Must Personally Inflict Injury. *People v. Lee* (2003) 31 Cal.4th 613, 631 [3 Cal.Rptr.3d 402, 74 P.3d 176]; *People v. Cole* (1982) 31 Cal.3d 568, 571 [183

Cal.Rptr. 350, 645 P.2d 1182]; *People v. Ramirez* (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 603, 627 [236 Cal.Rptr. 404] [Pen. Code, § 12022.8].

- General Intent Only Required. *People v. Carter* (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 752, 755–756 [70 Cal.Rptr.2d 569].
- Sex Offenses—Injury Must Be More Than Incidental to Offense. *People v. Escobar* (1992) 3 Cal.4th 740, 746 [12 Cal.Rptr.2d 586, 837 P.2d 1100].
- Group Beating Instruction. *People v. Modiri* (2006) 39 Cal.4th 481, 500–501 [46 Cal.Rptr.3d 762].
- “During Commission of” Felony. *People v. Jones* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 98, 109–110 [104 Cal.Rptr.2d 753, 18 P.3d 674]; *People v. Masbruch* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1001, 1014 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 760, 920 P.2d 705]; *People v. Taylor* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 578, 582 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 127].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Person Who Suffers Injury Need Not Be “Victim” of Domestic Abuse*

Penal Code section 12022.7(e) does not require that the injury be inflicted on the “victim” of the domestic violence. (*People v. Truong* (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 887, 899 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 904].) Thus, the enhancement may be applied where “an angry husband physically abuses his wife and, as part of the same incident, inflicts great bodily injury upon the man with whom she is having an affair.” (*Id.* at p. 900.)

See also the Related Issues section of CALCRIM No. 3160, *Great Bodily Injury*.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

3 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, §§ 350–354.

5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 91, *Sentencing*, § 91.35 (Matthew Bender).

### **3164–3174. Reserved for Future Use**

## F. SEX OFFENSES

### 3175. Sex Offenses: Sentencing Factors—Aggravated Kidnapping (Pen. Code, § 667.61(d)(2))

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If you find the defendant guilty of the crime[s] charged in Count[s] \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert counts charging sex offense[s] from Pen. Code, § 667.61(c)>*, you must then decide whether[, for each crime,] the People have proved the additional allegation that the defendant kidnapped \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of alleged victim>*, increasing the risk of harm to (him/her). [You must decide whether the People have proved this allegation for each crime and return a separate finding for each crime.]

To prove this allegation, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant took, held, or detained \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of alleged victim>* by the use of force or by instilling reasonable fear;
2. Using that force or fear, the defendant moved \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of alleged victim>* [or made (him/her) move] a substantial distance;
3. The movement of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of alleged victim>* substantially increased the risk of harm to (him/her) beyond that necessarily present in the \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert sex offense[s] from Pen. Code, § 667.61(c)>*;

[AND]

4. \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of alleged victim>* did not consent to the movement(/;)

[AND]

5. The defendant did not actually and reasonably believe that \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of alleged victim>* consented to the movement.]

*Substantial distance* means more than a slight or trivial distance. The movement must be more than merely incidental to the commission of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert sex offense[s] from Pen. Code, § 667.61(c)>*. In deciding whether the distance was substantial and whether the movement substantially increased the risk of harm, you must consider all the circumstances relating to the movement.

The People have the burden of proving each allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you must find that the allegation has not been proved.

New January 2006

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction on the sentencing factor when charged. (*Apprendi v. New Jersey* (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 490 [120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435].)

The victim's consent to go with the defendant may be a defense. (See *People v. Greenberger* (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 298, 375 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 61]; *People v. Isitt* (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 23, 28 [127 Cal.Rptr. 279] [reasonable, good faith belief that victim consented to movement is a defense to kidnapping].) For paragraphs instructing on actual consent or a reasonable, good faith belief in consent, see CALCRIM No. 1215, *Kidnapping*.

## AUTHORITY

- One-Strike Sex Offense Statute—Kidnapping Factor. Pen. Code, § 667.61(d)(2).
- Factors Must Be Pleaded and Proved. Pen. Code, § 667.61(j); *People v. Mancebo* (2002) 27 Cal.4th 735, 743 [117 Cal.Rptr.2d 550, 41 P.3d 556].
- Sentencing Factor Does Not Require Specific Intent to Commit Sex Offense. *People v. Jones* (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 693, 717 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 506].
- Sentencing Factor Requires Greater Movement Than That Incidental to Offense. *People v. Diaz* (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 243, 246 [92 Cal.Rptr.2d 682]; see also *People v. Aguilar* (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1044, 1052 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 231] [discussing meaning of “incidental”].
- Elements of Kidnapping. Pen. Code, § 207(a).
- Asportation Requirement. *People v. Martinez* (1999) 20 Cal.4th 225, 235–237 [83 Cal.Rptr.2d 533, 973 P.2d 512] [adopting modified two-pronged asportation test from *People v. Rayford* (1994) 9 Cal.4th 1, 12–14 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 317, 884 P.2d 1369], and *People v. Daniels* (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1119, 1139 [80 Cal.Rptr. 897, 459 P.2d 225]].
- Consent to Physical Movement. See *People v. Davis* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 516–518 [41 Cal.Rptr.2d 826, 896 P.2d 119].
- Force or Fear Requirement. *People v. Moya* (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 912, 916–917 [6 Cal.Rptr.2d 323]; *People v. Stephenson* (1974) 10 Cal.3d 652, 660 [111 Cal.Rptr. 556, 517 P.2d 820]; see *People v. Davis* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 517, fn. 13, 518 [41 Cal.Rptr.2d 826, 896 P.2d 119] [kidnapping requires use of force or fear; consent not vitiated by fraud, deceit, or dissimulation].
- Good Faith Belief in Consent. Pen. Code, § 26, subd. 3 [mistake of fact]; *People v. Mayberry* (1975) 15 Cal.3d 143, 153–155 [125 Cal.Rptr. 745, 542 P.2d 1337]; *People v. Isitt* (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 23, 28 [127 Cal.Rptr. 279]; *People v. Patrick* (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 952, 968 [179 Cal.Rptr. 276].

- Intent Requirement. *People v. Thornton* (1974) 11 Cal.3d 738, 765 [114 Cal.Rptr. 467, 523 P.2d 267]; *People v. Davis* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 519 [41 Cal.Rptr.2d 826, 896 P.2d 119]; *People v. Moya* (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 912, 916 [6 Cal.Rptr.2d 323].
- Substantial Distance Requirement. *People v. Derek Daniels* (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 1046, 1053 [22 Cal.Rptr.2d 877]; *People v. Stanworth* (1974) 11 Cal.3d 588, 600–601 [114 Cal.Rptr. 250, 522 P.2d 1058] [since movement must be more than slight or trivial, it must be substantial in character].

### RELATED ISSUES

See also the Related Issues section of CALCRIM No. 1215, *Kidnapping*.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

3 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, §§ 459–463.

5 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, § 727.

5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 91, *Sentencing*, §§ 91.38[1], 91.102[2][a] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.14 (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure § 13:9 (The Rutter Group).

**3176. Sex Offenses: Sentencing Factors—Aggravated Mayhem  
(Pen. Code, § 667.61(d)(3))**

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If you find the defendant guilty of the crime[s] charged in Count[s] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert counts charging sex offense[s] from Pen. Code, § 667.61(c)>, you must then decide whether[, for each crime,] the People have proved the additional allegation that, while committing that crime, the defendant also committed aggravated mayhem. [You must decide whether the People have proved this allegation for each crime and return a separate finding for each crime.]

To prove this allegation, the People must prove that:

1. During the commission of the crime, the defendant unlawfully and maliciously (disabled or disfigured someone permanently/ [or] deprived someone else of a limb, organ, or other part of (his/her) body);
2. When the defendant acted, (he/she) intended to (permanently disable or disfigure the other person/ [or] deprive the other person of a limb, organ, or other part of (his/her) body);

AND

3. Under the circumstances, the defendant's act showed extreme indifference to the physical or psychological well-being of the other person.

Someone acts *maliciously* when he or she intentionally does a wrongful act or when he or she acts with the unlawful intent to annoy or injure someone else.

[A disfiguring injury may be *permanent* even if it can be repaired by medical procedures.]

[The People do not have to prove that the defendant intended to kill.]

<If there is an issue in the case over whether the mayhem was committed "during the commission of" the offense, see Bench Notes.>

The People have the burden of proving each allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you must find that the allegation has not been proved.

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*New January 2006*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction on the sentencing factor when charged. (*Apprendi v. New Jersey* (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 490 [120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435].)

The bracketed sentence about the permanency of “disfiguring injury” may be given on request if there is evidence that the injury may be repaired by medical procedures. (*People v. Hill* (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1566, 1574–1575 [28 Cal.Rptr.2d 783] [not error to instruct that an injury may be permanent even though cosmetic repair may be medically feasible].)

The final bracketed sentence may be given on the prosecution’s request when there is no evidence or conflicting evidence that the defendant intended to kill someone. (See Pen. Code, § 205.)

If the case involves an issue of whether the defendant committed the mayhem “during the commission of” the offense, the court may give CALCRIM No. 3261, *While Committing a Felony: Defined—Escape Rule*. (See *People v. Jones* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 98, 109 [104 Cal.Rptr.2d 753]; *People v. Masbruch* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1001, 1014 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 760, 920 P.2d 705]; *People v. Taylor* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 578, 582 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 127].)

## AUTHORITY

- One-Strike Sex Offense Statute—Aggravated Mayhem Factor. Pen. Code, § 667.61(d)(3).
- Factors Must Be Pleaded and Proved. Pen. Code, § 667.61(j); *People v. Mancebo* (2002) 27 Cal.4th 735, 743 [117 Cal.Rptr.2d 550, 41 P.3d 556].
- Elements of Aggravated Mayhem. Pen. Code, § 205.
- Permanent Disability. See, e.g., *People v. Thomas* (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 507, 512 [158 Cal.Rptr. 120] [serious ankle injury lasting over six months].
- Permanent Disfigurement. See *People v. Hill* (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1566, 1571 [28 Cal.Rptr.2d 783]; see also *People v. Newble* (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 444, 451 [174 Cal.Rptr. 637] [head is member of body for purposes of disfigurement].
- Specific Intent to Cause Maiming Injury. *People v. Ferrell* (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 828, 833 [267 Cal.Rptr. 283]; *People v. Lee* (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 320, 324–325 [269 Cal.Rptr. 434].
- “During Commission of” Felony. *People v. Jones* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 98, 109–110 [104 Cal.Rptr.2d 753, 18 P.3d 674]; *People v. Masbruch* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1001, 1014 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 760, 920 P.2d 705]; *People v. Taylor* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 578, 582 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 127].

## RELATED ISSUES

See the Related Issues section of CALCRIM No. 800, *Aggravated Mayhem*.

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

3 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, §§ 459–463.

5 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, § 727.

5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 91, *Sentencing*, § 91.102[2][a][i] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.16 (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure § 13:9 (The Rutter Group).



**3177. Sex Offenses: Sentencing Factors—Torture (Pen. Code,  
§ 667.61(d)(3))**

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**If you find the defendant guilty of the crime[s] charged in Count[s] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert counts charging sex offense[s] from Pen. Code, § 667.61(c)>, you must then decide whether[, for each crime,] the People have proved the additional allegation that, while committing that crime, the defendant also committed torture. [You must decide whether the People have proved this allegation for each crime and return a separate finding for each crime.]**

**To prove this allegation, the People must prove that:**

- 1. During the commission of the crime, the defendant inflicted great bodily injury on someone else;**

**AND**

- 2. When inflicting the injury, the defendant intended to cause cruel or extreme pain and suffering for the purpose of revenge, extortion, or persuasion or for any sadistic purpose.**

***Great bodily injury* means significant or substantial physical injury. It is an injury that is greater than minor or moderate harm.**

**[It is not required that a victim actually suffer pain.]**

**[Someone acts for the purpose of *extortion* if he or she intends to (1) obtain a person’s property with the person’s consent and (2) obtain the person’s consent through the use of force or fear.]**

**[Someone acts for the purpose of *extortion* if he or she (1) intends to get a public official to do an official act and (2) uses force or fear to make the official do the act. An *official act* is an act that an officer does in his or her official capacity using the authority of his or her public office.]**

**[Someone acts with a *sadistic purpose* if he or she intends to inflict pain on someone else in order to experience pleasure himself or herself.]**

**<If there is an issue in the case over whether the torture was inflicted “during the commission of” the offense, see Bench Notes.>**

**The People have the burden of proving each allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you must find that the allegation has not been proved.**

**BENCH NOTES*****Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction on the sentencing factor when charged. (*Apprendi v. New Jersey* (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 490 [120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435].)

Unlike murder by torture, the crime of torture under Penal Code section 206 does not require that the intent to cause pain be premeditated or that any cruel or extreme pain be prolonged. (*People v. Pre* (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 413, 419–420 [11 Cal.Rptr.3d 739]; *People v. Aguilar* (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1196, 1204–1205 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 619]; *People v. Vital* (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 441, 444 [52 Cal.Rptr.2d 676].) Torture as defined in section 206 focuses on the mental state of the perpetrator and not the actual pain inflicted. (*People v. Hale* (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 94, 108 [88 Cal.Rptr.2d 904].) Give the bracketed sentence stating that “It is not required that a victim actually suffer pain” on request if there is no proof that the alleged victim actually suffered pain.

“Extortion” need not be defined for purposes of torture. (*People v. Barrera* (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1555, 1564 [18 Cal.Rptr.2d 395]; but see *People v. Hill* (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 661, 668 [190 Cal.Rptr. 628] [term should be defined for kidnapping under Pen. Code, § 209].) Nevertheless, either of the bracketed definitions of extortion, and the related definition of “official act,” may be given on request if any of these issues are raised in the case. (See Pen. Code, § 518 [defining “extortion”]; *People v. Norris* (1985) 40 Cal.3d 51, 55–56 [219 Cal.Rptr. 7, 706 P.2d 1141] [defining “official act”].) Extortion may also be committed by using “the color of official right” to make an official do an act. (Pen. Code, § 518; see *Evans v. United States* (1992) 504 U.S. 255, 258 [112 S.Ct. 1881, 119 L.Ed.2d 57]; *McCormick v. United States* (1990) 500 U.S. 257, 273 [111 S.Ct. 1807, 114 L.Ed.2d 307] [both discussing common law definition of the term].) It appears that this type of extortion would rarely occur in the context of torture, so it is excluded from this instruction.

“Sadistic purpose” may be defined on request. (See *People v. Barrera, supra*, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 1564; *People v. Raley* (1992) 2 Cal.4th 870, 899–901 [8 Cal.Rptr.2d 678, 830 P.2d 712] [approving use of phrase in torture-murder and special circumstances torture-murder instructions].)

If the case involves an issue of whether the defendant inflicted the injury “during the commission of” the offense, the court may give CALCRIM No. 3261, *While Committing a Felony: Defined—Escape Rule*. (See *People v. Jones* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 98, 109 [104 Cal.Rptr.2d 753, 18 P.3d 674]; *People v. Masbruch* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1001, 1014 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 760, 920 P.2d 705]; *People v. Taylor* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 578, 582 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 127].)

The second sentence of the great bodily injury definition could result in error if the prosecution improperly argues great bodily injury may be shown by greater than minor injury alone. (Compare *People v. Medellin* (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 519, 533–535 [258 Cal.Rptr.3d 867] [the definition was reasonably susceptible to prosecutor’s erroneous argument that the injury need only be greater than minor]

with *People v. Quinonez* (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 457, 466 [260 Cal.Rptr.3d 86] [upholding instructions containing great bodily injury definition as written].)

### AUTHORITY

- One-Strike Sex Offense Statute—Torture Factor. Pen. Code, § 667.61(d)(3).
- Factors Must Be Pleaded and Proved. Pen. Code, § 667.61(j); *People v. Mancebo* (2002) 27 Cal.4th 735, 743 [117 Cal.Rptr.2d 550, 41 P.3d 556].
- Elements of Torture. Pen. Code, § 206.
- Extortion Defined. Pen. Code, § 518.
- Great Bodily Injury Defined. Pen. Code, § 12022.7(f); see, e.g., *People v. Hale* (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 94, 108 [88 Cal.Rptr.2d 904] [broken and smashed teeth, split lip, and facial cut sufficient evidence of great bodily injury].
- Cruel Pain Equivalent to Extreme or Severe Pain. *People v. Aguilar* (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1196, 1202 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 619].
- Intent. *People v. Hale* (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 94, 106–107 [88 Cal.Rptr.2d 904]; *People v. Jung* (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1036, 1042–1043 [84 Cal.Rptr.2d 5]; see *People v. Aguilar* (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1196, 1204–1206 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 619] [neither premeditation nor intent to inflict prolonged pain are elements of torture].
- Sadistic Purpose Defined. *People v. Raley* (1992) 2 Cal.4th 870, 899–901 [8 Cal.Rptr.2d 678, 830 P.2d 712]; *People v. Aguilar* (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1196, 1202–1204 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 619]; see *People v. Healy* (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1142 [18 Cal.Rptr.2d 274] [sexual element not required].
- “During Commission of” Felony. *People v. Jones* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 98, 109–110 [104 Cal.Rptr.2d 753, 18 P.3d 674]; *People v. Masbruch* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1001, 1014 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 760, 920 P.2d 705]; *People v. Taylor* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 578, 582 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 127].

### RELATED ISSUES

See the Related Issues section of CALCRIM No. 810, *Torture*.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

3 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 202) Punishment, §§ 459–463.

5 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, § 727.

5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 91, *Sentencing*, § 91.102[2][a][i] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.15 (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure § 13:9 (The Rutter Group).

**3178. Sex Offenses: Sentencing Factors—Burglary With Intent to Commit Sex Offense (Pen. Code, § 667.61(d)(4))**

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If you find the defendant guilty of the crime[s] charged in Count[s] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert counts charging sex offense[s] from Pen. Code, § 667.61(c)>, you must then decide whether[, for each crime,] the People have proved the additional allegation that the defendant committed the crime during the commission of burglary, with the intent to commit \_\_\_\_\_ <insert sex offense[s] from Pen. Code, § 667.61(c)>. [You must decide whether the People have proved this allegation for each crime and return a separate finding for each crime.]

To prove this allegation, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant entered an inhabited (house [or a room within an inhabited house]/vessel/floating home/trailer coach/part of a building);
2. When the defendant entered the (house [or room within the house]/vessel/floating home/trailer coach/part of a building), (he/she) intended to commit \_\_\_\_\_ <insert sex offense[s] from Pen. Code, § 667.61(c)>;

**AND**

3. After the defendant entered the (house [or room within the house]/vessel/floating home/trailer coach/part of a building), (he/she) committed \_\_\_\_\_ <insert sex offense[s] from Pen. Code, § 667.61(c)> [before (he/she) escaped to a place of temporary safety].

A (house [or a room within an inhabited house]/vessel/floating home/trailer coach/part of a building) is *inhabited* if someone uses it as a dwelling, whether or not someone is inside at the time of the alleged entry.

[A *house* includes any (structure/garage/office/\_\_\_\_\_ <insert description>) that is attached to the house and functionally connected with it.]

[The defendant intended to commit rape if he intended to have sexual intercourse with a woman [who was not his wife], without her consent, by (using force, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury to her or to another person/threatening to retaliate against her or against a third person with a reasonable possibility that the threat would be carried out/threatening to have her or a third person incarcerated, arrested, or deported).]

[To decide whether the defendant intended to commit \_\_\_\_\_

<insert sex offense[s] other than rape from Pen. Code, § 667.61(c)>, please refer to the separate instructions that I (will give/have given) you on (that/those) crime[s].]

[A person has *reached a place of temporary safety* if he or she has successfully escaped from the scene of the crime and is no longer being pursued.]

The People have the burden of proving each allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you must find that the allegation has not been proved.

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*New January 2006*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction on the sentencing factor when charged. (*Apprendi v. New Jersey* (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 490 [120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435].)

If the defendant is charged with rape, give the bracketed sentence that begins with “The defendant intended to commit rape . . . .” If the defendant is charged with another offense, use the next bracketed paragraph, and give all necessary instructions on the Penal Code section 667.61(c) offenses alleged.

For a definition of “vessel,” “floating home,” or “trailer coach,” see CALCRIM No. 1701, *Burglary: Degrees*.

## AUTHORITY

- One-Strike Sex Offense Statute—Burglary With Intent to Commit Sex Offense. Pen. Code, § 667.61(d)(4).
- Factors Must Be Pleaded and Proved. Pen. Code, § 667.61(j); *People v. Mancebo* (2002) 27 Cal.4th 735, 743 [117 Cal.Rptr.2d 550, 41 P.3d 556].
- During the Commission of Burglary Defined for Sentencing Factor. *People v. Alvarado* (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 178, 191 [104 Cal.Rptr.2d 624].
- Elements of Burglary. Pen. Code, § 459.
- Determination of Degrees. Pen. Code, § 460.
- Inhabitation Defined. Pen. Code, § 459.
- Room Within Inhabited House. *People v. Sparks* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 71, 86–87 [120 Cal.Rptr.2d 508, 47 P.3d 289].

## RELATED ISSUES

See the Related Issues sections of CALCRIM No. 1700, *Burglary*, and CALCRIM No. 1701, *Burglary: Degrees*.

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

3 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, §§ 459–463.

5 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, § 727.

5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 91, *Sentencing*, § 91.102[2][a] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 143, *Crimes Against Property*, § 143.10 (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure § 13:9 (The Rutter Group).

**3179. Sex Offenses: Sentencing Factors—Kidnapping (Pen. Code, § 667.61(e)(1))**

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If you find the defendant guilty of the crime[s] charged in Count[s] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert counts charging sex offense[s] from Pen. Code, § 667.61(c)>, you must then decide whether[, for each crime,] the People have proved the additional allegation that the defendant kidnapped \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] of alleged victim[s]>. [You must decide whether the People have proved this allegation for each crime and return a separate finding for each crime.]

To decide whether the defendant kidnapped \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] of alleged victim[s]>, please refer to the separate instructions that I (will give/have given) you on kidnapping. You must apply those instructions when you decide whether the People have proved this additional allegation.

The People have the burden of proving each allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you must find that the allegation has not been proved.

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*New January 2006*

**BENCH NOTES**

***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction on the sentencing factor when charged. (*Appendi v. New Jersey* (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 490 [120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435].)

This sentencing factor applies if “the defendant kidnapped the victim of the present offense in violation of Section 207, 209, or 209.5.” (Pen. Code, § 667.61(e)(1).) Give the appropriate instruction on kidnapping, depending on which Penal Code section the prosecution alleges, as follows:

- Pen. Code, § 207: CALCRIM No. 1215, *Kidnapping*  
CALCRIM No. 1200, *Kidnapping: For Child Molestation*  
CALCRIM No. 1201, *Kidnapping: Person Incapable of Consent*
- Pen. Code, § 209: CALCRIM No. 1202, *Kidnapping: For Ransom, Reward, or Extortion*  
CALCRIM No. 1203, *Kidnapping: For Robbery, Rape, or Other Sex Offenses*
- Pen. Code, § 209.5: CALCRIM No. 1204, *Kidnapping: During Carjacking*

**AUTHORITY**

- One-Strike Sex Offense Statute—Kidnapping Factor. Pen. Code, § 667.61(e)(1).
- Factors Must Be Pleaded and Proved. Pen. Code, § 667.61(j); *People v. Mancebo* (2002) 27 Cal.4th 735, 743 [117 Cal.Rptr.2d 550, 41 P.3d 556].
- Sentencing Factor Does Not Require Specific Intent to Commit Sex Offense. *People v. Jones* (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 693, 717 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 506].
- Sentencing Factor Requires More Movement Than Incidental to Offense. *People v. Diaz* (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 243, 246 [92 Cal.Rptr.2d 682].

**RELATED ISSUES**

See also the Related Issues sections of the instructions on kidnapping, CALCRIM Nos. 1200–1204, 1215.

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

3 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, §§ 459–463.

5 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, § 727.

5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 91, *Sentencing*, §§ 91.38[1], 91.102[2][a] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.14 (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, *Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure* § 13:9 (The Rutter Group).



**3180. Sex Offenses: Sentencing Factors—Burglary (Pen. Code, § 667.61(e)(2))**

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If you find the defendant guilty of the crime[s] charged in Count[s] \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert counts charging sex offense[s] from Pen. Code, § 667.61(c)>*, you must then decide whether[, for each crime,] the People have proved the additional allegation that the defendant committed the crime during the commission of a burglary. [You must decide whether the People have proved this allegation for each crime and return a separate finding for each crime.]

To prove this allegation, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant entered (a building/an inhabited (house [or a room within an inhabited house]/vessel/floating home/trailer coach/part of a building));
2. When the defendant entered the (building/house [or a room within the house]/vessel/floating home/trailer coach/part of a building), (he/she) intended to commit (theft/ [or] \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert one or more felonies>*);

[AND]

3. After the defendant entered the (building/house [or a room within the house]/vessel/floating home/trailer coach/part of a building), (he/she) committed \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert sex offense[s] from Pen. Code, § 667.61(c)>* [before (he/she) escaped to a place of temporary safety](./);

*<Give element 4 only if prosecution alleges defendant entered a building that does not meet definition of inhabited dwelling.>*

[AND]

4. When the defendant committed \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert sex offense[s] from Pen. Code, § 667.61(c)>*, the building was closed to the public.]

[A (house [or a room within an inhabited house]/vessel/floating home/trailer coach/part of a building) is *inhabited* if someone uses it as a dwelling, whether or not someone is inside at the time of the alleged entry.]

[A *house* includes any (structure/garage/office/\_\_\_\_\_ *<insert description>*) that is attached to the house and functionally connected with it.]

*<Alternative A—theft>*

[The defendant intended to commit theft [by larceny] if (he/she) intended

to take property owned by someone else, without the owner's consent, to deprive the owner of it permanently [or to remove it from the owner's possession for so extended a period of time that the owner would be deprived of a major portion of the value or enjoyment of the property], to move the property, even a small distance, and to keep it for any period of time, however brief.]

*<Alternative B—rape by force, fear, or threats>*

[The defendant intended to commit rape if he intended to have sexual intercourse with a woman [who was not his wife], without her consent, by (using force, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury to her or to another person/threatening to retaliate against her or against a third person with a reasonable possibility that the threat would be carried out/threatening to have her or a third person incarcerated, arrested, or deported).]

*<Alternative C—other felony>*

[To decide whether the defendant intended to commit \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert other felony/felonies alleged>*, please refer to the separate instructions that I (will give/have given) you on (that/those) crime[s].]

[A person has *reached a place of temporary safety* if (he/she) has successfully escaped from the scene of the crime and is no longer being pursued.]

[The burglary was committed if the defendant entered with the intent to commit (theft/ [or] \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert one or more felonies>*). The defendant does not need to have actually committed that crime as long as (he/she) entered with the intent to do so. [The People do not have to prove that the defendant actually committed (theft/ [or] \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert one or more felonies>*).]]

[The People allege that the defendant intended to commit (theft/ [or] \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert one or more felonies>*). You may not find this allegation true unless you all agree that (he/she) intended to commit one of those crimes at the time of the entry. You do not need to all agree on which one of those crimes (he/she) intended.]

The People have the burden of proving each allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you must find that the allegation has not been proved.

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*New January 2006*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction on the sentencing factor when charged. (*Apprendi v. New Jersey* (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 490 [120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435].)

If the prosecution alleges that the defendant entered a “building” that does not meet the definition of inhabited dwelling, give element 4.

Give alternative A, B, or C depending on the prosecution’s theory about which felony the defendant intended to commit at the time of entry. To have the requisite intent for theft, the defendant must either intend to deprive the owner permanently or deprive the owner of a major portion of the property’s value or enjoyment. (See *People v. Avery* (2002) 27 Cal.4th 49, 57–58 [115 Cal.Rptr.2d 403, 38 P.3d 1].)

When giving this portion of the instruction, select the appropriate language in alternative A—theft.

If the prosecution alleges multiple underlying felonies, give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “The People allege that the defendant intended to commit either . . . .” (*People v. Failla* (1966) 64 Cal.2d 560, 569 [51 Cal.Rptr. 103, 414 P.2d 39]; *People v. Griffin* (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 741, 750 [109 Cal.Rptr.2d 273].)

For a definition of “vessel,” “floating home,” or “trailer coach,” see CALCRIM No. 1701, *Burglary: Degrees*.

## AUTHORITY

- One-Strike Sex Offense Statute—Burglary. Pen. Code, § 667.61(e)(2).
- Factors Must Be Pleaded and Proved. Pen. Code, § 667.61(j); *People v. Mancebo* (2002) 27 Cal.4th 735, 743 [117 Cal.Rptr.2d 550, 41 P.3d 556].
- During the Commission of Burglary Defined for Sentencing Factor. *People v. Alvarado* (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 178, 191 [104 Cal.Rptr.2d 624].
- Elements of Burglary. Pen. Code, § 459.
- Determination of Degrees. Pen. Code, § 460.
- Inhabitation Defined. Pen. Code, § 459.
- Room Within Inhabited House. *People v. Sparks* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 71, 86–87 [120 Cal.Rptr.2d 508, 47 P.3d 289].

## RELATED ISSUES

### **“Closed to the Public”**

“[T]he commission of a specified sex offense during a burglary is within the statute if the business is closed when the sex offense is committed.” (*People v. Palmore* (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1290, 1295–1296 [94 Cal.Rptr.2d 784].)

See the Related Issues sections of CALCRIM No. 1700, *Burglary*, and CALCRIM No. 1701, *Burglary: Degrees*.

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

3 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, §§ 459–463.

5 Witkin & Epstein, California. Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, § 727.

5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 91, *Sentencing*, § 91.102[2][a] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 143, *Crimes Against Property*, § 143.10 (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure § 13:9 (The Rutter Group).

## 3181. Sex Offenses: Sentencing Factors—Multiple Victims (Pen. Code, § 667.61(e)(4))

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**If you find the defendant guilty of two or more sex offenses, as charged in Counts \_\_\_\_\_ <insert counts charging sex offense[s] from Pen. Code, § 667.61(c)>, you must then decide whether the People have proved the additional allegation that those crimes were committed against more than one victim in this case.**

**The People have the burden of proving this allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you must find that this allegation has not been proved.**

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*New January 2006; Revised March 2019*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction on the sentencing factor when charged. (*Apprendi v. New Jersey* (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 490 [120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435].)

This sentencing factor must be pleaded, proved, and found true by the trier of fact. (*People v. Mancebo* (2002) 27 Cal.4th 735, 743 [117 Cal.Rptr.2d 550, 41 P.3d 556].) The court may not impose a sentence using this factor unless the jury has specifically made a finding that the factor has been proved, even if the defendant is convicted in the proceeding of qualifying offenses against more than one person. (*Ibid.*)

### AUTHORITY

- One-Strike Sex Offense Statute—Multiple Victims Factor. Pen. Code, § 667.61(e)(4).
- Factors Must Be Pleaded and Proved. Pen. Code, § 667.61(j); *People v. Mancebo* (2002) 27 Cal.4th 735, 743 [117 Cal.Rptr.2d 550, 41 P.3d 556].)

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *“Present Case or Cases”*

This sentencing factor applies when the “offenses are prosecuted ‘in the present case or cases.’” (*People v. Stewart* (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 163, 171 [14 Cal.Rptr.3d 353].) There is no requirement that the offenses be committed on the same date or in the course of the same transaction, so long as the offenses are tried together. (*Id.* at p. 172.)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

3 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, §§ 459–463.

5 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, § 727.

5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 91, *Sentencing*, § 91.102[2][a][ii], [3] (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, *Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure* § 13:9 (The Rutter Group).

## 3182. Sex Offenses: Sentencing Factors—Tying or Binding (Pen. Code, § 667.61(e)(5))

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If you find the defendant guilty of the crime[s] charged in Count[s] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert counts charging sex offense[s] from Pen. Code, § 667.61(c)>, you must then decide whether[, for each crime,] the People have proved the additional allegation that the defendant tied or bound \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] of alleged victim[s] or other person[s]> during the commission of (that/those) crime[s]. [You must decide whether the People have proved this allegation for each crime and return a separate finding for each crime.]

<If there is an issue in the case as to whether the tying or binding occurred “during the commission of” the offense, see Bench Notes.>

The People have the burden of proving each allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you must find that the allegation has not been proved.

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New January 2006

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction on the sentencing factor when charged. (*Apprendi v. New Jersey* (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 490 [120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435].)

If there is an issue in the case as to whether the defendant acted “during the commission of” the offense, the court may give CALCRIM No. 3261, *While Committing a Felony: Defined—Escape Rule*. (See *People v. Jones* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 98, 109 [104 Cal.Rptr.2d 753, 18 P.3d 674]; *People v. Masbruch* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1001, 1014 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 760, 920 P.2d 705]; *People v. Taylor* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 578, 582 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 127].)

### AUTHORITY

- One-Strike Sex Offense Statute—Tying or Binding Factor. Pen. Code, § 667.61(e)(5).
- Factors Must Be Pleaded and Proved. Pen. Code, § 667.61(j); *People v. Mancebo* (2002) 27 Cal.4th 735, 743 [117 Cal.Rptr.2d 550, 41 P.3d 556].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Binding Includes Placing Tape Over Victim’s Eyes*

In *People v. Campbell* (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 71, 77–79 [97 Cal.Rptr.2d 830], the court held that “binding” included placing tape over the victim’s eyes to prevent her from seeing.

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

3 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, §§ 459–463.

5 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, § 727.

5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 91, *Sentencing*, § 91.102[2][a][ii] (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure § 13:9 (The Rutter Group).



**3183. Sex Offenses: Sentencing Factors—Administered  
Controlled Substance (Pen. Code, § 667.61(e)(6))**

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If you find the defendant guilty of the crime[s] charged in Count[s] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert counts charging sex offense[s] from Pen. Code, § 667.61(c)>, you must then decide whether[, for each crime,] the People have proved the additional allegation that the defendant administered a controlled substance to \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] of alleged victim[s]> during the commission of (that/those) crime[s]. [You must decide whether the People have proved this allegation for each crime and return a separate finding for each crime.]

To prove this allegation, the People must prove that:

1. In the commission of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert sex offense[s] from Pen. Code, § 667.61(c)>, the defendant administered \_\_\_\_\_ <insert controlled substance from Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11054–11058> to \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name[s] of alleged victim[s]>;

**AND**

2. The defendant did so for the purpose of committing \_\_\_\_\_ <insert felony alleged>.

A person *administers* a substance if he or she applies it directly to the body of another person by injection, or by any other means, or causes the other person to inhale, ingest, or otherwise consume the substance.

<If there is an issue in the case as to whether the defendant acted “during the commission of” the offense, see Bench Notes.>

The People have the burden of proving each allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you must find that the allegation has not been proved.

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*New January 2006; Revised September 2017*

**BENCH NOTES**

***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction on the sentencing factor when charged. (*Apprendi v. New Jersey* (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 490 [120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435].)

If there is an issue in the case as to whether the defendant acted “during the commission” of the offense, the court may give CALCRIM No. 3261, *While Committing a Felony: Defined—Escape Rule*. (See *People v. Jones* (2001) 25

Cal.4th 98, 109 [104 Cal.Rptr.2d 753, 18 P.3d 674]; *People v. Masbruch* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1001, 1014 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 760, 920 P.2d 705] [weapon used before elements of felony committed]; *People v. Taylor* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 578, 582 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 127].)

### AUTHORITY

- One-Strike Sex Offense Statute—Administered Controlled Substance. Pen. Code, § 667.61(e)(6).
- Factors Must Be Pleaded and Proved. Pen. Code, § 667.61(j); *People v. Mancebo* (2002) 27 Cal.4th 735, 743 [117 Cal.Rptr.2d 550, 41 P.3d 556].
- Elements of Enhancement. Pen. Code, § 12022.75.
- Administering. Health & Saf. Code, § 11002.
- “During Commission of” Felony. *People v. Jones* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 98, 109–110 [104 Cal.Rptr.2d 753, 18 P.3d 674]; *People v. Masbruch* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1001, 1014 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 760, 920 P.2d 705]; *People v. Taylor* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 578, 582 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 127].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

3 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, §§ 574–578.

5 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, § 727.

5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 91, *Sentencing*, §§ 91.42, 91.102[2][a][ii] (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure § 13:9 (The Rutter Group).

**3184. Sex Offenses: Sentencing Factors—Using Force or Fear to  
Cause Minor to Engage in Commercial Sex Act (Pen. Code,  
§ 236.1(c)(2))**

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**If you find the defendant guilty of the crime[s] charged in Count[s] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert count[s] charging violation[s] of Penal Code section 236.1(c)> you must then decide whether[, for each crime,] the People have proved the additional allegation that when the defendant committed (that/those) crime[s], (he/she) used (force[,]/ [or] fear[,]/ [or] deceit[,]/ [or] coercion[,]/ [or] violence[,]/ [or] duress[,]/ [or] menace) (on) ([or] threat of unlawful injury to) (the other person/ [or] to someone else).**

**[*Duress* means a direct or implied threat of force, violence, danger, hardship, or retribution that is enough to cause a reasonable person to do [or submit to] something that he or she would not otherwise do [or submit to].**

**[*Duress* includes (a direct or implied threat to destroy, conceal, remove, confiscate, or possess any actual or purported passport or immigration document of the other person/ [or] knowingly destroying, concealing, removing, confiscating, or possessing any actual or purported passport or immigration document of the other person).]**

**[*Menace* means a verbal or physical threat of harm[, including use of a deadly weapon]. The threat of harm may be express or implied.]**

**[*Coercion* includes any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause a person to believe that failing to perform an act would result in (serious harm to or physical restraint against someone else/ [or] the abuse or threatened abuse of the legal process/ [or] debt bondage/ [or] providing or facilitating the possession of any controlled substance to impair the other person's judgment).]**

**[*Serious harm* includes any harm, either physical or nonphysical, including psychological, financial, or reputational harm, that is sufficiently serious, under all the circumstances, to force a reasonable person of the same background and in the same circumstances to perform or to continue performing labor, services[, or commercial sex acts] in order to avoid that harm.]**

**[When you decide whether the defendant acted with (*duress*/ [or] *coercion*), consider all of the circumstances, including the age of the other person, (his/her) relationship to the defendant [or defendant's agent[s]], and the other person's handicap or disability, if any.]**

**The People have the burden of proving each allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you must find**

that the allegation has not been proved.

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*New February 2014*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give an instruction defining this enhancement.

This instruction is based on the language of the statute effective November 7, 2012, and applies only to crimes committed on or after that date.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements and Definitions. Pen. Code, § 236.1(c)(2).
- Menace Defined [in context of false imprisonment]. *People v. Matian* (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 480, 484–486 [41 Cal.Rptr.2d 459].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, § 278.

**3185–3199. Reserved for Future Use**

## G. CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES

**3200. Controlled Substance: Quantity (Pen. Code, §§ 1203.07(a)(1), (2) & (4); Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11352.5, 11370.4)**

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If you find the defendant guilty of the crime[s] charged in Count[s] \_\_\_\_\_ [,] [or of attempting to commit (that/those) crime[s]] [or the lesser crime[s] of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert lesser offense[s]>], you must then decide whether[, for each crime,] the People have proved the additional allegation that the crime involved [more than] a specified amount [or more] of the controlled substance. [You must decide whether the People have proved this allegation for each crime and return a separate finding for each crime.]

To prove this allegation, the People must prove that:

- [1.] The defendant \_\_\_\_\_ <insert conduct alleged, e.g., sold or conspired to sell> [more than] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert quantity alleged> by (weight/volume) [or more] of a substance containing \_\_\_\_\_ <insert controlled substance>(.!;)**

<Give element 2 if enhancement alleged in conspiracy count.>

[AND

- 2. The defendant was substantially involved in the planning, direction, execution, or financing of the \_\_\_\_\_ <insert conduct alleged, e.g., sale> of the \_\_\_\_\_ <insert controlled substance>.]**

[In deciding whether the required (weight/volume) has been proved, do not take into account plant or vegetable material.]

The People have the burden of proving each allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you must find that the allegation has not been proved.

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*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction when the defendant is charged with an enhancement or a probation ineligibility clause based on the quantity of the controlled substance. (*Apprendi v. New Jersey* (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 490 [120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435].)

Give the bracketed phrases “more than” if the defendant is charged with an

enhancement under Health and Safety Code section 11370.4. Give the bracketed phrases “or more” if the defendant is charged under Health and Safety Code section 11352.5 or Penal Code section 1203.07.

Give bracketed element 2 if an enhancement under Health and Safety Code section 11370.4 is alleged in a count of conspiracy. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.4(a); *People v. Salcedo* (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 209, 217 [35 Cal.Rptr.2d 539].) Do not give element 2 if the defendant is not charged with conspiracy but is being prosecuted for one or more substantive offenses on a theory of coconspirator liability. (*People v. Salcedo, supra*, 30 Cal.App.4th at p. 217.) If the defendant is charged with the enhancement on both conspiracy and substantive offenses, the court should give this instruction once for the conspiracy charge, with element 2, and once for all the substantive offenses, without element 2. If properly instructed, the jury need not make a special finding that the defendant was substantially involved. (*People v. Lobato* (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 762, 766 [135 Cal.Rptr.2d 429].)

### AUTHORITY

- Enhancements and Sentencing Factors. Pen. Code, §§ 1203.07(a)(1), (2) & (4); Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11352.5, 11370.4.
- Substance Containing Controlled Substance—Need Not Be Pure. *People v. Pieters* (1991) 52 Cal.3d 894, 903 [276 Cal.Rptr. 918, 802 P.2d 420].
- Knowledge of Quantity or Specific Intent Not Required. *People v. Meza* (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1741, 1748 [45 Cal.Rptr.2d 844].
- Conspiracy Instruction. *People v. Duran* (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 923, 941–942 [114 Cal.Rptr.2d 595]; *People v. Salcedo* (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 209, 217 [35 Cal.Rptr.2d 539]; *People v. Lobato* (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 762, 766 [135 Cal.Rptr.2d 429].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### ***Must Controlled Substance Actually Exist?***

In *Valenzuela v. Superior Court* (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1445, 1447 [39 Cal.Rptr.2d 781], the court held that, where a defendant is charged with offering to sell, an enhancement under Health and Safety Code section 11370.4 “must be based on the weight of a substance in existence, not on an amount merely offered or negotiated.” Thus, the enhancement was not proper where the defendant negotiated to sell five kilograms of heroin but in fact only produced less than one kilogram, or where the defendant offered to sell four kilograms of cocaine but never possessed that substance. (*Valenzuela, supra*, 33 Cal.App.4th at p. 1455.) Similarly, *People v. Lopez* (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 897, 902–903 [24 Cal.Rptr.2d 649], held that an enhancement under Health and Safety Code section 11379.8 was not proper where the defendant agreed to manufacture more than three pounds of methamphetamine but failed to produce any of the substance. On the other hand, in *People v. Howard* (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1407, 1414–1416 [39 Cal.Rptr.2d 766], the court upheld an enhancement where the defendants agreed to purchase seven kilograms of cocaine

and had the required money on hand, but the officers conducting the undercover operation only provided one kilogram of the substance. The court distinguished prior holdings, finding that where a defendant is charged with conspiracy to purchase a controlled substance in an undercover operation, it is not necessary for the officers to produce all of the drugs promised. (*Id.* at p. 1416.)

### ***Sentencing Entrapment or Manipulation***

Some jurisdictions have recognized a defense of “sentencing entrapment or manipulation,” where undercover law enforcement officers persuade a defendant to sell or produce a greater quantity of the controlled substance for the purpose of later obtaining a higher mandatory sentence. (See *People v. Smith* (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1207, 1212 [7 Cal.Rptr.3d 559, 80 P.3d 662].) The doctrine of “sentencing entrapment” does not apply in California. (*Ibid.*) In *Smith*, the Court did not decide whether the doctrine of “sentence manipulation” does apply. (*Ibid.*) The Court did find that if the doctrine of sentence manipulation applies in California, its application to a particular case would require “truly outrageous” conduct by law enforcement officers. (*Ibid.*)

## **SECONDARY SOURCES**

3 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, §§ 375, 615.

5 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, § 727.

5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 91, *Sentencing*, § 91.42 (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 145, *Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses*, § 145.01[3][e][ii] (Matthew Bender).

**3201. Controlled Substance: Quantity—Manufacture of Controlled Substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379.8)**

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If you find the defendant guilty of the crime[s] charged in Count[s] \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert counts charging manufacturing or processing of controlled substance>*, you must then decide whether[, for each crime,] the People have proved the additional allegation that the crime involved more than a specified amount of the controlled substance. [You must decide whether the People have proved this allegation for each crime and return a separate finding for each crime.]

To prove this allegation, the People must prove that:

1. A substance used in, to be used in, or produced during the (manufacturing/ \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert description of alleged other process>*) process contained \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert controlled substance from Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11054–11058>*;

[AND]

2. The substance containing \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert controlled substance>* was more than \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert quantity alleged>* by (weight/volume)(./;)

*<Give element 3 if enhancement alleged in conspiracy count.>*

[AND]

3. The defendant was substantially involved in the direction or supervision of, or in a significant portion of the financing of, the (manufacturing/ \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert description of alleged other process>*) of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert controlled substance>*.]

[In deciding whether the required (weight/volume) has been proved, do not take into account plant or vegetable material.]

The People have the burden of proving each allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you must find that the allegation has not been proved.

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*New January 2006*

**BENCH NOTES**

***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction when the defendant is charged with an enhancement based on the quantity of the controlled substance. (*Apprendi v. New Jersey* (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 490 [120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435].)



Give bracketed element 3 if the enhancement is alleged in a count of conspiracy to manufacture a controlled substance. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379.8(e); *People v. Duran* (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 923, 941 [114 Cal.Rptr.2d 595].) Do not give element 3 if the defendant is not charged with conspiracy but is being prosecuted for one or more substantive offenses on a theory of coconspirator liability. (*People v. Duran, supra*, 94 Cal.App.4th at p. 942.) If the defendant is charged with the enhancement on both conspiracy and substantive offenses, the court should give this instruction once for the conspiracy charge, with element 3, and once for all the substantive offenses, without element 3. If properly instructed, the jury need not make a special finding that the defendant was substantially involved. (*People v. Lobato* (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 762, 766 [135 Cal.Rptr.2d 429].)

### AUTHORITY

- Enhancement. Health & Saf. Code, § 11379.8.
- Substance Containing Controlled Substance—Need Not Be Pure. *People v. Burgio* (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 769, 774 [20 Cal.Rptr.2d 397].
- Substance Containing Controlled Substance—Used or to Be Used in Process. *People v. Hard* (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 272, 275 [5 Cal.Rptr.3d 107].
- Knowledge of Quantity or Specific Intent Not Required. *People v. Meza* (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1741, 1748 [45 Cal.Rptr.2d 844].
- Conspiracy Instruction. *People v. Duran* (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 923, 941–942 [114 Cal.Rptr.2d 595]; *People v. Salcedo* (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 209, 217 [35 Cal.Rptr.2d 539]; *People v. Lobato* (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 762, 766 [135 Cal.Rptr.2d 429].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Combining Measurements*

Health and Safety Code section 11379.8 provides two sets of measurements, one for “liquid by volume” and one for “solids by weight.” “[S]o long as there is sufficient evidence, the trier of fact should be permitted to add the common measures of the seized substances in order to meet the statute’s standards.” (*People v. Good* (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 1533, 1537 [266 Cal.Rptr. 608].)

See the Related Issues section of CALCRIM No. 3200, *Controlled Substance: Quantity*.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

3 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, §§ 375, 615.

5 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, § 727.

5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 91, *Sentencing*, § 91.42 (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 145, *Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses*, § 145.01[3][c] (Matthew Bender).

**3202–3219. Reserved for Future Use**

## **H. OTHER ENHANCEMENTS**

### **3220. Amount of Loss (Pen. Code, § 12022.6)**

*New January 2006; Revised August 2009, April 2010, August 2016; Revoked March 2021*

### 3221. Aggravated White Collar Crime (Pen. Code, § 186.11(a)(1))

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If you find the defendant guilty of the crime[s] charged in Count[s] \_\_\_\_\_ [,] [or of attempting to commit (that/those) crime[s]] [or the lesser crimes[s] of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert lesser offense[s]>], you must then decide whether the People have proved the additional allegation that the defendant engaged in a pattern of related felony conduct that (involved the taking of/ [or] resulted in the loss by another person or entity of) more than \$ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert amount alleged>.

To prove this allegation, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant committed two or more related felonies, specifically \_\_\_\_\_ <insert names of alleged felonies and descriptions if necessary>;
2. Fraud or embezzlement was a material element of at least two related felonies committed by the defendant;
3. The related felonies involved a pattern of related felony conduct;

AND

4. The pattern of related felony conduct (involved the taking of/ [or] resulted in the loss by another person or entity of) more than \$ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert amount alleged>.

*A pattern of related felony conduct* means engaging in at least two felonies that have the same or similar purpose, result, principals, victims, or methods of commission, or are otherwise interrelated by distinguishing characteristics, and that are not isolated events.

*Related felonies* are felonies committed against two or more separate victims, or against the same victim on two or more separate occasions.

[Fraud is a material element of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of alleged felony>.]

[Embezzlement is a material element of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of alleged felony>.]

The People have the burden of proving this allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you must find that this allegation has not been proved.

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*New January 2006; Revised December 2008*

**BENCH NOTES*****Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction on the enhancement when charged. (*Apprendi v. New Jersey* (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 490 [120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435].)

If the court has not otherwise instructed the jury on all the elements of the underlying felonies, the court must also give the appropriate instructions on those elements.

It is unclear if the court may instruct the jury that the fraud or embezzlement is a material element of the felonies. The bracketed sentences are provided for the court to use at its discretion.

**AUTHORITY**

- Enhancement. Pen. Code, § 186.11(a)(1).

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

3 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, § 379.

5 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, § 727.

5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 91, *Sentencing*, § 91.49 (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 143, *Crimes Against Property*, § 143.01[4][d], [f] (Matthew Bender).

**3222. Characteristics of Victim (Pen. Code, §§ 667.9(a) & (b),  
667.10(a))**

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If you find the defendant guilty of the crime[s] charged in Count[s] \_\_\_\_\_ [,] [or of attempting to commit (that/those) crime[s]] [or the lesser crimes[s] of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert lesser offense[s]>], you must then decide whether[, for each crime,] the People have proved the additional allegation that the defendant committed that crime against a person who was (65 years of age or older/under the age of 14 years/blind/deaf/developmentally disabled/paraplegic/ [or] quadriplegic). [You must decide whether the People have proved this allegation for each crime and return a separate finding for each crime.]

To prove this allegation, the People must prove that:

1. At the time of the crime, \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of alleged victim> was (65 years of age or older/under the age of 14 years/blind/deaf/developmentally disabled/paraplegic/ [or] quadriplegic);

AND

2. At that time, the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of alleged victim> was (65 years of age or older/under the age of 14 years/blind/deaf/developmentally disabled/paraplegic/ [or] quadriplegic).

[Under the law, a person becomes one year older as soon as the first minute of his or her birthday has begun.]

[*Developmentally disabled* means a severe, chronic disability of a person that:

1. Is attributable to a mental or physical impairment or a combination of mental and physical impairments;
2. Is likely to continue indefinitely;

AND

3. Results in substantial functional limitation in three or more of the following abilities:
  - a. To care for one's self;
  - b. To understand and express language;
  - c. To learn;
  - d. To be independently mobile;
  - e. To engage in self-direction;

f. To live independently;

OR

g. To be economically self-sufficient.]

**The People have the burden of proving each allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you must find that the allegation has not been proved.**

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*New January 2006; Revised April 2011*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction on the enhancement when charged. (*Apprendi v. New Jersey* (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 490 [120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435].)

If the defendant is charged with a prior conviction under Penal Code section 667.9(b) or 667.10, the court must also give CALCRIM No. 3100, *Prior Conviction: Nonbifurcated Trial*, unless the defendant has stipulated to the prior or the court has granted a bifurcated trial on the prior conviction.

Give the bracketed paragraph about calculating age if requested. (Fam. Code, § 6500; *In re Harris* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 849–850 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391].)

Give the bracketed definition of developmental disability if that enhancement is charged.

## AUTHORITY

- Enhancements. Pen. Code, §§ 667.9(a) & (b), 667.10(a).
- Developmental Disability Defined. Pen. Code, § 667.9(d).
- Reasonably Should Have Known Not Unconstitutionally Vague. *People v. Smith* (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1182, 1188–1190 [16 Cal.Rptr.2d 820].
- Prior Conviction Not Required for Enhancement Under Penal Code Section 667.9(a). *People v. Huricks* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1201, 1213 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 592].
- Proof of Knowledge Requirement. *People v. Morris* (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1147, 1153–1154 [111 Cal.Rptr.3d 204].

## SECONDARY SOURCES

3 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, §§ 381, 420.

5 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, § 727.

5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 91, *Sentencing*, § 91.52 (Matthew Bender).

**3223. Reckless Driving With Specified Injury (Veh. Code, § 23105(a))**

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**If you find the defendant guilty of reckless driving, you must then decide whether the People have proved the additional allegation that when the defendant committed that crime, (he/she) caused someone else to suffer \_\_\_\_\_ <insert injury or injuries specified in Veh. Code § 23105(b)>.**

**The People have the burden of proving this allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you must find that the allegation has not been proved.**

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*New August 2013; Revised August 2016*

**BENCH NOTES**

***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction. See *Apprendi v. New Jersey* (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 490 [120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435] [any fact that increases penalty for crime beyond prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to jury and proved beyond reasonable doubt.]

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give CALCRIM No. 240, *Causation*, if the issue of whether the defendant's act caused injury goes to the jury. (*People v. Bernhardt* (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 567, 591 [35 Cal.Rptr. 401].)

**AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Veh. Code, § 23105(b).

***Related Instructions***

CALCRIM No. 2200, *Reckless Driving*.

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

2 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, § 271.

**3224–3249. Reserved for Future Use**



## I. TEMPLATES

### 3250. Enhancement, Sentencing Factor, or Specific Factual Issue: Template

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If you find the defendant guilty of the crime[s] charged in Count[s] \_\_\_\_\_ [,] [or of attempting to commit (that/those) crime[s]] [or the lesser crimes[s] of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert lesser offense[s]>], you must then decide whether[, for each crime,] the People have proved the additional allegation that \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of enhancement, sentencing factor, or factual issue>. [You must decide whether the People have proved this allegation for each crime and return a separate finding for each crime.]

To prove this allegation, the People must prove that:

*<Insert elements required.>*

The People have the burden of proving each allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you must find that the allegation has not been proved.

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*New January 2006*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

This template is provided for the court to use for any enhancements, sentencing factors, or factual issues to be submitted to the jury that are not covered in previous instructions. (*Cunningham v. California* (2007) 549 U.S. 270 [127 S.Ct. 856, 166 L.Ed.2d 856]; *Blakely v. Washington* (2004) 542 U.S. 296 [124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403].)

### 3251. Enhancement, Sentencing Factor, or Specific Factual Issue: Template—Bifurcated Trial

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**The People have alleged that \_\_\_\_\_** *<insert description of enhancement, sentencing factor, or factual issue>*.

**To prove this allegation, the People must prove that:**

*<Insert elements required.>*

**The People have the burden of proving each allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you must find that the allegation has not been proved.**

---

*New January 2006*

#### **BENCH NOTES**

##### ***Instructional Duty***

This template is provided for the court to use for any enhancements, sentencing factors, or factual issues to be submitted to the jury that are not covered in previous instructions when the court grants a bifurcated trial on that issue. (*Cunningham v. California* (2007) 549 U.S. 270 [127 S.Ct. 856, 166 L.Ed.2d 856]; *Blakely v. Washington* (2004) 542 U.S. 296 [124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403].)

The court **must also give** CALCRIM No. 221, *Reasonable Doubt: Bifurcated Trial*.

When inserting the description in the first sentence, the court should specify which crimes the enhancement or sentencing factor pertains to if it applies to one or more specific counts. For example, “the victim of the robbery in Count 1 was particularly vulnerable.”

**3252–3259. Reserved for Future Use**

## J. RELATED INSTRUCTIONS

### 3260. Duty of Jury: Verdict Form for Enhancement, Sentencing Factor, or Prior Conviction

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You have been given (a/\_\_\_\_\_ <insert number>) verdict form[s] for the additional allegation[s]. If you reach a verdict on any additional allegation, complete the verdict form for that allegation.

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*New January 2006*

#### BENCH NOTES

##### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction when instructing on any enhancements, sentencing factors, prior convictions, or other special findings.

**Do not give** this instruction for special circumstances. Give CALCRIM No. 700, *Special Circumstances: Introduction*.

#### AUTHORITY

- Statutory Authority. Pen. Code, §§ 1158, 1158a.

#### SECONDARY SOURCES

5 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, § 727.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.20 (Matthew Bender).

5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 91, *Sentencing*, §§ 91.31, 91.102[3] (Matthew Bender).

## 3261. While Committing a Felony: Defined—Escape Rule

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**The People must prove that \_\_\_\_\_ <insert allegation, e.g., the defendant personally used a firearm> while committing [or attempting to commit] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert felony or felonies>.**

*<Give one or more bracketed paragraphs below depending on crime[s] alleged.>*

*<Robbery>*

**[The crime of robbery [or attempted robbery] continues until the perpetrator[s] (has/have) actually reached a place of temporary safety.**

**The perpetrator[s] (has/have) reached a place of temporary safety if:**

- **(He/She/They) (has/have) successfully escaped from the scene; [and]**
- **(He/She/They) (is/are) not or (is/are) no longer being chased(; [and]/.)**
- **[(He/She/They) (has/have) unchallenged possession of the property(; [and]/.)]**
- **[(He/She/They) (is/are) no longer in continuous physical control of the person who is the target of the robbery.]]**

*<Burglary>*

**[The crime of burglary [or attempted burglary] continues until the perpetrator[s] (has/have) actually reached a place of temporary safety. The perpetrator[s] (has/have) reached a place of temporary safety if (he/she/they) (has/have) successfully escaped from the scene[,] [and] (is/are) no longer being chased[, and (has/have) unchallenged possession of the property].]**

*<Sexual Assault>*

**[The crime of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert sexual assault alleged> [or attempted \_\_\_\_\_ <insert sexual assault alleged>] continues until the perpetrator[s] (has/have) actually reached a place of temporary safety. The perpetrator[s] (has/have) reached a place of temporary safety if (he/she/they) (has/have) successfully escaped from the scene[,] [and] (is/are) no longer being chased[, and (is/are) no longer in continuous physical control of the person who was the target of the crime].]**

*<Kidnapping>*

**[The crime of kidnapping [or attempted kidnapping] continues until the perpetrator[s] (has/have) actually reached a place of temporary safety.**

**The perpetrator[s] (has/have) reached a place of temporary safety if (he/she/they) (has/have) successfully escaped from the scene, (is/are) no longer being chased, and (is/are) no longer in continuous physical control of the person kidnapped.]**

<Other Felony>

**[The crime of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert felony alleged> [or attempted \_\_\_\_\_ <insert felony alleged>] continues until the perpetrator[s] (has/have) actually reached a place of temporary safety. The perpetrator[s] (has/have) reached a place of temporary safety if (he/she/they) (has/have) successfully escaped from the scene and (is/are) no longer being chased.]**

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2006, August 2013*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

Give this instruction whenever the evidence raises an issue over the duration of the felony and another instruction given to the jury has required some act “during the commission or attempted commission” of the felony. (See *People v. Wilkins* (2013) 56 Cal.4th 333, 347–348 [153 Cal.Rptr.3d 519, 295 P.3d 903].)

This instruction should **not** be given if the issue is when the defendant formed the intent to aid and abet a robbery or a burglary. For robbery, give CALCRIM No. 1603, *Robbery: Intent of Aider and Abettor*. For burglary, give CALCRIM No. 1702, *Burglary: Intent of Aider and Abettor*.

## AUTHORITY

- Escape Rule. *People v. Wilkins* (2013) 56 Cal.4th 333, 347–348 [153 Cal.Rptr.3d 519, 295 P.3d 903].
- Place of Temporary Safety. *People v. Salas* (1972) 7 Cal.3d 812, 823 [103 Cal.Rptr. 431, 500 P.2d 7]; *People v. Johnson* (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 552, 560 [7 Cal.Rptr.2d 23].
- Continuous Control of Victim. *People v. Thompson* (1990) 50 Cal.3d 134, 171–172 [266 Cal.Rptr. 309, 785 P.2d 857] [lewd acts]; *People v. Carter* (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1236, 1251–1252 [23 Cal.Rptr.2d 888] [robbery].
- Robbery. *People v. Salas* (1972) 7 Cal.3d 812, 823 [103 Cal.Rptr. 431, 500 P.2d 7]; *People v. Cooper* (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1158, 1170 [282 Cal.Rptr. 450, 811 P.2d 742].
- Burglary. *People v. Bodely* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 311, 313–314 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 72].
- Lewd Acts on Child. *People v. Thompson* (1990) 50 Cal.3d 134, 171–172 [266 Cal.Rptr. 309, 785 P.2d 857].

- Sexual Assault. *People v. Hart* (1999) 20 Cal.4th 546, 611 [85 Cal.Rptr.2d 132, 976 P.2d 683]; *People v. Hernandez* (1988) 47 Cal.3d 315, 348 [253 Cal.Rptr. 199, 763 P.2d 1289].
- Kidnapping. *People v. Pearch* (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1282, 1299 [280 Cal.Rptr. 584]; *People v. Silva* (1988) 45 Cal.3d 604, 632 [247 Cal.Rptr. 573, 754 P.2d 1070].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Place of Temporary Safety Based on Objective Standard*

Whether the defendant had reached a place of temporary safety is judged on an objective standard. The “issue to be resolved is whether a robber had actually reached a place of temporary safety, not whether the defendant thought that he or she had reached such a location.” (*People v. Johnson* (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 552, 560 [7 Cal.Rptr.2d 23].)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the Person, §§ 156, 157, 160, 162.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, §§ 142.01[2][b][v], 142.10[1][b] (Matthew Bender).

**3262–3399. Reserved for Future Use**

# DEFENSES AND INSANITY

## A. GENERAL DEFENSES

- 3400. Alibi
- 3401. Reserved for Future Use
- 3402. Duress or Threats
- 3403. Necessity
- 3404. Accident (Pen. Code, § 195)
- 3405. Parental Right to Punish a Child
- 3406. Mistake of Fact
- 3407. Defenses: Mistake of Law
- 3408. Entrapment
- 3409. When Conduct of Officer May Not Be Attributed to Defendant
- 3410. Statute of Limitations
- 3411. Mistake of Law As a Defense
- 3412. Compassionate Use (Health & Saf. Code, § 11362.5)
- 3413. Collective or Cooperative Cultivation Defense (Health & Saf. Code, § 11362.775)
- 3414. Coercion (Pen. Code, § 236.23)
- 3415. Lawful Use Defense (Health & Saf. Code, § 11362.1)
- 3416–3424. Reserved for Future Use

## B. IMPAIRMENT DEFENSES

- 3425. Unconsciousness
- 3426. Voluntary Intoxication (Pen. Code, § 29.4)
- 3427. Involuntary Intoxication
- 3428. Mental Impairment: Defense to Specific Intent or Mental State (Pen. Code, § 28)
- 3429. Reasonable Person Standard for Physically Disabled Person
- 3430–3449. Reserved for Future Use

## C. INSANITY AND CIVIL COMMITMENTS

- 3450. Insanity: Determination, Effect of Verdict (Pen. Code, §§ 25, 29.8)
- 3451. Present Mental Competence of Defendant
- 3452. Determining Restoration to Sanity (Pen. Code, § 1026.2)
- 3453. Extension of Commitment (Pen. Code, § 1026.5(b)(1))
- 3454. Initial Commitment as Sexually Violent Predator (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 6600, 6600.1)
- 3454A. Hearing to Determine Current Status Under Sexually Violent Predator Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6605)

## DEFENSES AND INSANITY

- 3455. Mental Incapacity as a Defense (Pen. Code, §§ 25, 29.8)
- 3456. Initial Commitment of Mentally Disordered Offender as Condition of Parole (Pen. Code, § 2970)
- 3457. Extension of Commitment as Mentally Disordered Offender (Pen. Code, § 2970)
- 3458. Extension of Commitment to Division of Juvenile Facilities (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 1800)
- 3459–3469. Reserved for Future Use

### **D. SELF-DEFENSE AND DEFENSE OF ANOTHER**

- 3470. Right to Self-Defense or Defense of Another (Non-Homicide)
- 3471. Right to Self-Defense: Mutual Combat or Initial Aggressor
- 3472. Right to Self-Defense: May Not Be Contrived
- 3473. Reserved for Future Use
- 3474. Danger No Longer Exists or Attacker Disabled
- 3475. Right to Eject Trespasser From Real Property
- 3476. Right to Defend Real or Personal Property
- 3477. Presumption That Resident Was Reasonably Afraid of Death or Great Bodily Injury (Pen. Code, § 198.5)
- 3478–3499. Reserved for Future Use



## A. GENERAL DEFENSES

### 3400. Alibi

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**The People must prove that the defendant committed \_\_\_\_\_ <insert crime[s] charged>. The defendant contends (he/she) did not commit (this/these) crime[s] and that (he/she) was somewhere else when the crime[s] (was/were) committed. The People must prove that the defendant was present and committed the crime[s] with which (he/she) is charged. The defendant does not need to prove (he/she) was elsewhere at the time of the crime.**

**If you have a reasonable doubt about whether the defendant was present when the crime was committed, you must find (him/her) not guilty.**

**[However, the defendant may also be guilty of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert crime[s] charged> if (he/she) (aided and abetted/ [or] conspired with) someone else to commit (that/those) crime[s]. If you conclude that the defendant (aided and abetted/ [or] conspired to commit) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert crime[s] charged>, then (he/she) is guilty even if (he/she) was not present when the crime[s] (was/were) committed.]**

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*New January 2006*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has no sua sponte duty to instruct on alibi. (*People v. Freeman* (1978) 22 Cal.3d 434, 437–438 [149 Cal.Rptr. 396, 584 P.2d 533]; *People v. Alcalá* (1992) 4 Cal.4th 742, 803–804 [15 Cal.Rptr.2d 432, 842 P.2d 1192].) The court **must** give this instruction on request when evidence of alibi has been introduced. (*People v. Whitson* (1944) 25 Cal.2d 593, 603 [154 P.2d 867] [no sua sponte duty even if substantial evidence has been introduced by the defense]; *People v. Freeman* (1978) 22 Cal.3d 434, 437–438 [149 Cal.Rptr. 396, 584 P.2d 533].)

The defendant is not entitled to an instruction on alibi if the prosecution does not rely on the defendant's presence at the commission of the crime to establish culpability. (*People v. Manson* (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 102, 211 [132 Cal.Rptr. 265] [in prosecution for conspiracy and murder, defendant was not entitled to jury instruction on alibi, where prosecution never contended he was present at time of actual commission of any homicide and his presence was not requirement for culpability].)

If the prosecution's theory is that the defendant aided and abetted or conspired with the perpetrator but was not present when the crime was committed, give the last bracketed paragraph that begins with "However, the defendant may also be guilty."

(*People v. Sarkis* (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 23, 26–28 [272 Cal.Rptr. 34].) If this paragraph is given, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on aiding and abetting. (*Ibid.* [court properly instructed that alibi was not a defense in an aiding and abetting case, but erred in failing to define aiding and abetting].)

### AUTHORITY

- Burden of Proof. *In re Corey* (1964) 230 Cal.App.2d 813, 828 [41 Cal.Rptr. 379].
- Alibi, Aiding and Abetting. *People v. Sarkis* (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 23, 26–28 [272 Cal.Rptr. 34].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Defendant Need Not Prove Alibi, Only Raise Reasonable Doubt*

Alibi evidence need only raise a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not present at the scene of the crime. It is therefore error to instruct the jury (1) that an alibi must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence, (2) that alibi evidence must convince the jury of the defendant's innocence, (3) that the jury must give less credit to the testimony of alibi witnesses, or (4) that the jury must give more careful scrutiny or less weight to alibi evidence than to other evidence. (*People v. Costello* (1943) 21 Cal.2d 760, 763 [135 P.2d 164].)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

5 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, §§ 688–719.

3 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 73, *Defenses and Justifications*, § 73.10 (Matthew Bender).

### **3401. Reserved for Future Use**

## 3402. Duress or Threats

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The defendant is not guilty of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert crime[s]> if (he/she) acted under duress. The defendant acted under duress if, because of threat or menace, (he/she) believed that (his/her/ [or] someone else's) life would be in immediate danger if (he/she) refused a demand or request to commit the crime[s]. The demand or request may have been express or implied.

The defendant's belief that (his/her/ [or] someone else's) life was in immediate danger must have been reasonable. When deciding whether the defendant's belief was reasonable, consider all the circumstances as they were known to and appeared to the defendant and consider what a reasonable person in the same position as the defendant would have believed.

A threat of future harm is not sufficient; the danger to life must have been immediate.

[The People must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act under duress. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert crime[s]>.]

[This defense does not apply to the crime of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert charge[s] of murder; see Bench Notes>.]

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*New January 2006; Revised June 2007, April 2008*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court must instruct on a defense when the defendant requests it and there is substantial evidence supporting the defense. The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on a defense if there is substantial evidence supporting it and either the defendant is relying on it or it is not inconsistent with the defendant's theory of the case.

When the court concludes that the defense is supported by substantial evidence and is inconsistent with the defendant's theory of the case, however, it should ascertain whether defendant wishes instruction on this alternate theory. (*People v. Gonzales* (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 382, 389–390 [88 Cal.Rptr.2d 111]; *People v. Breverman* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 157 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094].)

Substantial evidence means evidence of a defense, which, if believed, would be sufficient for a reasonable jury to find a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt. (*People v. Salas* (2006) 37 Cal.4th 967, 982–983 [38 Cal.Rptr.3d 624, 127 P.3d 40].)

Fear of great bodily harm can also raise the defense of duress. (See *People v. Otis*

(1959) 174 Cal.App.2d 119, 124 [344 P.2d 342]; *United States v. Bailey* (1980) 444 U.S. 394, 409 [100 S.Ct. 624, 62 L.Ed.2d 575; cf. *People v. Subielski* (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 563, 566–567 [211 Cal.Rptr. 579] [duress cannot be based on fear of some unspecified injury].)

As provided by statute, duress is not a defense to crimes punishable by death. (Pen. Code, § 26(6); *People v. Anderson* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 767, 780 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 587, 50 P.3d 368] [duress is not a defense to any form of murder].) If such a crime is charged, the court should instruct, using the last bracketed paragraph, that the defense is not applicable to that count. However, “duress can, in effect, provide a defense to murder on a felony-murder theory by negating the underlying felony.” (*Id.* at p. 784.) If the defendant is charged with felony-murder, the court should instruct that the defense of duress does apply to the underlying felony.

### ***Related Instructions***

The defense of duress applies when the threat of danger is immediate and accompanied by a demand, either direct or implied, to commit the crime. (*People v. Heath* (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 892, 899–901 [255 Cal.Rptr. 120]; *People v. Steele* (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 703, 706 [253 Cal.Rptr. 773].) If the threat is of future harm or there is no implicit or explicit demand that the defendant commit the crime, the evidence may support instructing on the defense of necessity. (See CALCRIM No. 3403, *Necessity*.)

## **AUTHORITY**

- Instructional Requirements. Pen. Code, § 26(6).
- Burden of Proof. *People v. Graham* (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 238, 240 [129 Cal.Rptr. 31].
- Difference Between Necessity and Duress. *People v. Heath* (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 892, 897–902 [255 Cal.Rptr. 120].

## **RELATED ISSUES**

### ***Necessity Distinguished***

Although evidence may raise both necessity and duress defenses, there is an important distinction between the two concepts. With necessity, the threatened harm is in the immediate future, thereby permitting a defendant to balance alternative courses of conduct. (*People v. Condley* (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 999, 1009–1013 [138 Cal.Rptr. 515].) Necessity does not negate any element of the crime, but rather represents a public policy decision not to punish a defendant despite proof of the crime. (*People v. Heath* (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 892, 901 [255 Cal.Rptr. 120].) The duress defense, on the other hand, does negate an element of the crime. The

defendant does not have the time to form the criminal intent because of the immediacy of the threatened harm. (*Ibid.*)

### ***Duress Cannot Reduce Murder to Manslaughter***

Duress cannot reduce murder to manslaughter. (*People v. Anderson* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 767, 783–785 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 587, 50 P.3d 368] [only the Legislature can recognize killing under duress as new form of manslaughter].)

### ***Mental State or Intent***

Evidence of duress may be relevant to determining whether the defendant acted with the required mental state, even if insufficient to constitute a complete defense. (*People v. Coffman and Marlow* (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 99–100 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 710, 96 P.3d 30] [noting that court properly instructed that duress may be considered on the question of whether the defendant acted with the proper mental state].)

### ***Great Bodily Harm***

Penal Code section 26(6) discusses life-endangering threats and several older cases have outlined the defense of duress in the literal language of the statute. However, some cases have concluded that fear of great bodily harm is sufficient to raise this defense. (Compare *People v. Hart* (1950) 98 Cal.App.2d 514, 516 [220 P.2d 595] and *People v. Lindstrom* (1932) 128 Cal.App. 111, 116 [16 P.2d 1003] with *People v. Otis* (1959) 174 Cal.App.2d 119, 124 [344 P.2d 342]; see also 1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Defenses, § 59 [discussing this split]; but see *People v. Subielski* (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 563, 566–567 [211 Cal.Rptr. 579] [court rejects defense of duress because evidence showed defendant feared only a beating].) It is clear, however, that threats of great bodily harm are sufficient in the context of necessity. (*People v. Lovercamp* (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 823, 831 [118 Cal.Rptr. 110]; *People v. Pena* (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d Supp. 14, 27 [197 Cal.Rptr. 264].)

### ***Third Person Threatened***

In *People v. Pena* (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d Supp. 14, 21–25 [197 Cal.Rptr. 264], the court held that the defenses of necessity and duress may be based on threats of harm to a third party. Although *Pena* is regarded as a necessity case, its discussion of this point was based on out-of-state and secondary authority involving the defense of duress. (See *People v. Heath* (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 892, 898 [255 Cal.Rptr. 120] [acknowledging that though *Pena* uses the terms necessity and duress interchangeably, it is really concerned with the defense of necessity].) No other California cases discuss threats made to a third party and duress. (See also 1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Defenses, § 60 [discussing *Pena* on this point].)

## **SECONDARY SOURCES**

- 1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Defenses, §§ 55–57.  
3 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 73, *Defenses and Justifications*, § 73.05[1] (Matthew Bender).

### 3403. Necessity

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The defendant is not guilty of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert crime[s]> if (he/she) acted because of legal necessity.

In order to establish this defense, the defendant must prove that:

1. (He/She) acted in an emergency to prevent a significant bodily harm or evil to (himself/herself/ [or] someone else);
2. (He/She) had no adequate legal alternative;
3. The defendant's acts did not create a greater danger than the one avoided;
4. When the defendant acted, (he/she) actually believed that the act was necessary to prevent the threatened harm or evil;
5. A reasonable person would also have believed that the act was necessary under the circumstances;

AND

6. The defendant did not substantially contribute to the emergency.

The defendant has the burden of proving this defense by a preponderance of the evidence. This is a different standard of proof than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. To meet the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence, the defendant must prove that it is more likely than not that each of the six listed items is true.

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*New January 2006; Revised April 2008, September 2018*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court must instruct on a defense when the defendant requests it and there is substantial evidence supporting the defense. The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on a defense if there is substantial evidence supporting it and either the defendant is relying on it or it is not inconsistent with the defendant's theory of the case.

When the court concludes that the defense is supported by substantial evidence and is inconsistent with the defendant's theory of the case, however, it should ascertain whether defendant wishes instruction on this alternate theory. (*People v. Gonzales* (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 382, 389–390 [88 Cal.Rptr.2d 111]; *People v. Breverman* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 157 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094].)

Substantial evidence means evidence of necessity, which, if believed, would be

sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that the defendant has shown the defense to be more likely than not.

### ***Related Instructions***

If the threatened harm was immediate and accompanied by a demand to commit the crime, the defense of duress may apply. (See CALCRIM No, 3402, *Duress or Threats*.)

## **AUTHORITY**

- Instructional Requirements. *People v. Pena* (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d Supp. 14 [197 Cal.Rptr. 264]; *People v. Pepper* (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1029, 1035 [48 Cal.Rptr.2d 877]; *People v. Kearns* (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1135–1136 [64 Cal.Rptr. 2d 654].
- Burden of Proof. *People v. Waters* (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 935, 938 [209 Cal.Rptr. 661]; *People v. Condley* (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 999, 1008 [138 Cal.Rptr. 515].
- Difference Between Necessity and Duress. *People v. Heath* (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 892, 897–902 [255 Cal.Rptr. 120].

## **RELATED ISSUES**

### ***Duress Distinguished***

Although a defendant's evidence may raise both necessity and duress defenses, there is an important distinction between the two concepts. With necessity, the threatened harm is in the immediate future, thereby permitting a defendant to balance alternative courses of conduct. (*People v. Condley* (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 999, 1009–1013 [138 Cal.Rptr. 515].) Necessity does not negate any element of the crime, but rather represents a public policy decision not to punish a defendant despite proof of the crime. (*People v. Heath* (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 892, 901 [255 Cal.Rptr. 120].) The duress defense, on the other hand, does negate an element of the crime. The defendant does not have the time to form the criminal intent because of the immediacy of the threatened harm. (*Ibid.*)

### ***Abortion Protests***

The defense of necessity is not available to one who attempts to interfere with another person's exercise of a constitutional right (e.g., demonstrators at an abortion clinic). (*People v. Garziano* (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 241, 244 [281 Cal.Rptr. 307].)

### ***Economic Necessity***

Necessity caused by economic factors is valid under the doctrine. A homeless man was entitled to an instruction on necessity as a defense to violating an ordinance prohibiting sleeping in park areas. Lack of sleep is arguably a significant evil and his lack of economic resources prevented a legal alternative to sleeping outside. (*In re Eichorn* (1998) 69 Cal.App.4th 382, 389–391 [81 Cal.Rptr.2d 535].)

### ***Medical Necessity***

There is a common law and statutory defense of medical necessity. The common law defense contains the same requirements as the general necessity defense. (See

*People v. Trippet* (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1532, 1538 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 559].) The statutory defense relates specifically to the use of cannabis and is based on Health and Safety Code section 11362.5, the “Compassionate Use Act,” but see *Gonzales v. Raich* (2005) 545 U.S. 1 [125 S.Ct. 2195, 162 L.Ed.2d 1] [medical necessity defense not available].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

- 3 Witkin and Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Defenses, §§ 58–65.
- 3 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 73, *Defenses and Justifications*, §§ 73.05[2], 73.18 (Matthew Bender).



## 3404. Accident (Pen. Code, § 195)

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<Give this paragraph when instructing on general or specific intent crimes>

[The defendant is not guilty of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert crime[s]> if (he/she) acted [or failed to act] without the intent required for that crime, but acted instead accidentally. You may not find the defendant guilty of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert crime[s]> unless you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that (he/she) acted with the required intent.]

<Give this paragraph when instructing on criminal negligence crimes>

[The defendant is not guilty of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert crime[s]> if (he/she) acted [or failed to act] accidentally without criminal negligence. You may not find the defendant guilty of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert crime[s]> unless you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that (he/she) acted with criminal negligence. *Criminal negligence* is defined in another instruction.]

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*New January 2006; Revised April 2008, August 2012, September 2017*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has no **sua sponte** duty to instruct on accident. (*People v. Anderson* (2011) 51 Cal.4th 989, 997–998 [125 Cal.Rptr.3d 408].)

#### *Related Instructions*

If murder is charged, see CALCRIM No. 510, *Excusable Homicide: Accidental*.

### AUTHORITY

- Instructional Requirements. Pen. Code, §§ 26(5), 195.
- Burden of Proof. *People v. Black* (1951) 103 Cal.App.2d 69, 79 [229 P.2d 61]; *People v. Frye* (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1148, 1154–1155 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 217].
- Misfortune as Accident. *People v. Gorgol* (1953) 122 Cal.App.2d 281, 308 [265 P.2d 69].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Misfortune Defined*

“ ‘Misfortune’ when applied to a criminal act is analogous [to] the word ‘misadventure’ and bears the connotation of accident while doing a lawful act.” (*People v. Gorgol* (1953) 122 Cal.App.2d 281, 308 [265 P.2d 69].)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Defenses, § 273.

3 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 73, *Defenses and Justifications*, § 73.01[5] (Matthew Bender).

## 3405. Parental Right to Punish a Child

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A (parent/guardian/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert title of other person legally permitted to discipline the child>) is not guilty of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert crime> if (he/she) used (justifiable physical force/ [(a/or) another] justifiable method) to discipline a child. (Physical force/ [or] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert other method of punishment>) is justifiable if a reasonable person would find that punishment was necessary under the circumstances and that the (physical force/ [or] method) used was reasonable.

The People must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the (force/ [or] method of punishment) used was not justifiable. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert crime>.

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New January 2006

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the right of a parent to discipline a child. (*People v. Whitehurst* (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1045, 1049 [12 Cal.Rptr.2d 33].)

### AUTHORITY

- Instructional Requirements. *People v. Whitehurst* (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1045, 1049–1051 [12 Cal.Rptr.2d 33].
- Lawful Forms of Discipline. *People v. Checketts* (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1190, 1194 [84 Cal.Rptr.2d 491].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Confinement*

Reasonable acts of discipline include confinement to a particular location for disciplinary purposes. However, confining a child for an unlawful purpose or with the intent to endanger the child's health and safety is not a reasonable exercise of parental authority. (*People v. Checketts* (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1190, 1194, 1195 [84 Cal.Rptr.2d 491].)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Sex Offenses and Crimes Against Decency, § 172.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, §§ 142.13[2][a], 142.23[7] (Matthew Bender).

## 3406. Mistake of Fact

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The defendant is not guilty of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert crime[s]> if (he/she) did not have the intent or mental state required to commit the crime because (he/she) [reasonably] did not know a fact or [reasonably and] mistakenly believed a fact.

If the defendant's conduct would have been lawful under the facts as (he/she) [reasonably] believed them to be, (he/she) did not commit \_\_\_\_\_ <insert crime[s]>.

If you find that the defendant believed that \_\_\_\_\_ <insert alleged mistaken facts> [and if you find that belief was reasonable], (he/she) did not have the specific intent or mental state required for \_\_\_\_\_ <insert crime[s]>.

If you have a reasonable doubt about whether the defendant had the specific intent or mental state required for \_\_\_\_\_ <insert crime[s]>, you must find (him/her) not guilty of (that crime/those crimes).

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*New January 2006; Revised April 2008, December 2008, August 2014, September 2018*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court must instruct on a defense when the defendant requests it and there is substantial evidence supporting the defense. The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on a defense if there is substantial evidence supporting it and either the defendant is relying on it or it is not inconsistent with the defendant's theory of the case.

When the court concludes that the defense is supported by substantial evidence and is inconsistent with the defendant's theory of the case, however, it should ascertain whether defendant wishes instruction on this alternate theory. (*People v. Gonzales* (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 382, 389–390 [88 Cal.Rptr.2d 111]; *People v. Breverman* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 157 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094].)

Substantial evidence means evidence of a defense, which, if believed, would be sufficient for a reasonable jury to find a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt. (*People v. Salas* (2006) 37 Cal.4th 967, 982–983 [38 Cal.Rptr.3d 624, 127 P.3d 40].)

If the defendant is charged with a general intent crime, the trial court must instruct with the bracketed language requiring that defendant's belief be both actual and reasonable.

If the mental state element at issue is either specific criminal intent or knowledge, do not use the bracketed language requiring the belief to be reasonable. (*People v.*

*Reyes* (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 975, 984 & fn. 6 [61 Cal.Rptr.2d 39]; *People v. Russell* (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1425–1426 [51 Cal.Rptr.3d 263].)

Mistake of fact is not a defense to the following crimes under the circumstances described below:

1. Involuntary manslaughter (*People v. Velez* (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 558, 565–566 [192 Cal.Rptr. 686] [mistake of fact re whether gun could be fired]).
2. Furnishing cannabis to a minor (Health & Saf. Code, § 11352; *People v. Lopez* (1969) 271 Cal.App.2d 754, 760–762 [77 Cal.Rptr. 59]).
3. Selling narcotics to a minor (Health & Saf. Code, § 11353; *People v. Williams* (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 407, 410–411 [284 Cal.Rptr. 454] [specific intent for the crime of selling narcotics to a minor is the intent to sell cocaine, not to sell it to a minor]).
4. Aggravated kidnapping of a child under the age of 14 (Pen. Code, § 208(b); *People v. Magpuso* (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 112, 118 [28 Cal.Rptr.2d 206]).
5. Unlawful sexual intercourse or oral copulation by person 21 or older with minor under the age of 16 (Pen. Code, §§ 261.5(d), 287(b)(2); *People v. Scott* (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 784, 800–801 [100 Cal.Rptr.2d 70]).
6. Lewd and lascivious conduct with a child under the age of 14 (Pen. Code, § 288(a); *People v. Olsen* (1984) 36 Cal.3d 638, 645–646 [205 Cal.Rptr. 492, 685 P.2d 52]).

### AUTHORITY

- Instructional Requirements. Pen. Code, § 26(3).
- Burden of Proof. *People v. Mayberry* (1975) 15 Cal.3d 143, 157 [125 Cal.Rptr. 745, 542 P.2d 1337].
- This Defense Applies to Attempted Lewd and Lascivious Conduct With Minor Under 14. *People v. Hanna* (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 455, 461 [160 Cal.Rptr.3d 210].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### ***Mistake of Fact Based on Involuntary Intoxication***

A mistake of fact defense can be based on involuntary intoxication. (*People v. Scott* (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 823, 829–833 [194 Cal.Rptr. 633].) In *Scott*, the court held that the defendant was entitled to an instruction on mistake of fact, as a matter of law, where the evidence established that he unknowingly and involuntarily ingested a hallucinogen. As a result he acted under the delusion that he was a secret agent in a situation where it was necessary to steal vehicles in order to save his own life and possibly that of the President. The court held that although defendant’s mistake of fact was irrational, it was reasonable because of his delusional state and had the mistaken facts been true, his actions would have been justified under the doctrine of necessity. The court also stated that mistake of fact would not have been available if defendant’s mental state had been caused by voluntary intoxication. (*Id.* at pp.

829–833; see also *People v. Kelly* (1973) 10 Cal.3d 565, 573 [111 Cal.Rptr. 171, 516 P.2d 875] [mistake of fact based on voluntary intoxication is not a defense to a general intent crime].)

***Mistake of Fact Based on Mental Disease***

Mistake of fact is not a defense to general criminal intent if the mistake is based on mental disease. (*People v. Gutierrez* (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 1076, 1084 [225 Cal.Rptr. 885]; see *People v. Castillo* (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 119, 124–125 [238 Cal.Rptr. 207].) In *Gutierrez*, the defendant was charged with inflicting cruel injury on a child, a general intent crime, because she beat her own children under the delusion that they were evil birds she had to kill. The defendant’s abnormal mental state was caused in part by mental illness. (*People v. Gutierrez, supra*, 180 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1079–1080.) The court concluded that evidence of her mental illness was properly excluded at trial because mental illness could not form the basis of her mistake of fact defense. (*Id.* at pp. 1083–1084.)

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

3 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Defenses, § 47.

3 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 73, *Defenses and Justifications*, § 73.06 (Matthew Bender).

## 3407. Defenses: Mistake of Law

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**It is not a defense to the crime[s] of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert crime[s]> that the defendant did not know (he/she) was breaking the law or that (he/she) believed (his/her) act was lawful.**

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*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

There is no sua sponte duty to give this instruction. It is no defense to a crime that the defendant did not realize he or she was breaking the law when he or she acted. (*People v. Vineberg* (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 127, 137 [177 Cal.Rptr. 819].) This is true even when the defendant claims he or she was acting in good faith on the mistaken advice of counsel. (*People v. Snyder* (1982) 32 Cal.3d 590, 593 [186 Cal.Rptr. 485, 652 P.2d 42] [defendant's mistaken belief, based on attorney's advice, that prior conviction was a misdemeanor no defense to felon in possession of a firearm]; *People v. McCalla* (1923) 63 Cal.App. 783, 795 [220 P. 436], disapproved on other grounds by *People v. Elliot* (1960) 54 Cal.2d 498 [6 Cal.Rptr. 753, 354 P.2d 225]; *People v. Honig* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 289, 347–348 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 555]; *People v. Smith* (1966) 63 Cal.2d 779, 792–793 [48 Cal.Rptr. 382, 409 P.2d 222] [no defense to felony murder that defendant did not know that entering a store intending to pass a forged check constituted burglary in California].)

The court should, however, exercise caution with specific intent crimes. A mistaken belief about legal status or rights may be a defense to a specific intent crime if the mistake is held in good faith. (*People v. Vineberg* (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 127, 137 [177 Cal.Rptr. 819] [defendants' belief that they had a legal right to use clients' gold reserves to buy future contracts could be a defense if held in good faith]; *People v. Stewart* (1976) 16 Cal.3d 133, 140 [127 Cal.Rptr. 117, 544 P.2d 1317] [defendant's good faith belief that he was legally authorized to use property could be defense to embezzlement]; *People v. Flora* (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 662, 669–670 [279 Cal.Rptr. 17] [defendant's belief, if held in good faith, that out-of-state custody order was not enforceable in California could have been basis for defense to violating a child custody order]; see also 1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (3d ed. 2000) Defenses, § 37.) Although concerned with knowledge of the law, a mistake about legal status or rights is a mistake of fact, not a mistake of law. (See CALCRIM No. 3406, *Mistake of Fact*.)

### AUTHORITY

- Instructional Requirements. *People v. Vineberg* (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 127, 137 [177 Cal.Rptr. 819]; *People v. Stewart* (1976) 16 Cal.3d 133, 140 [127 Cal.Rptr. 117, 544 P.2d 1317]; *People v. Flora* (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 662, 669–670 [279 Cal.Rptr. 17].

**RELATED ISSUES*****Good Faith Reliance on Statute or Regulation***

Good faith reliance on a facially valid statute or administrative regulation (which turns out to be void) may be considered an excusable mistake of law. Additionally, a good faith mistake-of-law defense may be established by special statute. (See 1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Defenses, § 46.)

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th Ed. 2012) Defenses, §§ 45–46.

3 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 73, *Defenses and Justifications*, § 73.07 (Matthew Bender).



## 3408. Entrapment

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Entrapment is a defense. The defendant has the burden of proving this defense by a preponderance of the evidence. This is a different standard from proof beyond a reasonable doubt. To meet this burden, the defendant must prove that it is more likely than not that (he/she) was entrapped.

A person is entrapped if a law enforcement officer [or (his/her) agent] engaged in conduct that would cause a normally law-abiding person to commit the crime.

Some examples of entrapment might include conduct like badgering, persuasion by flattery or coaxing, repeated and insistent requests, or an appeal to friendship or sympathy.

Another example of entrapment would be conduct that would make commission of the crime unusually attractive to a normally law-abiding person. Such conduct might include a guarantee that the act is not illegal or that the offense would go undetected, an offer of extraordinary benefit, or other similar conduct.

If an officer [or (his/her) agent] simply gave the defendant an opportunity to commit the crime or merely tried to gain the defendant's confidence through reasonable and restrained steps, that conduct is not entrapment.

In evaluating this defense, you should focus primarily on the conduct of the officer. However, in deciding whether the officer's conduct was likely to cause a normally law-abiding person to commit this crime, also consider other relevant circumstances, including events that happened before the crime, the defendant's responses to the officer's urging, the seriousness of the crime, and how difficult it would have been for law enforcement officers to discover that the crime had been committed.

When deciding whether the defendant was entrapped, consider what a normally law-abiding person would have done in this situation. Do not consider the defendant's particular intentions or character, or whether the defendant had a predisposition to commit the crime.

[As used here, an *agent* is a person who does something at the request, suggestion, or direction of an officer. It is not necessary that the agent know the officer's true identity, or that the agent realize that he or she is actually acting as an agent.]

If the defendant has proved that it is more likely than not that (he/she) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert charged crime, e.g., committed embezzlement> because (he/she) was entrapped, you must find (him/her) not guilty of

\_\_\_\_\_ <insert charged crime>.

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*New January 2006; Revised April 2008*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court must instruct on a defense when the defendant requests it and there is substantial evidence supporting the defense. The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on a defense if there is substantial evidence supporting it and either the defendant is relying on it or it is not inconsistent with the defendant’s theory of the case.

When the court concludes that the defense is supported by substantial evidence and is inconsistent with the defendant’s theory of the case, however, it should ascertain whether defendant wishes instruction on this alternate theory. (*People v. Gonzales* (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 382, 389–390 [88 Cal.Rptr.2d 111]; *People v. Breverman* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 157 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094].)

Substantial evidence means evidence of entrapment, which, if believed, would be sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that the defendant has shown the defense to be more likely than not.

Give the bracketed definition of an agent if agency is an issue.

In the last paragraph, enter a phrase with a verb in the first blank to state what the defendant did (e.g., “committed embezzlement” or “sold cocaine”). Enter the crime(s) in the second blank (e.g., “embezzlement” or “sale of a controlled substance”).

## AUTHORITY

- Instructional Requirements. *People v. McIntyre* (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 229, 232 [271 Cal.Rptr. 467]; *People v. Barraza* (1979) 23 Cal.3d 675, 689–691 [153 Cal.Rptr. 459, 591 P.2d 947].
- Burden of Proof. *People v. McIntyre* (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 229, 232 [271 Cal.Rptr. 467]; *People v. Peppers* (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 677, 684 [189 Cal.Rptr. 879]; *People v. Barraza* (1979) 23 Cal.3d 675, 691, fn. 6 [153 Cal.Rptr. 459, 591 P.2d 947]; *In re Foss* (1974) 10 Cal.3d 910, 930–931 [112 Cal.Rptr. 649, 519 P.2d 1073].
- Definition of Agent. *People v. McIntire* (1979) 23 Cal.3d 742, 748 [153 Cal.Rptr. 237, 591 P.2d 527].

## RELATED ISSUES

### *Decoy Programs Permitted*

The use of “ruses, stings, and decoys” to expose illicit activity does not constitute entrapment, as long as no pressure or overbearing conduct is employed by the decoy. (*Proviso Corp. v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board* (1994) 7

Cal.4th 561, 568–570 [28 Cal.Rptr.2d 638, 869 P.2d 1163] [use of underage, but mature-looking, decoys to expose unlawful sales of alcoholic beverages to minors not entrapment; no pressure or overbearing conduct occurred, and targets could have protected themselves by routinely checking customer IDs].) The conduct of an unwitting decoy may also constitute sufficient badgering, cajoling, or importuning that entitles the defendant to an entrapment instruction. (*Bradley v. Duncan* (9th Cir. 2002) 315 F.3d 1091, 1096–1098.)

### ***Multiple Defenses Permitted***

A defendant may assert entrapment and still deny guilt. (*People v. Perez* (1965) 62 Cal.2d 769, 775–776 [44 Cal.Rptr. 326, 401 P.2d 934].) “Although the defense of entrapment is available to a defendant who is otherwise guilty [citation], it does not follow that the defendant must admit guilt to establish the defense. A defendant, for example, may deny that he committed every element of the crime charged, yet properly allege that such acts as he did commit were induced by law enforcement officers [citation].” (*Ibid.*)

## **SECONDARY SOURCES**

- 1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Defenses, §§ 45–46.
- 3 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 73, *Defenses and Justifications*, § 73.07 (Matthew Bender).

### 3409. When Conduct of Officer May Not Be Attributed to Defendant

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If, while acting for a law enforcement purpose, an officer [or (his/her) agent] pretends to be an accomplice of a defendant, then no act done by the officer [or agent] may be attributed to the defendant or held against the defendant, unless the defendant, using (his/her) independent will, directed the officer [or agent] to do the act.

[As used in this instruction, an *agent* is a person who does something at the request, suggestion, or direction of an officer. It is not necessary that the agent know the officer's true identity, or that the agent realize that he or she is acting as an agent.]

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*New January 2006*

#### BENCH NOTES

##### *Instructional Duty*

Give this instruction on request if supported by the evidence. (*People v. Goldberg* (1957) 152 Cal.App.2d 562 [314 P.2d 151]; *People v. Lanzit* (1925) 70 Cal.App. 498, 509 [233 P. 816].)

#### AUTHORITY

- Case Law. *People v. Goldberg* (1957) 152 Cal.App.2d 562 [314 P.2d 151]; *People v. Lanzit* (1925) 70 Cal.App. 498, 509 [233 P. 816].
- Agent Defined. *People v. McIntire* (1979) 23 Cal.3d 742, 748 [153 Cal.Rptr. 237, 591 P.2d 527].

#### SECONDARY SOURCES

3 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 73, *Defenses and Justifications*, § 73.08 (Matthew Bender).

## 3410. Statute of Limitations

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A defendant may not be convicted of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert crime[s]> unless the prosecution began within \_\_\_\_\_ years of the date the crime[s] ((was/were) committed/(was/were) discovered/should have been discovered). The present prosecution began on \_\_\_\_\_ <insert date>.

[A crime *should have been discovered* when the (victim/law enforcement officer) was aware of facts that would have alerted a reasonably diligent (person/law enforcement officer) in the same circumstances to the fact that a crime may have been committed.]

The People have the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that prosecution of this case began within the required time. This is a different standard of proof than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. To meet the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence, the People must prove that it is more likely than not that prosecution of this case began within the required time. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert crime[s]>.

[If the People have proved that it is more likely than not that the defendant was outside of California for some period of time, you must not include that period [up to three years] in determining whether the prosecution began on time.]

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*New January 2006; Revised April 2008, August 2009*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the statute of limitations if the defendant is relying on such a defense and there is substantial evidence supporting it. (See generally *People v. Stewart* (1976) 16 Cal.3d 133, 140 [127 Cal.Rptr. 117, 544 P.2d 1317] [discussing duty to instruct on defenses].)

Do not give this instruction in cases in which the statute of limitations had already expired under the pre-2009 version of Penal Code section 804(c).

The state has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the prosecution is not barred by the statute of limitations. (*People v. Crosby* (1962) 58 Cal.2d 713, 725 [25 Cal.Rptr. 847, 375 P.2d 839]; see CACI 200, *Obligation to Prove—More Likely True Than Not True*.)

For most crimes, the statute begins to run when the offense is committed. If the crime is a fraud-related offense and included in Penal Code section 803, the statute begins to run after the completion of or discovery of the offense, whichever is later.

(Pen. Code, §§ 801.5, 803.) Courts interpreting the date of discovery provision have imposed a due diligence requirement on investigative efforts. (*People v. Zamora* (1976) 18 Cal.3d 538, 561 [134 Cal.Rptr. 784, 557 P.2d 75]; *People v. Lopez* (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 233, 246 [60 Cal.Rptr.2d 511].) If one of the crimes listed in Section 803 is at issue, the court should instruct using the “discovery” language.

If there is a factual issue about when the prosecution started, the court should instruct that the prosecution begins when (1) an information or indictment is filed, (2) a complaint is filed charging a misdemeanor or infraction, (3) the defendant is arraigned on a complaint that charges the defendant with a felony, or (4) an arrest warrant or bench warrant is issued describing the defendant with the same degree of particularity required for an indictment, information, or complaint. (Pen. Code, § 804.)

### ***Limitation Periods***

No limitations period (Pen. Code, § 799):

Embezzlement of public funds and crimes punishable by death or by life imprisonment.

Six-year period (Pen. Code, § 800):

Felonies punishable for eight years or more, unless otherwise specified by statute.

Five-year period (Pen. Code, § 801.6):

All other crimes against elders and dependent adults.

Four-year period (Pen. Code, §§ 801.5, 803(c)):

Fraud, breach of fiduciary obligation, theft, or embezzlement on an elder or dependent adult, and misconduct in office.

Three-year period (Pen. Code, §§ 801, 802(b)):

All other felonies, unless otherwise specified by statute, and misdemeanors committed upon a minor under the age of 14. Note: “If the offense is an alternative felony/misdemeanor ‘wobbler’ initially charged as a felony, the three-year statute of limitations applies, without regard to the ultimate reduction to a misdemeanor after the filing of the complaint [citation].” (*People v. Mincey* (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 453 [6 Cal.Rptr.2d 822, 827 P.2d 388].)

Two-year period (Pen. Code, § 802(c)):

Misdemeanors under Business and Professions Code section 729.

One-year period (Pen. Code, § 802(a)):

Misdemeanors. Note: “If the initial charge is a felony but the defendant is convicted of a necessarily included misdemeanor, the one-year period for misdemeanors applies.” (*People v. Mincey* (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 453 [6 Cal.Rptr.2d 822, 827 P.2d 388]; Pen. Code, § 805(b); see also 1

Witkin & Epstein, California. Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Defenses, § 220.)

### AUTHORITY

- Instructional Requirements. Pen. Code, § 799 et seq.; *People v. Stewart* (1976) 16 Cal.3d 133, 140 [127 Cal.Rptr. 117, 544 P.2d 1317].
- Tolling the Statute. Pen. Code, § 803.
- Burden of Proof. *People v. Lopez* (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 233, 250 [60 Cal.Rptr.2d 511]; *People v. Zamora* (1976) 18 Cal.3d 538, 565 [134 Cal.Rptr. 784, 557 P.2d 75]; *People v. Crosby* (1962) 58 Cal.2d 713, 725 [25 Cal.Rptr. 847, 375 P.2d 839].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### ***Burden of Proof***

At trial, the prosecutor bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the prosecution began within the required time. However, at a pretrial motion to dismiss, the defendant has the burden of proving that the statute of limitations has run as a matter of law. (*People v. Lopez* (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 233, 249–251 [60 Cal.Rptr.2d 511].) The defendant is entitled to prevail on the motion only if there is no triable issue of fact. (*Id.* at p. 249.)

#### ***Computation of Time***

To determine the exact date the statute began to run, exclude the day the crime was completed. (*People v. Zamora* (1976) 18 Cal.3d 538, 560 [134 Cal.Rptr. 784, 557 P.2d 75].)

#### ***Felony Murder***

Felony-murder charges and felony-murder special circumstances allegations may be filed even though the statute of limitations has run on the underlying felony. (*People v. Morris* (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1, 14–18 [249 Cal.Rptr. 119, 756 P.2d 843], disapproved of on other grounds in *In re Sassounian* (1995) 9 Cal.4th 535 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d 446, 887 P.2d 527].)

#### ***Offense Completed***

When an offense continues over a period of time, the statutory period usually does not begin until after the last overt act or omission occurs. (*People v. Zamora* (1976) 18 Cal.3d 538, 548 [134 Cal.Rptr. 784, 557 P.2d 75] [last act of conspiracy to burn insured's property was when fire was ignited and crime was completed; last act of grand theft was last insurance payment].)

#### ***Waiving the Statute of Limitations***

A defendant may affirmatively, but not inadvertently, waive the statute of limitations. (*People v. Williams* (1999) 21 Cal.4th 335, 338, 340–342 [87 Cal.Rptr.2d 412, 981 P.2d 42]; *People v. Beasley* (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1078, 1089–1090 [130 Cal.Rptr.2d 717] [defendant did not request or acquiesce to instruction on time-barred lesser included offense].)

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Defenses, §§ 234–257.

2 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 40, *Accusatory Pleadings*, § 40.09 (Matthew Bender).

3 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 73, *Defenses and Justifications*, § 73.09 (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 124, *Jurisdiction and Disposition Hearings*, § 124.04 (Matthew Bender).



## 3411. Mistake of Law As a Defense

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[I have already explained that it is not a defense to the crime[s] of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert crime[s]> that the defendant did not know (he/she) was breaking the law or that (he/she) believed (his/her) act was lawful. But when you consider the crime[s] of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert crime[s]>, a different rule applies.]

\_\_\_\_\_ <insert crime[s]> require[s] that a defendant act with a specific (intent/ [and/or] mental state). The act and the specific (intent/ [and/or] mental state) required are explained in the instruction for (that/ those) crime[s].

The defendant is not guilty of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert crime[s]> if (he/she) made an honest or good faith mistake about the law, if that mistake shows that (he/she) did not have the specific (intent/ [and/or] mental state) required for the crime[s] of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert crime[s]>.

If you have a reasonable doubt about whether the defendant had the specific (intent/ [and/or] mental state) required for \_\_\_\_\_ <insert crime[s]>, you must find (him/her) not guilty of (that/those) crime[s].

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*New August 2013*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction if a defendant charged with a specific intent crime is appropriately relying on this defense or there is substantial evidence that a defendant's good faith mistake of law provides a valid defense to a specific intent crime and the defense is not inconsistent with the defendant's theory of the case. (*People v. Urziceanu* (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 747, 774–780 [33 Cal.Rptr.3d 859]).

Many defendants seek to rely on the defense of mistake of law, but few are successful, because it is limited to crimes in which a specific intent or mental state is negated by the mistake. (*People v. Cole* (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 452, 483–484 [67 Cal.Rptr.3d 526] [no error in instructing jury that mistake of law is no defense when defendant was charged with a general intent crime]; *People v. Vineberg* (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 127, 137 [177 Cal.Rptr. 819] [defendants' belief that they had a legal right to use clients' gold reserves to buy future contracts could be a defense if held in good faith]; *People v. Stewart* (1976) 16 Cal.3d 133, 140 [127 Cal.Rptr. 117, 544 P.2d 1317] [defendant's good faith belief that he was legally authorized to use property could be defense to embezzlement]; *People v. Flora* (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 662, 669–670 [279 Cal.Rptr. 17] [defendant's belief, if held in good faith, that out-of-state custody order was not enforceable in California could have been basis for

defense to violating a child custody order]).

Although concerned with knowledge of the law, a mistake about legal status or rights is a mistake of fact, not a mistake of law. (See CALCRIM No. 3406, *Mistake of Fact*.) If the defendant is charged with a general intent crime and raises a mistake of law defense, give instead CALCRIM No. 3407, *Defenses: Mistake of Law*. If both general and specific intent crimes are charged, use the bracketed first paragraph of this instruction as necessary.

### **AUTHORITY**

- Instructional Requirements. *People v. Cole* (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 452, 483–484 [67 Cal.Rptr.3d 526]; *People v. Bernhardt* (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 567, 585–587, 592 [35 Cal.Rptr. 401].

### **RELATED ISSUES**

#### ***Good Faith Reliance on Statute or Regulation***

Good faith reliance on a facially valid statute or administrative regulation (which turns out to be void) may be considered an excusable mistake of law. Additionally, a good faith mistake-of-law defense may be established by special statute. (See 1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Defenses, § 46.)

### **SECONDARY SOURCES**

1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Defenses, §§ 44–45.

## 3412. Compassionate Use (Health & Saf. Code, § 11362.5)

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**Possession or cultivation of cannabis is lawful if authorized by the Compassionate Use Act. The Compassionate Use Act allows a person to possess or cultivate cannabis (for personal medical purposes/ [or] as the primary caregiver of a patient with a medical need) when a physician has recommended [or approved] such use. The amount of cannabis possessed or cultivated must be reasonably related to the patient’s current medical needs.**

**The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not authorized to possess or cultivate cannabis for medical purposes. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of this crime.**

**[A *primary caregiver* is someone who has consistently assumed responsibility for the housing, health, or safety of a patient who may legally possess or cultivate cannabis.]**

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*New February 2015; Revised September 2018, March 2019*

### **BENCH NOTES**

#### ***Instructional Duty***

Pursuant to Health & Saf. Code, § 11362.5, defendants may raise a medical cannabis defense in appropriate cases. The burden is on the defendant to produce sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt that possession was lawful. (*People v. Mower* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 470 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067]; *People v. Jones* (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 341, 350 [4 Cal.Rptr.3d 916] [error to exclude defense where defendant’s testimony raised reasonable doubt about physician approval]; see also *People v. Tilehkooh* (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 1433, 1441 [7 Cal.Rptr.3d 226] [defendant need not establish “medical necessity”].)

If the evidence shows that a physician may have “approved” but not “recommended” the cannabis use, give the bracketed phrase “or approved” in the first paragraph of this instruction. (*People v. Jones, supra*, 112 Cal.App.4th at p. 347 [“approved” distinguished from “recommended”].)

A local ordinance prohibiting cannabis dispensaries does not nullify a defense under the Medical Marijuana Program Act or the Compassionate Use Act. (*People v. Ahmed* (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 136, 142–143 [235 Cal.Rptr.3d 472]).

### **AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Health & Saf. Code, § 11362.5; *People v. Jackson* (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 525, 538–539 [148 Cal.Rptr.3d 375].
- Burden of Proof for Defense of Medical Use. *People v. Mower* (2002) 28

Cal.4th 457, 470 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067].

- Amount Must Be Reasonably Related to Patient's Medical Needs. *People v. Trippet* (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1532, 1550–1551 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 559].
- Primary Caregiver. *People v. Mentch* (2008) 45 Cal.4th 274, 282–292 [85 Cal.Rptr.3d 480, 195 P.3d 1061].
- Defendant's Burden of Proof on Compassionate Use Defense. *People v. Mentch* (2008) 45 Cal.4th 274, 292–294 [85 Cal.Rptr.3d 480, 195 P.3d 1061] (conc.opn. of Chin, J.).

### SECONDARY SOURCES

7 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, § 136.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 145, *Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses*, § 145.01[3] (Matthew Bender).

**3413. Collective or Cooperative Cultivation Defense (Health & Saf. Code, § 11362.775)**

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(Planting[,] [or]/ cultivating[,] [or]/ harvesting[,] [or]/ drying[,] [or]/ processing) cannabis is lawful if authorized by the Medical Marijuana Program Act. The Medical Marijuana Program Act allows qualified patients [and their designated primary caregivers] to associate within the State of California to collectively or cooperatively cultivate cannabis for medical purposes, for the benefit of its members, but not for profit.

In deciding whether a collective meets these legal requirements, consider the following factors:

1. The size of the collective's membership;
2. The volume of purchases from the collective;
3. The level of members' participation in the operation and governance of the collective;
4. Whether the collective was formally established as a nonprofit organization;
5. Presence or absence of financial records;
6. Accountability of the collective to its members;
7. Evidence of profit or loss.

There is no limit on the number of persons who may be members of a collective.

Every member of the collective does not need to actively participate in the cultivation process. It is enough if a member provides financial support by purchasing cannabis from the collective.

A *qualified patient* is someone for whom a physician has previously recommended or approved the use of cannabis for medical purposes.

*Collectively* means involving united action or cooperative effort of all members of a group.

*Cooperatively* means working together or using joint effort toward a common end.

*Cultivate* means to foster the growth of a plant.

[A *primary caregiver* is someone who has consistently assumed responsibility for the housing, health, or safety of a patient who may legally possess or cultivate cannabis.]

The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that

**the defendant was not authorized to (plant[,] [or]/ cultivate[,] [or]/ harvest[,] [or]/ dry[,] [or]/ process) cannabis for medical purposes. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of this crime.**

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*New February 2015; Revised August 2015, September 2018, March 2019*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

A collective or cooperative cultivation defense under the Medical Marijuana Program Act may be raised to certain cannabis charges. (See Health & Saf. Code, § 11362.775.) The burden is on the defendant to produce sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt that possession was lawful. (*People v. Jackson* (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 525, 529–531, 538–539 [148 Cal.Rptr.3d 375].)

A local ordinance prohibiting cannabis dispensaries does not nullify a defense under the Medical Marijuana Program Act or the Compassionate Use Act. (*People v. Ahmed* (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 136, 142–143 [235 Cal.Rptr.3d 472]).

## AUTHORITY

- Elements. Health & Saf. Code, § 11362.775.
- Factors To Consider. *People v. Jackson* (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 525 [148 Cal.Rptr.3d 375].
- Primary Caregiver. *People v. Mentch* (2008) 45 Cal.4th 274, 282–292 [85 Cal.Rptr.3d 480, 195 P.3d 1061]; *People v. Mitchell* (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1189, 1205–1206 [170 Cal.Rptr.3d 825].
- Defendant’s Burden of Proof on Medical Marijuana Program Act Defense. *People v. Jackson* (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 525, 529–531, 538–539 [148 Cal.Rptr.3d 375].
- All Members Need Not Participate in Cultivation. *People v. Anderson* (2015) 232 Cal.App.4th 1259 [182 Cal.Rptr.3d 276].

## SECONDARY SOURCES

7 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare, § 147.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 145, *Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses*, § 145.01 (Matthew Bender).

### 3414. Coercion (Pen. Code, § 236.23)

The defendant is not guilty of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert crime[s]>* if (he/she) acted because of coercion.

In order to establish this defense, the defendant must prove that:

1. (He/She) acted because of coercion;
2. The coercion was a direct result of being a victim of human trafficking at the time the defendant acted;

AND

3. When the defendant acted, (he/she) had a reasonable fear of harm.

To prove that the defendant was the victim of human trafficking, the defendant must prove that:

1. Another person either deprived the defendant of personal liberty or violated the defendant's personal liberty;

[AND]

*<Give Alternative 2A if the defendant claims he or she was the victim of human trafficking under subsection (a).>*

- [2A. When the other person acted, (he/she) intended to obtain forced labor or services(.;/)]

[OR]

*<Give Alternative 2B if the defendant alleges he or she was the victim of human trafficking under subsection (b).>*

- [2B. When the other person acted, (he/she) intended to (commit/ [or] maintain) a [felony] violation of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert appropriate code section[s]>*.)]

***Depriving or violating a person's personal liberty***, as used here, includes substantial and sustained restriction of a person's liberty accomplished through \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert terms that apply from statutory definition, i.e.: force, fear, fraud, deceit, coercion, violence, duress, menace, or threat of unlawful injury>* to the person under circumstances in which the person receiving or perceiving the threat reasonably believes that it is likely that the person making the threat would carry it out.

***Forced labor or services***, as used here, means labor or services that are performed or provided by a person and are obtained or maintained through force, fraud, duress, or coercion, or equivalent conduct that would reasonably overbear the will of the person.]

**[Duress means a direct or implied threat of force, violence, danger, hardship, or retribution that is enough to cause a reasonable person to do [or submit to] something that he or she would not otherwise do [or submit to].]**

**[Duress includes (a direct or implied threat to destroy, conceal, remove, confiscate, or possess any actual or purported passport or immigration document of the other person/ [or] knowingly destroying, concealing, removing, confiscating, or possessing any actual or purported passport or immigration document of the other person).]**

**[Violence means using physical force that is greater than the force reasonably necessary to restrain someone.]**

**[Menace means a verbal or physical threat of harm[, including use of a deadly weapon]. The threat of harm may be express or implied.]**

**[Coercion includes any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause a person to believe that failing to perform an act would result in (serious harm to or physical restraint against someone else/ [or] the abuse or threatened abuse of the legal process/ [or] debt bondage/ [or] providing or facilitating the possession of any controlled substance to impair the other person's judgment).]**

**[When you decide whether the other person (used duress/ [or] used coercion/ [or] deprived the defendant of personal liberty or violated the defendant's personal liberty), consider all of the circumstances, including the age of the defendant, (his/her) relationship to the other person [or the other person's agent[s]], and the defendant's handicap or disability, if any.]**

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*New September 2017*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court must instruct on a defense when the defendant requests it and there is substantial evidence supporting the defense. The court has a  **sua sponte**  duty to instruct on a defense if there is substantial evidence supporting it and either the defendant is relying on it or it is not inconsistent with the defendant's theory of the case.

When the court concludes that the defense is supported by substantial evidence and is inconsistent with the defendant's theory of the case, however, it should ascertain whether defendant wishes instruction on this alternate theory. (*People v. Gonzales* (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 382, 389–390 [88 Cal.Rptr.2d 111]; *People v. Breverman* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 157 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094].)

Substantial evidence means evidence, which, if believed, would be sufficient for a



reasonable jury to find that the defendant has shown the defense to be more likely than not true.

This defense does not apply to a serious felony, as defined in subdivision (c) of Penal Code section 1192.7, or a violent felony, as defined in subdivision (c) of Penal Code section 667.5, or a violation of Penal Code section 236.1.

### AUTHORITY

- Instructional Requirements. Pen. Code, § 236.23.
- Definition of Coercion. Pen. Code, § 236.1(h)(1).
- Burden of Proof. *People v. Waters* (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 935, 938 [209 Cal.Rptr. 661]; *People v. Condley* (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 999, 1008 [138 Cal.Rptr. 515].
- Human Trafficking Elements and Definitions. Pen. Code, § 236.1.
- Menace Defined [in context of false imprisonment]. *People v. Matian* (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 480, 484–486 [41 Cal.Rptr.2d 459].
- Violence Defined [in context of false imprisonment]. *People v. Babich* (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 801, 806 [18 Cal.Rptr.2d 60].

### *Related Instruction*

See CALCRIM No. 1243, *Human Trafficking*.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Human Trafficking*, § 142.14A (Matthew Bender).

## 3415. Lawful Use Defense (Health & Saf. Code, § 11362.1)

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It is lawful for a person 21 years of age or older to do any of the following:

[(Possess[,]/ [or] process[,]/ [or] transport[,]/ [or] purchase[,]/ [or] obtain[,]/ [or] give away to persons 21 years of age or older), without receiving compensation, no more than 28.5 grams of cannabis [that is not in the form of concentrated cannabis.]]

[(Possess[,]/ [or] process[,]/ [or] transport[,]/ [or] purchase[,]/ [or] obtain[,]/ [or] give away to persons 21 years of age or older) without receiving compensation, no more than eight grams of cannabis in the form of concentrated cannabis, including concentrated cannabis contained in cannabis products.]

[(Possess[,]/ [or] plant[,]/ [or] cultivate[,]/ [or] harvest[,]/ [or] dry[,]/ [or] process) no more than six living cannabis plants and possess the cannabis produced by those plants.]

[Smoke or ingest cannabis or cannabis products.]

[(Possess[,]/ [or] transport[,]/ [or] purchase[,]/ [or] obtain[,]/ [or] use[,]/ [or] manufacture[,]/ [or] give away to persons 21 years of age or older without receiving compensation) cannabis accessories.]

The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not lawfully (possess[,]/ [or] transport[,]/ [or] purchase[,]/ [or] obtain[,]/ [or] give away[,]/ [or] plant[,]/ [or] cultivate[,]/ [or] harvest[,]/ [or] dry[,]/ [or] process) (cannabis[,]/ [or] concentrated cannabis[,]/ [or] cannabis products.) If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of this crime.

[*Cannabis* means all or part of the *Cannabis sativa L.* plant, whether growing or not, including the seeds and resin extracted from any part of the plant. [It also includes every compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of the plant, its seeds, or resin.]]

<If applicable, give the definition of industrial hemp: Health & Saf. Code, § 11018.5>

[Cannabis does not include industrial hemp. Industrial hemp means a fiber or oilseed crop, or both, that only contain types of the plant *Cannabis sativa L.* with no more than three-tenths of 1 percent tetrahydrocannabinol from the dried flowering tops, whether growing or not. It may include the seeds of the plant; the resin extracted from any part of the plant; and every compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of the plant, its seeds or resin produced from the seeds.]

**[Under the law, a person becomes one year older as soon as the first minute of his or her birthday has begun.]**

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*New September 2018*

## **BENCH NOTES**

### ***Instructional Duty***

Pursuant to Health & Saf. Code, § 11362.1, certain activities involving cannabis are lawful. Give the relevant bracketed paragraphs on defense request.

This instruction does not apply to offenses charged under Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11362.2, 11362.3, and 11362.4, nor to any of the offenses enumerated in Health & Saf. Code § 11362.45.

## **AUTHORITY**

- Elements. Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11362.1, 11362.2, 11362.3, 11362.4, 11362.45.
- Definition of Cannabis. Health & Saf. Code, § 11018.
- Definition of Industrial Hemp. Health & Saf. Code, § 11018.5.

**3416–3424. Reserved for Future Use**



## B. IMPAIRMENT DEFENSES

### 3425. Unconsciousness

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**The defendant is not guilty of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert crime[s]> if (he/she) acted while unconscious. Someone is unconscious when he or she is not conscious of his or her actions. [Someone may be unconscious even though able to move.]**

**Unconsciousness may be caused by (a blackout[,]/ [or] an epileptic seizure[,]/ [or] involuntary intoxication[,]/ [or] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert a similar condition>).**

**[The defense of unconsciousness may not be based on voluntary intoxication.]**

**The People must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was conscious when (he/she) acted. If there is proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted as if (he/she) were conscious, you should conclude that (he/she) was conscious, unless based on all the evidence, you have a reasonable doubt that (he/she) was conscious, in which case you must find (him/her) not guilty.**

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*New January 2006; Revised April 2008, August 2013*

### BENCH NOTES

#### ***Instructional Duty***

The court must instruct on a defense when the defendant requests it and there is substantial evidence supporting the defense. The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on a defense if there is substantial evidence supporting it and either the defendant is relying on it or it is not inconsistent with the defendant's theory of the case.

When the court concludes that the defense is supported by substantial evidence and is inconsistent with the defendant's theory of the case, however, it should ascertain whether defendant wishes instruction on this alternate theory. (*People v. Gonzales* (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 382, 389–390 [88 Cal.Rptr.2d 111]; *People v. Breverman* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 157 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094].)

Substantial evidence means evidence of a defense, which, if believed, would be sufficient for a reasonable jury to find a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt. (*People v. Salas* (2006) 37 Cal.4th 967, 982–983 [38 Cal.Rptr.3d 624, 127 P.3d 40].)

Because there is a presumption that a person who appears conscious is conscious (*People v. Hardy* (1948) 33 Cal.2d 52, 63–64 [198 P.2d 865]), the defendant must produce sufficient evidence raising a reasonable doubt that he or she was conscious

before an instruction on unconsciousness may be given. (*Ibid.*; *People v. Kitt* (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 834, 842 [148 Cal.Rptr. 447], disapproved on other grounds by *People v. Cooper* (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 836 [281 Cal.Rptr. 90, 809 P.2d 865] [presumption of consciousness goes to the defendant's burden of producing evidence].)

### AUTHORITY

- Instructional Requirements. Pen. Code, § 26(4); *People v. Mathson* (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1297, 1317–1323 [149 Cal.Rptr.3d 167]; *People v. Stewart* (1976) 16 Cal.3d 133, 140 [127 Cal.Rptr. 117, 544 P.2d 1317].
- Burden of Proof. Evid. Code, § 607; *People v. Hardy* (1948) 33 Cal.2d 52, 64 [198 P.2d 865]; *People v. Cruz* (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 308, 330–331 [147 Cal.Rptr. 740].
- Unconsciousness Defined. *People v. Newton* (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 359, 376 [87 Cal.Rptr. 394]; *People v. Heffington* (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 1, 9 [107 Cal.Rptr. 859].
- Unconscious State: Blackouts. *People v. Cox* (1944) 67 Cal.App.2d 166, 172 [153 P.2d 362].
- Unconscious State: Epileptic Seizures. *People v. Freeman* (1943) 61 Cal.App.2d 110, 115–116 [142 P.2d 435].
- Unconscious State: Involuntary Intoxication. *People v. Heffington* (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 1, 8 [107 Cal.Rptr. 859]; see *People v. Hughes* (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 343–344 [116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401, 39 P.3d 432] [jury was adequately informed that unconsciousness does not require that person be incapable of movement].
- Unconscious State: Somnambulism, Sleepwalking, or Delirium. *People v. Mathson* (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1297, 1317–1323 [149 Cal.Rptr.3d 167]; *People v. Methever* (1901) 132 Cal. 326, 329 [64 P. 481], overruled on other grounds in *People v. Gorshen* (1953) 51 Cal.2d 716 [336 P.2d 492].

### COMMENTARY

The committee did not include an instruction on the presumption of consciousness. There is a judicially created presumption that a person who acts conscious is conscious. (*People v. Hardy* (1948) 33 Cal.2d 52, 63–64 [198 P.2d 865].) Although an instruction on this presumption has been approved, it has been highly criticized. (See *People v. Kitt* (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 834, 842–843 [148 Cal.Rptr. 447], disapproved on other grounds by *People v. Cooper* (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 836 [281 Cal.Rptr. 90, 809 P.2d 865] [acknowledging instruction and suggesting modification]; *People v. Cruz* (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 308, 332 [147 Cal.Rptr. 740] [criticizing instruction for failing to adequately explain the presumption].)

The effect of this presumption is to place on the defendant a burden of producing evidence to dispel the presumption. (*People v. Cruz, supra*, 83 Cal.App.3d at pp. 330–331; *People v. Kitt, supra*, 83 Cal.App.3d at p. 842, disapproved on other grounds by *People v. Cooper* (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 836 [281 Cal.Rptr. 90, 809 P.2d

865]; and see *People v. Babbitt* (1988) 45 Cal.3d 660, 689–696 [248 Cal.Rptr. 69, 755 P.2d 253] [an instruction on this presumption “did little more than guide the jury as to how to evaluate evidence bearing on the defendant’s consciousness and apply it to the issue.”].) However, if the defendant produces enough evidence to warrant an instruction on unconsciousness, the rebuttable presumption of consciousness has been dispelled and no instruction on its effect is necessary. The committee, therefore, concluded that no instruction on the presumption of consciousness was needed.

## RELATED ISSUES

### *Inability to Remember*

Generally, a defendant’s inability to remember or his hazy recollection does not supply an evidentiary foundation for a jury instruction on unconsciousness. (*People v. Heffington* (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 1, 10 [107 Cal.Rptr. 859]); *People v. Samenigo* (1931) 118 Cal.App. 165, 173 [4 P.2d 809] [“The inability of a defendant . . . to remember . . . is of such common occurrence and so naturally accountable for upon the normal defects of memory, or, what is more likely, the intentional denial of recollection, as to raise not even a suspicion of declarations having been made while in an unconscious condition.”].) In *People v. Coston* (1947) 82 Cal.App.2d 23, 40–41 [185 P.2d 632], the court stated that forgetfulness may be a factor in unconsciousness; however, “there must be something more than [the defendant’s] mere statement that he does not remember what happened to justify a finding that he was unconscious at the time of that act.”

Two cases have held that a defendant’s inability to remember warrants an instruction on unconsciousness. (*People v. Bridgehouse* (1956) 47 Cal.2d 406, 414 [303 P.2d 1018] and *People v. Wilson* (1967) 66 Cal.2d 749, 761–762 [59 Cal.Rptr. 156, 427 P.2d 820].) Both cases were discussed in *People v. Heffington* (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 1 [107 Cal.Rptr. 859], but the court declined to hold that *Bridgehouse* and *Wilson* announced an “ineluctable rule of law” that “a defendant’s inability to remember or his ‘hazy’ recollection supplies an evidentiary foundation for a jury instruction on unconsciousness.” (*Id.* at p. 10.) The court stated that, “[b]oth [cases] were individualized decisions in which the court examined the record and found evidence, no matter how incredible, warranting the instruction.” (*Ibid.*)

### *Intoxication—Involuntary versus Voluntary*

Unconsciousness due to involuntary intoxication is a complete defense to a criminal charge under Penal Code section 26, subdivision (4). (*People v. Heffington* (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 1, 8 [107 Cal.Rptr. 859].) Unconsciousness due to voluntary intoxication is governed by former Penal Code section 22 [now Penal Code section 29.4], rather than section 26, and is not a defense to a general intent crime. (*People v. Chaffey* (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 852, 855 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 757]; see CALCRIM No. 3426, *Voluntary Intoxication*.)

### *Mental Condition*

A number of authorities have stated that a conflict exists in California over whether an unsound mental condition can form the basis of a defense of unconsciousness.

(See *People v. Lisnow* (1978) 88 Cal.App.3d Supp. 21, 23 [151 Cal.Rptr. 621]; 1 Witkin California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Defenses, § 32 [noting the split and concluding that the more recent cases permit the defense for defendants of unsound mind]; Annot., Automatism or Unconsciousness as a Defense or Criminal Charge (1984) 27 A.L.R.4th 1067, § 3(b) fn. 7.)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

- 1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Defenses, §§ 32.
- 3 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 73, *Defenses and Justifications*, § 73.01[4] (Matthew Bender).
- 6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 124, *Jurisdiction and Disposition Hearings*, § 124.04 (Matthew Bender).



## 3426. Voluntary Intoxication (Pen. Code, § 29.4)

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**You may consider evidence, if any, of the defendant’s voluntary intoxication only in a limited way. You may consider that evidence only in deciding whether the defendant acted [or failed to do an act] with \_\_\_\_\_ <insert specific intent or mental state required, e.g., “the intent to permanently deprive the owner of his or her property” or “knowledge that . . .” or “the intent to do the act required”>.**

**A person is *voluntarily intoxicated* if he or she becomes intoxicated by willingly using any intoxicating drug, drink, or other substance knowing that it could produce an intoxicating effect, or willingly assuming the risk of that effect.**

**In connection with the charge of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert first charged offense requiring specific intent or mental state> the People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted [or failed to act] with \_\_\_\_\_ <insert specific intent or mental state required, e.g., “the intent to permanently deprive the owner of his or her property” or “knowledge that . . .”>. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert first charged offense requiring specific intent or mental state>.**

*<Repeat this paragraph for each offense requiring specific intent or a specific mental state.>*

**You may not consider evidence of voluntary intoxication for any other purpose. [Voluntary intoxication is not a defense to \_\_\_\_\_ <insert general intent offense[s]>.]**

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2012, August 2013, February 2015, March 2019*

### BENCH NOTES

#### ***Instructional Duty***

The court has no sua sponte duty to instruct on voluntary intoxication; however, the trial court must give this instruction on request. (*People v. Ricardi* (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1427, 1432 [12 Cal.Rptr.2d 364]; *People v. Castillo* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1009, 1014 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 648, 945 P.2d 1197]; *People v. Saille* (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1103, 1119 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 364, 820 P.2d 588].) Although voluntary intoxication is not an affirmative defense to a crime, the jury may consider evidence of voluntary intoxication and its effect on the defendant’s required mental state. (Pen. Code, § 29.4; *People v. Reyes* (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 975, 982–986 [61 Cal.Rptr.2d 39] [relevant to knowledge element in receiving stolen property]; *People v. Mendoza* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1114, 1131–1134 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 428, 959 P.2d 735] [relevant to mental state in aiding and abetting].)

Voluntary intoxication may not be considered for general intent crimes. (*People v. Mendoza* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1114, 1127–1128 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 428, 959 P.2d 735]; *People v. Atkins* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 76, 81 [104 Cal.Rptr.2d 738, 18 P.3d 660]; see also *People v. Hood* (1969) 1 Cal.3d 444, 451 [82 Cal.Rptr. 618, 462 P.2d 370] [applying specific vs. general intent analysis and holding that assault type crimes are general intent; subsequently superseded by amendments to former Penal Code Section 22 [now Penal Code section 29.4] on a different point].)

If both specific and general intent crimes are charged, the court must specify the general intent crimes in the bracketed portion of the last sentence and instruct the jury that voluntary intoxication is not a defense to those crimes. (*People v. Aguirre* (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 391, 399–402 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d 48]; *People v. Rivera* (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 141, 145–146 [207 Cal.Rptr. 756].)

If the defendant claims unconsciousness due to involuntary intoxication as a defense to driving under the influence, see *People v. Mathson* (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1297, 1317–1323 [149 Cal.Rptr.3d 167].

The court may need to modify this instruction if given with CALCRIM No. 362, *Consciousness of Guilt*. (*People v. Wiidanen* (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 526, 528, 533 [135 Cal.Rptr.3d 736].)

Evidence of voluntary intoxication is inadmissible on the question of whether a defendant believed it necessary to act in self-defense. (*People v. Soto* (2018) 4 Cal.5th 968, 970 [231 Cal.Rptr.3d 732, 415 P.3d 789].)

### ***Related Instructions***

CALCRIM No. 3427, *Involuntary Intoxication*.

CALCRIM No. 625, *Voluntary Intoxication: Effects on Homicide Crimes*.

CALCRIM No. 626, *Voluntary Intoxication Causing Unconsciousness: Effects on Homicide Crimes*.

## **AUTHORITY**

- Instructional Requirements. Pen. Code, § 29.4; *People v. Castillo* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1009, 1014 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 648, 945 P.2d 1197]; *People v. Saille* (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1103, 1119 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 364, 820 P.2d 588].
- Effect of Prescription Drugs. *People v. Mathson* (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1297, 1328, fn. 32 [149 Cal.Rptr.3d 167].

## **RELATED ISSUES**

### ***Implied Malice***

“[E]vidence of voluntary intoxication is no longer admissible on the issue of implied malice aforethought.” (*People v. Martin* (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1107, 1114–1115 [93

Cal.Rptr.2d 433], quoting *People v. Reyes* (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 975, 984, fn. 6 [61 Cal.Rptr.2d 39].)

***Intoxication Based on Mistake of Fact Is Involuntary***

Intoxication resulting from trickery is not “voluntary.” (*People v. Scott* (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 823, 831–833 [194 Cal.Rptr. 633] [defendant drank punch not knowing it contained hallucinogens; court held his intoxication was result of trickery and mistake and involuntary].)

***Premeditation and Deliberation***

“[T]he trial court has no sua sponte duty to instruct that voluntary intoxication may be considered in determining the existence of premeditation and deliberation.” (*People v. Hughes* (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 342 [116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401, 39 P.3d 432], citing *People v. Saille* (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1103, 1120 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 364, 820 P.2d 588]; see *People v. Castillo* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1009, 1018 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 648, 945 P.2d 1197] [counsel not ineffective for failing to request instruction specifically relating voluntary intoxication to premeditation and deliberation].)

***Unconsciousness Based on Voluntary Intoxication Is Not a Complete Defense***

Unconsciousness is typically a complete defense to a crime except when it is caused by voluntary intoxication. (*People v. Heffington* (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 1, 8 [107 Cal.Rptr. 859].) Unconsciousness caused by voluntary intoxication is governed by former Penal Code section 22 [now Penal Code section 29.4], rather than by section 26 and is only a partial defense to a crime. (*People v. Walker* (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1615, 1621 [18 Cal.Rptr.2d 431] [no error in refusing to instruct on unconsciousness when defendant was voluntarily under the influence of drugs at the time of the crime]; see also *People v. Ochoa* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 423 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 408, 966 P.2d 442] [“if the intoxication is voluntarily induced, it can never excuse homicide. Thus, the requisite element of criminal negligence is deemed to exist irrespective of unconsciousness, and a defendant stands guilty of involuntary manslaughter if he voluntarily procured his own intoxication [citation].”].)

## SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Defenses, §§ 32–39.

3 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 73, *Defenses and Justifications*, § 73.04 (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 124, *Jurisdiction and Disposition Hearings*, § 124.04 (Matthew Bender).

## 3427. Involuntary Intoxication

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Consider any evidence that the defendant was involuntarily intoxicated in deciding whether the defendant had the required (intent/ [or] mental state) when (he/she) acted.

A person is *involuntarily intoxicated* if he or she unknowingly ingested some intoxicating liquor, drug, or other substance, or if his or her intoxication is caused by the (force/[ , [or] duress/, [or] fraud/, [or] trickery of someone else), for whatever purpose[, without any fault on the part of the intoxicated person].

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2013*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

It appears that the court has no sua sponte duty to instruct on involuntary intoxication, unless the intoxication results in unconsciousness. (See *People v. Saille* (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1103, 1119 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 364, 820 P.2d 588] [no sua sponte duty when evidence of voluntary intoxication presented to negate element of offense].) If the defendant is relying on the defense of unconsciousness caused by involuntary intoxication, see CALCRIM No. 3425, *Unconsciousness*.

In the definition of “involuntarily intoxicated,” the phrase “without any fault on the part of the intoxicated person” is taken from *People v. Velez* (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 785, 796 [221 Cal.Rptr. 631]. It is unclear when this concept of “fault” would apply if the person has no knowledge of the presence of the intoxicating substance. The committee has included the language in brackets for the court to use at its discretion.

If the defendant claims unconsciousness due to involuntary intoxication as a defense to driving under the influence, see *People v. Mathson* (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1297, 1317–1323 [149 Cal.Rptr.3d 167].

#### *Related Instructions*

See CALCRIM No. 3426, *Voluntary Intoxication*.

### AUTHORITY

- Instructional Requirements. See Pen. Code, § 26(3).
- Burden of Proof. See *People v. Saille* (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1103, 1106 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 364, 820 P.2d 588] [in context of voluntary intoxication].
- Involuntary Intoxication Defined. *People v. Velez* (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 785, 796 [221 Cal.Rptr. 631].

### COMMENTARY

One court has held that a mistake of fact defense (see Pen. Code, § 26(3)) can be

based on involuntary intoxication. (*People v. Scott* (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 823, 831–832 [194 Cal.Rptr. 633].) For further discussion, see CALCRIM No. 3406, *Mistake of Fact*.

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Unconsciousness Based on Voluntary Intoxication Is Not a Complete Defense*

Unconsciousness is typically a complete defense to a crime except when it is caused by voluntary intoxication. (*People v. Heffington* (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 1, 8 [107 Cal.Rptr. 859].) Unconsciousness caused by voluntary intoxication is governed by former Penal Code section 22 [now Penal Code section 29.4], rather than by section 26, and is only a partial defense to a crime. (*People v. Walker* (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1615, 1621 [18 Cal.Rptr.2d 431] [no error in refusing to instruct on unconsciousness when defendant was voluntarily under the influence of drugs at the time of the crime].)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

- 1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Defenses, §§ 32–39.
- 3 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 73, *Defenses and Justifications*, §§ 73.01[4], 73.04 (Matthew Bender).

## 3428. Mental Impairment: Defense to Specific Intent or Mental State (Pen. Code, § 28)

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**You have heard evidence that the defendant may have suffered from a mental (disease[,]/ [or] defect[,]/ [or] disorder). You may consider this evidence only for the limited purpose of deciding whether, at the time of the charged crime, the defendant acted [or failed to act] with the intent or mental state required for that crime.**

**The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted [or failed to act] with the required intent or mental state, specifically: \_\_\_\_\_ <insert specific intent or mental state required, e.g., “malice aforethought,” “the intent to permanently deprive the owner of his or her property,” or “knowledge that . . .”>. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of alleged offense>.**

*<Repeat this paragraph for each offense requiring specific intent or a specific mental state.>*

**[Do not consider evidence of mental (disease[,]/ [or] defect[,]/ [or] disorder) when deciding if \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of nontarget offense> was a natural and probable consequence of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of target offense>.]**

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*New January 2006; Revised March 2017*

### BENCH NOTES

#### ***Instructional Duty***

The court has no sua sponte duty to instruct on mental impairment as a defense to specific intent or mental state; however, the trial court must give this instruction on request. (*People v. Saille* (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1103, 1119 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 364, 820 P.2d 588].) The jury may consider evidence of mental impairment and its effect on the defendant’s ability to form any mental state required for the offense charged. (Pen. Code, § 28; *People v. Reyes* (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 975, 983–985 [61 Cal.Rptr.2d 39] [relevant to knowledge element in receiving stolen property]; *People v. Mendoza* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1114, 1131–1134 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 428, 959 P.2d 735] [voluntary intoxication relevant to mental state in aiding and abetting].)

Evidence of mental impairment may not be considered for general-intent crimes, unless there is an element, such as knowledge, that requires a specific mental state. (*People v. Reyes, supra*, 52 Cal.App.4th at pp. 983–985; *People v. Mendoza, supra*, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 1131–1134 [aiding and abetting].)

In all cases, the court must insert the specific intent or mental state required and the offense for which the mental state is an element. (See *People v. Hill* (1967) 67

Cal.2d 105, 118 [60 Cal.Rptr. 234, 429 P.2d 586].)

Give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “You must not consider evidence of mental” when instructing on aiding and abetting liability for a nontarget offense. (*People v. Mendoza, supra*, 18 Cal.4th at p. 1134.)

In an attempted murder case, it was error to insert “intent to kill” instead of “express malice” as the required intent in paragraph two of this instruction. (See *People v. Ocegueda* (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1393, 1407 [203 Cal.Rptr.3d 233].)

The court may need to modify this instruction to ensure it does not prohibit the jury from considering evidence of a defendant’s mental illness or impairment for a purpose other than deciding whether defendant possessed the required mental state for murder. (*People v. McGehee* (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1190, 1205 [201 Cal.Rptr.3d 714].) For example, giving this unmodified instruction with CALCRIM No. 362, *Consciousness of Guilt: False Statements*, could be error if a defendant’s false statements were the product of mental illness or impairment. (Ibid).

### AUTHORITY

- Statutory Authority. Pen. Code, § 28; see also Pen. Code, §§ 25, 29.
- Instructional Requirements. *People v. Saille* (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1103, 1119 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 364, 820 P.2d 588].
- Mental States—Knowledge. *People v. Reyes* (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 975, 983–985 [61 Cal.Rptr.2d 39].
- Mental States—Aiding and Abetting. *People v. Mendoza* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1114, 1131–1134 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 428, 959 P.2d 735].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Scope of Expert Testimony*

Penal Code section 29 provides that an expert testifying about a defendant’s mental illness “shall not testify as to whether the defendant had or did not have the required mental states.” (Pen. Code, § 29.) In *People v. Coddington* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 529, 582–583 [97 Cal.Rptr.2d 528, 2 P.3d 1081], disapproved on other grounds in *Price v. Superior Court* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1046, 1069, fn. 13 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 409, 25 P.3d 618], the Supreme Court held that the trial court improperly restricted the scope of the expert testimony when the court refused to permit “hypothetical questions regarding the effect of mental defect or illness on a person’s ability to deliberate or premeditate.” (*Id.* at p. 582.) “An expert’s opinion that a form of mental illness can lead to impulsive behavior is relevant to the existence *vel non* of the mental states of premeditation and deliberation regardless of whether the expert believed appellant actually harbored those mental states at the time of the killing.” (*Id.* at pp. 582–583 [italics original]; see also *People v. Nunn* (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1357, 1364–1365 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 294] [discussing appropriate scope of expert testimony].)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Defenses, § 9.

3 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 73, *Defenses and Justifications*, § 73.03 (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 124, *Jurisdiction and Disposition Hearings*, § 124.04 (Matthew Bender).



## 3429. Reasonable Person Standard for Physically Disabled Person

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**A person with a physical disability is required to (know what/use the amount of care that) a reasonably careful person with the same physical disability would (know/use) in the same situation.**

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*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court should give this instruction on request if the defendant has a physical disability and the crimes charged or lesser offenses include a reasonable person standard. (*People v. Mathews* (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 89, 99–100 [30 Cal.Rptr. 2d 330].) This includes cases where the prosecution must prove that the defendant “reasonably should have known” a fact, and cases involving negligence.

For example, in *People v. Mathews, supra*, 25 Cal.App.4th at pp. 93–94 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 330], the defendant, who was blind, hearing impaired, and confined to a wheelchair, was charged with brandishing a firearm at police officers when the officers entered the defendant’s home. The issue at trial was whether the defendant “reasonably should have known” that these were officers entering his home. (*Id.* at p. 98.) The court held that the trial court erred by failing to give the defense’s requested instruction that the defendant must be held to the standard of a reasonable person with the same physical disabilities, not to the standard of a reasonable person without disabilities. (*Id.* at pp. 99–100.)

If the case requires the prosecution to prove that the defendant “reasonably should have known” a fact, then, in the first parenthesis, select the words “know what” and, in the second, select “know.”

If the case requires the prosecution to prove negligence by the defendant, then, in the first parenthesis, select the phrase “use the amount of care that” and, in the second, select “use.”

By “same” disability, this instruction is referring to the effect of the disability, not the cause.

### AUTHORITY

- Instructional Requirements. *People v. Mathews* (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 89, 99–100 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 330].
- Authority. Restatement Second of Torts, § 283C; see also Restatement Second of Torts, § 283B; CACI No. 403.

## RELATED ISSUES

### *Reasonable Person Standard Not Modified by Evidence of Mental Impairment*

In *People v. Jefferson* (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 508, 519 [14 Cal.Rptr.3d 473], the court rejected the argument that the reasonable person standard for self-defense should be the standard of a mentally ill person like the defendant. “The common law does not take account of a person’s mental capacity when determining whether he has acted as the reasonable person would have acted. The law holds ‘the mentally deranged or insane defendant accountable for his negligence as if the person were a normal, prudent person.’ (Prosser & Keeton, Torts (5th ed. 1984) § 32, p. 177.)” (*Ibid.*; see also Rest.2d Torts, § 283B.)

## SECONDARY SOURCES

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.04[1][b] (Matthew Bender).

**3430–3449. Reserved for Future Use**

## C. INSANITY AND CIVIL COMMITMENTS

### 3450. Insanity: Determination, Effect of Verdict (Pen. Code, §§ 25, 29.8)

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You have found the defendant guilty of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert crime[s]>. Now you must decide whether (he/she) was legally insane when (he/she) committed the crime[s].

The defendant must prove that it is more likely than not that (he/she) was legally insane when (he/she) committed the crime[s].

The defendant was legally insane if:

1. When (he/she) committed the crime[s], (he/she) had a mental disease or defect;

AND

2. Because of that disease or defect, (he/she) was incapable of knowing or understanding the nature and quality of (his/her) act or was incapable of knowing or understanding that (his/her) act was morally or legally wrong.

Do not base a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity solely on the basis of a personality disorder, adjustment disorder, seizure disorder, or an abnormality of personality or character made apparent only by a series of criminal or antisocial acts.

[Special rules apply to an insanity defense involving drugs or alcohol. Addiction to or abuse of drugs or intoxicants, by itself, does not qualify as legal insanity. This is true even if the intoxicants cause organic brain damage or a settled mental disease or defect that lasts after the immediate effects of the intoxicants have worn off. Likewise, a temporary mental condition caused by the recent use of drugs or intoxicants is not legal insanity.]

[If the defendant suffered from a settled mental disease or defect caused by the long-term use of drugs or intoxicants, that settled mental disease or defect combined with another mental disease or defect may qualify as legal insanity. A *settled mental disease or defect* is one that remains after the effect of the drugs or intoxicants has worn off.]

You may consider any evidence that the defendant had a mental disease or defect before the commission of the crime[s]. If you are satisfied that (he/she) had a mental disease or defect before (he/she) committed the crime[s], you may conclude that (he/she) suffered from that same condition when (he/she) committed the crime[s]. You must still decide

whether that mental disease or defect constitutes legal insanity.

[If you find the defendant was legally insane at the time of (his/her) crime[s], (he/she) will not be released from custody until a court finds (he/she) qualifies for release under California law. Until that time (he/she) will remain in a mental hospital or outpatient treatment program, if appropriate. (He/She) may not, generally, be kept in a mental hospital or outpatient program longer than the maximum sentence available for (his/her) crime[s]. If the state requests additional confinement beyond the maximum sentence, the defendant will be entitled to a new sanity trial before a new jury. Your job is only to decide whether the defendant was legally sane or insane at the time of the crime[s]. You must not speculate as to whether (he/she) is currently sane or may be found sane in the future. You must not let any consideration about where the defendant may be confined, or for how long, affect your decision in any way.]

[You may find that at times the defendant was legally sane and at other times was legally insane. You must determine whether (he/she) was legally insane when (he/she) committed the crime.]

[If you conclude that the defendant was legally sane at the time (he/she) committed the crime[s], then it is no defense that (he/she) committed the crime[s] as a result of an uncontrollable or irresistible impulse.]

If, after considering all the evidence, all twelve of you conclude the defendant has proved that it is more likely than not that (he/she) was legally insane when (he/she) committed the crime[s], you must return a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity.

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*New January 2006; Revised April 2008, October 2010, August 2014, August 2015, September 2017*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on insanity when the defendant has entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. (Pen. Code, § 25.)

Give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “Special rules apply” when the sole basis of insanity is the defendant’s use of intoxicants. (Pen. Code, § 29.8; *People v. Robinson* (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 421, 427–428 [84 Cal.Rptr.2d 832].) If the defendant’s use of intoxicants is not the sole basis or causative factor of insanity, but rather one factor among others, give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “If the defendant suffered from a settled mental.” (*Id.* at p. 430, fn. 5.)

Do **not** give CALCRIM No. 224, *Circumstantial Evidence: Sufficiency of Evidence*, or CALCRIM No. 225, *Circumstantial Evidence: Intent or Mental State*. These instructions have “no application when the standard of proof is preponderance of the

evidence.” (*People v. Johnwell* (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1267, 1274 [18 Cal.Rptr.3d 286].)

There is no sua sponte duty to inform the jury that an insanity verdict would result in the defendant’s commitment to a mental hospital. However, this instruction must be given on request. (*People v. Moore* (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 540, 556 [211 Cal.Rptr. 856]; *People v. Kelly* (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 538 [3 Cal.Rptr.2d 677, 822 P.2d 385].)

If the court conducts a bifurcated trial on the insanity plea, the court **must** also give the appropriate post-trial instructions such as CALCRIM No. 3550, *Pre-Deliberation Instructions*, CALCRIM No. 222, *Evidence*, and CALCRIM No. 226, *Witnesses*. (See *In re Ramon M.* (1978) 22 Cal.3d 419, 427, fn. 10 [149 Cal.Rptr. 387, 584 P.2d 524].) These instructions may need to be modified.

### AUTHORITY

- Instructional Requirements. Pen. Code, §§ 25, 29.8; *People v. Skinner* (1985) 39 Cal.3d 765 [217 Cal.Rptr. 685, 704 P.2d 752].
- Burden of Proof. Pen. Code, § 25(b).
- Commitment to Hospital. Pen. Code, §§ 1026, 1026.5; *People v. Moore* (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 540, 556 [211 Cal.Rptr. 856]; *People v. Kelly* (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 538 [3 Cal.Rptr.2d 677, 822 P.2d 385].
- Excluded Conditions. Pen. Code, § 29.8.
- Anti-Social Acts. *People v. Fields* (1983) 35 Cal.3d 329, 368–372 [197 Cal.Rptr. 803, 673 P.2d 680]; *People v. Stress* (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1259, 1271 [252 Cal.Rptr. 913].
- Long-Term Substance Use. *People v. Robinson* (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 421, 427 [84 Cal.Rptr.2d 832].
- This Instruction Upheld. *People v. McCarrick* (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 227, 250–252 [210 Cal.Rptr.3d 838] [delusion also may negate premeditation and deliberation].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Bifurcated Proceedings*

The defendant has a right to bifurcated proceedings on the questions of sanity and guilt. (Pen. Code, § 1026.) When the defendant enters *both* a “not guilty” and a “not guilty by reason of insanity” plea, the defendant must be tried first with respect to guilt. If the defendant is found guilty, he or she is then tried with respect to sanity. The defendant may waive bifurcation and have both guilt and sanity tried at the same time. (Pen. Code, § 1026(a).)

#### *Extension of Commitment*

The test for extending a person’s commitment is not the same as the test for insanity. (*People v. Superior Court (Williams)* (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 477, 490 [284 Cal.Rptr. 601].) The test for insanity is whether the accused “was incapable of

knowing or understanding the nature and quality of his or her act or of distinguishing right from wrong at the time of the commission of the offense.” (Pen. Code, § 25(b); *People v. Skinner* (1985) 39 Cal.3d 765, 768 [217 Cal.Rptr. 685, 704 P.2d 752].) In contrast, the standard for recommitment under Penal Code section 1026.5, subdivision (b), is whether a defendant, “by reason of a mental disease, defect, or disorder represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others.” (*People v. Superior Court*, *supra*, 233 Cal.App.3d at pp. 489–490; *People v. Wilder* (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 90, 99 [39 Cal.Rptr.2d 247].)

### ***Legal and Moral Wrong***

The wrong contemplated by the two-part insanity test refers to both the legal wrong and the moral wrong. If the defendant appreciates that his or her act is criminal but does not think it is morally wrong, he or she may still be criminally insane. (See *People v. Skinner* (1985) 39 Cal.3d 765, 777–784 [217 Cal.Rptr. 685]; see also *People v. Stress* (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1259, 1271–1274 [252 Cal.Rptr. 913].)

### ***Temporary Insanity***

The defendant’s insanity does not need to be permanent in order to establish a defense. The relevant inquiry is the defendant’s mental state at the time the offense was committed. (*People v. Kelly* (1973) 10 Cal.3d 565, 577 [111 Cal.Rptr. 171, 516 P.2d 875].)

## **SECONDARY SOURCES**

- 1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Defenses, §§ 9–16, 18–20.
- 3 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 73, *Defenses and Justifications*, § 73.02 (Matthew Bender).
- 4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 86, *Insanity Trial*, §§ 86.01A, 86.04 (Matthew Bender).
- 6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 124, *Jurisdiction and Disposition Hearings*, § 124.04 (Matthew Bender).

## 3451. Present Mental Competence of Defendant

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**You must decide whether the defendant is mentally competent to stand trial. That is the only purpose of this proceeding. Do not consider whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty of any crime or whether (he/she) was sane or insane at the time that any alleged crime was committed.**

**The defendant is mentally competent to stand trial if (he/she) can do all of the following:**

- 1. Understand the nature and purpose of the criminal proceedings against (him/her);**
- 2. Assist, in a rational manner, (his/her) attorney in presenting (his/her) defense;**

**AND**

- 3. Understand (his/her) own status and condition in the criminal proceedings.**

**The law presumes that a defendant is mentally competent. In order to overcome this presumption, ((the defendant/the People) must prove/it must be proved) that it is more likely than not that the defendant is now mentally incompetent because of a (mental disorder/developmental disability).**

**[A *developmental disability* is a disability that begins before a person is 18 years old and continues, or is expected to continue, for an indefinite period of time. It must be a substantial handicap and does not include other handicapping conditions that are solely physical in nature. Examples of developmental disabilities include mental retardation, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, autism, and conditions closely related to mental retardation or requiring treatment similar to that required for mentally retarded individuals.]**

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*New January 2006*

### **BENCH NOTES**

#### ***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct the jury on the standard for competence.

The party that seeks a finding of incompetence bears the burden of proof. If the court raises the issue, neither party bears that burden. Choose the appropriate language regarding which party bears the burden of proof in the paragraph that begins with “The law presumes that . . .” (*People v. Skeirik* (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 444, 459–460 [280 Cal.Rptr. 175].)

Give CALCRIM No. 3550, *Pre-Deliberation Instructions*, and any other relevant post-trial instructions, such as CALCRIM No. 222, *Evidence*, or CALCRIM No. 226, *Witnesses*.

Do **not** give CALCRIM No. 224, *Circumstantial Evidence: Sufficiency of Evidence*, or CALCRIM No. 225, *Circumstantial Evidence: Intent or Mental State*. These instructions have “no application when the standard of proof is preponderance of the evidence.” (*People v. Johnwell* (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1267, 1274 [18 Cal.Rptr.3d 286]).

### AUTHORITY

- Instructional Requirements. Pen. Code, §§ 1367–1370.
- Developmental Disability Defined. Pen. Code, § 1370.1(a)(1)(H).
- Presumption of Competence. Pen. Code, § 1369(f).
- Unanimous Verdict. Pen. Code, § 1369(f).

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Threshold for Section 1368 Hearing*

A trial court must conduct a section 1368 hearing when there is substantial evidence of incompetence. (*People v. Cox* (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 221, 225–226 [147 Cal.Rptr. 73].) Substantial evidence raises a reasonable doubt about the defendant’s competence to stand trial. (*People v. Frye* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 951–952 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183].)

#### *Defense Counsel May Seek Finding Contrary to Client’s Wishes*

A section 1368 hearing is civil in nature. Since neither guilt nor innocence is at issue, defense counsel must “advocate the position counsel perceives to be in the client’s best interests even when that interest conflicts with the client’s stated position [citation].” (*People v. Stanley* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 804 [42 Cal.Rptr.2d 543, 897 P.2d 481].)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

5 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, § 824.

3 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 64, *Suspension of Criminal Proceedings*, §§ 64.01, 64.02 (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 124, *Jurisdiction and Disposition Hearings*, § 124.04 (Matthew Bender).



## 3452. Determining Restoration to Sanity (Pen. Code, § 1026.2)

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**The defendant was previously found not guilty of a crime and committed to a mental health facility. You must decide whether the defendant currently poses a danger to the health and safety of others as a result of a mental disease, defect, or disorder. That is the only purpose of this proceeding. You are not being asked to decide the defendant’s mental condition at any other time or whether (he/she) is guilty of any crime.**

*<Alternative A—defendant’s ability to continue unsupervised self-medication not an issue>*

**[The law presumes that the defendant currently poses a danger to the health and safety of others as a result of a mental disease, defect, or disorder. In order to overcome this presumption, the defendant has the burden of proving that it is more likely than not that (he/she) no longer poses such a danger.]**

*<Alternative B—defendant’s ability to continue unsupervised self-medication an issue>*

**[The law presumes that the defendant currently poses a danger to the health and safety of others as a result of a mental disease, defect, or disorder. In order to overcome this presumption, the defendant has the burden of proving that it is more likely than not that:**

- 1. (He/She) is no longer a danger to the health and safety of others because (he/she) is now taking prescribed medicine that controls (his/her) mental condition;**

**AND**

- 2. (He/She) will continue to take that medicine in an unsupervised environment.]**

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*New January 2006*

### **BENCH NOTES**

#### ***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the standard for determining if a defendant has been restored to sanity.

Revise and give CALCRIM No. 3550, *Pre-Deliberation Instructions*, as follows: replace the paragraph that begins with “Your verdict [on each count and any special finding(s)] must be unanimous” with “Nine or more of you must agree on your verdict.” (*In re Franklin* (1972) 7 Cal.3d 126, 149 [101 Cal.Rptr. 553, 496 P.2d 465].) In addition, give any other relevant post-trial instructions, such as CALCRIM

No. 222, *Evidence*, or CALCRIM No. 226, *Witnesses*.

**Do not** give CALCRIM No. 224, *Circumstantial Evidence: Sufficiency of Evidence*, or CALCRIM No. 225, *Circumstantial Evidence: Intent or Mental State*. These instructions have “no application when the standard of proof is preponderance of the evidence.” (*People v. Johnwell* (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1267, 1274 [18 Cal.Rptr.3d 286].)

**Do not** give this instruction in conjunction with proceedings under Penal Code sections 2970 and 2972. (*People v. Noble* (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 184, 190 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d 918].)

### AUTHORITY

- Instructional Requirements. Pen. Code, § 1026.2.
- Unsupervised Self-Medication. *People v. Williams* (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 1476, 1481–1482 [244 Cal.Rptr. 429].
- Presumption of Continuing Insanity. *In re Franklin* (1972) 7 Cal.3d 126, 141 [101 Cal.Rptr. 553, 496 P.2d 465] [interpreting precursor statute].
- Three-Fourths Verdict and Defendant’s Burden of Proof. *In re Franklin* (1972) 7 Cal.3d 126, 149 [101 Cal.Rptr. 553, 496 P.2d 465]; *People v. Mapp* (1983) 150 Cal.App.3d 346, 351 [198 Cal.Rptr. 177].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Court May Order a Directed Verdict*

The court may order a directed verdict when insufficiency of the evidence warrants it. (*People v. Mapp* (1983) 150 Cal.App.3d 346, 351 [198 Cal.Rptr. 177].)

#### *Both Parties Have Right to Jury Trial on Issue of Restoration of Sanity*

Even if the defendant waives the right to a jury on the issue of restoration of sanity, the prosecution may still assert its right to a jury. (*People v. Superior Court (Almond)* (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 607, 612 [268 Cal.Rptr. 375].)

#### *No Right to Jury Trial on First-Stage Hearing on Outpatient Treatment*

Even though success at the first-stage hearing is a necessary step on the way to eventual release, equal protection does not require that a criminal defendant who has been committed has a right to a jury at such a hearing. (*People v. Tilbury* (1991) 54 Cal.3d 56, 67 [284 Cal.Rptr. 288, 813 P.2d 1318].)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

5 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, §§ 803–813.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 86, *Insanity Trial*, § 86.10[4], [7] (Matthew Bender).

### 3453. Extension of Commitment (Pen. Code, § 1026.5(b)(1))

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\_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of respondent> has been committed to a mental health facility. You must decide whether (he/she) currently poses a substantial danger of physical harm to others as a result of a mental disease, defect, or disorder. That is the only purpose of this proceeding. You are not being asked to decide \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of respondent>'s mental condition at any other time or whether (he/she) is guilty of any crime.

To prove that \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of respondent> currently poses a substantial danger of physical harm to others as a result of a mental disease, defect, or disorder, the People must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that:

1. (He/She) suffers from a mental disease, defect, or disorder;

AND

2. As a result of (his/her) mental disease, defect, or disorder, (he/she) now:
  - a. Poses a substantial danger of physical harm to others;

AND

- b. Has serious difficulty in controlling (his/her) dangerous behavior.

[Control of a mental condition through medication is a defense to a petition to extend commitment. To establish this defense, \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of respondent> must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that:

1. (He/She) no longer poses a substantial danger of physical harm to others because (he/she) is now taking medicine that controls (his/her) mental condition;

AND

2. (He/She) will continue to take that medicine in an unsupervised environment.

**Proof by a preponderance of the evidence is a different burden of proof from proof beyond a reasonable doubt. A fact is proved by a preponderance of the evidence if you conclude that it is more likely than not that the fact is true.]**

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the standard for extending commitment, including the constitutional requirement that the person be found to have a disorder that seriously impairs the ability to control his or her dangerous behavior. (*People v. Sudar* (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 655, 663 [70 Cal.Rptr.3d 190].).

Give CALCRIM No. 219, *Reasonable Doubt in Civil Commitment Proceedings* and CALCRIM No. 3550, *Pre-Deliberation Instructions*, as well as any other relevant post-trial instructions, such as CALCRIM No. 222, *Evidence*, or CALCRIM No. 226, *Witnesses*.

The constitutional requirement for an involuntary civil commitment is that the person be found to have a disorder that seriously impairs the ability to control his or her dangerous behavior. (*Kansas v. Crane* (2002) 534 U.S. 407, 412–413 [122 S.Ct. 867, 151 L.Ed.2d 856]; *In re Howard N.* (2005) 35 Cal.4th 117, 128 [24 Cal.Rptr.3d 866, 106 P.3d 305].) This requirement applies to an extension of a commitment after a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity. (*People v. Zapisek* (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1151, 1159–1165 [54 Cal.Rptr.3d 873]; *People v. Bowers* (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 870, 878 [52 Cal.Rptr.3d 74]; *People v. Galindo* (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 531 [48 Cal.Rptr.3d 241].)

## AUTHORITY

- Instructional Requirements. Pen. Code, § 1026.5(b)(1).
- Unanimous Verdict, Burden of Proof. *Conservatorship of Roulet* (1979) 23 Cal.3d 219, 235 [152 Cal.Rptr. 425, 590 P.2d 1] [discussing conservatorship proceedings under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act and civil commitment proceedings in general].
- Affirmative Defense of Medication. *People v. Bolden* (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 1591, 1600–1602 [266 Cal.Rptr. 724].
- Serious Difficulty Controlling Behavior. *People v. Sudar* (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 655, 662–663 [70 Cal.Rptr.3d 190] [applying the principles of *Kansas v. Crane* and *In re Howard N.*].

## RELATED ISSUES

### *Extension of Commitment*

The test for extending a person’s commitment is not the same as the test for insanity. (*People v. Superior Court (Williams)* (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 477, 490 [284 Cal.Rptr. 601].) The test for insanity is whether the accused “was incapable of knowing or understanding the nature and quality of his or her act or of distinguishing right from wrong at the time of the commission of the offense.” (Pen. Code, § 25(b); *People v. Skinner* (1985) 39 Cal.3d 765 [217 Cal.Rptr. 685, 704 P.2d 752].) In contrast, the standard for recommitment under Penal Code section 1026.5(b) is whether a defendant, “by reason of a mental disease, defect, or disorder [,] represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others.” (*People v. Superior*

*Court, supra*, 233 Cal.App.3d at pp. 489–490; see *People v. Wilder* (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 90, 99 [39 Cal.Rptr. 2d 247].)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

5 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial §§ 816–819.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 86, *Insanity Trial*, § 86.10[7] (Matthew Bender).

**3454. Initial Commitment as Sexually Violent Predator (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 6600, 6600.1)**

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The petition alleges that \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of respondent> is a sexually violent predator.

To prove this allegation, the People must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that:

1. (He/She) has been convicted of committing a sexually violent offense;
2. (He/She) has a diagnosed mental disorder;

[AND]

3. As a result of that diagnosed mental disorder, (he/she) is a danger to the health and safety of others because it is likely that (he/she) will engage in sexually violent predatory criminal behavior(;/.)

<Give element 4 when evidence has been introduced at trial on the issue of amenability to voluntary treatment in the community.>

[AND]

4. It is necessary to keep (him/her) in custody in a secure facility to ensure the health and safety of others.]

The term *diagnosed mental disorder* includes conditions either existing at birth or acquired after birth that affect a person's ability to control emotions and behavior and predispose that person to commit criminal sexual acts to an extent that makes him or her a menace to the health and safety of others.

A person is *likely to engage in sexually violent predatory criminal behavior* if there is a substantial danger, that is, a serious and well-founded risk that the person will engage in such conduct if released into the community.

The likelihood that the person will engage in such conduct does not have to be greater than 50 percent.

Sexually violent criminal behavior is *predatory* if it is directed toward a stranger, a person of casual acquaintance with whom no substantial relationship exists, or a person with whom a relationship has been established or promoted for the primary purpose of victimization.

\_\_\_\_\_ <Insert name[s] of crime[s] enumerated in Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600(b)> (is/are) [a] *sexually violent offense[s]* when committed by force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury to the victim or another person or threatening to retaliate in the

future against the victim or any other person.

[ \_\_\_\_\_ <Insert name[s] of crime[s] enumerated in Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600(b)> (is/are) also [a] **sexually violent offense[s]** when the offense[s] (is/are) committed on a child under 14 years old.]

As used here, a *conviction* for committing a sexually violent offense is one of the following:

<Give the appropriate bracketed description[s] below.>

<A. *Conviction With Fixed Sentence*>

[A prior [or current] conviction for one of the offenses I have just described to you that resulted in a prison sentence for a fixed period of time.]

<B. *Conviction With Indeterminate Sentence*>

[A conviction for an offense that I have just described to you that resulted in an indeterminate sentence.]

<C. *Conviction in Another Jurisdiction*>

[A prior conviction in another jurisdiction for an offense that includes all of the same elements of one of the offenses that I have just described to you.]

<D. *Conviction Under Previous Statute*>

[A conviction for an offense under a previous statute that includes all of the elements of one of the offenses that I have just described to you.]

<E. *Conviction With Probation*>

[A prior conviction for one of the offenses that I have just described to you for which the respondent received probation.]

<F. *Acquittal Based on Insanity Defense*>

[A prior finding of not guilty by reason of insanity for one of the offenses that I have just described to you.]

<G. *Conviction as Mentally Disordered Sex Offender*>

[A conviction resulting in a finding that the respondent was a mentally disordered sex offender.]

<H. *Conviction Resulting in Commitment to Department of Youth Authority Pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 1731.5*>

[A prior conviction for one of the offenses that I have just described to you for which the respondent was committed to the Department of

**Youth Authority pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 1731.5.]**

**You may not conclude that \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of respondent> is a sexually violent predator based solely on (his/her) alleged prior conviction[s] without additional evidence that (he/she) currently has such a diagnosed mental disorder.**

**In order to prove that \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of respondent> is a danger to the health and safety of others, the People do not need to prove a recent overt act committed while (he/she) was in custody. A recent overt act is a criminal act that shows a likelihood that the actor may engage in sexually violent predatory criminal behavior.**

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2006, June 2007, August 2009, April 2011, February 2012, March 2019*

## **BENCH NOTES**

### ***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct the jury about the basis for a finding that a respondent is a sexually violent predator.

Do not use this instruction for extension or status proceedings. Use instead CALCRIM No. 3454A, *Hearing to Determine Current Status Under Sexually Violent Predator Act*.

If evidence is presented about amenability to voluntary treatment, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give bracketed element 4. (*People v. Grassini* (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 765, 777 [6 Cal.Rptr.3d 662]; *People v. Calderon* (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 80, 93 [21 Cal.Rptr.3d 92].) Evidence of involuntary treatment in the community is inadmissible at trial because it is not relevant to any of the SVP requirements. (*People v. Calderon, supra*, 124 Cal.App.4th at 93.)

The court also **must give** CALCRIM No. 219, *Reasonable Doubt in Civil Proceedings*; 222, *Evidence*; 226, *Witnesses*; 3550, *Pre-Deliberation Instructions*; and any other relevant post-trial instructions. These instructions may need to be modified.

Jurors instructed in these terms must necessarily understand that one is not eligible for commitment under the SVPA unless his or her capacity or ability to control violent criminal sexual behavior is seriously and dangerously impaired. No additional instructions or findings are necessary. *People v. Williams* (2003) 31 Cal.4th 757, 776–777 [3 Cal.Rptr.3d 684, 74 P.3d 779] (interpreting Welfare and Institutions Code section 6600, the same statute at issue here).

But see *In re Howard N.* (2005) 35 Cal.4th 117, 137–138 [24 Cal.Rptr.3d 866, 106 P.3d 305], which found in a commitment proceeding under a different code section, i.e., Welfare and Institutions Code section 1800, that when evidence of inability to control behavior was insufficient, the absence of a specific “control” instruction was



not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, *In re Howard N.* discusses *Williams* extensively without suggesting that it intended to overrule *Williams*. *Williams* therefore appears to be good law in proceedings under section 6600.

### AUTHORITY

- Elements and Definitions. Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 6600, 6600.1.
- Unanimous Verdict, Burden of Proof. *Conservatorship of Roulet* (1979) 23 Cal.3d 219, 235 [152 Cal.Rptr. 425, 590 P.2d 1] [discussing conservatorship proceedings under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act and civil commitment proceedings in general].
- Likely Defined. *People v. Roberge* (2003) 29 Cal.4th 979, 988 [129 Cal.Rptr.2d 861, 62 P.3d 97].
- Predatory Acts Defined. *People v. Hurtado* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1179, 1183 [124 Cal.Rptr.2d 186, 52 P.3d 116].
- Must Instruct on Necessity for Confinement in Secure Facility. *People v. Grassini* (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 765, 777 [6 Cal.Rptr.3d 662].
- Determinate Sentence Defined. Pen. Code, § 1170.
- Impairment of Control. *In re Howard N.* (2005) 35 Cal.4th 117, 128–130 [24 Cal.Rptr.3d 866, 106 P.3d 305].
- Amenability to Voluntary Treatment. *Cooley v. Superior Court* (2002) 29 Cal.4th 228, 256 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 177, 57 P.3d 654].
- Need for Treatment and Need for Custody Not the Same. *People v. Ghilotti* (2002) 27 Cal.4th 888, 927 [119 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 44 P.3d 949].
- Substantial Danger. *People v. Ghilotti* (2002) 27 Cal.4th 888, 922 [119 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 44 P.3d 949].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### ***Different Proof Requirements at Different Stages of the Proceedings***

Even though two concurring experts must testify to commence the petition process under Welfare and Institutions Code section 6001, the same requirement does not apply to the trial. (*People v. Scott* (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1060, 1064 [123 Cal.Rptr.2d 253].)

#### ***Masturbation Does Not Require Skin-to-Skin Contact***

Substantial sexual conduct with a child under 14 years old includes masturbation when the touching of the minor’s genitals is accomplished through his or her clothing. (*People v. Lopez* (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1306, 1312 [20 Cal.Rptr.3d 801]; *People v. Whitlock* (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 456, 463 [6 Cal.Rptr.3d 389].) “[T]he trial court properly instructed the jury when it told the jury that ‘[t]o constitute masturbation, it is not necessary that the bare skin be touched. The touching may be through the clothing of the child.’” (*People v. Lopez, supra*, 123 Cal.App.4th at p. 1312.)

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

3 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, §§ 277, 298.

5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 104, *Parole*, § 104.06 (Matthew Bender).

**3454A. Hearing to Determine Current Status Under Sexually  
Violent Predator Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6605)**

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The People allege that \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of petitioner>* currently is a sexually violent predator.

To prove this allegation, the People must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that:

1. (He/She) has a diagnosed mental disorder;

[AND]

2. As a result of that diagnosed mental disorder, (he/she) is a danger to the health and safety of others because it is likely that (he/she) will engage in sexually violent predatory criminal behavior(;/.)

*<Give element 3 when evidence has been introduced at trial on the issue of amenability to voluntary treatment in the community>*

[AND]

3. It is necessary to keep (him/her) in (custody in a secure facility/ [or] a state-operated conditional release program) to ensure the health and safety of others.]

The term *diagnosed mental disorder* includes conditions either existing at birth or acquired after birth that affect a person's ability to control emotions and behavior and predispose that person to commit criminal sexual acts to an extent that makes him or her a menace to the health and safety of others.

A person is *likely to engage in sexually violent predatory criminal behavior* if there is a substantial danger, that is, a serious and well-founded risk that the person will engage in such conduct if released in the community.

The likelihood that the person will engage in such conduct does not have to be greater than 50 percent.

Sexually violent criminal behavior is *predatory* if it is directed toward a stranger, a person of casual acquaintance with whom no substantial relationship exists, or a person with whom a relationship has been established or promoted for the primary purpose of victimization.

*<Give the following paragraph if evidence of the petitioner's failure to participate in or complete treatment is offered as proof that petitioner's condition has not changed>*

[You may consider evidence that \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of petitioner>* failed to participate in or complete the State Department of Mental Health Sex Offender Commitment Program as an indication that (his/

her) condition as a sexually violent predator has not changed. The meaning and importance of that evidence is for you to decide.]

<Give the following paragraph if the jury has been told about the petitioner's underlying conviction>

[You may not conclude that \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of petitioner> is currently a sexually violent predator based solely on (his/her) prior conviction[s] without additional evidence that (he/she) currently has such a diagnosed mental disorder.]

In order to prove that \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of petitioner> is a danger to the health and safety of others, the People do not need to prove a recent overt act committed while (he/she) was in custody. A *recent overt act* is a criminal act that shows a likelihood that the actor may engage in sexually violent predatory criminal behavior.

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*New April 2011; Revised February 2012*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct the jury about the basis for a finding that a petitioner is currently a sexually violent predator.

If evidence is presented about amenability to voluntary treatment, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give bracketed element 3. (*People v. Grassini* (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 765, 777 [6 Cal.Rptr.3d 662]; *People v. Calderon* (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 80, 93 [21 Cal.Rptr.3d 92].) Evidence of involuntary treatment in the community is inadmissible at trial because it is not relevant to any of the SVP requirements. (*People v. Calderon, supra*, 124 Cal.App.4th at 93.)

The court also **must give** CALCRIM No. 219, *Reasonable Doubt in Civil Proceedings*; 222, *Evidence*; 226, *Witnesses*; 3550, *Pre-Deliberation Instructions*; and any other relevant post-trial instructions. These instructions may need to be modified.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements and Definitions. Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 6600, 6605.
- Unanimous Verdict, Burden of Proof. *Conservatorship of Roulet* (1979) 23 Cal.3d 219, 235 [152 Cal.Rptr. 425, 590 P.2d 1] [discussing conservatorship proceedings under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act and civil commitment proceedings in general].
- Likely Defined. *People v. Roberge* (2003) 29 Cal.4th 979, 988 [129 Cal.Rptr.2d 861, 62 P.3d 97].
- Predatory Acts Defined. *People v. Hurtado* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1179, 1183 [124 Cal.Rptr.2d 186, 52 P.3d 116].

- Must Instruct on Necessity for Confinement in Secure Facility. *People v. Grassini* (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 765, 777 [6 Cal.Rptr.3d 662].
- Impairment of Control. *In re Howard N.* (2005) 35 Cal.4th 117, 128–130 [24 Cal.Rptr.3d 866, 106 P.3d 305].
- Amenability to Voluntary Treatment. *Cooley v. Superior Court* (2002) 29 Cal.4th 228, 256 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 177, 57 P.3d 654].
- Need for Treatment and Need for Custody Not the Same. *People v. Ghilotti* (2002) 27 Cal.4th 888, 927 [119 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 44 P.3d 949].
- State-Operated Conditional Release Program. *People v. Superior Court (George)* (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 183, 196–197 [78 Cal.Rptr.3d 711].
- Substantial Danger. *People v. Ghilotti* (2002) 27 Cal.4th 888, 922 [119 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 44 P.3d 949].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

3 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, § 298.

5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 104, *Parole*, § 104.06 (Matthew Bender).

## 3455. Mental Incapacity as a Defense (Pen. Code, §§ 25, 29.8)

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You may not find the defendant guilty of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of crime> if (he/she) was legally incapable of committing a crime because of mental incapacity.

The defendant was legally incapable of committing a crime because of mental incapacity if at the time the crime was committed:

1. (He/She) had a mental disease or defect;

AND

2. Because of that disease or defect, (he/she) was incapable of knowing or understanding the nature and quality of (his/her) act or was incapable of knowing or understanding that (his/her) act was morally or legally wrong.

The defendant has the burden of proving this defense by a preponderance of the evidence. [This is a different burden of proof from proof beyond a reasonable doubt.] To meet the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence, the defendant must prove that it is more likely than not that (he/she) was legally incapable of committing a crime because of mental incapacity.

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*New January 2006; Revised April 2008, August 2014*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on mental incapacity when the defendant has raised this defense and substantial evidence supports it. (Pen. Code, § 25.) Substantial evidence means evidence of a defense, which, if believed, would be sufficient for a reasonable jury to find a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt. (*People v. Salas* (2006) 37 Cal.4th 967, 982–983 [38 Cal.Rptr.3d 624, 127 P.3d 40].)

If the court grants a bifurcated trial on the defense of mental incapacity, the court must also give the appropriate post-trial instructions such as CALCRIM No. 3550, *Pre-Deliberation Instructions*, CALCRIM No. 222, *Evidence*, and CALCRIM No. 226, *Witnesses*. (See *In re Ramon M.* (1978) 22 Cal.3d 419, 427, fn. 10 [149 Cal.Rptr. 387, 584 P.2d 524].)

If the court does not grant a bifurcated trial, give the bracketed sentence “This is a different burden of proof from proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”

### AUTHORITY

- Instructional Requirements. Pen. Code, §§ 25, 29.8, 26.

- Burden of Proof. *In re Ramon M.* (1978) 22 Cal.3d 419, 427, fn. 10 [149 Cal.Rptr. 387, 584 P.2d 524].).
- Same Test for Both Mental Incapacity and Insanity. *In re Ramon M.* (1978) 22 Cal.3d 419, 427 [149 Cal.Rptr. 387, 584 P.2d 524].).
- Requirement of Mental Disease or Defect. *People v. McCaslin* (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 1, 8 [223 Cal.Rptr. 587].
- Incapacity Based on Mental Disease or Defect. *People v. Stress* (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1259, 1271 [252 Cal.Rptr. 913].
- Penal Code Section 25(b) Supersedes Model Penal Code Test. *People v. Phillips* (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 170, 173 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 448].

### COMMENTARY

In *In re Ramon M.* (1978) 22 Cal.3d 419, 427 [149 Cal.Rptr. 387, 584 P.2d 524], the Supreme Court held that the same test should apply for determining both mental incapacity and insanity. However, the court was applying the Model Penal Code test, which was subsequently superseded by Proposition 8 as codified in Penal Code section 25(b). The Court of Appeal in *People v. Phillips* (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 170, 173 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 448], expressly found that “the test for insanity as stated in section 25, subdivision (b) applies also to determine whether a person is an idiot pursuant to section 26.” Accordingly, the committee followed *Phillips* in drafting this instruction.

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Legal and Moral Wrong*

The wrong contemplated by the two-part insanity test refers to both the legal wrong and the moral wrong. If the defendant appreciates that his or her act is criminal but does not think it is morally wrong, he or she may still be criminally insane. (See *People v. Skinner* (1985) 39 Cal.3d 765, 777–784 [217 Cal.Rptr. 685, 704 P.2d 752]; see also *People v. Stress* (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1259, 1271–1274 [252 Cal.Rptr. 913].)

#### *Penal Code Sections 1016, 1017, 1026, 1027*

The Supreme Court found in *In re Ramon M.* (1978) 22 Cal.3d 419, 427 [149 Cal.Rptr. 387, 584 P.2d 524] that the same test for legal incapacity should apply to both insanity and mental retardation. Moreover, the court concluded that the Legislature “probably intended [Pen. Code, §§ 1016, 1017, 1026, 1027] to apply to all persons who assertedly lack mental capacity to commit crime [citation]. In light of this legislative intent, and of the identity of the legal test for mental incapacity and insanity . . . we conclude that the term ‘insanity’ in Penal Code sections 1016 through 1027 refers to mental incapacity, whether arising from mental illness or mental retardation. Accordingly a defendant asserting a defense of mental incapacity should raise that defense by separate plea (see Pen. Code, §§ 1016, 1017), may

obtain a bifurcated trial (see Pen. Code, § 1026), [and] must prove his incapacity by a preponderance of the evidence [citation] . . . .” (*Id.* at p. 427, fn. 10.)

### ***Extension of Commitment***

The test for extending a person’s commitment is not the same as the test for insanity. (*People v. Superior Court (Williams)* (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 477, 490 [284 Cal.Rptr. 601].) The test for insanity and mental incapacity is whether the accused “was incapable of knowing or understanding the nature and quality of his or her act or of distinguishing right from wrong at the time of the commission of the offense.” (Pen. Code, § 25(b); *People v. Skinner* (1985) 39 Cal.3d 765 [217 Cal.Rptr. 685, 704 P.2d 752].) In contrast, the standard for recommitment under Penal Code section 1026.5(b) is whether a defendant, “by reason of a mental disease, defect, or disorder [,] represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others.” (*People v. Superior Court, supra*, 233 Cal.App.3d at pp. 489–490; *People v. Wilder* (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 90, 99 [39 Cal.Rptr.2d 247].)

## **SECONDARY SOURCES**

- 1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Defenses, § 25.
- 3 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 73, *Defenses and Justifications*, §§ 73.01[3], 73.18 (Matthew Bender).



**3456. Initial Commitment of Mentally Disordered Offender as  
Condition of Parole (Pen. Code, § 2970)**

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The petition alleges that \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of respondent>* is a mentally disordered offender.

To prove this allegation, the People must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that at the time of (his/her) hearing before the Board of Parole Hearings:

1. (He/She) was convicted of \_\_\_\_\_ *<specify applicable offense(s) from Penal Code section 2962, subdivision (e)(2)>* and received a prison sentence for a fixed period of time;
2. (He/She) had a severe mental disorder;
3. The severe mental disorder was one of the causes of the crime for which (he/she) was sentenced to prison or was an aggravating factor in the commission of the crime;
4. (He/She) was treated for the severe mental disorder in a state or federal prison, a county jail, or a state hospital for 90 days or more within the year before (his/her) parole release date;
5. The severe mental disorder either was not in remission, or could not be kept in remission without treatment;

**AND**

6. Because of (his/her) severe mental disorder, (he/she) represented a substantial danger of physical harm to others.

*A severe mental disorder* is an illness or disease or condition that substantially impairs the person's thought, perception of reality, emotional process, or judgment; or that grossly impairs his or her behavior; or that demonstrates evidence of an acute brain syndrome for which prompt remission, in the absence of treatment, is unlikely. [It does not include (a personality or adjustment disorder[,]/ [or] epilepsy[,]/ [or] mental retardation or other developmental disabilities[,]/ [or] addiction to or abuse of intoxicating substances).]

*Remission* means that the external signs and symptoms of the severe mental disorder are controlled by either psychotropic medication or psychosocial support.

[A severe mental disorder cannot be *kept in remission without treatment* if during the year before the Board of Parole hearing, [on \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert date of hearing, if desired>*], the person:

*<Give one or more alternatives, as applicable>*

- [1. Was physically violent except in self-defense; [or]]
- [2. Made a serious threat of substantial physical harm upon the person of another so as to cause the target of the threat to reasonably fear for his or her safety or the safety of his or her immediate family; [or]]
- [3. Intentionally caused property damage; [or]]
- [4. Did not voluntarily follow the treatment plan.]

[A person has voluntarily followed the treatment plan if he or she has acted as a reasonable person would in following the treatment plan.]

[A *substantial danger of physical harm* does not require proof of a recent overt act.]

You will receive [a] verdict form[s] on which to indicate your finding whether the allegation that \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of respondent> is a mentally disordered offender is true or not true. To find the allegation true or not true, all of you must agree. You may not find it to be true unless all of you agree the People have proved it beyond a reasonable doubt.

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*New December 2008; Revised August 2014, September 2017, September 2020*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a  **sua sponte**  duty to instruct the jury about the basis for a finding that a respondent is a mentally disordered offender.

Give this instruction for an initial commitment as a condition of parole. For recommitments, give CALCRIM No. 3457, *Extension of Commitment as Mentally Disordered Offender*.

The court also  **must give**  CALCRIM No. 219, *Reasonable Doubt in Civil Proceedings*, CALCRIM No. 222, *Evidence*, CALCRIM No. 226, *Witnesses*, CALCRIM No. 3550, *Pre-Deliberation Instructions*, and any other relevant post-trial instructions. These instructions may need to be modified.

Case law provides no direct guidance about whether a finding of an enumerated act is necessary to show that the disorder cannot be kept in remission without treatment or whether some alternative showing, such as medical opinion or non-enumerated conduct evidencing lack of remission, would suffice. One published case has said in dictum that “the option of ‘cannot be kept in remission without treatment’ requires a further showing that the prisoner, within the preceding year, has engaged in violent or threatening conduct or has not voluntarily followed the treatment plan.” (*People v. Buffington* (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1161, fn. 4 [88 Cal.Rptr.2d 696]). The *Buffington* case involved a sexually violent predator.

**AUTHORITY**

- Elements and Definitions. Pen. Code, §§ 2962, 2966(b); *People v. Merfield* (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1071, 1075, fn. 2 [54 Cal.Rptr.3d 834].
- Unanimous Verdict, Burden of Proof. Pen. Code, § 2966(b); *Conservatorship of Roulet* (1979) 23 Cal.3d 219, 235 [152 Cal.Rptr. 425, 590 P.2d 1] [discussing conservatorship proceedings under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act and civil commitment proceedings in general].
- Institutions That May Fulfill the 90-Day Treatment Requirement. Pen. Code, § 2981.
- Treatment Must Be for Serious Mental Disorder Only. *People v. Sheek* (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1606, 1611 [19 Cal.Rptr.3d 737].
- Definition of Remission. Pen. Code, § 2962(a).
- Need for Treatment Established by One Enumerated Act. *People v. Burroughs* (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1407 [32 Cal.Rptr.3d 729].
- Evidence of Later Improvement Not Relevant. Pen. Code, § 2966(b); *People v. Tate* (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1678, 1683 [35 Cal.Rptr.2d 250].
- Board of Parole Hearings. Pen. Code, § 5075.
- This Instruction Cited As Authority With Implicit Approval. *People v. Harrison* (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1211, 1230 [164 Cal.Rptr.3d 167, 312 P.3d 88].
- Proof of Recent Overt Act Not Required. Pen. Code, § 2962(g).
- 90-Day Treatment Period Includes Extension Under Pen. Code, § 2963. *People v. Parker* (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 286, 289 [257 Cal.Rptr.3d 493].

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

3 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, §§ 763–767.

**3457. Extension of Commitment as Mentally Disordered Offender  
(Pen. Code, § 2970)**

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The petition alleges that \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of respondent> is a mentally disordered offender.

To prove this allegation, the People must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [at the time of (his/her) hearing before the Board of Prison Terms]:

1. (He/She) (has/had) a severe mental disorder;
2. The severe mental disorder (is/was) not in remission or (cannot/could not) be kept in remission without continued treatment;

AND

3. Because of (his/her) severe mental disorder, (he/she) (presently represents/represented) a substantial danger of physical harm to others.

*A severe mental disorder* is an illness or disease or condition that substantially impairs the person's thought, perception of reality, emotional process, or judgment; or that grossly impairs his or her behavior; or that demonstrates evidence of an acute brain syndrome for which prompt remission, in the absence of treatment, is unlikely. [It does not include (a personality or adjustment disorder[,]/ [or] epilepsy[,]/ [or] mental retardation or other developmental disabilities[,]/ [or] addiction to or abuse of intoxicating substances).]

*Remission* means that the external signs and symptoms of the severe mental disorder are controlled by either psychotropic medication or psychosocial support.

[A severe mental disorder cannot be *kept in remission without treatment* if, during the period of the year prior to \_\_\_\_\_ <insert the date the trial commenced> the person:

<Give one or more alternatives, as applicable.>

- [1. Was physically violent except in self-defense; [or]]
- [2. Made a serious threat of substantial physical harm upon the person of another so as to cause the target of the threat to reasonably fear for his or her safety or the safety of his or her immediate family; [or]]
- [3. Intentionally caused property damage; [or]]
- [4. Did not voluntarily follow the treatment plan.]

[A person has voluntarily followed the treatment plan if he or she has

acted as a reasonable person would in following the treatment plan.]

[A *substantial danger of physical harm* does not require proof of a recent overt act.]

You will receive [a] verdict form[s] on which to indicate your finding whether the allegation that \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of respondent> is a mentally disordered offender is true or not true. To find the allegation true or not true, all of you must agree. You may not find it to be true unless all of you agree the People have proved it beyond a reasonable doubt.

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*New December 2008; Revised September 2017, September 2020*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct the jury about the basis for a finding that a respondent is a mentally disordered offender.

Give this instruction for a successive commitment. For an initial commitment as a condition of parole, give CALCRIM No. 3456, *Initial Commitment of Mentally Disordered Offender as Condition of Parole*.

The court also **must give** CALCRIM No. 219, *Reasonable Doubt in Civil Proceedings*, CALCRIM No. 222, *Evidence*, CALCRIM No. 226, *Witnesses*, CALCRIM No. 3550, *Pre-Deliberation Instructions*, and any other relevant post-trial instructions. These instructions may need to be modified.

Give the bracketed language in the sentence beginning with “To prove this allegation” and use the past tense for an on-parole recommitment pursuant to Penal Code section 2966. For a recommitment after the parole period pursuant to Penal Code sections 2970 and 2972, omit the bracketed phrase and use the present tense.

Case law provides no direct guidance about whether a finding of an enumerated act is necessary to show that the disorder cannot be kept in remission without treatment or whether some alternative showing, such as medical opinion or non-enumerated conduct evidencing lack of remission, would suffice. One published case has said in dictum that “the option of ‘cannot be kept in remission without treatment’ requires a further showing that the prisoner, within the preceding year, has engaged in violent or threatening conduct or has not voluntarily followed the treatment plan.” (*People v. Buffington* (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1161, fn. 4 [88 Cal.Rptr.2d 696]). The *Buffington* case involved a sexually violent predator.

The committee found no case law addressing the issue of whether or not instruction about an affirmative obligation to provide treatment exists.

## AUTHORITY

- Elements and Definitions. Pen. Code, §§ 2966, 2970, 2972; *People v. Merfield* (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1071, 1075, fn. 2 [54 Cal.Rptr.3d 834].

- Unanimous Verdict, Burden of Proof. Pen. Code, § 2972(a); *Conservatorship of Roulet* (1979) 23 Cal.3d 219, 235 [152 Cal.Rptr. 425, 590 P.2d 1] [discussing conservatorship proceedings under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act and civil commitment proceedings in general].
- Treatment Must Be for Serious Mental Disorder Only. *People v. Sheek* (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1606, 1611 [19 Cal.Rptr.3d 737].
- Definition of Remission. Pen. Code, § 2962(a).
- Recommitment Must Be for the Same Disorder That Was Basis For Initial Commitment. *People v. Torfason* (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 1062, 1067–68 [252 Cal.Rptr.3d 11]; *People v. Garcia* (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 558, 565 [25 Cal.Rptr.3d 660].
- Proof of Recent Overt Act Not Required. Pen. Code, § 2962(g).
- Redesignation of MDO-Qualifying Conviction to Misdemeanor Under Penal Code Section 1170.18 Does Not Bar Recommitment. *People v. Foster* (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1202, 1211 [251 Cal.Rptr.3d 312, 447 P.3d 228].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

3 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, § 767.

**3458. Extension of Commitment to Division of Juvenile Facilities  
(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 1800)**

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The petition alleges that \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of respondent> is physically dangerous to the public because of a mental or physical deficiency, disorder, or abnormality that causes (him/her) to have serious difficulty controlling (his/her) dangerous behavior.

To prove this petition is true, the People must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that:

1. (He/She) has a mental or physical deficiency, disorder, or abnormality;
2. The mental or physical deficiency, disorder, or abnormality causes (him/her) serious difficulty in controlling (his/her) dangerous behavior;

AND

3. Because of (his/her) mental or physical deficiency, disorder, or abnormality, (he/she) would be physically dangerous to the public if released from custody.

You will receive [a] verdict form[s] on which to indicate your finding whether the petition is true or not true. To find the petition true or not true, all of you must agree. You may not find it to be true unless all of you agree the People have proved it beyond a reasonable doubt.

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*New December 2008*

**BENCH NOTES**

***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct the jury about the basis for a finding that a respondent is physically dangerous to the public.

The court also **must give** CALCRIM No. 219, *Reasonable Doubt in Civil Proceedings*, CALCRIM No. 222, *Evidence*, CALCRIM No. 226, *Witnesses*, CALCRIM No. 3550, *Pre-Deliberation Instructions*, and any other relevant post-trial instructions. These instructions may need to be modified.

**AUTHORITY**

- Elements and Definitions. Welf. & Inst. Code, § 1800 et seq.
- Unanimous Verdict, Burden of Proof. Welf. & Inst. Code, § 1801.5; *Conservatorship of Roulet* (1979) 23 Cal.3d 219, 235 [152 Cal.Rptr. 425, 590 P.2d 1] [discussing conservatorship proceedings under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act and civil commitment proceedings in general].

- Serious Difficulty in Controlling Dangerous Behavior. *In re Lemanuel C.* (2007) 41 Cal.4th 33 [58 Cal.Rptr.3d 597, 158 P.3d 148]; *In re Howard N.* (2005) 35 Cal.4th 117 [24 Cal.Rptr.3d 866, 106 P.3d 305].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

10 Witkin, Summary of California Law (10th ed. 2005) Parent and Child, §§ 966–977.

3 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, § 97.

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 125, *Postdisposition Proceedings*, § 125.03 (Matthew Bender).

**3459–3469. Reserved for Future Use**



## D. SELF-DEFENSE AND DEFENSE OF ANOTHER

### 3470. Right to Self-Defense or Defense of Another (Non-Homicide)

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Self-defense is a defense to \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert list of pertinent crimes charged>*. The defendant is not guilty of (that/those crime[s]) if (he/she) used force against the other person in lawful (self-defense/ [or] defense of another). The defendant acted in lawful (self-defense/ [or] defense of another) if:

1. The defendant reasonably believed that (he/she/ [or] someone else/ [or] \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert name of third party>*) was in imminent danger of suffering bodily injury [or was in imminent danger of being touched unlawfully];
2. The defendant reasonably believed that the immediate use of force was necessary to defend against that danger;

AND

3. The defendant used no more force than was reasonably necessary to defend against that danger.

Belief in future harm is not sufficient, no matter how great or how likely the harm is believed to be. The defendant must have believed there was (imminent danger of bodily injury to (himself/herself/ [or] someone else)/ [or] an imminent danger that (he/she/[or] someone else) would be touched unlawfully). Defendant's belief must have been reasonable and (he/she) must have acted because of that belief. The defendant is only entitled to use that amount of force that a reasonable person would believe is necessary in the same situation. If the defendant used more force than was reasonable, the defendant did not act in lawful (self-defense/ [or] defense of another).

When deciding whether the defendant's beliefs were reasonable, consider all the circumstances as they were known to and appeared to the defendant and consider what a reasonable person in a similar situation with similar knowledge would have believed. If the defendant's beliefs were reasonable, the danger does not need to have actually existed.

[The slightest touching can be unlawful if it is done in a rude or angry way. Making contact with another person, including through his or her clothing, is enough. The touching does not have to cause pain or injury of any kind.]

[The defendant's belief that (he/she/ [or] someone else) was threatened may be reasonable even if (he/she) relied on information that was not true. However, the defendant must actually and reasonably have believed that the information was true.]

[If you find that \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of victim> threatened or harmed the defendant [or others] in the past, you may consider that information in deciding whether the defendant's conduct and beliefs were reasonable.]

[If you find that the defendant knew that \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of victim> had threatened or harmed others in the past, you may consider that information in deciding whether the defendant's conduct and beliefs were reasonable.]

[Someone who has been threatened or harmed by a person in the past is justified in acting more quickly or taking greater self-defense measures against that person.]

[If you find that the defendant received a threat from someone else that (he/she) reasonably associated with \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of victim>, you may consider that threat in deciding whether the defendant was justified in acting in (self-defense/ [or] defense of another).]

[A defendant is not required to retreat. He or she is entitled to stand his or her ground and defend himself or herself and, if reasonably necessary, to pursue an assailant until the danger of (death/bodily injury/ \_\_\_\_\_ <insert crime>) has passed. This is so even if safety could have been achieved by retreating.]

The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in lawful (self-defense/ [or] defense of another). If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert crime(s) charged>.

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*New January 2006; Revised June 2007, April 2008, August 2009, February 2012, August 2012*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court must instruct on a defense when the defendant requests it and there is substantial evidence supporting the defense. The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on a defense if there is substantial evidence supporting it and either the defendant is relying on it or it is not inconsistent with the defendant's theory of the case. When the court concludes that the defense is supported by substantial evidence and is inconsistent with the defendant's theory of the case, however, it should ascertain whether defendant wishes instruction on this alternate theory. (*People v. Gonzales* (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 382, 389–390 [88 Cal.Rptr.2d 111]; *People v. Breverman* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 157 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094].)

Substantial evidence means evidence of a defense, which, if believed, would be sufficient for a reasonable jury to find a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt. (*People v. Salas* (2006) 37 Cal.4th 967, 982–983 [38 Cal.Rptr.3d 624, 127 P.3d 40].)

On defense request and when supported by sufficient evidence, the court must instruct that the jury may consider the effect of “antecedent threats and assaults against the defendant on the reasonableness of defendant’s conduct.” (*People v. Garvin* (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 484, 488 [1 Cal.Rptr.3d 774].) The court must also instruct that the jury may consider previous threats or assaults by the aggressor against someone else or threats received by the defendant from a third party that the defendant reasonably associated with the aggressor. (See *People v. Pena* (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 462, 475 [198 Cal.Rptr. 819]; *People v. Minifie* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1055, 1065, 1068 [56 Cal.Rptr.2d 133, 920 P.2d 1337]; see also CALCRIM No. 505, *Justifiable Homicide: Self-Defense or Defense of Another.*)

### ***Related Instructions***

CALCRIM No. 505, *Justifiable Homicide: Self-Defense or Defense of Another.*

CALCRIM Nos. 3471–3477, Defense Instructions: Defense of Self, Another, Property.

CALCRIM No. 851, *Testimony on Intimate Partner Battering and Its Effects: Offered by the Defense.*

CALCRIM No. 2514, *Possession of Firearm by Person Prohibited by Statute: Self-Defense.*

## **AUTHORITY**

- Instructional Requirements. *People v. Moody* (1943) 62 Cal.App.2d 18 [143 P.2d 978]; *People v. Myers* (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 328, 335, 336 [71 Cal.Rptr.2d 518].
- Lawful Resistance. Pen. Code, §§ 692, 693, 694; Civ. Code, § 50; see also *People v. Myers* (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 328, 335 [71 Cal.Rptr.2d 518].
- Burden of Proof. Pen. Code, § 189.5; *People v. Banks* (1976) 67 Cal.App.3d 379, 383–384 [137 Cal.Rptr. 652].
- Elements. *People v. Humphrey* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073, 1082 [56 Cal.Rptr.2d 142, 921 P.2d 1].
- Imminence. *People v. Aris* (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1178, 1187 [264 Cal.Rptr. 167] (overruled on other grounds in *People v. Humphrey* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073, 1089 [56 Cal.Rptr.2d 142, 921 P.2d 1]).
- No Duty to Retreat. *People v. Hughes* (1951) 107 Cal.App.2d 487, 494 [237 P.2d 64]; *People v. Hatchett* (1942) 56 Cal.App.2d 20, 22 [132 P.2d 51].
- Temporary Possession of Firearm by Felon in Self-Defense. *People v. King* (1978) 22 Cal.3d 12, 24 [148 Cal.Rptr. 409, 582 P.2d 1000].
- Duty to Retreat Limited to Felon in Possession Cases. *People v. Rhodes* (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1343–1346 [29 Cal.Rptr.3d 226].
- Inmate Self-Defense. *People v. Saavedra* (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 561 [67 Cal.Rptr.3d 403].
- Reasonable Belief. *People v. Humphrey* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073, 1082 [56 P.2d 1007]

Cal.Rptr.2d 142, 921 P.2d 1]; *People v. Clark* (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 371, 377 [181 Cal.Rptr. 682].

## RELATED ISSUES

### ***Brandishing Weapon in Defense of Another***

The defense of others is a defense to a charge of brandishing a weapon under Penal Code section 417(a)(2). (*People v. Kirk* (1986) 192 Cal.App.3d Supp. 15, 19 [238 Cal.Rptr. 42].)

### ***Reasonable Person Standard Not Modified by Evidence of Mental Impairment***

In *People v. Jefferson* (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 508, 519 [14 Cal.Rptr.3d 473], the court rejected the argument that the reasonable person standard for self-defense should be the standard of a mentally ill person like the defendant. “The common law does not take account of a person’s mental capacity when determining whether he has acted as the reasonable person would have acted. The law holds ‘the mentally deranged or insane defendant accountable for his negligence as if the person were a normal, prudent person.’ (Prosser & Keeton, Torts (5th ed. 1984) § 32, p. 177.)” (*Ibid.*; see also Rest.2d Torts, § 283B.)

See also the Related Issues section of CALCRIM No. 505, *Justifiable Homicide: Self-Defense or Defense of Another*.

## SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Defenses, §§ 68, 71–73, 86–87.

3 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 73, *Defenses and Justifications*, §§ 73.11, 73.12 (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 124, *Jurisdiction and Disposition Hearings*, § 124.04 (Matthew Bender).

## 3471. Right to Self-Defense: Mutual Combat or Initial Aggressor

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A person who (engages in mutual combat/ [or who] starts a fight) has a right to self-defense only if:

1. (He/She) actually and in good faith tried to stop fighting;

[AND]

2. (He/She) indicated, by word or by conduct, to (his/her) opponent, in a way that a reasonable person would understand, that (he/she) wanted to stop fighting and that (he/she) had stopped fighting(;/.)

<Give element 3 in cases of mutual combat.>

[AND]

3. (He/She) gave (his/her) opponent a chance to stop fighting.]

If the defendant meets these requirements, (he/she) then had a right to self-defense if the opponent continued to fight.

[However, if the defendant used only non-deadly force, and the opponent responded with such sudden and deadly force that the defendant could not withdraw from the fight, then the defendant had the right to defend (himself/herself) with deadly force and was not required to try to stop fighting(/ or) communicate the desire to stop to the opponent[, or give the opponent a chance to stop fighting].]

[A fight is *mutual combat* when it began or continued by mutual consent or agreement. That agreement may be expressly stated or implied and must occur before the claim to self-defense arose.]

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*New January 2006; Revised April 2008, December 2008, April 2011, February 2013*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court must instruct on a defense when the defendant requests it and there is substantial evidence supporting the defense. The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on a defense if there is substantial evidence supporting it and either the defendant is relying on it or it is not inconsistent with the defendant's theory of the case.

Give CALCRIM No. 3470, *Right to Self-Defense or Defense of Another (Non-Homicide)*, together with this instruction.

When the court concludes that the defense is supported by substantial evidence and is inconsistent with the defendant's theory of the case, however, it should ascertain whether defendant wishes instruction on this alternate theory. (*People v. Gonzales*

(1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 382, 389–390 [88 Cal.Rptr.2d 111]; *People v. Breverman* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 157 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094].)

Substantial evidence means evidence of a defense, which, if believed, would be sufficient for a reasonable jury to find a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt. (*People v. Salas* (2006) 37 Cal.4th 967, 982–983 [38 Cal.Rptr.3d 624, 127 P.3d 40].)

Give bracketed element 3 if the person claiming self-defense was engaged in mutual combat.

If the defendant started the fight using non-deadly force and the opponent suddenly escalates to deadly force, the defendant may defend himself or herself using deadly force. (See *People v. Quach* (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 294, 301–302 [10 Cal.Rptr.3d 196]; *People v. Sawyer* (1967) 256 Cal.App.2d 66, 75 [63 Cal.Rptr. 749]; *People v. Hecker* (1895) 109 Cal. 451, 464 [42 P. 307].) In such cases, give the bracketed sentence that begins with “However, if the defendant . . .”.

If the defendant was the initial aggressor and is charged with homicide, always give CALCRIM No. 505, *Justifiable Homicide: Self-Defense or Defense of Another*, in conjunction with this instruction.

### AUTHORITY

- Instructional Requirements. See Pen. Code, § 197, subd. 3; *People v. Button* (1895) 106 Cal. 628, 633 [39 P. 1073]; *People v. Crandell* (1988) 46 Cal.3d 833, 871–872 [251 Cal.Rptr. 227, 760 P.2d 423]; *People v. Sawyer* (1967) 256 Cal.App.2d 66, 75 [63 Cal.Rptr. 749].
- Escalation to Deadly Force. *People v. Quach* (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 294, 301–302 [10 Cal.Rptr.3d 196]; *People v. Sawyer* (1967) 256 Cal.App.2d 66, 75 [63 Cal.Rptr. 749]; *People v. Hecker* (1895) 109 Cal. 451, 464 [42 P. 307]; *People v. Anderson* (1922) 57 Cal.App. 721, 727 [208 P. 204].
- Definition of Mutual Combat. *People v. Ross* (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1045 [66 Cal.Rptr.3d 438].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, California. Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Defenses, §§ 68, 78–80.

3 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 73, *Defenses and Justifications*, § 73.11[2][a] (Matthew Bender).

## 3472. Right to Self-Defense: May Not Be Contrived

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**A person does not have the right to self-defense if he or she provokes a fight or quarrel with the intent to create an excuse to use force.**

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2016, March 2017*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court may give this instruction on request when supported by the evidence. (*People v. Olguin* (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1355, 1381 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d 596].) The California Supreme Court has held that language in CALJIC No. 5.55, which is similar to this instruction, correctly states California law on self-defense and imperfect self-defense. (*People v. Enraca* (2012) 53 Cal.4th 735, 761–762 [269 P.3d 543]; *People v. Hinshaw* (1924) 194 Cal. 1, 26 [227 P. 156].) This instruction may require modification in the rare case in which a defendant intends to provoke only a non-deadly confrontation and the victim responds with deadly force. (*People v. Eulian*, (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1324, 1334 [203 Cal.Rptr.3d 101]; see also *People v. Ramirez* (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 940, 952 [183 Cal.Rptr.3d 267].)

### AUTHORITY

- Instructional Requirements. *People v. Olguin* (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1355, 1381 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d 596]; *Fraguglia v. Sala* (1936) 17 Cal.App.2d 738, 743–744 [62 P.2d 783]; *People v. Hinshaw* (1924) 194 Cal. 1, 26 [227 P. 156].
- This Instruction Generally a Correct Statement of Law. *People v. Eulian*, (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1324, 1334 [203 Cal.Rptr.3d 101].)

### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Defenses, §§ 75, 78.  
3 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 73, *Defenses and Justifications*, § 73.11[2][a] (Matthew Bender).

### 3473. Reserved for Future Use

## 3474. Danger No Longer Exists or Attacker Disabled

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The right to use force in (self-defense/ [or] defense of another) continues only as long as the danger exists or reasonably appears to exist. [When the attacker (withdraws/ [or] no longer appears capable of inflicting any injury), then the right to use force ends.]

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*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court may give this instruction on request when supported by the evidence. (See *People v. Martin* (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 1000, 1010 [162 Cal.Rptr. 133].)

### AUTHORITY

- Instructional Requirements. See *People v. Keys* (1944) 62 Cal.App.2d 903, 916 [145 P.2d 589]; *People v. Perez* (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 232, 236 [90 Cal.Rptr. 521].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Defenses, § 81.  
3 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 73, *Defenses and Justifications*, § 73.11[1][b] (Matthew Bender).



## 3475. Right to Eject Trespasser From Real Property

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The (owner/lawful occupant) of a (home/property) may request that a trespasser leave the (home/property). If the trespasser does not leave within a reasonable time and it would appear to a reasonable person that the trespasser poses a threat to (the (home/property)/ [or] the (owner/ [or] occupants), the (owner/lawful occupant) may use reasonable force to make the trespasser leave.

*Reasonable force* means the amount of force that a reasonable person in the same situation would believe is necessary to make the trespasser leave.

[If the trespasser resists, the (owner/lawful occupant) may increase the amount of force he or she uses in proportion to the force used by the trespasser and the threat the trespasser poses to the property.]

When deciding whether the defendant used reasonable force, consider all the circumstances as they were known to and appeared to the defendant and consider what a reasonable person in a similar situation with similar knowledge would have believed. If the defendant's beliefs were reasonable, the danger does not need to have actually existed.

The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant used more force than was reasonable. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert crime>.

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*New January 2006; Revised April 2008*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court must instruct on a defense when the defendant requests it and there is substantial evidence supporting the defense. The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on a defense if there is substantial evidence supporting it and either the defendant is relying on it or it is not inconsistent with the defendant's theory of the case.

When the court concludes that the defense is supported by substantial evidence and is inconsistent with the defendant's theory of the case, however, it should ascertain whether defendant wishes instruction on this alternate theory. (*People v. Gonzales* (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 382, 389–390 [88 Cal.Rptr.2d 111]; *People v. Breverman* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 157 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094].)

Substantial evidence means evidence of a defense, which, if believed, would be

sufficient for a reasonable jury to find a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt. (*People v. Salas* (2006) 37 Cal.4th 967, 982–983 [38 Cal.Rptr.3d 624, 127 P.3d 40].)

***Related Instructions***

CALCRIM No. 3476, *Right to Defend Real or Personal Property*.

CALCRIM No. 3477, *Presumption That Resident Was Reasonably Afraid of Death or Great Bodily Injury*.

CALCRIM No. 506, *Justifiable Homicide: Defending Against Harm to Person Within Home or on Property*.

**AUTHORITY**

- Instructional Requirements. See *People v. Corlett* (1944) 67 Cal.App.2d 33, 51–52 [153 P.2d 595]; *People v. Teixeira* (1899) 123 Cal. 297, 298–299 [55 P. 988]; Civ. Code, § 50.
- Burden of Proof. See *Boyer v. Waples* (1962) 206 Cal.App.2d 725, 727 [24 Cal.Rptr. 192] [civil action].

**RELATED ISSUES**

***Negating Self-Defense Claim***

The right to defend one's home may negate a defendant's claim of imperfect self-defense, as held in *People v. Watie* (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 866, 878 [124 Cal.Rptr.2d 258]:

[T]he right of a victim to defend himself and his property is a relevant consideration in determining whether a defendant may prevail when he seeks to negate malice aforethought by asserting the affirmative defense of imperfect self-defense . . . [¶] . . . If [the victim] had a right to use force to defend himself in his home, then defendant had no right of self-defense, imperfect, or otherwise.

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Defenses, § 88.

3 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 73, *Defenses and Justifications*, §§ 73.11[1], 73.13[2] (Matthew Bender).

## 3476. Right to Defend Real or Personal Property

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The owner [or possessor] of (real/ [or] personal) property may use reasonable force to protect that property from imminent harm. [A person may also use reasonable force to protect the property of a (family member/guest/master/servant/ward) from immediate harm.]

*Reasonable force* means the amount of force that a reasonable person in the same situation would believe is necessary to protect the property from imminent harm.

When deciding whether the defendant used reasonable force, consider all the circumstances as they were known to and appeared to the defendant and consider what a reasonable person in a similar situation with similar knowledge would have believed. If the defendant's beliefs were reasonable, the danger does not need to have actually existed.

The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant used more force than was reasonable to protect property from imminent harm. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert crime>.

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*New January 2006; Revised April 2008*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court must instruct on a defense when the defendant requests it and there is substantial evidence supporting the defense. The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on a defense if there is substantial evidence supporting it and either the defendant is relying on it or it is not inconsistent with the defendant's theory of the case.

When the court concludes that the defense is supported by substantial evidence and is inconsistent with the defendant's theory of the case, however, it should ascertain whether defendant wishes instruction on this alternate theory. (*People v. Gonzales* (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 382, 389–390 [88 Cal.Rptr.2d 111]; *People v. Breverman* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 157 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094].)

Substantial evidence means evidence of a defense, which, if believed, would be sufficient for a reasonable jury to find a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt. (*People v. Salas* (2006) 37 Cal.4th 967, 982–983 [38 Cal.Rptr.3d 624, 127 P.3d 40].)

#### *Related Instructions*

CALCRIM No. 3475, *Right to Eject Trespasser From Real Property*.

CALCRIM No. 3477, *Presumption That Resident Was Reasonably Afraid of Death or Great Bodily Injury*.

CALCRIM No. 506, *Justifiable Homicide: Defending Against Harm to Person Within Home or on Property*.

**AUTHORITY**

- Instructional Requirements. See Civ. Code, § 50; *Boyer v. Waples* (1962) 206 Cal.App.2d 725, 727 [24 Cal.Rptr. 192].
- Burden of Proof. See *Boyer v. Waples* (1962) 206 Cal.App.2d 725, 727 [24 Cal.Rptr. 192] [civil action].

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

- 1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Defenses, § 88.
- 3 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 73, *Defenses and Justifications*, § 73.13 (Matthew Bender).

### 3477. Presumption That Resident Was Reasonably Afraid of Death or Great Bodily Injury (Pen. Code, § 198.5)

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The law presumes that the defendant reasonably feared imminent death or great bodily injury to (himself/herself)[, or to a member of (his/her) family or household,] if:

1. An intruder unlawfully and forcibly (entered/ [or] was entering) the defendant's home;
2. The defendant knew [or reasonably believed] that an intruder unlawfully and forcibly (entered/ [or] was entering) the defendant's home;
3. The intruder was not a member of the defendant's household or family;

AND

4. The defendant used force intended to or likely to cause death or great bodily injury to the intruder inside the home.

[*Great bodily injury* means significant or substantial physical injury. It is an injury that is greater than minor or moderate harm.]

The People have the burden of overcoming this presumption. This means that the People must prove that the defendant did not have a reasonable fear of imminent death or injury to (himself/herself)[, or to a member of his or her family or household,] when (he/she) used force against the intruder. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant reasonably feared death or injury to (himself/herself)[, or to a member of his or her family or household].

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*New January 2006; Revised March 2017, September 2020*

#### BENCH NOTES

##### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on presumptions relevant to the issues of the case. (See *People v. Hood* (1969) 1 Cal.3d 444, 449 [82 Cal.Rptr. 618, 462 P.2d 370]; but see *People v. Silvey* (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1320, 1327 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 681] [presumption not relevant because defendant was not a resident]; *People v. Owen* (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 996, 1005 [277 Cal.Rptr. 341] [jury was otherwise adequately instructed on pertinent law].)

Give this instruction when there is evidence that a resident had a reasonable expectation of protection against unwanted intruders. *People v. Grays* (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 679, 687–688 [202 Cal.Rptr.3d 288].

The second sentence of the great bodily injury definition could result in error if the

prosecution improperly argues great bodily injury may be shown by greater than minor injury alone. (Compare *People v. Medellin* (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 519, 533–535 [258 Cal.Rptr.3d 867] [the definition was reasonably susceptible to prosecutor’s erroneous argument that the injury need only be greater than minor] with *People v. Quinonez* (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 457, 466 [260 Cal.Rptr.3d 86] [upholding instructions containing great bodily injury definition as written].)

### AUTHORITY

- Instructional Requirements. Pen. Code, § 198.5; *People v. Brown* (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1489, 1494–1495 [8 Cal.Rptr.2d 513].
- Rebuttable Presumptions Affecting Burden of Proof. Evid. Code, §§ 601, 604, 606.
- Definition of Residence. *People v. Grays* (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 679, 687–688 [202 Cal.Rptr.3d 288].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

1 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Defenses, § 76.  
3 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 73, *Defenses and Justifications*, §§ 73.11[1], 73.13 (Matthew Bender).

**3478–3499. Reserved for Future Use**

## **POST-TRIAL: CONCLUDING**

### **A. UNANIMITY**

- 3500. Unanimity
- 3501. Unanimity: When Generic Testimony of Offense Presented
- 3502. Unanimity: When Prosecution Elects One Act Among Many
- 3503–3514. Reserved for Future Use

### **B. MULTIPLE COUNTS AND COMPLETION OF VERDICT FORMS**

- 3515. Multiple Counts: Separate Offenses (Pen. Code, § 954)
- 3516. Multiple Counts: Alternative Charges for One Event—Dual Conviction Prohibited
- 3517. Deliberations and Completion of Verdict Forms: For Use When Lesser Included Offenses and Greater Crimes Are Not Separately Charged and the Jury Receives Guilty and Not Guilty Verdict Forms for Greater and Lesser Offenses (Non-Homicide)
- 3518. Deliberations and Completion of Verdict Forms: For Use When Lesser Included Offenses and Greater Crimes Are Not Separately Charged and Jury Is Given Only One Not Guilty Verdict Form for Each Count (Non-Homicide)
- 3519. Deliberations and Completion of Verdict Forms: Lesser Offenses—For Use When Lesser Included Offenses and Greater Crimes Are Separately Charged (Non-Homicide)
- 3520–3529. Reserved for Future Use

### **C. ADMONITIONS**

- 3530. Judge’s Comment on the Evidence (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 10; Pen. Code, §§ 1127, 1093(f))
- 3531. Service Provider for Juror With Disability (Code Civ. Proc., § 224)
- 3532–3549. Reserved for Future Use

### **D. CONCLUDING INSTRUCTION ON SUBMISSION TO JURY**

- 3550. Pre-Deliberation Instructions
- 3551. Further Instruction About Deliberations
- 3552–3574. Reserved for Future Use

### **E. ALTERNATES**

- 3575. Substitution of Alternate Juror: During Deliberations (Pen. Code, § 1089)
- 3576. Substitution of Alternate Juror in Capital Case: After Guilt Determination, Before Submission of Penalty Phase to Jury (Pen. Code, § 1089)
- 3577. Instructions to Alternate on Submission of Case to Jury
- 3578–3589. Reserved for Future Use

**F. FINAL INSTRUCTION ON DISCHARGE OF JURY**

3590. Final Instruction on Discharge of Jury

3591–3599. Reserved for Future Use



## A. UNANIMITY

### 3500. Unanimity

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The defendant is charged with \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of alleged offense> [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] [sometime during the period of \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_ ].

The People have presented evidence of more than one act to prove that the defendant committed this offense. You must not find the defendant guilty unless you all agree that the People have proved that the defendant committed at least one of these acts and you all agree on which act (he/she) committed.

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*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give a unanimity instruction if the prosecution presents evidence of multiple acts to prove a single count. (*People v. Russo* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1124, 1132 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 436, 25 P.3d 641]; *People v. Diedrich* (1982) 31 Cal.3d 263, 282 [182 Cal.Rptr. 354, 643 P.2d 971]; *People v. Madden* (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 212, 218 [171 Cal.Rptr. 897]; *People v. Alva* (1979) 90 Cal.App.3d 418, 426 [153 Cal.Rptr. 644].) The committee has addressed unanimity in those instructions where the issue is most likely to arise. If a case raises a unanimity issue and other instructions do not adequately cover the point, give this instruction.

The Supreme Court has stated the rule as follows: “[W]hen the evidence suggests more than one discrete crime, either the prosecution must elect among the crimes or the court must require the jury to agree on the same criminal act. On the other hand, where the evidence shows only a single discrete crime but leaves room for disagreement as to exactly how that crime was committed or what the defendant’s precise role was, the jury need not unanimously agree on the basis or, as the cases often put it, the ‘theory’ whereby the defendant is guilty.” (*People v. Russo, supra*, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1132; see also *People v. Sutherland* (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 602, 618–619 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 752] [unanimity required in forgery case where prosecution alleges forgery of multiple documents under single count, but not where defendant charged with forging and uttering single document].)

The court has no sua sponte duty to instruct on unanimity if the offense constitutes a “continuous course of conduct.” (*People v. Maury* (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 423 [133 Cal.Rptr.2d 561, 68 P.3d 1]; *People v. Madden, supra*, 116 Cal.App.3d at p. 218.) “This exception arises in two contexts. The first is when the acts are so closely connected that they form part of one and the same transaction, and thus one

offense. The second is when . . . the statute contemplates a continuous course of conduct of a series of acts over a period of time.” (*People v. Napoles* (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 108, 115–116 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 777], quoting *People v. Avina* (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1309 [18 Cal.Rptr.2d 511]; internal quotation marks and citations omitted.) The court should carefully examine the statute under which the defendant is charged, the pleadings, and the evidence presented to determine whether the offense constitutes a continuous course of conduct. (*Ibid.*) [noting that child abuse may be a continuous course of conduct or a single, isolated incident]; see also *People v. Madden, supra*, 116 Cal.App.3d at p. 218 [distinguishing “continuous crime spree” and finding repeated sexual offenses did not constitute continuous course of conduct]; *People v. Wolfe* (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 177, 185 [7 Cal.Rptr.3d 483] [unanimity instruction required where acts fragmented in time or space]; *People v. Rae* (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 116, 123 [125 Cal.Rptr.2d 312] [elder abuse offense did constitute continuous course of conduct]; *People v. Cortez* (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1202, 1209 [8 Cal.Rptr.2d 580] [kidnapping is a continuous course of conduct].)

In addition, “where the acts were substantially identical in nature, so that any juror believing one act took place would inexorably believe all acts took place, the [unanimity] instruction is not necessary to the jury’s understanding of the case.” (*People v. Beardslee* (1991) 53 Cal.3d 68, 93 [279 Cal.Rptr. 276, 806 P.2d 1311]; see also *People v. Champion* (1995) 9 Cal.4th 879, 932 [39 Cal.Rptr.2d 547, 891 P.2d 93], questioned on unrelated issue in *People v. Ray* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 313, 369, fn. 2 [52 Cal.Rptr.2d 296, 914 P.2d 846].) However, the court should use caution in applying this exception. (See *People v. Brown* (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1493, 1500–1501 [50 Cal.Rptr.2d 407]; *People v. Wolfe, supra*, 114 Cal.App.4th at p. 185.) The better practice is to provide a unanimity instruction to the jury when evidence has been admitted of separate acts that could form the basis for one charge.

The jury need not unanimously agree on whether the defendant was an aider and abettor or a direct perpetrator of the offense. (*People v. Jenkins* (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 1024–1026 [95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044]; *People v. Beardslee, supra*, 53 Cal.3d at p. 93.)

The jury need not unanimously agree on which provocative act the defendant committed when prosecution is pursuing a provocative-act theory of murder. (*People v. Briscoe* (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 568, 591 [112 Cal.Rptr.2d 401].)

In a conspiracy case, the jury need not unanimously agree on what overt act was committed or who was part of the conspiracy. (*People v. Russo, supra*, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 1135–1136.) However, if a conspiracy case involves an issue about the statute of limitations or evidence of withdrawal by the defendant, a unanimity instruction may be required. (*Id.* at p. 1136, fn. 2.)

In a child molestation case, if the evidence has been presented in the form of “generic testimony” about recurring events without specific dates and times, the court should determine whether it is more appropriate to give CALCRIM No. 3501, *Unanimity: When Generic Testimony of Offense Presented*. (*People v. Jones* (1990)

51 Cal.3d 294, 321–322 [270 Cal.Rptr. 611, 792 P.2d 643].) See discussion below in Related Issues section.

If the prosecution elects one act among many as the basis for the offense, do not give this instruction. (*People v. Melhado* (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1529, 1536 [70 Cal.Rptr.2d 878].) Give CALCRIM No. 3502, *Unanimity: When Prosecution Elects One Act Among Many*.

Give the bracketed “sometime during the period” if the information alleges that the charged event happened during a period of time rather than on a single date.

### AUTHORITY

- Unanimity Required. Cal. Const., art. I, § 16; *People v. Russo* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1124, 1132 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 436, 25 P.3d 641].
- Instruction Required If Multiple Acts Could Support Single Charge. *People v. Russo* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1124, 1132 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 436, 25 P.3d 641]; *People v. Diedrich* (1982) 31 Cal.3d 263, 282 [182 Cal.Rptr. 354, 643 P.2d 971]; *People v. Madden* (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 212, 218 [171 Cal.Rptr. 897]; *People v. Alva* (1979) 90 Cal.App.3d 418, 426 [153 Cal.Rptr. 644].
- Continuous Course of Conduct. *People v. Maury* (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 423 [133 Cal.Rptr.2d 561, 68 P.3d 1]; *People v. Napoles* (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 108, 115–116 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 777]; *People v. Madden* (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 212, 218 [171 Cal.Rptr. 897]; *People v. Wolfe* (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 177, 185 [7 Cal.Rptr.3d 483].
- Acts Substantially Identical in Nature. *People v. Beardslee* (1991) 53 Cal.3d 68, 93 [279 Cal.Rptr. 276, 806 P.2d 1311]; see also *People v. Champion* (1995) 9 Cal.4th 879, 932 [39 Cal.Rptr.2d 547, 891 P.2d 93], questioned on unrelated issue in *People v. Ray* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 313, 369, fn. 2 [52 Cal.Rptr.2d 296, 914 P.2d 846].
- Aider and Abettor v. Direct Perpetrator. *People v. Jenkins* (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 1024–1026 [95 Cal.Rptr. 2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044]; *People v. Beardslee* (1991) 53 Cal.3d 68, 93 [279 Cal.Rptr. 276, 806 P.2d 1311].
- Provocative-Act Murder. *People v. Briscoe* (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 568, 591 [112 Cal.Rptr.2d 401].
- Conspiracy. *People v. Russo* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1124, 1135–1136 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 436, 25 P.3d 641].
- Generic Testimony. *People v. Jones* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 321–322 [270 Cal.Rptr. 611, 792 P.2d 643].
- Must Instruct on Election by Prosecutor. *People v. Melhado* (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1529, 1536 [70 Cal.Rptr.2d 878].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Cases Based on Generic Testimony*

In *People v. Jones* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294 [270 Cal.Rptr. 611, 792 P.2d 643], the Court analyzed the due process concerns raised when a witness testifies to

numerous, repeated acts of child molestation over a period of time, but the witness is unable to give specifics on time and date. The Court held that prosecutions based on this type of evidence satisfied due process where the testimony met specified criteria. (*Id.* at p. 316.) The Court then addressed what type of unanimity instruction is required in such cases:

In a case in which the evidence indicates the jurors might disagree as to the particular act defendant committed, the standard unanimity instruction should be given. (See, e.g., *People v. Gordon* [(1985)] 165 Cal. App.3d [839,] 855–856 [defendant raised separate defenses to the two offenses at issue].) But when there is no reasonable likelihood of juror disagreement as to particular acts, and the only question is whether or not the defendant in fact committed all of them, the jury should be given a modified unanimity instruction which, in addition to allowing a conviction if the jurors unanimously agree on specific acts, also allows a conviction if the jury unanimously agrees the defendant committed all the acts described by the victim.

(*Id.* at pp. 321–322; *People v. Matute* (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1437, 1448 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 472].) If the court concludes that the modified jury instruction is appropriate, do not give this instruction. Give CALCRIM No. 3501, *Unanimity: When Generic Testimony of Offense Presented*.

#### ***Instruction That Unanimity Not Required***

In *People v. Culuko* (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 307, 321–323 [92 Cal.Rptr.2d 789], the court held that an instruction stating that the jurors need not agree on whether the defendant was an aider and abettor or a principal was a correct statement of the law and not error to give. However, in *People v. Napoles* (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 108, 119 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 777], the court found that the nonunanimity instruction given in that case was erroneous. The court cautioned against giving any nonunanimity instruction in a case involving a continuous course of conduct offense. (*Id.* at p. 119, fn. 6.) The court stated that if a nonunanimity instruction must be given, the following language would be appropriate:

The defendant is accused of having [], [in count] by having engaged in a course of conduct between [date] and [date]. The People must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant engaged in this course of conduct. Each juror must agree that defendant engaged in acts or omissions that prove the required course of conduct. As long as each of you is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed some acts or omissions that prove the course of conduct, you need not all rely on the same acts or omissions to reach that conclusion.

(*Ibid.*)

## **SECONDARY SOURCES**

5 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, §§ 727–731.

2 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 40,

*Accusatory Pleadings*, § 40.07[9] (Matthew Bender).

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 84, *Motions at Trial*, § 84.03[2][b], Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.02[2][a][i] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.21[1][c][iii] (Matthew Bender).

## 3501. Unanimity: When Generic Testimony of Offense Presented

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The defendant is charged with \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description[s] of alleged offense[s]> [in Count[s] \_\_\_\_\_] sometime during the period of \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_.

The People have presented evidence of more than one act to prove that the defendant committed (this/these) offense[s]. You must not find the defendant guilty unless:

1. You all agree that the People have proved that the defendant committed at least one of these acts and you all agree on which act (he/she) committed [for each offense];

**OR**

2. You all agree that the People have proved that the defendant committed all the acts alleged to have occurred during this time period [and have proved that the defendant committed at least the number of offenses charged].
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*New January 2006; Revised February 2014*

### **BENCH NOTES**

#### ***Instructional Duty***

In *People v. Jones* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294 [270 Cal.Rptr. 611, 792 P.2d 643], the Court analyzed the due process concerns raised when a witness testifies to numerous, repeated acts of child molestation over a period of time, but the witness is unable to give specifics on time and date. The Court held that prosecutions based on this type of evidence satisfied due process where the testimony met specified criteria. (*Id.* at p. 316.) The Court then addressed what type of unanimity instruction is required in such cases:

In a case in which the evidence indicates the jurors might disagree as to the particular act defendant committed, the standard unanimity instruction should be given. (See, e.g., *People v. Gordon* [(1985)] 165 Cal. App.3d [839,] 855–856 [defendant raised separate defenses to the two offenses at issue].) But when there is no reasonable likelihood of juror disagreement as to particular acts, and the only question is whether or not the defendant in fact committed all of them, the jury should be given a modified unanimity instruction which, in addition to allowing a conviction if the jurors unanimously agree on specific acts, also allows a conviction if the jury unanimously agrees the defendant committed all the acts described by the victim.

(*Id.* at pp. 321–322; *People v. Matute* (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1437, 1448 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 472].) If the court concludes that the modified jury instruction is appropriate, give this instruction. If the court determines that the standard unanimity

instruction is appropriate, give CALCRIM No. 3500, *Unanimity*.

Give the bracketed portions when the defendant is charged with numerous charges for the same offense alleged to have occurred during the specified time period. (See *People v. Matute, supra*, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 1448 [15 rapes charged during 15 months].)

### AUTHORITY

- Unanimity Required. Cal. Const., art. I, § 16; *People v. Russo* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1124, 1132 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 436, 25 P.3d 641].
- Instruction Required If Multiple Acts Could Support Single Charge. *People v. Russo* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1124, 1132 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 436, 25 P.3d 641]; *People v. Diedrich* (1982) 31 Cal.3d 263, 282 [182 Cal.Rptr. 354, 643 P.2d 971]; *People v. Madden* (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 212, 218 [171 Cal.Rptr. 897]; *People v. Alva* (1979) 90 Cal.App.3d 418, 426 [153 Cal.Rptr. 644].
- Generic Testimony. *People v. Jones* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 321–322 [270 Cal.Rptr. 611, 792 P.2d 643].
- This Instruction Upheld. *People v. Fernandez* (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 540, 555–558 [157 Cal.Rptr.3d 43].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

5 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, § 731.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.02[2][a][i] (Matthew Bender).

6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, *Crimes Against the Person*, § 142.21[1][c][iii] (Matthew Bender).

## 3502. Unanimity: When Prosecution Elects One Act Among Many

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**You must not find the defendant guilty of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of alleged offense> [in Count \_\_\_\_\_] unless you all agree that the People have proved specifically that the defendant committed that offense [on] \_\_\_\_\_ <insert date or other description of event relied on>.**

**[Evidence that the defendant may have committed the alleged offense (on another day/ [or] in another manner) is not sufficient for you to find (him/her) guilty of the offense charged.]**

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*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

If the prosecutor has elected a specific factual basis for the offense alleged but evidence of multiple acts has been admitted, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the election unless the prosecutor informs the jury of the election. (*People v. Melhado* (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1529, 1534–1536 [70 Cal.Rptr.2d 878].)

### AUTHORITY

- Election Required on Demand. *People v. Russo* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1124, 1132 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 436, 25 P.3d 641]; *People v. Salvato* (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 872, 882 [285 Cal.Rptr. 837].
- Instructional Requirements. *People v. Melhado* (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1529, 1534–1536 [70 Cal.Rptr.2d 878].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

5 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, § 728.

2 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 40, *Accusatory Pleadings*, § 40.07[9] (Matthew Bender).

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.02[2][a][i] (Matthew Bender).

**3503–3514. Reserved for Future Use**



## **B. MULTIPLE COUNTS AND COMPLETION OF VERDICT FORMS**

### **3515. Multiple Counts: Separate Offenses (Pen. Code, § 954)**

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**Each of the counts charged in this case is a separate crime [except for Counts \_\_\_\_\_, which are charged as alternative offenses]. You must consider each count separately and return a separate verdict for each one [except for Counts \_\_\_\_\_, which are for lesser included offenses and will be addressed in other instructions].**

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*New January 2006; Revised February 2012*

#### **BENCH NOTES**

##### ***Instructional Duty***

The court should give this instruction on request if the defendant is charged with multiple counts for separate offenses. (*People v. Beagle* (1972) 6 Cal.3d 441, 456 [99 Cal.Rptr. 313, 492 P.2d 1].) The court has no sua sponte duty to give this instruction. (*Ibid.*)

If the prosecution has charged, in the alternative, more than one offense for the same event, give CALCRIM No. 3516, *Multiple Counts: Alternative Charges for One Event—Dual Conviction Prohibited*. Do not give this instruction unless the case involves both charges for separate events and charges in the alternative for a single event. In such cases, the court should give both instructions, inserting where indicated in this instruction the counts that are addressed in CALCRIM No. 3516.

Likewise, if the case involves lesser included offenses, the court should give either CALCRIM No. 3517, *Deliberations and Completion of Verdict Forms: For Use When Lesser Included Offenses and Greater Crimes Are Not Separately Charged and the Jury Receives Guilty and Not Guilty Verdict Forms for Greater and Lesser Offenses (Non-Homicide)*, or CALCRIM No. 3518, *Deliberations and Completion of Verdict Forms: For Use When Lesser Included Offenses and Greater Crimes Are Not Separately Charged and Jury Is Given Only One Not Guilty Verdict Form for Each Count (Non-Homicide)*. (See *People v. Fields* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 289, 308–311 [52 Cal.Rptr.2d 282, 914 P.2d 832].) Do not give this instruction unless the case involves both charges for separate events and one or more charges with a lesser included offense. In such cases, the court should give both instructions, inserting where indicated in this instruction the counts that are addressed in CALCRIM No. 3517 or 3518.

#### **AUTHORITY**

- Statutory Authority for Multiple Charges. Pen. Code, § 954.

- Instructional Requirements. *People v. Beagle* (1972) 6 Cal.3d 441, 456 [99 Cal.Rptr. 313, 492 P.2d 1].

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

5 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, § 727.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.20 (Matthew Bender).

## 3516. Multiple Counts: Alternative Charges for One Event—Dual Conviction Prohibited

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<Give this paragraph when the law does not specify which crime must be sustained or dismissed if the defendant is found guilty of both.>

**[The defendant is charged in Count \_\_\_\_\_ with \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of alleged offense> and in Count \_\_\_\_\_ with \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of alleged offense>. These are alternative charges. If you find the defendant guilty of one of these charges, you must find (him/her) not guilty of the other. You cannot find the defendant guilty of both.]**

<Give the following paragraph when the defendant is charged with both theft and receiving stolen property offenses based on the same incident.>

**[The defendant is charged in Count \_\_\_\_\_ with \_\_\_\_\_ <insert theft offense> and in Count \_\_\_\_\_ with \_\_\_\_\_ <insert receiving stolen property offense>. You must first decide whether the defendant is guilty of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of theft offense>. If you find the defendant guilty of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of theft offense>, you must return the verdict form for \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of receiving stolen property offense> unsigned. If you find the defendant not guilty of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert theft offense> you must then decide whether the defendant is guilty of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name of receiving stolen property offense>.]**

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*New January 2006; Revised June 2007, October 2010, April 2011*

### BENCH NOTES

#### ***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction where the defendant is charged in the alternative with multiple counts for a single event. (See *People v. Allen* (1999) 21 Cal.4th 846, 851 [89 Cal.Rptr.2d 279, 984 P.2d 486]; *People v. Jaramillo* (1976) 16 Cal.3d 752, 757 [129 Cal.Rptr. 306, 548 P.2d 706].) This instruction applies only to those cases in which the defendant may be legally convicted of only one of the alternative charges. See dual conviction list in *Related Issues* section below.

If the evidence raises the issue whether the same act or single event underlies both a theft conviction and a receiving stolen property conviction, this may be a question for the jury and the instruction should be modified accordingly.

If the defendant is charged with both theft and receiving stolen property, and the jury informs the court that it cannot reach a verdict on the theft count, the court may then instruct the jury to consider the receiving stolen property count.

If the defendant is charged with multiple counts for separate offenses, give CALCRIM No. 3515, *Multiple Counts: Separate Offenses*.

If the case involves separately charged greater and lesser offenses, the court should give CALCRIM No. 3519. Because the law is unclear in this area, the court must decide whether to give this instruction if the defendant is charged with specific sexual offenses and, in the alternative, with continuous sexual abuse under Penal Code section 288.5. If the court decides not to so instruct, and the jury convicts the defendant of both continuous sexual abuse and one or more specific sexual offenses that occurred during the same period, the court must then decide which conviction to dismiss.

### AUTHORITY

- Prohibition Against Dual Conviction. *People v. Ortega* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 686, 692 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 489, 968 P.2d 48]; *People v. Sanchez* (2001) 24 Cal.4th 983, 988 [103 Cal.Rptr.2d 698, 16 P.3d 118]; *People v. Allen* (1999) 21 Cal.4th 846, 851 [89 Cal.Rptr.2d 279, 984 P.2d 486]; *People v. Jaramillo* (1976) 16 Cal.3d 752, 757 [129 Cal.Rptr. 306, 548 P.2d 706].
- Instructional Requirements. See *People v. Allen* (1999) 21 Cal.4th 846, 851 [89 Cal.Rptr.2d 279, 984 P.2d 486]; *People v. Jaramillo* (1976) 16 Cal.3d 752, 757 [129 Cal.Rptr. 306, 548 P.2d 706].
- Conviction of Receiving Stolen Property Not Possible if Defendant Convicted of Theft. *People v. Ceja* (2010) 49 Cal.4th 1, 3–4 [108 Cal.Rptr.3d 568, 229 P.3d 995].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### ***Dual Conviction May Not Be Based on Necessarily Included Offenses***

“[T]his court has long held that multiple convictions may *not* be based on necessarily included offenses. The test in this state of a necessarily included offense is simply that where an offense cannot be committed without necessarily committing another offense, the latter is a necessarily included offense.” (*People v. Ortega* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 686, 692 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 489, 968 P.2d 48] [emphasis in original, citations and internal quotation marks omitted]; see also *People v. Montoya* (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1031, 1034 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 902, 94 P.3d 1098].) “In deciding whether an offense is necessarily included in another, we apply the elements test, asking whether all the legal ingredients of the corpus delicti of the lesser offense are included in the elements of the greater offense.” (*People v. Montoya, supra*, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1034 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted].)

#### ***Dual Conviction—Examples of Offense Where Prohibited or Permitted***

The courts have held that dual conviction is *prohibited* for the following offenses:

- Robbery and theft. *People v. Ortega* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 686, 699 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 489, 968 P.2d 48].
- Robbery and receiving stolen property. *People v. Stephens* (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 575, 586–587 [267 Cal.Rptr. 66].
- Theft and receiving stolen property. *People v. Jaramillo* (1976) 16 Cal.3d 752, 757 [129 Cal.Rptr. 306, 548 P.2d 706].

- Battery and assault. See *People v. Ortega* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 686, 693 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 489, 968 P.2d 48].
- Forgery and check fraud. *People v. Hawkins* (1961) 196 Cal.App.2d 832, 838 [17 Cal.Rptr. 66].
- Forgery and credit card fraud. *People v. Cobb* (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 1, 4 [93 Cal.Rptr. 152].

The courts have held that dual conviction is *permitted* for the following offenses (although dual punishment is not):

- Burglary and theft. *People v. Bernal* (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1455, 1458 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 839].
- Burglary and receiving stolen property. *People v. Allen* (1999) 21 Cal.4th 846, 866 [89 Cal.Rptr.2d 279, 984 P.2d 486].
- Carjacking and grand theft. *People v. Ortega* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 686, 693 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 489, 968 P.2d 48].
- Carjacking and robbery. *People v. Ortega* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 686, 700 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 489, 968 P.2d 48].
- Carjacking and unlawful taking of a vehicle. *People v. Montoya* (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1031, 1035 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 902, 94 P.3d 1098].
- Murder and gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated. *People v. Sanchez* (2001) 24 Cal.4th 983, 988 [103 Cal.Rptr.2d 698, 16 P.3d 118].
- Murder and child abuse resulting in death. *People v. Malfavon* (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 727, 743 [125 Cal.Rptr.2d 618].

### ***Joy Riding and Receiving Stolen Property***

A defendant cannot be convicted of both joy riding (Veh. Code, § 10851) and receiving stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496), unless the record clearly demonstrates that the joy riding conviction is based exclusively on the theory that the defendant drove the car, temporarily depriving the owner of possession, not on the theory that the defendant stole the car. (*People v. Allen* (1999) 21 Cal.4th 846, 851 [89 Cal.Rptr.2d 279, 984 P.2d 486]; *People v. Jaramillo* (1976) 16 Cal.3d 752, 758–759 [129 Cal.Rptr. 306, 548 P.2d 706]; *People v. Austell* (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1249, 1252 [273 Cal.Rptr. 212].)

### ***Accessory and Principal***

In *People v. Prado* (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 267, 273 [136 Cal.Rptr. 521], and *People v. Francis* (1982) 129 Cal.App.3d 241, 248 [180 Cal.Rptr. 873], the courts held that the defendant could not be convicted as both a principal and as an accessory after the fact for the same offense. However, later opinions have criticized these cases, concluding, “there is no bar to conviction as both principal and accessory where the evidence shows distinct and independent actions supporting each crime.” (*People v. Mouton* (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1313, 1324 [19 Cal.Rptr.2d 423]; *People v. Riley* (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1808, 1816 [25 Cal.Rptr.2d 676]; see also *People v. Nguyen* (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 518, 536, fn. 6 [26 Cal.Rptr.2d 323].)

**SECONDARY SOURCES**

5 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, § 727.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 85,  
*Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.02[2][a][i] (Matthew Bender).

**3517. Deliberations and Completion of Verdict Forms: For Use When Lesser Included Offenses and Greater Crimes Are Not Separately Charged and the Jury Receives Guilty and Not Guilty Verdict Forms for Greater and Lesser Offenses (Non-Homicide)**

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If all of you find that the defendant is not guilty of a greater charged crime, you may find (him/her) guilty of a lesser crime if you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of that lesser crime. A defendant may not be convicted of both a greater and lesser crime for the same conduct.

[Now I will explain to you the crimes affected by this instruction [including lesser crimes of the lesser crimes]:]

[\_\_\_\_\_ <insert crime> is a lesser crime of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert crime> [charged in Count \_\_\_\_\_.]]

[\_\_\_\_\_ <insert crime> is a lesser crime of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert crime> [charged in Count \_\_\_\_\_.]]

[\_\_\_\_\_ <insert crime> is a lesser crime of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert crime> [charged in Count \_\_\_\_\_.]]

It is up to you to decide the order in which you consider each crime and the relevant evidence, but I can accept a verdict of guilty of a lesser crime only if you have found the defendant not guilty of the corresponding greater crime.

*<Give the following paragraphs if the jury has separate guilty and not guilty forms for both greater and lesser offenses pursuant to Stone v. Superior Court.>*

**[[For (the/any) count in which a greater and lesser crime is charged,] (Y/y)ou will receive verdict forms of guilty and not guilty for the greater crime and also verdict forms of guilty and not guilty for the lesser crime. Follow these directions before you give me any completed and signed, final verdict form. Return any unused verdict forms to me, unsigned.**

- 1. If all of you agree the People have proved that the defendant is guilty of the greater crime, complete and sign the verdict form for guilty of that crime. Do not complete or sign any other verdict form [for that count].**
- 2. If all of you cannot agree whether the People have proved that the defendant is guilty of the greater crime, inform me only that you cannot reach an agreement and do not complete or sign any verdict form [for that count].**
- 3. If all of you agree that the People have not proved that the**

defendant is guilty of the greater crime and you also agree that the People have proved that (he/she) is guilty of the lesser crime, complete and sign the verdict form for not guilty of the greater crime and the verdict form for guilty of the lesser crime.

4. If all of you agree the People have not proved that the defendant is guilty of the greater or lesser crime, complete and sign the verdict form for not guilty of the greater crime and the verdict form for not guilty of the lesser crime.
5. If all of you agree the People have not proved that the defendant is guilty of the greater crime, but all of you cannot agree on a verdict for the lesser crime, complete and sign the verdict form for not guilty of the greater crime and inform me only that you cannot reach an agreement about the lesser crime.]

*<Give the following paragraphs if the jury has a combined verdict form for both greater and lesser offenses.>*

**[[For (the/any) charge with a lesser crime,] (Y/y)ou will receive a form for indicating your verdict on both the greater crime and the lesser crime. The greater crime is listed first. When you have reached a verdict, have the foreperson complete the form, sign, and date it. Follow these directions before writing anything on the form.**

1. If all of you agree that the People have proved that the defendant is guilty of the greater crime as charged, (write “guilty” in the blank/circle the word “guilty”/check the box for “guilty”) for that crime, then sign, date, and return the form. Do not (write/circle/ check) anything for the lesser crime.
2. If all of you cannot agree whether the People have proved that the defendant is guilty of the greater crime as charged, inform me only that you cannot reach an agreement and do not write anything on the verdict form.
3. If all of you agree that the People have not proved that the defendant is guilty of the greater crime and you also agree that the People have proved that (he/she) is guilty of the lesser crime, (write “not guilty” in the blank/circle the words “not guilty”/check the box for “not guilty”) for the greater crime and (write “guilty” in the blank/circle the word “guilty”/check the box for “guilty”) for the lesser crime. You must not (write/circle/ check) anything for the lesser crime unless you have (written/ circled/checked) “not guilty” for the greater crime.
4. If all of you agree that the People have not proved that the defendant is guilty of either the greater or the lesser crime, (write “not guilty” in the blank/circle the words “not guilty”/check the



box for “not guilty”) for both the greater crime and the lesser crime.

5. If all of you agree that the People have not proved that the defendant is guilty of the greater crime, but all of you cannot agree on a verdict for the lesser crime, (write “not guilty” in the blank/circle the words “not guilty”/check the box for “not guilty”) for the greater crime, then sign, date, and return the form. Do not (write/circle/check) anything for the lesser crime, and inform me only that you cannot reach an agreement about that crime.]

**Whenever I tell you the People must prove something, I mean they must prove it beyond a reasonable doubt [unless I specifically tell you otherwise].**

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2006, June 2007, February 2012, August 2012, February 2015*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

If lesser included crimes are not charged separately and the jury receives only one verdict form for each count, the court should use CALCRIM 3518 instead of this instruction. For separately charged greater and lesser included offenses, use CALCRIM 3519.

In all cases in which one or more lesser included offenses are submitted to the jury, whether charged or not, the court has a  **sua sponte**  duty to instruct on the applicable procedures. (*People v. Breverman* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 162 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094] [duty to instruct on lesser included offenses]; *People v. Dewberry* (1959) 51 Cal.2d 548, 555–557 [334 P.2d 852] [duty to instruct that if jury has reasonable doubt of greater offense, must acquit of that charge]; *People v. Fields* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 289, 309–310 [52 Cal.Rptr.2d 282, 914 P.2d 832] [duty to instruct that jury cannot convict of a lesser included offense unless it has concluded that defendant is not guilty of the greater offense]; *Stone v. Superior Court* (1982) 31 Cal.3d 503, 519 [183 Cal.Rptr. 647, 646 P.2d 809] [duty to give jury opportunity to render a verdict of partial acquittal on a greater offense], clarified in *People v. Marshall* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 826 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 347, 919 P.2d 1280] [no duty to inquire about partial acquittal in absence of indication jury may have found defendant not guilty of greater offense].)

In *Stone v. Superior Court*, *supra*, 31 Cal.3d at p. 519, the Supreme Court suggested that the trial court provide the jury with verdict forms of guilty/not guilty on each of the charged and lesser included offenses. The court later referred to this “as a judicially declared rule of criminal procedure.” (*People v. Kurtzman* (1988) 46 Cal.3d 322, 328 [250 Cal.Rptr. 244, 758 P.2d 572].) However, this is not a mandatory procedure. (*Ibid.*) If the court chooses not to follow the procedure

suggested in *Stone*, the court may give CALCRIM No. 3518 in place of this instruction.

**Do not** give this instruction for charges of murder or manslaughter; instead give the appropriate homicide instruction for lesser included offenses: CALCRIM No. 640, *Deliberations and Completion of Verdict Forms: For Use When Defendant is Charged With First Degree Murder and Jury Is Given Not Guilty Forms for Each Level of Homicide*, CALCRIM No. 641, *Deliberations and Completion of Verdict Forms: For Use When Defendant Is Charged With First Degree Murder and Jury Is Given Only One Not Guilty Verdict Form for Each Count; Not to Be Used When Both Voluntary and Involuntary Manslaughter Are Lesser Included Offenses*, CALCRIM No. 642, *Deliberations and Completion of Verdict Forms: For Use When Defendant Is Charged With Second Degree Murder and Jury Is Given Not Guilty Forms for Each Level of Homicide*, or CALCRIM No. 643, *Deliberations and Completion of Verdict Forms: For Use When Defendant Is Charged With Second Degree Murder and Jury Is Given Only One Not Guilty Verdict Form for Each Count; Not to Be Used When Both Voluntary and Involuntary Manslaughter Are Lesser Included Offenses*.

The court should tell the jury it may not return a guilty verdict on a lesser included offense unless it has found the defendant not guilty of the greater offense. (*People v. Fields, supra*, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 310–311.) If the jury announces that it is deadlocked on the greater offense but, despite the court’s instructions, has returned a guilty verdict on the lesser included offense, the court should again instruct the jury that it may not convict of the lesser included offense unless it has found the defendant not guilty of the greater offense. (*Ibid.*) The court should direct the jury to reconsider the “lone verdict of conviction of the lesser included offense” in light of this instruction. (*Ibid.*; Pen. Code, § 1161.) If the jury is deadlocked on the greater offense but the court nevertheless records a guilty verdict on the lesser included offense and then discharges the jury, retrial on the greater offense will be barred. (*People v. Fields, supra*, 13 Cal.4th at p. 307; Pen. Code, § 1023.)

The court may not control the sequence in which the jury considers the offenses. (*People v. Kurtzman, supra*, 46 Cal.3d at p. 330.)

### AUTHORITY

- Lesser Included Offenses—Duty to Instruct. Pen. Code, § 1159; *People v. Breverman* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 162 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094].
- Lesser Included Offenses—Standard. *People v. Birks* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 108, 117 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 848, 960 P.2d 1073].
- Reasonable Doubt as to Degree or Level of Offense. Pen. Code, § 1097; *People v. Dewberry* (1959) 51 Cal.2d 548, 555–557 [334 P.2d 852].
- Conviction of Lesser Precludes Retrial on Greater. Pen. Code, § 1023; *People v. Fields* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 289, 309–310 [52 Cal.Rptr.2d 282, 914 P.2d 832]; *People v. Kurtzman* (1988) 46 Cal.3d 322, 329 [250 Cal.Rptr. 244, 758 P.2d 572].

- Court May Ask Jury to Reconsider Conviction on Lesser If Jury Deadlocked on Greater. Pen. Code, § 1161; *People v. Fields* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 289, 310 [52 Cal.Rptr.2d 282, 914 P.2d 832].
- Must Permit Partial Verdict of Acquittal on Greater. *People v. Marshall* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 826 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 347, 919 P.2d 1280]; *Stone v. Superior Court* (1982) 31 Cal.3d 503, 519 [183 Cal.Rptr. 647, 646 P.2d 809].

## RELATED ISSUES

### *Duty to Instruct on Lesser*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct “on lesser included offenses when the evidence raises a question as to whether all of the elements of the charged offense were present [citation] but not when there is no evidence that the offense was less than that charged. [Citations.] The obligation to instruct on lesser included offenses exists even when as a matter of trial tactics a defendant not only fails to request the instruction but expressly objects to its being given. [Citations.] Just as the People have no legitimate interest in obtaining a conviction of a greater offense than that established by the evidence, a defendant has no right to an acquittal when that evidence is sufficient to establish a lesser included offense. [Citations.]” (*People v. Breverman* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 154–155 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094].)

### *Acquittal of Greater Does Not Bar Retrial of Lesser*

Where the jury acquits of a greater offense but deadlocks on the lesser, retrial of the lesser is not barred. (*People v. Smith* (1983) 33 Cal.3d 596, 602 [189 Cal.Rptr. 862, 659 P.2d 1152].)

### *Lesser Included Offenses Barred by Statute of Limitations*

The defendant may waive the statute of limitations to obtain a jury instruction on a lesser offense that would otherwise be time-barred. (*Cowan v. Superior Court* (1996) 14 Cal.4th 367, 373 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 458, 926 P.2d 438].) However, the court has no sua sponte duty to instruct on a lesser that is time-barred. (*People v. Diedrich* (1982) 31 Cal.3d 263, 283 [182 Cal.Rptr. 354, 643 P.2d 971].) If the court instructs on an uncharged lesser offense that is time-barred without obtaining an explicit waiver from the defendant, it is unclear if the defendant must object at that time in order to raise the issue on appeal or if the defendant may raise the issue for the first time on appeal. (See *People v. Stanfill* (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1145–1151 [90 Cal.Rptr.2d 885] [reasoning criticized in *People v. Smith* (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1182, 1193–1194 [120 Cal.Rptr.2d 185]].) The better practice is to obtain an explicit waiver on the statute of limitations when instructing on a time-barred lesser.

### *Conviction of Greater and Lesser*

The defendant cannot be convicted of a greater and a lesser included offense. (*People v. Moran* (1970) 1 Cal.3d 755, 763 [83 Cal.Rptr. 411, 463 P.2d 763].) If the evidence supports the conviction on the greater offense, the conviction on the lesser included offense should be set aside. (*Ibid.*)

## SECONDARY SOURCES

5 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, §§ 708–712.

6 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Judgment, § 70.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, §§ 85.03[2][g], 85.05, 85.20 (Matthew Bender).

**3518. Deliberations and Completion of Verdict Forms: For Use  
When Lesser Included Offenses and Greater Crimes Are Not  
Separately Charged and Jury Is Given Only One Not Guilty Verdict  
Form for Each Count (Non-Homicide)**

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If all of you find that the defendant is not guilty of a greater charged crime, you may find (him/her) guilty of a lesser crime if you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of that lesser crime. A defendant may not be convicted of both a greater and lesser crime for the same conduct.

[Now I will explain to you the crimes affected by this instruction [including lesser crimes of the lesser crimes]:]

[\_\_\_\_\_ <insert crime> is a lesser crime of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert crime> [charged in Count \_\_\_\_\_.]]

[\_\_\_\_\_ <insert crime> is a lesser crime of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert crime> [charged in Count \_\_\_\_\_.]]

[\_\_\_\_\_ <insert crime> is a lesser crime of \_\_\_\_\_ <insert crime> [charged in Count \_\_\_\_\_.]]

It is up to you to decide the order in which you consider each crime and the relevant evidence, but I can accept a verdict of guilty of a lesser crime only if you have found the defendant not guilty of the corresponding greater crime.

[For count[s] \_\_\_\_\_, you will receive (a/multiple) verdict form[s]. Follow these directions before you give me any completed and signed final verdict form. Return any unused verdict forms to me, unsigned.

1. If all of you agree the People have proved that the defendant is guilty of the greater crime, complete and sign the verdict form for guilty of that crime. Do not complete or sign any other verdict form [for that count].
2. If all of you agree the People have not proved that the defendant is guilty of the greater crime and also agree the People have proved that (he/she) is guilty of (the/a) lesser crime, complete and sign the verdict form for guilty of the lesser crime. Do not complete or sign any other verdict form[s] [for that count].
3. If all of you agree the People have not proved that the defendant is guilty of the greater or lesser crime, complete and sign the verdict form for not guilty.
4. If all of you cannot agree whether the People have proved that the defendant is guilty of a charged or lesser crime, inform me

**only that you cannot reach agreement [as to that count] and do not complete or sign any verdict form [for that count].]**

**Whenever I tell you the People must prove something, I mean they must prove it beyond a reasonable doubt [unless I specifically tell you otherwise].**

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*New January 2006; Revised August 2006, June 2007, April 2010, February 2012, August 2012, February 2015*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

If lesser crimes are not charged separately and the jury receives separate not guilty and guilty verdict forms for each count, the court should use CALCRIM No. 3517 instead of this instruction. For separately charged greater and lesser included offenses, use CALCRIM No. 3519.

In all cases in which one or more lesser included offenses are submitted to the jury, whether charged or not, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct on the applicable procedures. (*People v. Breverman* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 162 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094] [duty to instruct on lesser included offenses]; *People v. Dewberry* (1959) 51 Cal.2d 548, 555–557 [334 P.2d 852] [duty to instruct that if jury has reasonable doubt of greater offense, must acquit of that charge]; *People v. Fields* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 289, 309–310 [52 Cal.Rptr.2d 282, 914 P.2d 832] [duty to instruct that jury cannot convict of lesser included offense unless it has concluded that defendant is not guilty of greater offense]; *Stone v. Superior Court* (1982) 31 Cal.3d 503, 519 [183 Cal.Rptr. 647, 646 P.2d 809] [duty to give jury opportunity to render verdict of partial acquittal on greater offense], clarified in *People v. Marshall* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 826 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 347, 919 P.2d 1280] [no duty to inquire about partial acquittal in absence of indication jury may have found defendant not guilty of greater offense].)

In *Stone v. Superior Court*, *supra*, 31 Cal.3d at p. 519, the Supreme Court suggested that the trial court provide the jury with verdict forms of guilty/not guilty on each of the charged and lesser included offenses. The court later referred to this “as a judicially declared rule of criminal procedure.” (*People v. Kurtzman* (1988) 46 Cal.3d 322, 329 [250 Cal.Rptr. 244, 758 P.2d 572].) However, this is not a mandatory procedure. (*Ibid.*) If the court chooses to follow the procedure suggested in *Stone*, the court should give CALCRIM No. 3517 in place of this instruction.

**Do not** give this instruction for charges of murder or manslaughter; instead give the appropriate homicide instruction for lesser included offenses: CALCRIM No. 640, *Deliberations and Completion of Verdict Forms: For Use When Defendant is Charged With First Degree Murder and Jury Is Given Not Guilty Forms for Each Level of Homicide*, CALCRIM No. 641, *Deliberations and Completion of Verdict Forms: For Use When Defendant Is Charged With First Degree Murder and Jury Is Given Only One Not Guilty Verdict Form for Each Count; Not to Be Used When*

*Both Voluntary and Involuntary Manslaughter Are Lesser Included Offenses, CALCRIM No. 642, Deliberations and Completion of Verdict Forms: For Use When Defendant Is Charged With Second Degree Murder and Jury Is Given Not Guilty Forms for Each Level of Homicide, or CALCRIM No. 643, Deliberations and Completion of Verdict Forms: For Use When Defendant Is Charged With Second Degree Murder and Jury Is Given Only One Not Guilty Verdict Form for Each Count; Not to Be Used When Both Voluntary and Involuntary Manslaughter Are Lesser Included Offenses.*

The court should tell the jury it may not return a guilty verdict on a lesser included offense unless it has found the defendant not guilty of the greater offense. (*People v. Fields*, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 310–311.) If the jury announces that it is deadlocked on the greater offense but, despite the court’s instructions, has returned a guilty verdict on the lesser included offense, the court should again instruct the jury that it may not convict of the lesser included offense unless it has found the defendant not guilty of the greater offense. (*Ibid.*) The court should direct the jury to reconsider the “lone verdict of conviction of the lesser included offense” in light of this instruction. (*Ibid.*; Pen. Code, § 1161.) If the jury is deadlocked on the greater offense but the court nevertheless records a guilty verdict on the lesser included offense and then discharges the jury, retrial on the greater offense will be barred. (*People v. Fields*, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 307; Pen. Code, § 1023.)

The court may not control the sequence in which the jury considers the offenses. (*People v. Kurtzman*, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 330.)

### AUTHORITY

- Lesser Included Offenses—Duty to Instruct. Pen. Code, § 1159; *People v. Breverman* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 162 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094].
- Lesser Included Offenses—Standard. *People v. Birks* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 108, 117 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 848, 960 P.2d 1073].
- Reasonable Doubt as to Degree or Level of Offense. Pen. Code, § 1097; *People v. Dewberry* (1959) 51 Cal.2d 548, 555–557 [334 P.2d 852].
- Conviction of Lesser Precludes Retrial on Greater. Pen. Code, § 1023; *People v. Fields* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 289, 309–310 [52 Cal.Rptr.2d 282, 914 P.2d 832]; *People v. Kurtzman* (1988) 46 Cal.3d 322, 329 [250 Cal.Rptr. 244, 758 P.2d 572].
- Court May Ask Jury to Reconsider Conviction on Lesser If Jury Deadlocked on Greater. Pen. Code, § 1161; *People v. Fields* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 289, 310 [52 Cal.Rptr.2d 282, 914 P.2d 832].
- Must Permit Partial Verdict of Acquittal on Greater. *People v. Marshall* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 826 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 347, 919 P.2d 1280]; *Stone v. Superior Court* (1982) 31 Cal.3d 503, 519 [183 Cal.Rptr. 647, 646 P.2d 809].



## RELATED ISSUES

### *Duty to Instruct on Lesser*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct “on lesser included offenses when the evidence raises a question as to whether all of the elements of the charged offense were present [citation] but not when there is no evidence that the offense was less than that charged. [Citations.] The obligation to instruct on lesser included offenses exists even when as a matter of trial tactics a defendant not only fails to request the instruction but expressly objects to its being given. [Citations.] Just as the People have no legitimate interest in obtaining a conviction of a greater offense than that established by the evidence, a defendant has no right to an acquittal when that evidence is sufficient to establish a lesser included offense. [Citations.]” (*People v. Breverman* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 154–155 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094].)

### *Acquittal of Greater Does Not Bar Retrial of Lesser*

When the jury acquits of a greater offense but deadlocks on the lesser, retrial of the lesser is not barred. (*People v. Smith* (1983) 33 Cal.3d 596, 602 [189 Cal.Rptr. 862, 659 P.2d 1152].)

### *Lesser Included Offenses Barred by Statute of Limitations*

The defendant may waive the statute of limitations to obtain a jury instruction on a lesser offense that would otherwise be time-barred. (*Cowan v. Superior Court* (1996) 14 Cal.4th 367, 373 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 458, 926 P.2d 438].) However, the court has no sua sponte duty to instruct on a lesser that is time-barred. (*People v. Diedrich* (1982) 31 Cal.3d 263, 283 [182 Cal.Rptr. 354, 643 P.2d 971].) If the court instructs on an uncharged lesser offense that is time-barred without obtaining an explicit waiver from the defendant, it is unclear if the defendant must object at that time in order to raise the issue on appeal or if the defendant may raise the issue for the first time on appeal. (See *People v. Stanfill* (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1145–1151 [90 Cal.Rptr.2d 885] [reasoning criticized in *People v. Smith* (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1182, 1193–1194 [120 Cal.Rptr.2d 185]].) The better practice is to obtain an explicit waiver on the statute of limitations when instructing on a time-barred lesser.

### *Conviction of Greater and Lesser*

The defendant cannot be convicted of a greater and a lesser included offense. (*People v. Moran* (1970) 1 Cal.3d 755, 763 [83 Cal.Rptr. 411, 463 P.2d 763].) If the evidence supports the conviction on the greater offense, the conviction on the lesser included offense should be set aside. (*Ibid.*)

## SECONDARY SOURCES

5 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, §§ 708–712.

6 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Judgment, § 70.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, §§ 85.03[2][g], 85.05, 85.20 (Matthew Bender).



**3519. Deliberations and Completion of Verdict Forms: Lesser Offenses—For Use When Lesser Included Offenses and Greater Crimes Are Separately Charged (Non-Homicide)**

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If all of you find that the defendant is not guilty of a greater charged crime, you may find (him/her) guilty of a lesser crime if you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of that lesser crime. A defendant may not be convicted of both a greater and lesser crime for the same conduct.

[Now I will explain to you the crimes affected by this instruction [including lesser crimes of the lesser crimes]:]

[\_\_\_\_\_ <insert crime>, as charged in Count \_\_\_\_\_, is a lesser crime to \_\_\_\_\_ <insert crime> [as charged in Count \_\_\_\_\_].]

[\_\_\_\_\_ <insert crime>, as charged in Count \_\_\_\_\_, is a lesser crime to \_\_\_\_\_ <insert crime> [as charged in Count \_\_\_\_\_].]

[\_\_\_\_\_ <insert crime>, as charged in Count \_\_\_\_\_, is a lesser crime to \_\_\_\_\_ <insert crime> [as charged in Count \_\_\_\_\_].]

It is up to you to decide the order in which you consider each greater and lesser crime and the relevant evidence, but I can accept a verdict of guilty of the lesser crime only if you have found the defendant not guilty of the greater crime.

[[For (the/any) count in which a greater and lesser crime is charged,] (Y/y)ou will receive verdict forms of guilty and not guilty for [each/the] greater crime and lesser crime. Follow these directions before you give me any completed and signed, final verdict form. Return any unused verdict forms to me, unsigned.

1. If all of you agree the People have proved that the defendant is guilty of the greater crime, complete and sign the verdict form for guilty of that crime. Do not complete or sign any verdict form for the [corresponding] lesser crime.
2. If all of you cannot agree whether the People have proved that the defendant is guilty of the greater crime, inform me of your disagreement and do not complete or sign any verdict form for that crime or the [corresponding] lesser crime.
3. If all of you agree the People have not proved that the defendant is guilty of the greater crime and also agree the People have proved that (he/she) is guilty of the lesser crime, complete and sign the verdict form for not guilty of the greater crime and the verdict form for guilty of the [corresponding] lesser crime. Do not complete or sign any other verdict forms [for those charges].

4. If all of you agree the People have not proved that the defendant is guilty of the greater or lesser crime, complete and sign the verdict form for not guilty of the greater crime and the verdict form for not guilty of the [corresponding] lesser crime.
5. If all of you agree the People have not proved that the defendant is guilty of the greater crime, but all of you cannot agree on a verdict for the lesser crime, complete and sign the verdict form for not guilty of the greater crime and inform me about your disagreement on the lesser crime.]

Whenever I tell you the People must prove something, I mean they must prove it beyond a reasonable doubt [unless I specifically tell you otherwise].

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*New June 2007; Revised August 2012, February 2015*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

In all cases in which one or more lesser included offenses are submitted to the jury, whether charged or not, the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the applicable procedures. (*People v. Breverman* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 162 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094] [duty to instruct on lesser included offenses]; *People v. Dewberry* (1959) 51 Cal.2d 548, 555–557 [334 P.2d 852] [duty to instruct that if jury has reasonable doubt of greater offense, must acquit of that charge]; *People v. Fields* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 289, 309–310 [52 Cal.Rptr.2d 282, 914 P.2d 832] [duty to instruct that jury cannot convict of a lesser included offense unless it has concluded that defendant is not guilty of the greater offense]; *Stone v. Superior Court* (1982) 31 Cal.3d 503, 519 [183 Cal.Rptr. 647, 646 P.2d 809] [duty to give jury opportunity to render a verdict of partial acquittal on a greater offense], clarified in *People v. Marshall* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 826 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 347, 919 P.2d 1280] [no duty to inquire about partial acquittal in absence of indication jury may have found defendant not guilty of greater offense]).

Whenever greater and lesser included crimes are separately charged the court must use this instruction instead of CALCRIM No. 3517 or CALCRIM No. 3518.

**Do not** give this instruction for charges of murder or manslaughter; instead give the appropriate homicide instruction for lesser included offenses: CALCRIM No. 640, *Deliberations and Completion of Verdict Forms: For Use When Defendant is Charged With First Degree Murder and Jury Is Given Not Guilty Forms for Each Level of Homicide*, CALCRIM No. 641, *Deliberations and Completion of Verdict Forms: For Use When Defendant Is Charged With First Degree Murder and Jury Is Given Only One Not Guilty Verdict Form for Each Count; Not to Be Used When Both Voluntary and Involuntary Manslaughter Are Lesser Included Offenses*, CALCRIM No. 642, *Deliberations and Completion of Verdict Forms: For Use*

*When Defendant Is Charged With Second Degree Murder and Jury Is Given Not Guilty Forms for Each Level of Homicide, or CALCRIM No. 643, Deliberations and Completion of Verdict Forms: For Use When Defendant Is Charged With Second Degree Murder and Jury Is Given Only One Not Guilty Verdict Form for Each Count; Not to Be Used When Both Voluntary and Involuntary Manslaughter Are Lesser Included Offenses.*

The court should tell the jury it may not return a guilty verdict on a lesser included offense unless it has found the defendant not guilty of the greater offense. (*People v. Fields, supra*, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 310–311.) If the jury announces that it is deadlocked on the greater offense but, despite the court’s instructions, has returned a guilty verdict on the lesser included offense, the court should again instruct the jury that it may not convict of the lesser included offense unless it has found the defendant not guilty of the greater offense. (*Ibid.*) The court should direct the jury to reconsider the “lone verdict of conviction of the lesser included offense” in light of this instruction. (*Ibid.*; Pen. Code, § 1161.) If the jury is deadlocked on the greater offense but the court nevertheless records a guilty verdict on the lesser included offense and then discharges the jury, retrial on the greater offense will be barred. (*People v. Fields, supra*, 13 Cal.4th at p. 307; Pen. Code, § 1023.)

The court may not control the sequence in which the jury considers the offenses. (*People v. Kurtzman, supra*, 46 Cal.3d at p. 330.)

### AUTHORITY

- Lesser Included Offenses—Duty to Instruct. Pen. Code, § 1159; *People v. Breverman* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 162 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094].
- Lesser Included Offenses—Standard. *People v. Birks* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 108, 117 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 848, 960 P.2d 1073].
- Reasonable Doubt as to Degree or Level of Offense. Pen. Code, § 1097; *People v. Dewberry* (1959) 51 Cal.2d 548, 555–557 [334 P.2d 852].
- Conviction of Lesser Precludes Retrial on Greater. Pen. Code, § 1023; *People v. Fields* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 289, 309–310 [52 Cal.Rptr.2d 282, 914 P.2d 832]; *People v. Kurtzman* (1988) 46 Cal.3d 322, 329 [250 Cal.Rptr. 244, 758 P.2d 572].
- Court May Ask Jury to Reconsider Conviction on Lesser If Jury Deadlocked on Greater. Pen. Code, § 1161; *People v. Fields* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 289, 310 [52 Cal.Rptr.2d 282, 914 P.2d 832].
- Must Permit Partial Verdict of Acquittal on Greater. *People v. Marshall* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 826 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 347, 919 P.2d 1280]; *Stone v. Superior Court* (1982) 31 Cal.3d 503, 519 [183 Cal.Rptr. 647, 646 P.2d 809].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Duty to Instruct on Lesser*

The court has a  **sua sponte**  duty to instruct “on lesser included offenses when the evidence raises a question as to whether all of the elements of the charged offense

were present [citation] but not when there is no evidence that the offense was less than that charged. [Citations.] The obligation to instruct on lesser included offenses exists even when as a matter of trial tactics a defendant not only fails to request the instruction but expressly objects to its being given. [Citations.] Just as the People have no legitimate interest in obtaining a conviction of a greater offense than that established by the evidence, a defendant has no right to an acquittal when that evidence is sufficient to establish a lesser included offense. [Citations.]” (*People v. Breverman* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 154–155 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094].)

### ***Acquittal of Greater Does Not Bar Retrial of Lesser***

Where the jury acquits of a greater offense but deadlocks on the lesser, retrial of the lesser is not barred. (*People v. Smith* (1983) 33 Cal.3d 596, 602 [189 Cal.Rptr. 862, 659 P.2d 1152].)

### ***Lesser Included Offenses Barred by Statute of Limitations***

The defendant may waive the statute of limitations to obtain a jury instruction on a lesser offense that would otherwise be time-barred. (*Cowan v. Superior Court* (1996) 14 Cal.4th 367, 373 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 458, 926 P.2d 438].) However, the court has no sua sponte duty to instruct on a lesser that is time-barred. (*People v. Diedrich* (1982) 31 Cal.3d 263, 283 [182 Cal.Rptr. 354, 643 P.2d 971].) If the court instructs on an uncharged lesser offense that is time-barred without obtaining an explicit waiver from the defendant, it is unclear if the defendant must object at that time in order to raise the issue on appeal or if the defendant may raise the issue for the first time on appeal. (See *People v. Stanfill* (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1145–1151 [90 Cal.Rptr.2d 885] [reasoning criticized in *People v. Smith* (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1182, 1193–1194 [120 Cal.Rptr.2d 185]].) The better practice is to obtain an explicit waiver on the statute of limitations when instructing on a time-barred lesser.

### ***Conviction of Greater and Lesser***

The defendant cannot be convicted of a greater and a lesser included offense. (*People v. Moran* (1970) 1 Cal.3d 755, 763 [83 Cal.Rptr. 411, 463 P.2d 763].) If the evidence supports the conviction on the greater offense, the conviction on the lesser included offense should be set aside. (*Ibid.*)

## **SECONDARY SOURCES**

5 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, §§ 708–712.

6 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Judgment, § 70.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, §§ 85.03[2][g], 85.05, 85.20 (Matthew Bender).

## **3520–3529. Reserved for Future Use**

## C. ADMONITIONS

### 3530. Judge's Comment on the Evidence (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 10; Pen. Code, §§ 1127, 1093(f))

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**Do not take anything I said or did during the trial as an indication of what I think about the evidence, the witnesses, or what your verdict should be.**

**Now, I will comment on the evidence only to help you decide the issues in this case.**

**However, it is not my role to tell you what your verdict should be. You are the sole judges of the evidence and believability of witnesses. It is up to you and you alone to decide the issues in this case. You may disregard any or all of my comments about the evidence or give them whatever weight you believe is appropriate.**

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*New January 2006*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

If the court comments on the evidence, the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 10; Pen. Code, §§ 1127, 1093(f); *People v. Proctor* (1992) 4 Cal.4th 499, 543 [15 Cal.Rptr.2d 340, 842 P.2d 1100]; *People v. Brock* (1967) 66 Cal.2d 645, 651 [58 Cal.Rptr. 321, 426 P.2d 889], overruled on other grounds in *People v. Cook* (1983) 33 Cal.3d 400, 413, fn. 13 [189 Cal.Rptr. 159, 658 P.2d 86].)

“[J]udicial comment on the evidence must be accurate, temperate, nonargumentative, and scrupulously fair. The trial court may not, in the guise of privileged comment, withdraw material evidence from the jury’s consideration, distort the record, expressly or impliedly direct a verdict, or otherwise usurp the jury’s ultimate factfinding power.” (*People v. Proctor, supra*, 4 Cal.4th at p. 542.)

The judge may comment on the evidence before the case is submitted to the jury or after the jury has announced it is deadlocked. (*People v. Rodriguez* (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 766 [230 Cal.Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113] [overruling *People v. Cook* (1983) 33 Cal.3d 400 [189 Cal.Rptr. 159, 658 P.2d 86].)

The judge may comment on the evidence at the sanity phase of a trial. (*People v. Scott* (1960) 53 Cal.2d 558, 563–565 [2 Cal.Rptr. 274, 348 P.2d 882], overruled in part by *People v. Morse* (1964) 60 Cal.2d 631, 638, fn. 2, 648–649 [36 Cal.Rptr. 201, 388 P.2d 33].)

The judge may comment on the evidence at the penalty phase of a capital trial.

(*People v. Friend* (1958) 50 Cal.2d 570, 579 [327 P.2d 97], overruled on other grounds in *People v. Cook* (1983) 33 Cal.3d 400, 413, fn. 13 [189 Cal.Rptr. 159, 658 P.2d 86].) However, *Friend* was decided in 1958, prior to most of the modern case law on capital trials. Thus, the committee recommends proceeding with great caution prior to making any comment on the evidence in the penalty phase of a capital case.

### AUTHORITY

- Judge May Comment on Evidence. Cal. Const., art. VI, § 10; Pen. Code, §§ 1127, 1093(f).
- Admonition Required. Cal. Const., art. VI, § 10; Pen. Code, §§ 1127, 1093(f); *People v. Proctor* (1992) 4 Cal.4th 499, 543 [15 Cal.Rptr.2d 340, 842 P.2d 1100]; *People v. Brock* (1967) 66 Cal.2d 645, 651 [58 Cal.Rptr. 321, 426 P.2d 889], overruled on other grounds in *People v. Cook* (1983) 33 Cal.3d 400, 413, fn. 13 [189 Cal.Rptr. 159, 658 P.2d 86].
- Comments Must Not Direct Verdict and Must Be Fair. *People v. Proctor* (1992) 4 Cal.4th 499, 542 [15 Cal.Rptr.2d 340, 842 P.2d 1100]; *People v. Brock* (1967) 66 Cal.2d 645, 651 [58 Cal.Rptr. 321, 426 P.2d 889], overruled on other grounds in *People v. Cook* (1983) 33 Cal.3d 400, 413, fn. 13 [189 Cal.Rptr. 159, 658 P.2d 86].
- Judge May Comment After Jury Declares Deadlock. *People v. Rodriguez* (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 766 [230 Cal.Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

5 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, §§ 741–746.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 82, *Witnesses*, § 82.02[2]; Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.02[2][c] (Matthew Bender).

## 3531. Service Provider for Juror With Disability (Code Civ. Proc., § 224)

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\_\_\_\_\_ <insert name or number of juror> **has been assisted by (a/an) \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of service provider, e.g., sign language interpreter> to communicate and receive information. The \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of service provider> will be with you during your deliberations. You may not discuss the case with the \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of service provider>. The \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of service provider> is not a member of the jury and is not to participate in the deliberations in any way other than as necessary to provide the service to \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name or number of juror>.**

**All jurors must be able to fully participate in deliberations. In order to allow the \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of service provider> to properly assist \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name or number of juror>, jurors should not talk at the same time and should not have side conversations. Jurors should speak directly to \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name or number of juror>, not to the \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of service provider>.**

**[Two \_\_\_\_\_ <insert description of service providers> will be present during deliberations and will take turns in assisting \_\_\_\_\_ <insert name or number of juror>.]**

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*New January 2006*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction if a juror will be using the assistance of a service provider in deliberations. (Code Civ. Proc., § 224(b).)

### AUTHORITY

- Juror Not Incompetent Due to Disability. Code Civ. Proc., § 203(a)(6).
- Juror May Use Service Provider. Code Civ. Proc., § 224.
- Court Must Instruct on Use of Service Provider. Code Civ. Proc., § 224(b).

### SECONDARY SOURCES

7 Witkin, California Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Trial, §§ 320, 330.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 81, *Jury*

*Selection and Opening Statement*, § 81.02[2]; Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.05[1] (Matthew Bender).

**3532–3549. Reserved for Future Use**



## **D. CONCLUDING INSTRUCTION ON SUBMISSION TO JURY**

### **3550. Pre-Deliberation Instructions**

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**When you go to the jury room, the first thing you should do is choose a foreperson. The foreperson should see to it that your discussions are carried on in an organized way and that everyone has a fair chance to be heard.**

**It is your duty to talk with one another and to deliberate in the jury room. You should try to agree on a verdict if you can. Each of you must decide the case for yourself, but only after you have discussed the evidence with the other jurors. Do not hesitate to change your mind if you become convinced that you are wrong. But do not change your mind just because other jurors disagree with you.**

**Keep an open mind and openly exchange your thoughts and ideas about this case. Stating your opinions too strongly at the beginning or immediately announcing how you plan to vote may interfere with an open discussion. Please treat one another courteously. Your role is to be an impartial judge of the facts, not to act as an advocate for one side or the other.**

**As I told you at the beginning of the trial, do not talk about the case or about any of the people or any subject involved in it with anyone, including, but not limited to, your spouse or other family, or friends, spiritual leaders or advisors, or therapists. You must discuss the case only in the jury room and only when all jurors are present. Do not discuss your deliberations with anyone. Do not communicate using: \_\_\_\_\_ <insert currently popular social media> during your deliberations.**

**It is very important that you not use the Internet (, a dictionary/[ , or \_\_\_\_\_ <insert other relevant source of information>]) in any way in connection with this case during your deliberations.**

**[During the trial, several items were received into evidence as exhibits. You may examine whatever exhibits you think will help you in your deliberations. (These exhibits will be sent into the jury room with you when you begin to deliberate./ If you wish to see any exhibits, please request them in writing.)]**

**If you need to communicate with me while you are deliberating, send a note through the bailiff, signed by the foreperson or by one or more members of the jury. To have a complete record of this trial, it is**

**important that you not communicate with me except by a written note. If you have questions, I will talk with the attorneys before I answer so it may take some time. You should continue your deliberations while you wait for my answer. I will answer any questions in writing or orally here in open court.**

**Do not reveal to me or anyone else how the vote stands on the (question of guilt/[or] issues in this case) unless I ask you to do so.**

**Your verdict [on each count and any special findings] must be unanimous. This means that, to return a verdict, all of you must agree to it. [Do not reach a decision by the flip of a coin or by any similar act.]**

*<During a retrial, give the following paragraph on request to inform jury about prior proceedings without introducing extraneous matters>*

**[Sometimes issues are tried in separate trials. The only issue in this trial is whether the People have proved the charge[s] of \_\_\_\_\_ *<insert description of charge[s]>* [in Count[s] \_\_\_\_\_]. Do not speculate about whether the defendant was already found guilty for (his/her) conduct or may be found guilty in the future in another trial. Do not consider any potential punishment.]**

**It is not my role to tell you what your verdict should be. [Do not take anything I said or did during the trial as an indication of what I think about the facts, the witnesses, or what your verdict should be.]**

**You must reach your verdict without any consideration of punishment.**

**You will be given [a] verdict form[s]. As soon as all jurors have agreed on a verdict, the foreperson must date and sign the appropriate verdict form[s] and notify the bailiff. [If you are able to reach a unanimous decision on only one or only some of the (charges/ [or] defendants), fill in (that/those) verdict form[s] only, and notify the bailiff.] Return any unsigned verdict form.**

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*New January 2006; Revised April 2008, October 2010, April 2011, September 2018*

## **BENCH NOTES**

### ***Instructional Duty***

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to instruct that the jury's verdict must be unanimous. Although there is no sua sponte duty to instruct on the other topics relating to deliberations, there is authority approving such instructions. (See *People v. Gainer* (1977) 19 Cal.3d 835, 856 [139 Cal.Rptr. 861, 566 P.2d 997]; *People v. Selby* (1926) 198 Cal. 426, 439 [245 P. 426]; *People v. Hunt* (1915) 26 Cal.App. 514, 517 [147 P. 476].)

If the court automatically sends exhibits into the jury room, give the bracketed

sentence that begins with “These exhibits will be sent into the jury room.” If not, give the bracketed phrase that begins with “You may examine whatever exhibits you think.”

Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “Do not take anything I said or did during the trial” unless the court will be commenting on the evidence. (See Pen. Code, §§ 1127, 1093(f).)

Give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “Sometimes issues are tried in separate trials” if requested. (*People v. Hicks* (2017) 4 Cal.5th 203, 205 [226 Cal.Rptr.3d 565, 407 P.3d 409].)

### AUTHORITY

- Exhibits. Pen. Code, § 1137.
- Questions. Pen. Code, § 1138.
- Verdict Forms. Pen. Code, § 1140.
- Unanimous Verdict. Cal. Const., art. I, § 16; *People v. Howard* (1930) 211 Cal. 322, 325 [295 P. 333]; *People v. Kelso* (1945) 25 Cal.2d 848, 853–854 [155 P.2d 819]; *People v. Collins* (1976) 17 Cal.3d 687, 692 [131 Cal.Rptr. 782, 552 P.2d 742].
- Duty to Deliberate. *People v. Gainer* (1977) 19 Cal.3d 835, 856 [139 Cal.Rptr. 861, 566 P.2d 997].
- Judge’s Conduct as Indication of Verdict. *People v. Hunt* (1915) 26 Cal.App. 514, 517 [147 P. 476].
- Keep an Open Mind. *People v. Selby* (1926) 198 Cal. 426, 439 [245 P. 426].
- Do Not Consider Punishment. *People v. Nichols* (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 21, 24 [62 Cal.Rptr.2d 433].
- Hung Jury. *People v. Gainer* (1977) 19 Cal.3d 835, 850–852 [139 Cal.Rptr. 861, 566 P.2d 997]; *People v. Moore* (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1118–1121 [117 Cal.Rptr.2d 715].
- This Instruction Upheld. *People v. Santiago* (2010) 178 Cal.App.4th 1471, 1475–1476 [101 Cal.Rptr.3d 257].
- Special Instruction for Retrial Jury. *People v. Hicks* (2017) 4 Cal.5th 203, 205 [226 Cal.Rptr.3d 565, 407 P.3d 409].

### RELATED ISSUES

#### *Admonition Not to Discuss Case with Anyone*

In *People v. Danks* (2004) 32 Cal.4th 269, 298–300 [8 Cal.Rptr.3d 767, 82 P.3d 1249], a capital case, two jurors violated the court’s admonition not to discuss the case with anyone by consulting with their pastors regarding the death penalty. The Supreme Court stated:

It is troubling that during deliberations not one but two jurors had conversations with their pastors that ultimately addressed the issue being resolved at the

penalty phase in this case. Because jurors instructed not to speak to anyone about the case except a fellow juror during deliberations . . . may assume such an instruction does not apply to confidential relationships, we recommend the jury be expressly instructed that they may not speak to anyone about the case, except a fellow juror during deliberations, and that this includes, but is not limited to, spouses, spiritual leaders or advisers, or therapists. Moreover, the jury should also be instructed that if anyone, other than a fellow juror during deliberations, tells a juror his or her view of the evidence in the case, the juror should report that conversation immediately to the court.

(*Id.* at p. 306, fn. 11.)

The court may, at its discretion, add the suggested language to the fourth paragraph of this instruction.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

4 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, §§ 726–727.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, §§ 85.02, 85.03[1], 85.05[1] (Matthew Bender).

## 3551. Further Instruction About Deliberations

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Sometimes juries that have had difficulty reaching a verdict are able to resume deliberations and successfully reach a verdict [on one or more counts]. Please consider the following suggestions.

Do not hesitate to reexamine your own views. Fair and effective jury deliberations require a frank and forthright exchange of views.

Each of you must decide the case for yourself and form your individual opinion after you have fully and completely considered all of the evidence with your fellow jurors. It is your duty as jurors to deliberate with the goal of reaching a verdict if you can do so without surrendering your individual judgment. Do not change your position just because it differs from that of other jurors or just because you or others want to reach a verdict. Both the People and the Defendant are entitled to the individual judgment of each juror.

It is up to you to decide how to conduct your deliberations. You may want to consider new approaches in order to get a fresh perspective.

Let me know whether I can do anything to help you further, such as give additional instructions or clarify instructions I have already given you.

Please continue your deliberations at this time. If you wish to communicate with me further, please do so in writing [using the form my bailiff has given you].

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*New February 2012*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

There is no sua sponte duty to instruct a deadlocked jury on continuing its deliberations. Nevertheless, courts of review have approved instruction on the topics covered in this instruction (*See People v. Gainer* (1977) 19 Cal.3d 835, 856 [139 Cal.Rptr. 861, 566 P.2d 997]; *People v. Moore* (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1118 [117 Cal.Rptr.2d 715].) The court may give this instruction if the jury announces that it is unable to reach a verdict. In case of an impasse, Penal Code Section 1140 vests the trial court with discretion to determine whether there is a reasonable probability of agreement among jurors. California Rules of Court, Rule 2.1036 further explains the court's role in such a case.

### AUTHORITY

- *Allen Charge Disapproved.* *People v. Gainer* (1977) 19 Cal.3d 835, 842 [139 Cal.Rptr. 861, 566 P.2d 997].
- *Duty to Deliberate.* *People v. Gainer* (1977) 19 Cal.3d 835, 856 [139 Cal.Rptr. 861, 566 P.2d 997].

- Keep an Open Mind. *People v. Selby* (1926) 198 Cal. 426, 439 [245 P. 426].
- Alternate Methods of Deliberation. *People v. Moore* (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1118 [117 Cal.Rptr.2d 715].

### **SECONDARY SOURCES**

6 Witkin & Epstein, *California Criminal Law* (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Judgment, § 44.

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*. § 85.05 (Matthew Bender).

**3552–3574. Reserved for Future Use**

## E. ALTERNATES

### 3575. Substitution of Alternate Juror: During Deliberations (Pen. Code, § 1089)

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One of your fellow jurors has been excused and an alternate juror has been selected to join the jury.

Do not consider this substitution for any purpose.

The alternate juror must participate fully in the deliberations that lead to any verdict. The People and the defendant[s] have the right to a verdict reached only after full participation of the jurors whose votes determine that verdict. This right will only be assured if you begin your deliberations again, from the beginning. Therefore, you must set aside and disregard all past deliberations and begin your deliberations all over again. Each of you must disregard the earlier deliberations and decide this case as if those earlier deliberations had not taken place.

Now, please return to the jury room and start your deliberations from the beginning.

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*New January 2006*

## BENCH NOTES

### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction if an alternate juror has been seated. (*People v. Collins* (1976) 17 Cal.3d 687, 693–694 [131 Cal.Rptr. 782, 552 P.2d 742], overruled on other grounds in *People v. Boyette* (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 462, fn. 19 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 58 P.3d 391].)

If an alternate juror is seated during the penalty phase of a capital trial but prior to submission of the penalty phase to the jury, give CALCRIM No. 3576, *Substitution of Alternate Juror in Capital Case: After Guilt Determination, Before Submission of Penalty Phase to Jury*.

## AUTHORITY

- Statutory Authority to Seat Alternate Juror. Pen. Code, § 1089.
- Jury Must Be Instructed to Disregard Previous Deliberations. *People v. Collins* (1976) 17 Cal.3d 687, 693–694 [131 Cal.Rptr. 782, 552 P.2d 742], overruled on other grounds in *People v. Boyette* (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 462, fn. 19 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 58 P.3d 391]; *People v. Renteria* (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 552, 559 [113 Cal.Rptr.2d 287].

## SECONDARY SOURCES

5 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, § 615.1059

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, *California Criminal Defense Practice*, Ch. 81, *Jury Selection and Opening Statement*, §§ 81.01[2], 81.05[4]; Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.05[1] (Matthew Bender).



**3576. Substitution of Alternate Juror in Capital Case: After Guilt Determination, Before Submission of Penalty Phase to Jury (Pen. Code, § 1089)**

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**One of your fellow jurors has been excused and an alternate juror has been selected to take (his/her) place, as provided by law.**

**For the purposes of this phase of the trial, the alternate juror must accept [all] the verdict[s] and finding[s] returned by the jury in the prior phase[s] of the trial.**

**In this phase of the trial, you must now determine what penalty is appropriate in light of the prior verdict[s] and finding[s] and all the other evidence that bears on this question. The People and the defendant[s] have the right to a verdict on the issue of penalty that is reached only after full participation of the jurors whose votes determine that verdict. This right may be assured only if the alternate juror participates fully in the deliberations, including any necessary review of the evidence presented in the prior phase[s] of this trial.**

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*New January 2006*

**BENCH NOTES**

***Instructional Duty***

This instruction may be used if an alternate juror has been seated for the penalty phase of a capital trial. (*People v. Cain* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 66–67 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 481, 892 P.2d 1224]; *People v. Collins* (1976) 17 Cal.3d 687, 693–694 [131 Cal.Rptr. 782, 552 P.2d 742], overruled on other grounds in *People v. Boyette* (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 462, fn. 19 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 58 P.3d 391].) It is unclear if the court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction. (Compare *People v. Cain, supra*, 10 Cal.4th at pp. 66–67 [instruction approved]; *People v. Renteria* (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 552, 559 [113 Cal.Rptr.2d 287] [court required to give *Collins* instruction when juror substituted during guilt deliberations; noncapital case]; *People v. Cunningham* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 1030 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 291, 25 P.3d 519] [no error in failing to give instruction on beginning guilt phase deliberations anew where alternate juror seated for penalty phase]). The preferred approach would be to give the instruction when relevant.

In *People v. Cain* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 64–65 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 481, 892 P.2d 1224], the trial court gave a longer explanation of what verdicts and findings the alternate juror was required to accept. The committee believes that the second paragraph of this instruction sufficiently explains this concept. However, if the court would like to provide a more detailed explanation, the court may insert the following after that paragraph:

For (that/those) offense[s] for which the jury returned a verdict of guilty and for

(that/those) special circumstance[s] that the jury found to be true, the alternate juror must accept that those matters have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. [Similarly, for ((that/those) offense[s] for which the jury returned a verdict of not guilty/ [and] for (that/those) special circumstance[s] that the jury found (was/were) not proved), the alternate juror must accept that (that/those) matter[s] (has/have) not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.] [The alternate juror must also accept the jury's finding at the sanity phase of this trial.]

If the defendant requests an instruction on lingering doubt regarding guilt, the court should review the instruction approved of in *People v. Cain, supra*, 10 Cal.4th at pp. 64–65. However, the court has no sua sponte duty to instruct on lingering doubt. (*People v. Cunningham, supra*, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1030.)

### AUTHORITY

- Statutory Authority to Seat Alternate Juror. Pen. Code, § 1089.
- Alternate Juror Seated During Deliberations: Must Be Instructed to Disregard Previous Deliberations. *People v. Collins* (1976) 17 Cal.3d 687, 693–694 [131 Cal.Rptr. 782, 552 P.2d 742], overruled on other grounds in *People v. Boyette* (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 462, fn. 19 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 58 P.3d 391]; *People v. Renteria* (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 552, 559 [113 Cal.Rptr.2d 287].
- Alternate Juror Seated Prior to Penalty Phase. *People v. Cain* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 66–67 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 481, 892 P.2d 1224]; *People v. Cunningham* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 1030 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 291, 25 P.3d 519].

### SECONDARY SOURCES

5 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, § 615.  
 4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 87, *Death Penalty*, § 87.24[1] (Matthew Bender).

## 3577. Instructions to Alternate on Submission of Case to Jury

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**To the alternate juror[s]: The jury (will soon begin/is now) deliberating, but you are still [an] alternate juror[s] and are bound by my earlier instructions about your conduct.**

**Do not talk about the case or about any of the people or any subject involved in it with anyone, not even your family or friends[, and not even with each other]. Do not have any contact with the deliberating jurors. Do not decide how you would vote if you were deliberating. Do not form or express an opinion about the issues in this case, unless you are substituted for one of the deliberating jurors.**

---

*New January 2006; Revised June 2007*

### **BENCH NOTES**

#### ***Instructional Duty***

This instruction is provided for the court to use at its discretion.

**3578–3589. Reserved for Future Use**



## F. FINAL INSTRUCTION ON DISCHARGE OF JURY

### 3590. Final Instruction on Discharge of Jury

---

You have now completed your jury service in this case. On behalf of all the judges of the court, please accept my thanks for your time and effort.

Now that the case is over, you may choose whether or not to discuss the case and your deliberations with anyone.

[I remind you that under California law, you must wait at least 90 days before negotiating or agreeing to accept any payment for information about the case.]

Let me tell you about some rules the law puts in place for your convenience and protection.

The lawyers in this case, the defendant[s], or their representatives may now talk to you about the case, including your deliberations or verdict. Those discussions must occur at a reasonable time and place and with your consent.

Please tell me immediately if anyone unreasonably contacts you without your consent.

Anyone who violates these rules is violating a court order and may be fined.

[I order that the court's record of personal juror identifying information, including names, addresses, and telephone numbers, be sealed until further order of this court.

If, in the future, the court is asked to decide whether this information will be released, notice will be sent to any juror whose information is involved. You may oppose the release of this information and ask that any hearing on the release be closed to the public. The court will decide whether and under what conditions any information may be disclosed.]

Again, thank you for your service. You are now excused.

---

*New January 2006; Revised August 2012*

### BENCH NOTES

#### *Instructional Duty*

The court has a **sua sponte** duty to give this instruction on discharge of the jury. (Code Civ. Proc., § 206.) The court may give the bracketed portions at its discretion. (*Id.*, § 237.)

Code of Civil Procedure section 237(a)(2) requires the court to seal the personal identifying information of jurors in a criminal case following the recording of the jury's verdict. Access to the sealed records may be permitted on a showing of good cause in a petition to the court, as provided by subdivisions (b) through (d).

Section 14 of the California Standards of Judicial Administration states that "it is appropriate for the trial judge to thank jurors for their public service, but the judge's comments should not include praise or criticism of the verdict or the failure to reach a verdict."

### AUTHORITY

- Statutory Authority. Code Civ. Proc., §§ 206, 237.
- Jury Tampering. Pen. Code, § 116.5.

### SECONDARY SOURCES

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 85, *Submission to Jury and Verdict*, § 85.05[1], [4][c] (Matthew Bender).

**3591–3599. Reserved for Future Use**

# Disposition Table

## DISPOSITION TABLE

Case Name:  
Case Number:  
Date:

Jury Instruction No.	Proposed By	Given as requested	Given as modified	Refused	Withdrawn





## Tables of Related Instructions

### Table of Related Instructions: CALCRIM (2021 edition) to CALJIC (Fall 2020 edition)

<u>CALCRIM</u>	<u>CALJIC</u>	<u>CALCRIM</u>	<u>CALJIC</u>
100.....	0.50	304.....	2.07
101.....	0.50	305.....	2.08
102.....	0.50, 1.05	306.....	None
103.....	2.90-2.91	315.....	2.92
104.....	0.50, 1.02	316.....	2.23, 2.23.1
105.....	2.20	317.....	2.12
106.....	0.50	318.....	2.12
107.....	None	319.....	2.13
120.....	1.08, 1.09	320.....	2.26
121.....	1.08, 1.09	330.....	2.20.1
122.....	3.25	331.....	2.20.1
123.....	1.12	332.....	2.80, 2.82, 2.83
124.....	1.03, 17.52	333.....	2.81
200.....	1.00, 1.01, 17.31	334.....	3.10-3.14, 3.17-3.20
201.....	1.03	335.....	3.11-3.13, 3.16, 3.18
202.....	None	336.....	3.20
203.....	1.06, 1.11, 17.00	337.....	2.29
204.....	1.04	350.....	2.24, 2.40
205.....	17.46	351.....	2.42
206.....	17.46	355.....	2.25, 2.60, 2.61
207.....	4.71	356.....	2.13.1, 2.70, 2.71
208.....	None	357.....	2.71.5
218.....	12.85	358.....	2.70, 2.71, 2.71.7
219.....	None	359.....	2.72
220.....	2.90-2.91	360.....	2.10
221.....	2.90-2.91	361.....	2.62
222.....	2.00	362.....	2.03
223.....	2.00	370.....	2.51
224.....	2.01	371.....	2.04- 2.06
225.....	2.02	372.....	2.52
226.....	2.21.1, 2.21.2	373.....	2.11.5
240.....	3.40, 3.41	374.....	2.16
250.....	1.20-1.22, 3.30	375.....	2.50, 2.50.1, 2.50.2
251.....	1.20-1.22, 3.31, 3.31.5	376.....	2.15
252.....	1.20-1.22	377.....	1.09
253.....	3.35, 3.36	400.....	3.00
254.....	3.33	401.....	3.03
300.....	2.11	402.....	3.02
301.....	2.27	403.....	3.02
302.....	2.22	404.....	4.21.2, 4.22
303.....	2.09	415.....	6.10, 6.12- 6.14,

**Table 1**

**Tables of Related Instructions**

<u>CALCRIM</u>	<u>CALJIC</u>	<u>CALCRIM</u>	<u>CALJIC</u>
.....	6.18, 6.22-6.23, 6.25-6.26	581.....	8.46
416.....	6.10.5, 6.12-6.14, 6.18, 6.22, .....6.23, 6.25, 6.26	582.....	8.45
417.....	6.11, 6.16, 6.17, 6.21	590.....	8.92, 8.93, 8.94
418.....	6.24	591.....	8.91, 8.92, 8.93
419.....	6.19	592.....	8.90, 8.92
420.....	6.20	593.....	8.91, 8.92
440.....	6.40	594.....	8.93.5
441.....	6.35	595.....	8.95, 8.96, 8.97
442.....	1.25, 6.36	600.....	8.66, 8.66.1
443.....	3.04	601.....	8.67
450.....	3.26	602.....	1.27, 8.68
451.....	3.26	603.....	8.41-8.44
460.....	6.00, 6.01, 6.02	604.....	8.41
500.....	8.00, 8.37	620.....	8.55-8.58
505.....	5.10, 5.12-5.16	625.....	4.21, 4.21.1
506.....	5.42	626.....	8.47
507.....	5.26	627.....	8.73.1
508.....	5.25	640.....	8.74, 8.75
509.....	5.25	641.....	8.74, 8.75
510.....	5.00	642.....	None
511.....	5.01, 8.42, 8.44	643.....	None
512.....	8.01	700.....	8.80, 8.80.1
520.....	8.10, 8.11, 8.20, 8.30	701.....	8.80
521.....	8.20, 8.22-8.25.1, 8.30, 8.70, .....8.71, 8.74, 12.56	702.....	8.80.1
522.....	8.73	703.....	8.80.1
523.....	8.28, 8.28.1	704.....	8.83
524.....	8.35, 8.36	705.....	8.83.1
525.....	8.35.2	706.....	8.83.2
540A.....	8.21	707.....	8.83.3
540B.....	8.12	708.....	8.83.3
540C.....	8.12	720.....	8.81.1
541A.....	None	721.....	8.81.3
541B.....	8.12	722.....	8.81.4, 12.56
541C.....	8.12	723.....	8.81.5
548.....	8.74	724.....	8.81.7, 8.81.8
560.....	8.12	725.....	8.81.10
561.....	8.12	726.....	8.81.11, 8.81.19
562.....	8.65	727.....	8.81.15
563.....	None	728.....	8.81.15.1
570.....	8.42, 8.44, 8.72	729.....	8.81.16
571.....	5.17, 8.72	730.....	8.81.17
572.....	8.40	731.....	8.81.17.1
573.....	8.43	732.....	8.81.17.1
580.....	8.45, 8.50-8.51, 8.72	733.....	8.81.18
		734.....	None
		735.....	8.81.21

<u>CALCRIM</u>	<u>CALJIC</u>	<u>CALCRIM</u>	<u>CALJIC</u>
736.....	8.81.22	917.....	9.11
737.....	8.81.7	925.....	9.12
750.....	8.82	926.....	16.101
751.....	8.82	935.....	10.37, 10.37.1
760.....	8.84	936.....	10.37, 10.37.1
761.....	8.84.1	937.....	10.37.2
763.....	8.85	938.....	16.145
764.....	8.87	945.....	9.22, 9.29, 16.101
765.....	8.86	946.....	9.22
766.....	8.88	947.....	9.22
767.....	8.88	948.....	9.22
775.....	8.84.01- 8.84.03	949.....	9.22
800.....	9.32	950.....	9.22
801.....	9.30	951.....	9.22
810.....	9.90	960.....	16.140
820.....	9.36.5	965.....	9.03
821.....	1.25, 9.37	966.....	9.03.2
822.....	1.25, 9.36	967.....	9.03.1
823.....	1.25, 16.170	968.....	9.05, 9.06
830.....	9.38, 9.39	969.....	9.04
831.....	16.172	970.....	3.36, 9.03.3
840.....	9.35.01	980.....	9.07
841.....	16.140.1, 16.141	981.....	9.21
850.....	9.35.1	982.....	9.21.1
851.....	9.35.1	983.....	16.290
852.....	2.50.02	984.....	16.290
853.....	2.50.3	985.....	16.292
860.....	1.27, 9.20, 9.20.1	1000.....	1.23.1, 10.00, 10.00.1, 10.04, 10.65
861.....	1.27	1001.....	10.01
862.....	9.20	1002.....	1.23.2, 10.02, 10.05.1, 10.65
863.....	9.20	1003.....	10.02, 10.05.1
875.....	9.02, 9.02.1	1004.....	10.02
876.....	9.00, 9.02	1005.....	10.03
877.....	9.08.5	1015.....	1.23.1, 10.10, 10.16, 10.65
890.....	9.09	1016.....	10.12
891.....	9.30, 9.31	1017.....	1.23.2, 10.13, 10.65
900.....	1.27, 16.100	1018.....	10.13
901.....	9.00	1019.....	10.11
902.....	16.113	1020.....	10.11
903.....	9.00	1021.....	10.15
904.....	9.00	1022.....	10.14
905.....	9.00	1030.....	1.23.1, 10.20, 10.26, 10.65
906.....	9.00	1031.....	10.21
907.....	9.00	1032.....	1.23.2, 10.23, 10.65
915.....	9.00, 9.01, 9.08		
916.....	9.00.1, 9.08		

**Table 1**

**Tables of Related Instructions**

<u>CALCRIM</u>	<u>CALJIC</u>	<u>CALCRIM</u>	<u>CALJIC</u>
1033.....	10.23	1150.....	10.70, 10.70.1
1034.....	10.22	1151.....	10.71, 10.71.1
1035.....	10.22	1152.....	10.72
1036.....	10.25	1153.....	16.420
1037.....	10.24	1154.....	16.420
1045.....	1.23.1, 10.30, 10.35, 10.65	1155.....	16.420
1046.....	10.31	1156.....	16.455, 16.456
1047.....	1.23.2, 10.33, 10.65	1160.....	10.38, 16.220
1048.....	10.33	1161.....	16.400
1049.....	10.32	1162.....	16.400, 16.403
1050.....	10.32	1170.....	4.19
1051.....	10.34	1180.....	10.40.1
1060.....	10.90	1181.....	None
1070.....	10.40.2, 10.67	1190.....	10.60
1071.....	10.40.1, 10.67	1191.....	2.50.01, 10.27, 10.43, 10.44
1072.....	10.67, 16.164	1192.....	10.64
1080.....	10.46	1193.....	10.64
1081.....	10.45, 10.67	1194.....	10.61, 10.61.1
1082.....	10.45, 10.67	1200.....	9.51, 9.52
1090.....	10.48	1201.....	1.23, 9.52, 9.73
1091.....	10.47, 10.67	1202.....	9.53
1092.....	10.47, 10.67	1203.....	9.52.1, 9.54, 9.55, 9.56
1100.....	10.50	1204.....	9.54.1, 9.56
1101.....	10.49, 10.67	1215.....	9.50, 9.56, 9.58
1102.....	10.49, 10.67	1225.....	9.71.5
1110.....	10.41	1226.....	16.103
1111.....	10.42	1240.....	9.60
1112.....	10.42.5	1241.....	9.61
1120.....	10.42.6	1242.....	16.135
1121.....	10.57, 10.67	1243.....	None
1122.....	10.67, 16.440	1244.....	None
1123.....	10.55	1250.....	9.70, 9.72
1124.....	None	1251.....	9.71
1125.....	None	1252.....	9.71.5
1126.....	None	1300.....	1.20, 9.94
1127.....	None	1301.....	9.16.1, 9.16.11
1128.....	None	1302.....	9.91
1140.....	10.58, 16.184-16.187, 16.190-16.191, 16.193-16.195	1303.....	None
1141.....	16.182-16.187, 16.190-16.191, 16.193-16.195	1304.....	None
1142.....	16.180-16.182, 16.184-16.187, 16.190-16.191, 16.193-16.195	1305.....	None
1143.....	16.184-16.187, 16.190-16.191, 16.193-16.195, 16.210, 16.211	1350.....	16.500
1144.....	None	1351.....	16.500
		1352.....	16.501
		1353.....	17.24
		1354.....	17.24.5
		1355.....	16.500, 16.501



<u>CALCRIM</u>	<u>CALJIC</u>	<u>CALCRIM</u>	<u>CALJIC</u>
1400.....	6.50	1861.....	14.47
1401.....	17.24.2	1862.....	14.46
1402.....	17.19.5, 17.24.2	1863.....	9.44
1403.....	17.24.3	1900.....	15.00,15.03
1500.....	14.81, 14.83	1901.....	15.00, 15.03, 15.05
1501.....	14.80, 14.83, 14.91	1902.....	15.03
1502.....	14.83, 14.91	1903.....	15.00, 15.03, 15.04
1515.....	14.83, 14.91	1904.....	15.00, 15.03, 15.04
1520.....	14.84, 14.91	1905.....	15.01, 15.03-15.04
1530.....	14.82, 14.86, 14.91	1906.....	15.02-15.03
1531.....	14.82, 14.91	1920.....	15.03-15.04
1532.....	14.82, 14.85, 14.91	1921.....	1.24, 15.03-15.04
1550.....	1.24, 14.88	1925.....	15.00, 15.03
1551.....	14.90	1926.....	1.24, 15.00, 15.03
1600.....	9.40, 9.40.2, 9.40.3, 9.41	1930.....	15.03-15.04, 15.07
1601.....	9.42.1	1931.....	15.03, 15.07
1602.....	9.42, 9.43	1932.....	15.03, 15.07
1603.....	9.40.1	1935.....	15.03-15.04, 15.08
1650.....	9.46	1945.....	15.03, 15.06
1700.....	14.50, 14.58, 14.59	1950.....	15.00
1701.....	14.51-14.53, 14.56	1951.....	15.00
1702.....	14.54	1952.....	15.00
1703.....	None	1953.....	15.00
1750.....	14.65	1954.....	15.00
1751.....	14.66	1955.....	15.00
1752.....	14.68	1956.....	15.00
1800.....	14.00, 14.02, 14.03, 14.35, 14.37, 14.41	1957.....	15.00
1801.....	14.00, 14.21-14.21.1, 14.23-14.24, 14.26, 14.28-14.30, 14.35, 14.37, 16.300	1970.....	15.20-15.30
1802.....	14.00, 14.25, 14.31	1971.....	15.20
1803.....	14.00	2000.....	15.40, 15.41.3, 16.075
1804.....	14.00,14.03, 14.10-14.12, 14.14-14.20	2001.....	15.40, 15.41.3, 16.075
1805.....	14.00, 14.03, 14.05	2002.....	15.40
1806.....	14.00, 14.03, 14.07, 14.08	2003.....	15.41.3
1807.....	None	2004.....	None
1820.....	14.36, 14.37, 17.04	2020.....	15.50
1821.....	16.620	2021.....	15.51
1822.....	16.305	2022.....	15.52
1830.....	14.70- 14.75	2023.....	15.50-15.52
1831.....	14.74-14.75, 14.77- 14.79	2040.....	15.60
1832.....	14.75-14.76	2041.....	None
1850.....	14.40	2042.....	None
1860.....	14.27, 14.30	2043.....	None
		2044.....	None
		2100.....	12.61.1, 12.63
		2101.....	12.60.1
		2102.....	None

**Table 1**

**Tables of Related Instructions**

<u>CALCRIM</u>	<u>CALJIC</u>	<u>CALCRIM</u>	<u>CALJIC</u>
2110.....	12.61.1, 12.65-12.68, ..... 16.831-16.832	2350.....	12.22, 12.31-12.33
2111.....	12.60.1, 16.830.1	2351.....	12.23, 12.31
2112.....	16.831.1	2352.....	12.21, 12.31-12.33
2113.....	16.830.1	2360.....	12.24.1, 12.31-12.33, 16.035
2114.....	None	2361.....	12.22.5, 12.24.1, 12.31
2125.....	12.65- 12.68	2362.....	12.24.1, 12.31, 16.035
2126.....	12.65- 12.68	2363.....	12.24.1, 12.31
2130.....	16.835	2370.....	12.24, 12.31
2131.....	17.28.2, 17.29	2375.....	12.24.1, 12.31, 16.030
2140.....	12.70, 12.75	2376.....	12.24.1, 12.31-12.33, 16.030
2141.....	12.72-12.80	2377.....	12.20, 12.24.1, ..... 12.32-12.33, 16.030
2142.....	12.70	2380.....	1.25, 12.10, 12.15, ..... 12.32-12.33
2150.....	12.72-12.74, 16.650, 16.652	2381.....	1.25, 12.15
2151.....	12.72-12.75, 16.650, 16.652	2382.....	1.25, 12.11-12.12
2160.....	12.74	2383.....	1.25, 12.17
2180.....	1.26, 12.86, 12.87	2384.....	1.25, 12.13, 12.16
2181.....	1.26, 12.85, 12.87	2390.....	1.25, 12.25, 12.31-12.33
2182.....	1.26, 12.87, 16.890	2391.....	1.25, 12.26, 2.29, 12.31
2200.....	16.840-16.841	2392.....	1.25, 12.27, 12.31
2201.....	16.602, 16.860	2393.....	1.25, 12.28, 12.31
2202.....	16.602, 16.870	2400.....	16.060, 16.061
2220.....	16.640, 16.641	2401.....	16.050
2221.....	16.602, 16.630-16.631, ..... 16.640-16.641	2410.....	16.040
2222.....	16.632	2411.....	16.005
2240.....	16.880	2412.....	16.006
2241.....	1.28	2413.....	16.007
2300.....	12.07, 12.32, 12.33	2430.....	12.35, 12.37
2301.....	12.02-12.03, 12.07	2431.....	12.35, 12.37
2302.....	12.01, 12.32, 12.33	2432.....	12.36-12.37
2303.....	12.32, 12.33, 12.52, 17.16.2	2440.....	12.08
2304.....	12.00, 12.30.1, 12.30.2, ..... 12.32, 12.33	2441.....	12.08
2305.....	12.06	2500.....	12.40
2306.....	None	2501.....	12.41, 12.56
2315.....	12.04, 12.07	2502.....	12.41
2316.....	12.07	2503.....	16.293
2320.....	12.05	2510.....	12.43, 12.48
2321.....	12.32, 12.33	2511.....	12.44, 12.48
2330.....	12.09.1	2512.....	12.48
2331.....	12.09.1	2513.....	12.45, 12.48
2335.....	12.09.2	2514.....	12.50
2336.....	12.09.3	2520.....	12.46.2-12.47.2, 12.48, 16.460
2337.....	12.09.4-12.09.5	2521.....	12.46-12.46.2, 12.47.2, ..... 12.48, 16.460
2338.....	12.09.3-12.09.4	2522.....	12.46-12.46.1, 12.47.2,

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.....	12.47.5-12.47.6, 12.48, 16.460	2650.....	7.40
2530.....	12.48, 12.54, 12.54.1, 16.470	2651.....	7.50
2540.....	12.46, 12.47, 12.47.5,	2652.....	7.50
.....	12.48.5, 12.51, 12.54, 16.470	2653.....	9.80
2541.....	12.46.1, 16.460	2654.....	1.26, 9.81
2542.....	12.46.1, 12.47.1, 12.47.6,	2655.....	1.26, 9.82
.....	12.54.1, 16.460	2656.....	1.26, 16.102, 16.107
2543.....	12.47.6, 16.460	2670.....	8.81.8, 9.23- 9.25, 9.27,
2544.....	12.46.2, 16.460	.....	16.103-16.106, 16.108,
2545.....	16.460	.....	16.110, 16.111
2546.....	12.47.2	2671.....	9.23
2560.....	12.40	2672.....	9.26, 9.28, 16.111, 16.143
2561.....	17.16.1	2673.....	16.109
2562.....	17.16.1	2680.....	16.120
2570.....	12.55	2681.....	16.225
2571.....	12.55.1	2682.....	16.230-16.231
2572.....	12.55.2	2683.....	16.235
2573.....	12.55.3	2684.....	16.252, 16.253
2574.....	12.55.4	2685.....	16.240, 16.241
2575.....	12.55.4	2686.....	16.240, 16.250-16.252
2576.....	12.55.5	2687.....	16.251
2577.....	12.55.6	2688.....	16.260, 16.280
2578.....	12.55.7	2689.....	16.260-16.262, 16.280
2579.....	12.55.8	2690.....	16.260- 16.262, 16.280
2590.....	12.53	2700.....	None
2591.....	12.49, 12.49.5	2701.....	None
2592.....	12.49.5	2702.....	None
2600.....	7.00, 7.00.5,	2703.....	None
.....	7.05-7.07, 7.10, 7.11	2720.....	7.35
2601.....	7.00.5, 7.01, 7.05-7.07,	2721.....	7.36, 7.36.1
.....	7.10, 7.11	2722.....	7.36.1, 7.37.1
2602.....	7.06, 7.07	2723.....	7.36.1, 7.37
2603.....	7.00.5, 7.02, 7.05,	2730.....	12.24.1
.....	7.08, 7.09, 7.11	2735.....	7.36.1, 7.39
2610.....	7.03, 7.03.3, 7.04-7.07	2736.....	7.33
2611.....	7.03.3, 7.05-7.07, 7.11-7.12	2745.....	1.24, 7.38
2612.....	7.03.3, 7.05, 7.08, 7.09,	2746.....	1.24, 7.34.02
.....	7.11, 7.13	2747.....	7.34.01
2620.....	7.03.1	2748.....	7.34.03
2621.....	7.03.2	2760.....	7.30, 7.30.1
2622.....	7.14, 7.16	2761.....	7.30.1, 7.31
2623.....	7.15, 7.16	2762.....	16.115
2624.....	7.17	2763.....	7.32
2630.....	7.18, 16.510	2764.....	4.44
2640.....	7.20-7.25	2765.....	None
2641.....	7.21.1-7.24	2800.....	7.72, 7.80, 16.910

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2810.....	7.76, 7.79, 16.911	2994.....	12.94
2811.....	7.61, 7.71, 7.76, 7.79	2995.....	12.95
2812.....	7.67, 7.76, 7.79	2996.....	12.96
2825.....	7.62	2997.....	None
2826.....	16.912	3001.....	None
2827.....	7.64	3002.....	None
2828.....	7.68, 16.913	3100.....	12.48.5, 17.18, 17.18.1, 17.25
2840.....	7.73	3101.....	17.26
2841.....	7.78	3102.....	17.18, 17.18.1
2842.....	7.90, 7.93	3103.....	17.25
2843.....	7.91	3115.....	17.15
2844.....	7.92	3116.....	17.15
2845.....	7.94	3117.....	17.15
2846.....	7.90-7.94	3130.....	12.42, 17.16.1
2860.....	7.96	3131.....	17.16.1, 17.16.2, 17.23
2861.....	7.96	3132.....	17.23
2900.....	14.95, 16.320	3145.....	12.42, 17.16, 17.19.1
2901.....	14.95	3146.....	17.19, 17.19.1
2902.....	14.95	3147.....	17.19
2915.....	16.445	3148.....	17.19.5
2916.....	16.447	3149.....	17.19.5
2917.....	None	3150.....	17.19.5
2929.....	9.15	3160.....	17.20
2930.....	16.330	3161.....	None
2931.....	16.340	3162.....	None
2932.....	16.350, 16.531	3163.....	None
2933.....	16.531	3175.....	9.52.1, 9.54
2950.....	12.97	3176.....	None
2951.....	12.98	3177.....	9.90
2952.....	12.98.1	3178.....	14.50
2953.....	14.96, 14.99	3179.....	9.52.1, 9.54
2960.....	12.63, 16.020	3180.....	14.50
2961.....	12.63, 16.011	3181.....	2.50.01
2962.....	12.63, 16.010, 16.012, 16.013.1, 16.014	3182.....	9.90
2963.....	12.63, 16.012, 16.013.1, 16.014	3183.....	12.07
2964.....	12.63, 16.013-16.014	3184.....	9.62.4
2965.....	12.63, 16.014, 16.016	3200.....	17.21, 17.22
2966.....	16.430, 16.431	3201.....	17.21
2980.....	16.160-16.163	3221.....	17.17.1
2981.....	16.150-16.156	3222.....	17.24
2982.....	16.160.1	3223.....	None
2990.....	12.90, 12.91	3250.....	17.24.1
2991.....	12.90	3251.....	17.24.1
2992.....	12.92	3260.....	17.49
		3261.....	8.21-8.21.2



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3400.....	4.50, 4.51	3531.....	1.08, 1.09
3402.....	4.40	3550.....	4.16, 17.30, 17.40- 17.43, 17.45, 17.47, 17.50, 17.54
3403.....	4.43	3551.....	None
3404.....	4.45	3575.....	17.51
3405.....	4.80	3576.....	17.51.1
3406.....	4.35	3577.....	17.53
3407.....	4.36	3590.....	17.60
3408.....	4.60-4.62		
3409.....	3.15		
3410.....	4.70-4.74		
3411.....	None		
3412.....	None		
3413.....	None		
3414.....	None		
3425.....	4.30, 4.31		
3426.....	4.20, 4.21, 4.21.1, 4.21.2, 4.22		
3427.....	4.23		
3428.....	3.32		
3429.....	3.37		
3450.....	4.00- 4.05		
3451.....	4.10		
3452.....	4.15		
3453.....	4.18		
3454.....	4.19		
3454A.....	None		
3455.....	4.47		
3456.....	None		
3457.....	None		
3458.....	None		
3470.....	5.30- 5.32, 5.50, 5.51		
3471.....	5.54, 5.56		
3472.....	5.55		
3474.....	5.52, 5.53		
3475.....	5.40		
3476.....	5.42, 5.43		
3477.....	5.44		
3500.....	17.01		
3501.....	17.01		
3502.....	17.01		
3515.....	17.02		
3516.....	17.03, 17.04		
3517.....	17.10, 17.11, 17.49		
3518.....	17.11, 17.12		
3530.....	17.30, 17.32		



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190(c) . . . . .	.524	190.2(c) . . . . .	.702
190(d) . . . . .	.525	190.2(d) . . . . .	.702, 703, 731, 732
190.03(a) . . . . .	.523	190.3 . . . . .	.760, 761, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767
190.03(c) . . . . .	.729	190.3(b) . . . . .	.764
190.05 . . . . .	.751	190.4 . . . . .	.700
190.05(a) . . . . .	.751	190.4(b) . . . . .	.768
190.05(c) . . . . .	.751	190.25 . . . . .	.737
190.05(d) . . . . .	.751	190.25(c) . . . . .	.737
190.05(e) . . . . .	.751	190.41 . . . . .	.359, 730
190.1 . . . . .	.700	191.5 . . . . .	.590, 2113, 2131, 2160
190.1(a) . . . . .	.750	191.5(a) . . . . .	.520, 590
190.1(b) . . . . .	.750	191.5(b) . . . . .	.590, 591
190.2 . . . . .	.701, 702	191.5(d) . . . . .	.590
190.2(3) . . . . .	.702	192 . . . . .	.581, 603, 604
190.2(4) . . . . .	.702	192(3) . . . . .	.2160
190.2(5) . . . . .	.702	192(a) . . . . .	.520, 521, 570, 571, 572
190.2(6) . . . . .	.702	192(b) . . . . .	.510, 520, 521, 580, 581, 582
190.2(H) . . . . .	.731, 732	192(c) . . . . .	.520, 580, 581
190.2(M) . . . . .	.731, 732	192(c)(1) . . . . .	.590, 592, 2160
190.2(a) . . . . .	.724, 726, 737	192(c)(2) . . . . .	.590, 591, 592, 593
190.2(a)(1) . . . . .	.720	192(c)(3) . . . . .	.591, 594, 2113, 2131
190.2(a)(2) . . . . .	.700, 701, 702, 750	192(f) . . . . .	.570, 603
190.2(a)(3) . . . . .	.721	192.5(a) . . . . .	.592, 2160
190.2(a)(4) . . . . .	.722	192.5(b) . . . . .	.592, 593
190.2(a)(5) . . . . .	.723	192.5(c) . . . . .	.591, 2160
190.2(a)(6) . . . . .	.722	194 . . . . .	.512
190.2(a)(7) . . . . .	.602, 724	195 . . . . .	.510, 511, 3404
190.2(a)(8) . . . . .	.724	196 . . . . .	.507
190.2(a)(9) . . . . .	.602, 724	197 . . . . .	.505, 506, 508, 509, 3471
190.2(a)(10) . . . . .	.725	197 to 199 . . . . .	.505
190.2(a)(11) . . . . .	.726	198 . . . . .	.505, 506
190.2(a)(12) . . . . .	.726	198.5 . . . . .	.3477
190.2(a)(13) . . . . .	.726	199 . . . . .	.507
190.2(a)(14) . . . . .	.700	203 . . . . .	.801, 891
190.2(a)(15) . . . . .	.727, 728	205 . . . . .	.800, 3176
190.2(a)(16) . . . . .	.729	206 . . . . .	.810, 3177

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<b>Penal Code—Cont.</b>		<b>Penal Code—Cont.</b>	
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207 . . . . .	1200, 1201, 1202, 1203, 3179	241(b) . . . . .	860, 900, 926, 945
207(a) . . . . .	1200, 1201, 1204, 1215, 1225, 3175	241.1 . . . . .	901
207(b) . . . . .	1200, 1201, 1203, 1225	241.2 . . . . .	906
207(c) . . . . .	1225	241.3 . . . . .	907
207(d) . . . . .	1225	241.4 . . . . .	903
207(e) . . . . .	1201	241.6 . . . . .	904
207(e)(2) . . . . .	1226	241.7 . . . . .	905
207(f)(1) . . . . .	1225	241.8 . . . . .	902
207(f)(2) . . . . .	1226	242 . . . . .	800, 801, 822, 840, 841, 925, 926, 935, 936, 937, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 960, 1000, 1001, 1002, 1003, 1004, 1015, 1016, 1030, 1031, 1032, 1045, 1046, 1047, 1048, 1049, 1050, 1051, 1120, 2722, 2723
208(b) . . . . .	1200, 1201, 1215, 3406	242.4 . . . . .	903
209 . . . . .	810, 3177, 3179	243 . . . . .	926, 945
209(a) . . . . .	1202	243(a) . . . . .	840, 841, 947
209(b) . . . . .	1200, 1203	243(b) . . . . .	926, 945
209.5 . . . . .	1204, 3179	243(b) to 1) . . . . .	926
209.5(a) . . . . .	1204	243(c)(1) . . . . .	926
209.5(b) . . . . .	1204	243(c)(2) . . . . .	945
210.5 . . . . .	1240, 1241	243(d) . . . . .	925
211 . . . . .	1203, 1600	243(e)(1) . . . . .	840, 841
212 . . . . .	1600, 1650	243(f) . . . . .	926
212.5 . . . . .	1602	243(f)(4).507, 925, 2180, 2201, 2202, 2655, 2736, 2763, 2929, 2950	
213(a)(1)(A) . . . . .	1601	243(f)(5) . . . . .	945
215 . . . . .	1650	243(f)(6) . . . . .	926, 948, 949
215(a) . . . . .	1204	243(f)(10) . . . . .	840, 841, 3163
220 . . . . .	890, 891, 1000, 1001, 1015, 1016, 1030, 1031, 1045, 3130	243.1 . . . . .	946
220(a) . . . . .	890, 891	243.2 . . . . .	951
220(b) . . . . .	890	243.2(c) . . . . .	951
222 . . . . .	1002	243.3 . . . . .	948
236 . . . . .	810, 1200, 1202, 1203, 1204, 1215, 1240, 1241, 1242	243.4 . . . . .	935, 936, 2306
236.1 . . . . .	1243, 1244, 2980, 3414	243.4(a) . . . . .	935, 936, 1045
236.1(c) . . . . .	1243, 1244, 3184	243.4(b) . . . . .	936
236.1(c)(2) . . . . .	3184	243.4(c) . . . . .	937
236.1(h)(1) . . . . .	3414	243.4(d) . . . . .	935, 936
236.23 . . . . .	3414	243.4(e)(1) . . . . .	935, 936, 938, 1045
237 . . . . .	1200, 1202, 1203, 1204, 1215, 1240, 1241	243.4(e)(2) . . . . .	938
237(a) . . . . .	1240, 1242	243.4(f) . . . . .	935, 936, 937
237(b) . . . . .	1240	243.4(g)(1) . . . . .	935, 936, 937, 938
240 . . . . .	800, 801, 820, 822, 840, 841, 860, 861, 862, 863, 875, 876, 890, 891, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 915, 925, 926, 935, 936, 937, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 960, 1000, 1001, 1002, 1003, 1004, 1015, 1016, 1030, 1031, 1032, 1045, 1046, 1047, 1048, 1049, 1050, 1051, 1120, 1123, 2503, 2720, 2721, 2723	243.4(g)(3) . . . . .	936
241 . . . . .	900	243.4(g)(4) . . . . .	936
241(a) . . . . .	840	243.4(g)(5) . . . . .	936
		243.6 . . . . .	949
		243.7 . . . . .	950

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243.9 . . . . .	.2722	261.5(b) . . . . .	.1071, 1072
243.10 . . . . .	.947	261.5(c) . . . . .	.1071
243.15 . . . . .	.946	261.5(d) . . . . .	.1070, 3406
243.25 . . . . .	.960	261.6 . .938, 1000, 1002, 1004, 1015, 1017, 1019, 1030, 1032, 1045, 1049, 1050	
244 . . . . .	.877	261.7 . . . . .	.938, 1000, 1015, 1030, 1045
244.5 . . . . .	.861, 876	262 . . 1000, 1001, 1015, 1030, 1045, 1060, 1111, 1203, 2306	
244.5(b) . . . . .	.876	262(4) . . . . .	.1000
244.5(c) . . . . .	.861	262(5) . . . . .	.1000
245 . . . . .860, 862, 863, 875, 925, 965, 2720, 2721		262(C) . . . . .	.1003
245(a) . . . . .	.875	262(a)(1) . . . . .	.1000, 1001
245(a)(1) . . . . .	.800, 801, 810, 820, 3145	262(a)(2) . . . . .	.1002
245(a)(1) to 3) . . . . .	.875, 2720, 2721	262(a)(3) . . . . .	.1003
245(b) . . . . .	.875, 2720, 2721	262(a)(3)(B) . . . . .	.1003
245(c) . . . . .	.860	262(b) . . . . .	.1000
245(d) . . . . .	.860	263 . . 1000, 1002, 1003, 1004, 1005, 1070, 1071, 1072, 1127, 1180	
245(d)(1) to 3) . . . . .	.860	264.1 . . . . .	.890, 1001, 1046, 1123
245.1 . . . . .	.602, 860, 861, 900, 926, 1551	266c . . . . .	.937, 1000, 1015, 1030, 1045
245.2 . . . . .	.863	266h . . . . .	.1150
245.3 . . . . .	.862	266h(b) . . . . .	.1150
245.5(d) . . . . .	.949	266i . . . . .	.1151
246 . . . . .	.965, 967, 968	266i(a)(2) . . . . .	.1151
246.3 . . . . .	.970	266i(a)(5) . . . . .	.1151
246.3(a) . . . . .	.965	266i(b) . . . . .	.1151
246.3(c) . . . . .	.970	266j . . . . .	.1152
247 . . . . .	.965, 967	269(a) . . . . .	.1123
247(a) . . . . .	.967	269(a)(1) to (5) . . . . .	.1123
247(b) . . . . .	.966	270 . . . . .	.2981
247.5 . . . . .	.967	270e . . . . .	.2980, 2981, 2982
248 . . . . .	.967	272 . . . . .	.1070, 1071, 1072, 1121, 1122, 2980, 2982
261.123, 208, 890, 1000, 1001, 1004, 1005, 1015, 1030, 1045, 1060, 1111, 1203, 2306		272(b)(1) . . . . .	.2982
261(6) . . . . .	.1000, 1001	272(b)(2) . . . . .	.2982
261(7) . . . . .	.1000, 1001	273.5 . . . . .	.810, 822, 840
261 to 368 . . . . .	.1110	273.5(a) . . . . .	.840
261(a) . . . . .	.1000	273.5(b) . . . . .	.840
261(a)(1) . . . . .	.1004	273.5(d) . . . . .	.840, 841
261(a)(2) . . . . .	.810, 1000, 1001, 1123	273.6 . . . . .	.2700, 2701
261(a)(3) . . . . .	.1002	273.6(a) . . . . .	.2701
261(a)(4) . . . . .	.1003	273.6(b) . . . . .	.2701, 2702
261(a)(4)(B) to (D) . . . . .	.1003	273.6(c) . . . . .	.2701
261(a)(4)(D) . . . . .	.937	273.6(d) . . . . .	.2701, 2703
261(a)(5) . . . . .	.1005	273a . . . . .	.821
261(b) . . . . .	.1000	273a(a) . . . . .	.821
261(c) . . . . .	.1000, 1015, 1030, 1045, 1060, 1111	273a(b) . . . . .	.821, 822, 823
261.5 . . . . .	.1070, 1072, 1180		
261.5(a) . . . . .	.1070, 1071, 1072		



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<b>Penal Code—Cont.</b>		<b>Penal Code—Cont.</b>	
<b>Sec.</b>	<b>Inst.</b>	<b>Sec.</b>	<b>Inst.</b>
273ab . . . . .	520, 820	287(c) . . . . .	810, 1090, 1091, 1101
273ab(a) . . . . .	820	287(c)(1) . . . . .	1080
273ab(b) . . . . .	820	287(c)(2) . . . . .	1015
273d . . . . .	821, 822, 823	287(d) . . . . .	1016
273d(a) . . . . .	822	287(e) . . . . .	1022
277 . . . . .	1250, 1251	287(f) . . . . .	1017, 1018
277(b) . . . . .	1250, 1251, 1252	287(f)(2) to (4) . . . . .	1018
277(c) . . . . .	1250, 1251	287(g) . . . . .	1019
277(e) . . . . .	1250, 1251, 1252	287(h) . . . . .	1020
277(f) . . . . .	1250	287(i) . . . . .	1017
277(h) . . . . .	1251	287(j) . . . . .	1021
277(i) . . . . .	1250, 1251, 1252	288 . . . . .	890, 1060, 1110, 1111, 1152, 1200
277(j) . . . . .	1252	288(a) . . . . .	1110, 1111, 1200, 3406
277(k) . . . . .	1252	288(b) . . . . .	1060, 1111
278 . . . . .	1250, 1251	288(b)(1) . . . . .	1060, 1111
278.5 . . . . .	1251	288(b)(2) . . . . .	1060
278.5(a) . . . . .	1251	288(c)(1) . . . . .	460, 1112
278.5(b) . . . . .	1251	288(c)(2) . . . . .	1060
278.5(c) . . . . .	1251	288(f)(1) . . . . .	1060
278.7 . . . . .	1252	288(f)(3) . . . . .	1060
278.7(a) . . . . .	1252	288(g) . . . . .	1060
278.7(b) . . . . .	1252	288(h) . . . . .	1060
285 . . . . .	1180	288.2 . . . . .	1140
286 . . . . .	890, 1030, 1031, 2306	288.2(2) . . . . .	1140
286(3) . . . . .	1030	288.2(a) . . . . .	1140
286(a).1030, 1032, 1033, 1034, 1035, 1036, 1037, 1090, 1091, 1092, 1127		288.2(a)(1) . . . . .	1140
286(b)(1) . . . . .	1092	288.2(a)(2) . . . . .	1140
286(b)(2) . . . . .	1091	288.2(e) . . . . .	1140
286(c)(1) . . . . .	1090	288.2(f) . . . . .	1140
286(c)(2) . . . . .	1030, 1123	288.2(g) . . . . .	1140
286(d) . . . . .	1031	288.3 . . . . .	1082, 1124
286(e) . . . . .	1037	288.3(a) . . . . .	1124
286(f) . . . . .	1033	288.4 . . . . .	1125, 1126
286(f)(2) to (4) . . . . .	1033	288.4(a) . . . . .	1126
286(g) . . . . .	1034	288.4(a)(1) . . . . .	1125
286(h) . . . . .	1035	288.4(a)(2) . . . . .	1125
286(i) . . . . .	1032	288.4(b) . . . . .	1126
286(j) . . . . .	1036	288.5 . . . . .	1120, 3516
286(k) . . . . .	1030	288.5(a) . . . . .	1120
286.5 . . . . .	1181	288.5(b) . . . . .	1120
287 . . . . .	890, 1015, 1016	288.5(c) . . . . .	1120
287(a).1015, 1017, 1018, 1019, 1020, 1021, 1022, 1080, 1081, 1082		288.7(a) . . . . .	1127
287(b)(1) . . . . .	1082	288.7(b) . . . . .	1128
287(b)(2) . . . . .	1081	288a . . . . .	1015
		288a(3) . . . . .	1015

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288a(a) . . . . .	1021, 1120	293.5(b) . . . . .	123, 208
288a(b)(2) . . . . .	1081	302. . . . .	2681
288a(c)(2) . . . . .	1123	311. . . . .	1140
288a(e) . . . . .	1022	311(a) . . . . .	1141, 1142
288a(f) . . . . .	1018	311(a)(1) . . . . .	1141, 1142, 1143
288a(g) . . . . .	1019	311(a)(2) . . . . .	1141, 1142, 1143
288a(h) . . . . .	1020	311(a)(3) . . . . .	1141, 1142
288a(i) . . . . .	1017, 1018	311(c) . . . . .	1141, 1142, 1143, 1144, 1145
288a(j) . . . . .	1021	311(d) . . . . .	1141, 1142
288a(k) . . . . .	1015	311(e) . . . . .	1141, 1142, 1143, 1144, 1145
289 . . . . .	890, 935, 936, 937, 938, 1045, 2306	311(f) . . . . .	1141, 1142, 1143
289(2) . . . . .	1045, 1047	311(g) . . . . .	1143
289(a) . . . . .	1102, 1123	311(g)(3) . . . . .	1143
289(a)(1) . . . . .	1045, 1046, 1047	311.1(a) . . . . .	1141, 1142
289(b) . . . . .	1049	311.1(b) . . . . .	1141
289(c) . . . . .	1050	311.1(b) to (d) . . . . .	1141, 1142
289(d) . . . . .	1048	311.1(c) . . . . .	1141
289(d)(2) . . . . .	1048	311.1(d) . . . . .	1141
289(e) . . . . .	1047	311.2(a) . . . . .	1142
289(f) . . . . .	1051	311.2(b) . . . . .	1141
289(g) . . . . .	1045, 1047	311.2(e) . . . . .	1141, 1142
289(h) . . . . .	1102	311.2(e)(g) . . . . .	1141, 1142
289(i) . . . . .	1101	311.2(f) . . . . .	1141
289(j) . . . . .	1100	311.2(g) . . . . .	1141
289(k) . . . . .	1045	311.3 . . . . .	1142
289(k)(1) . . . . .	1047, 1048, 1049, 1050, 1051, 1100, 1101, 1102, 1128	311.3(b) . . . . .	1142
289(k)(2) . . . . .	1045, 1047, 1048, 1049, 1050, 1051, 1100, 1101, 1102, 1128	311.4 . . . . .	1142
289(k)(3) . . . . .	1045, 1047, 1048, 1049, 1050, 1051, 1100, 1101, 1102, 1128	311.4(b) . . . . .	1141, 1144
289.6(c) . . . . .	602	311.4(c) . . . . .	1141, 1144
290 . . . . .	1145, 1170, 2352	311.4(d)(1) . . . . .	1141, 1142, 1144, 1145
290(b) . . . . .	1170	311.4(f) . . . . .	1144
290(c) . . . . .	1170, 2364, 2370	311.6 . . . . .	1143
290(f) . . . . .	1170	311.8 . . . . .	1141, 1142, 1143
290.002 . . . . .	1170	311.8(a) . . . . .	1141, 1142, 1143, 1144
290.01 . . . . .	1170	311.10 . . . . .	1141
290.010 . . . . .	1170	311.11(a) . . . . .	1145
290.011 . . . . .	1170	311.11(a) to (c) . . . . .	1145
290.011(g) . . . . .	1170	311.11(b) . . . . .	1145
290.012 . . . . .	1170	311.11(c)(1) . . . . .	1145
290.013 . . . . .	1170	311.11(c)(2) . . . . .	1145
293 . . . . .	1194	312.1 . . . . .	1140, 1141
293.5 . . . . .	123, 208, 1194	313 . . . . .	1140
293.5(a) . . . . .	123, 208	313(a)(1) . . . . .	1140
		313(a)(2) . . . . .	1140
		313(e) . . . . .	1140

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314	1160	417(a)(2)	981, 3470
337a	2990, 2992, 2993, 2994, 2995, 2996	417(a)(2)(A)	983, 984
337a(a)(1)	2990, 2991, 2995	417(c)	981
337a(a)(2)	2992	417(e)	981
337a(a)(3)	2993	417.3	980
337a(a)(4)	2994	417.4	985
337a(a)(5)	2995	417.6(a)	981
337a(a)(6)	2990, 2996	417.6(b)	981, 2929
368	960, 1807, 2701	417.8	982
368(3)	830	422	358, 810, 1300, 1301
368(b)(1)	830	422.6	1350, 1351
368(b)(2)	830	422.6(a)	1350, 1351
368(c)	830, 831, 2701	422.6(b)	1352
368(d)	1807, 1850	422.6(c)	1350, 1351
368(e)	1807, 1850	422.7	1355
368(f)	1240	422.7(a)	1355
368(g)	830, 831, 1060, 1240, 1807	422.7(b)	1355
368(h)	830, 831, 1240, 1807	422.7(c)	1355
368(i)	1807	422.55	523, 1350, 1351, 1352, 1354, 1355
399	2950	422.56(a)	523, 1350, 1351, 1352, 1354, 1355
399.5	2951	422.56(b)	523, 1350, 1351, 1352, 1353, 1354, 1355
399.5(c)	2951, 2952	422.56(c)	523, 1350, 1351, 1352, 1354, 1355
403	2681	422.56(d)	523, 1350, 1351, 1352, 1354, 1355
404	2682, 2683, 2684, 2686, 2736	422.56(e)	523, 1350, 1351, 1352, 1354, 1355
404(a)	509	422.56(f)	523, 1350, 1351, 1352, 1354, 1355
404.6(a)	2682	422.56(g)	523, 1350, 1351, 1352, 1354, 1355
404.6(c)	2736	422.56(h)	523, 1350, 1351, 1352, 1354, 1355
404.6(d)	2736	422.56(i)	1354
405	2683	422.57	523, 1350, 1351, 1352, 1354, 1355
406	2684, 2686	422.75(a) to (c)	1354
407	2685, 2686	422.75(b)	1354
408	2684, 2685	422.75(d)	1354
409	2686, 2687	424(a)	2765
415(1)	2688, 2689	424(a)(1)	2765
415(2)	2689	424(a)(2)	2765
415(3)	2690	424(a)(5)	2765
415.5	2688, 2689, 2690	424(a)(6)	2765
415.5(a)(1)	2688	424(a)(7)	2765
415.5(a)(2)	2689	424(b)	2765
415.5(a)(3)	2690	426	2765
415.5(f)	2688, 2689, 2690	450	1501, 1502, 1515, 1520, 1530, 1531, 1532, 1550
416(a)	2686, 2687	451	1302, 1501, 1502, 1515, 1551
417	875, 981	451(a) to (c)	1551
417(2)	983	451(b)	1502
417(a)	980, 981, 982, 983	451.1	1551

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Penal Code—Cont.		Penal Code—Cont.	
Sec.	Inst.	Sec.	Inst.
451.1(a)(1) . . . . .	1551	487 to 488. . . . .	.1801
451.1(a)(5) . . . . .	1551	487(a). . . . .	.1802
451.5 . . . . .	1500, 1551	487a(b) . . . . .	.1801
452. . . . .	.1530, 1531, 1532	487(b)(1)(B). . . . .	.1801
453. . . . .	.1550	487(b)(3) . . . . .	.1803
455. . . . .	.1302, 1501, 1502, 1515, 1520	487(b) to (d) . . . . .	.1801
456(b). . . . .	.1551	487(d). . . . .	.1600
459 . . 1121, 1160, 1500, 1601, 1700, 1701, 1950, 2916, 3178, 3180		487(d)(2) . . . . .	.1801
459.5 . . . . .	.1700, 1703	487g. . . . .	.1600
460. . . . .	.1701, 3178, 3180	487h. . . . .	.1600
470 . . 1900, 1901, 1902, 1903, 1904, 1905, 1935, 1950		488. . . . .	.1600
470(a). . . . .	.1900, 1901	490.2 . . . . .	.1801, 1802
470a. . . . .	.1920	490.2(c). . . . .	.1801
470(b). . . . .	.1900, 1902	490a. . . . .	.1750
470b. . . . .	.1921	491. . . . .	.1801
470(c). . . . .	.1903	492. . . . .	.1801
470(d). . . . .	.1900, 1902, 1904, 1905, 1906, 1930	493. . . . .	.1801
472 . . . . .	.1925, 1926	496 . . . . .	.376, 1752, 3516
473(b).1900, 1901, 1902, 1904, 1905, 1930, 1932, 1935		496(a). . . . .	.1750
475. . . . .	.1930	496a(a) . . . . .	.1750
475(a). . . . .	.1930	496b. . . . .	.1750
475(b). . . . .	.1931	496(b). . . . .	.1750
475(c). . . . .	.1932	496(d). . . . .	.1750
476. . . . .	.1935	496d(a) . . . . .	.1750
476a. . . . .	.1970	499. . . . .	.1822
476a(b). . . . .	.1970, 1971	499b. . . . .	.1204, 1800, 1820, 1822
480. . . . .	.1933	499b(a) . . . . .	.1822
484 . . 1600, 1750, 1800, 1801, 1804, 1805, 1806, 1807		499b(b). . . . .	.1822
484(a). . . . .	.1804	499d. . . . .	.1820
484d. .1950, 1951, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955, 1956, 1957		502.7. . . . .	.1950
484d(2) . . . 1950, 1951, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955, 1956, 1957		503. . . . .	.1806
484e. . . . .	.1956	503 to 515. . . . .	.1806
484e(a) . . . . .	.1950	511. . . . .	.1863
484e(c). . . . .	.1950, 1951, 1952	512. . . . .	.1806, 1862
484e(d). . . . .	.1952, 1956	513. . . . .	.1862
484f . . . . .	.1953, 1955, 1956	514. . . . .	.1801
484f(a). . . . .	.1953, 1954	518. . . . .	.810, 1202, 1750, 1830, 1831, 1832, 3177
484f(b). . . . .	.1955	519. . . . .	.1830, 1831, 1832
484g . . . . .	.1956, 1957	520. . . . .	.1830, 1831
484g(a) . . . . .	.1956	522. . . . .	.1832
484g(b) . . . . .	.1957	523. . . . .	.1831
485. . . . .	.1750	524. . . . .	.1830, 1831, 1832
486. . . . .	.1800, 1801, 1804, 1805, 1806	529(a). . . . .	.2044
487 . . . . .	.1801, 1950, 2601, 2602	529(a)(3) . . . . .	.2044
		530.5. . . . .	.2041

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[References are to the Judicial Council of California Criminal Jury Instructions (CALCRIM), e.g., 1900]

<b>Penal Code—Cont.</b>		<b>Penal Code—Cont.</b>	
<b>Sec.</b>	<b>Inst.</b>	<b>Sec.</b>	<b>Inst.</b>
530.5(a) . . . . .	2040	601(a) . . . . .	2929
530.5(c) . . . . .	2041	601(a)(1) . . . . .	2929
530.5(d) . . . . .	2042	601(b) . . . . .	2929
530.5(d)(1) . . . . .	2042	601(c) . . . . .	2929
530.5(d)(2) . . . . .	2043	602 . . . . .	2952
530.55(a) . . . . .	2040, 2041, 2042, 2043	602(k) . . . . .	2930
530.55(b) . . . . .	2040, 2041, 2042, 2043	602(m) . . . . .	2931
532a . . . . .	2020, 2021, 2022	602.5 . . . . .	2932
532a(1) . . . . .	2020, 2021, 2022	602.5(a) . . . . .	2932
532a(2) . . . . .	2021	602.5(b) . . . . .	2932, 2933
532a(3) . . . . .	2022	646.9 . . . . .	1301, 2929
532a(4) . . . . .	2020, 2021, 2022, 2023	646.9(a) . . . . .	1301
532(b) . . . . .	1804	646.9(b) . . . . .	1301
537e(a) . . . . .	1750	646.9(e) . . . . .	1301
548 . . . . .	2004	646.9(e)(h) . . . . .	1301
548(a) . . . . .	2004	646.9(g) . . . . .	1301, 2929
550(4) . . . . .	2000	646.9(h) . . . . .	2929
550(5) . . . . .	2000	646.9(i) . . . . .	1301
550(6) . . . . .	2000	647(a) . . . . .	1160, 1161, 1162
550(7) . . . . .	2000	647(b) . . . . .	1150, 1151, 1153, 1154, 1155, 1156
550(8) . . . . .	2000, 2001	647(f) . . . . .	2966
550(9) . . . . .	2000	647(h) . . . . .	2915
550(a) . . . . .	2000, 2001	647(i) . . . . .	2916
550(a)(1) . . . . .	2000	647.6 . . . . .	1110, 1121, 1122
550(a)(2) . . . . .	2000, 2001	647.6(a) . . . . .	1121, 1122, 1160
550(a)(3) . . . . .	2000, 2002	647.6(a) to (c) . . . . .	1121, 1122
550(a)(4) . . . . .	2000	647.6(b) . . . . .	1121
550(a)(5) . . . . .	2000	647.6(c) . . . . .	1121, 1122
550(a)(6) . . . . .	2000	653(b) . . . . .	2917
550(a)(6) to (9) . . . . .	2000, 2001	653.20(a) . . . . .	1156
550(a)(7) . . . . .	2000	653.20(b) . . . . .	1156
550(a)(8) . . . . .	2001	653.22(a) . . . . .	1156
550(a)(9) . . . . .	2000	653.22(b) . . . . .	1156
550(c)(2) . . . . .	2000, 2001, 2003	653.22(c) . . . . .	1156
591 . . . . .	2902	653b . . . . .	2917
594 . . . . .	2900	653f . . . . .	441
594(2)(A) . . . . .	2900	653f(c) . . . . .	1110
594(b)(1) . . . . .	2900, 2901	653j . . . . .	442
594.1 . . . . .	2502	653j(a) . . . . .	442
597(a) . . . . .	2953	654 . . . . .	965, 1350, 1700, 1900, 1935, 1950, 1970, 2220, 2748, 3149
597f . . . . .	1181	654(a) . . . . .	1110
599b . . . . .	2953	660 . . . . .	1831
599(c) . . . . .	2953		
601 . . . . .	2929		
601(2) . . . . .	2929		

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Penal Code—Cont.		Penal Code—Cont.	
Sec.	Inst.	Sec.	Inst.
663 . . .	460, 520, 521, 600, 800, 801, 891, 1000, 1002, 1003, 1004, 1005, 1015, 1016, 1017, 1018, 1019, 1020, 1021, 1022, 1031, 1046, 1047, 1650, 1700, 2653	667.61(e)(6) . . . . .	3183
664 . . .	460, 600, 602, 603, 604, 820, 821, 822, 830, 840, 1001, 1016, 1030, 1031, 1032, 1033, 1034, 1035, 1036, 1037, 1045, 1046, 1047, 1048, 1049, 1050, 1051, 1060, 1070, 1072, 1081, 1090, 1091, 1092, 1100, 1101, 1102, 1110, 1111, 1121, 1122, 1140, 1141, 1142, 1150, 1151, 1152, 1160, 1180, 1202, 1204, 1240, 1241, 1250, 1251, 1301, 1355, 1600, 1750, 1800, 1804, 1805, 1806, 1807, 1820, 1822, 1900, 1901, 1902, 1903, 1904, 1925, 1926, 1935, 1953, 1955, 1956, 1957, 2004, 2110, 2747	667.61(j) . . . . .	3175, 3176, 3177, 3178, 3179, 3180, 3181, 3182, 3183
664(a) . . . . .	.601	668 . . . . .	1850
664(e) . . . . .	.602	686(3) . . . . .	317
666 . . . . .	1600, 1850	692 . . . . .	2514, 2670, 2671, 3470
667 . . . . .	2352	692 to 694 . . . . .	505, 508, 509
667(a)(1) . . . . .	3100, 3101	693 . . . . .	2514, 2670, 2671, 3470
667(e) . . . . .	2370, 3100, 3101	694 . . . . .	2514, 3470
667(e)(2)(C)(iv) . . . . .	1700, 1703, 1750, 1801, 1802, 1850, 1900, 1957, 1970, 2304, 2364	726 . . . . .	2686, 2687
667.5 . . . . .	3102, 3414	799 . . . . .	3410
667.5(a) . . . . .	3100, 3101, 3102	800 . . . . .	415, 3410
667.5(b) . . . . .	3100, 3101, 3102	801 . . . . .	415, 3410
667.5(c) . . . . .	3100, 3101, 3102	801.5 . . . . .	3410
667.5(c)(8) . . . . .	3146, 3160	801.6 . . . . .	3410
667.5(d) . . . . .	3102	802(a) . . . . .	3410
667.5(h) . . . . .	1850	802(b) . . . . .	3410
667.5(j) . . . . .	3102	802(c) . . . . .	3410
667.9(a) . . . . .	3222	803 . . . . .	3410
667.9(b) . . . . .	3222	803(c) . . . . .	3410
667.9(d) . . . . .	3222	804 . . . . .	3410
667.10 . . . . .	3222	804(c) . . . . .	3410
667.10(a) . . . . .	3222	805(b) . . . . .	3410
667.61 . . . . .	3145	830.507, 602, 860, 861, 900, 945, 981, 982, 1551, 2610, 2620, 2621, 2630, 2651, 2652, 2653, 2654, 2655, 2656, 2722, 2762, 2763	903
667.61(c) . . . . .	3175, 3176, 3177, 3178, 3179, 3180, 3181, 3182, 3183	831 . . . . .	862, 901, 946
667.61(d)(2) . . . . .	3175	831(a) . . . . .	602, 2653, 2654
667.61(d)(3) . . . . .	3176, 3177	831.5(a) . . . . .	602
667.61(d)(4) . . . . .	3178	831.7 . . . . .	602
667.61(e)(1) . . . . .	3179	834 . . . . .	1226
667.61(e)(2) . . . . .	3180	834 to 836 . . . . .	2670
667.61(e)(3) . . . . .	3145, 3149, 3150	834a . . . . .	2656, 2670
667.61(e)(4) . . . . .	3146, 3181	834(a) . . . . .	2670
667.61(e)(5) . . . . .	3182	834a . . . . .	2672
		835 . . . . .	1226
		835a . . . . .	507
		836(a)(1) . . . . .	2670
		836(c) . . . . .	2670
		836.5(a) . . . . .	2653, 2654
		836.6 . . . . .	2762, 2763
		836.6(c) . . . . .	2762
		837 . . . . .	508, 1226
		839 . . . . .	1226

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Sec.	Inst.	Sec.	Inst.
841 . . . . .	.2670	1127h . . . . .	.200
859.5 . . . . .	.358	1137 . . . . .	.102, 200, 768, 3550
868.4 . . . . .	.377	1138 . . . . .	.768, 3550
868.5 . . . . .	.377	1140 . . . . .	.768, 3550, 3551
954 . . . . .	1120, 3515	1157 . . . . .	.548, 640, 641, 642, 643
955 . . . . .	.207	1158 . . . . .	1850, 2126, 3100, 3101, 3102, 3103, 3260
970 . . . . .	.203	1158a . . . . .	.3260
1016 . . . . .	.3455	1159 . . . . .	.640, 641, 642, 643, 3517, 3518, 3519
1016 to 1027 . . . . .	.3455	1160 . . . . .	.203
1017 . . . . .	.3455	1161 . . . . .	.640, 641, 642, 643, 3517, 3518, 3519
1023 . . . . .	.640, 641, 642, 643, 3517, 3518, 3519	1170 . . . . .	.3454
1025 . . . . .	.1850, 3100, 3101, 3103	1170.12 . . . . .	.3100, 3101
1025(b) . . . . .	.2125, 2126, 3101	1170.18 . . . . .	.3457
1025(c) . . . . .	.3100	1192(c) . . . . .	.3100, 3101
1026 . . . . .	.3450, 3455	1192.7 . . . . .	.3414
1026(a) . . . . .	.3450	1192.7(c)(23) . . . . .	.3145
1026.2 . . . . .	.3452	1203(e)(7) . . . . .	.1862
1026.5 . . . . .	.3450	1203.06 . . . . .	.3131, 3132
1026.5(b) . . . . .	.219, 3450, 3453, 3455	1203.06(a)(3) . . . . .	.3132
1026.5(b)(1) . . . . .	.3453	1203.06(b)(2) . . . . .	.1402, 3146, 3147
1026.5(b)(7) . . . . .	.219	1203.06(b)(3) . . . . .	.524, 3131, 3145
1027 . . . . .	.3455	1203.07 . . . . .	.3200
1054.5(b) . . . . .	.306	1203.07(2) . . . . .	.3200
1089 . . . . .	.3575, 3576	1203.07(4) . . . . .	.3200
1093 . . . . .	.1850	1203.07(a)(1) . . . . .	.3200
1093(f) . . . . .	.200, 300, 768, 3530, 3550	1203.066(b) . . . . .	.1120
1096 . . . . .	.103, 220, 221	1203.4 . . . . .	.2510
1096a . . . . .	.103, 220, 221	1203.4(a) . . . . .	.2510
1097 . . . . .	.640, 641, 642, 643, 3517, 3518, 3519	1208 . . . . .	.2760
1111 . . . . .	.224, 301, 334, 335, 376, 707, 708, 935, 1402, 1804, 3149, 3150, 3160, 3161, 3162	1318 . . . . .	.3002
1111.5 . . . . .	.336	1320 . . . . .	.3002
1119 . . . . .	.101	1320.5 . . . . .	.3001
1122 . . . . .	.101, 106, 201	1367 to 1370 . . . . .	.3451
1122(a)(1) . . . . .	.101	1369(f) . . . . .	.3451
1122(b) . . . . .	.124	1370.1(a)(1) . . . . .	.1004, 1060
1124 . . . . .	.200	1370.1(a)(1)(H) . . . . .	.3451
1126 . . . . .	.200	1376 . . . . .	.775
1127 . . . . .	.200, 300, 761, 768, 3530, 3550	1376(a) . . . . .	.775
1127a . . . . .	.336	1376(b)(1) . . . . .	.775
1127a(c) . . . . .	.336	1376(b)(2) . . . . .	.775
1127b . . . . .	.332, 2430, 2431, 2432	1376(e) . . . . .	.775
1127c . . . . .	.372	1385 . . . . .	.1551
1127d . . . . .	.1194	2684 . . . . .	.2747, 2748
1127f . . . . .	.330	2962 . . . . .	.3456
1127g . . . . .	.331	2962(a) . . . . .	.3456, 3457

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<b>Sec.</b>	<b>Inst.</b>	<b>Sec.</b>	<b>Inst.</b>
2962(e)(2)	. 3456	12020	. 2500, 2501
2962(g)	. 3456, 3457	12020(a)	. 2500
2963	. 3456	12020(a)(4)	. 2500, 2520, 2521, 2522
2966	. 219, 3457	12020(c)(7)	. 2500
2966(b)	. 3456	12021	. 2510, 2511, 2512, 2513, 2514
2970	. 3452, 3457	12022	. 524
2972	. 219, 3452, 3457	12022(2)	. 3145
2972(a)	. 3457	12022(a)	. 2590, 3115
2981	. 3456	12022(a)(1)	. 3115
4011.9	. 2760, 2761	12022(a)(2)	. 3116
4500	. 2720	12022(b)	. 3145
4501	. 2720, 2721	12022(b)(1)	. 3145
4501.1	. 2722	12022(c)	. 3131
4501.5	. 2723	12022(d)	. 3117
4502	. 2745	12022.3	. 3130, 3131, 3145, 3146
4503	. 2735	12022.5	. 524, 3146
4504	. 1022, 1037, 2721, 2722, 2723, 2735	12022.5(b)	. 3147
4532	. 723, 2760, 2761	12022.6(a)	. 1802
4532(a)(1)	. 2760	12022.6(a)(1) to (4)	. 1802
4532(a)(2)	. 2760, 2761	12022.6(b)	. 1802
4532(b)(1)	. 2760	12022.7	. 3160
4532(b)(2)	. 2760, 2761	12022.7(b)	. 3161
4573.6	. 2748	12022.7(c)	. 3162
4574	. 2746, 2747	12022.7(d)	. 3162
4574(a)	. 2746, 2747	12022.7(e)	. 3163
4574(b)	. 2747	12022.7(f)	. 810, 820, 821, 830, 1300, 1501, 1530, 2964, 3160, 3161, 3162, 3163, 3177
4574(c)	. 2747	12022.7(h)	. 3160
4852.17	. 2510	12022.8	. 3160, 3161, 3162, 3163
5003	. 1022, 1037, 2720, 2721, 2722, 2723, 2735	12022.53	. 3148, 3149
5075	. 3456	12022.53(a)	. 1402
6031.4	. 602, 862, 901, 946, 1022, 1037, 2722	12022.53(b)	. 3146, 3147
11165.1	. 2980	12022.53(c)	. 3148
11411	. 1302, 1303, 1304	12022.53(d)	. 3149, 3150
11411(a)	. 1303	12022.53(e)	. 1402
11411(b)	. 1303	12022.53(e)(1)	. 3149
11411(c)	. 1302, 1303, 1304	12022.53(f)	. 3149
11412	. 1305	12022.55	. 521
11413	. 1302	12022.75	. 3183
11413(b)	. 1302	12025(b)	. 2543
11413(b)(7)	. 1302	12031(a)(2)(C)	. 2542
11413(c)	. 1302	12034(d)	. 968
11413(e)	. 1302	12076	. 2510
11417	. 521	12280	. 2562
11417(a)(1)	. 521	12280(e) to (s)	. 2562
11417(a)(2)	. 521	12303.2	. 2572
12001(a)(1)	. 984		



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Penal Code—Cont.		Penal Code—Cont.	
Sec.	Inst.	Sec.	Inst.
12312 . . . . .	.2579	20610 . . . . .	.2500
13519(b) . . . . .	.2624	20710 . . . . .	.2500
13700 . . . . .	.852A	20910 . . . . .	.2500
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[References are to the Judicial Council of California Criminal Jury Instructions (CALCRIM), *e.g.*, 1900.]

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[References are to the Judicial Council of California Criminal Jury Instructions (CALCRIM), *e.g.*, 1900.]

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[References are to the Judicial Council of California Criminal Jury Instructions (CALCRIM), *e.g.*, 1900.]

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[References are to the Judicial Council of California Criminal Jury Instructions (CALCRIM), *e.g.*, 1900.]

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[References are to the Judicial Council of California Criminal Jury Instructions (CALCRIM), *e.g.*, 1900.]

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