



Superior Court
State of California
County of Lake
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DAVID HERRICK
PRESIDING JUDGE

TO: Justice Brad Hill, Presiding Judge
Court of Appeal, Fifth District

FROM: David Herrick, Presiding Judge
Lake Superior Court

DATE: August 27, 2012

SUBJECT: Lake Superior Court SB1407 Project Information on Selection Criteria

We appreciate the opportunity to advocate and provide input for our courthouse project, and understand the extremely difficult decisions you have before you, the statewide need for new courthouses is great and resources are few.

The Lakeport courthouse has consistently been ranked as one of the most deficient facilities in the state, some of the most severe problems with the current facility include the following:

Security Issues

- Ineffective perimeter security screening as a result of a shared use facility with multiple access/entry points.
- No separate circulation paths for judges, staff, the public or in-custody defendants.
- In-custody defendants are moved through public hallways with jurors, the public and staff.

Overcrowding

- No jury assembly room so jurors have to stand in the hallway, sometimes for hours.
- No victim's waiting room so that victims wait in public hallways with accused perpetrators.
- Staff workstations in hallways and converted closets.
- Limited on-site record storage which decreases staff efficiency due to multiple trips to off-site storage.
- Cost of off-site storage

Physical Condition

- Concerns about structural integrity of current facility. In some areas the floor drops nearly one inch in a 6 foot span. Pencils roll off desks, staff need to brace their chairs to keep from rolling away from desks.
- Aging HVAC system is inadequate and required an average of two service work orders per week over the past year.
- No fire sprinklers.

1. Security

Although the draft criteria does not rank each category by priority we would suggest security should be weighted heavily. Without a safe court facility, many of the other issues are irrelevant.

On August 6 and 7, 2012 the AOC's Office of Emergency Response and Security conducted a Security Survey for the Lakeport Courthouse and submitted a written report to the court. The report details the security issues listed below, among others, and concludes that these issues create "unacceptable risks to court users." The report is attached hereto.

While entrance screening is provided at the main entrance of the Lakeport facility, it is of limited effectiveness. The court occupies the fourth floor of a four-story shared use facility, with the county occupying the remaining three floors. The county is reluctant to implement or enforce strict screening procedures. There are six key-carded entrances, which court and county employees may enter without being screened. Individuals who want to avoid security screening through the front entrance, simply follow an employee in or slip in after an employee exits through one of the employee entrances. The county has been resistant to proposed changes to improve this situation, such as requiring all employees to enter through the main entrance.

There are no separate circulation paths for judicial officers, court staff or in-custody defendants. Judges are required to walk through the public hallways with the parties whose cases they just decided. In-custody defendants are led through public hallways to the courtroom, posing a security risk to the public as well as creating an escape risk. Recently, a juvenile in-custody defendant began to cause a disturbance while in the courtroom. In order for the deputies to remove the individual from the courtroom, they had to take him through the public hallway. In the process of doing so, the individual was able to pull the fire alarm on the wall in the public hallway; thus causing the entire four story building to evacuate.



The in-custody defendant in this case had been convicted of the murder of a 4 year old child, as well as several attempted murder charges. He is being led through the public hallway seconds after having being sentenced to 311 years in state prison. The group of individuals in the hallway are the parents of the child who was murdered, additional victims, as well as the defendants family and friends.



Felony in-custody defendants being led into the courtroom. The door at the end of the hallway where the defendants are led through also leads into a stairway to an exterior door. Should one of the defendants escape, he or she would have a direct, unobstructed route outside the building.



Felony in-custody defendants being removed from the courtroom. On this day in particular, defendants could be observed giving hand signals to individuals sitting in the audience section of the courtroom.

There is no secure judicial parking. Judges park in reserved spots in the county lot and walk through public parking lots, stairways, and hallways to get to and from their chambers.

There is no adequate separation for juvenile in-custody defendants. Juvenile in-custody defendants are held in a jury deliberation room that has the windows covered with sheets of plywood for privacy. When in-custody juveniles are brought into the courtroom, they must also be moved through the public hallway. There is a temporary sliding separation screen that shields the juveniles as they move through the public hallway. However, when the screen is in use it blocks the entrance to one courtroom and an emergency exit.



Plywood covering on windows in jury room where juveniles are held.



Movable partition that provides privacy for juveniles coming to and from court but blocks access to an emergency exit, and access to two courtrooms.

2. Overcrowding

The Lakeport court facility is roughly 15,000 square feet of space, our storage facility is 2,362 square feet and our Self Help Center is 1,815 square feet for a total of 19,177 square feet. The Project Feasibility Report conducted by the Administrative Office of the Courts estimates that adequate space for four courtrooms and all related supporting functions is approximately 50,000 square feet. To say our facility is overcrowded is an understatement. As a result of severe overcrowding, jurors are forced to wait, often with no place to sit, in public hallways, staff workstations are placed in hallways and converted closets.

On sight file storage is extremely limited which requires the court lease space to house court records. Aside from the obvious cost of the lease, the more severe consequence is the significant amount of staff time spent transporting files to and from the storage facility that could be spent on case processing activities.

Unfortunately, the public is also impacted as a result of having to store records off-site. Often, as a result of staffing shortages, we are unable to provide members of the public copies of case documents in a timely

manner, sometimes taking one to two weeks to retrieve documents from storage. This can cause delays in parties getting re-married, passing a background check for a new job, or delays in providing information to district attorneys on prior convictions resulting in incorrect charging in a criminal case.

As a result of limited space, and poor planning and design, court clerical spaces are separated from the vast majority of court files. Instead of taking a staff member 20 seconds to pull a file off of the shelf, it takes two or three minutes to run down the hall and pull the file. Since this occurs many, many times per day, this is a significant waste of time.

The restroom facilities on the fourth floor are grossly inadequate with only one three stall restroom for women, two urinals and one stall for men. On days when there are a large number of people on the floor, judges have to take longer breaks to allow for all prospective jurors or other parties to use the restroom facilities.

There are no sound barriers between the public hallways and the courtroom. Noise carries easily from the public hallways into the courtrooms, which can be intimidating to a witness and distracting to the parties, judge and staff.



The Lakeport court facility has no jury assembly room. Jurors are forced to wait in crowded hallways. Jurors, victims, witnesses, attorneys, are all forced to wait in the same public hallway.



Space is so limited that staff are quite literally required to work in hallways.

3. Physical Condition

We believe this criterion sets our courthouse apart from most if not all others. The concerns about the structural deficiencies in our building was documented in the Facilities Master Plan (2003) completed by Jay Farbstein & Associates, with the following comments:

“Building Structure: The structure is a four-story-story steel-frame building with some bracing (adequacy unknown). Floors and roof are steel deck with “celotex” insulation at the roof. There is evidence of what may be serious structural problems.”

“There is considerable differential settlement in the main courthouse, possibly due to the floor being overloaded by the law library (since relocated out of the building). The fourth floor is estimated to slope by as much as three to four inches from the exterior wall to the center and pencils are observed to roll off desks.....”

In one office the floor drops nearly one inch in six feet, see photo below. Local lore has it that one of the courtrooms that was added after the original building was complete, was actually designed on the back of a napkin. While this is probably not true, after touring the facility one might wonder. Another portion of the building which was also added after the building was originally built was so structurally unsound that it had to be vacated for a time while the county added additional support to hold up the building, including a concrete pillar in the middle of the judge’s chambers, see photo below.

Lake County is a hotbed of seismic activity due to its proximity to the Geysers. This assertion is demonstrated in the attached list of earthquakes in our region for period of August 17, 2012 through August 24, 2012. Our volcano, Mt. Konocti, is also classified as active. This geological activity lends a certain urgency to our structural concerns about this building.

Aside from the underlying structural deficiencies, we have numerous Workers Compensation issues from employees tripping over cords and obstacles to carpal tunnel claims resulting from inadequate work space.



A six foot level showing nearly an inch slope in the floor of one office.



Pillar in judge's chamber.

The HVAC system is inadequate and requires constant maintenance work. This week alone, the technician was at the court two days out of three because the temperature in the building was over 85 degrees. In the winter months staff use space heaters at their desks because the HVAC systems do not work properly. The extra appliances often trip overloaded breakers causing power outages and fire risks. Over the past year there have been 114 service requests placed for HVAC related work. With approximately 260 week days per year, that averages to more than two service requests each and every week, for a 15,000 square foot facility this is excessive.

In early fall after the first cold snap, bats routinely find their way into offices, public hallways and courtrooms. This has obvious potential health risks as well as creating trip and fall hazards for those trying to avoid contact with the bats or the folks trying to catch the bats.

There are no fire sprinklers in the current building. This poses risks to both the health and safety of staff and court visitors, as well as potential damage to original court files and evidence.

Between the current building and the old jail which is used as court holding, there is a very large diesel tank and a residential size propane tank. Both fuel tanks are in an area easily accessible to the public. There are no fences or gates prohibiting access to this area. This is a serious risk to staff and court visitors.



Photos of the two fuel tanks located between the courthouse on the left and the old jail on the right.

4. Access to Court Services

In addition to the deficiencies listed above in security, overcrowding and the physical condition of the building, the current facility provides an unsafe environment for judges, staff, victims, witnesses, jurors and all members of the public who visit the court.

One of the most underserved populations is jurors. We require these folks to take time off work to come to court. When they arrive, instead of being asked to sit comfortably in a room where they could quietly read, maybe watch television or even work remotely while they wait to be called into the courtroom, they walk into a hallway that is so packed with people there is hardly room to navigate through the crowd to check in. Jurors are then required to stand in the hallway, sometimes for hours, waiting to be called into the courtroom.

The current facility has many deficiencies relating to ADA access. There is not an ADA accessible bathroom on the court floor. Individuals must go down the elevator to a separate floor to use an accessible bathroom. The public seating in courtrooms, several witness and jury boxes, judicial officer benches and many staff areas are not ADA compliant. Because of the limited amount of space, facility modifications to the current facility to make all of these areas ADA compliant are not feasible.



Sign outside the restrooms on the court floor. Individuals have to go down the elevator two floors to county space to use the accessible bathrooms.



Witness box which is not ADA accessible.

Our Self Help Center is two blocks from the courthouse in a leased facility so litigants often have to scurry back and forth between the courthouse and the off-site facility. Services to self-represented litigants will be greatly improved in the new courthouse where the Self Help Center and court will be under the same roof.

5. Economic Opportunity

The site for the Lakeport courthouse project has already been acquired. There will be significant operational efficiencies and cost savings as a result of consolidating three facilities into the new building. There will be hard cost savings, which may be partially offset by increased operational costs for the much larger new building. However, in the current budget climate where we have lost approximately 30% of our staff over the last four years, of far greater importance are the operational efficiencies which are expected. It will no longer be necessary to transport files back and forth to the off-site records storage facility, working files will be adjacent to clerical areas so staff no longer have to walk down the hall to retrieve a files, and there are many other efficiencies the new building provide. The amount of time spent transporting and retrieving files from the storage facility as well as keeping everything in order, is easily one full-time position. In a court of 30.6 FTE's, this is a material impact.

We will be able to terminate leases for the off-site storage facility as well as the Self-Help Center at an annual savings of approximately \$60,000 annually.

6. Project Status

The Lakeport project has preliminary plans approved by the Public Works Board and is ready to move into the working drawings phase. It is important to note that this project has the support of the local community, and is ready and able to move forward to completion quickly. Our project is a perfect opportunity for the Judicial Branch Facilities Program to demonstrate its ability to build beautifully functional courthouses on time, and on budget.

7.1 Court Usage (Courtroom Locations and Judicial Officer Calendar Assignments)

Lakeport Courthouse – Four Courtrooms (Main Court)

Department 1: Presiding Judge David W. Herrick
 Department 2: Judge Richard C. Martin
 Department 3: Judge Andrew S. Blum
 Department 4: Assistant Presiding Judge Stephen O. Hedstrom
 No unused courtrooms.

Clearlake Courthouse - One Courtroom (Branch Court)

Commissioner Vincent T. Lechowick
 No unused courtrooms.

7.2.2 Court Usage (Estimated Population Served)

The Lakeport courthouse serves the entire county population of approximately 63,000, with the small exception of family support, small claims, unlawful detainer and infraction cases. All other matters, criminal, family law, juvenile, civil, and probate countywide are handled at this facility.

7.3 to 7.6 Court Usage Data

Please note that our JPE figure on the Draft Court Usage Data is incorrect and we have notified AOC staff who will make the correction prior to submitting the final data to your working group. Those figures should be closer to the following:

Judicial Resources		County Population		Draft Criteria		Dispositions		Jury Trials		Preliminary Assessed Judge Need		
Judicial		2012		Per		Per		Per				
Positions	JPE	Total	Per JPE	Total	JPE	Total	JPE	Total	JPE			
4.8	5.6	63266	11298	12822	2290	12912	2306	36	6.4	5.3	-0.5	-10%

(JPE was previously reported as 6.8)

One comment we would like to make on this data is that this is countywide data, not facility specific data. So in large counties, while their total “Usage” figures may be high, if the facility they are replacing is a juvenile

facility for instance, they may have fewer filings per judge when you isolate the data and only look at juvenile filings.

Also on the issue of population per judge, “Is a citizen in Orange County or Los Angeles County more entitled to a safe and accessible building than someone in Lake County simply because a dollar spent in a metropolitan area benefits more people than in rural areas?” We recognize that it is necessary to be prudent with limited public funds, but all citizens in California deserve equal access to justice, which starts with a safe and accessible court facility.

8. Type of Courthouse

The Lakeport Courthouse is the main courthouse located in the county seat of Lakeport. Additionally, we have a branch courthouse in Clearlake which has been rated as a critical need project that is also slated for a new courthouse. However, we do not anticipate this happening for many years, so the new courthouse in Lakeport is desperately needed for our community.

9. Disposition of Existing Court Space

The disposition of the Lakeport Courthouse is in a “yet to be determined” category although we know that the county wants the space once the new courthouse is complete.

The two rental agreements that are in place for records storage and our Self Help Center will be terminated.

10. Consolidation of Facilities

Once the courthouse is complete the three facilities in Lakeport (Lakeport Courthouse, Self Help Center, and records storage) will be consolidated into the one new building. As mentioned above, the consolidation of these facilities will provide operational efficiencies in having all of these services and staff in one location as well as savings of approximately \$60,000 annually that is spent leasing the Self Help Center and records storage facilities.

11. Extent to Which Project Solves a Court’s Facilities Problems

The new courthouse will solve all the problems listed above.

12.1 Expected Operational Impact (One-time and Ongoing Cost Impacts)

It is challenging in the best of circumstances to try and predict costs several years in advance, compounded by the fact that we are still not certain exactly what the project budget includes such as telephone systems or evidence presentation systems, etc. Based on what we know so far our costs estimates are as follows:

<p><u>Expected One-time Costs</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Moving Cost - Furniture and files for all Lakeport locations \$40,000 • Moving Cost IT \$15,000 • Technology Purchases \$25,000 (ELMO/electronic signage, etc.) • Telephone System \$15,000 • Postage Machine (will be offset by county administrative payments) 	<p><u>Expected Increases to On-going Costs (Annual)</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Janitorial \$25,000 • Queuing System Licenses \$5,000 • Ongoing expense for new equipment \$5,000
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On a positive note we do not anticipate ongoing costs to increase significantly. Current costs for perimeter security should remain stable because we will still have only one entrance. We expect operational efficiencies to provide many savings opportunities such as the reduction of the number of copy machines necessary when we are in the new building. The ongoing increases that we do anticipate will be covered by the savings from terminating current lease agreements.

12.2 Expected Operational Impact (Funding Source)

As noted above we do expect that increases in ongoing costs will be covered by savings in lease payments which will no longer be necessary. Funding the one-time costs is obviously more challenging. As everyone is now aware, recent legislation prohibits courts from carrying forward more than 1% of their annual operating budget beginning July 1, 2014. For Lake 1% of our FY12/13 operating budget is approximately \$36,000. Clearly, that is not adequate to cover all the one time move-in expenses. Absent a new procedure to cover these one-time expenses as part of the project budget, or emergency funding, the expenses would have to be covered out of the court's annual budget allocation.

12.3 Expected Operational Impact (Cost Savings)

The court intends to eliminate two facility leases when the new Lakeport facility is complete. This annual cost savings is estimated to be approximately \$60,000. For a court our size, that is a substantial savings. While we do not anticipate any reduction in staffing as a result of the facility, as mentioned above we do expect significant operational efficiencies. These efficiencies will help us cope with the staffing reductions we have experienced in the past few years.

13. Qualitative Statement of Need

The court facility in Lakeport is the main courthouse in Lake County serving the entire population. The facility has severe security problems, is extremely overcrowded and has many physical deficiencies.

14. Courtroom and Courthouse Closures

The court has not closed any courtrooms or court facilities other than 16 closure/limited service days in FY12/13 which are unpaid furlough days for staff. All courtrooms and court facilities are open and scheduled to hear cases every day, with the exception of the 16 closure days. In an effort to streamline criminal case processing, all criminal cases are now heard in the Lakeport court facility. This move has added to the security and overcrowding issues discussed at length above.

15. "Outside the Box Thinking"

While the court is open to new creative solutions to all of the deficiencies in our current building, renovation is simply not an option with our current facility. The court occupies the fourth floor of a four story building. The first three floors are occupied by the county, and they have no desire to vacate the building, so expansion is not an option in this building. More importantly there are serious and well documented concerns about the structural integrity of this building.

Finally, land for this project has already been purchased. The project team, lead by our architects, has recently taken significant steps to accomplish the 3% budget reduction by reducing the overall square footage. These changes included limiting the number of jury capable courtrooms, using jury assembly space as an extra hearing room and staff training room.



Earthquake Hazards Program

Earthquake List for Map Centered at 39°N, 123°W

Update time = Fri Aug 24 16:47:11 UTC 2012

Here are the earthquakes in the Map Centered at 39°N, 123°W area, most recent at the top.

(Some early events may be obscured by later ones.)

Click on the underlined portion of an earthquake record in the list below for more information.

<u>MAG</u>	<u>UTC DATE-TIME</u> y/m/d h:m:s	<u>LAT</u> deg	<u>LON</u> deg	<u>DEPTH</u> km	<u>LOCATION</u>
<u>MAP</u>	<u>2.2</u>	<u>2012/08/24 13:16:20</u>	<u>38.517</u>	<u>-122.436</u>	<u>9.1</u> 3 km (2 mi) ENE of Saint Helena, CA
<u>MAP</u>	<u>2.0</u>	<u>2012/08/24 12:40:10</u>	<u>38.513</u>	<u>-122.431</u>	<u>7.2</u> 3 km (2 mi) ENE of Saint Helena, CA
<u>MAP</u>	<u>1.2</u>	<u>2012/08/24 11:10:33</u>	<u>38.761</u>	<u>-122.734</u>	<u>1.9</u> 4 km (2 mi) WSW of Anderson Springs, CA
<u>MAP</u>	<u>1.2</u>	<u>2012/08/24 10:26:56</u>	<u>38.753</u>	<u>-122.715</u>	<u>1.3</u> 3 km (2 mi) SW of Anderson Springs, CA
<u>MAP</u>	<u>1.0</u>	<u>2012/08/24 10:18:53</u>	<u>38.729</u>	<u>-122.793</u>	<u>5.8</u> 8 km (5 mi) S of The Geysers, CA
<u>MAP</u>	<u>1.1</u>	<u>2012/08/24 09:36:20</u>	<u>38.801</u>	<u>-122.815</u>	<u>3.2</u> 1 km (0 mi) WNW of The Geysers, CA
<u>MAP</u>	<u>1.2</u>	<u>2012/08/24 07:33:16</u>	<u>38.827</u>	<u>-122.852</u>	<u>2.1</u> 5 km (3 mi) NW of The Geysers, CA
<u>MAP</u>	<u>2.1</u>	<u>2012/08/24 05:46:07</u>	<u>38.841</u>	<u>-122.837</u>	<u>2.1</u> 5 km (3 mi) NNW of The Geysers, CA
<u>MAP</u>	<u>1.6</u>	<u>2012/08/24 03:28:58</u>	<u>38.753</u>	<u>-122.705</u>	<u>1.4</u> 3 km (2 mi) SSW of Anderson Springs, CA
<u>MAP</u>	<u>2.1</u>	<u>2012/08/24 00:16:46</u>	<u>39.282</u>	<u>-123.237</u>	<u>6.4</u> 15 km (9 mi) N of Ukiah, CA
<u>MAP</u>	<u>1.0</u>	<u>2012/08/23 22:15:16</u>	<u>38.812</u>	<u>-122.827</u>	<u>0.7</u> 2 km (1 mi) NW of The Geysers, CA
<u>MAP</u>	<u>1.1</u>	<u>2012/08/23 21:41:17</u>	<u>38.844</u>	<u>-122.763</u>	<u>1.7</u> 4 km (2 mi) WNW of Cobb, CA
<u>MAP</u>	<u>1.0</u>	<u>2012/08/23 16:53:20</u>	<u>38.808</u>	<u>-122.751</u>	<u>1.0</u> 4 km (2 mi) SW of Cobb, CA
<u>MAP</u>	<u>2.0</u>	<u>2012/08/23 14:06:41</u>	<u>38.807</u>	<u>-122.822</u>	<u>2.5</u> 2 km (1 mi) NW of The Geysers, CA
<u>MAP</u>	<u>1.3</u>	<u>2012/08/23 09:13:01</u>	<u>38.835</u>	<u>-122.811</u>	<u>2.5</u> 4 km (3 mi) N of The Geysers, CA
<u>MAP</u>	<u>1.2</u>	<u>2012/08/23 08:29:46</u>	<u>38.532</u>	<u>-122.283</u>	<u>4.6</u> 15 km (9 mi) ESE of Angwin, CA
<u>MAP</u>	<u>1.2</u>	<u>2012/08/23 08:23:44</u>	<u>38.536</u>	<u>-122.291</u>	<u>3.5</u> 14 km (9 mi) ESE of Angwin, CA
<u>MAP</u>	<u>1.7</u>	<u>2012/08/23 05:14:02</u>	<u>38.837</u>	<u>-122.796</u>	<u>2.8</u> 4 km (3 mi) NNE of The Geysers, CA
<u>MAP</u>	<u>1.3</u>	<u>2012/08/23 04:05:26</u>	<u>38.788</u>	<u>-122.730</u>	<u>2.3</u> 4 km (2 mi) WNW of Anderson Springs, CA
<u>MAP</u>	<u>1.9</u>	<u>2012/08/23 04:01:30</u>	<u>38.837</u>	<u>-122.795</u>	<u>2.4</u> 4 km (3 mi) NNE of The Geysers, CA
<u>MAP</u>	<u>1.6</u>	<u>2012/08/23 02:32:06</u>	<u>39.246</u>	<u>-122.725</u>	<u>12.2</u> 17 km (11 mi) NE of Nice, CA
<u>MAP</u>	<u>1.6</u>	<u>2012/08/23 02:11:00</u>	<u>39.252</u>	<u>-122.724</u>	<u>10.1</u> 18 km (11 mi) NE of Nice, CA
<u>MAP</u>	<u>1.7</u>	<u>2012/08/23 02:03:08</u>	<u>39.254</u>	<u>-122.721</u>	<u>11.6</u> 18 km (11 mi) NE of Nice, CA
<u>MAP</u>	<u>1.7</u>	<u>2012/08/23 02:01:32</u>	<u>39.255</u>	<u>-122.725</u>	<u>9.9</u> 18 km (11 mi) NE of Nice, CA
<u>MAP</u>	<u>1.1</u>	<u>2012/08/23 00:12:10</u>	<u>38.828</u>	<u>-122.807</u>	<u>1.0</u> 3 km (2 mi) N of The Geysers, CA
<u>MAP</u>	<u>1.4</u>	<u>2012/08/23 00:02:28</u>	<u>38.785</u>	<u>-122.737</u>	<u>1.8</u> 4 km (3 mi) WNW of Anderson Springs, CA
<u>MAP</u>	<u>1.0</u>	<u>2012/08/22 19:43:38</u>	<u>38.825</u>	<u>-122.761</u>	<u>0.9</u> 4 km (2 mi) WSW of Cobb, CA
<u>MAP</u>	<u>1.1</u>	<u>2012/08/22 17:27:20</u>	<u>38.712</u>	<u>-122.285</u>	<u>16.6</u> 21 km (13 mi) NE of Angwin, CA
<u>MAP</u>	<u>1.0</u>	<u>2012/08/22 09:32:26</u>	<u>38.810</u>	<u>-122.791</u>	<u>3.2</u> 2 km (1 mi) NE of The Geysers, CA
<u>MAP</u>	<u>1.1</u>	<u>2012/08/22 05:14:04</u>	<u>38.811</u>	<u>-122.824</u>	<u>2.4</u> 2 km (1 mi) NW of The Geysers, CA
<u>MAP</u>	<u>1.6</u>	<u>2012/08/21 20:00:16</u>	<u>39.704</u>	<u>-123.511</u>	<u>5.9</u> 4 km (2 mi) NNW of Laytonville, CA
<u>MAP</u>	<u>2.0</u>	<u>2012/08/21 17:21:51</u>	<u>38.324</u>	<u>-122.627</u>	<u>5.6</u> 6 km (4 mi) ESE of Rohnert Park, CA
<u>MAP</u>	<u>2.4</u>	<u>2012/08/21 16:40:52</u>	<u>38.324</u>	<u>-122.623</u>	<u>7.3</u> 7 km (4 mi) ESE of Rohnert Park, CA
<u>MAP</u>	<u>1.7</u>	<u>2012/08/21 15:58:57</u>	<u>38.776</u>	<u>-122.748</u>	<u>0.5</u> 5 km (3 mi) W of Anderson Springs, CA
<u>MAP</u>	<u>1.2</u>	<u>2012/08/21 13:07:45</u>	<u>38.812</u>	<u>-122.820</u>	<u>3.3</u> 2 km (1 mi) NW of The Geysers, CA
<u>MAP</u>	<u>1.1</u>	<u>2012/08/21 13:00:24</u>	<u>38.821</u>	<u>-122.809</u>	<u>3.7</u> 3 km (2 mi) N of The Geysers, CA
<u>MAP</u>	<u>1.8</u>	<u>2012/08/21 09:00:46</u>	<u>38.819</u>	<u>-122.797</u>	<u>3.0</u> 2 km (1 mi) NNE of The Geysers, CA
<u>MAP</u>	<u>1.1</u>	<u>2012/08/21 07:10:33</u>	<u>38.838</u>	<u>-122.827</u>	<u>2.4</u> 5 km (3 mi) NNW of The Geysers, CA
<u>MAP</u>	<u>1.6</u>	<u>2012/08/21 07:00:45</u>	<u>39.448</u>	<u>-123.127</u>	<u>8.7</u> 15 km (9 mi) WNW of Lake Pillsbury, CA
<u>MAP</u>	<u>1.7</u>	<u>2012/08/21 05:35:24</u>	<u>38.823</u>	<u>-122.802</u>	<u>3.5</u> 3 km (2 mi) N of The Geysers, CA
<u>MAP</u>	<u>1.0</u>	<u>2012/08/21 04:12:59</u>	<u>38.810</u>	<u>-122.814</u>	<u>3.7</u> 1 km (1 mi) NNW of The Geysers, CA
<u>MAP</u>	<u>1.7</u>	<u>2012/08/21 04:10:44</u>	<u>39.250</u>	<u>-123.136</u>	<u>7.1</u> 13 km (8 mi) NNE of Ukiah, CA

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MAP	1.9	2012/08/21 03:18:41	39.491	-123.115	5.1	16 km (10 mi) NW of Lake Pillsbury, CA
MAP	1.4	2012/08/21 00:47:55	38.837	-122.763	1.4	4 km (2 mi) W of Cobb, CA
MAP	1.3	2012/08/20 20:13:05	38.802	-122.743	1.7	4 km (3 mi) SSW of Cobb, CA
MAP	1.0	2012/08/20 15:08:50	38.814	-122.434	12.6	11 km (7 mi) E of Hidden Valley Lake, CA
MAP	1.1	2012/08/20 14:59:16	38.837	-122.808	2.7	4 km (3 mi) N of The Geysers, CA
MAP	1.0	2012/08/20 07:51:36	38.840	-122.829	2.6	5 km (3 mi) NNW of The Geysers, CA
MAP	1.6	2012/08/20 07:27:43	38.862	-122.853	1.8	8 km (5 mi) NNW of The Geysers, CA
MAP	1.8	2012/08/20 06:11:39	39.264	-123.183	9.3	13 km (8 mi) N of Ukiah, CA
MAP	1.4	2012/08/20 04:00:45	38.837	-122.804	2.2	4 km (3 mi) N of The Geysers, CA
MAP	1.5	2012/08/20 02:34:35	38.835	-122.775	2.9	5 km (3 mi) W of Cobb, CA
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MAP	2.0	2012/08/19 14:15:04	39.369	-122.903	10.3	6 km (4 mi) SE of Lake Pillsbury, CA
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MAP	1.3	2012/08/19 06:12:41	38.812	-122.824	2.8	2 km (1 mi) NW of The Geysers, CA
MAP	1.4	2012/08/19 03:27:41	38.839	-122.804	2.3	5 km (3 mi) N of The Geysers, CA
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MAP	1.5	2012/08/19 00:38:43	38.751	-122.717	2.3	4 km (2 mi) SW of Anderson Springs, CA
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MAP	1.3	2012/08/18 00:25:58	38.926	-122.658	3.0	4 km (2 mi) SW of Clearlake, CA
MAP	1.3	2012/08/17 22:37:21	38.828	-122.772	1.5	4 km (3 mi) W of Cobb, CA
MAP	2.0	2012/08/17 20:21:18	38.813	-122.812	3.1	2 km (1 mi) NNW of The Geysers, CA
MAP	1.1	2012/08/17 20:16:22	38.809	-122.825	2.8	2 km (1 mi) NW of The Geysers, CA
MAP	1.1	2012/08/17 19:55:26	38.828	-122.807	2.1	3 km (2 mi) N of The Geysers, CA
MAP	2.5	2012/08/17 19:37:45	39.366	-122.906	10.8	6 km (4 mi) SE of Lake Pillsbury, CA

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Security Survey for Lakeport Courthouse, Lake County

AUGUST 6 AND 7, 2012



ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE
OF THE COURTS

OFFICE OF EMERGENCY
RESPONSE AND SECURITY

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Figure 1. Lakeport Courthouse, Superior Court of California, County of Lake

Overview

On August 6 and 7, 2012, staff from the Office of Emergency Response and Security (OERS) attended a meeting at the Superior Court of Lake County. The meeting was held at the Lakeport Courthouse located at 255 North Forbes Street, Lakeport, California 95453. Attendees included:

- Mary Smith, Court Executive Officer, Superior Court of Lake County
- Krista Levier, Assistant Court Executive Officer, Superior Court of Lake County
- Malcolm Franklin, Senior Manager, Office of Emergency Response and Security

The meeting was in response to a request from the Court Executive Officer (CEO) Mary Smith to update the original 2006 security survey (Attachment 1). The court has made several changes to the way it calendars cases now, moving all felony issues to the Lakeport Courthouse, leaving traffic and small claims at the southern Clearlake Courthouse. The survey focused on changes within the Lakeport facility since 2006, in particular the additional felony cases, the increase in “in-custody” defendants, and lack of secure separation of staff, inmates, and the public. Since the original survey in 2006 the courthouse has had the addition of screening stations, cameras, alarm systems, and a secure access system installed through security grants from the OERS and the Entrance Security Screening Replacement Program, which included ongoing staffing for screening stations. The court and the Sheriff have, over the last year, had concerns about security in this facility, with the rise in serious criminal cases over recent years, and the lack of separation between inmates, staff, and the public. These factors, added to the lack of suitable jury assembly

areas, have created unacceptable risks to court users. The following report details OERS observations and recommendations.

Although total records on crime in Lake County for 2011 are not yet available, the Lake County Sheriff/Coroner reports that his agency collected the following statistics for 2010.

- 557 drug-related crimes;
- 431 violent crimes;
- 219 domestic violence felonies and misdemeanors;
- 41 assaults with deadly weapon;
- 32 sex crimes;
- 13 robberies;
- 5 attempted homicides; and
- 3 homicides.

It was noted that these statistics are for incidents reported through the sheriff's office only, not through all other state, county, and city agencies or the American Indian agencies.

The Superior Court of Lake County is small in comparison with many of its neighbors. The superior court comprises a total of five courtrooms: Departments 1 through 4 in Lakeport and Department A in Clearlake. While the original assessment covered both Lakeport and Clearlake facilities, this report will focus on Lakeport only. The court staff family is very close; four judges and the CEO and Assistant CEO work together daily. Their day-to-day activities are consistent with good security policy and their written records reflect those policies.

In the last two years, current Sheriff Carlos Riviera has on several occasions complained about the level of security in the Lakeport Courthouse. Specifically, he believes that the screening should be placed on the fourth floor, where all the courtrooms and staff are located. Sheriff Riviera has stated on more than one occasion that the Lakeport Courthouse is a sieve and anyone can gain entry through a multitude of doors and access points that are not staffed by security personnel. While OERS has worked with the court and the county Board of Supervisors since 2006 on increased security measures at the courthouse, only a portion of its overall plan could be implemented based on the limited space available in the building.

Both the court and the OERS are in agreement with his general sentiment; however, with the facility size, design, and make up it is not feasible to incorporate screening on the fourth floor. The elevators, available floor space, and the sheer volume of public, jurors, and court officers that attend the facility daily make it impractical, as noted in an OERS evaluation (Attachment 2).

On March 1, 2011, Sheriff Rivero wrote to the AOC, "*During our meeting of February 9, 2011, I told you (Malcolm Franklin) the security at the courthouse was dangerously inadequate to protect the safety of the Judges that hold court there. Specifically, I informed you the building was porous with many avenues for someone to secrete a weapon into the building.*" OERS has

worked for the last two years with the sheriff's office, the probation department, and the architects to design a new courthouse that would adequately meet all the security requirements and protect both the staff and the public. OERS did a risk assessment for the new facility location (Attachment 3).

Perimeter Security

Lighting

The 2006 security assessment commented on the inadequate lighting around the courthouse and the issue of poor maintenance and landscape upkeep. Six years later, the problem is still as bad, and on the night of August 6, at 9:20 p.m. the area around the front door to the court was very dark. Employees of the county were still inside the building and were observed leaving towards a vehicle parked on Forbes Street. The area was not safe, in staff's professional opinion, due to inadequate lighting. The parking lot located on the west (uphill) side of the courthouse, adjacent to the Office of the District Attorney, is still without lighting. Although the city street lights do give the area some ambient coverage, it is not sufficient for today's security standards. There are no other security measures incorporated in this area and no surveillance camera or alarm for parking lot users.

There are other areas around the facility, particularly between the old jail and the current courthouse, that are very dark at night. This includes the unsecured parking area assigned for judges, as well as the rear of the courthouse, two west entry doors for staff, and the disabled entrance on the second floor level. These areas would easily conceal an attacker planning to accost a victim without warning.

Parking Areas

Although the major parking issues are dealt with under "Lighting" above, the remaining parking available for court users, visitors, and jurors is on the street. With the severe incline on both sides of the courthouse and the restricted time zones in other areas including the front, parking is considered inadequate for the volume of visitors.



Figure 2. West end of parking lot



Figure 3. Judges' assigned parking

Landscaping

Landscaping is generally in reasonable condition, except where it interferes with walkway lighting at night.

Access to the Building by Vehicle

Access to the building is poor, and in some areas dangerous. I have reviewed these in three areas.

1. Access for mail, parcel, or other vendor is by a doorway on the north side. Small trucks can back into the doorway from the city street; larger trucks need to park adjacent to the public street parking. The court and OERS did install an intercom and camera at this site to assist with security measures, but this is solely based on the security awareness of the individual county employee. It was also noted that smokers use this location outside the building, indicating that the entrance is used by unauthorized personnel.
2. The sally port into the basement of the old jail requires jail vans to enter a dead end alley, make a sharp turn into the first roll up gate, then a sharp turn into a second secure area. The issue of security is very high at this location since the public have open access to the area; maintenance personnel park their work vehicles next to the entrance. This is an ideal location for attack on the jail vans entering or leaving the facility.
3. As reported in 2006, the fuel oil diesel tank located between the court house and the old jail is easily accessible and a major risk. It has some bollard protection against vehicle collision that has been added since 2006 but no protection against vandalism or terroristic activities. This tank is considered a major risk to the safety of court personnel.



Figure 4. View between old jail and courthouse



Figure 5. Vendor/delivery access door



Figure 6. Sally port entrance



Figures 7–9. Diesel and propane storage between buildings

Weapons Screening

The court employs a private security guard company to staff its screening stations at both Lakeport and Clearlake. Screening was added to the Lakeport facility after long and in-depth reviews by the county Board of Supervisors, the court, and the OERS team.

The system screens all visitors to the courthouse, exclusive of attorneys who are known to the staff and the court and county staff who use various other entry doors around the facility. The two screening staff were monitored on this and several other visits in the last year. They do an excellent job and are polite and efficient. At the time of this survey, in addition to the court activities on the fourth floor, the county Board of Supervisors were having hearings in their chamber on the first floor.



Figure 10. First floor lobby and screening

As stated, the court and county staff are not screened. This is for several reasons, but in particular the design of the courthouse, the severe slopes outside, and the lack of parking make it inconvenient for county and court staff to enter through a single controlled point. The OERS has installed access systems on both internal and external doors to control entry and exit, but this system relies totally on the honesty of every single user. It cannot prevent “tailgating” or other unauthorized entrance if the door is opened by a staff member.



Figure 11. First floor screening

Doors, Windows, Other Openings

Two important changes have occurred since 2006. First, the county has replaced the main front doors to the courthouse. The old ones were not considered secure; they could easily be pried open. The new “store front” system is now secure. Second, the “disabled persons” entrance on the second floor from designated parking has been fitted with an access card reader and an intercom to security for access by disabled persons. This was observed in action and was working as designed.

Interior Security

General Interior Security

Interior security is considered at the highest risk level. While there is screening for the visitors to the courthouse, which eliminates weapons brought in through this location, it does not stop articles brought in by staff, vendors, or package deliverers. The sheer number of people who are required to collect on the fourth floor, through which inmates are marched without separation from the public or staff, through which juvenile inmates are moved, and in which location jurors are mixed with witnesses, family members, litigants, law enforcement, and attorneys make the area a powder keg of emotions.

Access Control

Secure areas such as the clerk’s office, jury office, and chambers have had a card access system installed. It was observed in use by staff and appears to meet the court’s needs. It is, however, emphasized that several of these access doors are located in the overcrowded hallways. This makes unauthorized access a potential issue, i.e., the staff member using the door could be overpowered in these close quarters.

Public Areas

The public hallway that provides entrance to the four courtrooms, the clerk’s office, the jury office, and access from the jail is small and overcrowded in the morning due to court calendars. The two elevators (which serve the entire building, not just the court floor) are old and although they have a 2,000 pound weight limit, realistically they cannot hold more than six people comfortably. When an elevator goes down for service or breakage, then one six person unit is all that is available unless visitors walk up four floors of stairs. At the time of this inspection, over



Figure 12. Jurors line up to sign in



Figure 13. Elevator exit to main court floor

70 people were counted in an area measuring 11 feet by 46 feet, servicing 3 courtroom entries, 2 elevators, prisoner transport, clerk's counter, and a jury window counter.

General Public Counters

The clerk's counter is operated off the main hallway, it is composed of two windows and a waiting area that is not suitable for more than four or five persons. Anyone else in line waits among other court visitors and jurors in the main hallway. There are duress alarms and cameras installed in this area.

Electronic Security Systems

Duress Alarms

The court is a user of the OERS Stoptech duress alarm system, which works in conjunction with the sheriff's office radios. The robust system is used in courthouses throughout the state. No complaints were made about its efficiency.

Surveillance Cameras

After the 2006 survey the court received a security grant from OERS to upgrade and improve its camera system. A number of new cameras were installed in the courtrooms, screening area, and public hallways. These assist security in operation of the "disabled persons" door entry and allow the bailiffs in each courtroom to monitor the other courtrooms at all times.

Courtrooms and Related Areas

Courtroom Security

Department Two, Judge Martin's courtroom, security was at the highest risk level observed by the OERS. Inmates are required to be brought from the old county jail (now court holding) via a narrow walkway to the public hallway outside the courtroom. Inmates are moved through this public section, through the front main doors to the courtroom, through the center of the public seating to the jury box on the right hand side.



At the time of this inspection there were 12 inmates in the jury box, 2 transport deputies, and 1 bailiff in the courtroom. At one point, the deputies moved four inmates out on a return to holding and as they moved through the public seating in the courtroom, they were observed giving hand signals to persons seated in the public well. The court was full at the time. The noise from outside the courtroom in the public hallway was very loud inside the courtroom and very distracting.

Figure 14. Inmates leave Department 2 via public hallway

Department Three had eight inmates in the jury box at the time of inspection. This courtroom was less crowded and the inmates have a direct access to the courtroom without moving through the public hallway, this is the only courtroom with the correct separation.



Figure 15. Inmates enter Department 2 through public hallway

Department Four, previously Department A, was not in session at the time of the inspection. However, this courtroom is used to process juvenile in-custody inmates. To ensure their separation from the public, a cloth screen (similar to the old-fashioned hospital screens) is pulled across the entry to the courtroom from the jail corridor while the inmates enter the court. This eliminates access to Department Two during the transportation of the juveniles.

Department One was in session with a civil calendar. On this occasion no inmates were present; however, in the circumstances where an inmate would be needed as a witness in a case, the inmate would have to be moved through the public corridor to the courtroom.

Judges Chambers

Access to the judges' chambers is all from the public hallway. The basic separation of inmates, staff, and the public does not exist in this facility.

Jury Assembly Area

There is no jury assembly area. Jurors are required to move to the fourth floor with all other court users and staff. The area becomes so congested that a jury clerk operates a podium sign outside the elevator doors. Jurors are then called from this area to one of the courtrooms. There is no separation from witnesses, defendants, family members, or staff, who all crowd into this one hallway. At the time of this inspection, there was only one jury pool called that day and the area was overcrowded. Court staff indicates that at times they have three jury pools on a single day.



Figure 16. Inmates walked out of Department 2 through the public seating

Witness Waiting Rooms

There are no designated spaces for witnesses due to insufficient room on the fourth floor.

Attorney Client Conference Rooms

There are no attorney client conference rooms due to insufficient space on the fourth floor.

Inmate Holding and Transport

There is no inmate holding at the courtroom location. On the day of the survey, there were 43 in-custody inmates at the courthouse at one time. Inmates are transported via van from the county jail to the old jail location adjacent to the courthouse. The building houses the holding area and the Office of the District Attorney. The cells are inadequate, very old, and in poor condition. The single elevator that moves inmates and deputies from the sally port up to the cell block frequently breaks down. Deputies informed OERS that inmates and an officer were stuck for an extended period in the elevator in June 2012.



Figure 17. Elevated inmate walkway through holding to courthouse



Figure 18. View of elevated inmate walkway from the outside

The holding cells only have four small units and two larger cells. The issue is that officers cannot segregate the gang affiliation inmates sufficiently with so few small cells.

The other major issue in the lack of courtroom holding is bathroom facilities. If an inmate requires use of a bathroom in the courthouse, and the only jury bathroom is not available, the inmate must be taken all the way back to the old jail. This removes a critical officer from the courtroom and it takes extended periods of time to transport through the public hallways.

Fire Life Safety

Fire life safety was not part of this assessment; however, with such crowded conditions on the fourth floor, OERS recommends the court request an in depth study by the Office of Court Construction and Management's Risk Management Unit.

Recommendations

The Lakeport Courthouse is beyond capacity today, based on the number of jury trials and the operations of the four courtrooms. Without the basic separation of inmates, public, and staff, the facility cannot be expected to continue operations without the risk of serious incidents.

Grant Assistance

OERS extended a number of security grants to the court to improve security in the existing building, based on the assumption that these would not be permanent security solutions, but temporary measures while the new courthouse was designed. With the pressure exerted by the sheriff and the continued growth of trials, in-custody inmates, and crowded conditions, not much more can be done to relieve the situation if the court stays in this location.

Attachment 1



Superior Court of Lake County

SECURITY REVIEW
APRIL 2006

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SUPERIOR COURT OF LAKE COUNTY

255 North Forbes Street
Lakeport, California 95453

7000-A South Center Drive
Clearlake, California 95422



OVERVIEW

On April 4-5 2006, Emergency Response and Security (ERS) completed a security review of two Superior Court of Lake County facilities at the request of court staff. The initial meeting on April 5 included Mary Smith, Court Executive Officer, Kip Rodda, Assistant Court Executive Officer, Sergeant Mark Hommer, Sheriff's Department, Bob Allen, County Maintenance Manager, and Malcolm Franklin, Emergency Response and Security.



The following report discusses both facilities. The Lakeport facility is termed Northlake and the Clearlake facility is termed Southlake.

Northlake. The Northlake facility was opened in 1966, and holds the courts and all other county offices, including the county supervisors' meeting room on the first floor. The old jail adjacent to the courthouse now houses the district attorney's office and holding cells for the court. The four courtrooms are all located on the fourth floor.

Southlake. The Southlake facility is also a multi-use facility housing the sheriff's office and a district attorney's office. The facility has clerk's offices and one courtroom, with a small attached jury room. The presiding judge's courtroom, Hon. Stephen Hedstrom, is located at this facility.

As discussed at the April 5 meeting, a number of options for the future security screening needs of the facility are included as an appendix to this report. Emergency Response and Security will gladly assist the court in any future discussions if requested.

SECURITY COMMITTEE

Northlake / Southlake

At the initial meeting, the formation of a court security committee was discussed. It appeared that attempts had been made in the past create a security committee, however, records had not been kept, minutes were not documented, and the group did not meet on a regular basis. The Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC) advocates court security committees as a vital link in communications and planning efforts to county building owners, security providers, and other key partners. ERS recommends a court security committee be formed and chaired by the presiding judge or court executive officer and include members from the county supervisors, sheriff's department, other building tenants, the local fire department, and court administration. Meetings should be held at least every four months, with prearranged agendas to ensure meetings maintain focus on security and emergency response issues. ERS would gladly attend the first meeting to provide a general briefing and facilitate initial dialog.


EVENING REVIEW

Northlake: At approximately 8 p.m. on April 4, a brief review of the facility was completed after dark. In general, the building was found to be secure at the time of inspection.

The following areas, however, require improvement. The landscaping at the front of the building (east) was too high for security purposes and could conceal an individual.

The condition of the exterior landscape lighting on sidewalks and foot paths was less than satisfactory. Approximately 50 – 60% of the lights were not functioning properly, were overgrown with plants, or were misaligned. Overall, too many dark areas and corners were found. Proper exterior lighting is the number one crime deterrent for this type of facility.

Parking areas were better lit. The south side had additional flood lights installed and the parking lot outside the old jail also had good lighting. The covered driveway between the handicapped stalls and the judge's parking was too dark. A number of trucks were parked between the buildings, adjacent to the fuel tank. This left the area very dark. It is highly recommended that a secure parking area be located away from the buildings and the fuel tanks, allowing law enforcement clear access for surveillance.



Southlake: No evening inspection was conducted at this facility, although the daytime inspection revealed several exterior lights in need of repair and additional lights should be considered for increased evening safety.



PARKING & LANDSCAPING



Northlake: Parking is permitted on all streets surrounding the courthouse. Main parking for staff is on the hill above the main building and is uncontrolled, paved, and lit at night. Handicapped, supervisor, and judge's parking is on the south side of the facility. All parking spaces have the title of the assigned parker (e.g. supervisor, administration, etc.). Of major concern are the spaces marked for superior court judges. These spaces should not indicate they are for judges but could instead be marked reserved.



Much of the street parking was on a steep hill and was well lit. Parking did not seem to be an issue for staff or visitors.



Southlake: Parking at this facility was limited to the area against the building, in front of the courthouse. There was sufficient parking with an overflow lot on the freeway end of the facility.



Sheriff's vehicle parking was at the back of the facility. Public, staff, and judicial parking was uncontrolled. ERS recommends that judicial officers consider parking at the rear of the facility with the police cars.

PERIMETER SECURITY & SCREENING

Northlake: Northlake had no perimeter screening in place. The courts are confined to the fourth floor, which has insufficient room in the hallway for the necessary equipment and personnel. Funding is not currently available for the court to provide equipment and personnel to the entire building. Passage of this year's governor's budget will provide funding for perimeter screening and personnel. The court is in negotiation with county officials to implement a full security program at the courthouse. County supervisors hold some resistance, but the April 5 discussions showed progress toward some common ground.



Main foyer / lobby area



4th floor lobby area

The remainder of the building is secured with older lock sets, both internally and externally. These systems are many years old and require multiple keys. Although not included as part of this review, the court security committee should immediately review the lock and key control of the fourth floor and suggest the county do the same for the remainder of the building. In the attached Court Security Assessment Checklist that was completed by the court prior to this review, the section on key control, was crossed out as not applicable, which is of concern.

No alarm systems were installed for general security measures.

After-hours police response is provided by the Lakeport police located about a block away. 911, however, is operated by the county sheriff's office.



Southlake: No perimeter screening was in place at this facility. Again, passage of this year's governor's budget will provide funding for perimeter screening and personnel.

The main entrance has sufficient room for an x-ray and magnetometer system with minor alterations including moving the soda machines and an old drinking fountain.

The sheriff's office provides police response to this facility.

COURTROOM SECURITY

Northlake: The four courtrooms on the fourth floor were all well equipped and functional. All courts are staffed by bailiffs from the sheriff's department. Courts had duress / panic alarms, although they are not regularly tested. ERS suggests monthly documented testing at all locations.

Each courtroom is equipped with CCTV cameras which are monitored at the bailiff's desks in each courtroom. This system allows security personnel to monitor all other courtrooms simultaneously. While this system would not be suitable for larger court facilities, it is quite effective for courthouses containing up to six courtrooms. The Northlake cameras are well maintained and have a new digital recorder. The AOC will offer an additional two cameras to enhance this system.



Although no part of this review, the evidence vault was secure. ERS encourages the court to ensure clear sign in/out procedures are documented.



The judge's chambers are all on the fourth floor, have outer offices, secure entry into the courtrooms, and escape routes. However, judges are required to travel through public hallways to get to their chambers, which is of concern. The building design does not allow changes to correct this. New courthouse standards will require all new construction to separate staff, the public, and inmates within the courthouse.



Southlake: The Southlake facility is an older building with a larger court. The duress alarm system does not meet the current standards and ERS intends to have it replaced. Southlake has inadequate evidence locker facilities, and information has been requested on suitable replacements. The court design is not ideal, partly due to low ceilings. The jury room doubles as a conference room and is located behind the court, and is equipped with water and restroom facilities.

The six camera CCTV system in the building and court are older black and white and the recording device requires updating, which ERS will review.

The judge's chamber's windows face directly out to the public parking areas are of concern. County officials were asked to review the type of glass used in those windows. ERS recommends replacing those windows with tinted bullet resistant glass. The judge was advised to keep blinds drawn at all times, particularly when no security staff are present in the building.



Judge's Chambers Windows


FIRE LIFE SAFETY



No emergency exit signs / lights

Northlake: Life Safety is a major concern in this facility. The county has apparently attempted to replace some exit lights and required signs, however, much of this work remains incomplete. The county only has five maintenance personnel for over forty county buildings. Many insufficient emergency lighting and exit signs were found. ERS recommends that the court and/or county have an in-depth review conducted to assess the systems designed to protect employees and customers.

No one could recall the date of the last fire inspection by the local fire department or Fire Marshall.




Southlake: Similar to the Northlake facility, emergency equipment was either not installed or not function. Some exit units were tested and failed to operate. Exit signs failed to meet code and inspection records were non-existent.



This facility requires a full Fire Life Safety inspection by the AOC's Office of Court Construction and Management, who may be able to assist contractors on staff to perform these inspections.

GENERAL INTERNAL SECURITY

Northlake: Internal security in public areas was poor as a result of the facilities being too small, not as a result of court activity. The main fourth floor hallway measured approximately 11' x 48'. All activities are funneled into this space from the elevators to four courtrooms and all jury panel participants line up in this same general area. Security suffers when judicial officers mix with witnesses, jurors, and the public.



Some security updates have been made. All clerk's and filing windows have protective glass with pass through ability. In the confined hallway, all door openings were clearly marked and security staff monitored the overall area when available.

An agreement with the county needs to be achieved to install security screening at the ground floor entrance. Security staff are currently unable to restrict anyone entering from the street and traveling upstairs to a fourth floor courtroom. The fourth floor has insufficient room to install any type of screening equipment.


The following week, during the Judicial Council site visit, access to the roof was found insecure. Bailiffs indicated that county personnel had failed to lock the roof access.

Southlake: The clerk's window at the Southlake facility is screened and secure and offices are locked. Restricting access through the side door by installing a screening station would greatly enhance staff safety.



INMATE HOLDING AREAS & FIREARM POLICIES

Northlake: In-custody holding is located in the adjacent old county jail building, which was not part of this review.



In-custodies are walked from the holding location across an enclosed walkway to the fourth floor courthouse entrance. They are then escorted to any of the four courtrooms. Only one courtroom is accessible without entering public hallways. The other three courtrooms require in-custodies to use the same public hallway that jurors, witnesses, and judicial officers use.

Juvenile defendants enter through the same hallway, although the court uses a screen that is pulled across the public hallway to allow their entry into a courtroom without being seen by the public.

No firearms policies are in effect due to the lack of perimeter screening.

Screening to protect juveniles



Southlake: Southlake’s holding cells are part of the sheriff’s office in the building with direct entry into the courtroom. The court services sheriffs have been asked to review the procedures for transport from holding into the courtroom to ensure best practices are always in place.

No firearms policies are in effect due to the lack of perimeter screening.

ELECTRONIC SECURITY

Northlake: Other than the CCTV system and panic alarms, no other electronic systems were apparent. Northlake is on the list for the new wireless duress/panic alarm system at both court locations.



Southlake: Other than the CCTV system and panic alarms, no other electronic systems were apparent. Southlake is on the list for the new wireless duress/panic alarm system at both court locations.

CASH MANAGEMENT

Northlake: Not included in this survey.

Southlake: Not included in this survey.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The court must formalize a security committee with membership from those listed in this report. This committee will allow smaller facility issues to be addressed and will provide clear direction and an ability to respond for those responsible. ERS is available to assist with initial meetings and briefings.
2. A follow-up evening review of security and landscape lighting should be conducted this summer to allow the county to respond prior to early winter nights and dark mornings. This is a staff safety issue that can be addressed by the security committee.
3. Review landscaping to limit areas where assailants could hide (see security committee).
4. Host a general walk-through with local police and fire departments in Lakeport to allow familiarity with layout, locations of primary personnel, and evacuation routes.
5. Review Appendix A regarding county discussion options.
6. Request a Fire Life Safety inspection from the AOC's Office of Court Construction and Management. Contact Dennis Leung at 415-865-7566. Review county work plan on life safety upgrades and request a completion plan for the work.
7. Through the security committee, review security practices with county agencies, specifically maintenance staff responsibility to ensure that roof access areas and other vulnerable areas are secured at all times. Request the sheriffs unit to patrol vulnerable areas when available.

GRANT ASSISTANCE

The ERS has reviewed several projects with the court, and planning will proceed for the projects detailed below:

1. Enhance camera and recording systems at the Northlake and Southlake facilities. The statewide RFP currently being written will include these locations.

2. Replace the duress/panic alarm system with a new wireless system as part of a statewide contract currently under negotiation.
3. If the Governor’s screening budget is approved, work with county agencies to improve security at both sites by installing equipment and appropriate staffing. This may include installation of additional CCTV cameras and an access system. Design will be subject to county approval of the projects.

COURT SECURITY ASSESSMENT CHECKLIST REVIEW

Review of the Court Security Assessment Checklist identified the following areas that should be reviewed by the Court Security Committee, the Presiding Judge, and the Court Executive Officer.

- 2.1 The court should establish a Court Security Committee. The checklist was completed well by the sheriff’s department sergeant assigned to the court, however, several sections need input from maintenance and court staff.
- 2.3-1 Staff should be issued copies of all emergency procedures and trained regularly.
- 2.3-4 First aid equipment should be checked monthly and documented.
- 2.4-2 As indicated, the fire department has previously conducted inspections. Court staff should be able to request a copy of the report for their own review.
- 3.5-1 Landscaping needs to be trimmed.
- 4.3-2 Roof access should be secured at all times.
- 5.6-3 Additional duress alarms are needed in clerk offices and chambers.
- 7.3-2 Vital records storage should be protected.
- 7.4-4 Clarification on the protection and transportation of money should be made.
- 7.5-15 Court microphones should always be secured to prevent them being used as weapons in the courtroom.
- 7.7-5 Judicial officer’s mail should be screened and/or x-rayed.
- 7.7-15 The court should have a written policy on staff carrying firearms into the courthouse.

ADDITIONAL NOTES



The diesel tank in the parking area is of great concern. Although the tank has inner protection against leaks, the very presence of these newer diesel and propane tanks between these buildings is surprising. Local fire codes were not researched.

There are no reservoirs to contain contents in a leak and no protection against damage from vandals, parked vehicles, or pedestrians. Building and life safety are compromised with the proximity of these tanks.

ANNEX A – LAKEPORT SECURITY PLAN OPTIONS

As part of the overall security review of the Lakeport facility, below are some options to improve security at this site. A general overview on security for the building is followed by some cost consideration and three options for perimeter screening of occupants and visitors.

Overview

Security at the Lakeport courthouse continues to be discussed by the court and county as to the overall need and justification for increasing security measures. The courthouse is composed of four courtrooms, all on the fourth floor. The fourth floor lobby and hallway are less than 11' x 48' and service three of the four courtrooms, the elevators, the clerk's counter, and jury registration. At times, this area is congested such that court staff and the public have difficulty passing through.

The current space is insufficient to establish a weapons screening station, leaving the entire facility, including courtrooms, vulnerable to weapons and other contraband. The court and the Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC) find this situation unacceptable. Current security standards include x-ray and weapons screening at all court locations.

The only area able to support a weapons screening station is just inside the main front doors. While this area can accommodate the equipment and personnel, there are concerns about ADA access and employee entrances around the building.

There are several benefits to the county in establishing weapons screening which include a safer environment for all employees at the facility, minimizing the risk of violence in the workplace, and a message to employees and visitors that their safety and security is a priority to the county. Further, security screening would increase security personnel without any additional cost to the county or sheriff.

Cost Options

The California Department of Finance (DOF) and the AOC have planned to fund x-rays, magnetometers, and personnel for the Lakeport and Clearlake courthouses. Personnel would be based on the existing Judicial Council Staffing Standards, and the equipment allowance is up to \$30,000 per station. This funding is currently awaiting approval in the Governor's 2006-2007 budget, due July 1, 2006.

If weapons screening was installed on the ground floor, other facility issues would need to be addressed. Several external doors require installation of an access system; however, the AOC has security improvement funds available to assist with installation of this system. Suitable ADA access to the building is also a concern and the AOC has offered to assist with planning options for this project as well.

Costs to the county for these projects could include installation of door hardware, such as panic bars, and posting signs with information on entry points and emergency exits.

Perimeter Screening

Option 1: High profile personnel such as county supervisors and judges enter through a single, private entrance using a badge access system close to their parking area. No other personnel are allowed use of this entrance. All other employees, jurors, and the public enter through a single screening station on the ground floor. All other entrances and exits are closed except as alarmed emergency exits.

Option 2: High profile personnel such as county supervisors and judges enter through a single, private entrance using a badge access system close to their parking area. No other personnel are allowed use of this entrance. All other employees enter through a separate rear entrance or through an express line beside the main screening station using a badge access system. Visitors, jurors, and the public would be required to enter through the screening station.

Option 3: No weapons screening is installed, leaving the courthouse as is, with no preventative security measure.

Attachment 2



Judicial Council of California

ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS

455 Golden Gate Avenue • San Francisco, California 94102-3688
Telephone 415-865-4200 • Fax 415-865-4205 • TDD 415-865-4272

MEMORANDUM

Date	Action Requested
May 23rd, 2011	Please Review
To	Deadline
Malcolm Franklin Senior Manager Office of Emergency Response and Security	N/A
From	Contact
Ed Ellestad Senior Security Coordinator Office of Emergency Response and Security	N/A
Subject	
Relocation of security screening equipment in Lakeport	

On May 10, 2010 a meeting was held to discuss the feasibility of relocating the courts' weapons screening equipment and operations from its current location on the first floor to the fourth floor.

Present at this meeting were:

Francisco Rivero, Sheriff, Lake County
Chris Macedo, Lieutenant, Lake County Sheriff's Office
Mary Smith, CEO, Lake County Superior Court
Krista Levier, Lake County Superior Court
David Jezek, Chief Building Official, Lake County
Shawn Sen, Fire Prevention Officer, AOC – Office of Court Construction and Management
Ed Ellestad, Sr. Security Coordinator, AOC- Office of Emergency Response and Security

Background

Currently, the weapons screening station for the Lake County Superior Court is located on the first floor at the main entrance of the shared County/Court facility, and has been in place for about four years. All members of the public are subject to screening upon entry, whether they are conducting business with the court (located on the fourth floor) or county. Court and county staff are allowed to bypass screening by showing their court/county identification card to the screening station staff.

In addition to the main entrance, there are other entrances to the building. One is used for handicapped accessibility, another for staff. One concern expressed by Sheriff Rivero is the possibility of unauthorized and unscreened individuals to access the building through the staff door. Sheriff Rivero indicated that the door is often propped open, and staff may let others in through this door without challenge.

The building is often open after normal court hours for the Board of Supervisors meetings and other county functions. The public is not screened during this time, and has access to all floors.

In order to ensure that all visitors to the fourth floor court space are screened, Sheriff Rivero has expressed the desire to relocate the screening station to the fourth floor, outside of the elevators.

Sheriff Rivero indicated that some members of the Board of Supervisors feel that weapons screening is not necessary for the entire building, and would also like the screening equipment moved to the court occupied fourth floor.

The possibility of placing screening equipment on the fourth floor was addressed in 2006, before any screening was in place at all. At that time, as indicated in the Lake County Superior Court Security Review dated April 2006, it was determined that insufficient space existed on the fourth floor to establish a weapons screening station.

Since the issue of moving the weapons screening station has been raised by Sheriff Rivero, an in depth analysis of the proposal was agreed to by the Office of Emergency Response and Security.

Findings

Prior to the May 10th meeting, Shawn Sen conducted an analysis of the screening equipment relocation proposal from a fire code perspective, and determined that insufficient space existed to locate the equipment on the 4th floor without violating various codes. During our meeting,

David Jezek, Chief Building Official of Lake County agreed that insufficient space exists to establish a weapons screening station on the fourth floor in its current configuration.

Mr. Jezek pointed out that by removing / relocating walls directly across from the elevators – enough space could be created to avoid violation of building and fire codes.

The suggestion was to remove the wall separating the court clerks' windows from the elevator lobby, as well as the wall of the server room and mediator office. The server room would need to have the head end access system equipment, dedicated air conditioning unit, and other electrical items moved, much closer to the server equipment and a new wall and door installed. This would result in the server room losing about 50% of its square footage. The mediator office would no longer be of sufficient size to use as an office, and there would be no privacy or separation between people at the clerks counter and other court visitors.

While the wall relocation / removal suggestion may create enough space to satisfy building and fire codes, there are other issues with locating the screening equipment on the fourth floor that need to be considered.

The space outside of the elevators on the fourth floor is used as a waiting area for the courtrooms, overflow waiting / queuing for the clerk's public service windows and is the de-facto jury assembly room, as no other room exists for jurors to await selection. Adding a screening station and staff to this already undersized space would create severe congestion especially during peak court times and jury selection days. The existing bench seating along both walls in this space would have to be removed, eliminating about 50% of available seating for those waiting outside of the courtrooms or for jury selection. This would result in a negative impact on the public as well as the court and its ability to provide access to services. There is no space available for queuing people waiting to be screened, since the space in front of the elevators has to be kept clear to allow access. The result of the lack of space would have people backed up into the elevators waiting to be screened, while others waited to use the elevators to leave the floor.

Another concern, related to the congestion is the difficulty of managing the pedestrian traffic in such a small area. People will be using the same elevators to come and go, yet those arriving on the fourth floor will not have been screened yet, and those waiting to leave the fourth floor have already been screened. The close proximity of screened and non-screened individuals to one another is a serious security concern.

Finally, security best practices suggest that screening stations, vehicle checkpoints, etc. be located as far as practical from the objective. Maintaining distance between screening and the objective increases the time to react to an incident, allowing for a more effective response.

Malcolm Franklin
Senior Manager
Office of Emergency Response and Security
May 23, 2011
Page 4

Locating the screening station on the fourth floor would allow a person with ill intent to reach their objective before being screened. If a person were to breach the screening area, they could be inside of a courtroom in seconds, with the bailiff having literally no warning.

Recommendations

Sheriff Rivero's concerns regarding unscreened individuals accessing the building through staff entrances and after hours are valid. I believe the concerns should be addressed specifically.

Policy should be developed that forbids any employee from using staff entrances without presenting their access card to the card reader. Each employee should "badge" in, even if several are coming through the door as a group. No employee should, under any circumstances, allow anyone to enter through the staff area that does not have an access badge, or is not being escorted. There should be appropriate consequences for those violating security policies. Employees need to understand that security is everyone's business and needs to be taken seriously.

Assuming that all doors on the fourth floor are locked at the end of the day, unless forced entry is used, the only place for one to conceal a weapon or contraband after hours is in the public hallways and elevator lobby on the 4th floor. It is common practice in many courts to perform a sweep / search of these types of areas each day before opening to the public. Such a search of the fourth floor would not take more than 10 minutes.

With the security screening station in its current location, the county is collaterally provided a great deal of security at no cost. The minor inconvenience of weapons screening is outweighed by the benefit of an effective security measure that helps deter the introduction of weapons or other contraband by the public into the building.

At this time, there does not appear to be a viable alternative to the current location of the weapons screening station.



Risk Assessment for Lakeport Courthouse, Lake County

MARCH 2011



ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE
OF THE COURTS

OFFICE OF EMERGENCY
RESPONSE AND SECURITY

Risk Assessment for Lake Courthouse

This Risk Assessment report with recommendations for architectural/physical and electronic security measures or elements was prepared by the Office of Emergency Response and Security (OERS). The report will be provided to and reviewed with the Office of Court Construction and Management project manager prior to finalization. Upon request, OERS can develop a security assessment that addresses operational policies and procedures.

City Profile

Lakeport is an incorporated city and the county seat of Lake County, located approximately 120 miles north of San Francisco. Lakeport sits on the western shore of Clear Lake, the largest natural fresh water lake in California and a popular tourist attraction. Lakeport has a year round population of approximately 5,230 and the surrounding regional population is estimated at 35,000. These population figures grow significantly during the summer tourist season, and are also affected by the large number of seasonal farm workers employed by the region's agricultural industry. The Lakeport economy is based principally on tourism, agriculture, and government employment. Lakeport has a moderate climate with hot dry summers and cool wet winters, and an elevation of 1,355 feet above sea level. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, the city of Lakeport has an area of 2.7 square miles. Lakeport is served by its own police and fire departments, and the nearest 24 hour emergency medical care is provided by Sutter Lakeside Hospital, located within the city.

Site Profile

The new Lakeport Courthouse will be constructed on a 5.8 acre piece of land located east of Highway 29 and the George C. Hoberg Vista Point, south of Lakeport Boulevard, west of the Lakeview Shopping Center, and north of what is locally known as "Prayer Hill," a small mountain overlooking the site. The site is located on a hill, with the courthouse location being approximately 20 feet below the Vista Point. The courthouse will be accessed via a connecting drive to Lakeport Boulevard.



Figure 1. The Lakeport Boulevard building site. The court will be located on in the flat open area just right of the Chamber of Commerce. Lakeport Boulevard is the road directly above the site.

Issues of General Security

Issues include asset identification and threat identification.

Asset Identification

Assets include the following.

Users of the Facility

- Administrative, judicial, and custodial staff who operate the facility;
- Lake County Sheriff’s Department staff assigned to provide court security;
- Attorneys and administrators;
- General public; and
- Defendants and plaintiffs.

Information

- Intellectual property, comprising civil and criminal court records, retained in electronic and hard copy formats;
- Information regarding court proceedings and security policies and procedures;
- Information regarding the construction of the facility, materials used, and security system design; and
- Information-technology systems and secure networks.

Equipment

- Operational facilities equipment such as generators, Heating Ventilating and Air Conditioning (HVAC), and security equipment; and
- Technology equipment, such as desktop computers and laptops, copiers, and audiovisual equipment.

Infrastructure

- Electrical, telephone/data, water, sewage systems, and other systems.

Processes

- Court cases, including adoption, family law, juvenile, criminal, civil small claims, and probate cases;
- Processes such as paying fines, obtaining records, and hosting community activities; and
- Cash handled and exchanged for fines or fees.

Threat Identification

Threats include people and events that disrupt court operations, causing bodily harm to people while at the facility or damage that results in significant loss or diminished ability to operate the court. Threats are typically categorized as natural, accidental, or criminal. See the tables in Attachment 1 for more information.

1. **Known prior threats to the court building that this facility will replace**

There are no specific, significant threats facing the current court facility.

2. **Known prior threats to other government facilities near this court building site**

None. There have been minor acts of vandalism reported in the surrounding area, but nothing that indicates a pattern of targeted activity.

3. **Groups operating in the area that may pose a particular threat (e.g., domestic terrorist groups, tax protesters, etc.) and known tactics of these groups**

Criminal street gangs are active within the City of Lakeport and surrounding Lake County area. The two primary gang influences in Lakeport are Mexican American gangs such as the Sureños, and Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs (OMG) such as the Vagos Motorcycle Club, the Misfits, and the Hells Angels.

In addition to these gangs, there are politically motivated organizations operating in the area such as extreme right-wing, antigovernment, and anti-tax groups such as the “Constitutionalists” or “Sovereign Citizens.”

Members of all of these groups have been known to use violence against government agencies and officers, rivals, and the public. Methods of attack include everything from physical assault and vandalism, firearms attack, arson, and kidnapping to use of sophisticated explosive devices.

4. **Threats common to the site of the court building (criminal/environmental/other)**

A 2009 crime index¹ gives the city of Lakeport a total crime risk score of 403.4. This is above the crime index score for the United States, which is 319.2. The most prevalent

¹ City-Data.com, “Lakeport, California,” www.city-data.com/city/Lakeport-California.html (as of March 3, 2011).

risk listed in the crime index for Lakeport is the risk of theft, with 3,481 incidents of theft per 100,000 residents recorded in 2009.

It should be noted that the crime statistics researched for this report compile figures from eight crime categories: murder, rape, robbery, assault, burglary, theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson. Actual crimes committed in a subject area will most likely be higher as certain crimes are not included in the statistical data. Examples of the types of crimes that may occur in the area but are not included in the statistical data include vandalism, drug trafficking, prostitution, and weapons possession.

It should further be noted that the OERS team conducting the site survey observed little to no visible criminal activity, no vandalism, very little refuse, no abandoned vehicles in the area, and a very large presence of law enforcement. The court site and surrounding area appear to be low crime areas.

Identification of Vulnerabilities

A map of the preferred site showing the vulnerabilities of this location is below.

1. Vehicular access along high-speed route directly to the site

This site has a single point of vehicle access, a drive to the north connecting the site to Lakeport Boulevard. Traffic will be forced to make a 90 degree turn left or right off of Lakeport Boulevard when entering the site, eliminating the ability for a vehicle to use this major thoroughfare to build speed for a ramming attack. The current plans also call for a driveway from the street to the parking area. The addition of turns to this driveway, as well as the presence of speed bumps, will make it difficult to build speed while transiting from the street to the building.



Figure 3. Looking west on Lakeport Boulevard towards Highway 29



Figure 2. View from building site on future driveway towards Highway 29

2. Adjacent high rise buildings

There are no adjacent high rise buildings, and there are no current plans to construct a building that would look down on the proposed court house.

3. Other area features (e.g., terrain, landscape, adjacent physical structures) that present vulnerabilities to a court building located on the site

There are two adjacent features that present a security threat to the proposed court site. These threats are the George C. Hoberg Vista Point, located to the west, and Prayer Hill, located to the south.

The Vista Point is a publicly accessible parking and picnic area immediately west of the proposed courthouse. This site sits 20 feet above the courthouse and provides a platform to survey the court building and parking area, as well as an area that could be used in a rifle attack against the court.




Figure 4. The Chamber of Commerce building and adjacent parking area



Figure 5. View of the courthouse site from Vista Point

Prayer Hill is a publicly accessible open space located to the south of the court site. There are no fences, gates, or signs restricting entry to this mountain area, and it presents a vantage point over the court site that could be used for surveillance or a rifle attack. In addition to the terrain elevation, there is a communications tower located atop this hill that provides further opportunity for surveillance and/or attack.



Figures 6, 7, and 8. From left to right: view of Prayer Hill from Vista Point, view of court site from Prayer Hill, and communications tower atop Prayer Hill

To mitigate the threat of exposure from Vista Point and Prayer Hill, the parking areas, courtrooms, entrances, and secure areas facing west and south should be covered and windows should be bullet resistant.

4. Other government or private offices nearby that may be subject to attack

There are no government offices located near the proposed court site. The city of Lakeport has proposed building a fire station across Lakeport Boulevard to the north of the court site. There is no information that suggests the addition of a fire house will pose a security threat to the court site.

5. Susceptibility to natural hazards (e.g., floods, fires, etc.)

The court site is not particularly susceptible to fires or floods—not to a level requiring measures that exceed the *California Trial Court Facilities Standards*. Seismic concerns are addressed in section 12.4 of the *Trial Court Design Standards*, and are not within the scope of this assessment.

6. Site proximity to potentially hazardous sites (e.g., chemical plant, oil refinery, rail line, etc.)

There are no known hazardous materials sites in close proximity to the building site.

Specific Risks, Mitigation Strategies, and Recommendations

Specific risks and mitigation strategies are listed below with OERS recommendations.

Criminal—Disgruntled employee with firearm

The most difficult threat to mitigate is disgruntled employees who intend violence, because they are known to building and security staff and may not be perceived as a threat until they act. This threat is best mitigated by providing entrance screening stations that offer both adequate equipment and sufficient room for trained security staff to perform weapons screening for all those who enter the court, whether they be employees or visitors. Operationally, the use of entry screening equipment, coupled with the enforcement of strong policies and procedures requiring all court staff, attorneys, contractors/vendors, and the general public to utilize the screening station staffed by court security officers, is the best mitigation for this threat. Only those authorized to carry firearms and other weapons within the court building should be allowed to bypass screening for dangerous weapons and materials.

Criminal—Attack by person(s) with firearm

This threat is best mitigated by ensuring that all external entry points to the building (such as doors and windows) are monitored and controlled by the security system (cameras/access control/alarms), allowing a breach in perimeter security to be identified and responded to immediately by court security. Operationally, this threat is best addressed with strong enforcement of policies and procedures that require screening of all persons entering the court.

Criminal—Long range attack by rifleman

Mitigation of an attack by a long range rifleman is best accomplished by locating the windows near the ceiling in courtrooms and court staff areas. This will allow natural light into the room while preventing direct observation of court staff and activities from outside the building. The threat of a rifle attack on a judicial officer is further mitigated by the use of bullet-resistant glass, when needed, in judges' chambers and all courtrooms. Also, the judges' parking, sally port entrances/exits, and any other area where judicial officers and inmates are present should be fenced and covered to eliminate visibility from elevated positions.

Given the particular vulnerabilities of this site to rifle attack from the prominent positions to the west and south, the judges' parking, sally port entrances and exits, and any other areas where judicial officers and inmates are present should ideally be located to the north or east, or at least be fenced and covered to eliminate visibility from these elevated positions.

Natural—Earthquakes

The new courthouse is located in a seismically active area. Seismic concerns are addressed in section 12.4 of the *Trial Court Design Standards* and not within the scope of this assessment.

Accidental—Loss of building services

This threat to the facility is usually caused by a vehicle striking a power pole or an adjacent construction project digging up water or sewage lines. These incidents result in a loss of building services resulting in closure of the building and have financial consequences resulting in staff overtime and rescheduling of court activities. Mitigation strategies may include providing certain redundant building systems, as determined in the Feasibility Study Phase of the Project.

Criminal—Disgruntled employee or contractor sabotage

Sabotage, such as disabling computers, access control, or alarm systems or doing intentional damage to the facility and its systems, is difficult to deter and typically not detected immediately. The best mitigation strategy includes a robust access control system, limiting access to critical information and systems to authorized personnel, archiving backups of critical information, including systems programming, and cross training personnel to limit knowledge silos.

Criminal—Arson

This threat is best mitigated through the use of good external lighting, video surveillance, and recording camera views of the exterior of the building to deter arson attempts. In addition, the building should be equipped with automatic fire detection and sprinkler systems when required by the *California Building Code* and *California Fire Code*.

Accidental—Catastrophic building system failure

This is best mitigated by locating primary and backup systems apart from each other by at least 50 feet, or further if possible. Mitigation strategies may also include providing certain redundant building systems, as determined in the Feasibility Study Phase of the Project.

Criminal—Hand-held explosives (grenades, pipe bombs, suicide vests)

While this threat has occurred at courts in California, it is very rare. This threat is best mitigated through the use of video surveillance and recording of camera views of the exterior of the building to deter attempts. Crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) principles should be applied to increase lighting and minimize areas without natural surveillance, which will deter criminal activities.

Criminal—Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIED)

While these can be potentially catastrophic to the building and people, the likelihood of occurrence is extremely low. To protect against the possibility of this event occurring in the future, vehicle barriers should be provided to keep vehicles a minimum of 25 feet from the building. The 25-foot setback should be considered as a minimum and should be expanded further whenever possible.

Criminal—Transients at facility perimeter

New facilities should be designed so there is a minimum amount of usable space around the perimeter. There should be no areas on the perimeter of new facilities that could be used for shelter from the elements, camping, storing personal belongings, cooking, or any other activity commonly associated with the transients. This recommendation excludes the addition of necessary space for queuing at the entrance area of the building.

Summary of findings

The findings and recommended mitigation measures discussed in this report include strategies related to architectural elements as well as physical and electronic security. Identified risks and vulnerabilities can be reduced further, using appropriate mitigation strategies. This report discusses proposed project security elements, including the rationale for proposals that exceed or do not meet the facilities standards (see *California Trial Court Facilities Standards*, as amended March 1, 2010).

The following security features should be included in the design of this facility:

- To mitigate the threat of exposure from higher elevation (high ground to the west and to the south), parking areas and entrances facing these areas should be covered and windows should be bullet resistant.

The following table lists security measures from the *California Trial Court Facilities Standards*, as amended March 1, 2010, which may be necessary based upon the findings of this Risk Assessment report. Refer to the standards for additional security measures that are mandated for any court building.

Measure	Necessary Yes/No	Comments
Parking Security		
Co-locate parking and service/ delivery entries	N/A	
Provide cameras at parking entries and exits	Y	Required to effectively monitor activity in and out of public and secure areas
Parking adjacent to courthouse must be set back from building by 25 feet (at minimum)	Y	50 foot minimum setback recommended
Site Security		
Provide physical barriers to maintain building setback	Y	Barriers at the outermost point on the property establish the maximum effective setback distance. Barriers also give the perception the target has been hardened and is difficult to attack. Barriers should withstand the impact of a 4,000 pound vehicle travelling at 30 miles per hour.
Provide video surveillance of building entrances and perimeter	Y	
Building Layout		
Place unoccupied spaces at the lower perimeter levels	N/A	Recommended to minimize harm to persons and critical functions from ground level attacks
Stack critical areas and supporting utilities	Y	Recommended to simplify infrastructure routing and protection
Judges' Chambers		
Provide bullet-resistant glazing (Class III)	Y	Recommended for Judges' chambers, courtrooms, critical areas facing west or south
Lobby and Waiting Area		
Physically isolate unscreened lobby area	Y	Recommended to minimize the impact incidents in this area would have on the main structure
Service/Delivery/Mailroom		
Provide camera surveillance of lobby and secured areas of building	Y	Required to provide a comprehensive security program and an additional deterrent to unwanted behavior
Physically isolate the service area	Y	High risk areas should be isolated from critical spaces to the extent possible.

Measure	Necessary Yes/No	Comments
Service/Delivery/Mailroom		
Provide package weapons scanner in mailroom	N	If mailroom exists
Locate critical and occupied space at least 25-feet away from service delivery/mailroom or harden/ physically isolate the service area	Y	
Security Control Center		
Provide control center to operate and monitor electronic security systems	N	Not required for a court of this size
Duplicate functions of in-custody holding in building security control room	N/A	
Building Envelope		
Provide bullet-resistant glazed windows in chambers	Y	
Provide forced-entry protection on first floor	Y	
Monitor exterior glass with intrusion alarm system	Y	Glass-break alarm only
Provide blast-resistant laminated glazing and mullions to meet security requirements	N	
Mechanical Electrical and Fire Protection Systems		
Locate main and backup systems as far apart from each other as possible, a minimum of 50 feet	Y	Required to reduce the likelihood a single incident can disable both main and backup power systems
Isolate mailroom HVAC zone	N/A	No mail room
Provide mailroom purging system	N/A	No mail room
Provide redundancy of critical systems	Y	Required to reduce the likelihood a single incident can disable both main and backup systems

Attachment 1—Risk Estimates

Based upon historical court or county-specific threat data, known groups operating in the Lakeport area, or other information about possible threats to the court, OERS has evaluated the likelihood of occurrence of the incidents identified in Table 1 and the impact of loss related to those incidents. The results are reflected in Table 2.

Table 1. What Are the Identified Risks?

1. Criminal—Attack by person(s) with firearm (including disgruntled employees)
2. Criminal—Other violence resulting in physical harm to judicial officer, staff, juror, witness, litigant, etc.
3. Criminal—Explosive device/arson in/on court property (including pipe bombs, VBIED, and IED)
4. Criminal—Attempted violence to judicial officer, court staff, juror, witness, litigant, etc.
5. Criminal—Long-range rifle attack
6. Criminal—Inmate escape
7. Criminal—Hostage-situation
8. Criminal—Sabotage by employee/contractor
9. Accidental—Fire
10. Accidental—Catastrophic system failure
11. Accidental—Loss of critical building services (power/water/gas/sewage)
12. Natural—Earthquake

Table 2. What Are the Level of Risk Estimates?

Impact of Loss	Likelihood of Occurrence			
	Very High	High	Moderate	Low
Devastating				3
Severe			1, 5, 9, 11	6, 7, 8, 10, 12
Noticeable			2, 4	
Minor				

1st Priority

2nd Priority

3rd Priority